

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The Department of State

bulletin

Vol. XXXIV, No. 862

January 2, 1956

BRIGHTER HOPES FOR PEACE ● *Remarks by President Eisenhower* 3

PROGRESS REPORT ON ATOMS-FOR-PEACE PROGRAM ● *Correspondence Between the President and Morehead Patterson* 4

U.S. GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE TO AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD ● *by Ben H. Thibodeaux* 22

AIDING ARAB REFUGEES
Statements by Ambassador James J. Wadsworth 31
Text of U.N. Resolution 33

For index see inside back cover

The Department of State bulletin

VOL. XXXIV, No. 862 • PUBLICATION 6225

January 2, 1956

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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Brighter Hopes for Peace

Remarks by President Eisenhower[1]

My fellow Americans at home and across the seas, my fellow men and women of every nation:

For hundreds of millions of us, Christmas symbolizes our deepest aspirations for peace and for good will among men.

For me, this particular Christmas has a very special meaning and has brought to me, really, new understandings of people.

During the past 3 months my family and I have received literally thousands—tens of thousands—of messages. Each of these has borne a sentence of good wishes and good will for health and happiness to us both. It has been heart-warming evidence that human understanding and human sympathy can surmount every obstacle—even those obstacles that some governments sometimes seem to raise in the attempt to divide us.

Now the free world is just coming to the close of a very significant year, one in which we have worked hard and sometimes effectively for peace. Now the facts of today, of course, do not measure up to the high hopes of the free world, the hopes by which we have lived and which we have long entertained. But this Christmas is, nevertheless, brighter in its background and its promise for the future than any we have known in recent years. I think it is even better than last year, and you will remember that Christmas was the first one in many years that was not marred by the tragic incidents of war.

Now peace is the right of every human being. It is hungered for by all of the peoples of the earth. So we can be sure that tonight in the fullness of our hearts and in the spirit of the season, as we utter a simple prayer for peace, we will be joined by the multitudes of the earth.

Those multitudes will include rulers as well as the humblest citizens of lands, the great and the meek, the proud and the poor, the successful and the failures, the dispirited and the hopeful.

Now each of those prayers will of course differ according to the characteristics and the personality of the individual uttering it, but running through every single one of those prayers will be a thought something of this kind:

May each of us strive to do our best to bring about better understanding in the world. And may the infinite peace from above live with us and be ours forever, and may we live in the confident hope that it will come.

And so it is tonight in that hope, which must never die from the earth, which we must cling to and cherish and nurture and work for, that I light the National Community Christmas Tree at the Pageant of Peace in Washington.

To each of you—wherever you may be—from Mrs. Eisenhower and me: a very Merry Christmas!

[1] Broadcast by radio and television from Gettysburg on Dec. 18 on the occasion of the lighting of the National Community Christmas Tree at Washington, D.C.

Progress Report on Atoms-for-Peace Program

On November 30, Morehead Patterson, U.S. Representative for International Atomic Energy Agency Negotiations, sent to President Eisenhower a letter of resignation to which he attached a report on his activities during the past year. Following are the texts of the letters exchanged by the President and Mr. Patterson.

White House (Gettysburg) press release dated December 6

THE PRESIDENT TO MR. PATTERSON

December 3, 1955

Dear Mr. Patterson: I am deeply grateful to you for the services you have contributed to the government over the past year, acting as United States Representative "to implement the policy of the United States looking toward the establishment of an International Atomic Energy Agency." Knowing that you undertook this work at great personal sacrifice, I must accede to your wishes and herewith accept your resignation.

The report you submitted to me of your activities for the period, which accompanied your letter of November thirtieth, is immensely valuable, and will, I know, be most helpful to all working in this field.

I shall hope to see you, together with the Secretary of State, soon after my return to Washington, to discuss with you means of implementing the work you have so ably carried on, and to convey to you, in person, my appreciation of the important contribution you have made in this vital field.

With warm regard,
Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower

Mr. Morehead Patterson,
American Machine and Foundry Company,
511 Fifth Avenue,
New York 22, New York.

MR. PATTERSON TO THE PRESIDENT

November 30, 1955

Dear Mr. President: On November 4, 1954 you appointed me United States Representative "to implement the policy of the United States looking toward the establishment of an International Atomic Energy Agency." In your letter of appointment you said that "this is a subject of vital and deep concern to the United States, and to the peace of the world."

Today, after twelve months, I am happy to report that we have reached what I believe is an important landmark in this vital aspect of your "Atoms for Peace" program.

The draft Statute of an International Agency, agreeable to the eight negotiating States, has been submitted to all eighty-four States eligible for initial membership in the Agency. The First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly has unanimously adopted a resolution noting with satisfaction the progress that has been made.

Additionally, the program for securing bilateral agreements for cooperation for research reactors is now well underway. Twenty-four agreements under this program were initialed in 1955 and nineteen have become effective.

I feel that the major contribution which I can make to your program under my assignment has been completed. Accordingly, I would appreciate being relieved of my duties at this time and I herewith submit my resignation.

Attached to this letter is a brief report of my detailed activities during the past year.

It has been a rare privilege to be associated with your administration in the accomplishment of this task and I wish to express my deep appreciation for the unfailing support and understanding which you and your staff, as well as the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State, have extended to me. To have had the opportu-

nity of working under you in the interests of your challenging hopes and plans for world peace has been a most gratifying experience.

Very respectfully,

MOREHEAD PATTERSON

[Enclosure]

Summary of Progress Report

During the past year the United States, in negotiations with seven other States (Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Portugal, Union of South Africa, and the United Kingdom), has developed a draft Statute of an International Atomic Energy Agency, acceptable to all eight negotiating States.

The draft Statute was turned over to the Soviet Union on a confidential basis on July 29, 1955, and its comments were requested. It was distributed by the United States on behalf of the negotiating States, also on a confidential basis, to all eighty-four States, Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies, on August 22, 1955. Comments on the Statute were requested from all States and many have been received. These comments indicate that differences in viewpoint as disclosed to date are mainly concentrated on a few points such as: a) composition and manner of selection of the Board of Governors of the Agency; b) relationship of the Agency to the United Nations; c) procedures for approval of the budget and prorating among States of operating expenses.

The United States and the other negotiating States have sought to give full consideration to the viewpoints expressed by all of the States. It would not, however, be feasible to include within the negotiating group all States which have made comments. A group of that size could not effectively work out the technical details of a Statute. Also a detailed discussion of the Statute in the General Assembly was undesirable at this stage.

On October 21, the United States called for an Operating Level Meeting to consider further the draft Statute. The United States asked the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, India, and Brazil in addition to the original negotiating group to participate in this Meeting. Thus the phase of the negotiations which I have conducted has now been merged with the negotiations with the USSR, heretofore reserved for the attention of the Secretary of State. The new group will seek to reconcile differences of viewpoint and to produce a Statute which will be acceptable to as many States as possible.

On many fundamental matters all States are thinking basically along the same lines. The differences of viewpoint, while substantial, seem capable of reconciliation. The unanimous approval by the Tenth General Assembly of the resolution dealing with the peaceful uses of the atom highlights the great progress that has already been made.

Twenty-four Bilateral Agreements for Cooperation between the United States and other States, as provided by Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, were initialed by approximately June 15, 1955. Nineteen of these Agreements were initialed in time to become effective prior to the adjournment of the Congress. These Agreements permit the States entering into them to secure from the United States the fuel necessary for the operation of research reactors.

Progress Report on International Atomic Energy Agency Negotiations

On November 4, 1954 I received the following communication from the President of the United States:

DEAR MR. PATTERSON: I am happy to appoint you United States Representative, with the personal rank of Ambassador, to implement the policy of the United States looking toward the establishment of an International Atomic Energy Agency.

As you know, this is a subject of vital and deep concern to the interests of the United States, and to the peace of the world. I join all Americans in wishing you Godspeed in this undertaking.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

The following is a progress report of my activities for the year during which I have served.

I. *Discussions Abroad*

In December 1954, at the suggestion of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee of the Congress, I joined certain of its members in visiting a number of European countries to determine the international response to our "Atoms for Peace" program. In Turkey, Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, France, and Switzerland, I consulted the individuals in government and in business chiefly concerned with atomic energy programs. It was apparent that the prospective demand for power in all these countries far exceeded their conventional fuel resources and that all of them would seek as rapidly as possible to develop atomic power programs. It was clear that they wished to cooperate and exchange information immediately with the United States. They preferred not to wait for the creation of an International Agency.

II. *Negotiations for an International Atomic Energy Agency*

The Secretary of State in his opening statement to the Ninth United Nations General Assembly on September 23, 1954[1] stated that the U.S. efforts "have been and will be directed primarily toward the following ends: 1) The creation of an International Agency whose initial membership will include nations from all regions of the world. It is hoped that such an Agency will start its work *as early as next year*." The view of the United States that the Agency should come into being as soon as possible became the view of the United Nations when the General Assembly by a unanimous vote passed a resolution expressing "the hope that the International Atomic Energy Agency will be established without delay."[2]

This raised a basic issue—how it would be possible to solve the many complicated problems and troublesome details and at the same time establish an Agency at an early date. It was my conclusion that the draft Statute of the Agency should be a broad constitutional framework—a

[1] BULLETIN of Oct. 4, 1954, p. 471.

[2] *Ibid.*, Dec. 13, 1954, p. 919.

statement of general principles rather than a point-by-point revelation of details—which would leave the Agency free to develop primarily as an operating Agency after its creation. The Agency should be led and operated by experts in the field and administrators qualified to meet and cope with the uncharted and evolving problems which will have to be solved. I proceeded on this basis, bearing constantly in mind the examples of the International Bank and the International Monetary Fund as organizations which have carried out great responsibilities in a businesslike and successful manner.

Among the problems which could be dealt with after the establishment of the Agency were the location of its headquarters and the functions it would assume under its broad grant of authority.

It was clear that the membership as a whole could not deal with the day-to-day technical problems which would confront the Agency. Therefore, we provided in the Statute for a Board of Governors with broad authority to make most of the necessary decisions for the Agency. The membership as a whole—described in the Statute as the General Conference—maintains its control over the Board of Governors through election of a number of its members and through complete control over the purse. The budget must be approved by a two-thirds vote of the General Conference.

The provisions of the Statute dealing with composition and selection of the Board of Governors were designed to reflect the realities of the international situation. It is clear that for a number of years the Agency will secure its fissionable materials, its source materials and its technical skill from a very small number of States. It would be unrealistic to disregard this situation in developing a formula for composition and selection of the Board of Governors of the Agency. We studied a number of methods of meeting this situation. One possibility was to provide a system of weighted voting in the Board of Governors dependent upon the size of contributions. This was not feasible because of the technical difficulties of evaluating contributions.

Another possible method of meeting this situation was to provide that certain countries with the most advanced atomic energy programs should be permanent members of the Board of Governors. This did not seem desirable for two reasons: Over a period of years quite a number of additional States are likely to develop important atomic energy programs. Furthermore the possibility exists that a State designated as a permanent member would fail to make a substantial contribution to the Agency.

The formula which we developed, while it necessarily could not fully satisfy everyone, seems to me a sound one. It places appropriate emphasis upon contributions of fissionable materials, of technical skills, and of source materials. It contemplates extensive changes in the composition of the Board as other States developed their resources of uranium and thorium and their atomic energy programs. It provides substantial representation for countries which would be in a position to contribute neither fissionable materials nor source materials nor technical skills.

I have gone into some detail in connection with this provision of the Statute since it was far the most difficult problem which faced the negotiating group.

Generally as the negotiating group clarified the problems and visualized in detail how the Agency would operate, solutions of other problems suggested themselves.

Procedurally the negotiations developed somewhat as follows: The United States prepared a first draft of the Statute taking into consideration suggestions received from other negotiating States and also from the United Nations General Assembly debates. This draft was then submitted to the negotiating States on March 29, 1955. During April and May the United States discussed this draft with all the negotiating States and also received further comments from interested agencies of the United States Government which had not participated in the original drafting.

After a thorough discussion, it developed that there was sufficient unanimity among all negotiating States so that substantially all of the suggested changes could be reconciled and incorporated into a new draft of the Statute.[3] This new draft was transmitted to the Soviet Union on a confidential basis on July 29, 1955, and its comments were requested. It was distributed by the United States on behalf of the negotiating States also on a confidential basis to all eighty-four States Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies on August 22, 1955. Comments on the Statute were requested from all States.

Many comments have been received either through communications to the State Department or through statements made in the recent debate on this subject in the Tenth General Assembly. These comments indicate that differences in viewpoint as disclosed to date are mainly concentrated on a few points such as: a) composition and manner of selection of the Board of Governors of the Agency; b) relationship of the Agency to the United Nations; c) procedures for approval of the budget and prorating among States of operating expenses.

The United States and the other negotiating States have sought to give full consideration to the viewpoints expressed by all of the States. It would not, however, be feasible to include within the negotiating group all States which have made comments. A group of that size could not effectively work out the technical details of a Statute. Also a detailed discussion of the Statute in the General Assembly was undesirable at this stage.

On October 21, the United States called for an Operating Level Meeting to consider further the draft Statute. The United States asked the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, India, and Brazil in addition to the original negotiating group to participate in this Meeting. The USSR on October 1 had suggested such a meeting with the USSR and Czechoslovakia added to the original eight negotiating States. Thus the phase of the negotiations which I have conducted has now been merged with the negotiations with the USSR, heretofore reserved for the attention of the Secretary of State. The new group will seek to reconcile differences of viewpoint and to produce a Statute which will be acceptable to as many States as possible.

[3] For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 24, 1955, p. 666.

[4] *Ibid.*, Nov. 14, 1955, p. 798.

On many fundamental matters all States are thinking basically along the same lines. The differences of viewpoint, while substantial, seem capable of reconciliation. The unanimous approval by the Tenth General Assembly of the resolution dealing with the peaceful uses of the atom[5] highlights the great progress that has already been made.

II. *Bilateral Agreements for Cooperation*

The informal discussions among the eight States participating in the drafting of a Statute for an International Agency had by December 1954 revealed that the drafting of a Statute of an International Agency satisfactory even to the eight States initially participating in the negotiations, would in itself be a considerable task. To secure the views of all other States would certainly take a year. Therefore immediate achievements in advancing the Atoms-for-Peace program were more likely to result from bilateral agreements for cooperation.

The United States Atomic Energy Commission had already embarked upon extensive programs to share the benefits of the atom particularly through distribution of radio-isotopes, through furnishing extensive libraries of unclassified information to countries in all areas of the world and through extensive programs for training foreign students in the United States. This cooperation involving exchange of neither classified material nor fissionable materials was possible without formal agreements for cooperation.

A further approach promising immediate results was a program for the installation of research reactors abroad. These research reactors would furnish training in the type of problems that would be encountered on a larger scale in the operation of power reactors. In addition, these research reactors would permit production abroad of a number of useful isotopes.

In order for countries to receive from the United States the atomic fuel necessary for the operation of the research reactors, it is necessary for them to enter into Agreements for Cooperation as provided by Article 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The discussions with several States which had already expressed an interest in such reactors disclosed that conditions and requirements in most countries were sufficiently similar so that a standard form of agreement could be prepared. Accordingly, the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission developed such an agreement which was first made available on March 22, 1955.

It was necessary that the Agreements for Cooperation be negotiated and initialed by approximately June 15 lest the adjournment of Congress in early August might make compliance with the thirty day waiting provision of Article 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 impossible until February of next year. The Missions in Washington of thirty-four States were contacted and twenty-four such Bilateral Agreements were initialed. Nineteen of these Agreements were initialed in time to become effective prior to the adjournment of Congress. (Annex I)

IV. *Geneva Technical Conference*

I attended the UN Technical Conference in Geneva from August 7 to August 20, accompanied by my Special Assistant. We discussed informally problems relating to the International Atomic Energy Agency with a large number of delegations.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 801; Dec. 19, 1955, p. 1030.

ANNEX I

Missions Contacted

1. Argentina
2. Australia
3. Austria
4. Brazil
5. Burma
6. Chile
7. China
8. Colombia
9. Denmark
10. Egypt
11. Finland
12. France
13. Greece
14. India
15. Indonesia
16. Ireland
17. Israel
18. Italy
19. Japan
20. Korea
21. Lebanon
22. Mexico
23. Netherlands
24. New Zealand
25. Pakistan
26. Peru
27. Philippines
28. Portugal
29. Spain
30. Switzerland
31. Thailand
32. Turkey
33. Union of South Africa
34. Venezuela

Bilateral Agreements for Cooperation Initialed
(Research Reactors)

Date Initialed	*Country*	*Signed*
5/3/55	1. Turkey[6]	6/10/55
5/31/55	2. Brazil	8/3/55
5/31/55	3. Colombia	7/19/55
6/2/55	4. Lebanon	7/18/55
6/3/55	5. Israel	7/12/55
6/7/55	6. Argentina	7/29/55
6/7/55	7. Spain	7/19/55
6/7/55	8. Italy	7/28/55
6/10/55	9. Denmark	7/25/55
6/10/55	10. Switzerland	7/18/55
6/14/55	11. Portugal	7/21/55
6/14/55	12. China	7/18/55
6/14/55	13. Netherlands	7/18/55
6/14/55	14. Philippines	7/27/55
6/14/55	15. Venezuela	7/21/55
6/15/55	16. Pakistan	8/11/55
6/20/55	17. Chile	8/8/55
6/21/55	18. Japan	11/14/55
6/22/55	19. Greece	8/4/55
6/24/55	20. Uruguay[7]	
7/1/55	21. Peru[7]	
7/1/55	22. Korea[7]	
7/1/55	23. Sweden[7]	
7/11/55	24. Thailand[7]	

Letters of Credence

James C. Hagerty, press secretary to the President, announced on December 13 that the President had that day received the credentials of the newly appointed Ambassador of the Argentine Republic, Adolfo A. Vicchi.

[6] For text, see *ibid.*, July 11, 1955, p. 55.

[7] These agreements did not become effective prior to the adjournment of Congress.

Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference

Press release 703 dated December 20

Secretary Dulles: Before we plunge into things, I would like to say as we approach the end of the year that I greatly appreciate the meetings we have had together, the courtesy that you have shown me, and I wish you all a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year. I will probably not be here the last Tuesday of the year because I expect to be in New York over the New Year period. I think our meetings have been good and have been productive. I have tried to make them so, and I appreciate your cooperation.

Soviet Offers of Economic Aid

I have a prepared statement here which I thought it might be useful to make, as indicating our point of view toward the reported offers by the Soviet Union of economic aid in different parts of the world. It reads as follows:[1]

The United States seeks no monopoly in rendering economic assistance. We welcome any grant of economic aid which invigorates less developed countries and makes them more free and more independent. This has been United States policy for many years. Since World War II, we have given substantial economic aid to many free nations. Not one of them has, on that account, lost any particle of freedom or independence.

If the Soviet Union were to follow our example, that would be gratifying. Imitation is the sincerest flattery. But there is likely to be a question as to whether the Soviet really seeks to promote the vigorous independence of free nations. That question arises because of the long Soviet record in absorbing other countries. Also, the Soviet Union is not, like the United States, a country which has economic surpluses. The Soviet Union is a deficit area. Most of the Russian people are without things which we regard as necessities of life. The captive peoples of Eastern Europe, who once enjoyed high standards of living, have been economically squeezed by the Soviet Union so that their present living standards are deplorable.

It would seem unnatural for the Soviet rulers to provide economic aid to other peoples when the peoples they already rule are themselves in dire need.

We hope that Soviet economic aid is not offered as a Trojan horse to penetrate, and then take over, independent countries.

The leaders of countries which are receiving Soviet offers are, of course, aware of this political danger. They are for the most part statesmen of experience. They have won political successes in making their own countries independent, and I believe they can be counted upon to be alert to defend that independence.

Now, if you have questions.

Q. Can you tell us, Mr. Secretary, what the King of Afghanistan said to the President and what the President said to the King in their exchange of correspondence?

A. No, I can't disclose the contents of the exchange. There was an exchange of rather general character of mutual good wishes and regard on the part of the Heads of the two Governments. But I can't give you the contents of the messages because they have not been made public by either side.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Lord Mayor of West Berlin has asked the West to give Moscow direct warning if it attempts to interfere with the four-power status, and he asked that the West should get clarification at a higher level on the status. Could you comment on that, sir?

A. Well, I think that the United States and the other two Western powers that are in Berlin have made their position quite clear, as has the Federal Republic of Germany. We possess rights in relation to Berlin which derive from the wartime agreements. We do not believe that the Soviet Union can evade those obligations by setting up a puppet regime in East Germany and East Berlin and claim that it now has authority. We plan to hold the Soviet Union to its very formal and clear obligations with respect to Berlin and access to Berlin, and I think that this position has been made very clear. It was underlined at the last meeting of the NATO Council, which we had in Paris last week. You will recall that the communique which was issued by the NATO Council dealt among other things, with the situation in Berlin.

[1] The following five paragraphs were also released separately as press release 701 dated Dec. 20.

[2] BULLETIN of Dec. 26, 1955, p. 1047. For U.S. protest on the detention of four Americans in the Soviet sector of Berlin on Nov. 27, see *ibid.*, Dec. 19, 1955, p. 1012.

Level of Requests for U.S. Foreign Aid Funds

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the economic aid field, the administration appears to be asking an increase next year of close to $200,000,000, as well as a much larger increase, at least in obligations, on the military side of foreign aid. Can you explain a little of the administration's thinking behind these increases?

A. I have tried to get some of the figures here and it might be useful if I would give you the figures, at least as approximations, because it is very easy to become confused between expenditures and appropriations and requests for appropriations. When figures which don't correspond are actually contrasted, it is apt to create confusion. So I have put this down; is this being mimeographed or not?

Mr. White:[3] Yes.

A. Perhaps it is useful to have it mimeographed because figures are illusive, at least to me, if I only hear them.[4]

At the last session, the administration asked the Congress for about $1,800,000,000 for the economic part of our mutual security program. The Congress granted about $1,700,000,000. For the military part of the program, the administration asked for $1,700,000,000 approximately, although it contemplated spending at a rate of about $2,500,000,000. Congress granted about $1,000,000,000. The reason why both the administration's request and the congressional appropriation for military aid were below the current rate of spending was that there was a large backlog of past appropriations for military aid.

This year it is expected that the administration will ask for about $1,900,000,000 for the economic part of our mutual security program. This is about $100,000,000 more than was asked for last year and about $200,000,000 more than Congress appropriated last year. We shall ask for the appropriations needed to maintain the military part of the program at approximately the present rate. I understand that the military backlog has now been reduced to a point where it will probably be necessary to request an appropriation of about $3,000,000,000 in order to sustain the military aid program at the current level of spending.

In other words, the mutual security requests of Congress will total about $4,900,000,000 for the next fiscal year. The current rate of spending, for both military and economic, for fiscal year 1956 is about $4,200,000,000 and is estimated to be about $4,400,000,000 for fiscal year 1957.

All of these figures are approximations designed to give the general picture.

The precise figures will not be available until the President's budget message is submitted, but they will be of the general order of those which I have used here.

Q. Is it a fair conclusion that we foresee a more or less indefinite need for spending on the approximate current level on both the economic and military side without any real change, plus or minus, in either case?

A. Yes. I think it's a fair inference that we consider that both the economic aid and the military aid will need to go on for a considerable period of time at about the present level. Now, there may be changes. We are, as I indicated, asking for about $100,000,000 more for economic aid this year than we asked for last year and about $200,000,000 more than we got last year. That is primarily in order to create greater resources and flexibility with reference to the situation in the Middle and Far East. And there are constantly coming up new situations where the Soviet tactics are changed or where they are changing and we need flexibility and we don't feel that we are tied down to any arbitrary figure in any particular year. Each year we take a fresh look, and, as I say, this year for the economic side we are asking for about $200,000,000 more than we got last year. Of course you should realize, as you do no doubt, that the so-called economic aid is in considerable part in support of military programs and to that extent it is not a very flexible figure, so long as the military program goes on as it does. In areas such as Korea, Formosa, Viet-Nam, Turkey, where there is a military program which is in excess of what the economy of the country can support, there is economic support of the military program.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in what area would the economic and military aid be increased for this $200,000,000 difference?

A. Well, we expect to ask this year for the other $100,000,000 of the Far East flexible Presidential program. You may recall that last year there

[3] Lincoln White, Acting Chief, News Division.

[4] The following four paragraphs were also released separately as press release 702 dated Dec. 20.

was a request for $200,000,000 which was, as I recall, authorized, but of which only $100,000,000 was appropriated for the current fiscal year. We expect to ask for the other $100,000,000 of appropriation for that fund. Then we expect to ask for about $100,000,000 as a flexible Presidential fund for use in the Near and Middle East.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us why the congressional leaders seem so surprised when the report came that the military planned to request $3 billion, especially after the White House briefing of last week? [5]

A. Well, I think probably the explanation lies in the fact that, while it was pointed out that the rate of expenditure would be at approximately the present rate in so far as the military part of the program was concerned, we did not, I guess, at that briefing—I was there during only part of it but apparently we did not—get into the accounting aspects of the matter and the situation which resulted from the fact that in a sense last year we had lived to a considerable extent out of what was regarded as surplus in the pipeline. Now that surplus in the pipeline is pretty well used up, and the military people estimate that it will be necessary now to go back to a higher rate of appropriation than the Congress thought necessary last year.

Q. Is it fair then to say that the cuts last year were too deep?

A. No, I wouldn't say so. The question of whether they were too deep or not is a matter of opinion. But it's a question of judgment as to how much you really need to have in the pipeline. Now, last year, in any case, the administration's own request of Congress indicated that we thought that there was some fat, you might say, to live off of in terms of past appropriations. And we only asked, as I say here, for $1,700,000,000, although we contemplated spending at the rate of $2,500,000,000. In other words, our own request suggested that there was some $800,000,000 in the pipeline which did not need to be replenished. Congress thought there was even more than that. But that is a matter of judgment which I don't quarrel with. All I point out is that you can't go on indefinitely living off your pipeline if you expect your program to be one which would be projected ahead for a good many years. And because we do think that the program is probably one that will need to be projected ahead for a good many years, we think the time has come this year to replenish the pipeline and not to go on living off of it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I was just wondering how the decision to seek increased appropriations for foreign aid fits in with the public statements that you and Mr. Hollister [6] *have made on this subject over the past 2 months, which most reporters and I think most Congressmen interpreted to mean that the request was going to be about the same. I have specifically in mind what you said on November 18 after the Geneva conference when you were asked the question, "Will the United States now have radically to revise its programs for defense and mutual security?" and you answered, "The answer to this is 'no,'" and skipping down a bit, you then said, "Hence the outcome of the Geneva conference does not require us to alter the general scope of our programs. Their general order of magnitude can remain as planned."*

A. Well, on the economic side we are asking this year for $1,900,000,000, as against $1,800,000,000 last year. I consider that as being of the same general order of magnitude. As far as the military spending is concerned, as I say, it is expected to continue at about the same rate, namely, the general order of about $2,500,000,000.

Now, the question of what appropriations you need to sustain that is a question of pipeline, lead time, and a whole lot of complicated factors which I'm not very familiar with in detail but which have led to the conclusion that it is necessary, in order to maintain the pipeline in adequate flow, to replenish the pipeline this year rather than drawing it down as we did last year. But the actual spending is expected to be at about the same level, so that the program is virtually unchanged.

Q. Well, then, you and Mr. Hollister both were talking about spending, sir, is that it?

A. Yes.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it is my recollection that on Sunday, when you returned to this country, you were asked about these foreign aid figures and that

[5] Bulletin of Dec. 26, 1955, p. 1049.

[6] John B. Hollister, Director, International Cooperation Administration.

you replied that you were not familiar with them. I wonder if those figures were available, whether you would know whether they had been decided upon before you went to Paris, and whether they were known to the Congress and to the White House?

A. Yes, the figures in general were known to me when I left for Paris; but in all of these matters there are, even until the last moment, budgetary refinements. The Bureau of the Budget goes over these things, and I was not aware when I got off the plane as to whether or not there might have been changes of that character that had taken place during my absence. I was sure there would be no change of any major significance taken without my knowing about it. As it turned out, there were no changes of great significance and the figures that I have given you today are approximately the same figures that I had in my mind when I went to Paris.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said that the program to be asked included provision for a $100,000,000 fund for the flexible fund at the President's discretion for the Middle East.

A. That is correct.

Q. Is that military, or economic, or both?

A. That is economic.

Q. Is there a comparable fund for Asia, apart from the Middle East?

A. Yes. That fund was sought last year when the President asked for a $200,000,000 fund for what was sometimes called the Arc of Asia Program, for economic aid in the Far East and Southeast Asia. That was a request for $200,000,000, all of which, as I recall, was authorized by the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees; but when the thing got to the Appropriations Committee, they felt that it would not be necessary to spend more than $100,000,000 a year. Therefore they appropriated $100,000,000, and we are going to ask for the appropriation of the other half for the fiscal year 1957.

Q. I'd like to ask, sir, which one of those funds granted or proposed covers the area of India, Afghanistan, and Pakistan? In other words, what I think you referred to as the new "cold war" program?

A. Well, you have perhaps a certain overlapping there, where you have a situation where Pakistan is both a member of the Southeast Asia security treaty and also a member of the Baghdad Pact with Turkey; so there is perhaps a borderline there. But I would say in general the Far East program is designed to cover Pakistan and the Southeast Asia treaty countries and the general area of Formosa, Korea, Japan, and the countries of Indochina, and that the new fund sought is designed primarily to cover what is generally known as the Near East.

Q. Mr. Secretary, one of the projects—the first, I believe, to use that Asian development—was this so-called Asian Nuclear Center. You said last week you expected to make a decision in a few days on its location. Have you made a decision?

A. Well, I would say that the decision seems to be nearer than it was when I was here 2 weeks ago. But it hasn't been actually finalized yet. I said at that time, I think, that we would be largely influenced by the facilities that would be accorded by the recipient country. And that is a matter we are still checking up on. We have made considerable progress, but I'm not prepared as yet to announce what the final word will be.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is there some fear within the Department that some of these nations of the Middle East and perhaps the Far East may try to play Russia against us when they see the success of Egypt getting a dam after the tentative offer from Russia?

A. Well, there is always a risk. I think I said at a prior press conference here that we are not going to put ourselves in a position where the Soviets, by just making paper offers, can require us to make real offers to top them. That would mean that the Soviets would be spending nothing except a piece of paper but would require us to spend a great deal of money. Now, these projects we are working on are not projects which have only come into being after the Soviet has made a proposal. This upper dam has been a very active matter for well over 2 years. I remember it was very active when I was in Egypt in—I think it was May 1953. And the World Bank has been working on it for upward of 2 years. This is a normal evolution which is not just a response to the Soviet intervention in that situation. And in general we expect to carry on in that way.

Q. A lot of countries will feel that this hastened our decision, won't they, and that the way they can get aid is to tell us about a Soviet offer?

A. Well, they may feel that way, but I have already had occasion to point out to several of them that the interest of the United States and of the World Bank in this dam is something which goes back 2 years and more and is not attributable at all to the Soviet proposal.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would the dam be financed out of this Near Eastern flexible-type project fund as part of the aid in grant?

A. Yes. You see, the portion of the fund for the dam, that will be put up by the United States and to a lesser degree by the United Kingdom, is on an annual basis, and the amount in any one year will not be very great. I mean, it may average out in the order of 15 or 20 million dollars a year. So that it may be that an initial increment will come out of this fund.

Position of Western Powers in Berlin

Q. Mr. Secretary, in relation to Germany, who was responsible for putting Berlin inside the Soviet zone and for the failure to make sure of access by the other three powers to Berlin?

A. Well, I think perhaps the facts of geography put Berlin in the Soviet zone. You might say, putting it the other way around, "Why was the Soviet zone so big as to include Berlin?" There had been agreed upon, as I recall, at the time of the Yalta conference, a general program for the giving of zones in Germany, and the Soviet forces had moved in and taken over that area.

Now, the reason why the Western powers had a sector of Berlin was that it was decided still to regard Berlin as the capital of Germany, and we all felt entitled to a part of Berlin, or at least a standing there. Of course, at that time, as I understand it—now I am talking only about history because I was not in on any of this business—the thought at that time was not that there should be the permanent partition of Germany which has resulted. As a matter of fact, the Potsdam agreements about Germany were quite explicit that there should not be a partition of Germany, and it was not intended that the military occupation of these different zones would divide Germany, as has been the case. You had a historical evolution in Germany which is different from the historical evolution in Austria. In Austria also you had the zones; but, nevertheless, Austria stayed a unit under a single central government. I think the difference in the evolution has been due to the fact that, whereas the four powers recognized from the beginning the continuance of a single government in Austria, in the case of Germany they took over the entire sovereignty of Germany. There was no such thing as a German Government at all, and, therefore, the sovereignty of Germany became divided really between four powers. And that is a reason why the evolution has been toward a partition of Germany, which was never contemplated really at the beginning.

Q. Can you say who was responsible for the decision?

A. I wouldn't want to say.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been a good deal of rather loose talk that we are more optimistic now, or have reason to be more optimistic, about peace in the Middle East. Can you discuss in general the prospects for peace in that general area?

A. Well, I think I would stand by the same position that I took 2 weeks ago here when I was asked about the so-called "optimism" about a settlement. I said then that I knew of no facts which justified any great optimism about the matter. Now there is, I think, the fact that such a program as that which I had described in my August 26 speech [7] is continuously being studied. The fact that people are continuing to think along those lines is, perhaps, a reason for encouragement. On the other hand, there are episodes like this recent attack on Syria which seemed to set back our hopes.

Voting on Membership in U.N.

Q. Mr. Secretary, why did the United States abstain rather than taking a definite position on one side or the other in the voting on the five Communist-nation applications for membership in the United Nations? [8] *And, in retrospect,*

[7] *Ibid.*, Sept. 5, 1955, p. 378.

[8] For statements by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., during the debate in the United Nations on the membership item, see *ibid.*, Dec. 26, 1955, p. 1067.

would you say that that was the best possible position for us to have taken?

A. The answer to the last question is "yes." The United States has from the very beginning taken the view that the veto power ought not to be used on questions of admission and that one nation ought not to be in a position to block a country which the overwhelming majority of the present members wanted to bring in. That point of view was reflected in the Vandenberg Resolution, which was overwhelmingly adopted by the Senate in June 1948. We have never used the veto on the question of the admission of new members, never thought it should be used. And, while one can say that that meant laying down a possible weapon that the Soviets have not laid down, I, nevertheless, think that the sound position to take is that the veto power ought not to be used for these purposes. I do not think that the veto power was ever intended to be used for such a purpose. I think if one studies the records of the San Francisco conference, where I was a participant, it is made quite apparent that the veto power was intended to be used only in rather exceptional circumstances to protect what one of the permanent members might regard as his own vital interest. And there were indications of that sort given by the permanent members—that they would not abuse the veto power. We have stuck consistently to that position, and I think we have been right in doing so.

Q. I am thinking not so much about the veto power but voting in favor. Do we oppose the so-called principle of universality?

A. We are not in favor of universality unless and until the charter is amended to adopt the principle of universality. There was a long argument at San Francisco as to whether or not the principle of universality should be adopted. I think the greater part of the United States delegation felt that perhaps it should be. But the final result was article 4 of the charter, which puts a qualification on the eligibility of members. And, so long as that is in the charter, we believe the charter should be lived up to and that nations should not be made members who are not, in the words of that article 4, peace-loving and able and willing to carry out their obligations under the charter.

Q. Mr. Secretary, has your own personal philosophy changed on the principle of universality since you wrote your book?

A. No. But in my book I advocated a series of amendments of the charter, one of which would be greater universality, another of which would be the principle of weighted voting, and a change of the voting procedures in both the Security Council and in the General Assembly. I still believe that the general program which I outlined in my book in '49, I think it was, is a sound program; but I don't think that you can just take one part of the program and advocate that without taking into account the balancing features which are also in the book.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in this last instance it would have been possible to have voted "no" without its applying as a veto, wouldn't it? Hasn't that been the case?

A. In the Security Council a negative vote and an abstention are just the same unless you want your negative vote to count as a veto. In other words, you have to get seven affirmative votes, you see, and if you don't get seven affirmative votes, then the proposal fails. So if you abstain it is just as much a preventive of seven affirmative votes as though you voted "no," unless you want your negative vote to count as a veto overriding the seven affirmative votes.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you think the prospects are that Japan will gain admission to the United Nations next year?

A. Well, I don't like to do guessing on this matter. I can say that certainly Japan ought to be a member. I believe that it is a very bad violation of the charter for one nation to exclude, by the veto power, membership to gain advantages in a trading matter, such as the negotiation of the Russo-Japanese peace treaty. It looks to me as though the Soviet was using its veto power in the Security Council to try to drive a harder bargain with the Japanese in terms of a peace treaty. That, of course, is wrong by every standard—legal and moral. Unfortunately, we have to live in a world with people who don't live up either to their legal or to their moral obligations.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you interpret the result of Sunday's election in the Saar?

A. Well, it looks as though a majority of the inhabitants of the Saar favored some form of political unity with Germany; but, also, there is

a substantial minority who do not favor that, and the so-called pro-German parties did not get the 75 percent majority which would have been needed to alter the present constitution of the Saar.

Q. Mr. Secretary, since your letter to Senator Margaret Smith about the Japanese textile situation,[9] has anything happened in the Government to change your position on that, in view of the pressures that are still keeping up in the industries?

A. Well, I don't recall precisely what I said; but the facts are that the Japanese Government is taking effective action to prevent excessive exports of textile goods to the United States, either directly or indirectly, and I would hope and believe that the situation can be taken care of in that way without the necessity of having quotas.

Further Questions on Foreign Aid

Q. Mr. Secretary, if I may return to foreign aid for just a moment to tie up one loose end here. Senator Mansfield, who, apparently, is rather upset about the size of the request, says that, in his view, the administration has broken faith with the legislators who were at the White House on Tuesday [December 13] because he says they understood that the figure was going to be about 2.7 [billion dollars].

Now is it your view that there was no breaking of faith, and that, if they had an impression there was to be anything above 2.7, it was due to a misunderstanding?

A. As I have said, I was only present during a small part of the conference, but it is quite obvious to me that there was a genuine misunderstanding, which I regret took place. I have the highest regard for Senator Mansfield. He has been an extremely valuable and cooperative member of the Foreign Relations Committee, and I am confident that he would have followed this matter closely, intelligently, and fairly. And if he feels that he didn't get the full story, I can only regret it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, at the end of the summit meeting did you and the President think you would need more money, or less money, or about the same money to meet the Russian challenge around the world?

A. About the same. We never figured on dropping our guard in any way because of what took place at the summit conference, and, as I pointed out after I got back from the second Geneva conference, on that account we did not have to revise our plans upward in any spectacular way.

Q. Mr. Secretary, one other question on foreign aid: As I understand it, you are asking for $200,000,000 more in economic aid than you got last year, or, rather, this year. But you are also saying that the rate of expenditure in this field will be about the same. Then is this 200—

A. No, excuse me. I didn't mean to say that. You see, in the economic field we run our expenditures very close to our appropriations. It is not like in the military field, where you have a "lead" time of often several years for making planes and the like. And I would expect that, if we get, as I hope, the added appropriation for fiscal year '57, we will spend it in '57. In other words, our expenditures in '57 in the economic field will, I hope, be between $100,000,000 and $200,000,000 more than during fiscal year '56.

Q. There is a real distinction then between military aid, and the upping of the military aid requests, and the upping of the economic aid—in that you are going to spend more?

A. Yes. You see, in the case of the economic aid we are seeking a total increase of about $200 million, which will be added right away in fiscal year '57 to our actual expenditures. In the case of the military aid, we do not expect that the expenditures will appreciably go up but that there will have to be an increased appropriation in order to keep the pipeline filled, so that we won't have a complete ending of the program abruptly 2 or 3 years from now.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are these increases due directly to this Russian offensive in this same field?

A. You mean the increases in the economic?

Q. Both in the economic and in the supply line.

A. Well, in the economic, the increase is due to our feeling that there is increased need in the Middle East primarily. That is where we are asking for the $100 million more than we asked for last year. In other words, we are asking for the same amount we asked for last year plus $100 million in the economic field. In the military field

[9] *Ibid.*, Dec. 26, 1955, p. 1064.

ve do not expect to expend, as I understand it—his is, perhaps, more in the Defense Department ield than mine—but as I understand it, they don't xpect to expend any more. But, because we anicipate that that expenditure, at about this presnt rate, will have to go on for several years, we lon't want to see the pipeline become empty, beause it takes 3 or 4 years to get stuff from the eginning to the end of the pipeline; and if you vait until the pipeline gets empty before you start o fill it again, you would have a gap of 3 years, et's say, where there would be nothing in the pipeine, and you couldn't do anything about it.

Coal and Steel Community Official Invited To Visit U.S.

Press release 707 dated December 22

The Secretary of State has invited René Mayer, President of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, to visit the United States in February 1956 to discuss current questions of mutual interest to the United States and the Community. M. Mayer expects to arrive at Washington on February 6 and will probably be accompanied by a member of the High Authority.

This is the third official visit of a President of the High Authority to the United States. Jean Monnet, when he held that post, visited this country once in May 1953 and once in April 1954. It will be M. Mayer's first visit to the United States as President of the High Authority, a post he assumed on June 10, 1955. He has been in this country on many previous occasions.

Berlin Conference Hall

The Department of State announced on December 12 (press release 691) that seven leading Americans have been named to work with the government of Free Berlin in the construction of an American-sponsored conference hall intended as "an expression in stone and mortar of the right of free speech."

To be completed for the Berlin Building Exhibition in 1957, the $4 million building and grounds program will fill an urgent need in the cultural and political life of the city. The building was designed under the guidance of a special committee of the American Institute of Architects. The financing will be shared by the American Government, the Berlin Senate, and the Federal Republic of Germany.

Because construction of the building will coincide with the celebration of the 250th anniversary of the birth of Benjamin Franklin, the building will contain a memorial to the eminent American and the sponsoring organization will be called the Benjamin Franklin Foundation.

At the request of Secretary Dulles, Ralph Walker of New York, past president of the American Institute of Architects, has accepted the position of chairman of the Board of the Foundation. Deputy chairman will be Howard S. Eichenbaum, architect, of Little Rock, Ark. Other American directors of the foundation will be William S. Culbertson, former Minister to Rumania and Ambassador to Chile; Moreland Griffith Smith, architect, Montgomery, Ala.; Kenneth Perry, attorney and business executive, Bound Brook, N. J.; Albert Edelman, attorney, Bronxville, N. Y.; and Robert B. Wolf, attorney, Philadelphia, Pa. The German members of the Board will be named in the near future by Mayor Otto Suhr of Berlin.

In a letter to Ralph Walker, Secretary Dulles said:

> I am gratified to learn of your willingness to cooperate in a program to construct a conference hall in West Berlin. This program, which has been developed with the aid of the committee of the American Institute of Architects under your chairmanship, can, in my opinion, contribute substantially to the policy of this Government in support of the security and welfare of the city. We believe the plan to construct this building and assure its use as a contribution to the cultural, scientific and political life of Berlin is the more significant because it is a cooperative undertaking in which German participation plays a substantial part.

In acknowledging American efforts on behalf of the project, Mayor Suhr last month declared that it "is highly significant not only for the further development of Berlin, but also as a symbol of the free world vis-à-vis the East."

Planning for the conference hall began when a committee appointed by the American Institute of Architects accompanied Mrs. Eleanor L. Dulles, Special Assistant in the Office of German Affairs, to Berlin in the spring of 1955 to study possible American participation in the Berlin Building Exhibition. Members of the committee were Messrs. Walker, Eichenbaum, Smith, and Hugh A. Stubbins, of Cambridge, Mass. The group de-

cided unanimously that the most appropriate participation would be a conference hall to be available for scientific, cultural, educational, and political meetings in the center of the city in the Tiergarten area, not far from the border of the Communist sector.

Mr. Stubbins prepared the designs for the building at the request of the American Institute of Architects. The central auditorium of the building as planned will seat 1,200 people. The ground floor will also house the reception and exhibition areas, committee rooms, administrative offices, and library rooms necessary for large conferences.

Also assisting with the planning of the project have been George Cummings of Binghamton, N. Y., president of the AIA, and Edmund Randolph Purves, Washington, D. C., executive director, AIA.

President of Italy To Visit United States

James C. Hagerty, press secretary to the President, announced on December 17 that the President has extended an invitation to the President of Italy, Giovanni Gronchi, to visit the United States.

President Gronchi has accepted the invitation and will arrive at Washington on February 28 for a 3-day state visit.

Cutoff Date for Visa Applications for Italian Refugees

Press release 709 dated December 23

Because there are 47,413 applicants for the remaining 22,775 visas under the Refugee Relief Act provisions for Italy, the Department of State on December 23 instructed consulates in that country to accept no more new cases after December 31, 1955.

The act authorized a total of 60,000 visas to Italians. As of December 16, 1955, 37,225 of these had actually been issued.

The Department announced a similar cutoff, effective November 28, 1955, for processing new cases under the Greek section of the act.[1]

In instructions to the consulates, Pierce J. Gerety, Deputy Administrator of the act made the following points:

1. The cutoff will not apply to escapee and orphan applicants who are processed under other sections of the Refugee Relief Act.

2. Assurances received after the cutoff dates for the two countries will be sent to the appropriate consular authorities to permit the applicant to establish a priority registration date under the normal annual quota of the Immigration and Nationality Act, since they cannot be processed under the Refugee Relief Act.

3. As of December 16, 1955, the total worldwide issuance of visas under the Refugee Relief Program was 70,586. Although the success of the program in Greece and Italy is assured, sponsors continue to be urgently needed for refugees in Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands, as well as for refugees in Italy and Greece who have already been processed but are lacking sponsors.

[1] BULLETIN of Dec. 5, 1955, p. 917.

Baghdad Pact Council Concludes First Meeting

TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE[1]

The inaugural meeting of the Baghdad Pact Powers, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and the United Kingdom, was held in Baghdad on November 21 and 22 under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister of Iraq, Al Sayyed Nuri Al-Said. Iran was represented by the Prime Minister Hussein Ala; Pakistan by the Prime Minister Choudhury Mohammed Ali; Turkey by the Prime Minister Adnan Menderes; and the United Kingdom by the Foreign Secretary, the Right Honorable Mr Harold Macmillan.

2. The U.S. Government, having accepted the invitation of the Baghdad Pact Powers to take part in their proceedings in the capacity of observers, was represented on the Council by the U.S. Ambassador at Baghdad[2] and on the military committee by a United States Service Representative [Adm. John H. Cassady].

[1] Issued at Baghdad on Nov. 22.

[2] For text of a statement made at the meeting by Ambassador Waldemar Gallman, see BULLETIN of Dec. 5, 1955, p. 926.

The Council welcomed the intention expressed by the U.S. Government to establish permanent political and military liaison with the Council and to have an observer present at the organizational meeting of the economic committee.

3. The Government of Iraq emphasized that, as laid down in the preamble and in paragraph 4 of the Baghdad Pact, the responsibilities of Iraq under the pact and as a member of the Council are in full accord with her obligations under the treaty of joint defence and economic cooperation between the Arab League States. The other member powers were glad to note this.

4. The Council decided that the Baghdad Pact, the special agreement concluded under the Pact between Iraq and the United Kingdom, and the instruments of accession of the Powers who have joined the Pact, should be registered by the Government of Iraq with the United Nations.

5. The 5 governments in council reaffirmed their intention as provided in the Pact and consistently with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter to work in full partnership with united purpose for peace and security in the Middle East, to defend their territories against aggression or subversion, and to promote the welfare and prosperity of the peoples in that region.

6. The 5 governments in council reviewed the critical world situation particularly in the light of the Geneva Conference and resolved in consequence to maintain constant contact and even closer cooperation in the face of any threat to their common interests.

7. The five governments set up a permanent Council as provided for in Article 6 of the Pact. The Council will be deemed to be in continuous session. Ministerial meetings will take place at least once a year. Iraq as host country will provide the first chairmanship until the end of 1956, and the chairmanship will be held thereafter in alphabetical order of the other powers for a period of 1 year. If, however, additional meetings were to be held elsewhere than in the capital of the regular chairman, the host country will be asked to provide the chairman for that meeting.

8. The permanent seat of the organization and its dependent bodies shall be in Baghdad.

9. Each government will appoint a deputy representative to the Council with Ambassadorial rank.

10. The Council, through their permanent deputies in Baghdad, shall meet at any time to discuss any matters of political, economic and military interest to the 5 governments.

11. The Council agreed that a permanent secretariat for the Baghdad Pact organization should be established in Baghdad.

12. The Council established a permanent military committee responsible and subordinate to the Council and charged with carrying out such directive as may be entrusted to it. The representatives of the 5 governments on the military committee will be their Chiefs of Staff or their deputies.

13. The military committee at its first meetings laid the foundations of a military organization to ensure the security of the region. In this connection the Council noted that the Governments of Iraq and of the United Kingdom have concluded a special agreement under the pact on the 4th of April, 1955. By this agreement Iraq assumed full responsibility for her own defence, and took over the command and the guarding of all defence installations in Iraq. Withdrawal of United Kingdom forces for the bases at Habbaniya and Shaiba is proceeding according to plan and as stipulated in the special agreement between Iraq and the United Kingdom. The Council further noted that the United Kingdom is affording Iraq help in building up her armed forces and maintaining them in a state of readiness for the defence of Iraq.

14. The Council took note with appreciation of the generous and valuable help extended to each of them by the United States Government in the form of free aid in the provision of arms and other military equipment to enable them to strengthen their defence against aggression, and of the support and encouragement of the U.S. Government in their efforts to cooperate for peace.

15. An economic committee was set up to develop and strengthen the economic and financial resources of the region. In particular the economic committee will consider ways and means of sharing experience in the field of development; and how a regional approach to some of the problems involved would be a common benefit, including discussion on a regional basis with the World Bank, the World Health Organization, UNICEF and other specialized agencies.

16. In this connection the Council viewed with satisfaction the practical progress already made in this field. They noted, for example, that the

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United Kingdom has decided to assist Iraq by making available gold to constitute a reserve of 5 million pounds during the next 2 years, and by other forms of financial cooperation.

17. The Council noted the statement of the U.K. representative that his government is ready to use their experience in the field of atomic energy to assist other countries of the pact with their own atomic energy projects for the peaceful application of the science; and particularly that they were ready to assist Baghdad Pact countries in the application of atomic techniques with special reference to local and regional problems. The Council welcomed this offer and directed the economic committee to consider its practical application.

18. The 5 governments expressed their gratification for the extensive economic assistance which has been freely accorded by the Government of the United States.

19. The Council decided to meet again in special session in Tehran during the first half of April, 1956. They directed the military committee and the economic committee to report progress at that session.

Revival of Russian-Language Magazine "Amerika"

Press release 708 dated December 23

The U.S. Embassy at Moscow, in a note to the Soviet Government dated September 9, 1955, proposed the distribution within the U.S.S.R. of an illustrated Russian-language magazine, issued monthly, devoted to an objective presentation of various aspects of American life. The Embassy indicated that, as a matter of reciprocity, the United States would be prepared to give favorable consideration to according the Soviet Union similar distribution possibilities in the United States.

At the Foreign Ministers conference at Geneva, October 27–November 16, 1955, the U.S. delegation referred to the American Embassy's note of September 9 and pointed out that a favorable response to the proposal made in this note would serve to promote better understanding between the peoples of the two countries.[1]

The Soviet Foreign Office, in a note delivered to the American Embassy at Moscow December 16, 1955, stated that the Soviet Government accepts the U.S. proposal concerning the distribution in the U.S.S.R. of an American magazine in the Russian language.

Plans for the publication of a Russian-language magazine, which will be entitled *Amerika*, are now in preparation with a view to early distribution in the U.S.S.R. *Amerika* magazine will be produced monthly, and arrangements for its distribution in the U.S.S.R. will be handled by the American Embassy at Moscow.

The acceptance by the Soviet Union of the U.S. proposal of September 9 makes possible a revival of the Russian-language magazine *Amerika*, publication of which was suspended in 1952.[2]

Following are texts of the U.S. note of September 9 and of the Soviet note of December 16.

U. S. Note of September 9

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the views expressed by the President of the United States in addressing the Heads of Government of the USSR, France and the United Kingdom at Geneva, on July 22, on the topic of normalizing and increasing East-West contacts. President Eisenhower said in part:[3]

> To help achieve the goal of peace based on justice and right and mutual understanding, there are certain concrete steps that could be taken: (1) to lower the barriers which now impede the interchange of information and ideas between peoples . . .

The Government of the United States believes that publication, by it, of a Russian language magazine for distribution within the Soviet Union, would constitute a concrete step furthering a fuller interchange of information and ideas.

Accordingly, the Government of the United States proposes the distribution within the USSR of an illustrated Russian language magazine, issued monthly, which would be cultural and nonpolitical in character, devoted to an objective presentation of various aspects of American life. The Government of the United States further proposes that distribution of this magazine be effected as

[1] Bulletin of Nov. 14, 1955, p. 176.

[2] *Ibid.*, July 28, 1952, p. 127. For the Soviet reply to the suspension, see *ibid.*, Aug. 18, 1952, p. 263.

[3] *Ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1955, p. 174.

ollows: 50,000 copies of each issue to be distributed through Soviet distribution channels, with an option to increase this number, with the Government of the United States reserving the right to distribute 2,000 copies of each issue through the Embassy on a complimentary basis, with an option to increase the number.

In view of the cultural and non-political character of the magazine proposed by the United States, it is assumed that the Soviet Government would not request pre-publication review or any other type of censorship, such as that previously imposed on foreign publications as a war-time emergency measure.

The Embassy awaits the favorable reply of the Ministry regarding this proposal and is prepared to discuss the details of its implementation with the appropriate Soviet authorities at an early date.

Soviet Reply of December 16

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America and, referring to the Embassy's note handed to the Ministry on September 10 of this year by Counselor of Embassy [Walter N.] Walmsley, and his statement made when handing over the above-mentioned note, has the honor to state the following:

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics accepts the proposal of the Government of the United States of America concerning the distribution in the USSR of an American monthly illustrated magazine in the Russian language. Proceeding from the assurance contained in the Embassy note concerning the character of this magazine and understanding that the Government of the United States of America will itself take corresponding measures to this end, the Government of the USSR will not require a preliminary review of the magazine. In accordance with the desire expressed by the Embassy of the United States of America it is deemed acceptable that the magazine will be distributed in a quantity of 50,000 copies through normal Soviet channels and 2,000 copies of each issue of the magazine by the Embassy gratis.

Note is also taken of the statement of the Embassy of the United States of America that there will be no objection on the basis of reciprocity to publication by the Embassy of the USSR in the United States of America of a Soviet monthly magazine in the English language.

Entry and Residence Privileges of U. S. and Soviet Ecclesiastics

Press release 690 dated December 12

There follow the texts of a note delivered December 10, 1955, by the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of a note received by the Embassy from the Soviet Ministry on December 2, 1955. These notes present the views of the United States and Soviet Governments, respectively, with regard to privileges of entry and residence for the American Catholic priest, Father Louis Dion, in the Soviet Union, and for Soviet Archbishop Boris in the United States.

U. S. NOTE OF DECEMBER 10

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the Ministry's Note No. 118 of December 2, 1955. Essentially, the Ministry's note again supports the view of the Soviet Government that Soviet Archbishop Boris should be granted the privilege of unlimited entry to the United States to function as resident Exarch of the Russian Orthodox Church in America before the American Catholic priest, Father Dion, will be permitted to enter the Soviet Union to assume the modest functions which his predecessors fulfilled under the terms of the November 16, 1933 agreement which established diplomatic relations between the USA and the USSR.[1] It is regrettable that the Soviet Government has seen fit since its expulsion of Father Bissonnette in March 1955 [2] to link these dissimilar cases.

Properly considering each of these matters in its own context, the United States Government holds to the position presented in the Embassy's

[1] For an exchange of letters between President Roosevelt and Maxim Litvinov on religious liberty, dated Nov. 16, 1933, see BULLETIN of Mar. 14, 1955, p. 425.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 424.

note of June 27, 1955 [3] that the right of American clergymen to tend the spiritual needs of American nationals in the Soviet Union rests on the terms of the November 16, 1933 agreement. Consequently, the Soviet Government's expulsion of Father Bissonnette and its present negative attitude toward the admission of Father Dion constitute a clear violation of that agreement.

Although the Ministry's Note of March 8, 1955 [4] erroneously claimed that the November 16, 1933 agreement provided for reciprocity with regard to Soviet clergymen in the United States, the United States Government perceived no objection to the extension of reciprocity. Consequently, the Embassy advised the Ministry on June 27, 1955 and has subsequently reiterated that the United States Government is prepared to grant a Soviet clergyman the same possibilities of tending to the religious needs of Soviet nationals in the United States as those accorded to American clergymen to tend to the religious needs of American nationals in the Soviet Union. Despite the absence of a positive Soviet response to this voluntary offer of reciprocity, it remains in effect.

As the Ministry is aware, a representative of the Assumptionist Order has been advised orally by the Soviet Embassy in Washington that Father Dion should not attempt to utilize his Soviet visa until such time as the question of the entry of Archbishop Boris into the United States is resolved. The United States Government requests that this counsel be revoked and that no further obstacles be placed in the way of Father Dion's early departure for the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government's action in linking the entry of Archbishop Boris with that of Father Dion has tended to confuse the issues involved and to complicate a clear understanding of the United States Government's position with regard to the entry of Archbishop Boris. Divorced from the irrelevant and extraneous considerations introduced by the Soviet Government in dealing with these two distinctly different problems simultaneously, this position may be summarized as follows:

The United States Government has not objected to temporary visits to the United States by Soviet ecclesiastics for the purpose of conducting legitimate church affairs. Archbishop Boris and his predecessor, Archbishop Germogen, were admitted temporarily for this purpose, and in both cases their visas were extended subsequently to permit a longer stay in the United States than that for which they were originally admitted. However, the Department continues to feel that it is neither appropriate nor desirable for Archbishop Boris, a Soviet national who is a high-ranking official of the Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union, to reside indefinitely in the United States as head of one of the Russian Orthodox Church groups in the United States.

The Embassy's request of November 12, 1955 [5] that the passports of Archbishop Boris and his secretary be made available for the cancellation of their visas is reaffirmed. This cancellation can be effected by United States consular officials at any United States diplomatic mission or consular office abroad.

SOVIET NOTE OF DECEMBER 2

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America and in connection with the Embassy's Note No. 324 of November 12 of this year has the honor to communicate the following.

As is known, in February of this year the Department of State of the USA, without explanation of its reasons, refused to prolong the stay in the United States of Exarch of the Russian Orthodox Church in America, Archbishop of the Aleutians and North America Boris and his secretary Shishkin. In this connection, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR recognized that the further stay in the Soviet Union of the American Father Bissonnette was impossible.

Under the circumstances, Archbishop Boris and his secretary were forced to leave the USA and the American Father Bissonnette—the Soviet Union.

After some time a request was received in the Embassy of the USSR in the USA, concerning the issuance of a visa to the American Father Dion proceeding to the USSR as successor to Father Bissonnette. Inasmuch as the departures of Archbishop Boris, his secretary and the American Father Bissonnette took place not because of personal character objections to them, the request con

[3] *Ibid.*, July 18, 1955, p. 102.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 103.

[5] Note not printed; for a Department statement of Nov 15, see *ibid.*, Nov. 28, 1955, p. 888.

cerning a visa for the successor to Father Bissonnette was interpreted by the Soviet side as sign of the desire of the American side to reestablish the situation existing before then, when the American priest in the USSR and the Exarch of the Russian Orthodox Church in the USA were able to perform the religious duties conferred upon them.

On April 20, the Ministry notified the Embassy of the USA that it agreed to issue a visa for entry into the USSR of Father Dion, having in mind that American visas would be issued to Archbishop Boris and his secretary Shishkin for the same period of time. This stand of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR presented the possibility of settling the question without delay. However, the matter was complicated by the fact that the American side put forth demands conditioning the entrance into the USA of Archbishop Boris.

For example, it was stated that a Soviet clergyman would be permitted into the U.S. only if his religious activities were analogous to the religious activities of the American priest in the Soviet Union. It is apparent to everyone that it was impossible to agree to this demand inasmuch as the religious functions of an Exarch exercising administration of an Exarchate could not be placed on the same footing with the functions of an American priest serving the religious needs of employees of the American Embassy in Moscow.

The American side also stated that it does not object in principle to short-term trips to the U.S. of representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate. This statement does not create a basis for the satisfactory solution of the given question inasmuch as every time after a short-term stay in the U.S. of the Exarch a question would arise concerning his departure from the USA which would also presuppose the departure of the American priest from the Soviet Union. It must be noted that in the past representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate made short-term trips to the U.S. for the settlement of ecclesiastical affairs in the Exarchate. Such trips were made for example of Archbishop Aleksei in 1945, Metropolitan Grigori in 1947 and Archbishop Germogen in 1954. However, it is impossible to identify the missions of such representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate with the mission of Archbishop Boris who, being Exarch, must constantly carry out the direction of the Exarchate on the spot.

Proceeding from the fact that the religious missions of the Exarch and the American priest bear a permanent character, the Ministry, as indicated in its Note of September 8,[6] issued an instruction to the Embassy of the USSR in Washington to issue a visa to Father Dion without fixing the period of his stay in the Soviet Union. With this, the Ministry expressed the hope that in issuing visas to Archbishop Boris and his secretary the American side also would not fix the period of their stay in the USA.

On November 2, Father Dion received a Soviet entry visa on the advice of the Department of State.[7] On issuing the visa, it was stated by the Embassy of the USSR in the USA that the fact of his receiving a visa to enter the USSR was regarded by the Embassy as evidence of the readiness of the Government of the USA to issue visas to Archbishop Boris and his secretary for entry into the USA for the same period for which a visa was issued to him, Father Dion, inasmuch as the question was placed precisely thus in the Note of September 8 of this year from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR to the Embassy of the USA in Moscow.

On November 4, the Embassy of the USA in Moscow issued visas to Archbishop Boris and his secretary. In forwarding their passports to the Ministry, the Embassy pointed out in a note that their acceptance of the visas would be regarded by the Government of the USA as agreement by the Soviet side that Archbishop Boris would perform religious functions in the USA comparable to those which the American priest performs in the USSR. After the Ministry reminded the Embassy that Archbishop Boris performs the functions of the spiritual leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church in America which his predecessors performed for a period of over 150 years and which he performed until his departure from the USA, the Embassy in its note of November 12 proposed the return of the passports of the Archbishop and his secretary for the annulment of the visas placed in them for entry into the USA. In addition, it was pointed out in the Note that "The Government of the United States can not permit Archbishop Boris to perform the function of Exarch of the Russian Orthodox Church in America".

Such a stand by the American side in no way corresponds to the statement contained in the Note

[6] Not printed.

[7] *Ibid.*, Nov. 14, 1955, p. 784.

of the Embassy of the USA of June 27 that the Government of the USA does not place any obstacles in the way of the appointment by the Moscow Patriarchy of officials of the Russian Orthodox Church in America.

Commenting on the above-mentioned Note of the Embassy of the USA of November 12, a representative of the Department of State spoke in the sense that the American side could not permit Archbishop Boris to conduct services for members of the Russian Orthodox Church in America who are citizens of the USA.

Considering this declaration by an official representative of the Department of State, the Ministry would wish, before the annulment of the visas given to the Archbishop, his secretary and Father Dion, to clarify whether the Government of the USA is agreeable to permitting the entry of Archbishop Boris and his secretary having in view that, during his stay in the USA, Archbishop Boris would limit himself to fulfilling his administrative functions as Exarch. In the case of agreement by the American side to this proposal, the necessity for annuling the visas of Archbishop Boris, his secretary and Father Dion naturally will no longer arise.

United States Government Assistance to American Business Abroad

by Ben H. Thibodeaux
Director, Office of International Trade and Resources[1]

We in Washington and in our missions abroad regard those who are engaged in American business abroad as part of our team. Or, to express it the other way, we are on your team as well. There is much that government and private business can do to help each other in the entrancing game of foreign economic affairs.

You invited me here to tell you what the United States Government can do. But since I am talking and thereby have you at my mercy for the time being, I should like to begin by suggesting some things that *you* might do.

American private investments and operations abroad are an important part of our foreign relations. They are, in effect, extensions of the system of free and competitive private enterprise that has given the United States its predominant strength. Those of you actually engaged in American business operations abroad are demonstrators of that economic system. The operations of responsible American firms abroad are a good antidote to the prejudices that exist against our system in some areas of the world. I hope that you also serve as salesmen for the foreign economic policies of the United States that we will discuss in part today and that you help us in their application abroad. Then too, and very importantly, you can—and I know you do—contribute to a better understanding among the people in the United States of the problems we encounter in our international business affairs and of the policies needed to cope with them. By promoting a better understanding here and abroad of our international business relations, you facilitate the task of the Department of State of strengthening the economic ties and hence the political ties of the free world.

And American investments in themselves have done much to strengthen the free world. American private investments abroad amount to approximately $27 billion and are spread over a wide range of economic activity in many countries. Some 7,500 branches and subsidiaries of American firms are located abroad. American business makes a direct contribution to the progress of the world and to closer relations between the United States and other countries.

American business operations abroad are a means of spreading our technical know-how and of inducing ever widening economic development. The automobile does not come by itself. Many

[1] Address made before overseas representatives of the Ford Motor Company at Washington, D. C., on Nov. 28.

other things come with it. In this country, for example, increasing use of the automobile necessitated more and better highways, and these in turn made possible a vast array of economic development. From your own experience, you may be familiar with comparable developments in foreign countries as a result of American business operations.

Thus American private capital and technology contribute to increased prosperity in other free countries to their and our mutual advantage. This process is beneficial in itself. But it also demonstrates that a free economy can help our foreign friends and allies far more than can the system of communism. Particularly is this true today in the underdeveloped areas of the world, where so many things need to be done and where people are groping for ways to get them done. American capital and business can do much more in this direction. Truly, the surface has hardly been scratched.

So much, then, for what you as American business representatives can do and are doing to further United States policy objectives abroad. This brings me now to the question given me for discussion today, and that is, How does the United States Government assist American business operations abroad?

An element in the answer that comes first to mind is the tremendous financial and technical assistance given by the United States Government to foreign countries since the end of World War II. Western Europe generally is now firmly on its economic feet, thanks in part to the Marshall plan and in part to the great efforts of the Europeans themselves. Economic and technical assistance from the United States Government continues to aid other countries in their economic development, as do proceeds from the sale of surplus American agricultural commodities abroad. Our participation in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have also helped strengthen the economies of other countries.

These measures by the United States Government have helped make the free world a better place in which to live and to do business. By the same token, they have helped set the stage for American business operations abroad.

Additionally, the United States Government uses direct incentives to expand the flow of private investment funds from the United States to other countries. For example, investment guaranties are available on convertibility and expropriation. As a further inducement, the administration now has a bill before Congress that would reduce by 14 percentage points the Federal tax on earnings of corporate overseas investments.[2]

But United States incentives are not enough. Foreign countries must do their part if they want private capital from the United States. Our Government continually seeks, therefore, to induce other countries to create conditions favorable to American private investments and business.

Our efforts take various forms. Among these, I should like to cite the Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation that we negotiate with foreign countries; the measures taken to protect American patents, copyrights, and trade-marks abroad; and our efforts to lead other countries to eliminate restrictive business practices that not only discriminate against American business but hamper their own economic development. I should like to say a word on each of these three lines of action that are being pursued by the Department of State in cooperation with other agencies of the United States Government.

Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation

Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation—usually called FCN treaties—are in the nature of codes of fair treatment for our citizens who wish to trade, invest in, or run a business enterprise in a foreign country. They are a means by which the United States Government carries out its responsibility of protecting and promoting the interests of Americans abroad. Among the principles in these treaties are freedom to establish a business enterprise and to control and manage it, freedom in the employment of essential personnel, equality of competitive opportunity with local business, and security for private property. Altogether, we have 30 such treaties, in whole or in part pertaining to commerce and general economic relations between the United States and individual foreign countries. Additional treaties are now in process of negotiation with countries that share the United States interest in this type of reciprocal arrangement. I understand that this meeting includes representatives from 14 different countries.

[2] H. R. 7725. For background, see BULLETIN of Sept. 12, 1955, p. 432.

We have FCN treaties in effect or close to completion with 8 of those countries: Argentina, Belgium, Denmark, England, Finland, Germany, Ireland, and the Netherlands.

These treaties are helpful in a number of ways, as I have already indicated. Certain countries, for example, have an irresistible temptation once in a while to tax foreign businessmen more heavily than their own. When this happens, the foreign investor in such a country can have an unhappy time indeed. An FCN treaty serves to avoid harassments of this kind for the American businessman abroad.

Protection of Patents and Trade-Marks

In the fields of patents, copyrights, and trade-marks, the Department of State negotiates multilateral and bilateral arrangements with other countries to give maximum possible protection to American rights abroad. These arrangements give effective protection to American interests in practically every country and territory outside the Soviet bloc. When these agreements are not adhered to, the Department of State intervenes on behalf of the American interests affected. I am sure that this feature of our work as applied to patents and trade-marks is well known to the staff of the Ford Motor Company and does not need to be elaborated here.

Restrictive Business Practices

And now, a word on restrictive business practices in certain countries and what we try to do about them. As you know, the word "cartel" sounds different to different ears, depending upon the nationality of the ear. In one case that came to our attention, a United States-owned firm was faced with the alternative of joining a cartel that would have impeded its freedom of action or of going out of business in the country involved. In another case, an American firm found that it would be impossible to perform on a defense contract on a competitive-bid basis but that it would get a slice of the business if it joined with foreign firms in submitting collusive bids. All of this is a far cry from the free, competitive, private enterprise system described by Mr. Henry Ford II in an excellent speech he made last year at Cologne, Germany, on the operation of the American economy and its relation to the growth of the Ford Motor Company.

Whenever such discriminations occur against American firms, the Department of State endeavors to seek the removal of these conditions through consultation with the government concerned. We are always glad to have American business bring to our attention cases in which it encounters discrimination in its foreign operations. We cannot always guarantee a solution, but I am happy to say that we have had successes.

U.S. Trade Program

Lastly, let me turn to what the President has termed the key element in our foreign economic policy—the trade program of the United States.

The volume and course of our foreign trade are of crucial importance to American business operations abroad. Earnings of American investments abroad usually are expected, sooner or later, to return here in the form of dollars. The eagle on the American dollar must be permitted to return home to roost; otherwise, its private owner will be unwilling to let it leave home.

But foreign countries must be able to earn dollars in order to make dollar payments on American investments and to spend dollars for goods and services from us. And the only means they have of earning dollars is by selling goods and services to us.

For a long time we have been selling more abroad than we have bought. Since the end of World War II, much of the difference has been made up by grants and loans from the United States Government to other countries. Because of dollar shortages, many countries have blocked the earnings of American business enterprises and have restricted imports of American goods by quotas, embargoes, and exchange restrictions. I am sure you agree with me that these restrictions are unfortunate both for the countries concerned and for ourselves.

How does our trade program help on this problem? The answer is, "In a very direct way." The objective of our trade program is to expand the movement of goods both ways and to enable the rest of the world to earn the dollars it wants to spend with us. For us, this means continued efforts to expand international trade on a mutually profitable and equitable basis. That is the continuing course best calculated to increase the economic strength of the United States and of the countries of the free world. It is the course that enables the fullest and most efficient use of our

resources and those of the other free countries. It is the course that enables other countries to earn more dollars to spend in our markets and to meet payments on American investments needed for their development.

I am happy to report steady progress on that program. At the President's request, the Congress extended the Trade Agreements Act for another 3 years and gave additional authority to the President to make further tariff reductions on a reciprocal basis with other countries.[3] Accordingly, the United States and other countries that participate in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) are meeting at Geneva, beginning in January, to negotiate another round of reciprocal tariff concessions.

Importance of GATT

The GATT is the major instrument in the conduct of our foreign trade relations. The GATT is a multilateral trade agreement in which the United States participates with 34 other countries. These 35 countries together account for about 80 percent of total world trade. The purpose of the GATT is to reduce tariffs and other barriers to trade and to insure fair play in international commerce. In the 8 years that it has been in existence, the GATT has proved its value. Under it, tariffs have been reduced reciprocally and international trade has been conducted in a more orderly way than might otherwise have been the case.

Also part of the President's trade program are two highly significant pieces of legislation that have been submitted to the Congress. One, H.R. 5550, would authorize United States membership in the Organization for Trade Cooperation, an organization whose primary function would be to administer the GATT. The other is the Simplified Customs Bill which, as its name implies, would facilitate the entry of imports through our customs.[4] It is expected that both bills will be considered at the coming session of the Congress. Also under consideration is legislation that would increase the duty-free allowance on foreign goods brought back by American tourists.

The record of the United States in reducing its barriers to trade has been good. Our only import quotas are on a few agricultural products, and these are necessary to safeguard our domestic farm price supports. Our customs procedures are still overly complicated, true, but we are endeavoring to simplify them and have already made some headway. For the rest, our only import restrictions are our tariffs.

Tariff Reductions

And here too, our record of tariff reductions is good. During the past 25 years, the proportion of our customs collections to the value of total imports has been reduced by nearly 75 percent. These tariff reductions have been made on a reciprocal basis with other countries. A few tariff adjustments have been made in especially critical situations to avoid serious injury to our economy, but these have served as safety valves that enabled the trade machinery to continue to function. Although they created a large volume of publicity, these few adjustments do not represent a change in the trend of our trade policy. The record of our overall performance on trade policy is one to which we can refer with assurance when we discuss trade problems with our neighbors in the free world.

What, you might well ask, about the trade policies of other countries? What about the restrictions of other countries against imports of American goods and what is being done to correct these conditions? How do reciprocal reductions in tariffs help if they are offset by other trade-restrictive devices such as import quotas?

It is precisely on these points that our trade program and our cooperation with other countries in trade and financial matters are paying off. As economic recovery and improvement occurred in the rest of the world, we have pressed other countries to relax their import quotas on dollar goods as fully as their foreign exchange reserves allowed. We have exerted this pressure directly and through our participation in the GATT, the International Monetary Fund, and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation.

What are the results so far? The answer is, "Good and getting better as economic conditions in the free world continue to improve." Canada led the way; for some time now, Canada has had no limitation on its trade with the United States other than its tariff. As European recovery developed, the other principal trading countries be-

[3] P.L. 86, 84th Cong.
[4] H.R. 6040.

gan to relax the systems of quotas and licenses that had been established to restrict dollar imports and dollar payments. Western Europe generally has now gone far in that direction, and our exports to that region have surged upward. Developments in other regions are also increasingly favorable. Certainly there is need for continued improvement, and we still look forward to the great goal of full convertibility of the major currencies and the disappearance of the dollar-shortage problem in conjunction with a high level of international trade. I am glad to say that progress is being made. And I believe we can say with justification that the commercial policy of the United States has been an important factor in that progress.

Finally, you are aware, I am sure, of the important role of our diplomatic and consular establishments abroad. They are there, among other things, to help American business by giving advice and information and by helping to remove obstacles to trade and investment. Their analyses of local situations and problems are greatly aided by exchanges of views with you. They, too, are important members of the team, ready to give or to receive assistance.

And now, in closing, I should like to hope that I have given substance to the statement that I made at the beginning of my comments—that American business and its Government can and do work together, in mutual cooperation and help, in foreign economic affairs. Both in Washington and in our missions abroad, the Department of State values and seeks your assistance on foreign economic problems. You have given it, generously. For that, we are grateful.

Renegotiation of Tariff Concessions With Five Countries

Press release 695 dated December 16

Tariff negotiations held by India, the Netherlands Antilles, New Zealand, Nicaragua, and Pakistan with the United States have now been concluded, resulting in the modification of certain tariff concessions previously made by these countries under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.[1] The United States agreed to the modification or withdrawal of some existing concessions in return for new concessions on trade items in which it has an interest. No changes in U.S. duties were involved in these renegotiations.

By an action taken by the Contracting Parties to the general agreement earlier in the year, the firm life of the tariff concessions in the agreement—which was due to expire on July 1, 1955—was renewed to December 31, 1957. Before agreeing to this action, a number of countries undertook to renegotiate some of their tariff concessions in accordance with the provisions of article XXVIII of the agreement and procedures established by the Contracting Parties. In these renegotiations, the country wishing to modify or withdraw concessions usually grants new concessions as compensation to countries that were originally granted the concessions being modified or withdrawn and to countries determined to have a substantial trade interest in such concessions. The purpose of granting new concessions is to endeavor to maintain the previous level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions.

India negotiated with the United States and other countries for the withdrawal of its concession rates on certain coal-tar dyes. As compensation for the withdrawals, India granted new concessions to the United States, reducing duties substantially below the present legal rates on certain patent foods and on surgical and scientific instruments, apparatus, and appliances. The United States may also benefit indirectly from India's compensatory concession to Germany binding the present low rate of duty on dye intermediates. In fiscal year 1953–54, U.S. exports of the items on which the concessions were withdrawn are estimated to have been about $1,924,000. Trade statistics are not available for all of the compensatory items, but India imported about $483,000 worth of surgical and scientific instruments and $73,000 worth of dye intermediates from the United States in fiscal 1953–54, and U.S. trade in these items may be expected to increase substantially.

The Netherlands Antilles negotiations were

[1] For details of the negotiations, see *General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Analysis of Renegotiation of Certain Tariff Concessions (India, Netherlands Antilles, New Zealand, Nicaragua, and Pakistan)*, Department of State publication 6201, for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., 15 cents. For an announcement concerning renegotiations with Italy, Peru, Turkey, and South Africa see BULLETIN of Oct. 10, 1955, p. 578; with Canada and Belgium, see *ibid.*, June 27, 1955, p. 1051.

more extensive, involving a revision of their entire tariff schedule and resulting in a generally moderate increase of their customs duties. These increases in rates are not expected to have a restrictive effect on U.S. exports; hence, the Netherlands Antilles was not obligated to grant as much compensation as would normally be expected. Nevertheless, rates on a number of products have been reduced or bound at the previous level and new concessions on a number of products have been granted at reduced rates or rates considered moderate. Rates in the revised schedule are still generally quite low and are assessed on an f. o. b. factory basis. Imports from the United States of the products on which rates were increased were valued at about $10 million in 1953. U.S. trade in the compensatory items was about $5 million in 1953.

New Zealand withdrew a concession originally granted to the United States on mufflers, pistons, and cylinder sleeves for tractor and traction engines and also concessions with other countries on seven other items in which the United States had a trade interest. As compensation, New Zealand granted new concessions to the United States on vegetable turpentine, rosin, green or sun-dried fur skins, and electric motors up to 25 horsepower, and concessions to other countries on motors, confectionery, glass sheets, and musical instruments. Imports from the United States of products on which concessions were withdrawn amounted to slightly under $100,000 in 1952, the latest year for which complete trade figures are available, while imports from the United States of the products on which new concessions were granted were valued at approximately $336,000.

Nicaragua made small to moderate increases in duties on concessions granted to the United States on flavoring preparations, rayon hosiery and certain rayon fabrics, small radio sets and parts, typewriters and parts, calculating machines and parts, and evaporated, condensed, and powdered milk, and cream. As compensation for these increases, Nicaragua reduced substantially the duties on certain medicinals and pharmaceuticals, X-ray equipment and film, and fountain pens and granted new concessions to the United States on trucks and jeeps. Nicaragua also modified upward a number of concessions originally granted to other countries on items in which the United States has a varying degree of trade interest. These items include marble, glass, plywood, brandy, whisky, sparkling wines, and textiles. Nicaragua granted compensation for these increases by reducing duties on previous concessions or granting new concessions on textiles, newsprint, sewing machines, bicycles and parts, motorcycles and parts, and tires and tubes of all types. U.S. trade in the items on which duties were increased was valued at approximately $1,100,000 in 1953, while the value of U.S. trade in the compensation items amounted to nearly $2,500,000 in 1953.

Pakistan withdrew concessions originally negotiated with the United States on canned vegetables, certain types of paint, razor blades, typewriter ribbons, and fountain pens valued at not more than $1.50 each. The United States received compensation in the form of a concession binding the present duty-free rate on wheat and concessions binding rates substantially below present statutory levels on electric generating sets, thermoplastic and thermosetting moulding powders, and certain antimalarial drugs. Pakistan also agreed that preference rates, formerly applicable to tobacco of Burmese and British Colonial origin and now eliminated, will not be restored. The five items on which concessions were withdrawn had a trade value to the United States of about $12,000 in fiscal year 1953–54. The low level of U.S. exports reflects in part import restrictions on these items imposed by Pakistan for balance-of-payment reasons. Except for tobacco and wheat, in which U.S. trade with Pakistan was valued at $3,150,000, the trade coverage of the compensatory concessions granted by Pakistan cannot be determined from available statistical data.

Surplus Commodity Agreements With Colombia and Argentina

On December 21 the Department of State announced the signing of surplus commodity agreements with Colombia (press release 704) and Argentina (press release 705) under authority and provisions of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended.

The agreement with Colombia, signed at Bogotá on December 20, authorizes the sale during the fiscal year 1956 to Colombia, through private U.S. traders, of approximately 50,000 metric tons of wheat, approximately 32,400 bales of cotton, and approximately 4,300 metric tons of edible oil.

The total export market value of this transaction is estimated at $11,600,000.

The agreement provides that, of the $11,600,000 in Colombian pesos accruing as a result of the sale, $7,000,000 in pesos will be earmarked for loans to stimulate Colombia's economic potential and will be repayable in dollars or pesos under terms of a supplementary loan agreement to be concluded at a later date. The balance, $4,600,000 in pesos, will be used for various purposes by the United States, including the financing of an educational exchange program and agricultural market development.

The agreement with the Argentine Republic signed at Buenos Aires on December 21, authorizes the sale to Argentina, through private U.S. traders, of 80,000 metric tons of edible oils and/or fat. Of the $25.3 million in pesos accruing as a result of the sale, 70 percent will be earmarked for loans to stimulate Argentina's economic potential and will be repayable in dollars or pesos under terms of a supplementary loan agreement to be concluded at a later date. The balance will be used for various purposes by the United States, including the financing of an educational exchange program

This agreement, the first to be concluded with the provisional government of President Aramburu, was negotiated at Washington through Ambassador Adolfo Vicchi.

Agreement on Sale of Poultry to Federal Republic of Germany

Press release 710 dated December 23

The Department of State on December 23 announced signature of an agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany for the sale of approximately $1,200,000 worth of United States poultry (chickens and turkeys) to the Federal Republic for Deutschemarks under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (Public Law 480).

Sales under this program will be made by private U.S. traders. Details of the purchase authorization to be issued will be announced later.

The bulk of the Deutschemarks accruing from this sale will be used for development of markets for United States agricultural commodities in Germany.

Assistant Secretary of State Livingston T. Merchant signed the agreement for the United States and Albert F. Ernecke, Commercial Counselor of the German Embassy, signed for the Federal Republic.

Advisory Council of Inter-American Agricultural Institute

The Department of State announced on December 16 (press release 697) that Byron T. Shaw, Administrator, Agricultural Research Service, Department of Agriculture, has been designated U.S. member of the Technical Advisory Council of the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences. Claud L. Horn, Agricultural Attaché, American Embassy, San José, Costa Rica, has been designated alternate U.S. member of the Council.

The purpose of the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences is "to encourage and advance the development of agricultural sciences in the American Republics through research, teaching and extension activities in the theory and practice of agriculture and related arts and sciences." The Institute undertakes to carry out in this specialized field the broad objective of the Organization of American States to promote, through cooperative action, the economic and social development of the American Republics. It carries on its program through (1) the demonstration of modern agricultural techniques and equipment, (2) research and field projects carried on by resident and visiting scientists, (3) instruction at the graduate level of students who are selected with a view to their returning to their own countries to occupy scientific and administrative positions, and (4) inter-American technical meetings.

The Institute, which is a specialized organization of the Organization of American States, is located at Turrialba, Costa Rica. It was established pursuant to a resolution of the Eighth American Scientific Congress, held at Washington, D. C., May 10–17, 1940, and a recommendation of the Governing Body of the Pan American Union. The convention establishing the Institute entered into force on November 30, 1944.

Provision was made in the 1944 convention for the establishment of a Technical Advisory Council

o assist the director of the Institute in dealing ;ith agricultural matters of a technical nature. 'n view of the increasing scope of the Institute's ctivities, the Board of Directors on April 26, 1955, asked member governments to appoint representatives on the Technical Advisory Council. It is expected that the Council will hold its first meeting in March 1956, at the Institute.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of Meetings [1]

djourned During December 1955

. N. General Assembly: 10th Session	New York	Sept. 20–Dec. 20
ATT Contracting Parties: 10th Session	Geneva	Oct. 27–Dec. 2
ıternational Exposition on "The Child in the World"	Rome	Nov. 1–Dec. 15
lver Jubilee Fair in Celebration of the 25th Anniversary of the Coronation of the Emperor.	Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)	Nov. 5–Dec. 4
. N. ECE Electric Power Committee and Working Parties	Geneva	Nov. 22–Dec. 3
ıternational Association of Social Security: 12th General Assembly.	México, D. F.	Nov. 23–Dec. 4
l International Fair and Exposition of Colombia	Bogotá	Nov. 25–Dec. 11
ıternational Sugar Council: 6th Session	London	Nov. 28–Dec. 1
LO Asian Technical Conference on Vocational Training for Industry.	Rangoon	Nov. 28–Dec. 10
. N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade: Resumed 2d Session.	Geneva	Nov. 28–Dec. 16
t European Civil Aviation Conference	Strasbourg	Nov. 29–Dec. 16
NESCO Conference on Cultural Relations and International Cooperation.	Paris	Dec. 1–6
t Central American Meeting on Agricultural Research (FAO/IAIAS).	Turrialba (Costa Rica)	Dec. 5–10
AO International Rice Commission: 5th Meeting of Working Party on Fertilizers and 6th Meeting of Working Party on Rice Breeding.	Penang (Malaya)	Dec. 5–11
aribbean Commission: 21st Meeting	Aruba (Netherlands Antilles)	Dec. 5–12
. N. Economic and Social Council: Resumed 20th Session	New York	Dec. 5–15
. N. Seminar on Population Problems in Latin America	Rio de Janeiro	Dec. 5–16
. N. ECE Steel Committee: 15th Session	Geneva	Dec. 8–9
ıter-American Travel Congresses: 1st Meeting of Technical Committee on Travel Plant and Facilities.	Washington	Dec. 12–16
ATO: Ministerial Meeting of the Council	Paris	Dec. 15–16

ı Session as of December 31, 1955

orth Pacific Fur Seal Conference	Washington	Nov. 28–
ıternational Peace and Progress Fair	Ciudad Trujillo (Dominican Republic).	Dec. 20–

cheduled January 1–March 31, 1956

. N. ECOSOC Human Rights Commission: 8th Session of Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.	New York	Jan. 3–
. N. ECAFE Inland Transport Committee: 5th Session	Bangkok	Jan. 9–

[1] Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Dec. 20, 1955. Asterisk indicates tentative date. Following a list of abbreviations: U. N., United Nations; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; ECE, Economic ommission for Europe; ILO, International Labor Organization; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; UNESCO, nited Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; IAIAS, ıter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; ECAFE, Economic ommission for Asia and the Far East; WHO, World Health Organization; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Orıanization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; WMO, World Meteorological Organizaon; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund.

Calendar of Meetings—*Continued*

Scheduled January 1–March 31, 1956—*Continued*

Royal Agricultural and Food Exhibition	Colombo (Ceylon)	Jan. 12–
Mining, Geological and Metallurgical Institute of India: 50th Anniversary Celebration.	New Delhi	Jan. 15–
Inter-American Travel Congresses: 2d Meeting of Permanent Executive Committee.	Lima	Jan. 16–
WHO Executive Board: 17th Session	Geneva	Jan. 17–
Inter-American Council of Jurists: 3d Meeting	México, D. F.	Jan. 17–
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: 1956 Tariff Negotiations	Geneva	Jan. 18–
U. N. Refugee Fund: 2d Meeting of Program Subcommittee	Geneva	Jan. 18–
U. N. Refugee Fund: 2d Session of Executive Committee	Geneva	Jan. 23–
Pan American Highway Congresses: Technical Committee on Financing.	Caracas	Jan. 23–
Caribbean Commission/FAO: Technical Conference on Cooperatives.	Georgetown (British Guiana)	Jan. 24–
U. N. ECAFE Committee on Industry and Trade: 8th Session	Bangalore (India)	Jan. 24–
U. N. Trusteeship Council: Standing Committee on Administrative Unions.	New York	Jan. 31–
International Atomic Energy Agency: Working Level Meeting on Draft Statute.	Washington	January
U. N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: 12th Session.	Bangalore (India)	Feb. 2–
Pan American Highway Congresses: Technical Committee on Terminology.	Buenos Aires	Feb. 7–
U. N. Trusteeship Council: 17th Session	New York	Feb. 7–
FAO Forestry and Forest Products Commission for Asia and Pacific: Subcommission on Teak.	Bangkok	Feb. 9–
ILO Building, Civil Engineering and Public Works Committee: 5th Session.	Geneva	Feb. 13–
ICAO Panel on Vertical Separation of Aircraft: 1st Meeting	Montreal	Feb. 14–
ICEM Executive Committee: 4th Session	Geneva	Feb. 14–
WMO International Hurricane Seminar	Ciudad Trujillo (Dominican Republic)	Feb. 16–
ICEM Council: 4th Session	Geneva	Feb. 20–
U. N. International Wheat Conference: 2d Session	Geneva	Feb. 20–
ILO Governing Board: 131st Meeting	Geneva	Feb. 27–
U. N. ECOSOC Committee on Nongovernmental Organizations	New York	Feb. 27–
FAO Intergovernmental Consultation on Epizootics	Paris	February
Inter-American Travel Congresses: Technical Committee on Travel Barriers.	Buenos Aires	February
Inter-American Travel Congresses: Technical Committee on Travel Promotion.	México, D.F.	February
ITU International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR): Study Group XI, Color Television Demonstrations.	New York	Mar. 5–
U. N. ECAFE Subcommittee on Electric Power	India	Mar. 5–
U. N. Human Rights Commission: 12th Session	New York	Mar. 5–
UNICEF Executive Board and Program Committee	New York	Mar. 5–
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization: Council and Economic Committee.	Karachi	Mar. 6–
IAIAS Technical Advisory Council: 1st Meeting	Turrialba (Costa Rica)	Mar. 8–
U. N. ECOSOC Commission on Status of Women: 10th Session	Geneva	Mar. 13–
U. N. ECAFE Railway Subcommittee: 4th Session	New Delhi	Mar. 15–
8th International Congress of the Vineyard and Wine	Santiago	Mar. 19–
U. N. ECAFE: 4th Regional Conference of Statisticians	Bangkok	Mar. 26–
ITU International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR): Study Group XI, Color Television Demonstrations.	Paris	Mar. 27–
American International Institute for the Protection of Childhood: Semiannual Meeting of Directing Council.	Montevideo	March*
Inter-American Specialized Conference on the Conservation of the Resources of the Continental Shelf and Marine Waters.	Ciudad Trujillo (Dominican Republic)	March
U.N. Scientific Committee on Radiation: 1st Meeting	New York	March
UNESCO Conference on the Cultural Integration of Immigrants	Caracas	March
WMO Regional Association VI (Europe): 2d Session	Dubrovnik (Yugoslavia)	March

Aiding Arab Refugees

Statements by James J. Wadsworth
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly[1]

STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 16

U.S. delegation press release 2275

For the second year we have had the privilege of listening to a statement by the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. Mr. [Henry R.] Labouisse as usual has been fair and objective in the presentation of his statement. He has shown, as we know, that he is a man of courage and honesty. He has a determination to do his job and do it right.

I intervene here in this committee today to tell it that the United States wants to help him in the Herculean job that he has before him. I am here to enlist the support of others because Mr. Labouisse and the many faithful employees of the Agency cannot do the job alone.

Mr. Labouisse has made clear his view that he cannot carry out his mandate completely unless there is a resolution of some of the important political problems connected with the overall Palestine question. We agree with him. There must be a solution to the problem of whether the Arab refugees shall be repatriated or shall be compensated. The sooner the better. There must be a solution of the other outstanding differences between Israel and the Arab States. Again we say—the sooner the better.

However, the inability to settle these problems must not stand in the way of what in our opinion is the most important matter before us—namely, the maintenance and improvement of the lot of the Arab refugee. This responsibility should elicit from us all—but particularly from the Arab States directly concerned, whose brothers these refugees are—all the courage and imagination that their leaders have at their command. It will take this courage and imagination just to make a start on beginning a new and better life for the refugees. We have no illusions that in proposing a start on programs which will make refugees self-supporting we have hit on the solution to the refugee problem. Not at all. But a start is necessary now. A start should have been made long ago. We are sure that in making that start our Arab friends understand that what will benefit the Arab refugees will benefit the Arab countries themselves.

Let me be specific. The plan for the development of the Jordan Valley, which has been the subject of intensive and fruitful negotiation between Ambassador Eric Johnston and the interested countries in the area, will bring 125,000 acres of new land into cultivation in the Kingdom of Jordan alone. It will provide the basis for substantial hydroelectric power on the Yarmuk River for Syria and Jordan. Bringing this new land under cultivation will not only assist in providing many, many thousands of Arab refugees and their other fellow Arabs with new and self-respecting means of livelihood. It will also create new jobs, new facilities, new industries which, given a period of time, will increase the gross national product of Jordan alone many times what it is today. We repeat: This project alone—just as the Sinai project alone—won't solve the refugee problem. But it is a very substantial start—a start that must be made, a start that the United States, for one, has already shown its earnest desire to help by its contributions to UNRWA. It is a start for a new and better Arab world.

However, the United States alone, the contribu-

[1] Made in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee.

tors of funds to UNRWA alone, the United Nations itself can't bring this about unless the leaders in these Arab nations will let us help them help themselves. We believe that they can, to the benefit of their countries, view the refugee as an important asset, not, as is too often implied here in debate, an unwanted liability. Upon these leaders' shoulders, we believe, rests the choice between progress to greatness and prosperity or the narrow clinging to the *status quo* which benefits no one but those who profit from misery and chaos.

As for the problem of continued relief for the refugees, we, of course, believe that we must to the best of our ability continue to support UNRWA in its program. We have already indicated to the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds that we are prepared to assist during the coming year to the extent of some $16 million or its equivalent in goods. We earnestly hope that contributions will be forthcoming from many other countries who have not already pledged. This work must be continued, even under the restrictions under which Mr. Labouisse and his Agency are able to operate.

With regard to Mr. Labouisse's special report, called for in last year's resolution, we have noted with concern the plight of the Jordanian villagers and the other Arabs in the Gaza area and those Bedouin tribes who do not qualify under the definition of Palestine refugees. We sincerely believe that the solution to their problem is to appeal to charitable organizations, with the material assistance of UNRWA, to try to cope with this problem. I can assure you that the United States is considering how it may further assist in this particular problem.

We welcome the indication that concrete steps are being taken toward assuring that more children are being properly fed. The sooner those undeserving of assistance are removed from the roles, the sooner may more children be taken care of.

I said at the outset that we recognized the necessity of settling the political problems connected with the Palestine question. It is the continuing duty of us all, especially Israel and the Arab States involved, to work toward this goal. Our record is perfectly clear on this point. We have striven and are still hard at work both in the United Nations and outside to bring about their early solution. I need only point to Secretary of State Dulles' August statement on steps toward the resolution of the Palestine dispute as proof of our concern over these problems.[2] But what must be of paramount importance here, now, in this debate, is that these political problems which must be resolved—and which have taken and will take time to solve—shall not stand in the way of steps of progress toward a better life for the Arab refugee.

In the light of the position of my Government which I have just set forth, the United States has joined with its British and Turkish colleagues in drafting a resolution[3] which we hope we will be able to table within 24 hours. I reserve for my delegation the right to speak again after the resolution is tabled.

STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 29

U.S. delegation press release 2298

It would seem that it has been a very desirable thing to have heard the intervention of the distinguished representative of Syria [Ahmed Shukairy], and to the extent that my intervention today might not answer all the specific points which he has brought up, I would like to reserve for my delegation after consultation with the cosponsors the right to pinpoint at a later time some of the matters which he has brought to our attention.

Now, with the conclusion of the general debate, we have the obligation, as my delegation sees it, of charting a course for the Agency for this coming year. The differences of opinion expressed in the past 10 days have not, I trust, obscured the fact that there has been a large measure of agreement on the immediate and practical problem before us.

The plight of the refugees is unchallenged. Their need and desire to live active and useful lives is beyond question, and their potential contribution to the wealth and well-being of the Middle East has been attested to by many speakers here. The special problem posed by other claimants not refugees, but nonetheless the unhappy victims of events beyond their control, has stirred the compassion of all those here.

Perhaps even more striking than the essential agreement on the dimensions of refugee needs

[2] BULLETIN of Sept. 5, 1955, p. 378.
[3] U.N. doc. A/AC.80/L.6 dated Nov. 28.

Resolution on Palestine Refugee Item[1]

U.N. doc. A/Res/337 dated December 7

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) of 2 December 1950, 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953 and 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954,

Noting the annual report[2] and the special report[3] of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and the report (A/3017) of the Advisory Commission of the Agency,

Having reviewed the budgets for relief and rehabilitation prepared by the Director of the Agency,

Noting that repatriation or compensation of the refugees, as provided for in paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III), has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme for reintegration of refugees endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) and that the situation of the refugees therefore continues to be a matter of grave concern,

1. *Directs* the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to pursue its programmes for the relief and rehabilitation of refugees, bearing in mind the limitations imposed upon it by the extent of the contributions for the fiscal year;

2. *Requests* the Agency to continue its consultation with the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine in the best interest of their respective tasks, with particular reference to paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III);

3. *Requests* the Governments of the area, without prejudice to paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III), to make a determined effort, in co-operation with the Director of the Agency, to seek and carry out projects capable of supporting substantial numbers of refugees;

4. *Notes with gratification* that the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan and the Agency have made substantial progress toward resolving the difficulties which impede the granting of rations to all qualified refugee children in Jordan;

5. *Notes* the serious need of the other claimants for relief as described in the special report prepared by the Director pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 818 (IX), namely, the frontier villagers in Jordan, the non-refugee population of the Gaza strip, a number of the refugees in Egypt, and certain of the Bedouin;

6. *Appeals* to private organizations to give them increased assistance to the extent that local governments cannot do so;

7. *Urges* all Governments and individuals to support these private organizations with food, goods and services;

8. *Requests* the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds, after the receipt of the budgets from the Director of the Agency, to seek such funds as may be required by the Agency;

9. *Appeals* to the Governments of Member and non-member States to make voluntary contributions to the extent necessary to carry through to fulfilment the Agency's programmes, and thanks the numerous religious, charitable and humanitarian organizations for their valuable and continuing work in assisting the refugees;

10. *Expresses its thanks* to the Director and the staff of the Agency for their continued faithful efforts to carry out their mandate, and requests the Governments of the area to continue to facilitate the work of the Agency and to ensure the protection of its personnel and property;

11. *Requests* the Director of the Agency to continue to submit the reports referred to in paragraph 21 of resolution 302 (IV) as well as the annual budgets.

[1] Approved by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on Nov. 30 by a vote of 38–0–19 and by the General Assembly on Dec. 3, 38–0–17.

[2] U.N. doc. A/2978.

[3] U.N. doc. A/2978/Add. 1.

and the role of the Agency is the impatience threaded through the statements of delegate after delegate, an impatience that we are not moving forward rapidly enough with the task of helping these people toward self-support. It is an impatience that my Government shares. While we agree with those who say that the refugee problem cannot be solved overnight, we believe it is reasonable to expect a beginning without further delay. Projects have been planned in great detail on which work could begin almost immediately, and it is time we get on with that part of the job.

As in the past, the resolution tabled by Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States centers on the technical and administrative needs of the Agency. It does not focus on complex political problems. On the contrary, a careful effort has been made to exclude issues of political significance. A solution must be found for these problems as quickly as possible. And I can assure the members of this committee that my Government is actively seeking such a solution at all

times. But we recognize that a resolution on the operation of the Agency, on the technical and administrative factors, is not the place to attempt the resolution of political problems.

As my colleagues will recognize, the preamble of the resolution follows the general pattern of past years in recalling the pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly and in taking cognizance of the report of the Director and the report of the Advisory Commission. May I say, Mr. Chairman, that if the preamble concludes by stating the discouraging circumstance that the proposals of the General Assembly for the amelioration of the lot of the refugees have not been put into effect, and if it reiterates once again that the situation continues to be a matter of grave concern, it nevertheless reflects accurately the facts of the matter.

Now, the first operative paragraph of the resolution is designed to express the will of the Assembly that the Agency should continue its program for relief and rehabilitation. As a matter of normal prudence, the Agency is asked to maintain its expenditures within the limits imposed by the extent of the contributions. It is not intended to ask the Agency to adjust its operations to the level of contributions prevailing at any one time in the course of the year, but to make its plans on the basis of anticipated contributions for the entire year.

Now the second operative paragraph is precisely the same as, and the third paragraph is very similar to, the corresponding paragraphs in the resolution last year.[4] The second paragraph has been reintroduced to express the continued desirability of consultation between the Agency and the Palestine Conciliation Commission concerning their respective functions. The third paragraph once again calls on the governments of the Near East to cooperate with the Director in seeking and carrying out projects capable of supporting substantial numbers of refugees. My Government, Mr. Chairman, places great importance on this paragraph since it is through these projects, wherever they may be found, that large numbers of the refugees may be helped toward self-support. We can help them to help themselves, but we cannot indefinitely maintain them in idleness when opportunities such as those provided in the Jordan Valley plan, the Sinai project, and other projects which may be found offer them a better life. Now, this paragraph is designed to provide a general stimulus to all the governments of the area, without prejudice to any existing rights, in the search for new opportunities for the refugees and toward cooperation with the Agency in carrying out projects for refugee benefits.

The next four paragraphs are new as contrasted to last year and are responsive to the Special Report of the Director concerning the other claimants for relief.[5] In these paragraphs the distinction in the Special Report between two broad categories of claimants has been maintained. On the one hand, there are those children in Jordan who are qualified for relief under the definition of eligibility sanctioned by the General Assembly but who are not receiving full relief services. On the other hand are the persons who for the most part are not refugees under the definition but who have been cut off from their normal sources of livelihood as a consequence of the hostilities of 1948.

Cooperation of Jordan Government

In the case of qualified children, my Government believes that the Agency with the cooperation of the Government of Jordan should undertake their support as rapidly as the removal of ineligibles from the rolls will permit. And I wish to repeat the welcome expressed in my statement of November 16 to the indications that immediate and practical steps are being taken in this direction. This gratification has been noted in the resolution in evidence of the cooperation between the Government of Jordan and the Agency—this cooperation which we fervently hope and believe is bringing this difficult question nearer to solution.

Now, so far as the other claimants are concerned, however, the unfortunate facts are that financial support for the Agency is clearly insufficient to warrant extensive additional responsibilities, despite the support of the United States and a number of other countries, all of which are well known to the members of this committee. We do not believe that there should be a redefinition of refugee eligibility which would at this time add new claimants to the Agency's relief rolls. Further, the history to date of the effort

[4] Bulletin of Jan. 3, 1955, p. 27.

[5] U.N. doc. A/2978/Add. 1.

o make the refugee self-sustaining warns us gainst placing heavy new burdens on the Agency. This is a matter of stark reality. We therefore elieve that the only course of action, if we are ot to ignore this side of the problem completely, s to appeal to voluntary agencies for the assistance of these people. And my Government lans to help make such an appeal meaningful y making increased quantities of foodstuffs available to the agencies coming to their help.

Now, Mr. Chairman, the resolution last year nade the necessary arrangements to extend the ife of the Agency for 5 years. The paragraphs n previous resolutions respecting the maintenance of the rehabilitation fund and the continuation of the Agency's activities are therefore no onger required. It is felt desirable to indicate hat the Assembly has reviewed the budgets submitted to the Director, however, and to renew the equest to the negotiating committee to seek the unds required by the Agency on receipt of new udgets, and this particularly, Mr. Chairman, ince the new budgets are scheduled for submission before the General Assembly meets again. The review of the budgetary submission has been ncluded in the preamble along with the recognition given to the other reports submitted by the Agency, while the request to the negotiating committee has been carried over intact from last year s operative paragraph No. 8.

ppeal for Contributions

The appeal in our paragraph 9 for contributions o carry through the Agency's programs and the xpression of thanks for the valuable support iven by the numerous religious, charitable, and umanitarian organizations are both set forth in recisely the same language as that used last year, s is the request to the Director in our paragraph 1 to continue his customary reports.

The only remaining change, therefore, in this esolution is the addition of the new paragraph 0. This paragraph expresses thanks to the Director and staff of the Agency and requests the overnments of the area to continue to facilitate he Agency's work and to insure the protection f its personnel and property. The gratitude that e of the Assembly owe to the Director in his ifficult task has been so warmly and so widely tated in this committee that its inclusion requires o further explanation.

I would, however, like to conclude with a comment on this matter of facilitating the work of the Agency and of insuring the protection of its personnel and property. In annex G of his Annual Report, the Director points to the greater understanding which the Agency has found this past year in its correspondence with governments of the area regarding and respecting its status as a public international organization. The recital of the operating difficulties which the Agency still is experiencing is, however, a long one, and it includes descriptions of highly onerous restrictions on Agency activities. We feel that the governments of the area have a particularly good opportunity to give concrete expression to their appreciation for the efforts of the Director by helping in still greater measure to ease his difficult task. And with full recognition of the tremendous problems of these troubled times in this area, we feel that it is essential to urge special care for the lives and well-being of the dedicated people who make up this Agency and for the property which is the material evidence of the world's interest in the tragic condition of the Palestine refugees.

STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 30

U.S. delegation press release 2303

After consultation with my colleagues from the United Kingdom and Turkey, I intervene again today to comment briefly on statements from several of the delegations with regard to the resolution before us.

The purpose of this resolution is to provide a directive for the operation of UNRWA in the next year, to express due commendation of that Agency's work, and to appeal for its continued support. The resolution is therefore in much the same form and language as last year's resolution which was passed by a substantial majority, including the affirmative votes of most of the delegations of the Arab States.

Much of the comment on the resolution has centered on operative paragraph 3, which requests the governments of the area to make a determined effort in cooperation with the Director of the Agency to seek and carry out projects capable of supporting substantial numbers of refugees. Mr. Shukairy has asked my United Kingdom colleague to make clear which governments of the area are referred to. As Mr. [P. M.] Cros-

thwaite has already said, the request is a general one. "Governments of the area" means what it says, and no particular government is excluded. The phrase "projects capable of supporting substantial numbers of refugees" is also general. It is not confined to projects presently under consideration. We all hope that new projects will be found. Both these phrases are time-honored. They appear also in last year's resolution, and there is no need to read anything new or sinister in the language. By supporting such language no State commits itself to carry out any particular project. Certainly, the need for such projects has not diminished since last year.

It has also been stated that the resolution, in paragraphs 6 and 7, has "shifted the responsibility on the charitable organizations" for the other claimants discussed in the Director's Special Report. I should like to make it clear to this committee that the Agency has never had responsibility for those other claimants, has not been engaged in providing for their relief, and that no question of shifting responsibility arises. The resolution recognizes that there are other needy people in the area besides those eligible for relief services from the Agency, and it makes a special appeal to private organizations to give them increased assistance to the extent that local governments cannot do so. We are sympathetic to the tragic human problem which these other claimants represent, and my Government is attempting to assist them through making increased foodstuffs available to voluntary agencies coming to their assistance. We do not believe, however, that they should be added to UNRWA's relief rolls, increasing still further the Agency's tremendous responsibilities. We are already concerned at the lack of financial support for UNRWA, which is making it difficult to meet even the present requirements.

We are deeply concerned with the urgent need for a solution of the political issues which have been debated at length in this committee. My Government, the Government of the United Kingdom, and other governments as well, are actively cooperating in a search for a solution. But let me repeat the earnest conviction that these problems must not deflect the General Assembly from its immediate task of providing, through this Agency, not a plan of starvation but the best obtainable life for the Arab refugees.

Future of Togoland Under British Administration

STATEMENT BY BENJAMIN GERIG [1]

The United States delegation has carefully examined the special report of the Visiting Mission on the Togoland Unification Problem and the Future of Togoland under British Administration.[2] It wishes first of all to pay tribute to the clear and painstaking way in which the mission discharged its duties. We consider that the resolutions of the Visiting Mission constitute a practical basis, both as to substance and procedure, on which the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly can, within the scope of their respective functions, take the necessary decisions. In this connection, we think that in view of the rapidly approaching adjournment date of the General Assembly, and without establishing a precedent, the Trusteeship Council might well couch its recommendations in general terms, leaving it to the General Assembly to provide further detailed recommendations, if it so desires. The immediate problem is the future of the people of British Togoland, the solution of which will have profound effects for the Togolese people and their relations with their neighbors.

As we have already heard from the statement of the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom [Henry Hopkinson], there are certain points on which his delegation would prefer to see amendments or changes. Let me say, first of all, that we have always considered that the full and wholehearted cooperation of the Administering Authority is essential in carrying out any such plan affecting the future of this territory. We are encouraged to believe that there will be such cooperation in view of the earnestness with which the United Kingdom Government has sought to satisfy the United Nations in regard to this problem of joint concern. The differences which remain between the recommendations of the Visiting Mission and those of the Administering Authority are not, in our view, insurmountable. In pa

[1] Made in the U.N. Trusteeship Council on Nov. (U.S./U.N. press release 2283). Mr. Gerig, Director the Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Department State, was acting U.S. representative in the Council.

[2] U.N. doc. T/1206 and Add. 1.

ular, we are glad to note that the recommenda-
n of the mission as to the procedure for carrying
t the plebiscite and regarding the duties of a
ebiscite commissioner is in general regarded as
acticable and seems to be acceptable to the Ad-
nistering Authority. Here too, of course, there
ıy be certain minor details which will need to
considered, but there is already a great gain if
e procedure for carrying out the plebiscite can
generally agreed on.

There remain then one or two other questions
which an arrangement will need to be worked
t. One of these, as the distinguished represent-
ve of the United Kingdom told us yesterday, is
e nature of the question or questions to be put in
e plebiscite. We agree that experience has
own that, in principle, plebiscite questions
ould always be kept simple, should be easily
derstood, and that the number of questions
ould be kept to a minimum. The principal ques-
n to be put to the people of British Togoland
whether they wish to see their future as a part
an independent Gold Coast. This is essentially
e choice which is offered by the Special Mission
d, we believe, also the choice which the Admin-
ering Authority would wish to place before
em. The essential difference between the form-
ation of the Visiting Mission and that preferred
the Administering Authority seems to be the
press reference to continuing some kind of trus-
eship for any district that would not opt imme-
ately for integration with the Gold Coast. After
l, if a simple single question were to be put, as
e United Kingdom representative proposes, and
a majority in any area were to vote in the nega-
ve, the practical situation would be the same as if
e question were asked in two parts, namely, some
ntinuing administration would need to be pro-
ded for.

Although we appreciate the problems involved
the formulation of the question, as pointed out
esterday by Mr. Hopkinson, we find it difficult to
lieve that the Administering Authority would
ıd it impossible to continue temporarily some
nd of administrative responsibility in certain
eas where there might be substantial majorities
ho are not quite ready to make up their own
inds as to their future. We fully realize why
e Administering Authority, which has expressed
s view that the territory is ready for independ-
ıce as an integral part of the Gold Coast, would
ot wish to undertake to administer a part of the
territory after the Gold Coast had become independent. We nevertheless would hope that, now that the development of the territory has so nearly reached a point of final determination, the Administering Authority might find it possible to accommodate themselves to such a temporary situation. This situation of course may not arise and, in fact, my delegation trusts that we will not be confronted with such a contingency. But should such a contingency arise, we would hope that the Administering Authority in cooperation with the United Nations would find it possible to continue to assist in these final stages.

We believe, therefore, that in practice the two proposed questions of the Visiting Mission and the simpler single one proposed by the Administering Authority really amount to about the same thing since they recognize the possible problem of the need for providing an administration for those who temporarily desire to continue under the present arrangement.

The second point of difference between the recommendation of the Visiting Mission and the Administering Authority is with respect to the way the plebiscite votes would be counted—whether in a single block or separately in several area units. We have tried to see the advantages and disadvantages of both points of view. If differences within the population are not too wide, we would normally prefer to see a decision taken on the basis of a majority of the country as a whole. Or if prevailing differences were evenly distributed throughout the country as a whole, we think the attitude of the majority should also prevail. However, when the differences are quite pronounced as between geographic areas, a special situation arises which we feel at least merits some consideration. We would hope, however, that there would be no ultimate fragmentation which, we believe, the Visiting Mission itself sought to avoid. We attach importance to the advantages which accrue from establishing and maintaining an entity which is both politically and economically viable. And we believe that the inhabitants themselves share this opinion.

After examining the advantages and disadvantages of the recommendations of the Visiting Mission we are inclined to the view that their proposal of counting the plebiscite votes by districts not only is somewhat more sensitive to the feelings and attitudes of the people but we also believe that the plan is feasible and practicable, provided all the

directly interested authorities could agree to cooperate together in carrying out the proposal. In saying this we will be prepared to consider adjustments or alternative arrangements which may be brought forward in the discussions here or in the General Assembly. Our minds are not absolutely fixed to any one course of procedure but we believe, as I said earlier, that the proposals of the Visiting Mission in this respect furnish a practicable and feasible means for ascertaining the wishes of the people.

Mr. Chairman, nothing is more important than the building of a new nation made up of peoples with common interests. We believe that if this next step is carried out in a spirit of accommodation and with sensitiveness to the wishes of the people involved, the future of the people of Togoland and of the Gold Coast can be, and we believe will be, happy, peaceful, and prosperous. It is our ardent hope to be able to contribute to this end, and all our votes and decisions, as far as my Government is concerned, will be motivated by this objective.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION[3]

U.N. doc. A/3046, Annex 1

The Trusteeship Council,

Recalling General Assembly resolution 860 (IX) of 14 December 1954 by which it decided that, in view of the eventual revision or termination of the Trusteeship Agreement for Togoland under British administration, steps should be taken, in the light of the particular circumstances of the Trust Territory, to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants as to their future, without prejudice to the eventual solution they might choose, requested the Trusteeship Council to consider what arrangements should be made in pursuance of the above decision and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its tenth session, and further requested the Trusteeship Council to dispatch a special mission to the Trust Territories of Togoland under British administration and Togoland under French administration to make a special study of these problems and to submit its report thereon in time for the Council to report to the General Assembly at its tenth session,

Recalling its resolution 1084 (XV) of 14 March 1955 by which it decided, in conformity with Article 87 of the United Nations Charter, and in pursuance of the requests addressed to the Council in General Assembly resolution 860 (IX), to dispatch a visiting mission to the Trust Territories of Togoland under British administration and Togoland under French administration and charged this Visiting Mission to carry out the tasks prescribed in General Assembly resolution 860 (IX),

Recalling further its resolution 1252 (XVI) of 8 July 1955 by which it requested this Visiting Mission to submit to the Council a special report on the subject not later than 1 November 1955,

Having received the special report of the Visiting Mission and the observations of the Administering Authorities concerned thereon,

1. *Considers* that the views expressed in the special report of the Visiting Mission provide in general a useful basis for determining the arrangements to be made in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 860 (IX);
2. *Decides* to transmit the special report of the Visiting Mission, together with the present resolution, to the General Assembly for its consideration and action;
3. *Recommends* that the General Assembly examine the special report with a view to action being taken to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants as to their future.

[3] Sponsored by India and the U.S.; adopted by the Trusteeship Council on Nov. 23 by a vote of 9-0-3 (Belgium, Haiti, U.S.S.R.).

Current Treaty Actions

MULTILATERAL

Trade and Commerce

Fourth protocol of rectifications and modifications to annexes and texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 7, 1955.[1]
Signature: Cuba, November 15, 1955.

Agreement on Organization for Trade Cooperation. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.[1]
Signatures: India, November 10, 1955; Haiti, November 15, 1955.

Protocol of organizational amendments to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.[1]
Signatures: India, November 10, 1955; Haiti and Union of South Africa, November 15, 1955.

Protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.[1]
Signatures: India, November 10, 1955; Cuba, France, Haiti, and Union of South Africa, November 15, 1955.

Protocol amending preamble and parts II and III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.[1]
Signatures: India (with a reservation), November 10, 1955; Cuba, France, Haiti, and Union of South Africa (with a reservation), November 15, 1955.

Protocol on terms of accession of Japan to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, with annex A (schedules of the Contracting Parties) and annex B (schedule of Japan). Done at Geneva June 7, 1955. Entered into force September 10, 1955.
Notification of intention to apply concessions received. Pakistan, November 7, 1955 (effective December 7, 1955).

Protocol of rectification to French text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva June 15, 1955.[1]
Signatures: India, November 10, 1955; New Zealand, November 12, 1955; Cuba, Haiti, and Union of South Africa, November 15, 1955.

[1] Not in force.

Africa. Future of Togoland Under British Administration (Gerig) 36
Agriculture. Advisory Council of Inter-American Agricultural Institute 28
American Republics. Advisory Council of Inter-American Agricultural Institute 28
Argentina
Letters of Credence (Vicchi) 7
Surplus Commodity Agreements With Colombia and Argentina 27
Asia. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference 8
Atomic Energy. Progress Report on Atoms-for-Peace Program (Eisenhower, Patterson, text of report) 4
Colombia. Surplus Commodity Agreements With Colombia and Argentina 27
Economic Affairs
Agreement on Sale of Poultry to Federal Republic of Germany 28
Renegotiation of Tariff Concessions With Five Countries 26
Surplus Commodity Agreements With Colombia and Argentina 27
Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference. . 8
United States Government Assistance to American Business Abroad (Thibodeaux) 22
Europe. Coal and Steel Community Official Invited To Visit U.S. 15
Foreign Service. Cutoff Date for Visa Applications for Italian Refugees 16
Germany
Agreement on Sale of Poultry to Federal Republic of Germany 28
Berlin Conference Hall 15
Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference. . 8
Immigration and Naturalization. Cutoff Date for Visa Applications for Italian Refugees . . . 16
India. Renegotiation of Tariff Concessions With Five Countries 26
International Information. Revival of Russian-Language Magazine "Amerika" 18
International Organizations and Meetings. Calendar of Meetings 29
Italy
Cutoff Date for Visa Applications for Italian Refugees 16
President of Italy To Visit United States 16
Mutual Security
Baghdad Pact Council Concludes First Meeting (text of communique) 16
Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference. . 8
Near East
Aiding Arab Refugees (Wadsworth, text of resolution) 31
Baghdad Pact Council Concludes First Meeting (text of communique) 16
Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference. . 8
Netherlands Antilles. Renegotiation of Tariff Concessions With Five Countries 26
New Zealand. Renegotiation of Tariff Concessions With Five Countries 26
Nicaragua. Renegotiation of Tariff Concessions With Five Countries 26
Non-Self-Governing Territories. Future of Togoland Under British Administration (Gerig) . . 36
Pakistan. Renegotiation of Tariff Concessions With Five Countries 26
Presidential Documents
Brighter Hopes for Peace 3
Progress Report on Atoms-for-Peace Program (letter to Morehead Patterson) 4
Refugees and Displaced Persons
Aiding Arab Refugees (Wadsworth, text of resolution) 31
Cutoff Date for Visa Applications for Italian Refugees 16
Treaty Information
Agreement on Sale of Poultry to Federal Republic of Germany 28
Current Actions 38
Surplus Commodity Agreements With Colombia and Argentina 27
U.S.S.R.
Entry and Residence Privileges of U.S. and Soviet Ecclesiastics (exchange of notes) 19
Revival of Russian-Language Magazine "Amerika" . 18
United Kingdom. Future of Togoland Under British Administration (Gerig) 36
United Nations
Aiding Arab Refugees (Wadsworth, text of resolution) 31
Future of Togoland Under British Administration (Gerig) 36
Progress Report on Atoms-for-Peace Program (Eisenhower, Patterson, text of report) . . . 4
Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference. . 8

Name Index

Dulles, Secretary 8
Eisenhower, President 3, 4
Gerig, Benjamin 36
Gronchi, Giovanni 16
Mayer, René 15
Patterson, Morehead 4
Thibodeaux, Ben H. 22
Vicchi, Adolfo A. 7
Wadsworth, James J. 31

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: December 19–25

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Press releases issued prior to December 19 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 690 and 691 of December 12 and 695 and 697 of December 16.

No.	Date	Subject
701	12/20	Dulles: economic assistance (combined with No. 703).
702	12/20	Dulles: mutual security appropriation (combined with No. 703).
703	12/20	Dulles: transcript of news conference.
704	12/21	Surplus commodity agreement with Colombia.
705	12/21	Surplus commodity agreement with Argentina (combined with No. 704).
*706	12/21	Burrows given rank of Minister.
707	12/22	President of Coal and Steel Community to visit U.S.
708	12/23	Revival of Russian-language magazine *Amerika.*
709	12/23	Cutoff on visas for Italian refugees.
710	12/23	Agreement on poultry sale to Germany.

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The Department of State bulletin

Vol. XXXIV, No. 863

January 9, 1956

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN THE DIPLOMAT 50

CURRENT ASPECTS OF U.S.-SPANISH RELATIONS • *by Ambassador John Lodge* 43

SELF-DETERMINATION ARTICLE IN HUMAN RIGHTS COVENANTS • *Statement by Mrs. Oswald B. Lord* 70

GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION ON DISARMAMENT
Statements by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. 55
Text of Resolution 63

For index see inside back cover

The Department of State bulletin

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January 9, 1956

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Current Aspects of U. S.–Spanish Relations

by John Lodge
Ambassador to Spain[1]

This is my first report to my fellow Americans on my mission in Spain. In my report to you I shall try to give you my impressions about Spain, the Spanish people, the value of our agreements with them, and the prospects for our relations in the future.

Before taking up with you the current aspects of our relations with the Spanish Government, I should like to sketch roughly in a few broad strokes some observations on the political and economic situation in Spain as I see it. A great many of the world's governments with which we enjoy friendly and mutually beneficial relations are certainly not popular governments as we Americans understand that term. Indeed, I have always regarded the toleration and acceptance of differing or, if you will, dissident views as to government or religion as a basic tenet of international relations.

The distinguished writer José Maria Gironella in the preface to his book *The Cypresses Believe in God* says:

> Spain is an unknown country. Experience proves that it is hard to view my country impartially. Even writers of high order succumb to the temptation to adulterate the truth, to treat our customs and our psychology as though everything about them were of a piece, of a single color. Legends and labels pile up; black Spain, inquisitorial Spain, beautiful Spain, tragic Spain, folkloric Spain, unhappy Spain, a projection of Africa into the map of Europe. . . .

I believe Spain has been misunderstood and misrepresented in our country many times over. Too often our impression of this intensely interesting and varied country has been limited to stories of bullfighters, dark-eyed beauties in mantillas, gypsy dancers, and castanets. This is as inaccurate a picture of Spain as the impression, widespread in Europe, that all Americans are millionaires and that Americans spend most of their time fighting gangsters and crowning bathing beauties. Fascinating as all of these secondary features of the Spanish scene may be to the foreigner, they obscure the more significant and enduring aspects of Spanish life and character. What are these aspects?

Spain is infinitely varied, racially and linguistically. Within a few hours you can pass from the green wooded valleys of Galicia and Asturias in the north to the arid, windswept tableland of Castile which occupies central Spain, or from the orange groves of the Valencian Coast through the endless silver-grey olive trees of Andalucia to the cork forests of Extremadura.

The people vary like the landscape. It is hard to identify the sandy-haired factory worker of Barcelona or Bilbao, both of predominantly Celtic extraction, with the dark, Moorish profile of the Andalusian girl carrying a jug of water on her head from the village fountain. Spaniards differ also in the languages they speak. Although Castilian predominates and is readily understood throughout the peninsula, the Galicians and the Catalans both have languages of their own, the former very close to Portuguese and the latter—Catalan—derived from the old Provençal French. There is also the strange Basque tongue, whose precise origin is shrouded in the mists of history but which is still spoken in the northern Basque provinces, where it serves as the rallying point for this intensely regionalist segment of the population.

[1] Address made before the Connecticut Editorial Association at Darien, Conn., on Dec. 10.

Characteristics of Spanish People

But within this variety there are, I believe, certain common and constant traits which characterize the Spaniards as a people. One which particularly impresses the foreigner living in Spain is the dignified cordiality encountered everywhere. This cordiality is not of the "hail-fellow-well-met" type but tempered by a grave politeness hard to match anywhere else in the world. A Spaniard's friendship is not given lightly or superficially but only after the establishment of a relationship of mutual confidence and respect. This is part of the Spaniard's intense sense of personal honor and pride. When a Spaniard's word has been formally given, he means it and sticks to it.

Our talented fellow citizen, Temple Fielding of Stamford, who has spent a great deal of time in Spain, has this to say about Spaniards in his *Travel Guide to Europe:*

> They've got something that has almost vanished from this complex, high-pressure civilization of ours, the time to reflect, the capacity to find joy in reflection, and the peace of mind that only mental tranquillity can bring.

Enjoying comparatively few of the material benefits of the modern world, the Spaniard is inclined to place less value on the practical, physical things in life. To him, the manner in which a gift is proffered or an act performed may be more important than the object itself. We must get to know the Spanish people better, and they us, in order to broaden and deepen the relationship which has been so auspiciously established. The achievement of this goal is as much a matter of successful psychological relations as it is of the continuation of ordinary diplomatic relations.

In this task the members of this distinguished audience and their colleagues of the press elsewhere in the United States can play a particularly valuable role in creating the indispensable climate of reciprocal familiarity and understanding.

During the months which I have spent in Spain I have found that often the humblest newspaper story, if accurately and sympathetically written, or the most modest lecture in the United States on contemporary Spain can weigh significantly in the balance of Spanish-American relations. This is a field in which you ladies and gentlemen of the press are especially competent. You can contribute in a most positive and constructive way to the accomplishment of our foreign policy aims in Spain.

A realization which I have found helpful in understanding Spain and its political traditions is that this very old land, located on the periphery of Europe and associated over several hundred years with North African peoples, never went through, or was influenced only very slightly by, two of the philosophical experiences which are fundamental to the origin of our country and of our way of thinking. I am referring to the profound changes in thought which grew out of 18th century rationalism and the French Revolution.

Similarly the impact of the 19th century industrial revolution upon Spain's economic and social fabric was not nearly so far-reaching as in other countries of Western Europe, in Great Britain, or in the United States. But there were compelling physical and topographical reasons for this. The Iberian Peninsula is broken up geographically by a series of diagonal mountain ranges which separate one region from another and which have always made communications slow and difficult; and while there are fertile river valleys, a great central portion of the country consists of the high, largely arid Castilian plateau. This "lofty, spacious, and barren" region will support only dry-farming crops, and these must be painstakingly wrested from a recalcitrant soil.

Added to these natural handicaps is the even more debilitating one, for a predominantly agricultural country like Spain, of a generally poor and very unevenly distributed rainfall. Although narrow coastal belts in the north and to the east enjoy sufficient rain to support a variety of crops, in great reaches of the peninsula—close to two-thirds, in fact—the rainfall is equivalent to that of the American Southwest.

One need only travel a few miles outside of Madrid into the Castilian countryside during the time of the wheat harvesting to believe oneself back in biblical times. In village after village the grain has been spread out on circular stone threshing floors over which a kind of sled is drawn by a patient mule. Later, when the grain has been sufficiently separated, it is pitchforked into the air so that the wind will blow the straw and husks to one side. But for all the painstaking antiquity of this process you are sure to get a cheerful wave of greeting from the winnowers. The Spaniard may be poor, but they are as uniformly cheerful as any people I know.

Given these physical factors and the histori

tradition of Spain, there are many valid reasons why Spain has developed along economic, social, and political lines that are quite different from those we have followed in the United States. This does not mean, however, that we cannot work closely together in a fruitful alliance founded on mutual respect and on the larger concept of the defense of the Western World from the onslaught of Communist imperialism.

From a strategic point of view, but also politically and psychologically, Spain stands at the crossroads of some of the world's most vital areas and turbulent currents. The Iberian Peninsula faces Africa to the south and Europe to the north; the Atlantic Ocean lies on its northwestern shores and the Mediterranean to the east; it has strong linguistic and religious ties with the Hispanic world overseas; it is perhaps as well or better able to understand the Arab approach to life than any other European country; and, finally, Spain now has strong bonds of defensive alliance with the United States.

U.S. Agreements With Spain

A little over 2 years ago, in September 1953, following a year and a half of exploratory study and negotiation which began after the trip of the late Admiral Forrest Sherman to Madrid in 1951, our Government and the Government of Spain signed three agreements.[2] The first of these concerned the establishment and construction in Spain, for the joint defensive use of our two countries, of five military bases—four air and one naval. The second agreement provided for American military equipment. Because of its civil war from 1936 to 1939, and a virtual blockade during 5 years of World War II, Spain was not in a position to supply or produce the arms necessary to defend the bases. The third and last agreement governed a commensurate amount of what is called defense-support aid, that is, economic assistance for Spain in strengthening those sectors of her economy—key industries, communications, transportation system, agriculture—which are related to the effective functioning of the new complex of bases.

Although the signing of these agreements may, on the surface, seem an obvious act of self-interest on the part of both countries, its achievement was a question of much greater complexity and more lasting significance than any simple physical arrangement.

The days when we affirmed our own neutrality are not so long past as to have erased the memory of the motives and reactions which led us to try to avoid what we then considered dangerous "foreign entanglements." A similar desire to avoid foreign entanglement gripped the Spanish people and its Government well through the end of World War II. Although under considerable pressure from Hitler throughout the Second World War to join the Axis, Spain adhered to a policy of neutrality.

Aside from a defensive alliance made with her next-door neighbor, Portugal, in 1939, dictated by the obvious geographical necessity of defending the Iberian Peninsula, the agreements of 1953 with the United States are the first major foreign military alliance entered into by Spain in her modern history. The reason is that, despite her isolation, she understands the true nature of the Communist danger to world peace and the urgent need to be strong and ready to meet its challenge.

Spain's postwar foreign relations have developed along four main lines, two of which we have already noted: the Iberian defensive pact with Portugal, which provides for joint military and political consultation, and action if necessary; and the base, military, and economic aid agreements with the United States.

The other two principal directions in which Spain has sought to strengthen her international ties have been the "Hispanic" one, that is, toward Latin America, implemented through the fostering of her historical, cultural, and religious ties with the "sister republics" of Central and South America; and toward the Arab world through an active policy of rapprochement with the Moslem countries, using as a bridge her favorable relationships with the Moroccan peoples of North Africa. Gradually certain other Western nations, as they too became convinced of the real danger of Communist imperialism, became more understanding and appreciative of Spain's value in the defense of the West.

Accordingly, in 1950 the United Nations, by resolution, lifted the ostracism it had voted against Spain in 1946. In 1952 Spain was voted into UNESCO. From the status of almost an international pariah under U.N. condemnation at the close of World War II, Spain today has a defense agreement with the United States, has con-

[2] BULLETIN of Oct. 5, 1953, p. 435.

cluded a concordat with the Vatican, is a member of all the important U.N. specialized agencies, and is overwhelmingly endorsed for admission to the organization itself.[3]

So much for the background to our present relations with Spain. How are our agreements working out?

Success of Base and Training Programs

In the base program Spanish cooperation is very good indeed. I have inspected the major projects now being constructed in Spain. The quality of the work by the Spanish subcontractors is very impressive and the rate of construction that has been established is most satisfactory. The job is being done with the care needed to insure the worth and durability of the bases and at a speed that is consistent both with economy and the need for strengthening our defenses. The Spanish Government also has gone out of its way to fulfill its commitments, some of which—such as the requisition of large areas of fertile land—are onerous indeed.

With regard to military aid for the Spanish armed services, U.S. military officials report most favorably on the progress made by those services in handling and caring for the new U.S. equipment.

In training, the Spaniards are showing up well. Eighty percent of the Spanish students sent to technical Air Force training courses in the United States have graduated in the top 10 percent of their classes—an outstanding record.

While the Minister of the Army, General Agustin Muñoz Grandes, was touring installations in this country, he was told by a senior officer at the Army school at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, that the two Spanish officers enrolled in the communications course stood near the top of their class. Similar favorable comments come to us from U.S. military technical schools in West Germany.

I can assure you that the bases are coming along well and that the Spanish armed forces are justifying our high expectations.

Defense-Support Economic Aid

Now I should like to report on the problem involved in the third agreement with Spain, namely, defense-support economic aid. When we began a base construction program in Spain and undertook to provide the Spaniards with arms to help defend these bases, we assumed problems in the economic field which had to be solved in order to achieve these objectives. First, it was necessary to insure that the base construction program would not upset the marginal Spanish economy. Spain's per capita gross national product is $260 per year, or somewhat less than half the average of other European countries and about one-seventh of ours.

Although Spain has made great strides in developing her industries—and the country has appreciable mineral resources—nevertheless, during the past 50 years, and more so in the last 20, her badly needed foreign exchange earnings have been derived principally from agricultural exports, foremost among them olives, olive oil, and citrus fruit. It is well recognized that an economy which depends mainly on agriculture is highly vulnerable. Two years of poor rainfall, such as Spain experienced in 1951 and 1952, or an abnormally cold winter like that of 1953-54, when freezing weather in southern Spain destroyed great portions of the olive and orange crops, result inexorably in well-nigh disastrous shortages. It is a striking illustration of this situation to note that the losses in badly needed foreign exchange resulting from the freeze a year ago equaled the total economic aid we granted Spain that year.

A large construction program in Spain without defense-support assistance might well produce greatly increased inflationary pressures which, among other bad results, would raise the cost of building the bases. This has been avoided.

In addition, however, if a mutual defense pact with Spain was to be worth while over any length of time, it would have to help Spain build up its domestic economy. Spain would need economic aid both to maintain the added military strength resulting from our delivery of weapons to the Spanish armed forces and to combat inflationary tendencies brought on by base construction expenditures. Concern only for the immediate inflationary effects of the base construction program without providing for longer-range economic stability also would be shortsighted and would have jeopardized for the future the heavy military investment we are now making.

Defense-support assistance, therefore, has been used in two ways: one, to provide raw material and agricultural commodities to offset the infla

[3] Spain was one of the group of 16 new members admitted to the U.N. on Dec. 14.

tionary impact of base construction and, two, to provide capital equipment for sectors of the economy in which Spain is the weakest. Fortunately, the harsh necessities of the Spanish economy have coincided with the needs of the air and naval bases being constructed by the United States. Economic aid in Spain, which is being devoted in considerable part to transportation and electric power, is quite properly termed defense-support aid since its purpose is to strengthen our mutual defense effort. Without improvement, the railroads, for instance, could not provide adequate communications from port areas to the military bases. Spain's highways, though in relatively better condition than its railway system, fall far short of the requirements both of the civilian economy and of the military program. Road-building equipment is being furnished in the aid program, and it is being used on those roads and highways which are of importance to the joint Spanish-American military line of communications.

Economic Aid a Good Investment

Two concrete examples are illustrative of the extent to which the military and the economic are closely interrelated in our Spanish program. A modern fuel pipeline, reaching from Cadiz to Zaragoza across two-thirds of the country, from the southern coast to within a few miles of the northeastern border, is in process of construction. Similarly, work has begun on the creation of an ultramodern telecommunications network to link the bases and thus greatly amplify and improve the existing Spanish communications system. Fuel pipeline and communications systems can also serve important civilian peacetime needs.

It is, I think, particularly gratifying that, in these days of necessarily vast and uneconomic investment in military establishments and equipment, at least a part of this terrible cost can also serve peaceful civilian ends.

There is another reason why I think our economic assistance to Spain is a good investment. One of the terms of the 1953 economic aid agreement was that the U.S. would receive for its own uses, primarily to pay the peseta costs of base construction, the local currency equivalent or counterpart of 70 percent of the dollar aid advanced. If these pesetas were not available, the U.S. would have to spend on base construction an additional amount of dollars equivalent to the value of these pesetas. In other words, every dollar of economic assistance costs the U.S. taxpayer only about 30 cents.

Though not directly related to the military-base and defense-support programs, there is still another way in which the Spanish program, in its economic aspects, is helping the U.S. Spain is becoming a good customer for our surplus agricultural commodities. Under the administration's program to expand markets for American farm products, the U.S. can sell abroad surplus agricultural commodities for currencies of other countries, if such sales do not "unduly interfere" with the traditional markets of other friendly countries. In the past Spain has not had enough foreign exchange to purchase all the agricultural commodities she actually needed. Our sales, therefore, can be expanded at a rapid rate without interfering with the normal marketings of other friendly countries.

Under this program Spain so far has made purchases amounting to $31.5 million, and substantial additional sales are anticipated. To date, we have kept 50 percent of the peseta proceeds to meet U.S. expenses in Spain for economic development. Surplus agricultural commodities in storage cost the taxpayer money; selling them now for 50 percent cash and 50 percent long-term credit, thus eliminating carrying charges, is good business for us, and it helps Spain to fill some of her greatest needs. In addition, these sales are paving the way for the future when, with our help, the Spanish economy is strong enough to permit her to buy needed American products in the normal way.

Prospects for the Future

I come now to a part of my report to you that is, I think, of particular interest—the prospects for the future of U.S.–Spanish relations. Increasingly important as the material ties between our two countries have become—the base construction program, the economic, military, and technical aid—these things are only part of integral friendship. There are stronger and deeper bonds of understanding and culture which link us together.

Vast areas of our hemisphere, notably in South and Central America and in the great Southwest of our own land, were discovered, explored, colonized, and settled by people from Spain. In the Americas, next to the English language the Spanish tongue is the most widespread. Spanish customs and traditions have had a marked effect

upon our own culture. Both our cultures, committed as they are to enduring spiritual values, have produced a joint determination to resist Soviet aggression.

The agreements of 1953 are being carried out in a spirit of loyalty and mutual respect on both sides. I can say to you with pride that Americans today in Spain are popular and well received.

Only recently the visit to Spain of our distinguished Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles,[4] and the marked cordiality with which he was welcomed, demonstrated to the world the growing closeness of our relations with this proud and ancient land. Our great President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, is not only admired but loved by the people of Spain.

I believe that our partnership with Spain now has a sound foundation and that the prospects for the future are very good indeed.

On our part I believe that of course we should carry through with our commitments concerning the bases, and I am convinced that at the same time we should provide the defense-support economic aid required in connection with this program.

On the part of Spain, I believe that we shall continue to find the excellent cooperation and soldierly qualities desirable in partners in a joint undertaking in which the security of hundreds of millions of people is involved.

The bases themselves will be of the greatest strategic importance. The other nations of Western Europe will, in my opinion, come to appreciate and welcome this vital contribution to the defense of the West from sudden aggression. It is a formidable bulwark which we are building, and the criticism leveled against us by the Communists points up its value. I am confident that you will support this important undertaking.

I am honored that our President has entrusted to me the task of Ambassador to Spain. It is a splendid opportunity for public service.

Spain, toughened by ordeal in the fiery crucible of a bitter civil war, will continue by our side—a dependable anti-Communist ally. I think it is encouraging and entirely right that, as we Americans attempt to discharge the massive responsibilities of leadership of the anti-Communist world, we should have at our side this loyal friend and gallant ally—Spain.

[4] Secretary Dulles made an official visit to Madrid on Nov. 1.

U.S. Restates Views on Soviet Obligations in Germany

Following are the texts of a statement issued by the U.S. Embassy at Bonn on December 16 and a letter from Ambassador James B. Conant delivered on the same date to Georgi Pushkin, senior Soviet diplomatic representative in the Soviet Zone of Germany, together with a letter dated December 14 from Ambassador Pushkin to the U.S., French, and British Ambassadors to the Federal Republic. The French and British Embassies on December 16 replied to the Soviet representative's communication with similar statements and letters.

U.S. Embassy Statement of December 16

The letter from Mr. Pushkin of December 14 merely restates the Soviet position as set out in the exchange of letters between Mr. Zorin and Herr Bolz on September 20. At that time the three Western Powers made clear to the Soviet Government in their notes of October 3[1] that they continued to hold the Soviet Government responsible for the obligations assumed by it in the quadripartite agreements regarding Germany, including Berlin. This remains the position of the United States Government.

Mr. Conant's Letter of December 16

Dear Mr. Pushkin: I acknowledge receipt of your letter of December 14. The position of my Government has already been made clear in its note to the Soviet Government of October 3, 1955, namely that it continues to hold the Soviet Government responsible for the obligations assumed by it under quadripartite agreements on the subject of Germany, including Berlin.

The attitude of my Government remains unchanged.

Sincerely yours,

James B. Conant

Mr. Pushkin's Letter of December 14

[Unofficial translation]

Dear Mr. Ambassador: I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of December 1 of this year.[2] This letter defends the action of a group of American citizens who used an automobile equipped with an unregistered radio trans-

[1] Bulletin of Oct. 17, 1955, p. 616.

[2] *Ibid.*, Dec. 19, 1955, p. 1013.

nitter on the territory of East Berlin under violation of he laws which are valid in the German Democratic Republic.

I know that the commandant of the American garrison of West Berlin, Major General Dasher, has been given an appropriate explanation, in which it was stated that the matter falls fully and completely under the competence of the presidium of the People's Police of East Berlin.

Concerning the other questions mentioned in your letter, I deem it necessary to tell you that under the treaty concluded September 20 between the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic exercises full and complete jurisdiction on its whole territory and regulates all questions arising from its relations with the German Federal Republic as well as with other states.

From the above-mentioned treaty and the documents relating to it—whose texts have been brought to the attention of the Governments of the United States, Britain and France—it can be seen that the German Democratic Republic exercises the guarding and control on the borders of the German Democratic Republic, the line of demarcation between the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic, on the outer ring of Greater Berlin, in Berlin, as well as on the lines of communication between the German Federal Republic and West Berlin.

In this connection it is well known that agreements exist between the Governments of the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic that the control of traffic of armed forces personnel and freight of the garrisons of the United States, Britain and France stationed in West Berlin between the German Federal Republic and West Berlin will be exercised temporarily until conclusion of an appropriate agreement by the command of the group of Soviet forces in Germany.

Sincerely yours,

G. Pushkin

Deadline Extended for Filing Property Claims in Austria

Press release 713 dated December 28

Information has been received by the Department of State that the deadline has been extended for filing claims in Austria under certain laws relating to restitution of property seized during the period of German occupation. The extension provides that such claims may be filed up to July 31, 1956, whereas the deadline had previously been December 31, 1955.[1] The extension of time for filing is applicable only in regard to the following types of claims:

(1) Claims to property of which foundations and funds were deprived if such foundation or fund was dissolved during the German occupation of Austria and if its status as a juridical person was not restored as of December 1, 1953.

(2) Claims to property which was under public administration on June 30, 1952, or thereafter.

(3) Claims which could not be enforced by reason of a fact existing outside of Austrian laws.

Claims of the above types should be filed prior to July 31, 1956. Proceedings are formal and are commenced by the filing of a petition or complaint with the *Finanzlandesdirektion* (State Finance Office) where the property is located, or with the *Rueckstellungskommission* (Restitution Commission) for the district in which the present owner of the property resides. It is suggested that claimants who wish to file claims under the Austrian Restitution Laws should consider obtaining Austrian legal advice to insure that their claims are correctly filed and processed with the appropriate restitution authority.

Claims of Former Persecutees under Austrian State Treaty

Persons wishing to file claims for property confiscated in Austria on account of the racial origin or religion of the owner are reminded that article 26 of the State Treaty provides for restoration of property to former persecutees where such property was taken after March 13, 1938. Such claims should be filed prior to July 31, 1956, directly with the

Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance,
Himmelpfortgasse 8,
Vienna I.

Special Austrian Fund To Aid Former Persecutees

Information has also been received that the Austrian Government has recommended to its Parliament legislation to establish a special fund to provide limited payments to former Austrian citizens or residents who were victims of Nazi persecution in Austria. Such payments will be made to persons residing presently outside Austria as a measure to alleviate hardships arising from financial need, age, ill health, or other similar circumstances. Persons wishing to obtain information regarding this fund and the procedure for filing claims may communicate with the

Committee for Jewish Claims on Austria
Suite 800, 270 Madison Avenue
New York 16, N. Y.

[1] Bulletin of Nov. 7, 1955, p. 761.



Courtesy of the New York Public Library

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN
1706 – 1790

Benjamin Franklin the Diplomat

Two hundred and fifty years ago, on January 17, 1706, a notable and versatile American was born: Benjamin Franklin, printer, writer, businessman, philanthropist, inventor, scientist, public official, statesman, and diplomat. Sometimes referred to as the first professional Foreign Service officer of the United States, Franklin was as eminently successful in international relations as he was in the various other fields of enterprise to which at one time or another he devoted his endeavors.

To an extent that was unique among Americans of the time, Franklin acquired diplomatic experience during the colonial period. For more than 15 years before the outbreak of the Revolution, he lived in England as the representative of the political and economic interests of certain of the American Colonies. From 1757 to 1762 and from 1764 to 1775 he represented Pennsylvania in this manner; and he likewise represented Georgia from 1768, New Jersey from 1769, and Massachusetts from 1770. Under these appointments, and with his outstanding personality and reputation, he was in effect an ambassador extraordinary from the Colonies to Great Britain.

Franklin was on the high seas homeward bound, after his mission as agent of the Colonies, when blood was shed at Lexington and Concord. On May 6, 1775, the day after his arrival at Philadelphia, he was chosen a member of the Continental Congress. On November 29, 1775, the Congress appointed him one of a committee of five "for the sole purpose of corresponding with our friends in Great Britain, Ireland, and other parts of the world." This committee is usually regarded as the first stage in the development of what is now the Department of State.

Soon after the Declaration of Independence, which he had helped to draft, Franklin began his service as a diplomatic representative of the new Nation. On September 28, 1776, he was commissioned by the Congress one of three Joint Commissioners to the Court of France, with full powers to negotiate treaties. He arrived in France the following December, and he remained abroad under this and subsequent diplomatic appointments until July 12, 1785. Although named additionally Commissioner to the Court of Spain on January 2, 1777, he never entered upon this assignment. Together with his two fellow Commissioners to France, he signed on February 6, 1778, with the Plenipotentiary of Louis XVI, the first three treaties entered into by the United States. One of these was the alliance that brought France into the Revolutionary War.

On September 14, 1778, the Congress elected Franklin its sole representative to the Court of France, with the rank and title of Minister Plenipotentiary. This was the first appointment of a minister plenipotentiary in the American diplomatic service.

In the years that followed the Congress gave him additional assignments. On June 15, 1781, he was commissioned one of five Joint Commissioners to negotiate a treaty of peace with Great Britain, and in this capacity he signed preliminary articles of peace on November 30, 1782, and the definitive treaty of peace on September 3, 1783. On September 28, 1782, he was commissioned Minister Plenipotentiary to negotiate a treaty of amity and commerce with Sweden; on April 3, 1783, he signed such a treaty. On May 12, 1784, he was commissioned one of three Joint Ministers Plenipotentiary to negotiate treaties of amity and commerce with European countries and with the Barbary states; and under this commission he signed a treaty with Prussia on July 9, 1785. Three days later he brought his mission to a close and left Paris on his last trip home.

The portrait on the opposite page is by Joseph-Sifrède Duplessis, who also made a number of other portraits of Franklin. This one was painted in France in 1783, when Franklin, at the age of 77, was at the culmination of his diplomatic career.

Chinese Communist Complaint Concerning Student

Press release 714 dated December 30

The Department of State is investigating a Chinese Communist complaint that a student formerly attending the University of Missouri has been prevented from leaving the United States by being confined to a mental institution. The complaint was received at the American Consulate General in Geneva from the Communist representative, Wang Ping-nan, on December 28 and by the American Red Cross in Washington, D. C., in a telegram from the Chinese Communist Red Cross on December 29.[1]

The former student is Liu Yung-ming, who is presently a patient in the Missouri State Hospital No. 4 at Farmington, Mo. Preliminary investigation has disclosed that Liu was a student at the University of Missouri in May 1949, when he was committed to the State Hospital through court procedure instituted by the foreign student adviser of the University of Missouri. Hospital physicians diagnosed his case as chronic schizophrenia.

The U. S. Immigration Service obtained a deportation order against Liu on January 29, 1951, but deportation could not be carried out due to the impossibility of obtaining travel documentation which would assure his acceptance elsewhere.

Hospital officials state that the only correspondence received concerning him was from his father, Y. W. Liu of Hong Kong, who asked that the hospital continue to care for him. Expense of caring for Liu has been borne by the State Hospital, although the hospital authorities recently wrote to Liu's father to ask whether he could contribute a part of this cost. Hospital authorities were unable to recall any correspondence from Liu's wife to the hospital.

At the time that Liu was committed to the State Hospital there were no restrictions of any kind on the departure of Chinese. Following the outbreak of the Korean war, preventive departure orders were issued with respect to a small number of Chinese with technical training, but no such order was ever issued against Liu.

The Department is consulting with the American Red Cross as to appropriate disposition of Liu's case.

[1] Text of note not printed.

Survey of Mekong River

The International Cooperation Administration announced on November 26 that, at the request of the Governments of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Viet-Nam, it will help finance a reconnaissance survey to explore the potentialities of the Mekong River for immediate and long-range development.

The Bureau of Reclamation, U. S. Department of the Interior, will make the survey. ICA will pay the dollar costs, estimated at $50,000, and the Governments of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Viet-Nam will pay local currency costs and provide other assistance for the survey.

The Mekong is believed to hold considerable possibilities for improvement and development in the fields of navigation, irrigation, power, and domestic water supplies. It is one of the world's longest waterways, comparable to the Mississippi River in length and volume.

To make the survey, the Bureau of Reclamation under an agreement with ICA will send six American river-development experts to Southeast Asia. They will present a report next spring with recommendations for improvements and projects which could be undertaken along the 1,620 miles of the Mekong from the Communist China border to its mouth on the South China Sea. (Another 1,000 miles of the river is in Communist China.)

The Mekong survey project is an outstanding example of cooperation among governments of Southeast Asia for mutual betterment in the economic sphere. Any regional developmental projects which cut across political boundaries can only be undertaken through cooperative action among the several governments involved. Such cooperative projects often offer far greater benefits than can be realized by the various governments working independently.

The Mekong River flows for 2,600 miles from its source in the snow-covered mountain ranges of the great plateau of Tibet through China to Burma Laos, and Thailand, forming parts of the borders of these countries. It continues through tropical Cambodia and Viet-Nam to the South China Sea

The primary objective of the reconnaissance survey is to bring together all basic information and all previous plans for development of the potentials of the river, to forecast potential developments apparently worthy of investigation, and to establish guidelines for further specialized engineering surveys.

The reconnaissance will point out any initial simple, low-cost projects that can be undertaken at an early date to enhance the economic well-being of the people in the Mekong watershed, such as minor improvements of sections of the river for navigation, improvements for flood protection for inhabitants of the lower river areas, extension of flood irrigation in the lower areas, simple pilot irrigation schemes on a demonstration basis, and provision of adequate transport craft and river port and portage facilities to increase navigation along the river and reduce transportation costs.

Long-range possibilities which will be considered in the reconnaissance include potentials for hydroelectric power either on the main stream or its tributaries; development of irrigation in the northeast Thailand plateau from the waters of the Mae Nam Mun River, a tributary; and major increases in irrigation in the lower reaches of the river. Recommendations will be made regarding long-term engineering and economic studies that are necessary before major developmental projects can be properly undertaken.

Flood control may be found necessary to reduce losses of life and property which result from the river's extraordinary overflowing on an average of once every 9 years. Rainfall in the area is heavy, ranging from 40 to 100 inches.

No assistance is currently scheduled for development projects on the Mekong, but ICA said that a reconnaissance survey such as is being undertaken would be necessary before any national or international projects could be wisely planned to put the river to use for the benefit of the people of the four countries.

U.S. Helps Combat Flood Suffering in Pakistan

The International Cooperation Administration announced on December 11 that the U.S. Government was rushing emergency medical supplies, blankets, and warm clothing to Pakistan by air and sea to combat sickness and cold-weather suffering in the wake of recent disastrous floods in West Pakistan. The supplies, gifts of the American people, are being sent to assist the hundreds of thousands of people affected by the flooding of the Ravi and Sutlej rivers.

The first of 12 American commercial aircraft carrying initial supplies had already arrived in Pakistan, and others were to follow within a few days. The air cargo will be followed by sea shipments of additional supplies.

Emergency supplies to combat cold-weather suffering include 70,000 wool blankets, 100,000 wind-resistant jackets, 100,000 wool overcoats, 100,000 pairs of trousers, and 30,000 sweaters. The medical supplies include 50,000 vials of penicillin; 5 million vitamin tablets; 100 tons of DDT to be used in malaria control; 18,300,000 paludrine tablets, an antimalaria drug; 25,000 cakes of carbolic soap; and 200,000 meparcine tablets.

The ICA has also turned over more than 14 tons of sulphanilimide and sulfadiazine, 1 million yards of bandage, 36 tons of warm clothing, and 2,000 blankets to the American Red Cross for shipment to the Pakistan Red Cross.

Distributing Agricultural Surpluses

Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson announced on December 14 that wheat, corn, rice, and dry beans will be made available immediately to U.S. charitable agencies for foreign relief purposes and also to eligible domestic outlets. Secretary Benson said:

> This is a further important step in our program to benefit farmers and others in this country, as well as to help our friends overseas. Increasing the distribution of these products will serve to provide needed food to the hungry throughout the world from our U.S. surpluses. I am happy that we have been able to complete the lengthy arrangements leading to this announcement during this appropriate period between Thanksgiving and Christmas. We know from personal meetings and from our mail that our United States farmers are proud and delighted to be able to share their abundance with the less fortunate both at home and abroad.
>
> These donations will continue to be made in a manner to be of maximum assistance to the hungry people of the world, to persons who need them and would not otherwise get them or get enough of them. The distribution will continue to be made through the U.S. welfare agencies, 18 of which are currently distributing food in 67 countries abroad. The foods will continue to be distributed overseas with full recognition of their American origin, identified as "gifts of the people of the United States."

The action adds wheat and corn to the commodities being made available to nonprofit school lunch programs and other eligible outlets in this country; rice and dry beans are already being distributed to such outlets. It also makes all four products available to U.S. private welfare agencies for foreign relief distribution.

U.S. Completes Action Required for Membership in IFC

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) on December 5 announced that the United States on that date completed the action required for membership in the International Finance Corporation, the proposed new affiliate of the World Bank.[1] George M. Humphrey, Secretary of the Treasury, signed the Articles of Agreement of the International Finance Corporation and deposited with the bank an Instrument of Acceptance signed by President Eisenhower on behalf of the U.S. Government.

The United States was the third country to complete this process, the first two being Canada and Iceland. The bank announced on December 16 that Egypt and Ecuador had completed action, and on January 10 that Australia, Costa Rica, Mexico, and the United Kingdom had completed action.

The charter of the International Finance Corporation requires a minimum membership of 30 countries, together subscribing at least $75 million, before the corporation can begin operations. The capital subscriptions of the nine countries which have now completed action amount to $56,761,000.

The governments of 38 other member countries of the bank have indicated their intention of joining the IFC. In almost all cases legislation is required to enable these governments to adhere to the new corporation, and the following countries have already passed the domestic legislation required to authorize membership: Haiti, India, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, and Peru. The prospective capital subscriptions of these six countries total $5,212,000. Bills authorizing membership are in an advanced stage of the legislative process in a number of other countries.

World Bank Loan to Honduras for Highway System

The World Bank on December 22 announced that it made a loan of $4.2 million to Honduras on that date to enable a highway maintenance organization to be set up and to begin operations. The loan will also finance preliminary engineering studies for the improvement and new construction of various sections of two important trunk roads, the Northern and Western Highways.

The lack of an adequate transport system seriously hampers the economic development of Honduras. Several areas have important possibilities, especially in agriculture, livestock, and timber, but in the absence of transport and of sufficient population these areas are practically undeveloped at present.

Of the 1,600 miles of roads in Honduras only 20 miles are paved. The basic network consists of five trunk highways, all in need of improvement, and in some cases relocation, to make possible their conversion into first-class paved highways. The two trunk roads recognized as having priority are the Northern Highway, which runs 230 miles from Tegucigalpa, capital of Honduras, northward to San Pedro Sula and Puerto Cortes on the Caribbean; and the Western Highway, which runs 106 miles from San Pedro Sula westward toward El Salvador. The latter road requires an extension of 100 kms. (62 miles) to reach the border between the two countries.

The remainder of the road system consists of secondary roads and trails, many passable only in dry weather. In spite of this and of the resulting high costs of transport, the number of motor vehicles in Honduras has doubled since 1950, and in 1955 there were 7,000 in operation.

The construction and maintenance of the road system of Honduras are the responsibility of the Highway Department, which was established 5 years ago as a part of the Ministry of Development.

Little road construction or maintenance equipment is at present available to the Department, and such as exists is in poor condition. The Highway Department also lacks adequate offices, warehouses, and workshop facilities.

The Government of Honduras has decided to embark on a comprehensive program to improve the country's highways. The first need is to reorganize the Highway Department. Its technical and administrative staff for design, engineering, and field work must be strengthened to enable it to carry out its various tasks. A new maintenance division is to be set up within the Department and equipped with the necessary road maintenance equipment and spare parts, workshop construction materials, and tools.

[1] For the President's message to Congress recommending U.S. participation and a summary of the principal features of the IFC, see BULLETIN of May 23, 1955, p. 844.

General Assembly Action on Disarmament

Statements by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly[1]

REVIEW OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

U.S. delegation press release 2304 dated December 5

At Geneva, in the afternoon of July 21, 1955, the President of the United States, meeting with the leaders of France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, looked across the conference table directly at the Soviet delegation and spoke the following words:

> . . I have been searching my heart and mind [he declared] for something that I could say here that could convince everyone of the great sincerity of the United States in approaching this problem of disarmament. I should address myself for a moment principally to the delegates from the Soviet Union, because our two great countries admittedly possess new and terrible weapons in quantities which do give rise in other parts of the world, or reciprocally, to the fears and dangers of surprise attack.
>
> I propose, therefore, that we take a practical step, that we begin an arrangement, very quickly, as between ourselves—immediately. These steps would include:
>
> To give to each other a complete blueprint of our military establishments, from beginning to end, from one end of our countries to the other; lay out the establishments and provide the blueprints to each other.
>
> Next, to provide within our countries facilities for aerial photography to the other country—we to provide you the facilities within our country, ample facilities for aerial reconnaissance, where you can make all the pictures you choose and take them to your own country to study; you to provide exactly the same facilities for us and we to make these examinations—and by this step to convince the world that we are providing as between ourselves against the possibility of great surprise attack, thus lessening danger and relaxing tension. Likewise we will make more easily attainable a comprehensive and effective system of inspection and disarmament, because what I propose, I assure you, would be but a beginning.

The people of the world, who have the greatest stake in avoiding an atomic holocaust, saw in the President's proposal something which could at one stroke lift the disarmament debate from the morass into which it had sunk and provide a safeguard against that great surprise attack which might herald the doom of mankind.

Let me explain how the President's plan would operate: The information which would be exchanged would include, first, the identification, strength, command structure, and disposition of personnel, units, and equipment of all major land, sea, and air forces; second, a complete list of military plants, facilities, and installations, with their locations. Comparable information would be furnished simultaneously by each participating country. Freedom of communications for inspecting personnel would be assured.

The heart of the plan is unrestricted—but monitored—reciprocal, aerial inspection, by visual, photographic, and electronic means. Personnel of the country being inspected may be aboard the aircraft.

Modern aerial reconnaissance has phenomenal capabilities. Two standard jet photo-planes can photograph a band of terrain 490 miles wide and 2,700 long, the distance from New York to Los Angeles, in only two hours.

A country the size of the United States or the Soviet Union can have its picture taken, mile by mile, field and factory, in considerably less than 6 months. The information can be kept current week by week. Extremely accurate results are

[1] Made in Committee I (Political and Security) on Dec. 6, 9, and 12 and in plenary on Dec. 16.

possible at night and under adverse weather conditions.

The costs of the operation are slight for the boon it would confer. For a whole year, the expenses could be compared to the cost of only 2 or 3 days of World War II. And if we include in the account the unspeakable suffering, the blight on the future, the deaths, and the broken lives in another war, no cost would be too great.

The United States has offered to extend this plan to other countries and to bases abroad if acceptable to the nations involved. We have agreed to add to it Mr. Bulganin's plan for ground observers.

The United States regrets that the Soviet Union has still not approved President Eisenhower's plan. But we continue to hope that further discussions will lead it to recognize the value of the proposal.

Here is the background against which it was made.

Central Issues of Inspection and Control

Inspection is the crux of the problem of disarmament by international agreement—inspection to see that what is promised is actually performed. When disarmament is undertaken *without* adequate inspection, as it was in Germany and Japan between the two World Wars, the result is a war-breeding fiasco.

President Eisenhower at Geneva declared that—

> No sound and reliable agreement can be made unless it is completely covered by an inspection and reporting system adequate to support every portion of the agreement. The lessons of history teach us that disarmament agreements without adequate reciprocal inspection increase the dangers of war and do not brighten the prospects of peace.

The other Heads of State at Geneva and leaders in other countries have said very much the same thing.

Marshal Bulganin put it in a nutshell when he told the Supreme Soviet on August 14, 1955, that "each disarmament plan boils down to the question of control and inspection."

But the Soviet Union does not mean the same thing by control and inspection that we do. It will not allow the kind of forehanded, permanent, and thorough inspection which the other countries on the United Nations Subcommittee [2] would accept, which is necessary to ease the arms burde and to permit the full flowering of atomic energ for peace.

This is the issue which has divided the Sovie Union from the overwhelming majority in th United Nations ever since 1946. Meanwhile, th problem has become steadily more difficult an more urgent.

The production of nuclear material has bee under way for a decade under no internationa control whatsoever. During all of this time i has been possible to hide atomic weapons. Th telltale radioactivity of nuclear materials can b shielded by containers, beyond the range of an presently known detection device.

As the stockpile grows, the danger mounts. Be cause of the margin of error in accounting, wit each year that passes, the amount of materia available for hidden weapons has increased. Wit the passage of time we were bound to reach crucial point at which this margin of error repre sented a dangerous potential in nuclear weapon That point has now been reached.

This is the scientific background of the Eisen hower project.

It means that the older plans for inspection o nuclear material based on total accounting fo production are unrealistic.

The situation thus created required two things an intensive review of the inspection problem and some new and radical conception whic would offer the world time, security, and confi dence while it tackled its problem.

The President moved to meet the first by mobi lizing a number of our most eminent physicists military men, industrialists, and scholars to wor on all aspects of the problem under the directio of Mr. Harold E. Stassen.[3] The United State considers that such studies should be the subjec of appropriate consultation between governments

To meet the second vital requirement for in creased international security, and as a demon stration of American sincerity, the President pu forward his proposals.

The plan of aerial inspection for peace is de signed primarily to provide against great sur prise attack. Since we can no longer keep trac of all nuclear munitions, it focuses more sharpl on controlling the means for delivering them i war.

[2] The Subcommittee of Five (Canada, France, U.S.S.R., U.K., and U.S.) of the U.N. Disarmament Commission.

[3] BULLETIN of Oct. 31, 1955, p. 706.

If we succeed in shackling surprise attack, we may set a seal against war itself.

The Soviet Union in its May 10 proposals [4] also recognized very clearly the danger of mounting stockpiles in the changed technological picture. It also claims to see the increased necessity of guarding against surprise attack.

The Soviet May 10 proposals contain these words:

> There are possibilities beyond the reach of international control for evading this control and for recognizing the clandestine manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons, even if there is a formal agreement on international control. In such a situation, the security of states signatories to the international convention cannot be guaranteed, since the possibility would be open to a potential aggressor to accumulate stocks of atomic and hydrogen weapons for a surprise atomic attack on peace-loving states.

But the Soviet Union prescribes no new remedy to fit this clear diagnosis. Moreover, it continues to call for measures of disarmament which could not be backed up by the only kind of inspection which it would permit.

In spite of repeated inquiries put by the members of the Subcommittee, the Soviet Union would give no assurance that inspectors would be in the field and ready to operate before disarmament began. It will not specify in any detail those things which the inspectors would be allowed to inspect. It would allow inspection from the air only at the very end of a disarmament program.

These Soviet proposals are quite inadequate to guard against surprise attack. Nor are they sufficient to support a comprehensive program of arms limitation.

This is what the Soviet position on inspection boils down to after we examine the confused and contradictory record of the past year—a year marked by alternating hope and disappointment for the rest of us.

The Soviet Government knows as well as anyone how illusory the prospect for total prohibition of nuclear weapons material is under present conditions. Yet it would pledge every country to a program vitally affecting its national security without providing the means to insure that the provisions of an agreement are carried out equally by all.

To continue to call for elimination of nuclear weapons as an immediate objective in the light of inescapable scientific facts is to ignore the cardinal principle that any disarmament program must be fully supported by effective control. We cannot lend ourselves to this hypocrisy and obscurantism. A new solution must be found which will fit the facts.

Mr. Chairman, I am sure that most of you recall a story about Marshal Potemkin, the Viceroy of Catherine the Great of Russia. When the Czarina went out to tour her domain, the Marshal, in order to create the illusion of prosperity under his regime, built false villages along her route. The Czarina's party was hurried through without time for a closer look behind the false facades.

Mr. Chairman, we will not accept illusions. We want no Potemkin village of disarmament.

Recent Evolution of Soviet and U. S. Policy

Mr. Kuznetsov [5] is apparently disturbed because the United States position evolves and is not static. He would have you believe that the United States is less eager for disarmament because it has *some* reserves about *some* of the ideas we have contributed to these discussions in the past.

It is true that we are appraising past theories in the light of changing political and scientific conditions. It is true that we believe that whatever may be eventually agreed with respect to levels of armed forces or the reductions of conventional weapons will have to be calculated in relation to what can be done about nuclear weapons.

In a field so complex, dynamic, and dangerous, we cannot afford to be doctrinaire. Each country has a positive obligation to test and revise its policies constantly. We believe that this is an honest and logical course of action.

But if the test of policy be *lack* of change, let us see how that applies to the Soviet position.

From 1946 to 1954 the Soviet Union in effect called for prohibition and elimination of atomic weapons, by mere declaration, with inspection second. Theirs was a platform of "ban the bomb, trust the Russians." But disarmament cannot be built on a platform of trust alone. It must be supervised by rigorous, unremitting, reciprocal inspection under rigid, agreed standards.

In October 1954 the late Mr. Vyshinsky surprised the General Assembly with an apparent

[4] *Ibid.*, May 30, 1955, p. 900.

[5] Vasily V. Kuznetsov, Soviet representative in Committee I.

370757—56——3

change in the Soviet position. He said his country would accept as a "basis for discussion" the Anglo-French proposals of June 11, 1954[6] which stipulated real inspection from the outset and throughout each stage of a progressive program of arms reduction. But the Soviet Union still could not say whether inspection would be intermittent or continuous, permanent or periodic, or whether it could operate from the beginning.

The London talks [of the Disarmament Commission Subcommittee] in 1955 occurred during a mysterious period of change in the Soviet Government. The Soviet disarmament position was obviously in a state of flux. Mr. Gromyko opened in February with a remarkable proposal for immediate "destruction" of all nuclear weapons, *without* inspection and with no provision for stopping nuclear weapons production.[7] This scheme bore no relation to Mr. Vyshinsky's idea. It was not disarmament. It was really a proposal for a built-in nuclear arms race, rigged to let the Soviet Union start even.

For weeks the other members of the Subcommittee wondered what this really involved. Then, in mid-March, the Soviet Union just as suddenly switched back to the Vyshinsky position;[8] but it neither abandoned nor affirmed the Gromyko proposition. Instead we were told that it had something called "independent significance." For all we know, it still does; but just what it signifies for our present discussions, or for real disarmament, we do not know.

Then, overnight, on May 10, the Soviet Union took up what we are told is its present position. It ostensibly accepted some Western suggestions—which it was still violently attacking only 2 or 3 days earlier—but on the key issue of inspection it still did not and does not state in any useful detail what it would allow to be inspected, or what the rights, duties, and immunities of the inspectors would be, or when they could begin their task. It has not specified whether the control teams would be mobile or stationary. It has not explained how inspectors could mount an effective guard against surprise attack if they were tied down to fixed control posts.

Thus, Mr. Chairman, in spite of a confused shifting back and forth in Soviet ideas, there has been very little evolution where it is mos needed—in the vital matter of inspection an control.

The United States stands firm on the need fo genuine inspection. But it is always ready t study new methods to fit the facts. My Swedis colleague, Mr. Sandler, the other day expresse the hope that what he called our "reserved atti tude" was "a question of preliminary measure proposed so as to facilitate genuine disarmamen in due course." I am glad to assure him tha that is exactly the case.

Toward a Reduction of Armaments

Even where effective controls can be devised international distrust may block their applica tion. The other states represented in the Sub committee also recognize this condition. In its proposals of May 10 the Soviet Union says:

> The necessary conditions for the institution of a contro system which would enjoy the trust of all states an would fully meet the requirements of international se curity do not at present exist.

The solution to the problem is not to jettisor all attempts to establish effective control. The answer is to attack the problem at its heart, to try to reach agreement on measures to dispel distrust, and to create conditions for more fruitful discussion of disarmament.

President Eisenhower declared at Geneva that—

> The United States is ready to proceed in the study and testing of a reliable system of inspection and reporting and, when that system is proved, then to reduce armaments with all others to the extent that the system will provide assured results.

The President's plan was not intended to be a substitute for an overall program for the limitation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. Rather, it was intended to make one possible.

The resolution which we have sponsored with our colleagues of the United Kingdom, France, and Canada[9] demonstrates clearly the importance and priority we assign to this objective.

The President's plan would provide practical experience in many of the control measures required to supervise a disarmament agreement. More important, it would promote that interna-

[6] *Ibid.*, Aug. 2, 1954, p. 182.
[7] *Ibid.*, May 30, 1955, p. 892.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 895.

[9] U.N. doc. A/C.1/L. 150, introduced by Anthony Nutting (United Kingdom) on Dec. 2.

ional confidence which is indispensable to such n agreement.

The United States is pledged to work for, arnestly desires, and energetically seeks a comrehensive, progressive, enforceable agreement or the reduction of military expenditures, arms, rmaments, and armed forces under effective inernational inspection and control.

It believes that these reductions should be of uch character and the machinery for inspection nd enforcement so effective that no one nation nywhere in the world would be in a position to aunch sudden, successful aggression against any ther nation anywhere in the world. At the ame time, every nation must have the strength o assure its internal security, to meet its interational obligations, and to discourage predatory esigns.

The Eisenhower plan would lead promptly nd directly to the achievement of all these bjectives.

The United States further believes that, if greement can be reached to eliminate or limit uclear weapons within the framework of an effective system of disarmament and under proper afeguards, there should be corresponding retrictions on the testing of such weapons.

The United States intends that a general disrmament agreement should affect broad elenents of armed strength, including military ases. This applies to those bases which, by the esire and at the request of other countries, have een placed at the disposition of the United tates abroad. It should apply as well to the ases of the Soviet Union at home and abroad, ven though the Soviet Union, proclaiming that no longer has any foreign bases, apparently ersists in regarding its military installations n other countries as domestic establishments.

You will find in the record concrete evidence f the readiness of the United States to reduce s armaments while not merely maintaining but ctually increasing the prosperity not only of its wn citizens but of its friends elsewhere in the orld. The record contains the figures for nited States strength year by year since the nd of the war. From a military force of 12½ illion in the last year of World War II we ame down to a million and a half men before e Korean War.

You will not find in the record any comparable gures for the Soviet armed forces. You will not be able to fix any base line for Soviet strength against which to measure the arms cuts recently reported by the Soviet Union.

Whether the United States reduces its forces further or alters their composition in any way, whether agreement on disarmament comes late or soon, the world may be sure of this: The United States will not use atomic weapons or any other weapons—be they guns, tanks, airplanes, rifles, or anything else—in any way except in accordance with the charter of the United Nations and in defense against aggression.

Soviet Objections

The Eisenhower conception is as simple as it is bold. The United States readily understands that any government would want to weigh its effect most carefully. But we must all be aware that the longer a start on this problem is delayed, the more difficult it will become.

The Soviet Union has expressed what must be its considered objections to the plan through Mr. Molotov at Geneva, through Mr. Sobolev in the Disarmament Commission, and through Mr. Kuznetsov.

What are these objections?

First, the Soviet Union says that the President's plan has nothing to do with disarmament. The fact is that the proposal was made as a prelude to reduction in armament, after 9 years of discussion of other methods had failed to produce a solution. The resolution introduced on December 2 by the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and the United States declares our resolve to seek early agreement on both the President's proposals and on such adequately safeguarded measures of a disarmament plan as are now feasible. We shall continue to strive for a comprehensive agreement.

Second, the Soviet delegation at Geneva objected that the plan was limited to the territory of the United States and the Soviet Union. That is, in fact, the logical place to begin. These two countries hold the preponderance of nuclear weapons which the world fears may be loosed in war. They also maintain the greatest portion of their armed strength within their own borders.

The President spoke only for his own country when he made his proposal to the Soviet Union. But we are ready to negotiate both with other sovereign states involved and with the Soviet Union for the extension of the Eisenhower plan and the Bulganin plan for ground control posts

to overseas bases and the forces of other countries. They are sovereign states; it is up to them. My guess is that they will authorize it.

Third, the Soviet Union says that the plan might involve "enormous expenditures." I have already dealt with that point, and it is perfectly true that some expense would be involved. We can afford it and we believe that the Soviet Union could afford it. It is a trifling premium to pay for an insurance policy against war.

Fourth, the Soviet Union to our surprise still claimed at Geneva that the plan did not provide for ground observers at key points. The fact is that President Eisenhower told Mr. Bulganin in his letter of October 11 [10] that,

> I have not forgotten your proposal having to do with stationing inspection teams at key points in our countries, and if you feel this would help to create the better spirit I refer to, we could accept that too.

Finally, Mr. Molotov at Geneva and Mr. Khrushchev in India have argued that the Eisenhower plan would increase the risk of war because it would give each country access to military information about the other which it might put to use in launching a surprise attack. The fact is, as Secretary Dulles pointed out at Geneva, that lack of information is not what inhibits hostilities. What is lacking is the deterrent to attack which would result if this plan is put into effect, depriving the aggressor of the benefit of surprise.

These are the sum of the Soviet arguments against the Eisenhower proposals. In all candor, they do not appear impressive—or insuperable. This is lucky, because the outlook would be bleak indeed if we were constrained to accept them as the Soviet last word.

The outlook would be far brighter if the Soviet Union would answer these four questions:

1. When will the Soviet Union join us in a policy of openness which would reassure the world and advance the cause of disarmament?

2. Why does the Soviet Union continue to advocate elimination of atomic weapons as an immediate objective, when it has told the world so clearly that this is impossible?

3. Why would the Soviet Union commit states to a whole series of actions vitally affecting their national security without providing the means of inspection and control to see that they are carried out equally by all?

4. Why, if the Soviet Union is sincere in i concern about the possibility of attack from tl West, is it not willing to join in an immedia practical program to proscribe surprise attack l either side?

If it is the Soviet aim to lull the defenses of tl free world with a smile and to promote the dissol tion of free-world alliances which have been cr ated in response to the Soviet Union's postwa policy and action, then a specious disarmamei program unsupported by inspection would ser that end. But we are loath to think that this the answer to our questions. Gentlemen, let ı have clear answers; the world deserves them.

What Should Be Done?

In spite of recent discouraging development the United States is not ready to accept melai choly conclusions about Soviet policy.

We still hope that with further reflection an discussion the Soviet Union will see that tl Eisenhower plan is in the world's interest and i its own.

We are glad to note that understanding has bee reached on at least some points. All of us agre that nuclear material can now be concealed in sig nificant quantities. All agree that there must b new emphasis on preventing surprise attack.

We note that the Soviet Union, after rejectin aerial inspection for 10 years, now seems to sa it would accept it, at least "at the concludin stage" of a disarmament program. We hope tha it will agree that such inspection as proposed b President Eisenhower should occur as a *beginnin* step, when it would do most to lessen tension an open the path to further measures of inspectio and control of armaments.

This would not be the first time that the Sovie Union has reacted negatively to new proposal only to adjust its thinking as time went on. W remember the welcome evolution of its views con cerning the atoms-for-peace plan.

The United States hopes the Soviet delegat will choose the platform of this General Assembl to announce an advance in Soviet thinking on thi problem. We believe the General Assembly wil want to go on record for the principles of th Eisenhower proposals as well as for the construc tive suggestions made by the British, French, an Soviet Governments.

Mr. Chairman, I conclude:

[10] Bulletin of Oct. 24, 1955, p. 643.

On November 26 last, Mr. Khrushchev spoke to an Indian audience. "Just imagine," he is reported to have said, "Soviet planes flying over the United States and United States planes flying over the Soviet Union."

Mr. Khrushchev seemed to find this picture fantastic.

We Americans do not. We believe that many, many others do not.

We believe that this vision of "sentinels of peace" crossing each other in the "open skies" is something which millions of everyday people in every country can see plainly.

It will be as reassuring as the sight of the policeman on his beat. We hope that there will be the vision and the statesmanship to enable the Soviet leaders also to see it.

We hope, finally, that this Assembly of the United Nations will endorse this plan for aerial inspection and that this endorsement will lead to its being put into effect soon. The day that these "sentinels of peace" start their flights will indeed be the most brilliant day in the history of the United Nations.

VIEWS ON SOVIET POSITION

U.S. delegation press release 2314 dated December 9

We now approach the end of this general debate. In a short while the conclusions reached by this body will be incorporated in a resolution for presentation to the General Assembly of the United Nations. This resolution must reflect the widest possible consensus of the views expressed in this debate. Our present draft was intended to do just that. The delegations of the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and the United States have also been examining with great care the various amendments submitted by the Soviet Union [11] and India.[12] We hope to incorporate as many as possible of these suggestions in our draft, and we shall shortly submit a revised resolution for the committee's consideration.

I shall deal today with some points in Mr. Kuznetsov's speech of day before yesterday, which furnished the background to the Soviet amendments.

As this debate ends, the principal issue which divides us is still that of the kind and extent of inspection needed to support a disarmament agreement. Mr. Kuznetsov claims that we have misrepresented and undervalued Soviet ideas on control. Yet, in all truth, they are inadequate. We have in the last year asked the Soviet Union many questions in an honest desire to find out what that nation would be prepared to accept in the way of international inspection. Practically none of these questions have been answered.

Following the submission of the May 10 proposals, we hoped for a time that some advance had been made, mainly because of the Soviet Union's recognition of the problems created by the accumulation of nuclear stockpiles, and partly because the Soviet Union agreed to accept international control at certain points, such as large ports, railway junctions, airdromes, and highways. However, these proposals were still vague on other vital requirements of control. The importance of precision about these matters becomes all the more apparent when we recognize that increasing quantities of nuclear material can be hidden away beyond the scope of detection by known scientific means.

The Soviet Union in the May 10 proposals vaguely indicated that inspection should be applied to certain other items which it vaguely called "the objects of control." All of the Western delegations in our meetings in the Subcommittee in London and later in New York [13] have tried in vain to wring from the Soviet Union the slightest indication of what these "objects of control" would include—and what they might not include. Mr. Nutting, for the British delegation, submitted a projected list of things which the United Kingdom thought ought to be controlled. The Soviet Union did not agree to this list, made no suggestions of its own, and indeed has offered no comment of any kind.

Before and after the May 10 proposals repeatedly we asked the Soviets some simple questions. I repeat some of them now: Would the Soviet Union permit inspection teams and an international control authority to be established and operating in Soviet territory with full communication facilities before any operation of disarmament actually began? If not, what assurance

[11] U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.152.

[12] U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.153.

[13] For U.S. statements at the New York meeting, Aug. 29–Oct. 7, see BULLETIN of Sept. 12, 1955, p. 438, and Oct. 31, 1955, p. 703; for statements at subsequent meetings of the Disarmament Commission, see *ibid.*, Nov. 7, 1955, p. 765, and Dec. 19, 1955, p. 1032.

could the Soviet Union, or any nation, give that clandestine stockpiling of arms had not taken place or clandestine troop dispositions had not been made beforehand, in order to evade inspection? How would one know at what level the freeze of armaments and armed forces would begin?

The Soviet Union asserts that the international control authority would have adequate responsibilities and immunities, but it insists that upon the completion of one stage of disarmament the next would begin automatically in accordance with fixed time limitations, independent of the findings and recommendations of the international control organ. The Soviet Union has been unwilling to concede to the control authority that autonomy, under the provisions of the international agreement, which the other powers would accept and which they consider to be absolutely necessary. The Western powers at London on April 21, 1955, spelled out very completely the extent of the rights, powers, and duties of the control authority.[14] The Soviet Union has not submitted anything comparable to this proposal.

Safeguards Against Surprise Attack

With the Eisenhower plan for aerial inspection, the United States sought to raise the problem of disarmament above all these tangled issues. We are convinced that, supplemented as it would be by the Bulganin control posts, it would provide a real safeguard against great surprise attack, which we all recognize as the foremost danger in this atomic age.

Mr. Kuznetsov sought to prove that the United States plan could not really guard against surprise attack but that the Soviet control-post proposal would do so. We do not entirely understand this, since the United States would accept both plans. But let us, nevertheless, examine the Soviet contention. Control posts at major ports, railway junctions, main highways, and airdromes would certainly have some value. But if they were tied down to fixed locations their utility would be strictly limited in these days of mobile, multidimensional warfare. The Soviet Union has not answered our questions as to whether these observer teams would be fixed or mobile. Moreover, even under the best of circumstances, a reasonable surety against surprise attack could not be furnished by these old-fashioned means without aerial reconnaissance.

The Soviet theory seems to be that surprise attack inevitably requires the massing of large concentrations of troops and planes at very conveniently specified junctions, railroads, and airports. No potential aggressor would be so naive. Moreover, an atomic attack with presently available weapons, to say nothing of weapons of the future, could be launched with devastating effect without such massive concentrations.

The United States, therefore, does not understand why the Soviet Union would be content with ground inspection without aerial reconnaissance. And we are increasingly convinced of the efficacy and necessity of the latter. We cannot help wondering whether the Soviet Union is making a full disclosure of its real reasons.

Reduction of Armaments

I turn now to Mr. Kuznetsov's familiar charge that the United States blocks progress on the reduction of armaments. But first I should like my colleagues to indulge in an exercise of the imagination.

If today the Eisenhower plan were in effect would you not agree that a new era in international relations would be at hand? Would not the world breathe much easier? In such a world would not every government feel that it could with safety begin to lift the military harness from the backs of its citizens and to devote more of its resources to productive enterprises?

But the Soviet Union objects that we cannot carry out this plan unless it is tied from the beginning to concrete reductions in armed forces. Despite every assurance we have been able to give it persists in doubting our intentions in this respect. It refuses to believe that the President's plan and other confidence-building measures are "integrally connected with the fulfillment of the task of stopping the armaments race."

Mr. Chairman, let me assure the Soviet representative and this committee that the United States intends that the Eisenhower plan *should* be part of the task of stopping the arms race and reducing armaments. To that end we have in this session cosponsored a resolution which, as Mr. Moch[15] pointed out to Mr. Kuznetsov, couples the Eisenhower plan with earliest possible agree-

[14] *Ibid.*, May 30, 1955, p. 898.

[15] Jules Moch (France).

Text of Resolution on Disarmament[1]

U.N. doc. A/Res/383

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 808 (IX) of 4 November 1954, which established the conclusion that a further effort should be made to reach agreement on comprehensive and co-ordinated proposals to be embodied in a draft international disarmament convention providing for:

(a) The regulation, limitation and major reduction of all armed forces and all conventional armaments,

(b) The total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction of every type, together with the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes,

(c) The establishment of effective international control, through a control organ with rights, powers and functions adequate to guarantee the effective observance of the agreed reductions of all armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and to ensure the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only,

The whole programme to be such that no State would have cause to fear that its security was endangered,

Expressing the hope that efforts to relax international tensions, to promote mutual confidence and to develop co-operation among States, such as the Geneva Conference of the Heads of Governments of the four Powers, the Bandung Conference of Asian and African countries and the United Nations tenth anniversary commemorative meeting at San Francisco, will prove effective in promoting world peace,

Desirous of contributing to the lowering of international tensions, the strengthening of confidence between States, the removal of the threat of war and the reduction of the burden of armaments,

Convinced therefore of the need to continue to seek agreement on a comprehensive programme for disarmament which will promote international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources,

Welcoming the progress which has been made towards agreement on objectives during the meetings in 1955 of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission,

Noting that agreement has not yet been reached on the rights, powers and functions of a control system, which is the keystone of any disarmament agreement, nor on other essential matters set out in General Assembly resolution 808 (IX),

Noting also that special technical difficulties have arisen in regard to the detection and control of nuclear weapons material,

Recognizing further that inspection and control of disarmament can best be achieved in an atmosphere which is free of fear and suspicion,

1. *Urges* that the States concerned and particularly those on the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission:

(a) Should continue their endeavours to reach agreement on a comprehensive disarmament plan in accordance with the goals set out in General Assembly resolution 808 (IX);

(b) Should, as initial steps, give priority to early agreement on and implementation of:

(i) Such confidence-building measures as the plan of Mr. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America, for exchanging military blueprints and mutual aerial inspection, and the plan of Mr. Bulganin, Prime Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, for establishing control posts at strategic centres;

(ii) All such measures of adequately safeguarded disarmament as are now feasible;

2. *Suggests* that account should also be taken of the proposals of the Prime Minister of France for exchanging and publishing information regarding military expenditures and budgets, of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for seeking practical experience in the problems of inspection and control, and of the Government of India regarding the suspension of experimental explosions of nuclear weapons and an "armaments truce";

3. *Calls upon* the States concerned, and especially those on the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, to study the proposal of the Prime Minister of France for the allocation of funds resulting from disarmament for improving the standards of living throughout the world and, in particular, in the less-developed countries;

4. *Recommends further* that scientific search should be continued by each State, with appropriate consultation between Governments, for methods that would make possible thoroughly effective inspection and control of nuclear weapons material, having as its aim to facilitate the solution of the problem of comprehensive disarmament;

5. *Suggests* that the Disarmament Commission reconvene its Sub-Committee and that both pursue their efforts to attain the above objectives;

6. *Decides* to transmit to the Disarmament Commission, for its information, the records of the meetings of the First Committee at which the disarmament problem was discussed during the tenth session of the General Assembly, and requests the Disarmament Commission and the Sub-Committee to give careful and early consideration to the views expressed in those documents.

[1] Adopted in Committee I on Dec. 12 by a vote of 53–5 (Soviet bloc), with no abstentions, and in plenary on Dec. 16 by a vote of 56–7 (original Soviet bloc, plus Hungary and Rumania)–0.

ment upon every kind of disarmament which can presently be supervised and guaranteed by adequate inspection. We believe that this undertaking for immediate practical steps promises to be much more fruitful for disarmament than the elaborately qualified and inadequately controlled plan which the Soviet Union proposes. We do not believe, however, that the Eisenhower plan with its safeguard against war need necessarily wait upon agreement and execution of arms reductions.

What we should like to see would be both together.

The Soviet Union claims to believe that the United States is not sincere about reductions in armed forces because it does not now specify figures for the size of military forces permitted under an eventual agreement. In my opening remarks in this session I described the criteria which the United States would use in negotiating these force levels. They would certainly assure real reductions. But as to the figures of a million and a half for the Soviet Union, the United States, and China, and the other figures which have been cited in the Soviet remarks, let me say this: The United States itself mentioned some of these figures in 1952 with the indication that they were for purposes of illustration. That was almost 4 years ago. Since then, the geographic, political, and technological bases of these calculations have been in constant evolution. The new factor of an untold but possibly decisive quantity of hidden nuclear bombs has intervened.

The United States believes that levels for conventional forces will, of course, ultimately be expressed by international agreement in specific numbers. Whatever these figures may be, they will certainly have to be calculated with reference to what it may then be possible to do with respect to the control of nuclear materials. Above all, they must take account of the capabilities of inspection and control.

The United States does not believe that the resolution we adopt in this committee should refer to specific force-level figures which may prove unrealistic.

Prohibition of Atomic Weapons

The United States has repeatedly said that it would never use any weapons, be they rifles or H-bombs, except in defense against aggression and in conformity with the charter of the United Nations.

Mr. Khrushchev is not satisfied with that pledge. Mr. Bulganin calls on all states to commit themselves not to be the first to use the nuclear weapons in war, and in any case to use them only if approved by the Security Council. This has a fine self-denying ring about it. Let us see what it really means.

The Soviet Union's own proposal of May 10 which has so often been quoted here, shows why atomic weapons cannot be totally eliminated in the near future.

If an international agreement makes it impossible for a law-abiding power to use them first even in dire extremity of self-defense against a massive aggression, then that power which is strongest in conventional means of warfare would be immediately established as the strongest military power on earth. And it would still have a reserve of its own nuclear weapons sufficient to strike devastating blows.

The true democracies of the world, by their very way of life, have traditionally been forced to accept the first blows in war. Thus they generally concede a great strategic initiative. Should they also agree not to use their most powerful weapons in their own defense after taking that first blow, they would be committing suicide.

But this is not all. The Soviet Union has dredged up the idea of subjecting the use of these weapons, even in self-defense, to protracted Security Council approval—another way of saying "veto."

The pledge against the use of atomic weapons except in defense against aggression as provided in the charter is actually wider reaching than the fallacious proposal put forward by the Soviet Union. What then would be the value of additional pledges? My Belgian colleague [Fernand van Langenhove] answered this question in conclusive terms in this powerful statement the other day:

> Such undertakings would have the effect, if there were some potential aggressor in the world, of reassuring such an aggressor as to the consequences of the act which he is contemplating, and consequently of encouraging the aggressor to commit an aggression. How can we rely on the undertaking that this aggressor would have assumed not to use the atomic weapons if that same aggressor was capable of violating the fundamental undertaking of the United Nations Charter not to resort to aggression by any weapon whatsoever?

I fully subscribe to this analysis. The United tates would, therefore, oppose any amendment) the draft resolution which would substitute a)-called prohibition against first use for the gen- ral undertaking not to use atomic weapons ex- ept in defense against aggression.

Mr. Kuznetsov tries to reinforce his proposed an on atomic weapons by citing the supposed ffectiveness of international conventions pro- ibiting the use of chemical and bacteriological eapons. It is true that these weapons were not sed in World War II. But this was certainly ot only because of such international agreements. 'hese undertakings were observed because of the ontrolling force of strategic and political con- iderations.

If chemical warfare could have been employed ith the versatility of the atomic weapons on any attlefield in a manner so decisive as to prevent etaliation on the aggressor, does anyone believe hat the Nazi war machine would not have used t in World War II?

oviet Responsibility for Tension

Let me conclude with some comments on inter- ational confidence and cooperation.

The Soviet Union has submitted a draft reso- ution on "Measures for the further relaxation of nternational tension and development of inter- ational cooperation."[16] This is, to use the lan- uage of automobile manufacturers, the 1956 nodel of the annual Soviet omnibus proposal. It ontains a number of sentiments with which, of ourse, we can all agree. The Soviet Union also roposes that we begin our resolution by express- ng satisfaction with the improvement in inter- ational relations supposedly achieved in the past ear. It speaks of certain efforts made "of late" y states to relax tensions and to promote confi- lence.

Any such efforts by the Soviet Union deserve he support of us all; but, as men who are opti- nistic but realistic, we must recognize that most f the principal sources of tension still exist and hat it lies in the power of the Soviets to relieve hem instantly.

We must also take account with great regret f certain Soviet decisions "of late" which have n effect quite contrary to the relaxation of ten- ions.

[16] U.N. doc A/C. 1/L.151. The committee did not vote n the Soviet draft.

The most prominent example of unrelieved tension is probably the divided state of Germany. To our disappointment, the Soviet delegation "of late" at Geneva still blocked unification on just and reasonable terms.

Also at Geneva, the Soviet Union showed that our hopes for a dissolution of the Iron Curtain must be still further deferred. It was unwilling to consider the progressive elimination of barriers to free communications, to the free movement of persons, or the free communication of ideas and information. It was willing to consider only such measures of relaxation of controls of such strategic materials in international trade as might improve its position.

There is another example of a source of tension maintained by the Soviet Union which is quite germane to our discussions. It is quite true that Soviet and Western troops have both withdrawn from Austria. But in contravention of its treaty obligations, the Soviet Union still maintains troops and bases in Hungary and Rumania.

"Of late" the Soviet Union has taken certain positive measures which certainly do not relieve tension. It has helped create an arms race, where one did not exist, in the Middle East.

The Soviet Union continues to claim credit for the Communist states for the cessation of hostilities in Korea and Indochina. It is impossible for us to understand the process of reasoning whereby anyone claims credit for no longer doing something that he should never have done in the first place. I do not understand this attitude that you ought to get praise when you stop doing something wrong.

Here in the United Nations, Mr. Kuznetsov and Mr. Malik have resurrected the charge that the Korean War started with aggression fomented from "overseas"—that is the word. It is regrettable that a charge so alien to our debate, so conclusively refuted by the evidence gathered by United Nations observers, has been brought into these discussions. It flies in the face of world opinion as that world opinion is represented in this Assembly, and it certainly cannot be accepted by the thousands of families who have lost sons in the battle for freedom which was waged by the United Nations in Korea.

In other parts of the world, responsible Soviet leaders are using language about their Geneva associates—and you all have read this—that is far different from what they used at Geneva, and it

is presumably very different from what they will use when they return to the Western World.

Against that background of Soviet actions and Soviet arguments in this debate, we must conclude regretfully that our hopes for renewed mutual confidence and our hopes for a better climate for disarmament have had a check. We hope this check will prove only temporary. On the other hand, this committee would mislead world opinion if it prefaced its recommendations with optimism so excessive that it was contrary to the plain facts.

The present Soviet attitude on the Eisenhower plan is not the least disquieting of these developments. Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Kuznetsov have advanced the rather startling theory that this "open sky" plan would actually create and not allay distrust, and the reason they give is that the Soviet Union and the United States could, under that plan, each see what the other was doing behind its frontiers.

For people like me who have been brought up in a democratic society, this is almost totally incomprehensible. Our Belgian colleague says this idea leaves him "speechless," and I do not wonder.

The statement that the Eisenhower plan would increase distrust is either some kind of smokescreen, in which case we should ask why anyone thinks it is worth while to do such a thing, or else it is a sign of confused reasoning. Of course, it could be a mixture of both.

Mr. Kuznetsov quoted Air Marshal [Sir Basil] Embry and General [Maxwell] Taylor on the utility of aerial reconnaissance for military operations. Of course Air Marshal Embry and General Taylor think aerial reconnaissance is very useful for military operations. From this he then deduced that we should not endorse the President's plan. You do not have to quote Air Marshal Embry or General Taylor to convince us that aerial reconnaissance has military value. It must be obvious to the merest layman that the fact that air power has great value for war is what presents us with our most dramatic problem here at the United Nations.

The advantage of President Eisenhower's plan is that it takes air power and uses it for peace—that is the point. Of course, air power can be used for war, but this plan takes it and uses it for peace; it puts it at the service of peace, just as the plan which President Eisenhower presented here 2 years ago yesterday took atomic power, with its dread potential for death and destruction, and used it for peace. Surely that point cannot really have escaped Mr. Kuznetsov. I repeat that Mr. Kuznetsov has not fully disclosed why he opposes the President's plan.

Let me say in conclusion that we shall continue to seek progress. We wish to allay any legitimate misgivings the Soviet Union may have. We wish to meet other views halfway. We shall strive to resolve all the issues we can and to draw the others clearly so that the world may judge, so that opinion may be enlightened, so that we can make progress.

The draft resolution we have submitted, and the revisions which we shall shortly present, will make clear our purpose to promote world peace and security and to do it constructively and honestly.

COMMENTS ON AMENDMENTS

U.S. press release 2320 dated December 12

I dislike speaking so often, but it is the custom—and I think a wise custom—for those who are sponsors to explain their positions on these various amendments.

I would like to say that our intention from the beginning of the debate has been to meet the consensus of views expressed here, insofar as we could possibly do so, within the framework of our joint resolution. Accordingly, we were very pleased to be able to accept in whole or in substance no less than five Soviet and seven Indian suggestions in the revised text which appears in document L.150/Rev.1. We also welcome the amendment of Pakistan, Costa Rica, and Mexico in document L.154/Rev.1. I shall not review these additions to our text since they were fully explained last Friday by the representative of the United Kingdom.

The United States supports his motion for priority for our resolution under Rule 132.[17]

Since our new text was submitted, we have had time to study the revised amendments introduced by India in document L.153/Rev.1. Because of our desire to see the widest possible measure of agreement on a subject so vital to us all, we are

[17] "If two or more proposals relate to the same question, a committee shall, unless it decides otherwise, vote on the proposals in the order in which they have been submitted. A committee may, after each vote on a proposal, decide whether to vote on the next proposal."

ıow prepared to revise our text further to include s many as possible of these new amendments.

We accept the Indian amendment No. 2, subparagraph (1). Accordingly, subparagraph (a) of our first operative paragraph will now read as ollows: "Should continue their endeavors to reach greement on a comprehensive disarmament plan n accordance with the goals set out in resolution 08(IX)."

We are also prepared to insert the words "as nitial steps" in subparagraph (b) of our first perative paragraph so that it will now read as ollows: "(b) Should, as initial steps, give priority o early agreement on and implementation of," tc. This is part of the Indian amendment No. 2, ubparagraph (2).

We accept most of the Indian amendment No. , subparagraph (3). Our new paragraph 1(b) ii) will therefore read as follows: "All such measres of adequately safeguarded disarmament as re now feasible." Having inserted the words "as nitial steps" above, we think it would be reundant to repeat them here as suggested in this ndian amendment.

We and our cosponsors have also given careful tudy to the first Indian amendment. We have ecided that, if it is considered desirable by thers, we can actually quote the language from ıst year's resolution [18] which is being recalled in ur first preambular paragraph. It seems unecessary to us to add all this language to an lready lengthy text; but in a spirit of accommoation, here too, we will accept the first version of his Indian amendment as it appeared in document L.153. Our first preambular paragraph ould then begin as follows: "Recalling its resoution 808(IX) of 4 November 1954, which estabshed the conclusion 'that a further effort should e made,'" etc.

I come now to those amendments submitted by ıe Indian and Soviet delegations to which the onsors object and which have not been incororated in this revised resolution.

First, let me take up the amendments proposed ı document A/C.1/L.153/Rev.1, submitted by ndia on December 9, which we have not accepted.

As I have stated, the United States has accepted ıe earlier version of the first Indian amendment, hich repeats the language of the General Asembly resolution of 1954. The United States voted for that resolution and subscribes to its principles. But the revised version of the amendment, as contained in document L.153/Rev.1, reaffirms in blanket fashion without discrimination and without reference to changing circumstances all of the operative provisions of last year's resolution. This includes the provisions for elimination of all nuclear weapons.

Difficulties of Controlling Nuclear Arms

Mr. Chairman, I believe practically every delegate who has spoken in this debate has recognized the impossibility of totally accounting for nuclear weapons material by any scientific means known at this time. This makes total elimination of these weapons scientifically impossible at present. Mr. Moch of France has, for the past several years, warned us of these facts. In the light of these facts we do not see how we can proceed now to draw up a disarmament convention, as last year's resolution recommends, incorporating a provision which we know cannot be enforced. It is inconsistent with paragraph (c) of last year's resolution, which calls for effective control. It is inconsistent with preambular paragraphs 7 and 8 of our present draft resolution, which recognize the difficulties of such control. It is inconsistent with the debate which has taken place in this committee and with the facts as we know them today.

Until success rewards the scientific search recommended in paragraph 3 [19] of the four-power resolution and until fully adequate inspection and control is agreed, in place, and operating, nuclear weapons cannot be totally eliminated. Paragraph 1(a) of our resolution directs us to continue to seek agreement on a comprehensive plan which will accord with the goals of last year's resolution. This means all those goals which can be effectively controlled. When elimination of nuclear weapons can be effectively controlled, this can be provided for in a comprehensive plan, but not before. Also, I must point out that the question is not merely one of making a further effort to reach agreement; it is a matter of technical fact, which only new technical developments can alter.

I come now to that part of Indian amendment No. 2 which we have not accepted. We have not incorporated the word "equal" in part (2) of this amendment. Both of the sections of paragraph 1(b) of our resolution are on the same general

[18] BULLETIN of Nov. 1, 1954, p. 664.

[19] Paragraph 4 of final draft.

plane of priority—in that sense they *are* equal. However, we do not believe that agreement on, or the carrying out of, one should of necessity await agreement on and carrying out of the other. We hope that they can be done together; but we do not want this to be a requirement.

The next Indian amendment which we have not been able to accept is No. 3, which deals with the enlargement of the Disarmament Commission and the Subcommittee. The United States cannot support this enlargement at this time. We believe that the problem of enlarging this Commission must be considered when we review the size and composition of other major organs in the light of any decision reached on the admission of new members.

We all know that such a review will be necessary and that it must be undertaken as soon as possible. But it would be a mistake to attempt now to alter the composition of this important Commission in the absence of new members who, once admitted to the United Nations, should have a voice in such a decision.

Views on Proposed Convention

Next, there is the Indian amendment No. 5, which would insert a new paragraph as follows: "*Decides* that the Disarmament Commission should undertake without delay the drafting of an international disarmament convention and circulate it to all States for their comments and report to the General Assembly."

The United States, of course, believes that agreement on disarmament should eventually be embodied in such a convention. But while lack of agreement on so many vital points still exists, it is exceedingly difficult to draft up any kind of legal instrument which is reasonably complete or which makes much sense at all.

The product of such an operation, as I think those who have tried it will agree, looks like a series of blanks connected with legal verbiage. It might be compared to a fish net—a lot of holes connected with string. I know that Mr. Menon's suggestion was put forward with the purpose, with which of course I entirely agree, of putting on a little more pressure for tangible results. But I am afraid that it could have results opposite to what he intends and to what I desire. The time spent in trying to draw up a convention would be better spent in coming to grips with the actual issue.

I turn now to the amendments submitted by the Soviet Union in document A/C.1/L.152 of December 6, 1955, which we have not been able to incorporate in our joint resolution. Let me begin with the first paragraph in amendment No. 3.

This Soviet language would be substituted for those paragraphs in our resolution which recognize that agreement has not been reached on the nature of controls and inspection, that special technical difficulties exist, and that inspection and control and reduction of armaments can best be achieved in an atmosphere of confidence. These paragraphs are matters of deep conviction for us. They state the truth of the present situation. We could not omit them.

The suggested Soviet language conveys a misleading idea of the extent of agreement reached in the Subcommittee and in the Commission. Our text acknowledges some "progress towards" agreement, which gives the world an accurate picture of what has taken place.

To take up the second paragraph of Soviet amendment No. 3, here again, in our view, the Soviet Union overstates the extent of agreement on force levels, on prohibition, and on timing. As I have said before, we are against proposing total and immediate prohibition until we can be assured that this prohibition would be effective. With reference to force levels, the United States believes the ultimate figures must be established in the light of what can be done about nuclear weapons and effective inspection and control. There has *not* been substantial agreement on the order to be followed in a comprehensive disarmament program. The Soviet Union won't say when control can be installed; moreover, it wants to pass *automatically* from one stage of disarmament to another rather than in accordance with the findings and judgment of the International Control Authority. Furthermore, it calls for total prohibition and elimination of atomic weapons to take place somewhere in this sequence even though they know total prohibition is impossible to check. Above all, there is a vast difference of opinion on what constitutes effective control.

Next we come to Soviet amendment No. 6. This paragraph would completely transform the sense of our resolution. It gives the Soviet May 10 and July 21, 1955, proposals [20] first priority. The former brings in a host of political issues which are not in the competence of the Disarmament Commission, such as the settlement of Far Eastern

uestions, dismantling of all bases abroad, and the emoval of foreign troops from Germany.

It cuts the heart out of the forward-looking approach adopted in our present resolution. That pproach is that we *do all that can be done now*, ven while we continue to work toward comprehensive disarmament in accordance with the ltimate goals expressed in last year's resolution nd while we tackle the scientific barriers and the arriers of international distrust which block olution of the problem of comprehensive isarmament.

Mr. Chairman, a second revision of our resolution incorporating the additional language which have just mentioned will be circulated very soon. Ve believe that this revised text points out the ıost promising path of progress for the Disarmaıent Commission and its Subcommittee. It has ıe virtue of being both forward looking and realtic. It faces squarely the fact that new technical ifficulties have arisen in regard to the control of uclear weapons material. And it recognizes that ıternational suspicions must be cleared away if e are to make progress toward comprehensive isarmament.

But, Mr. Chairman, we have not stopped there. Knowing the world's great yearning for at least start—a first installment—on disarmament, we ave included a directive to the governments conerned to take every action which is now feasible. nd that is a significant step, Mr. Chairman. his resolution directs the states to make such inial reductions as can be adequately controlled— the earliest opportunity—without waiting for greement on a comprehensive plan, although we ontinue to work for such a plan.

We have also requested the governments conrned to start *now* to carry out the Eisenhower ıd Bulganin plans. As I stressed earlier, the nited States wants both the Eisenhower plan and beginning on disarmament—together if possie—to go into effect as soon as possible.

We do not believe, however, that the Eisenhower-Bulganin plan need be postponed while we ıy to get agreement even on the initial measures disarmament which are currently feasible and controllable. We do not believe the peoples of the world should be deprived any longer of its shield against war, while we debate interminably on details. We are convinced—and we are glad that others agree with us—that the early execution of the Eisenhower plan will speed progress on far-reaching disarmament.

Let me repeat: We share the earnest desire of most governments represented here that there be a firm statement in this resolution directing the states concerned to achieve early reductions in armaments. With the adoption of this resolution, we shall lay to rest once and for all the charge that we seek inspection without disarmament.

It is in our power to lift the disarmament discussion out of the morass into which it has sunk. With the adoption of this resolution, which represents a good-faith attempt on the part of the sponsors to meet the desires that have been expressed here in this room by the representatives of all countries, we may hope that deliberation on disarmament will finally lead to some action, some immediate action for which the world has waited so anxiously for so many years.

EXPLANATION OF VOTE IN PLENARY

U.S. delegation press release 2330 dated December 16

This hall is full of distinguished men—men with records of accomplishment behind them; men who are doing important work today; men who will do big things in the future. With all this in mind, I say this: Nothing anyone here has ever done, or may do, is likely to work so powerfully for peace as what we have just done here today in giving worldwide endorsement to President Eisenhower's "open sky" plan, which is linked with Marshal Bulganin's plan for ground control posts.

When this plan was proposed at Geneva last summer, the world welcomed it because it was fresh and new and bold. Over the years the world had become disillusioned and confused—and, if the truth be told, dangerously bored and cynical—by the endless disarmament talks. Undoubtedly many persons suspected that we here in the United Nations had succumbed to ritual; that we had become so proficient in the old arguments and so dominated by traditional concepts that we had lost touch with the bewildering speed of scientific development.

By our action today, we have shown that the

[*] For text of the July proposals, see *The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18–23, 1955*, Department of State publication 6046, p. 55. Texts of both the May and July proposals were circulated in U.N. doc. A/2979 dated Sept. 22.

United Nations can move ahead with the times. We have stepped out of the squirrel's cage.

Our endorsement of the "open sky" plan by such an overwhelming majority will now mobilize the irrestible force of world opinion. No government can long stand out against that great force. Our action today will make the "open sky" plan a household word in every land—and eventually behind the Iron Curtain. The people of the world will demand that this plan be put into operation, and I am confident that the Soviet Union will join it, as they joined the atoms-for-peace program.

Thus the plan will go into effect, and the "sentinels of peace" will fly over the United States. They will fly over the Soviet Union and over other lands which eventually take part in this plan. This in turn will make major surprise attack impossible because of the impossibility of concealing preparations for it. This will remove the menace of World War III. In its turn this will make possible comprehensive disarmament and all the other blessings of peace and prosperity.

This resolution directs that we start *now* toward that goal. It also calls on the nations, at the earliest moment, to take those steps toward the reduction of armaments which can be surely and safely safeguarded under an efficient system of international inspection. It is the most significant disarmament resolution which the General Assembly has yet passed.

There is an old proverb uttered by one of the earliest American statesmen and diplomats, Benjamin Franklin. It goes something as follows: "For want of a nail, the shoe was lost; for want of a shoe, the horse was lost; and for want of a horse, the rider was lost." Thus the rider did not arrive and the battle was lost.

We today in the air-atomic age are putting the reverse of this old proverb into effect. Instead of losing a battle because of a nail, we are on our way to winning the peace by using air power for peace, now that modern science has made this possible. The United Nations thus becomes the place where both air power and atomic power are directed to man's life rather than to man's death.

What we have done here today can change the lives of babies now in their cradles. In and of itself, it alone justifies our existence and that of the United Nations.

Self-Determination Article in Human Rights Covenants

Following is a statement by Mrs. Oswald I Lord on November 29 in Committee III (Socia Humanitarian and Cultural) in explanation o the negative U.S. vote on a revised draft of articl 1 of the two draft Covenants on Human Right together with drafts of the article as it read at th beginning of the committee debate and as it rea after it was revised by a working party.[1]

STATEMENT BY MRS. LORD

U.S. delegation press release 2301 dated November 29

The United States delegation voted agains paragraph 2 of article 1 and, because of the inclu sion of this paragraph, voted *against* the article a a whole. We did this in spite of the improvement in the paragraph made by the working party be cause the paragraph is still subject to misinterpre tation and possible abuse. The language was no sufficiently clear and forthright in specifying th intention of the committee that the paragraph wa not intended to impair legal rights of individual or authorize expropriation without adequate prompt, and effective compensation.

This paragraph is intended for acceptance b the contracting parties as a legally binding obliga tion. In a legally binding text, should this be come one, the rights and obligations assume should be stated as clearly and unambiguously a possible. This has not been achieved in this text We could not, therefore, approve it, even with th advance knowledge that because of our decisio not to sign the covenants it would not be bindin on us in any case.

The United States delegation notes, howeve that a large majority of those delegations who ex pressed themselves on the paragraph stated it to b their desire to avoid any interpretation whic

[1] For a statement by Mrs. Lord in Committee III o Oct. 27, see BULLETIN of Nov. 14, 1955, p. 808.

On Nov. 29 a Danish motion to postpone the final de cision until the next session of the Assembly was defeate by a vote of 25 in favor, 28 against, with 5 abstentions The committee then adopted article 1, after a long serie of votes on individual parts, by 33 in favor, 12 agains (U.S.), with 13 abstentions. The text of article 1 wil not be voted on in plenary until the draft covenants ar completed.

ould justify expropriation, actions contrary to nternational law or agreements, measures impairng international economic cooperation, or impairnent of legal rights. Criticism of the original ext on this basis and/or support for amendment f the original text to achieve this objective was exressed along these general lines by the representaives of El Salvador, Uruguay, Argentina, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Panama, Cuba, Costa Rica, Lebanon, Colombia, Australia, United Kingdom, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, Chile, and Pakistan, whose statements may be found in the ertinent summary records. Likewise, support for he revised version has been expressed by a number f representatives on behalf of their governments ecause of their understanding that the present ersion is intended to encompass these protections. We note that a number of representatives have poken along these lines. Several representatives ave specifically indicated that international law s intended to include international agreements, nd also that there is no intent to authorize impairnent of legal and property rights. Others indiated a willingness to go even further in making hese points clearer in the text, which would unoubtedly have been accomplished had it been posible to devote more time to consideration of the erminology.

I bring these factors out in explanation of the United States vote because the confusion of the ext requires the clearest possible explanation of he intent of the text in order that it may not be ited as justification for actions and procedures hich its framers have stated they did not intend.

The United States recognizes the right of a state o control its natural wealth and resources, proided that the obligation to make prompt payment f just compensation for the taking of property or he extinguishment of legal rights is also recogized. Any such compensation should be in an ffectively realizable form and should represent he full equivalent of the property taken or the egal rights extinguished. We felt that the pararaph should have been more specific in reflecting hese principles, which seem to be generally cceptable.

IRST DRAFT OF ARTICLE

1. All peoples and all nations shall have the ght of self-determination, namely, the right freely to determine their political, economic, social and cultural status.

2. All States, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories and those controlling in whatsoever manner the exercise of that right by another people, shall promote the realization of that right in all their territories, and shall respect the maintenance of that right in other States, in conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

3. The right of peoples to self-determination shall also include permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence on the grounds of any rights that may be claimed by other States.

REVISED DRAFT[2]

1. All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of this right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

2. The peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic cooperation based upon the principle of mutual benefit and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.

3. All the States parties to the Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of non-self-governing and trust territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

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[2] In the revised draft, paragraph 3 became paragraph 2. It was improved by the working party but still was not acceptable to the U.S. delegation.

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Question of the Continuation of the United Nations Tribunal in Libya. Communication dated 31 October 1955 from the Libyan Ambassador to the United States of America addressed to the Secretary-General. A/C.6/L.362, November 4, 1955. 7 pp. mimeo.

Report of the Special Committee on Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgements. Report of the Fifth Committee. A/3016, November 5, 1955. 21 pp. mimeo.

Report of the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds. Report of the Fifth Committee. A/3014, November 5, 1955. 6 pp. mimeo.

Special Report of the Advisory Commission of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. A/3017, November 7, 1955. 15 pp. mimeo.

Effects of Atomic Radiation. (a) Co-ordination of Information Relating to the Effects of Atomic Radiation upon Human Health and Safety. (b) Dissemination of Information on the Effects of Atomic Radiation and on the Effects of Experimental Explosions of Thermonuclear Bombs. Report of the First Committee. A/3022, November 10, 1955. 10 pp. mimeo.

Budget Estimates for the Financial Year 1956. Special Internes. Report of the Secretary-General. A/C.5/641, November 11, 1955. 4 pp. mimeo.

Administrative and Budgetary Co-ordination Between the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies. Administrative budgets for 1956. Fourteenth report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to the tenth session of the General Assembly. A/3023, November 11, 1955. 32 pp. mimeo.

Use of Income Derived from the Staff Assessment Plan. Report of the Secretary-General. A/C.5/643, November 12, 1955. 9 pp. mimeo.

Treatment of People of Indian Origin in the Union of South Africa. Note by the Secretary-General. A/3001/Add.1, November 14, 1955. 22 pp. mimeo.

Budget Estimates for the Financial Year 1956. Reimbursement rates for services rendered to the specialized agencies. Fifteenth report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to the tenth session of the General Assembly. A/3024, November 14, 1955. 5 pp. mimeo.

Budget Estimates for the Financial Year 1956. Permanent headquarters of the International Telecommunication Union and the World Meteorological Organization at Geneva. Sixteenth report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to the tenth session of the General Assembly. A/3025, November 14, 1955. 5 pp. mimeo.

The Korean Question. Note by the Secretary-General. A/C.1/771, November 16, 1955. 5 pp. mimeo.

The Question of Race Conflict in South Africa Resulting from the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Union of South Africa: Report of the United Nations Commission on the Racial Situation in the Union of South Africa. Report of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. A/3026, November 16, 1955. 7 pp. mimeo.

Organization of the Secretariat. Report of the Secretary-General. A/3041, November 23, 1955. 25 pp. mimeo.

UNREF Progress Report for 1955. Submitted by the High Commissioner. A/AC.79/23, November 28, 1955. 18 pp. mimeo.

Organization of the Secretariat. Budget Estimates for the Financial Year 1956. Twenty-fourth report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to the tenth session of the General Assembly. A/3049, November 28, 1955. 15 pp. mimeo.

Registration and Publication of Treaties and International Agreements. Report of the Fifth Committee. A/3058, December 2, 1955. 7 pp. mimeo.

Draft Convention on the Nationality of Married Women. Report of the Third Committee. A/3059, December 2, 1955. 9 pp. mimeo.

Draft International Covenants on Human Rights. Report of the Third Committee. A/3077, December 8, 1955. 35 pp. mimeo.

United Nations Administrative Tribunal. Annual note by the Administrative Tribunal to the President of the General Assembly as to the Functioning of the Administrative Tribunal. A/INV/68, December 8, 1955. 5 pp. mimeo.

ıdget Estimates for the Financial Year 1956. Organization of the Secretariat. Report of the Fifth Committee. A/3103, December 14, 1955. 98 pp. mimeo.

curity Council

etter dated 23 September 1955 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain addressed to the Secretary-General concerning the application of Spain for admission to membership in the United Nations and declaration accepting obligations under the Charter. S/3441/Rev. 1, September 27, 1955. 2 pp. mimeo.

etter dated 27 September 1955 from the Permanent Representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/3442, September 28, 1955. 2 pp. mimeo.

ote dated 28 September 1955 from the Representative of the United States addressed to the Secretary-General concerning the effective date of the change in command of the military forces made available to the Unified Command pursuant to the Security Council resolution of 7 July 1950 (S/1588). S/3402/Add. 1, October 5, 1955. 1 p. mimeo.

etter dated 22 October 1955 from the Representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Secretary Council. S/3448, October 24, 1955. 3 pp. mimeo.

etter dated 28 October 1955 from the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/3450, October 28, 1955. 2 pp. mimeo.

etter dated 28 October 1955 from the Permanent Representative of Syria to the President of the Security Council. S/3451, October 28, 1955. 2 pp. mimeo.

etter dated 29 October 1955 from the Representative of the United Kingdom addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/3452, October 31, 1955. 3 pp. mimeo.

etter dated 1 November 1955 from the Representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/3454, November 1, 1955. 2 pp. mimeo.

etter dated 3 November 1955 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the Representative of Syria. S/3455, November 3, 1955. 1 p. mimeo.

etter dated 3 November 1955 from the Representative of Egypt addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/3456, November 3, 1955. 3 pp. mimeo.

etter dated 22 November 1955 from the Representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/3462, November 25, 1955. 3 pp. mimeo.

etter dated 25 November 1955 from the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission addressed to the Secretary-General. S/3463, November 25, 1955. 1 p. mimeo.

TREATY INFORMATION

efense Agreement With Germany ecomes Effective

ess release 711 dated December 27

The German Chargé d'Affaires ad interim, lbrecht von Kessel, on December 27, deposited the instrument of ratification of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. With this deposit, the agreement, which was signed on June 30 of this year, becomes effective.[1]

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. Done at New York June 5, 1954.[2]
Ratification deposited: Ceylon, November 28, 1955; Cambodia, November 29, 1955.

Customs convention on temporary importation of private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954.[2]
Ratification deposited: Ceylon, November 28, 1955.

Aviation

Convention for unification of certain rules relating to international transportation by air, and additional protocol. Concluded at Warsaw October 12, 1929. Entered into force February 13, 1933. 49 Stat. 3000.
Adherence deposited: Egypt, September 6, 1955.

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Finance Corporation. Signed at Washington May 25, 1955, and open for signature until the close of business December 31, 1956. Enters into force when signed and accepted by not less than 30 governments whose subscriptions comprise not less than 75 percent of the subscriptions set forth in schedule A.
Signatures: Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, May 25, 1955; Ecuador, June 1, 1955; Pakistan, July 21, 1955; Iceland, August 18, 1955; India, October 19, 1955; Canada, United Kingdom, October 25, 1955; Austria, December 2, 1955; United States, December 5, 1955.

North Atlantic Treaty

Agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their forces. Signed at London June 19, 1951. Entered into force August 23, 1953. TIAS 2846.
Ratification deposited: Italy, December 22, 1955.

Protocol on status of international military headquarters. Signed at Paris August 28, 1952. Entered into force April 10, 1954. TIAS 2978.
Ratification deposited: Italy, December 22, 1955.

Agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for cooperation regarding atomic information. Signed at Paris June 22, 1955.[2]
Notification of being bound by terms of the agreement: United States, December 28, 1955.

Postal Matters

Universal postal convention, with final protocol, annex, regulations of execution, and provisions regarding airmail and final protocol thereto. Signed at Brussels

[1] For text, see BULLETIN of July 25, 1955, p. 142.
[2] Not in force.

July 11, 1952. Entered into force July 1, 1953. TIAS 2800.
Ratification deposited: Turkey, November 12, 1955.

Sugar

International sugar agreement. Done at London under date of October 1, 1953. Entered into force May 5, 1954. TIAS 3177.
Ratification deposited (with a declaration): Greece, September 14, 1955.

BILATERAL

Argentina

Surplus commodity agreement pursuant to the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 69 Stat. 44, 721). Signed at Buenos Aires December 21, 1955. Entered into force December 21, 1955.

Canada

Agreement providing for the establishment and operation of certain radar stations in the Newfoundland-Labrador area. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa June 13, 1955. Entered into force June 13, 1955.

Agreement providing for the construction and operation of certain radar stations in British Columbia, Ontario, and Nova Scotia. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa June 15, 1955. Entered into force June 15, 1955.

Colombia

Surplus commodity agreement pursuant to the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 69 Stat. 44, 721). Signed at Bogotá December 20, 1955. Entered into force December 20, 1955.

Federal Republic of Germany

Mutual defense assistance agreement. Signed at Bonn June 30, 1955.
Entered into force: December 27, 1955 (date of deposit of instrument of ratification by the Federal Republic).

Arrangement for the return of equipment pursuant to the mutual defense assistance agreement. Effected by exchange of notes at Bonn June 30, 1955.
Entered into force: December 27, 1955 (upon entry into force of the mutual defense assistance agreement).

THE DEPARTMENT

Delegation of Authority[1]

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY WITH RESPECT TO DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by section 4 of the Act of May 26, 1949 (63 Stat. 111; 5 U. S. C. 151c), I hereby delegate to the Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs of the Department of State, or in his absence to the officer designated to act for him, the performance of all the functions which the Secretary of State is authorized to perform pursuant to and under the authority of Section 25 (b) of the Federal Reserve Act, as amended (Act of December 23, 1913, ch. 6, section 25 (b), as added June 16, 1933, ch. 89, section 15, 48 Stat. 184, and amended April 7, 1941, ch. 43, section 2, 55 Stat. 131; 12 U. S. C. 632).

Delegation of Authority No. 69 dated August 12, 19[illegible] (18 F. R. 4930, August 19, 1953), is hereby rescinded.

Dated: December 13, 1955.

[SEAL] JOHN FOSTER DULLES,
Secretary of State.

[1] Public Notice 145; 20 *Fed. Reg.* 9873.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Double Taxation—Taxes on Income. TIAS 3176. Pub. 5858. 53 pp. 20¢.

Convention between the United States and Japan—Signed at Washington April 16, 1954. And exchange of notes—Signed at Washington April 16, 1954.

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. TIAS 330[illegible] Pub. 5997. 26 pp. 15¢.

Agreement between the United States and Belgium—Signed at Washington June 15, 1955.

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. TIAS 330[illegible] Pub. 6021. 11 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Brazil—Signed at Rio de Janeiro August 3, 1955.

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. TIAS 330[illegible] Pub. 6014. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Chile—Signed at Washington August 8, 1955.

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. TIAS 332[illegible] Pub. 6052. 11 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland—Signed at Washington June 15, 1955.

Great Lakes Fisheries. TIAS 3326. Pub. 6058. 7 pp. 10¢.

Convention between the United States and Canada—Signed at Washington September 10, 1954.

Entry Rights—Traders and Investors. TIAS 3349. Pub. 6094. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington September 6, 1955.

griculture. Distributing Agricultural Surpluses . 53
sia. Survey of Mekong River 52
ustria. Deadline Extended for Filing Property Claims in Austria 49
hina, Communist. Chinese Communist Complaint Concerning Student 52
laims and Property. Deadline Extended for Filing Property Claims in Austria 49
isarmament. General Assembly Action on Disarmament (Lodge, text of resolution) . . . 55
conomic Affairs
.S. Completes Action Required for Membership in IFC 54
Vorld Bank Loan to Honduras for Highway System 54
oreign Service. Benjamin Franklin the Diplomat 50
ermany
efense Agreement With Germany Becomes Effective 73
.S. Restates Views on Soviet Obligations in Germany (Conant, Pushkin) 48
onduras. World Bank Loan to Honduras for Highway System 54
lutual Security
urrent Aspects of U.S.-Spanish Relations (Lodge) . 43
efense Agreement With Germany Becomes Effective 73
urvey of Mekong River 52
akistan. U.S. Helps Combat Flood Suffering in Pakistan 53
ublications. Recent Releases 74
pain. Current Aspects of U.S.-Spanish Relations (Lodge) 43
tate, Department of. Delegation of Authority (Dulles) 74
reaty Information
urrent Actions 73
Defense Agreement With Germany Becomes Effective 73
U.S.S.R. U.S. Restates Views on Soviet Obligations in Germany (Conant, Pushkin) . . . 48
United Nations
Current U.N. Documents 71
General Assembly Action on Disarmament (Lodge, text of resolution) 55
Self-Determination Article in Human Rights (Lord, texts of drafts) 70

Name Index

Benson, Ezra T. 53
Conant, James B. 48
Dulles, Secretary 74
Liu Yung-ming 52
Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr. 55
Lodge, John 43
Lord, Mrs. Oswald B. 70
Pushkin, Georgi 48

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: December 26–January 1

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

No.	Date	Subject
711	12/27	German ratification of MDA agreement.
*712	12/27	Delegation to Liberian presidential inauguration.
713	12/28	Deadline for filing Austrian property claims.
714	12/30	Complaint concerning Chinese student.

* Not printed.

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The Department of State

bulletin

XXXIV, No. 864

January 16, 1956

THE STATE OF THE UNION • *Excerpts From President Eisenhower's Message to the Congress* 79

VISIT OF PRESIDENT-ELECT KUBITSCHEK OF BRAZIL 86

APPROVAL OF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONTROLLING LEVELS OF LAKE ONTARIO 89

FUTURE STATUS OF TOGOLAND
Statement by Laird Bell 100
Text of Resolution 102

SUMMARY OF ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF TENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY 97

For index see inside back cover

The Department of State bulletin

VOL. XXXIV, No. 864 • PUBLICATION 6241

January 16, 1956

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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'he State of the Union

MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS (EXCERPTS)[1]

o THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

The opening of this new year must arouse in us l grateful thanks to a kind Providence whose otection has been ever present and whose bounty s been manifold and abundant. The state of e Union today demonstrates what can be accomished under God by a free people; by their vion, their understanding of national problems, eir initiative, their self-reliance, their capacity r work—and by their willingness to sacrifice enever sacrifice is needed.

In the past 3 years, responding to what our ople want their Government to do, the Congress d the Executive have done much in building a ronger, better America. There has been broad ogress in fostering the energies of our people, providing greater opportunity for the satisfacon of their needs, and in fulfilling their demands r the strength and security of the Republic.

Our country is at peace. Our security posture mmands respect. A spiritual vigor marks our tional life. Our economy, approaching the 400-llion-dollar mark, is at an unparalleled level of osperity. The national income is more widely d fairly distributed than ever before. The numr of Americans at work has reached an all-time gh. As a people we are achieving ever higher ndards of living—earning more, producing re, consuming more, building more, and investg more than ever before.

Virtually all sectors of our society are sharing these good times. Our farm families, if we act sely, imaginatively, and promptly to strengthen r present farm programs, can also look forward sharing equitably in the prosperity they have lped to create.

War in Korea ended 2½ years ago. The collective security system has been powerfully strengthened. Our defenses have been reinforced at sharply reduced costs. Programs to expand world trade and to harness the atom for the betterment of mankind have been carried forward. Our economy has been freed from governmental wage and price controls. Inflation has been halted, the cost of living stabilized.

Government spending has been cut by more than $10 billion. Nearly 300,000 positions have been eliminated from the Federal payroll. Taxes have been substantially reduced. A balanced budget is in prospect. Social security has been extended to 10 million more Americans and unemployment insurance to 4 million more. Unprecedented advances in civil rights have been made. The long-standing and deep-seated problems of agriculture have been forthrightly attacked.

This record of progress has been accomplished with a self-imposed caution against unnecessary and unwise interference in the private affairs of our people, of their communities, and of the several States.

If we of the executive and legislative branches, keeping this caution ever in mind, address ourselves to the business of the year before us—and to the unfinished business of last year—with resolution, the outlook is bright with promise.

Many measures of great national importance recommended last year to the Congress still demand immediate attention—legislation for school and highway construction; health and immigration legislation; water resources legislation; legislation to complete the implementation of our foreign economic policy; such labor legislation as amendments of the Labor-Management Relations Act, extension of the Fair Labor Standards Act to

[1] Read to the Senate and the House of Representatives o Jan. 5 (H. doc. 241, 84th Cong., 2d sess.).

additional groups not now covered, and occupational safety legislation; and legislation for construction of an atomic-powered exhibit vessel.

Many new items of business likewise require our attention—measures that will further promote the release of the energies of our people; that will broaden opportunity for all of them; that will advance the Republic in its leadership toward a just peace—measures, in short, that are essential to the building of an ever-stronger, ever-better America.

Every political and economic guide supports a valid confidence that wise effort will be rewarded by an even more plentiful harvest of human benefit than we now enjoy. Our resources are too many, our principles too dynamic, our purposes too worthy, and the issues at stake too immense for us to entertain doubt or fear. But our responsibilities require that we approach this year's business with a sober humility.

A heedless pride in our present strength and position would blind us to the facts of the past, to the pitfalls of the future. We must walk ever in the knowledge that we are enriched by a heritage earned in the labor and sacrifice of our forebears; that, for our children's children, we are trustees of a great Republic and a time-tested political system; that we prosper as a cooperating member of the family of nations.

In this light, the administration has continued work on its program for the Republic, begun 3 years ago. Because the vast spread of national and human interests is involved within it, I shall not in this message attempt its detailed delineation. Instead, from time to time during this session there will be submitted to the Congress specific recommendations within specific fields. In the comprehensive survey required for their preparation, the administration is guided by enduring objectives. The first is:

The Discharge of Our World Responsibility

Our world policy and our actions are dedicated to the achievement of peace with justice for all nations.

With this purpose we move in a wide variety of ways and through many agencies to remove the pall of fear; to strengthen the ties with our partners and to improve the cooperative cohesion of the free world; to reduce the burden of armaments; and to stimulate and inspire action among all nations for a world of justice and prosperit and peace. These national objectives are full supported by both our political parties.

In the past year our search for a more stable an just peace has taken varied forms. Among th most important were the two conferences a Geneva, in July and in the fall of last year. W explored the possibilities of agreement on critica issues that jeopardize the peace.

The July meeting of Heads of Governmen held out promise to the world of moderation i the bitterness, of word and action, which tends t generate conflict and war. All were in agreemen that a nuclear war would be an intolerable dis aster which must not be permitted to occur. Bu in October, when the Foreign Ministers met again the results demonstrated conclusively that th Soviet leaders are not yet willing to create th indispensable conditions for a secure and lasting peace.

Nevertheless, it is clear that the conflict between international communism and freedom has taken on a new complexion.

We know the Communist leaders have often practiced the tactics of retreat and zigzag. We know that Soviet and Chinese communism still poses a serious threat to the free world. And in the Middle East recent Soviet moves are hardly compatible with the reduction of international tension.

Yet Communist tactics against the free nations have shifted in emphasis from reliance on violence and the threat of violence to reliance on division, enticement, and duplicity. We must be well prepared to meet the current tactics, which pose a dangerous though less obvious threat. At the same time our policy must be dynamic as well as flexible, designed primarily to forward the achievement of our own objectives rather than to meet each shift and change on the Communist front. We must act in the firm assurance that the fruits of freedom are more attractive and desirable to mankind in the pursuit of happiness than the record of communism.

In the face of Communist military power, we must, of course, continue to maintain an effective system of collective security. This involves two things—a system which gives clear warning that armed aggression will be met by joint action of the free nations and deterrent military power to make that warning effective. Moreover, the awesome power of the atom must be made to serve

s a guardian of the free community and of the eace.

In the last year the free world has seen major ains for the system of collective security: the ccession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- on and Western European Union of the sover- gn Federal German Republic; the developing ooperation under the Southeast Asia Collective)efense Treaty; and the formation in the Middle 'ast of the Baghdad Pact among Turkey, Iraq, ran, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom. In ur own hemisphere the inter-American system as continued to show its vitality in maintaining eace and a common approach to world problems. 'e now have security pacts with more than 40 her nations.

In the pursuit of our national purposes, we have een steadfast in our support of the United Na- ons, now entering its second decade with a wider embership and ever-increasing influence and efulness. In the release of our 15 fliers from ommunist China, an essential prelude was the orld opinion mobilized by the General Assembly hich condemned their imprisonment and de- anded their liberation. The successful atomic ergy conference held in Geneva under United ations auspices and our atoms-for-peace pro- ram have been practical steps toward the world- ide use of this new energy source. Our sponsor- ip of such use has benefited our relations with her countries. Active negotiations are now in ogress to create an international agency to fos- r peaceful uses of atomic energy.

During the past year the crucial problem of sarmament has moved to the forefront of prac- al political endeavor. At Geneva I declared e readiness of the United States to exchange lueprints of the military establishments of our ation and the U.S.S.R., to be confirmed by ciprocal aerial reconnaissance. By this means felt mutual suspicions could be allayed and an mosphere developed in which negotiations look- g toward limitation of arms would have im- oved chances of success.

In the United Nations Subcommittee on Dis- rmament last fall, this proposal was explored nd the United States also declared itself willing include reciprocal ground inspection of key oints. By the overwhelming vote of 56 to 7, the nited Nations on December 16 endorsed these oposals and gave them a top priority.[2] Thereby, the issue is placed squarely before the bar of world opinion. We shall persevere in seeking a general reduction of armaments under effective inspection and control, which are essential safeguards to insure reciprocity and protect the security of all.

In the coming year much remains to be done.

While maintaining our military deterrent, we must intensify our efforts to achieve a just peace. In Asia we shall continue to give help to nations struggling to maintain their freedom against the threat of Communist coercion or subversion. In Europe we shall endeavor to increase not only the military strength of the North Atlantic alliance but also its political cohesion and unity of purpose. We shall give such assistance as is feasible to the recently renewed effort of Western European nations to achieve a greater measure of integration, such as in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy.

In the Near East we shall spare no effort in seeking to promote a fair solution of the tragic dispute between the Arab States and Israel, all of whom we want as our friends. The United States is ready to do its part to assure enduring peace in that area. We hope that both sides will make the contributions necessary to achieve that purpose. In Latin America we shall continue to cooperate vigorously in trade and other measures designed to assist economic progress in the area.

Strong economic ties are an essential element in our free-world partnership. Increasing trade and investment help all of us prosper together. Gratifying progress has been made in this direction, most recently by the 3-year extension of our trade-agreements legislation.

I most earnestly request that the Congress approve our membership in the Organization for Trade Cooperation,[3] which would assist the carrying out of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, to which we have been a party since 1948. Our membership in the OTC will provide the most effective and expeditious means for removing discriminations and restrictions against American exports and in making our trade agreements truly reciprocal. United States membership in the Organization will evidence our continuing desire to cooperate in promoting an expanded

[2] BULLETIN of Jan. 9, 1956, p. 63.

[3] For a Presidential message on OTC, see *ibid.*, Apr. 25, 1955, p. 678; for text of OTC agreement, see *ibid.*, Apr. 4, 1955, p. 579.

trade among the free nations. Thus the Organization, as proposed, is admirably suited to our own interests and to those of like-minded nations in working for steady expansion of trade and closer economic cooperation. Being strictly an administrative entity, the Organization for Trade Cooperation cannot, of course, alter the control by Congress of the tariff, import, and customs policies of the United States.

We need to encourage investment overseas by avoiding unfair tax duplications, and to foster foreign trade by further simplification and improvement of our customs legislation.

We must sustain and fortify our Mutual Security Program. Because the conditions of poverty and unrest in less developed areas make their people a special target of international communism, there is a need to help them achieve the economic growth and stability necessary to preserve their independence against Communist threats and enticements.

In order that our friends may better achieve the greater strength that is our common goal, they need assurance of continuity in economic assistance for development projects and programs which we approve and which require a period of years for planning and completion. Accordingly, I ask Congress to grant limited authority to make longer-term commitments for assistance to such projects, to be fulfilled from appropriations to be made in future fiscal years.

These various steps will powerfully strengthen the economic foundation of our foreign policy. Together with constructive action abroad, they will maintain the present momentum toward general economic progress and vitality of the free world.

In all things, change is the inexorable law of life. In much of the world the ferment of change is working strongly; but grave injustices are still uncorrected. We must not, by any sanction of ours, help to perpetuate these wrongs. I have particularly in mind the oppressive division of the German people, the bondage of millions elsewhere, and the exclusion of Japan from United Nations membership.

We shall keep these injustices in the forefront of human consciousness and seek to maintain the pressure of world opinion to right these vast wrongs in the interest both of justice and secure peace.

Injustice thrives on ignorance. Because an understanding of the truth about America is one o our most powerful forces, I am recommending substantial increase in budgetary support of th United States Information Agency.

The sum of our international effort should b this: the waging of peace, with as much resource fulness, with as great a sense of dedication an urgency as we have ever mustered in defense o our country in time of war. In this effort ou weapon is not force. Our weapons are the prin ciples and ideas embodied in our historic tradi tions, applied with the same vigor that in the pas made America a living promise of freedom fo all mankind.

To accomplish these vital tasks, all of us shoul be concerned with the strength, effectiveness, an morale of our State Department and our Foreig Service.

Another guide in the preparation of the ad ministration's program is:

The Constant Improvement of Our National Securit

Because peace is the keystone of our nationa policy, our defense program emphasizes an effec tive flexible type of power calculated to deter o repulse any aggression and to preserve the peace Short of war we have never had military strengt better adapted to our needs with improved readi ness for emergency use. The maintenance of thi strong military capability for the indefinite futur will continue to call for a large share of our na tional budget. Our military programs must mee the needs of today. To build less would expos the Nation to aggression. To build excessively under the influence of fear, could defeat our pur poses and impair or destroy the very freedom an economic system our military defenses are de signed to protect.

We have improved the effectiveness and comba readiness of our forces by developing and makin operational new weapons and by integrating th latest scientific developments, including ne atomic weapons, into our military plans. We con tinue to push the production of the most moder military aircraft. The development of long range missiles has been on an accelerated basis fo some time. We are moving as rapidly as prac ticable toward nuclear-powered aircraft and ships Combat capability, especially in terms of fire power, has been substantially increased. We hav made the adjustments in personnel permitted b

he cessation of the Korean war, the buildup of ur allies, and the introduction of new weapons. The services are all planning realistically on a ong-term basis.

To strengthen our continental defenses, the Jnited States and Canada, in the closest cooperaion, have substantially augmented early-warning etworks. Great progress is being made in exending surveillance of the Arctic, the Atlantic, nd the Pacific approaches to North America.

In the last analysis our real strength lies in the aliber of the men and women in our Armed Forces, active and reserve. Much has been done o attract and hold capable military personnel, ut more needs to be done. This year I renew my equest of last year for legislation to provide roper medical care for military dependents and more equitable survivors' benefit program. The dministration will prepare additional recomendations designed to achieve the same objecives, including career incentives for medical and ental officers and nurses, and increases in the roportion of regular officers.

Closely related to the mission of the Defense Department is the task of the Federal Civil Deense Administration. A particular point of reationship arises from the fact that the key to civil efense is the expanded continental defense proram, including the distant-early-warning system. Our Federal civil defense authorities have made rogress in their program, and now comprehenive studies are being conducted jointly by the Federal Civil Defense Administration, the States, nd critical target cities to determine the best rocedures that can be adopted in case of an tomic attack. We must strengthen Federal ssistance to the States and cities in devising the ost effective common defense.

We have a broad and diversified mobilization ase. We have the facilities, materials, skills, and nowledge rapidly to expand the production of hings we need for our defense whenever they are equired. But mobilization base requirements hange with changing technology and strategy. We must maintain flexibility to meet new requireents. I am requesting, therefore, that the Conress once again extend the Defense Production ct.

Of great importance to our Nation's security s a continuing alertness to internal subversive ctivity within or without our Government. This dministration will not relax its efforts to deal forthrightly and vigorously in protection of this Government and its citizens against subversion, at the same time fully protecting the constitutional rights of all citizens.

. . . . .

Immigration Policy

In keeping with our responsibility of world leadership and in our own self-interest, I again point out to the Congress the urgent need for revision of the immigration and nationality laws. Our Nation has always welcomed immigrants to our shores. The wisdom of such a policy is clearly shown by the fact that America has been built by immigrants and the descendants of immigrants. That policy must be continued realistically with present-day conditions in mind.

I recommend that the number of persons admitted to this country annually be based not on the 1920 census but on the latest, the 1950 census. Provision should be made to allow for greater flexibility in the use of quotas so, if one country does not use its share, the vacancies may be made available for the use of qualified individuals from other countries.

The law should be amended to permit the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to waive the requirements of fingerprinting on a reciprocal basis for persons coming to this country for temporary visits. This and other changes in the law are long overdue and should be taken care of promptly. Detailed recommendations for revision of the immigration laws will be submitted to the Congress.

I am happy to report substantial progress in the flow of immigrants under the Refugee Relief Act of 1953; however, I again request this Congress to approve without further delay the urgently needed amendments to that act which I submitted in the last session. Because of the high prosperity in Germany and Austria, the number of emigrants from those countries will be reduced. This will make available thousands of unfilled openings which I recommend be distributed to Greece and Italy and to escapees from behind the Iron Curtain.

. . . . .

To conclude: The vista before us is bright. The march of science, the expanding economy, the advance in collective security toward a just peace—in this threefold movement our people are creating

new standards by which the future of the Republic may be judged.

Progress, however, will be realized only as it is more than matched by a continuing growth in the spiritual strength of the Nation. Our dedication to moral values must be complete in our dealings abroad and in our relationships among ourselves. We have single-minded devotion to the common good of America. Never must we forget that this means the well-being, the prosperity, the security of all Americans in every walk of life.

To the attainment of these objectives I pledge full energies of the administration as, in the session ahead, it works on a program for submission to you, the Congress of the United States.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

THE WHITE HOUSE,
January 5, 1956

Outlook for Free World in 1956

Statement by Secretary Dulles [1]

The year 1955 has done much for peace. At the summit conference President Eisenhower showed the whole world the sincerity of our peaceful purpose. Germany entered into NATO, and the SEATO and Baghdad Pacts are now functioning in Asia. Thus the free world has done much to consolidate its position and to deter open war.

Now the Soviet Communist rulers turn to other devices. We can be confident that these, too, will fail and that 1956 will further extend the influence of freedom in the world.

Southeast Asia Pact Council To Meet at Karachi

Press release 12 dated January 6

The Foreign Ministers of the governments signatory to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty have agreed to meet at Karachi from March 6 to 8. This will be the second meeting of the SEATO Council, the first having been held at Bangkok in February 1955.[2] The Secretary of State will attend the Karachi meeting and plans to leave Washington about March 2.

[1] Released at New York, N.Y., on Dec. 31.
[2] BULLETIN of Mar. 7, 1955, p. 371.

United States Position on Liberation of Captive Peoples

Statement by James C. Hagerty
Press Secretary to the President

White House press release dated December 30

Mr. Khrushchev is reported to have said that the Christmas messages of President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles to the peoples of Eastern Europe "in no way accord with the spirit of Geneva." [3]

It was made abundantly clear at Geneva to the Soviet rulers that the "spirit of Geneva" could not and did not involve any relaxing of the peaceful purpose of the United States to achieve liberty and justice for the oppressed peoples of the world.

In his opening statement at Geneva, President Eisenhower said:

> . . . there is the problem of respecting the right of peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and of restoring sovereign rights and self-government to those who have been deprived of them. The American people feel strongly that certain peoples of Eastern Europe, many with a long and proud record of national existence, have not yet been given the benefit of this pledge of our United Nations wartime declaration, reinforced by other wartime agreements.

In his radio-television report to the American people immediately following the Geneva conference, President Eisenhower said:

> . . . the Secretary of State and I specifically brought up, more than once, American convictions and American beliefs and American concern about such questions as the satellites of Eastern Europe and the activities of international communism. We made crystal clear what were American beliefs about such matters as these.

The peaceful liberation of the captive peoples has been, is, and, until success is achieved, will con-

[3] The President's message, broadcast over Radio Free Europe, was as follows:

"During the Christmas season, I want you to know that the American people recognize the trials under which you are suffering; join you in your concern for the restoration of individual freedoms and political liberty; and share your faith that right in the end will prevail to bring you once again among the free nations of the world."

Secretary Dulles' message read as follows:

"On this first of all Christian holidays I join with the millions of Americans whose thoughts are with you. We share your firm faith in God. We look to the future with hope and resolution, confident that freedom and justice shall at last prevail."

nue to be a major goal of United States foreign olicy.

.S. Recognition of Independence f the Sudan

reeting From President Eisenhower

ress release 1 dated January 2

President Eisenhower has sent the following reeting on the occasion of the recognition by the nited States of the independence of the Sudan.[1]

It gives me great pleasure to extend, on behalf f the American people, warmest greetings on the tainment of Sudanese independence. The Gov-nment of the United States looks forward to iendly relations with the Government of the udan and wishes you and your fellow country-en every success in establishing a stable, pros-rous and happy nation.

epartment Announcement

ess release 2 dated January 2

The United States has extended recognition to e Sudan as an independent sovereign state. his action followed termination of the Anglo-gyptian condominium in the Sudan and recog-tion of the Sudan's independence by Egypt and e United Kingdom. The U.S. Liaison Officer in hartoum, Arthur E. Beach, presented the letter recognition quoted below to the President of e Supreme Commission, which will exercise the wers of the Head of State:

"I have been requested by my Government to form you that it has noted the declaration on December 19, 1955 by the Parliament of the Sudan proclaiming the Sudan as an independent sovereign state and is pleased to extend its official recognition. The Government of the United States contemplates the establishment of appropriate means for the conduct of formal diplomatic relations at an early date. The United States of America congratulates the people of the Sudan on their assumption of the powers, duties and responsibilities of independence and expresses the hope that in the adoption and maintenance of an independent form of government the rights, liberties and happiness of the Sudanese people will be secure and the progress of the country insured."

[1] Delivered on Jan. 2 by the U.S. Liaison Officer in Khar-tum, Arthur E. Beach, to the President of the Supreme ommission.

Mob Violence in Amman and Jerusalem

Press release 13 dated January 8

At the request of the Secretary of State, the Chargé d'Affaires of Jordan (Taysir A. Toukan) called upon the Secretary on January 8. Secretary Dulles expressed his deep concern at reports of mob violence occurring on January 7 in Amman and in the Jordan-occupied sector of Jerusalem. American property had been damaged and American lives had been endangered. It was obvious that the measures taken by the Jordan Government to prevent mob action had been inadequate to the situation.

The Secretary requested the Jordan representative to communicate urgently to his Government the importance of the Jordan Government's taking all necessary measures to protect American lives and property in Jordan.

Instructions to make similar representations have been sent to the American Ambassador at Amman (Ambassador Lester DeWitt Mallory) and the American Consul General in Jerusalem (Consul General William E. Cole, Jr.).

Visit of President-Elect Kubitschek of Brazil

Following are texts of statements made at Washington National Airport on the arrival of Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira, President-elect of Brazil, on January 5; an address which he delivered before the U.S. Senate on the same date; and an excerpt from his address to the National Press Club at Washington on January 6.

WELCOME AT AIRPORT

Press release 9 dated January 5

Remarks of Secretary Dulles

Mr. President-elect of Brazil, you have already been welcomed to the United States by President Eisenhower. That leaves little for me to do. President Eisenhower talked to me on the telephone after he had breakfast with you [at Key West] and told me of the great pleasure which he had in talking with you and making an acquaintance which we feel sure will help to strengthen the solidarity between our two countries.

There has long been a very close association between our countries. It goes back for many years when the United States, I think, was the first to recognize the newborn Republic of Brazil. We have fought together in World War I and in World War II. And your great country with its vast domain, its natural resources, and its growing population, drawn as ours is from many parts of the world, creates a basis for an ever-continuing and ever-closer association. We know that that will be promoted by your visit here and that you will find, Mr. President, a welcome by the American people, which is an indication of the very high regard which we feel for you and your country.

Response by Mr. Kubitschek

Mr. Dulles, it is with gratified emotion that I greet the American people. I took great pleasure in calling on President Eisenhower at Key West and I was very glad to hear from him wor that show how deeply he appreciates the need f continued cooperation between our two countri

Since the days they were born, Brazil and t United States have come a long way together the road of friendship and mutual understandin We are neighbors by geography, brothers by so friends by tradition. We share the same idea of democratic freedom and a common interest defending our way of life from the inroads doctrines opposed to our Christian beliefs.

I wish to bring you the assurance that t Brazilian people are firmly decided to fight f freedom and progress with the same determinati that brought about the greatness of your countr

ADDRESS OF JANUARY 5[1]

Mr. Vice President and Members of the Senat it is with deep emotion that as President-elect the United States of Brazil I am addressing th august assembly. My emotion is justifiable, fo on behalf of my country, I am speaking from o of the greatest of free platforms in the world the stalwart, generous Nation to whom our civil zation is indebted for timely support in some the most perilous and perplexing hours of ne that have ever befallen mankind.

Great as is your progress and that unequal wealth and power which has vouchsafed you t highest form of social justice existing on eart justice founded in the prosperity and dignity the individual; great as is your industrial networ the fertility of your well-tilled fields, your ve riches; nobler far is the heroic use you made them in the near past, endangering them, twi in half a century, when oppression laid siege what is for you, and for us too, the basic fram work of civilization, and that is the freedom

[1] Delivered in Portuguese and interpreted by A. Jo de Seabra of the Department of State; reprinted fr *Cong. Rec.* of Jan. 5, 1956, p. 109.

man, the respect for man, unassailable in his conscience and in his rights, and the independence of his way of living.

Yet you did not sway the world merely by force of arms, but rather by faith in your ideals, by the unselfish exercise of power that you have proved morally fit to possess.

In the course of the last two wars in which you intervened, overcoming resistance from many a quarter and discarding multiple reasons that urged you to stay at home, you found my country at your side, unable to cooperate on the same scale as yours, but running the same risk.

Together we took part in the two conflagrations, not only from motives of continental solidarity, though this concept be firmly anchored in the Brazilian mentality, but also because we share the same ideals, the same sentiments, the same respect for the paramount dignity of man, that led you to take up arms and fight with unflinching valor.

I cannot fail to take this opportunity of paying homage to the young of your Nation who died for this great cause and express my gratitude for the services they have rendered to our countries and for all they have done so that we may live as we want to live: free and abiding by the Christian beliefs and principles of our upbringing, to which we aspire to remain faithful.

Nor should we forget the obligations we have assumed toward those whose devotion has gone as far as the sacrifice of life itself: these obligations consist mainly in the defense of democracy and the independence of peoples. It would be to betray what is most sacred to the nations, the dead fallen in righteous combat for an ideal—and here I call to mind the military cemeteries in Europe, and among them the Campo Santo of Pistoia, where the Brazilian soldiers are laid in eternal rest—it would be to forget the fateful hours not to defend the freedom of man, not to defend democratic government whenever it is threatened.

The Brazilian Nation rejects all forms of tyranny as you, too, reject them; tyranny and oppression, whether from right or left, are equally repulsive to us. We Brazilians are steadfast and determined to safeguard the fruits of our liberty that we strove so hard to win.

The Brazilian Nation holds the freedom of her sons as dear as does the American Nation; the Brazilian Nation cherishes and stands guard over her moral and spiritual heritage and needs none to give her lessons in self-respect—herein again we are alike. We are, however, well aware that successful opposition to extremist ideologies that infringe on the prerogatives of man lies not so much in ruthless repression as in finding a solution to the grave problems of development and prosperity. We know that ideas of oppression must be routed by constructive action and that there is no more efficient remedy for curing the antidemocratic sickness than the contentment and satisfaction of the patient. To combat extremist ideas in my country—ideas now defended by but a small minority—it is chiefly necessary to bring Brazil into line with her destiny, to work constantly toward a higher standard of living as you have done in this country. Brazilians do not believe that the social problem can be efficiently coped with except by way of development, expansion, progress, an improvement in the living conditions of the population, and naturally by the spread of culture along humanistic lines and by deepening the notion of moral law.

I feel that I have now said enough, gentlemen of this high chamber which is the Senate of the United States of America, for you to recognize the intentions and desires of cooperation and understanding, the design for social progress, and the political line of thought which characterize the future Government of Brazil with regard to your country. I have already outlined the constructive and pioneering zeal which will be the mainspring of my government. In a few parting words, I should like to convey once again the depth of my sentiments and to stress that your material greatness would not be really great, had it not been made available for the furtherance of great and noble causes, notably the defense of man, his freedom, and his well-being on this complex planet of ours on which God has seen fit to place us.

EXCERPT FROM JANUARY 6 ADDRESS

. . . . .

With you I intend to discuss frankly three points which are important for a proper understanding of my policy, the policy of the coming administration of Brazil. These three subjects are also of constant interest to Brazilian journalists.

First, freedom of the press; secondly, my attitude toward extremisms, whether from the right

or from the left; and thirdly, my point of view with regard to foreign capital in Brazil.

I am in a good position to come out squarely in favor of absolute freedom of the press. I have been the target of unfair campaigns, but I have learned a great deal from them. I know from my own experience that defamation cannot stand up against the truth, just as I know that nothing is more useful to a government than the criticism that is leveled at it, whatever form such criticism may take. He who would wield political power must be on his guard against many hidden dangers, but the greatest of them all is the formation of a sort of cloud of unreality that surrounds the executive and obscures his judgment. The press and other forms of free expression of opinion have the power to awaken perceptions and focus attention, and, when a campaign is unjust, this in itself has the merit of arousing in those who hold the power the instinct of self-defense, which is also indispensable to the health of a democratic regime.

Freedom of the press is, however, no longer a problem in my country. It would not enter into anyone's head—save in times of upheaval and peril—to argue about whether the press should be free or not. In Brazil we are all convinced that a press that is not free is quite unworthy of the name. Any debate on this question is purely academic.

I am well aware that the problem of communism is one of your most constant sources of worry. For communism to get the upper hand in Brazil, it would be necessary for there to be a complete change of heart, a transformation in the fundamental character of the Brazilian people, or for the problems of the people to be allowed to drag on without any attempt being made to solve them. Brazil is a nation in which Christian faith and upbringing is predominant. My country was called Vera Cruz (the True Cross) and Santa Cruz (the Holy Cross), before it received its present name. Succeeding generations grew up in the shadow of the Cross and gradually the national character took definitive shape. It would be extremely difficult to remold our country into a stronghold of materialism.

We want no extremist ideology to dominate o land. But we realize that police repression no way of changing a man's opinions, nor does make for enlightenment of the people. The w to defeat the ideas of leftist totalitarianism is pay heed to the appeals of the underprivilege to strive to raise the standard of living of t working classes, and to combat poverty wherev it may be encountered. This calls for determin tion, persistence, and good techniques.

I shall be doing my duty as a Christian and statesman in endeavoring to meet the revindic tions of the Brazilian people and pursuing a pr gressive, humanitarian policy, not of sheer vi lence but of constructive action to offset t subversive activities of those who seek to wa Brazil from her traditions, her way of living, h religion, and her concept of family ties.

There is no denying that the best way to era icate communism is to promote prosperity. T remedy is not applicable merely to old and illu trious nations. It will work with any people. W are reluctant to resort to violence in any for in the conflict of ideas, but we like to be firm.

As to foreign capital, my Government will wel come it gladly, as it deserves. The contributi of foreign capital, as well as technical know-ho will prove to be a decisive factor in speeding u our development. Whoever considers the assis ance of foreign capital indispensable and is an ious to attract it must start by creating an atmo phere of calm and security and provide suitab guaranties if investments are to materialize. Th is what my Government will try to do, and w shall make a point of it, not merely because there lie our interests but for ethical reasons. To a peal to foreign capital for strengthening and d veloping the country, and afterward to persecu such capital, is a procedure which only can qualified as entrapment.

A careful analysis shows that Brazil has ge erously rewarded the capital invested in her d velopment. We need the cooperation of forei capital and we value its aid. Investment will welcomed, then, but let it come as true investme not as sheer speculation.

. . . . .

Approval of Recommendations for Controlling Levels of Lake Ontario

ress release 686 dated December 9

The following exchange of correspondence has aken place between the Department of State and he U.S. Section of the International Joint Com- ission, U.S.–Canada, with reference to the con- rol of the levels of Lake Ontario in connection ith the St. Lawrence Seaway and power projects.[1] n these letters the chairman of the U.S. Section f the Commission has recommended that a specific ange of elevations be established for the lake, hat certain criteria be adopted as a basis for its egulation, and that a specific plan of regulation hich was developed within this range of eleva- ons and according to these criteria be approved y the Government of the United States.

The Department of State, as the coordinating uthority for the Government, has accepted the ommission's recommendations with regard to the ange of elevations and criteria. It also has ap- roved the plan of regulation as a basis for chan- el excavations in connection with the St. Law- ence projects, at the same time urging the ommission to continue its studies in order "to erfect the plan of regulation so as best to meet e requirements of all interests both upstream nd downstream," within the approved range of evations and criteria.

ETTER FROM INTERNATIONAL JOINT COM- ISSION TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE, MARCH , 1955

he Honorable
JOHN FOSTER DULLES,
Secretary of State,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In accordance with the intention expressed in the letters which it addressed on 23 February 1955 to the Secretary of State of the United States and to the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada respectively,[2] the International Joint Commission met in Montreal on 14, 15 and 16 March 1955.[3] The meeting was held to enable the Commission to reach tentative conclusions as to the range of stage of Lake Ontario which, on technical considerations, would be most appropriate in accordance with the purposes of the Lake Ontario Reference dated 25 June 1952[4] submitted to the Commission by both Governments under the provisions of Article IX of the Boundary Waters Treaty of January 11, 1909.[5]

At the meeting in Montreal, the Commission received technical information and advice from the International Lake Ontario Board of Engineers. It also had the benefit of the advice and views of the International St. Lawrence River Board of Control, the St. Lawrence River Joint Board of Engineers and Counsel for the Governments of the United States and Canada.

Written representations were received from lakeshore property owners and municipalities and from the St. Lawrence power and seaway agencies of both countries.

As a result of its deliberations, the Commission is satisfied that measures can be taken, having due regard to the interests of all concerned, to regulate the level of Lake Ontario for the benefit of property owners on the shores of the lake in both countries, so as to reduce the extremes of stage which have been experienced in the past.

It is the Commission's tentative conclusion that the works for the development of power in the

[1] Similar letters were exchanged on the same dates by e Canadian Department of External Affairs and the nadian Section of the International Joint Commission.

[2] Not printed.

[3] For text of joint statement issued on Mar. 16, see BULLETIN of Apr. 4, 1955, p. 563.

[4] Department of State press release 489 dated June 24, 1952.

[5] 36 Stat. 2448; for text, see S. Doc. 165, 83d Cong., 2d sess., p. 104.

International Rapids Section of the St. Lawrence River, which were approved by the Commission in its Order of Approval dated 29 October 1952,[6] should be operated in accordance with the criteria set forth below. These criteria are consistent with the basic, governing requirements of paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) of that Order of Approval. The elevations indicated in the criteria are referred to the Oswego gage and are based on the principal gages on Lake Ontario, adjusted to the Oswego gage, United States Lake Survey 1935 datum. As soon as a method of regulation, based on these criteria, has been worked out in detail and approved, the Commission proposes to substitute it for Method of Regulation No. 5 mentioned in paragraph (i) and in paragraph (a) of Appendix A of that Order of Approval.

Proposed Criteria for a Method of Regulation of Outflows and Levels of Lake Ontario Applicable to the Works in the International Rapids Section of the Saint Lawrence River

(a) The regulated outflow from Lake Ontario from 1 April to 15 December shall be such as not to reduce the minimum level of Montreal Harbor below that which would have occurred in the past with the supplies to Lake Ontario since 1860 adjusted to a condition assuming a continuous diversion out of the Great Lakes Basin of 3,100 cubic feet per second at Chicago and a continuous diversion into the Great Lakes Basin of 5,000 c. f. s. from the Albany River Basin (hereinafter called the "supplies of the past as adjusted").[7]

(b) The regulated winter outflows from Lake Ontario from 15 December to 31 March shall be as large as feasible and shall be maintained so that the difficulties of winter power operation are minimized.

(c) The regulated outflow from Lake Ontario during the annual spring break-up in Montreal Harbor and in the river downstream shall not be greater than would have occurred assuming supplies of the past as adjusted.

(d) The regulated outflow from Lake Ontario during the annual flood discharge from the Ottawa River shall not be greater than would have occurred assuming supplies of the past as adjusted.

(e) Consistent with other requirements, the minimum regulated monthly outflow from Lake Ontario shall be such as to secure the maximum dependable flow for power.

(f) Consistent with other requirements, the maximum regulated outflow from Lake Ontario shall be maintained as low as possible to reduce channel excavations to a minimum.

(g) Consistent with other requirements, the levels Lake Ontario shall be regulated for the benefit of pro erty owners on the shores of Lake Ontario in the Unit States and Canada so as to reduce the extremes of sta which have been experienced.

(h) The regulated monthly mean level of Lake C tario shall not exceed elevation 248.0 with the supplies the past as adjusted.

(i) Under regulation, the frequencies of occurrences monthly mean elevations of approximately 247.0 a higher on Lake Ontario shall be less than would ha occurred in the past with the supplies of the past as a justed and with present channel conditions in the Gal Rapids Section of the Saint Lawrence River.

(j) The regulated level of Lake Ontario on 1 Ap shall not be lower than elevation 244.0. The regulat monthly mean level of the lake from 1 April to 30 N vember shall be maintained at or above elevation 244.0

(k) In the event of supplies in excess of the suppl of the past as adjusted, the works in the Internatio Rapids Section shall be operated to provide all possil relief to the riparian owners upstream and downstrea In the event of supplies less than the supplies of the pa as adjusted, the works in the International Rapids S tion shall be operated to provide all possible relief to n igation and power interests.

The Commission will hold public hearings Rochester, New York, and Toronto, Ontario, 12 and 14 April 1955 respectively, at which all i terested parties, including the property owners the shores of Lake Ontario and the Saint Lawren River, both upstream and downstream from t works in the International Rapids Section, will given full opportunity to present their views up the range of stage and the other criteria tentative proposed.

After consideration of the views of all co cerned, and as soon as possible after these pub hearings, the Commission will present an interi report recommending, for the approval of the tw Governments, a range of lake levels and crite for acceptable duration of high stages of La Ontario.

If the two Governments approve the recomme dations which will be contained in the interim r port, the Commission will put the recommend tions into effect by issuing an appropriate supp ment to its Order of Approval, dated 29 Octob 1952. The Commission hopes to be able to iss this supplement on or about 1 May 1955.

Yours sincerely,

LEN JORDAN
Chairman
United States Section

[6] BULLETIN of Dec. 29, 1952, p. 1019.

[7] For an exchange of notes between the United States and Canada on the diversion of waters into the Great Lakes system, see *ibid.*, Nov. 16, 1940, p. 430.

LETTER FROM INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE, MAY 9, 1955

The Honorable
JOHN FOSTER DULLES,
Secretary of State,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In my letter of March 17, 1955, I transmitted to you on behalf of the Commission, criteria for a plan of regulation of Lake Ontario in connection with the St. Lawrence Power Project, having regard to all interests affected. In that letter, I also informed you that after public hearings and a consideration of the views of all concerned, the Commission would present an interim report recommending, for the approval of the two Governments, a range of lake levels and criteria for acceptable duration of high stages of Lake Ontario.

Public hearings were held at Rochester, New York, and at Toronto, Ontario, on April 12 and 14. The Commission considered this matter fully at an executive session in Buffalo, New York, on May 5, 1955.

As a result of these deliberations the Commission has reached agreement on a range of elevations, 244 (navigation season) to 248.0 feet as nearly as may be. Further, a plan of regulation (No. 12–A–9) has been developed within this range and three copies of it are enclosed.[8] This plan, subject to minor adjustments that may result from further detailed study and evaluation, seems to offer the best possibility of achieving the optimum objective set forth in the Reference.

The Commission accordingly recommends to the Governments the adoption of the criteria, range of elevations and plan of regulation mentioned above. If the Governments concur in this recommendation the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power entities should be advised that they may proceed with the determination of the critical profiles and the final design of channel excavations based on this range and plan of regulations 12–A–9, with the assurance that any adjustments required will be of a minor nature.

Taking into account the downstream interests and on the basis of the past 95 years' experience, the recommended method of regulation will lower all stages in Lake Ontario above elevation 246 and thus provide substantial benefits to the lakeshore owners.

Sincerely yours,

LEN JORDAN
Chairman
United States Section

[8] Not printed.

LETTER FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, DECEMBER 3, 1955

The Honorable
LEN JORDAN,
Chairman, United States Section,
International Joint Commission.

DEAR MR. JORDAN: I have for reply your letter of May 9, 1955, on the subject of Lake Ontario levels. I note that the International Joint Commission has reached agreement and has recommended a range of elevations for Lake Ontario, namely, 244 feet (navigation season) to 248 feet, as nearly as may be. I am pleased to inform you that this range of mean monthly elevations is approved by the Government of the United States.

In your letter of May 9, you also stated that the Commission recommended approval of the criteria for the operation of the regulatory works being built in the International Rapids Section of the St. Lawrence River, set out in your letter of March 17, 1955. I am pleased to inform you that the Government of the United States approves these criteria as recommended in your letter of May 9.

Copies of Plan of Regulation No. 12–A–9, which had been developed within this range of elevations and according to these criteria, were enclosed with your letter of May 9. It is apparent that the Plan of Regulation will be modified in minor details from time to time, both during the construction stage and afterwards as the several works are completed and come into operation. Accordingly, it is important to preserve the flexibility for adjustments and progressive improvements which, subject to specified requirements and procedure, is prescribed in paragraph (i) of the Commission's order of approval of October 29, 1952. It is important that the St. Lawrence River Joint Board of Engineers and the Power and Seaway entities be provided with a Plan of Regulation in substitution for Plan of Regulation No. 5 referred to in the order of approval, as the basis on which they may

proceed with the determination of the critical profiles and the design for channel excavations, if the whole St. Lawrence project is not to be delayed seriously. Therefore, the Government of the United States approves Plan of Regulation No. 12–A–9 for the purpose of calculating critical profiles and the design of channel excavations.

The Government urges the Commission to continue its studies with a view to perfecting the Plan of Regulation so as best to meet the requirements of all interests both upstream and downstream, within the range of elevations and criteria herein approved.

Sincerely yours,

HERBERT HOOVER, Jr.
Under Secretary

U.S.-Canadian Commission Discusses Levels of Lake Ontario

IJC press release dated December 21

In the course of a special meeting held on 19 and 20 December in New York City, the International Joint Commission considered the terms of the supplement to its Order of Approval of 29 October 1952,[1] which it is planning to issue with respect to the regulatory works in the International Rapids Section of the St. Lawrence River.

As the Commission has received letters of 3 December 1955,[2] approving the recommendations regarding the levels of Lake Ontario, discussions were held with the technical advisers regarding the terms of such an order.

The proposed supplement to the Order of Approval will put into effect the approval of the Governments of the United States and Canada of the Commission's recommendations regarding the range of stage and criteria for operation of the works.

The Commission has reexamined the provisions for protection and indemnity which are provided by the St. Lawrence Order of Approval. In the order of the 29th of October 1952, the Commission stated that as a condition of its approval it had required that: "All interests on either side of the International Boundary which are injured by reason of the construction, maintenance and operation of the work shall be given suitable and adequate protectio and indemnity in accordance with the laws i Canada or the Constitution and laws in th United States respectively, and in accordanc with the requirements of Article VIII of th Treaty" (the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909) The Commission provided that under such orde it retain jurisdiction over the subject matter an may "after giving such notice and opportunit to all interested parties to make representation as the Commission deems appropriate, make suc further Order or Orders relating thereto as ma be necessary in the judgment of the Commission.

Attention was invited to the fact that durin the construction of the works and after the proj ect is in operation, persons who may feel ag grieved because of anything that is done ma bring their problems or complaints to the enti ties (The Hydro-Electric Power Commission o Ontario or the Power Authority of the State o New York), the Provincial, State, or Federa Governments, or the Commission for whateve remedial measures may be appropriate in th circumstances.

[1] BULLETIN of Dec. 29, 1952, p. 1019.
[2] See above.

United States and Germany Discus Research Reactor Agreement

Press release 10 dated January 6

JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT

Discussions were initiated today by the Ger man Embassy and representatives of the Depart ment of State and the Atomic Energy Commissio with respect to an agreement for cooperation i the field of research in the peaceful uses o atomic energy. The United States has negoti ated 24 of these agreements, which provide th basis for cooperation in the training of personne in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, look to th installation of research reactors, and provide th legal framework necessary for the lease or sal of a limited amount of fissionable material They also provide for the exchange of unclassifie information in the research reactor field, relate health and safety problems, and on the use o radioactive isotopes in physical and biologica research, medical therapy, agriculture, and in dustry. It is expected that a research reacto

ıgreement with the German Federal Republic will ıssist the Federal Republic in meeting the prob-lem of training personnel in the various fields of nuclear science.

Negotiations Concerning Debts of City of Berlin

'ress release 8 dated January 5

Agreement has now been reached that negotia-ions are considered to be practicable for the set-lement of debts owed by the city of Berlin and ɔy public utility enterprises owned or controlled ɔy Berlin. This agreement is in accordance with ırticle 5 (5) of the Agreement on German Ex-ernal Debts of February 27, 1953.[1]

The agreement was concluded by similar ex-hanges of notes between the United States, Brit-sh, and French Embassies at Bonn, Germany, ınd the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Fed-ral Republic of Germany. The texts of the notes xchanged between the U.S. Embassy and the 'oreign Ministry follow.

The dollar bonds, the settlement of which was leferred under article 5 (5) of the Agreement on Jerman External Debts, are as follows:

'ity of Berlin 6 percent of 1928 due June 15, 1958
'ity of Berlin 6½ percent of 1925 due April 1, 1950
:erlin City Electric Company 6 percent of 1930 due April 1, 1955
:erlin City Electric Company 6½ percent of 1926 due December 1, 1951
:erlin City Electric Company 6½ percent of 1929 due February 1, 1959
:erlin Electric Elevated and Underground Railways 6½ percent due October 1, 1956

Holders of bonds of the above issues that have ot been validated should register them with the 'alidation Board for German Dollar Bonds, 30 Broad Street, New York 4, New York, before Feb-uary 29, 1956, in order that they may be eligible or settlement under the terms of any settlement ffer that may be announced as a result of the orthcoming negotiations.

Inquiries regarding the settlement of the bonds f the city of Berlin should be directed to the 'oreign Bondholders Protective Council, Incor-orated, 90 Broad Street, New York 4, New York. nquiries regarding the other issues should be di-ected to the U.S. Committee for German Corporate Dollar Bonds, 910 17th Street, Northwest, Washington 6, D.C.

The provisions of article 5 (5) of the Agreement on German External Debts are as follows:

> The settlement of debts owed by the City of Berlin and by public utility enterprises owned or controlled by Berlin, and situated in Berlin, shall be deferred until such time as negotiations on the settlement of these debts are considered by the Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America and by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Senat of Berlin to be practicable.

Note From German Foreign Ministry

The German Foreign Office has the honor to communicate the following to the Embassy of the United States of America concerning the settlement of the debts of the City of Berlin and of the Berlin public utility enterprises mentioned in para 5 of Article 5 of the Agreement on German External Debts of February 27, 1953:

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Senat of Berlin consider that the time has arrived to enter into negotiations on the settlement of the above-mentioned debts.

The German Foreign Office would, therefore, appreciate being notified by the Government of the United States of America whether it likewise considers such negotiations to be practicable at the present time.

Notes Verbale of the same tenor have been addressed to the Royal British Embassy and the French Embassy.

The German Foreign Office avails itself of this opportunity to assure the Embassy of the United States of America of its highest consideration.

Text of U.S. Reply

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs and has the honor to refer to its note number 507–519–746–71284/55 of the 13th of August, 1955, on the subject of the settlement of the debts of the City of Berlin and of the Berlin public utility enterprises.

In accordance with Article 5 (5) of the Agreement on German External Debts of February 27, 1953, the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs states that the Government of the Federal Republic and the Senat of Berlin consider that the moment has come to engage in negotiations for the settlement of these debts.

[1] S. Exec. D, 83d Cong., 1st sess.

The Government of the United States of America also considers that negotiations for the settlement of these debts are now practicable.

The Embassy of the United States of America assumes that the Senat of Berlin will send separately to the Allied Kommandatura a formal statement that it shares the same view.

The Embassy of the United States of America suggests that, upon receipt by the Allied Kommandatura of the note of the Berlin Senat, certified true copies of the notes originated by the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the British Embassy, the French Embassy, the Embassy of the United States of America should be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland for transmission to governments which are signatories of or which accede to the Agreement on German External Debts.

The Embassy of the United States of America avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs the assurance of its highest consideration.

U.S. Asks Payment of Damages for Destruction of Navy Plane

Press release 11 dated January 6

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Department of State on January 6 delivered to the Soviet Embassy at Washington a note requesting the payment of $724,947.68 as damages for the destruction of a Navy Neptune and injuries to the crew members resulting from an attack by Soviet fighter aircraft over the Bering Sea near St. Lawrence Island. As the note states, the total damages suffered were $1,449,895.36. The United States Government, however, agreed on July 7, 1955, to accept a Soviet offer to pay 50 percent of the amount of the damages inflicted.[1]

The note makes clear that the Soviet attack upon the Neptune was unprovoked and that it took place while the Neptune was flying lawfully in the international air space over the Bering Sea. It reiterates that the United States' acceptance of 50 percent of the damages caused by the wrongful act of the Soviet military aircraft is not to be construed as in any way condoning the illegality of the Soviet conduct but that it is motivated, as was stated in the note of July 7, 1955, by the Soviet Government's expression of regret and its statement that orders have been issued to military authorities to refrain from any future action of this character.

[1] BULLETIN of July 18, 1955, p. 100.

TEXT OF U.S. NOTE OF JANUARY 6

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer again to the incident of June 22, 1955, in which Soviet military jet-propelled aircraft shot down and destroyed a United States naval Neptune aircraft lawfully flying near St. Lawrence Island over the Bering Sea, and caused serious injuries to the crew of the naval aircraft. In a memorandum delivered by the Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Vyacheslav M. Molotov, to the Secretary of State of the United States at San Francisco on June 25, 1955, the Soviet Government expressed its regret in regard to the incident and offered to bear fifty percent of the amount of the damages inflicted. On July 7, 1955, the United States Government in a note to the Soviet Government stated, among other things, that it was prepared to regard the Soviet memorandum of June 25, 1955, on this subject, as providing an acceptable basis for the disposal of this particular incident.

In acknowledging the note of July 7, 1955, the Soviet Government, in a note of July 18, 1955, delivered to the Department of State by the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, stated that "investigation has confirmed the facts communicated June 25, 1955 . . . concerning the violation of the Soviet state frontier by a military airplane of the 'Neptune' type. . . ."

The United States Government, in the interest of preventing the reoccurrence of similar incidents in the future, which the Soviet Government states it also desires to prevent, finds it necessary to take this opportunity to point out with regret that the Soviet Government's latest note suggests the implication that the Soviet Government adheres to a version of the facts directly opposite to those found by the United States with respect to this incident. In particular, while it does not state precisely where the Soviet state frontier is claimed

by the Soviet Government to lie in this area, or precisely where in geographical coordinates the violation of a Soviet state frontier by the Neptune aircraft on June 22, 1955 (June 23 Moscow Time) is claimed to have taken place, it reiterates that such a violation in fact took place. This reiteration is a cause of concern.

For its part the United States Government has made a careful investigation of the entire incident as well as of the damages inflicted upon the United States and upon United States nationals involved in consequence of the attack by the Soviet aircraft under reference. This has disclosed that the Neptune aircraft was attacked without warning by Soviet fighter aircraft, believed to be of the MIG–jet type, at approximately 2213 hours Greenwich Mean Time, in the neighborhood of St. Lawrence Island, at a position not closer than twenty-four nautical miles to the nearest Soviet land mass and probably as far as fifty-three nautical miles from such a land mass. Furthermore, at no time in the course of its flight in this area had the Neptune aircraft approached any closer to any Soviet-held land mass. The attack by the Soviet aircraft caused crew members inside the Neptune to be hit by shell fragments and projectiles; the aircraft suffered a fire in the port wing and multiple hits in the fuselage and starboard wing and was forced to crash on the beach of St. Lawrence Island, eight miles south of Gambell. During the crash landing, as a result of the injuries caused by the attack, an explosion took place on board the aircraft. The fire and the explosion caused additional serious injuries to members of the crew. All crew members suffered shock. The aircraft and its contents became a total wreck.

The Soviet Government has not controverted the United States Government's factual statements as to the geographical position of attack by the Soviet fighters. The United States Government is therefore at a loss to understand the basis of fact upon which the Soviet Government proceeds in its averment that the Neptune violated a Soviet state frontier. It does not understand the Soviet Government to challenge, by implication or otherwise, that the positions described by the United States Government in this area as those of the flight of the Neptune and of the attack upon it by Soviet fighters were beyond question in the universally accepted and long-established international air space of the Bering Sea area.

The United States Government is therefore reinforced in its conclusions with respect to this incident. First, the attack in this case by Soviet aircraft was entirely unprovoked. Secondly, the attack took place while the Neptune was flying lawfully in the international air space of the Bering Sea area between St. Lawrence Island and the coast of Siberia.

In agreeing to accept from the Soviet Government only one-half of the damages caused by the wrongful act of the Soviet military aircraft involved in this incident, the United States Government desires to make it clear that it is not condoning the illegality of the Soviet conduct, or impugning the legality and innocence of the acts of the Neptune and its crew, but acting because of the special circumstances surrounding the incident to which reference is made in the note of July 7, 1955.

The United States Government has found after careful investigation that the damages inflicted upon the United States and its nationals in consequence of the incident total $1,449,895.36. A detailed breakdown of this figure is set forth in the annex to the present note.

The United States Government requests the Soviet Government, in pursuance of the terms of the agreement represented by the exchange of the memorandum of June 25, 1955, the note of July 7, 1955 and the note of July 18, 1955, to make payment of fifty percent of the above total damages, namely, $724,947.68. The United States Government requests that payment be made in United States dollar exchange in the form of a dollar check to the order of the Secretary of State of the United States.

Department of State,
Washington, January 6, 1956

[Enclosure]

ANNEX

The figure of $1,449,895.36 constituting the damages suffered by the United States Government on account of the incident of June 22, 1955 is calculated as follows:

A. Injuries suffered by the United States Government directly:

1. Loss of the United States Navy P2V–5 aircraft, known as Neptune type, bearing number 131515, valued at $924,700.00

2. Equipment within the aircraft, property of the United States Government, valued at $95,645.00
3. Cost of search and rescue operations, $3,000.00
4. Expenditures and loss in consequence of injuries to the crew members and their disablement, $335,674.71.

B. Injuries suffered by the crew members, all nationals of the United States, not otherwise compensated:

1. Personal injuries, $90,000.00
2. Personal property on board the aircraft and lost in consequence of the incident, $875.65.

SOVIET NOTE OF JULY 18

[Translation]

In connection with the note of the Government of the United States of America dated July 7, 1955, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to communicate that a further investigation has confirmed the facts communicated June 25 in V. M. Molotov's statement to Mr. Dulles, Secretary of State of the United States of America, concerning the violation of the Soviet state frontier by a military airplane of the "Neptune" type with the identification marks of the United States Air Force.

The Soviet Government takes note of the statement of the Government of the United States to the effect that it is prepared to consider the statement of the Soviet side of June 25 as giving an acceptable basis for the settlement of the incident with the aforementioned American airplane.

The Soviet Government expresses its confidence that, just as is being done by the Soviet side, measures will be taken on the part of the Government of the United States directed toward the prevention of such actions as could lead to incidents similar to the incident of June 23.

The Soviet Government notes with satisfaction the statement contained in the note of the Government of the United States of America to the effect that the Government of the United States of America wishes an improvement in relations between the United States of America and the U. S. S. R., which corresponds fully to the desires of the Soviet Government.

Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Washington July 18, 1955

Advisers to U.S. Delegation to Tariff Negotiations

The Department of State announced on January 4 (press release 6) that four prominent citizens have accepted the invitation of Secretary Dulles to serve as advisers to the U.S. delegation in the multilateral tariff negotiations which will begin at Geneva, Switzerland, on January 18.[1]

The four advisers will be:

Elliott V. Bell, editor and publisher of *Business Week* and chairman of the Executive Committee of the McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., Inc.

Homer L. Brinkley, executive vice president of the National Council of Farmer Cooperatives

Bryant Essick, president of the Essick Manufacturing Company, Los Angeles, Calif.

Stanley H. Ruttenberg, director of the Department of Research, American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL–CIO)

They began their service on January 4 by conferring with Secretary Dulles and with Herbert V. Prochnow, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. Later they were to be thoroughly briefed on the tariff negotiations by officials of the White House and various executive agencies participating in the trade agreements program. They will then go to Geneva to observe the bargaining sessions at first hand and to take part in the United States delegation's deliberations.

The United States will negotiate with 24 other countries with a view toward reciprocal tariff concessions. These countries, like the United States, are contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

The United States will participate under the authority in Public Law 86, the Trade Agreement Extension Act of 1955 (known as H.R. 1 before its enactment last June 21). In this act Congress authorized the President to reduce tariff rates by not over 15 percent or, if a rate now is above 50 percent, to lower it to that level. In either case the reduction will take place gradually over a 3-year period.

The U.S. delegation may offer concessions only on products drawn from a selected list which has been publicly announced and made the subject of public hearings.

The delegation will consist of officials from the Departments of State, Commerce, Agriculture, Defense, Treasury, Interior, and Labor; the Tariff Commission; and the International Cooperation Administration. The list of delegates will be published shortly.

[1] For earlier announcements, see BULLETIN of Aug. 22, 1955, p. 305, and Sept. 26, 1955, p. 507.

Summary of Accomplishments of Tenth General Assembly

U.S. delegation press release 2332-A dated December 16

Disarmament

By an historic vote of 56–7 the General Assembly endorsed President Eisenhower's "open sky" proposal.[1] The Assembly thus recognized the soundness of the United States approach to the disarmament question.

Speaking to the plenary session of the General Assembly on December 16, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., said:

> . . . Nothing anyone here has ever done, or may do, is likely to work so powerfully for peace as what we have just done here today in giving worldwide endorsement to President Eisenhower's "open sky" plan, which is linked with Marshal Bulganin's plan for ground control posts . . . .
>
> By our action today, we have shown that the United Nations can move ahead with the times . . . .
>
> . . . In and of itself, it alone justifies our existence and that of the United Nations.

Membership

On December 13, 15 Soviet vetoes in the Security Council—cast in reprisal for the Chinese veto of Outer Mongolia—prevented admission of any of the 13 free-world applicants which the Soviet Union had insisted on tying to its 5 Communist candidates in a "package deal."[2] Following this action, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., United States Representative, said in the Security Council:

> It was perfectly clear that we today could have had 17 nations admitted to the United Nations if it had not been for the Soviet Union . . . . But the Soviet representative insisted on having all or nothing.
>
> . . . if there is never to be any spirit of compromise, any spirit of accommodation, any give and take, you cannot operate the United Nations . . . .

The next day, December 14, 12 free nations became members of the United Nations when the Soviet Union retreated from its "18 or nothing" stand. The Soviet representative then vetoed a U.S. resolution calling for Japan's admission in 1956—which received 10 votes in favor from the other Council members.

Thus the United Nations received the added vitality of 12 long-excluded free countries. The Soviet retreat showed that even an apparently inflexible Soviet stand will be scrapped in the face of adverse circumstances and the pressure of world opinion.

Atoms-for-Peace

The atoms-for-peace program, launched by President Eisenhower in his United Nations address of December 1953, received new impetus. By a vote of 58 to 0, the Assembly on December 3 approved a method for establishing the International Atomic Energy Agency and called for a second scientific conference on the peaceful uses of atomic energy within 3 years.[3]

In a speech to the plenary session of the General Assembly on December 3, Senator John O. Pastore, speaking for the United States, said:

> Two years ago President Eisenhower presented before this Assembly his memorable proposal for an international agency devoted to the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The adoption of this resolution [marks] another milestone in our advance toward the establishment of this agency.
>
> By stimulating the free exchange of basic scientific knowledge on atomic energy, the international conference provided for in . . . this resolution will lay a firmer foundation for international cooperation in this field.

Radiation

On December 3, the Assembly approved unanimously a United States proposal to organize studies of the effects of atomic radiation on man and his environment[4]—thus taking a big step to dispel the ignorance and fears which are widespread in the world on this subject.

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[1] For text of resolution and statements by Ambassador Lodge, see BULLETIN of Jan. 9, 1956, pp. 63 and 55.

[2] For statements and resolutions, see *ibid.*, Dec. 26, 1955, p. 1067.

[3] *Ibid.*, Oct. 24, 1955, p. 660; Nov. 14, 1955, p. 801; Dec. 19, 1955, p. 1030.

[4] *Ibid.*, Nov. 21, 1955, p. 851; Dec. 19, 1955, p. 1031.

Ambassador James J. Wadsworth, speaking in the plenary session of the General Assembly on December 3, commented:

> The United States attaches the greatest importance to this problem and will of course lend its full support to the Scientific Committee established by this resolution. . . .
>
> We hope that the committee will convene as early as possible next year and will begin quickly to organize its plan of work.

On December 9, 1955, Ambassador Lodge informed the Secretary-General of the appointment of Dr. Shields Warren as U.S. representative on the scientific committee established by this resolution and of the appointment of Dr. Austin Moore Brues and Merril Eisenbud as alternate U.S. representatives.

Charter Review

The Assembly on November 21 approved a resolution deciding in principle to hold a Charter Review Conference and setting up a mechanism to decide by 1957 where and when that conference should be held as well as its organization and procedures.[5]

Speaking to the plenary session of the General Assembly on November 17, Laird Bell said:

> Article 109 directs our attention to *review* rather than to *revision* of the charter. A review of the charter could usefully determine whether or not improvements in the United Nations machinery are desirable and feasible . . . . We need, it seems to us, to take time out from the urgencies of specific problems . . . to study, reflect, and consult on the United Nations system as a whole. . . .
>
> . . . It is our belief that a conference to review the charter could greatly strengthen . . . public understanding. We believe, as well, that the weight of informed public opinion based upon such a conference might prove to be a constructive influence in the achievement of agreement to recommended improvements.

Togoland

By a vote of 42–7–10, the Assembly gave its approval to the holding of a plebiscite next spring in British Togoland which could mark British Togoland as the first of the trust territories under United Nations supervision to emerge from that status.[6] The Assembly's decision, giving the people of British Togoland the right to vote for union with an independent Gold Coast or for remaining temporarily under trusteeship pending similar developments in French Togoland, marks a significant step toward the development of free political institutions among the non-self-governing people of West Africa.

Speaking of this development in the General Assembly's Fourth Committee, Laird Bell said:

> One must give credit to the foundations laid by the administering authorities, to the increasingly effective political action of the inhabitants themselves, and, in some measure, to the focusing of world public opinion on these areas through the United Nations.

Palestine Refugees

The General Assembly on December 3 voted 38 to 0 with 17 abstentions to continue the Arab refugee aid program in spite of the political tensions surrounding this situation.[7]

Speaking to the *Ad Hoc* Committee on November 16, Ambassador James J. Wadsworth said:

> [The United States] recognize[s] the necessity of settling the political problems connected with the Palestine question. . . . But what must be of paramount importance here, now, in this debate, is that these political problems which must be resolved—and which have taken and will take time to solve—shall not stand in the way of steps of progress toward a better life for the Arab refugee.

International Finance Corporation

The General Assembly expressed again approval of the creation of the International Finance Corporation, a one-hundred-million-dollar corporation, to stimulate private investment in underdeveloped countries.

Speaking in Committee II on October 26, Colgate Whitehead Darden, Jr., said:[8]

> The idea of the International Finance Corporation . . . is one of the results of our continuing search in the United Nations for ways to encourage private capital to play an increasing role in economic development around the world. . . .
>
> . . . I am happy to say that my Government has now completed all the necessary legislative steps required for our membership in the corporation. These include authority to contribute over $35 million to its capital stock.

SUNFED

In a resolution dealing with the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development, the General Assembly on December 9 unanimously recognized the need for continued and increased

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[5] *Ibid.*, Dec. 5, 1955, p. 948.

[6] See p. 100.

[7] BULLETIN of Jan. 2, 1956, p. 31.

[8] *Ibid.*, Nov. 21, 1955, p. 858.

economic aid to underdeveloped countries. The resolution recognized that new United Nations efforts in the field of economic development must await the time when governments are able to devote additional funds to this purpose as a result of reductions in arms expenditures resulting from an agreed disarmament plan.

Speaking in Committee II on November 25, Congressman Brooks Hays said:[9]

> . . . it is the view of my Government that under existing circumstances it would be premature to try now to define precisely what should be the organization and operation of the proposed international fund. . . .
>
> . . . the *ad hoc* committee which is to be constituted under this resolution is to carry on an orderly exploration . . . of the various ideas and suggestions which governments may have relating to the proposed special fund which may be useful when the fund becomes a practical possibility.

Technical Assistance

Every country either equaled or exceeded its contribution last year to the United Nations Technical Assistance Program, putting the program at its highest level thus far.

Speaking in Committee II on October 12, Congressman Brooks Hays announced:[10]

> . . . it gives me great pleasure to be able to announce that my Government will pledge to the United Nations Technical Assistance Program for 1956 the sum of $15,500,000. The only limitation on this contribution is that it shall not exceed 50 percent of all contributions.

Refugees

The Assembly reaffirmed by a vote of 43 to 0 with 15 abstentions on October 25 the humanitarian character of the refugee program in spite of the Soviet effort to turn it into a machine for forced repatriation of Iron Curtain refugees.[11]

Jacob Blaustein in the plenary session of the General Assembly on October 25 said:

> The High Commissioner for Refugees . . . has always followed the principle that the refugee should be left entirely free to choose the solution to his problem, whether it be return to the country of origin, resettlement in another country, or integration in the receiving country. . . .
>
> The draft resolution of the U.S.S.R. . . . was significantly different in approach . . . . The resolution would have required the High Commissioner to "urge" the refugees to return. Indeed, in its original form it contained no mention whatever of resettlement or integration, and . . . its revised form included these only as subsequent steps if "encouraged" repatriation failed. This bore strongly in the direction of "forcible" repatriation . . . .

Human Rights

Committee III, on November 21, unanimously endorsed a United Nations action program in the field of human rights, in line with President Eisenhower's proposals.[12]

In a statement on November 16, Mrs. Oswald B. Lord said:

> The United Nations demonstrated today its sincere interest in achieving greater freedom in all areas of life, for men and women everywhere, by the overwhelming vote in favor of the new program of advisory services in the field of human rights.
>
> . . . The General Assembly has expressed the hope that international and national nongovernmental organizations, universities, and other private groups will supplement this United Nations program in further research and the exchange of information concerning human rights. Consequently the United Nations program will serve as a catalyst for practical action in many fields—for example, in promoting women's rights, eradicating discrimination against minorities, and encouraging the free flow of information.

Administrative Tribunal

By a vote of 33 to 17 with 9 abstentions, the United States proposal to establish judicial review of decisions of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal was approved by the Assembly on November 8.[13] This was the culmination of several years of United States efforts to provide for review of the judgements of the Administrative Tribunals.

United States efforts in this direction arose from judgments of the Tribunal in 1952 and 1953 making awards to 11 American employees of the United Nations who were dismissed by the Secretary-General after invoking the Fifth Amendment before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

In a speech on November 8, 1955, before the General Assembly's plenary session, Congressman Chester E. Merrow said:

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[9] U.S. delegation press release 2284 (not printed here).

[10] U.S. delegation press release 2226 (not printed here).

[11] BULLETIN of Oct. 17, 1955, p. 628, and Nov. 14, 1955, p. 811.

[12] *Ibid.*, Dec. 19, 1955, p. 1034.

[13] *Ibid.*, Dec. 5, 1955, p. 938.

. . . the primary objective of the procedure adopted . . . has been to provide a way in which the possible concern of member states with respect to future Administrative Tribunal judgments could be dealt with by judicial process.

International Law Commission

Recommendations of the International Law Commission for facilitating its work and increasing its effectiveness were approved by the Assembly which increased the terms of office for its members and authorized it to hold its meetings in Geneva.

Speaking to the Assembly's Legal Committee on October 10, 1955,[14] Robert L. Brokenburr pointed out that the United States has "been impressed by the range of problems dealt with by the [International Law] Commission, and by the valuable contribution of the Commission's work to the growth of law in the life of the United Nations."

Future Status of Togoland

STATEMENT BY LAIRD BELL[1]

The accelerating political advancement of West Africa is one of the striking and gratifying developments of recent years. New African nations are emerging toward independence with much greater speed than would have been anticipated a few years ago. While this development is not without its element of struggle, it is taking place almost entirely in the field of political action and not through force of arms. Many elements have contributed to this essentially peaceful historic process. One must give credit to the foundations laid by the administering authorities, to the increasingly effective political action of the inhabitants themselves, and, in some measure, to the focusing of world public opinion on these areas through the United Nations.

In West Africa, as elsewhere, the solution of old problems brings other problems to the fore. Thus, the welcome advent of Gold Coast independence has focused urgent attention on the Togoland problem. Moreover, it has thrown the spotlight particularly on British-administered Togoland. That territory, though different in legal status from the Gold Coast, has under the provisions of the mandate and the trusteeship agreement fully shared its political, economic, and social development. One of the questions now before this committee is whether British Togoland shall be given an opportunity to take the final step over the threshold of independence at the same time as the Gold Coast, becoming an integral part of that new state. By the same token, the peoples of British Togoland should have the opportunity of *not* taking that step, thereby leaving themselves free to decide later on their future status.

We have been told by the United Kingdom delegation that Gold Coast independence should be a fact before the end of 1956. Under these circumstances, it is clear that, if the peoples of British Togoland are to be given an opportunity to go ahead with the Gold Coast, a plebiscite must be held in British Togoland next spring.

It has often been emphasized that in the colonial field a sense of timing is particularly important. The administering members are not infrequently advised to be more sensitive to the changing tempo of the times. They must seize the psychological moment to take decisive steps forward. In the Fourth Committee, we are now faced with a problem of timing. In the view of my delegation the psychological moment has now arrived in British Togoland. There has just been a special Visiting Mission to the territory to make recommendations concerning the means of ascertaining the people's wishes. Gold Coast independence is just around the corner. The people of the trust territory believe that they are at last to have an opportunity to decide on their future. They are ready and eager to do so. To keep them in suspense, to allow this matter to drag on would, in our view, be a disservice to them. It would not contribute to the orderly march of progress in the area, nor would it redound to the credit of the United Nations among these people.

Thus, Mr. Chairman, my delegation believes that the time is ripe for decision in British Togoland. Consequently, we oppose the establishment of separate institutions for British Togoland before holding a plebiscite. We are convinced that such a step is unnecessary, impractical, and would, with-

[14] U.S. delegation press release 2223 (not printed here).

[1] Made in Committee IV (Trusteeship) of the General Assembly on Dec. 8 (U.S. delegation press release 2315).

out adequate justification, unduly delay decision where decision can and should be taken.

We recognize that one of the reasons for advocating the preliminary establishment of separate institutions for British Togoland is the desire to assure an absolutely free choice for the people of that territory. No one quarrels with that desire. In our view, however, an effort to establish separate institutions would not achieve the desired result. We have heard very clear statements from representatives of the large majority in northern British Togoland that they would not participate in any such separate institutions. We feel that institutions in which a very large proportion of the people would not be represented would be meaningless as a means of formulating the wishes of the people. Consequently, we must seek other means of assuring that freedom of choice is exercised in British Togoland.

For our part we have full confidence in the administering authority to conduct a fair plebiscite. We are sustained in this confidence by the forthright and frank manner in which it has placed this matter before the General Assembly. At the same time, as the administering authority is an interested party, it was the first to recognize that there should be disinterested supervision and observation of every phase of the plebiscite by the United Nations. My delegation is convinced that the arrangements for such supervision and observation recommended by the Visiting Mission would provide the assurance of full freedom of choice that we all desire. We attach particular importance to the selection of a United Nations plebiscite commissioner of outstanding personal qualities and reputation who will command the respect of all concerned. Moreover, he should be assisted by a sufficient number of U.N. observers and other staff to enable him to supervise the plebiscite effectively at all stages and in all areas. Under such conditions, surely no one would be able to question the fairness of the plebiscite. We do not feel, however, that it would be wise or practical to establish a commission for this purpose.

Mr. Chairman, in this debate there has been no disagreement on the fundamental proposition that the future status of British and French Togoland should be determined according to the wishes of the inhabitants of those territories. Differences have arisen as to matters of timing, the phrasing of the questions to be asked, and the arrangements for consulting the people. These differences derive in large measure from the desire of members of the committee to seek ideal solutions. My delegation is concerned, however, lest our preoccupation with such considerations obscure the actual situation in the Togolands and the practical possibilities that are open to us. We are not suggesting the compromise of basic principles. In fact, we believe there is agreement on basic principles. We do hope, however, that the desire of some to obtain more comprehensive solutions will not prevent the taking of the constructive step we are in a position to take. We hope, too, that members will consider the consequences of not taking it.

The Indian draft resolution,[2] we feel, covers the essential points of the issue before us. It provides for ascertaining the wishes of the inhabitants of Togoland under British administration now. It also envisages a similar procedure for ascertaining the wishes of the inhabitants of Togoland under French administration as soon as proposed programs of political reform for that territory have been carried out. Thus, it provides for the implementation of the fundamental recommendations contained in the Visiting Mission's report.[3] Moreover, it does not, in our opinion, prejudice the opportunity of the inhabitants of both territories to assure that their future status conforms to their own wishes.

It is true that the Indian draft implies that only a single question would be asked in the plebiscite to be held in Togoland under British administration. In our view this question gives to the inhabitants a clear choice on the immediate issue before them. If a majority of them vote against integration with the Gold Coast, the effect would be the same as if the two questions proposed by the Visiting Mission were placed before them. Consequently, we do not feel obliged to press for the inclusion of the second question suggested by the Mission.

We would, however, strongly oppose proposals for the inclusion in the plebiscite of several alternative questions. A plebiscite conducted on such a basis would not only be unrealistic and confusing to the people but might well lead to no definitive conclusions.

---

[2] U.N. doc. A/C.4/L.428.

[3] U.N. doc. T/1206 and Add. 1.

The distinguished representative of India [V. K. Krishna Menon] has argued cogently for considering the trust territory as a single unit for plebiscite purposes, whereas the Visiting Mission suggested the division of the territory into four plebiscite units. As the United States representative in the Trusteeship Council has said,[4]

> We have tried to see the advantages and disadvantages of both points of view. If differences within the population are not too wide, we would normally prefer to see a decision taken on the basis of a majority of the country as a whole. Or if prevailing differences were evenly distributed throughout the country as a whole, we think the attitude of the majority should also prevail. However, when the differences are quite pronounced as between geographic areas, a special situation arises which we feel at least merits some consideration.

We do not believe, however, that this proposal is vital to the conduct of a satisfactory plebiscite. The first step is to learn the wishes of the people. Certainly when they are known the Assembly and the administering authority will be in a position to take the necessary decisions regarding the future of the territory. Thus, we do not feel it essential to press for the adoption of the Visiting Mission's recommendation on this matter either.

Therefore, while we believe that there are some elements in the Indian draft resolution which might be formulated more satisfactorily, we could support its main features. We also share the analyses and conclusions of the Indian representative in regard to the amendments proposed by the representative of Liberia [Angie Brooks].

TEXT OF RESOLUTION ON TOGOLAND[5]

U.N. doc. A/Res/366

THE TOGOLAND UNIFICATION PROBLEM AND THE FUTURE OF THE TRUST TERRITORY OF TOGOLAND UNDER BRITISH ADMINISTRATION

I

THE FUTURE OF TOGOLAND UNDER BRITISH ADMINISTRATION

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 860 (IX), adopted on 14 December 1954, by which the Trusteeship Council was requested to consider the arrangements to be made to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory of Togoland under British Administration as to their future, without prejudice to the eventual solution which they might choose, whether it be independence, unification of an independent Togoland under British Administration with an independent Togoland under French Administration, unification with an independent Gold Coast, or some other self-governing or independent status,

Having received the report (A/3046) of the Trusteeship Council transmitting the special report (T/1206 and Add. 1) of the United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories of Togoland under British Administration and Togoland under French Administration, 1955, the observations (T/1214) of the representative of the United Kingdom, and the official records of the relevant meetings of the Council,

Noting the opinion of the Trusteeship Council that the views expressed in the special report of the Visiting Mission provide in general a useful basis for determining the arrangements to be made in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 860 (IX),

Taking note also of the views expressed orally by the various local political groups before the Fourth Committee during the hearings,

Noting further the statement of the Government of the United Kingdom that the Gold Coast will attain independence in the near future and that, in consequence, it will be impossible thereafter for Togoland under British Administration to be administered as at present,

1. *Accepts* the recommendation of the Visiting Mission contained in its special report that the wishes of the inhabitants of Togoland under British Administration as to their future should be ascertained by plebiscite;

2. *Recommends* that the Administering Authority of Togoland under British Administration, in pursuance of Article 76 b of the Charter of the United Nations, take steps, in consultation with a United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner, to organize and conduct without delay, under the supervision of the United Nations, a plebiscite in respect of the Trust Territory in order to ascertain the wishes of the majority of its inhabitants in regard to (a) the union of their Territory with an independent Gold Coast; or (b) separation of Togoland under British Administration from the Gold Coast and its continuance under trusteeship pending the ultimate determination of its political future;

3. *Decides* to appoint a United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner[6] who shall exercise on behalf of the General Assembly the powers and functions of supervision defined by the Visiting Mission in its special report, and who shall be assisted by observers and staff to be appointed by the Secretary-General in consultation with him;

4. *Recommends further* that the plebiscite be organized and conducted on the basis of the arrangements proposed in chapter IV of the special report of the Visiting Mission, subject to such modifications of detail as are agreed upon

[4] BULLETIN of Jan. 2, 1956, p. 36.

[5] Submitted by India; adopted, as amended, in Committee IV on Dec. 12 by a vote of 40–5 (Soviet bloc)–8; adopted in plenary on Dec. 15, 42–7–10.

[6] The General Assembly on Dec. 15 confirmed the appointment of Eduardo Espinosa Prieto of Mexico as Plebiscite Commissioner.

between the Administering Authority and the United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner, and such additional measures as may be proposed by the Commissioner in order to secure a free and neutral atmosphere for the plebiscite;

5. *Requests* the United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner to submit a report on the organization, conduct and results of the plebiscite to the Trusteeship Council for its consideration, and for transmission to the General Assembly at its eleventh session in order that the latter may, in consultation with the Administering Authority, assess the results and determine the further action to be taken on the attainment of independence by the Gold Coast in the light of all the circumstances and in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Trusteeship Agreement;

6. *Requests* the Trusteeship Council, in virtue of the provisions of the Trusteeship Agreement and the Charter, to continue to exercise its functions either at its regular or special sessions as may be necessary and to take into consideration any matter that may arise, or be referred to it, in respect of the Trust Territory.

II

THE FUTURE OF TOGOLAND UNDER FRENCH ADMINISTRATION

The General Assembly,

Noting, with regard to Togoland under French Administration, the statements made by the Administering Authority, as recorded by the Visiting Mission in its special report (T/1206 and Add. 1), to the effect that that Authority itself, taking into account the views of the Territorial Assembly, contemplates holding in due course consultations with the inhabitants of the Territory to ascertain their wishes in respect of the future of the Territory,

Noting also the statements by the representative of France in both the Fourth Committee and the Trusteeship Council to the effect that his Government supports in principle the proposals made by the Visiting Mission,

Noting also the view expressed by the Visiting Mission that, following the political reforms at present contemplated by the Administering Authority, steps will be taken to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants of the Territory as to their future,

1. *Endorses* the conclusion of the Visiting Mission in respect of Togoland under French Administration that the implementation of the contemplated political reforms will play a helpful role in enabling the wishes of the inhabitants of the Territory as to their future to be ascertained at an early date by direct and democratic methods;

2. *Recommends* that this consultation of the population be conducted, as in the case of Togoland under British Administration, under the supervision of the United Nations;

3. *Requests* the Trusteeship Council at its forthcoming regular session to undertake a special study of this matter in consultation with the Administering Authority and to report thereon to the General Assembly, if possible, at its eleventh session.

Israeli Action Against Syria

Statement by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
U.S. Representative to the U.N.[1]

Mr. President, I speak early at this meeting to express the shock of the United States Government at the military action last Sunday evening [December 11] which the Government of Israel has announced it undertook on Syrian soil against Syrian forces on the northeastern shores of the Sea of Galilee.

We have not yet received official reports from General Burns[2] nor from the Syrian–Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission. We therefore cannot now decide what must be the exact position of the Council on this attack.

The United States Government, however, feels compelled to state that, as we have said so many times in the past, we oppose such acts of military violence. We realize that there may be provocations for such action, and for any provocations, if such there be, there is no excuse.

But regardless of whether or not there are provocations, members of the United Nations have undertaken not to resort to the use of force in the settlement of their disputes. Israel has specifically undertaken not to resort to force. It is greatly to be regretted that Buteiha should now be added to the list of military actions which Israel initiated at Gaza, at Qibya, and at El Hamma.

It seems fitting to recall here the words of the President of the United States as set forth in a statement he issued on November 9 as follows:

> All Americans have been following with deep concern the latest developments in the Near East. The recent outbreak of hostilities has led to a sharp increase in tensions. These events inevitably retard our search for world peace. Insecurity in one region is bound to affect the world as a whole. . . .
>
> I stated last year that our goal in the Near East as elsewhere is a just peace. Nothing has taken place since which invalidates our fundamental policies, policies based on friendship for all of the peoples of the area.
>
> We believe that true security must be based upon a just and reasonable settlement. . . .
>
> Recent developments have made it all the more imperative that a settlement be found. . . .

[1] Made in the Security Council on Dec. 16 (U.S./U.N. press release 2331).

[2] Maj. Gen. E. L. M. Burns, Chief of Staff of the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization.

The peace and future welfare of the Near East rests in largest measure on the shoulders of the leaders of the countries in that part of the world. There must be restraint, regardless of whatever the provocations to fight may be. Should fighting break out again, the only victors will be those who live and rule by misery and chaos. The United States Government is convinced that the responsible leaders in the Near East know this to be true. This Council should encourage as best it can this continued sense of responsibility.

In conclusion let me repeat here what the United States has already said to the Government of Syria: that we extend our sincerest sympathy for this tragic loss of life.

I hope that the President of the Council will see fit to request an urgent report from General Burns detailing all elements of the military action, together with a text of the Mixed Armistice Commission's decision, and setting forth the present situation with regard to the control and policing of the demilitarized zones. We suggest that General Burns be requested to make specific recommendations which may serve as a basis for the further deliberations of the Council when next we meet on this question. I reserve the right to speak again at a later date after we have received the report of the Truce Supervision Organization.[3]

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

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[3] General Burns' report was circulated on Dec. 20 as U.N. doc. S/3516.

TREATY INFORMATION

Agreement With Germany on Defense Use of Technology

Press release 5 dated January 4

The Department of State announced on January 4 the signing of an agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany to facilitate the exchange of patent rights and technical information for defense purposes. The agreement was signed at Bonn on that date by Heinrich von Brentano, German Foreign Minister, and U.S. Ambassador James B. Conant.

The agreement is expected to foster the exchange of technology for defense purposes between the two Governments and between the private industries of the respective contracting countries. Thus it should prove of reciprocal benefit in providing for national defense and in contributing to the mutual defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area.

The agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany is the latest to be signed to date of a series being negotiated with the NATO countries and with Japan. Other agreements of this nature have been signed with Italy, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Norway, the Netherlands, and Greece.

The agreements recognize that privately owned technology should, to the greatest extent practicable, be exchanged through commercial agreements between owners and users. They also stipulate that rights of private owners of patents and technical information should be fully recognized and protected in accordance with laws applicable to such rights. Other provisions are intended to assure fair treatment of private owners when they deal directly with a foreign government and in cases in which private information communicated through government channels might be used or disclosed without authorization. The agreements also provide for the establishment of arrangements by which owners of patentable inventions placed under secrecy by one government may obtain comparable protection in the other country.

The agreements also provide as a general rule that government-owned inventions shall be interchanged for defense purposes on a royalty-free basis.

Each of the agreements provides for the establishment of a Technical Property Committee to be composed of a representative of each government. These committees are charged with general responsibility for considering and making recommendations on any matters relating to the agreements brought before them by either government, either on their own behalf or on behalf of their nationals. One of the specific functions of the committee is to make recommendations to the governments, either in particular cases or in general, concerning disparities in their laws affecting the compensation of owners of patents and technical information.

The U.S. representative to the Technical Property Committees in Europe is assigned to the staff of the Defense Adviser, United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations (USRO), 2 Rue St. Florentin, Paris.

Policy guidance for the U.S. representatives on the Technical Property Committees is provided by the Interagency Technical Property Committee for Defense, which is chaired by the Department of Defense and includes representatives of the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the International Cooperation Administration, and the Government Patents Board. This committee is assisted by an industry advisory group representing major sectors of American industry concerned with defense production.

New International Agreement on North Atlantic Ice Patrol

Press release 7 dated January 4

On January 4 Herbert V. Prochnow, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, signed for the U.S. Government a new agreement concerning the contributions of the 11 countries supporting the International Ice Patrol. The new agreement will not affect the operation of the Ice Patrol itself but will bring about a distribution of its cost ($461,566 for 1955) among participating countries based on the current figures of the tonnage of their merchant shipping benefiting from the services of the patrol. The present shares are based on out-of-date tonnage figures. Under the new agreement the shares will be adjusted annually to conform to changes in tonnage.

In addition to the United States, which is the managing government, proportional contributions are made by the Governments of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. The new agreement will replace the present agreement whenever all of the governments concerned have signed.

Of all the peacetime hazards of the sea, none is more fearsome, unyielding, and treacherous than icebergs. The presence of these bergs in the heavily traveled shipping lanes of the North Atlantic, in an area of the heaviest fogs in the world, creates an extremely dangerous condition.

Prior to 1912, however, nothing was done toward establishing a system to warn ships of the location of icebergs, but on April 14 of that year the compelling necessity for the patrol was tragically brought home. Some 1,500 lives were lost on that date when the express passenger liner *Titanic*, on its maiden voyage, crashed into an iceberg and sank.

The U.S. Navy detailed two cruisers in that year to form the first ice patrol. The International Ice Observation and Ice Patrol Service in the North Atlantic was then created, and the United States was invited to operate the patrol with the expense to be borne by the 14 participating nations. The U.S. Coast Guard was designated as the responsible U.S. agency and since 1913 (with the exception of war years) has operated the Ice Patrol. Not a single vessel nor life has been lost because of collision with an iceberg during the years when the patrol has been operating.

At first the patrol consisted of a fleet of cutters that remained at sea during the danger season, screening the area and at times standing by particularly dangerous bergs to warn passing vessels. But the advent of long-range aircraft changed the structure of the patrol. Except in fog and bad weather an airplane has a great advantage over surface craft in sweeping the area and quickly determining from day to day the positions of the many bergs. It is estimated that 7,500 sizable bergs break off from the west Greenland glaciers each year, an average of 428 of which drift south of latitude 48 degrees (Newfoundland) and ap-

proximately 35 of which reach south of latitude 43 degrees (approximate latitude of Portsmouth, N.H.).

The use of cutters cannot be dispensed with entirely, however, because fog may obscure the surface of the most critical regions to airplanes for weeks at a time and strong currents may send bergs hundreds of miles from their originally sighted positions. Thus, when the weather is unsuitable for planes, the cutters replace them.

Headquarters at Argentia, Newfoundland, is the nerve center of the patrol. Its radios are in constant touch with the patrol units and merchant vessels crossing the area. Reports of ice sightings are received from many sources all over the northwestern Atlantic and are carefully analyzed to determine their actual and potential danger. Routine broadcasts of all ice conditions hazardous to shipping are made several times daily. Many more specific messages are sent to individual ships requesting detailed information. At headquarters the positions and courses of merchant ships traveling through the dangerous zone are charted, together with the positions of all dangerous bergs. The patrol commander thus has at hand a complete picture of the situation.

An idea that frequently occurs to the public is that icebergs can be destroyed by gunfire and mining, but this is without foundation. Gunfire has little or no effect, and the bergs are far too dangerous to board and blast. Neither can they be towed or pushed, and they cannot be rammed except in their last stages when they are rotten with slush. In the final analysis, these giants from the north can be eliminated only by nature, when they meet the warmer waters from the Gulf Stream. The Ice Patrol can only seek them out, watch them carefully and patiently, and make the best scientific prediction as to their future movements.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Federal Republic of Germany

Charter of the Arbitral Commission on property rights and interests in Germany (annex to convention on the settlement of matters arising out of the war and the occupation signed at Bonn May 26, 1952, as amended by the protocol on the termination of the occupation regime signed at Paris October 23, 1954). Entered into force May 5, 1955.
Accession deposited: Greece, November 4, 1955.

Japan

Treaty of peace with Japan. Signed at San Francisco September 8, 1951. Entered into force April 28, 1952. TIAS 2490.
Ratification deposited (with declarations): Ecuador, December 27, 1955.

North Atlantic Ice Patrol

Agreement regarding financial support of the North Atlantic ice patrol. Opened for signature at Washington January 4, 1956. Enters into force on the date on which it shall have been signed by all the 11 Governments named in the preamble.
Signature: United States, January 4, 1956.

North Atlantic Treaty

Agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for cooperation regarding atomic information. Signed at Paris June 22, 1955.[1]
Notification of being bound by terms of the agreement: Netherlands, January 4, 1956.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention. Signed at Buenos Aires December 22, 1952. Entered into force January 1, 1954. TIAS 3266.
Ratification deposited: Greece, December 13, 1955.

Final protocol to the international telecommunication convention. Signed at Buenos Aires December 22, 1952. Eutered into force January 1, 1954. TIAS 3266.
Ratification deposited: Greece, December 13, 1955.

Trade and Commerce

Protocol on terms of accession of Japan to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, with annex A (schedules of the Contracting Parties) and annex B (schedule of Japan). Done at Geneva June 7, 1955. Entered into force September 10, 1955.
Notification of intention to apply concessions received: Norway (effective January 16, 1956).

BILATERAL

Colombia

Agreement for interchange of technical knowledge and skills for development of Cauca Valley region, pursuant to the general agreement for technical cooperation of March 5 and 9, 1951 (TIAS 2231). Effected by exchange of notes at Bogotá July 29, November 15 and 28, 1955. Entered into force November 28, 1955.

Haiti

Agreement providing assistance for Artibonite Valley project in Haiti. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington December 27 and 28, 1955. Entered into force December 28, 1955.

Japan

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington November 14, 1955.
Entered into force: December 27, 1955 (upon exchange of notes establishing that all procedures of the two governments necessary to give legal effect to the agreement have been completed).

Netherlands

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington July 18, 1955.
Entered into force: December 30, 1955 (the day after receipt by the United States of notification that constitutional approval has been obtained by the Netherlands).

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[1] Not in force.

Page

Africa. Future Status of Togoland (Bell, text of resolution) 100

Asia. Southeast Asia Pact Council To Meet at Karachi 84

Atomic Energy. United States and Germany Discuss Research Reactor Agreement 92

Brazil. Visit of President-Elect Kubitschek of Brazil (Dulles, Kubitschek) 86

Canada
Approval of Recommendations for Controlling Levels of Lake Ontario (Jordan, Hoover) . . 89
U.S.-Canadian Commission Discusses Levels of Lake Ontario 92

Claims and Property. U.S. Asks Payment of Damages for Destruction of Navy Plane (text of note) 94

Congress, The. The State of the Union (Eisenhower) 79

Economic Affairs
Advisers to U.S. Delegation to Tariff Negotiations . 96
Approval of Recommendations for Controlling Levels of Lake Ontario (Jordan, Hoover) . . 89
Negotiations Concerning Debts of City of Berlin . 93
New International Agreement on North Atlantic Ice Patrol 105
U.S.-Canadian Commission Discusses Levels of Lake Ontario 92

Europe. United States Position on Liberation of Captive Peoples (Hagerty) 84

France. Future Status of Togoland (Bell, text of resolution) 100

Germany
Agreement With Germany on Defense Use of Technology 104
Negotiations Concerning Debts of City of Berlin . 93
United States and Germany Discuss Research Reactor Agreement 92

International Information. United States Position on Liberation of Captive Peoples (Hagerty) . 84

Israel. Israeli Action Against Syria (Lodge) . . 103

Military Affairs. U.S. Asks Payment of Damages for Destruction of Navy Plane (text of note) . 94

Mutual Security
Outlook for Free World in 1956 (Dulles) . . . 84
Southeast Asia Pact Council To Meet at Karachi . 84

Near East. Mob Violence in Amman and Jerusalem 85

Non-Self-Governing Territories. Future Status of Togoland (Bell, text of resolution) 100

Presidential Documents
The State of the Union 79
United States Position on Liberation of Captive Peoples (Hagerty) 84
U.S. Recognition of Independence of the Sudan . . 85

Page

Protection of Nationals and Property. Mob Violence in Amman and Jerusalem 85

Sudan. U.S. Recognition of Independence of the Sudan 85

Syria. Israeli Action Against Syria (Lodge) . . 103

Treaty Information
Agreement With Germany on Defense Use of Technology 104
Current Actions 106
New International Agreement on North Atlantic Ice Patrol 105

U.S.S.R. U.S. Asks Payment of Damages for Destruction of Navy Plane (text of note) . . . 94

United Kingdom. Future Status of Togoland (Bell, text of resolution) 100

United Nations
Current U.N. Documents 104
Future Status of Togoland (Bell, text of resolution) 100
Israeli Action Against Syria (Lodge) 103
Summary of Accomplishments of Tenth General Assembly 97

Name Index

Bell, Laird 100
Dulles, Secretary 84, 86
Eisenhower, President 79, 84, 85
Hagerty, James C. 84
Hoover, Herbert, Jr. 91
Jordan, Len 89, 91
Kubitschek de Oliveira, Juscelino 86
Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr. 103

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: January 2-8

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

Press release issued prior to January 2 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 686 of December 9.

No.	Date	Subject
1	1/2	Eisenhower greeting to Sudan Commission.
2	1/2	Recognition of Sudan's independence.
*3	1/3	Dulles: death of Edward Wilber.
*4	1/3	Program for Kubitschek visit.
5	1/4	U.S.–German agreement on technology.
6	1/4	Advisers to GATT delegation.
7	1/4	Agreement on North Atlantic Ice Patrol.
8	1/5	Negotiations on Berlin's external debts.
9	1/5	Arrival of President-elect Kubitschek.
10	1/6	U.S.–German negotiations on atomic agreement.
11	1/6	Note to U.S.S.R. on damages for plane.
12	1/6	Second meeting of SEATO Council.
13	1/8	Mob violence in Amman and Jerusalem.

*Not printed.

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The Department of State

bulletin

XXXIV, No. 865
January 23, 1956

THE UNITED NATIONS: SOME NEW PERSPECTIVES AFTER TEN YEARS ● *by Assistant Secretary Wilcox* . . . 111

ANALYSIS OF U.N. BUDGET FOR 1956 ● *Statement by Representative Chester E. Merrow* 138

PROSPECTS FOR EXPANDING SPANISH-AMERICAN TRADE ● *by Ambassador John Lodge* 126

THIRD PROGRESS REPORT ON THE AGRICULTURAL TRADE DEVELOPMENT AND ASSISTANCE ACT 130

For index see inside back cover

The Department of State bulletin

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January 23, 1956

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The United Nations: Some New Perspectives After Ten Years

by Francis O. Wilcox
Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs [1]

Just a few weeks ago the General Assembly concluded its tenth, and perhaps its most momentous, session. High on the list of accomplishments was its action in enlarging the membership of the United Nations from 60 to 76 countries.[2] This expansion of the organization's membership brings new vitality and new voices to the task of creating and maintaining peace with justice among nations.

The United States must now assess the implications for its foreign policy of a United Nations in which European representation has been increased, the voice of Asia and the Middle East has become strengthened, the number of so-called uncommitted countries has been enlarged, and the proportionate numerical strength of the Latin American group reduced.

This means new problems, but it also means a new challenge to our diplomacy—a new opportunity to develop policies that will advance our own interests and those of the international community.

The President in his state of the Union message [3] stated the cardinal aim of our foreign policy: "the waging of peace, with as much resourcefulness, with as great a sense of dedication and urgency as we have ever mustered in defense of our country in time of war."

In charting our course in a newly revitalized United Nations we must search out and understand the new forces at work.

[1] Address made before the National Press Club, Washington, D. C., on Jan. 13 (press release 17).
[2] Bulletin of Dec. 26, 1955, p. 1067.
[3] *Ibid.*, Jan. 16, 1956, p. 79.

Impact of Bandung and the Geneva Summit Meeting

Two important developments in 1955 made themselves felt in the Tenth General Assembly. The first was the convening of the Bandung conference. The second was the summit meeting in Geneva. Together they loosened the rather rigid cold war alinements which have thus far prevailed in the United Nations.

The Bandung conference reflected an upsurge of confidence among the Asian-African countries. Representatives of the conference, it should be noted, rejected Communist colonialism as well as the discarded colonialism of former times.

Within the United Nations the "spirit of Bandung" gave rise to increased expressions of solidarity of interest among members of the group and continued cohesiveness on issues of special mutual concern such as colonial questions, questions of race, the needs and desires of underdeveloped countries, and the question of membership. This current of Asian-African self-expression cut sharply across prevailing Communist–free-world alinements and brought the Tenth General Assembly face to face with changing political and economic realities.

Despite the "spirit of Bandung," however, the General Assembly, after voting to include the Algerian item on the agenda, subsequently decided not to consider the question further, and on the Cyprus item the Bandung powers were divided.

At the Assembly there was felt not only a new sense of urgency arising from anticolonial pressures and a heightened appreciation of the value of the United Nations as a world forum for dis-

cussion of pressing problems, but also a sense of the limitations of U.N. action at certain times in dealing with certain problems. As Ambassador Lodge has said, "Public debate is curative in many cases, but it cannot cure all problems any more than a certain medicine will cure all diseases."

On the ground of interference in domestic affairs, South Africa withdrew its delegation from the General Assembly. The issue, of course, was over South Africa's racial policies. Here again, the Assembly recognized the United Nations limitations. While reaffirming the hope that South Africa would live up to its charter obligations, the Assembly did not again appoint the commission which had been set up to study race problems in that country and with which South Africa had refused to cooperate.

The Asian and African countries, however they may differ in their foreign policies, share a compelling desire for rapid advancement along the road of industrial, economic, and social progress. Many of these peoples are newly free of colonial rule. They find the climate of independence no less invigorating now than it was for us in 1776. Nor did the United States, after winning its independence, emerge into a static world assured of a secure and prosperous place among the nations. True, it did not, as do the newly independent lands today, have recourse to a United Nations. But one may well imagine some of the issues we would have hotly pursued in such a forum.

The summit meeting held in Geneva last July also left its imprint on the Tenth Assembly. This historic meeting raised the hopes of peoples that the danger of war had further receded. It appeared that the U.S.S.R. joined us in realizing that neither side can survive a global hydrogen war. It seemed possible that some of the outstanding political differences could now be dealt with in good faith.

The General Assembly began its work in this warm afterglow of the Geneva summit meeting. Many delegates invoked the "spirit of Geneva" in their speeches. The Soviets came wearing the smile of conciliation. The Great Powers for the time being at least were not glaring at each other across conference tables, fighting out problems born of the Second World War.

In the freer atmosphere, pressures of a changing world were felt with new force. The smaller nations, the less-developed countries, the former colonial peoples of Asia and Africa spoke up with a new vigor. They spoke not only of their particular problems; they addressed themselves to the Great Powers about the kind of world they want to live in.

While the Bandung conference and the Geneva summit meeting did not confront us with an entirely new situation, we can agree that there was a shift of emphasis which resulted in blurring traditional issues and alinements. At least until the close of the second Geneva conference in November, Soviet tactics in the Assembly appeared more flexible than in the past. Prior to that time the Soviets used the gloved rather than the mailed fist.

Our impression from this past Assembly is that Soviet leaders would like to maintain the appearance of cooperative relations, even though they are not willing to create the indispensable conditions for a secure peace. The cold war, in the sense of peaceful competition between conflicting ideologies, was in fact conducted with much vigor.

We must therefore reckon coldly with the true aims of the new flexibility of Soviet tactics in the United Nations. These are to divide the non-Communist world and to gain acceptance as the champion of all peoples seeking a better life.

The Soviet challenge was met resourcefully and to good effect. Let us consider four of the important issues before the Assembly: the admission of new members, the peaceful development of the atom, disarmament, and economic assistance for underdeveloped areas. These are issues of major import for the future of the United Nations and for United States policy.

Admission of New Members

In its first decade the United Nations has grown from an original membership of 51 to a more broadly representative organization of 76. As a result, it should be better equipped to serve the needs of mankind during its second decade.

There are six points that I wish to stress regarding the United States attitude on the admission of new members. I shall then try to assess the implications for our foreign policy of the increase in size of the United Nations.

First, we have followed a consistent policy based squarely on the principles of the charter. In the words of Ambassador Lodge, the United States was guided by three basic principles:

1. To bring into membership all qualified states which apply;

2. To follow the provisions of the charter as to judging the qualifications of the applicants;

3. To avoid thwarting the will of a qualified majority by use in the Security Council of the veto.

The admission of qualified states had been prevented solely by the Soviet veto. These would long ago have been members of the United Nations had not the Soviet Union used the veto 45 times on the membership question in the past 10 years.

Second, consistent with these principles the United States took the initiative early during the Assembly session. We actively sought the agreement of the five permanent members of the Security Council not to use the veto on the admission of new members.

The United States has long favored such an agreement. We stressed this point in varying ways with each of the permanent members. In the present case we ourselves said publicly that we would not use the veto and that we would abstain in the voting on the applications of the Soviet satellites even though in our view their present governments are not independent and their conduct has been reprehensible. This voting position accorded fully with the spirit and intent of the Vandenberg resolution, adopted by the Senate in 1948 by a 64 to 4 vote, which expressed the view that there should be agreement among the permanent members not to use the veto to prevent the admission of new members.

Third, we believed that the admission of qualified applicants would enrich and strengthen the United Nations morally and materially. Their participation in the organization would outweigh any disadvantages which might follow from the admission of the four satellites.

Fourth, it is evident that the pressure of world opinion does exert influence on the Soviet Union. Its original position was that the United Nations must admit all the Soviet satellites, including Outer Mongolia, or the Soviet Union would veto all qualified candidates. We made no comparable insistence. We did not condition the admission of one state upon another under threat of veto. But evidently, among other motives, the Soviets did not wish to bear the onus for having vetoed the long list of free-world applicants.

We should frankly recognize that Soviet willingness to see 16 nations admitted was a comedown from its rigid 18-or-nothing position. But we must nevertheless hold them accountable for frustrating the admission of Japan. Contrary to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, the Soviet Union conditioned Japan's admission on that of the fictional entity of Outer Mongolia. It withheld United Nations membership as a new instrument of pressure on the Japanese in their peace treaty negotiations. We deeply regret the continued exclusion of Japan, whose candidacy was backed by every member of the Security Council except the Soviet Union. We also deplore the exclusion of the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Viet-Nam, both of whom we regard as fully qualified.

Fifth, the abstention of the United States in the voting on the satellites does not mean that we accept as permanent the present situation in Eastern Europe. We will continue to hold the four new Eastern European members responsible for past agreements. We will continue to charge the Soviet Union with its undeniable responsibilities in this regard. As Secretary Dulles said recently, the United States "will accept no compromise with the Soviet Union" that would seem to be acquiescence in the present status in Eastern Europe.

Meanwhile, we hope that United Nations membership will have a salutary effect on the international behavior of these governments and will encourage freer contacts between their peoples and the outside world. We trust that they will be brought to feel with new force the need to respect the human rights and basic freedoms which they now deny their people. They have now bound themselves to observe the terms of the charter. The world will note how they carry out this pledge.

Sixth, our abstention on the satellite applications does not mean any change in United States policy on the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations. We continue to support the Government of the Republic of China. We continue to oppose vigorously the seating of the Chinese Communists.

Implications for the Future

What are the implications of the admission of 16 new members? On the organizational side it is clear that the number of members on the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and perhaps on other bodies should be increased.

Let us look, for example, at the Security Coun-

cil. Asia has never been adequately represented on the Council. With the admission of six additional Asian members, this imbalance must be redressed. The increase of 10 European countries also requires a review of the number of Council seats allocated to the European region. While we have made no decision on this matter, it may be that only two seats need to be added, although perhaps three or four more will be required. I believe the concept of the semipermanent membership as it evolved in the League of Nations is also worthy of study.

Any increase in members of the Security Council would, of course, in turn affect the number of votes required for decisions. Moreover, this question of the size of the Council involves an amendment of the charter, which requires the concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the United Nations, including the five permanent members of the Security Council. This complex question will obviously require extensive diplomatic negotiations. The United States hopes to begin such negotiations within the next month or two.

We can also expect that new and important political problems will be brought to the General Assembly for solution as a result of its new membership.

The enlarged United Nations will speak with wider authority. It will more accurately mirror underlying conditions as they are in the world and confront all of us in a more decisive manner with the crucial problems of the atomic age. A greater sense of responsibility will be required of all the members if the organization is to develop in a sound and practical way and if problems are to be solved and not aggravated.

There are, of course, those who are already predicting that the United States will lose voting support in the General Assembly. I have this comment regarding such dim predictions:

Up to the present time the United States has been able to retain a position of leadership through the justice of its cause and the logic of its arguments. Almost invariably on important issues our policies have been overwhelmingly supported by the members of the free world.

If the time should ever come when we found ourselves consistently outvoted on important issues in the United Nations, that would surely be a sign that we ought to reexamine in a hardheaded way our basic policies.

Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

We face another major challenge in promoting the peaceful uses of atomic energy. President Eisenhower originally announced his atoms-for-peace plan at the United Nations. He proposed that an agency be established under its aegis. This reflected his estimate of the value of the United Nations as a mechanism for promoting international cooperation. That is why he also proposed that, once established, the agency should be brought into an appropriate relationship with the United Nations.

The traditional way would have been to continue with our bilateral programs. The need to safeguard our security interests and the difficulty of working out an international mechanism for parceling out and controlling the use of fissionable materials would have justified a unilateral approach. But President Eisenhower rejected the pattern of the past in recognition of the needs of the present.

He rejected it in the knowledge that the acquisition of nuclear technology and material brings with it the capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons. Atomic power reactors can be utilized to produce nuclear materials for weapons even as they generate electricity. Unless effective preventive measures are taken soon, the wider utilization of atomic energy—which will occur whether or not an international agency is created—will inevitably hasten the day when many nations will be in a position to manufacture atomic weapons.

Think of what this means in terms of existing international tensions, current power relationships, and international plans generally. This is what gives the President's call for international cooperation in this field its great sense of urgency. In the long run it may well be that the greatest contribution of the International Agency will be to assure that atomic energy is used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

At the Tenth Assembly the majority of member nations sought a greater voice in shaping the agency's statute, in conducting its operations, and in establishing an appropriate form of relationship with the United Nations.

In keeping with the President's original conception, the United States met those desires by proposing to convene a conference on the final text of the agency's statute and by agreeing to authorize the Secretary-General to make a study of the

agency's relationship with the United Nations. The United States also announced that the original group of states which had been engaged in drafting the statute of the agency would be expanded by the addition of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, India, and Brazil.

The expanded negotiating group will soon meet. It will seek agreement on a draft statute and will consider the suggestions of other governments. One of the main problems in these negotiations will be to seek agreement with respect to the powers and authority of the agency to guard against the diversion of fissionable materials.

The Soviet Union, whose original hostility to the President's proposal was abandoned in the face of strong world public opinion, will probably continue to press for a relationship with the United Nations which would subject the agency's power to guard against the diversion of fissionable materials to a veto in the Security Council. But the General Assembly has twice rejected this concept, and it remains to be seen whether the Soviet Union will once again adjust its policy to world opinion.

Disarmament

Disarmament is a third important challenge. This past Assembly urged that the states concerned should continue to seek agreement on a comprehensive disarmament plan.[4] It also urged that in the meantime priority should be given to the following "initial steps":

> (i) Such confidence-building measures as the plan of Mr. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America, for exchanging military blueprints and mutual aerial inspection, and the plan of Mr. Bulganin, Prime Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, for establishing control posts at strategic centres;
>
> (ii) All such measures of adequately safeguarded disarmament as are now feasible.

With this resolution, which was the product of United States and United Kingdom initiative, the Assembly has revitalized 10 years of fruitless debate. It has adjusted its sights to a new and feasible disarmament goal.

This fresh approach to the disarmament problem will have its first test early this year when the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission resumes its work. If the Soviet Union will now agree to the early implementation of the President's "open sky" plan, the United Nations will finally have the possibility of progressing to a more comprehensive plan of disarmament. Regrettably, Mr. Khrushchev's recent attack on the President's plan is far from encouraging.

Meanwhile this Government is making an intensive review of concrete measures which might be taken now to reduce or limit armaments and armed forces with adequate safeguards as to inspection and control. Our ultimate goal remains unchanged. We are searching intensively for new scientific techniques to guarantee effective inspection and control of a more comprehensive plan which would include nuclear weapons. Success in this search will make possible comprehensive disarmament, including the elimination of nuclear weapons. We will persevere in this search with all the skill and resources at our command.

Economic Assistance to Underdeveloped Countries

The shifting emphasis of the cold war has made the solution of economic problems even more vital. The current Soviet effort to exploit the economic needs of some of the underdeveloped countries—highlighted by the Khrushchev-Bulganin Asian tour—is a matter for serious concern to all those who are genuinely interested in the freedom as well as the progress of the economically underdeveloped countries.

I am convinced that from a dollars-and-cents point of view economic aid through multilateral organizations is less costly to us in many instances since it spreads the burden over a larger number of contributors. Moreover, the multilateral approach may often be found more acceptable by some of the underdeveloped countries.

The crux of the matter is that we must remain flexible regarding the manner in which economic aid is made available to our free-world partners. When the job can best be done bilaterally we should use this approach. This is equally true of the multilateral approach.

In the face of the new challenge it has now become even more important to increase the effectiveness of our economic and technical assistance programs. Thus it is essential that we continue and strengthen our support of the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance of the United Nations, which is generally recognized as a long-range program for the economic betterment of underdeveloped countries.

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[4] *Ibid.*, Jan. 9, 1956, p. 63.

We hope that in the future more of our technical experts will be able to share their experiences with the people of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and the less developed parts of Latin America.

We believe that the program could be further strengthened by increasing, through fellowships and study tours, the number of those from the underdeveloped countries who are enabled to visit our schools and farms and factories.

Another area which deserves imaginative exploration is the problem of international financing. There is no one answer to that problem. Much is already being done, and perhaps more could be done, through such bodies as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, on the multilateral side, and our own Export-Import Bank.

Further headway is likely to be made through the early establishment of the International Finance Corporation, which the General Assembly endorsed unanimously at its last session. It will help to bring together opportunities in underdeveloped countries and potential investors in capital-exporting countries and will, we trust, encourage the flow of private capital. The Congress has already approved this undertaking, and the United States has formally adhered to the new organization.

It is an open question whether all these measures will be adequate to meet those basic needs for capital in the world which cannot be satisfied by the underdeveloped countries from their own domestic resources. While there can be no doubt that domestic savings must in the long run provide the bulk of the necessary funds, President Eisenhower has recognized that additional funds may be necessary. As you know, over the past several years there has been mounting pressure from the underdeveloped areas for a special United Nations fund for economic development. President Eisenhower has made it clear that, as some success in disarmament is achieved, this Government will ask our people to join in devoting a portion of the savings thus achieved to an international fund for economic development within the framework of the United Nations. Such a fund would help in the development of roads and other means of transportation, the multiple use of water, and other basic services which, in turn, will create better conditions for private investment.

The formula for a special United Nations fund for economic development as developed to date may not be adequate, but I hope that ways and means will be found for the United States to participate constructively in such a fund.

Reviewing the Charter

Since the General Assembly approved the idea of charter review in principle, we must examine carefully in the months ahead the ways and means by which the United Nations can be improved.

In some respects the United Nations has never had a fair chance to function. When the organization was born in 1945, those who drafted the charter did not know about the atomic bomb. Moreover, they assumed that the peace treaties ending the war would soon be concluded and the U.N. would be able to function in a relatively peaceful world. They also assumed that the five Great Powers would work together to win the peace as they had cooperated to win the war.

All these basic assumptions proved erroneous. The signatures on the charter were hardly dry when the atomic bomb was dropped over Hiroshima and we all realized the world had entered a new and dangerous era. Shortly afterward the Great Powers, instead of working together, fell to quarreling among themselves. The peace treaties were scrapped, and the United Nations, together with its members, became enmeshed in the cold war.

What we have, therefore, is a preatomic charter which is compelled to function in a nuclear age. Some United Nations critics point out that we are, in fact, sending a Cub Scout to do a man-sized job.

I do not agree, but in any event we ought to examine pretty carefully such fundamental questions as the following:

1. Should the United Nations be given sufficient power to cope adequately with the mortal threat which atomic and hydrogen weapons pose for us all?

2. Are there any effective steps that can be taken to revitalize the enforcement machinery of the U.N. which has remained dormant since the charter was drafted?

3. Can we find ways and means of curbing the excessive use of the veto without discarding our right to protect our vital interests in important issues before the Security Council?

4. Is there any better way of determining just

what kinds of problems are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of states and therefore not properly subject to action by the United Nations?

5. Should we support some system of weighted voting which would remove voting inequalities in the General Assembly and give to the big nations voting strength more commensurate with their power and responsibility in the world?

6. How can the United Nations be made a more effective instrument of peaceful change without undermining the principles of stability and order in the world?

Faced with fundamental questions like these, some people argue that it would be far more logical to draft a new charter based on a brandnew set of assumptions. This, it seems to me, is an unrealistic approach. It would open a Pandora's box and probably result in leaving the world with a weaker charter.

Chief Justice Marshall once said of the Constitution that "it was intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs." The Constitution has, in fact, proven a living document and has kept pace with the growth of our Nation.

In a somewhat comparable way the charter has proven flexible enough to be adapted to a good many new situations without the need for formal amendment. In the first decade of U.N. existence, for example, not one formal amendment has been put to the vote in the General Assembly. Even so, many important changes have taken place within the United Nations system. Some provisions of the charter have already fallen into disuse. Others have been applied in a way the framers of the charter did not contemplate.

It is important to remember that we are not examining the charter drafted in San Francisco in 1945. We are examining the charter of 1956 as it has been amplified by custom and usage, resolutions of the various U.N. organs, and treaties like the Atlantic Pact and the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. If we were to proceed now to consider amendments to the old charter rather than the new, it would be very much like a surgeon planning an operation on the basis of a diagnosis made 10 years ago.

What I am saying is that even though we have a *preatomic* charter, we do not have a *static* charter.

We ought to keep this fact in mind, for any amendment we propose can be rejected by the Soviet Union. But even if this obstacle proves insurmountable, a decade of experience has taught us that a great deal of progress can still be made within the framework of the present charter without resorting to formal charter amendments.

Let me leave you with one concluding thought. It is good that we have a flexible and not a static charter because the next decade of the atomic era is likely to place new strains on the organization. Perhaps its most severe test will be in bringing about peaceful change in our dynamic society in which the atom can bring either unimagined benefits or awesome destruction.

If the next decade brings, as I believe it will, a greater striving for harmonization for relations among nations, the United States must be in the forefront in helping to create favorable conditions conducive to peace, security, and well-being. In our relations with the United Nations we should be completely aware of its shortcomings, enthusiastic over its potentialities, and dedicated to its principles.

As a Nation we have never been defeated in war. We cannot afford defeat in waging peace. If we can rival the soldiers in our dedication and resourcefulness, we can build a peace which will earn us the thanks of future generations.

General Assembly Delegation's Views on Economic Aid

Press release 14 dated January 11

Secretary Dulles at his news conference on January 11 read the following statement sent to him on December 9, 1955, by the members of the U.S. delegation to the Tenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly concerning U.S. foreign economic policy.[1]

Impelled by a unanimous feeling that economic and social questions are assuming increasing importance on the international scene, the United

[1] The members of the delegation signing the statement were: Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Chairman of the Delegation; Brooks Hays and Chester E. Merrow, U.S. House of Representatives; John O. Pastore, U.S. Senate; Colgate Whitehead Darden, Jr.; Robert L. Brokenburr; Laird Bell; Jacob Blaustein; Ambassador James J. Wadsworth, Deputy Representative to the United Nations; and Mrs. Oswald B. Lord.

States delegation to the Tenth General Assembly has joined in framing this statement.

The present period in history may one day be recognized as a major turning point in the struggle between Communism and freedom. It appears to be clearly a shift in the cold war, in which economic and social problems have moved to the forefront.

Members of the United States Delegation during this General Assembly session have observed the effectiveness of Soviet tactics under these new conditions. This can be seen both in the way the Soviet bloc delegates work in various United Nations meetings, and also in the voting that occurs in many committees. As we observed maneuvers, we were conscious that the Soviet Union, elsewhere in the world, was using economic and social collaboration as a means for jumping military as well as political barriers. Examples of this can be found in India, Egypt, and Burma.

We believe that the United States must counter these Soviet efforts. We can succeed, not by outbidding Communism in sheer amounts of economic aid, but by making newly independent and newly articulate peoples feel that they can best satisfy their wants by becoming and remaining part of the community of free nations.

We welcome more emphasis on economic and educational endeavors, for we have a proven experience in these fields.

We are in a contest in the field of economic development of underdeveloped countries which is bitterly competitive. Defeat in this contest could be as disastrous as defeat in an armaments race.

We could lose this economic contest unless the country *as a whole* wakes up to all its implications.

Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference

Press release 15 dated January 11

Secretary Dulles: The U.S. delegation to the U.N. General Assembly, when it was recessing last month, made a statement which they sent down to me and which I went over with the President. We both thought it was sufficiently important to make public. So I will read it to you on this occasion.[1]

. . . . .

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you and the President agree with that statement?

A. Generally speaking we do, yes, and it is for that reason that the President suggested I join in making this statement public at this time.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us what the significance of the timing of the statement now is—of its release now?

A. You mean why the statement was made?

Q. Why is it being released now?

A. This is the first press conference which I have had since I received the statement and had a chance to discuss it with the President.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to whom was this statement addressed?

A. It was addressed to me. It is entitled "A statement to the Secretary of State by the U.S. Delegation to the Tenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly."

Q. Mr. Secretary, when did you discuss it with the President?

A. I think I discussed it with him approximately the day before Christmas—I think it was about the 24th of December. I would not be absolutely decisive as to the date, but it was when he came up from Gettysburg for the Christmas holidays.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you view this as a recommendation to step up aid?

A. I take it as a statement which reinforces very strongly what the views of the administration are with respect to aid which will be embodied in various proposals which we will make. They were in part discussed in the President's state of the Union message,[2] and they will be further developed in subsequent messages and communications to the Congress.

Long-Term Aid Commitments

Q. Mr. Secretary, on this—the exact text—I think it said something to the effect the country as a whole needed to wake up to this need. Do you and the President feel the country needs to

[1] See above.

[2] BULLETIN of Jan. 16, 1956, p. 79.

wake up to the need, and, if so, is part of the timing to call the country's attention particularly now to the President's long-range foreign aid program?

A. I think that one could say that. There is an aspect of the President's proposals to Congress embodied in the state of the Union message which I don't think has been adequately appreciated yet, and that is the suggestion he makes that we be authorized to make long-term commitments subject to annual appropriations. Now that theme will be developed more fully, and I am not in a position at the moment to give any precise figures because that has not yet been finally dealt with by the Bureau of the Budget. But the importance of that is very great because it will enable us, I hope, to have not only greater flexibility but the opportunity of doing things which have a more permanent value in developing the economy of these less well-developed countries.

The granting of economic aid, if it assumes a form which is primarily budgetary aid for a given year, does not have the permanent impact upon the community that long-range projects do. In some of the bigger projects we have been inhibited somewhat from going into them because of the fact that these long-range projects take quite a long while. It may be a 5-year project or a 10-year project and the institution, such as the World Bank, or the governments of the countries concerned, or private enterprise in the countries concerned, hesitate to embark upon these long-range projects if all they can count on from the United States is a contribution for the first year. I think we can greatly improve the quality of our economic assistance in building up these less developed countries if we can have the opportunity to assume, subject to annual appropriations, commitments for future years. I believe that that can be extremely important, and that is a very important new aspect of the program which we are presenting to Congress this year.

Q. As a corollary to this question, if I may, sir, does this mean that Senator George will have to be awakened? He came out firmly against economic aid.

A. Well, this program will not substantially increase the amount of economic aid in any given year. It does presuppose a continuance of at least a percentage of our present economic aid over a period of years, which might be 5 or 10 years. But as far as the actual amounts are concerned, this is not so much a question of amount or totals as it is a question of continuity.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you hope or are you seeking for bipartisan support of this idea? Is it rather a new idea as put forward in the President's message? Was there consultation beforehand with congressional leaders on this?

A. Yes, this was brought up at the meeting we had with the bipartisan group, although I would not necessarily say, in the light of all the matters we had to discuss, that it was presented as adequately as would be desirable. That will be done as these matters come up in concrete form before the Congress.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I think it was about 1½ years ago that Governor Stassen said the FOA [Foreign Operations Administration] suggested a similar long-range program but that it was overruled by the State Department on the aid program. I wonder if this means the State Department has changed its position since then.

A. No. I don't know what the episode is you refer to. The State Department has been in favor of something of this sort for some time, and I don't know what it was you referred to as having been overruled. It may have been some particular project that was overruled on technical grounds. But the concept of finding a way to make this economic assistance both more flexible and to get a greater continuity is one which I have favored for some time. We have thought about various ways of doing it. I remember I had considerable discussion, I think it was last year, about the possibility of creating a new finance institution with sufficient capital so it could draw on it year by year, somewhat as the Export-Import Bank does. That particular project did not win favor that year. This is another way of arriving at that same objective, which has been an objective I have had in mind for some time.

U.S. Position on Baghdad Pact

Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask on another subject what the attitude of the United States is toward the development of the Baghdad Pact.

A. Well, the United States has been, as you know, sympathetic toward the formation of the

Baghdad Pact; indeed, it comes out of an idea I developed when I was in that part of the world the first year I was in office, in May 1953. Then I talked about the "northern tier" concept,[3] and that idea took hold and it resulted in the present Baghdad Pact, including the northern tier countries; namely, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. On the question of its further development, the United States has no particular views. We have not urged any other countries to join the pact.

Responsibilities in Foreign Aid Field

Q. Mr. Secretary, going back to the question of foreign aid, as you see it, where does your responsibility lie in this field in relation to Mr. Hollister?

A. I have the policy responsibility in this field. Now the policy responsibility is primarily exercised at the time when the program is made up for submission to the Congress. At that time we go over, with the International Cooperation Administration, the various world situations and our policies and our programs; and at that point the State Department makes a basic policy decision as to how much money we think we need for such and such an area and, broadly speaking, for what purposes, and we consider such matters as this proposal I just talked about of trying to get a possibility of forward commitments. We talk about the possibility of a discretionary fund for the Near and Middle East; the possibility of a discretionary fund, which we have already in principle, of $100 million for the Far East. It is at that point primarily that the policy decisions are made, and it is at that point the State Department, drawing upon the advice of our Ambassadors and our Assistant Secretaries and ICA, takes a predominant role. Then, of course, we appear before the congressional committees and give the primary justification for the general program and discretionary funds and committed funds. Once the money is voted by the Congress the policy decisions have basically been made and under normal circumstances, from that point on, the administration of the money is a responsibility of what is now known as the ICA.

Now, that is not wholly the case because at various times new situations arise, emergencies develop—certain needs seem not to be as important as they did seem and there are variations which call for current policy decisions. But I would say in the main that 90 percent of the policy direction is given during the period when the program is prepared for submission to Congress, and that from then on most of the work of administering the fund is done by the ICA in accordance with the policy decisions which are reflected in the request to Congress and in the response made by Congress in actually appropriating money.

Q. Are you taking responsibility then for the programing of that?

A. When you say "I," the State Department in the main takes responsibility for deciding the areas and the countries where we need money and where we think it should be spent. Now when it comes to the question of working out what are the precise programs within the countries which should be supported, that is primarily a matter for the ICA because it has the technicians and the field people, and normally I would not get into that unless it involves some major problems, such as the Aswan Dam project,[4] for example. If we get the authority which we hope for in terms of forward commitments, that would probably lead to the consideration of more large-scale programs which would have sufficient political implications so that I would want to express a political view with respect to those particular projects. In the past I would say that the expenditures, once they are agreed upon as to amount and as to place, do not involve any particular detailed consideration by me unless some special circumstances bring it to my attention.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would American contributions to the U.N. technical assistance program be included in this new policy?

A. No, I don't think there would be any desire to make forward commitments to that particular project. I think that can be handled on a year-to-year basis.

Arab-Israel Problems

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Israeli Government has expressed anxiety that there will be competition between the West and the Russians to outbid each other to win Arab favor by being tough on the

[3] *Ibid.*, June 15, 1953, p. 835.

[4] *Ibid.*, Dec. 26, 1955, p. 1050.

Israeli Government. I wonder if you have any comment on that.

A. I don't think that there need be any fear of competition in that respect. I think it is quite possible that the Soviet Government may itself try to win Arab favor by, for example, proposing a tough resolution before the Security Council when this Syrian question comes up, perhaps tomorrow. But I can assure you the United States will not itself be drawn into competition of that kind.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you consider the Soviet resolution now before the Security Council a tough resolution?

A. I don't know that there is any now before the Security Council. I haven't seen it. I have heard about it in general terms—about a resolution which they may sponsor.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is there any decision yet on the arms for Israel?

A. No.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how soon is that to reaching a decision? They say they have been waiting 6 months for that.

A. Waiting 6 months?

Q. 6 weeks.

A. Oh, 6 weeks. That is about right. I suppose we will give the matter a fresh look after the Security Council acts on this Syrian question.[5] We will not do it before that, surely.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us what countries you would like to visit on your trip to the SEATO Council meeting in Karachi?

A. Now, if you were only asking me countries which as a tourist I would like to visit that would be a long list. I hope to visit on my way back some of the countries of South Asia and Southeast Asia which I have not yet visited and some which I would like to revisit because of the importance of our relations with those countries. But it would not be practical for me at the present time to name those countries because I do not visit countries unless I am invited by the government of the country in question. I don't want to embarrass them.

Q. I wanted to know if you had been invited to visit India because of the problem of Nehru.

A. I understand that there has been an indication on my side that I would hope to have the opportunity to visit India in connection with this trip and an indication of the Government of India, on its side, that they would be happy if I could do it. But there have been no arrangements about dates.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us under what conditions the United States would be likely to join the Baghdad Pact?

A. Well, I think we would consider joining the Baghdad Pact if and when it seemed in doing so it would be a contribution to the general stability of the area. We do not consider it as an isolated act.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you discuss the subject of the pact with Marshal Tito when you were there?[6] *Did you go into the whole matter of neutralism with Tito at that time?*

A. I am trying to recall. I do not think that we covered any matters—certainly not in any significant way—which I did not report at my press interview that immediately followed that conference. I made a very full report there, in which Marshal Tito joined, and I am afraid I would have to ask you to refresh your recollection and mine in seeing just what we said. I don't think that your point came up in any significant way.

Q. As regards that pact, there have been suggestions that the Secretary of the Baghdad Pact be the channel for the sending of aid on a regional basis into the Middle East and that Arab nations who are unwilling to subscribe to the military features of that pact nevertheless could come in for economic aid under the pact. Did that come to your attention, and if so what is our attitude toward that?

A. No.

Q. Can you tell us something of your meeting this morning with Ambassador Eric Johnston and

[5] For text of a U.S. statement made in the Security Council on Dec. 16, see *ibid.*, Jan. 16, 1956, p. 103.

[6] Secretary Dulles visited Yugoslavia on Nov. 6; for a summary of the subjects he discussed with Marshal Tito, see BULLETIN of Nov. 21, 1955, p. 833.

of the present status of the economic development out in the Middle East?

A. Well, he came at my suggestion because I wanted to check with him as to his impressions of the effect of the present condition in the Near East upon his program. I wanted to get his estimate as to where his program stood in the light of events which have taken place since I last talked with him, which was perhaps about 6 weeks ago or more.

Q. Is Mr. Johnston going to go back to the area?

A. He has no present trip scheduled. I would hope that developments would be such as to make it worth his while to go back, because the project is very well advanced on a technical level and I would hope that political conditions would make it practical for the project to go ahead.

Hydrogen Bomb Tests

Q. Mr. Secretary, several weeks ago you said that the Government had reached no positive conclusions on various proposals for stopping the hydrogen bomb test.[7] *I wonder, can you tell us now, since the proposal has been made, have you any more recent suggestions along that line?*

A. We have not yet found any basis which would seem to warrant us in suspending hydrogen bomb tests. We feel it imperative to keep to the forefront of scientific knowledge in that field, unless and until some dependable basis can be found to assure a disarmament, a controlled and inspected disarmament, which would make it safe for us to cease our experimental and testing efforts, which in part are designed to find ways to protect ourselves against the use of the atomic weapons by others. So the situation is about where it was. As you know, the general efforts in this field are being conducted under the leadership of Governor Stassen, and we are hopeful that a way may be found to relieve the burden of expense in this effort and also the very great danger which it implies for much of the world. Those efforts are continuing and no doubt will be resumed at the United Nations Subcommittee on Disarmament when it reconvenes, I think sometime this February.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you say that we want to keep in the forefront of this scientific field, do you mean that we are ahead now?

A. I believe that we are, yes, although inevitably that is partly a matter of speculation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you mentioned a few weeks ago the technical difficulties in regard to a prohibition of atomic weapons, did you mean that the United States does not know now if the Communists, the Russians, have set off a bomb?

A. We announced the large explosion which they made on—whatever it was, some 6 weeks ago, I think approximately that time.[8] Yes, we knew about that.

Q. I mean, is it not possible for the Americans to know every time when the Russians do set off a bomb?

A. We know, generally speaking. Of course it is very difficult to say that we know about a bomb that we don't know about. But we know about the ones we do know about. We think we know about most of them.

Q. Mr. Secretary, regarding your opening statement, you didn't mention any particular area of the world in which Soviet efforts had been countered. May we assume that you are referring to the Middle East and Asia in particular?

A. Yes. South Asia and the Middle East, I would think, are the areas where they have exerted themselves most.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there are reports from London that the British are going to propose a joint Middle East aid agency or a Middle East aid program for the Western Powers. Would you give us some of your thinking on such an idea?

A. Well, I have no reason to believe that the British do have such a plan. Perhaps they do. I have no knowledge of it. And if they had, we would of course consider anything that they wish to bring up. But I would say I doubt very much if they do have any program of that sort; certainly we know nothing of it.

Magazine Interview

Q. Mr. Secretary, a national magazine [Life] *is carrying tomorrow what purports to be an exclusive interview with you, sir, in which a number of interesting statements are made that don't always jibe with the information we have been getting in this Department, and in the embassies*

[7] *Ibid.*, Dec. 12, 1955, p. 964.

[8] *Ibid.*, Dec. 5, 1955, p. 916.

of the interested countries, about a number of major historical events in the past 2 or 3 years. In fairness to you, sir, I would like to clear up some of these points here if you would agree to entertain questions on that article.

A. Well, I will have to tell you that I have not read the article; so perhaps we had better wait until I have read it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you know what you said at the time of the interview.

A. I have no precise recollection of that. I would hardly say that it was an exclusive interview. I have talked to a great many of you in one way or another at one time or another and, as I say, what is reported in this article I have not yet seen.

Q. Mr. Secretary, one of the points that is made here, and the one that interests me, is a claim that the Indochina settlement reached at Geneva was a victory for our policy of deterrence. I'd like to know, sir, in what respect did we put the Chinese Communists on notice or warning that, unless they accepted this settlement, which I recall we didn't like very well at that time, we would do all kinds of drastic things to them?

A. Well, I think the answer to that is a matter of pretty general public knowledge. There was the program for "united action" in that area, and you will recall that I went first to London and then to Paris and reached what I thought was an agreement on united action.[9] We had also had the agreement of the Philippines and Thailand to united action at that time, which was a matter of public knowledge. We had hoped to get the united action into force promptly and before the Geneva conference was held. However, later on it developed that the British and the French preferred to wait and see what came out of the Geneva armistice talks before agreeing to the "united action" proposal. Therefore, it was a matter of common knowledge, all the world knew, that if there should be a breakdown of the Geneva talks then the British and the French were prepared to go ahead with us on the program of "united action" which we had announced in advance.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did that program in any way imply the possible use of atomic bombardment of South China in the event they moved into Indochina with their troops?

A. It involved, if necessary, a common military effort there with whatever weapons would be appropriate.

Q. Sir, this article is embargoed until 6 o'clock. Are your answers likewise embargoed?

A. I am sorry someone didn't tell me that first. I would think not.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the same article—

A. Just a minute. I have just learned that the article is embargoed until 6 o'clock; so I think I had better not answer any more questions about it, particularly as I have not read it yet.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Senator George said Monday [January 9] in a radio interview that President Eisenhower's illness has contributed greatly to the lack of success in our foreign policy in the last 4 months. Do you agree with that?

A. Well, if you were quoting what I read, he did not say that.

Q. Well, I was there and heard him.

A. I see. Well, I suggest you check what you have just said against what Senator George was reported in the press as having said. He made no reference that I can recall at all to the lack of success of our foreign policy.

Q. He called it a lack of positive attitude and an unhappy situation.

A. Well, now, you are using different words.

Q. Well, he said all three things.

A. According to what I read, and I read the full transcript of the newscast, he did not say all three things.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it true that a decision had been made to bomb Manchuria and to use atomic bombs in Korea if the Korean truce negotiations had broken down?

A. I assume, when you are going into back history of this kind, it is because it has been revived by this article perhaps. If so, I prefer not to answer it.

Q. I didn't mention the article.

A. It's this sudden interest in what took place

[9] *Ibid.*, Apr. 26, 1954, p. 622.

2 or 3 years ago that makes me a little questioning of the background of your question.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is there any reason why the answers to the questions should not be embargoed until 6 o'clock, when the article is for release?

A. Did you ask me why the answers should not be embargoed until the article comes out?

Q. I think the point, sir, here is that here is an article that quotes you as stating positions by this Government on historical developments of great importance, and all we are trying to do is find out whether those statements are right, not to get ahead of the article. The questions could be embargoed until the article came out.

A. Well, I will have to leave the verdict on that to people who know the technical etiquette in these matters better than I do. I don't know whether it's inappropriate to answer these questions. As I say, I answered them in innocence, not knowing that the article was embargoed.

Q. Well, would you make an embargoed answer to my question, sir?

A. No. I'm not going to talk any more about the article until I have read it.

Soviet Criticism of President

Q. Mr. Secretary, how would you interpret the fact that Khrushchev in his speech to the Supreme Soviet attacked President Eisenhower personally for the first time in a long time?

A. Well, I interpret it as a recognition by the Soviet rulers that they cannot carry out the policy which they themselves have adopted in the Near East and South Asia and at the same time try to maintain the good relations to which they pretended at the Geneva "summit" conference; and that since those two things are irreconcilable, they prefer to get what may be the internal benefits of a criticism of President Eisenhower, perhaps particularly because of what President Eisenhower has said at that conference—but more particularly since that conference—with reference to the situation of the Eastern European countries which are under Soviet rule. That appears to be a point about which they are particularly sensitive. I think that the President's speech in Philadelphia on August 25 [24][10] aroused a considerable feeling on the Soviet side because of its interpretation of the Geneva conference as reflecting a desire to have a dynamic peace which would pursue justice, and which mentioned the freedom of the Eastern European countries as part of that program.

Q. Mr. Secretary, before we break up, I'm sure there will be some confusion about just where we stand on this embargoing business—could you give the ruling now? Is what you said for the record as of now?

A. It seems to me, while perhaps it was regrettable that I answered these questions, in view of the fact that the article is embargoed, which I did not know, that after all it's perhaps best to let the thing stand as it is and not treat anything I have said today as embargoed.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you take some steps to let us know in the near future whether or not you did in fact say the statements attributed to you in this article?

A. Well, I expose myself to you as nearly as I can every week.

Q. Rather than wait a whole week to determine whether or not you believe that was attributed to you in this article.

A. Well, if I spent all of my time reporting on the accuracy of everything that is said in the press about me, I would be very fully occupied. If there are any particular statements here that would seem to me to be of such momentous significance they ought to be confirmed or corrected, I would do so.

Discussions on Middle East

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is a lot of interest in Cairo as to whether Ambassador Byroade has come back here to give you what the Egyptians regard as new ideas on what our policy in the Middle East should be. Can you throw any light on that interest?

A. Well, Ambassador Byroade came back here to give us a more understanding report than can be done by cable with reference to our relations

[10] *Ibid.*, Sept. 5, 1955, p. 375.

with Egypt, our problems there, some of which relate to the Aswan Dam proposals, some of which relate to the Egyptian attitude toward the Baghdad Pact, and things of that order. We like to have personal reports wherever we can because it is possible to make them much more understanding and fuller than even a very carefully drawn dispatch.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you get the impression that Red China is trying to break off the Johnson-Wang talks at Geneva?

A. I do not have that impression, although there has been a disappointing failure to do some of the things which would make the talks useful, notably to give the Americans in China the right expeditiously to return.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in order to round out this Middle Eastern picture, could you tell us whether you propose discussing any formula for the settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute with the British delegation when they come here at the end of the month?

A. I have no doubt that that topic will be one of the topics, one of the principal topics, of discussion at that time. Whether they have a formula or not, I don't know. Our own views remain very much as set forth in my speech of August 26.[11]

Tariff Concessions to Norway

Press release 18 dated January 13

In accordance with the provisions of the Protocol for the Accession of Japan to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,[1] U.S. concessions to countries other than Japan in connection with the negotiations for Japan's accession will be made effective 30 days after such countries notify the Executive Secretary of the general agreement that their concessions to Japan are being placed in effect.

On December 17, 1955, the Norwegian Government gave notification of intention to apply the concessions contained in its schedule to the Protocol. Accordingly the United States will on January 16, 1956, apply the concessions initially negotiated with Norway. The items affected are:

Item designation	*Description*
301 [Identified only as to the matter related to the rate of 56¼¢ per ton].	Iron in pigs and iron kentlege.
717 (c)	Fish, dried and unsalted, other than cod, haddock, hake, pollock, and cusk (except shark fins).
702 (a) (2)	Herring, whole or beheaded, but not further advanced, if hard dry-smoked.

The President has notified the Secretary of the Treasury of the effective date for the concessions to Norway.

Memorandum for the Secretary of the Treasury

Reference is made to my proclamation of July 22, 1955 carrying out the Protocol of Terms of Accession by Japan to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

On December 17 Norway gave to the Executive Secretary to the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement the notification referred to in paragraph 3 of the Protocol for the accession of Japan, of intention to apply on January 16, 1956 concessions which it had negotiated initially with Japan. Accordingly, pursuant to the procedure described in Part I (b) (1) of the above-mentioned proclamation, I hereby notify you that items 301 [identified only as to the matter related to the rate of 56¼¢ per ton], 717 (c), and 720 (a) (2) in Part I of Schedule XX to the said Protocol shall not be withheld pursuant to paragraph 4 of the said Protocol on or after January 16, 1956.

Seminar on International Problems for Representatives of NATO

In support of the NATO Cultural Relations Program, Oxford University is organizing a special summer Seminar on Problems of International Organization with special reference to NATO, which will be held in England next July at St. Anthony's College, Oxford. The 2-week seminar is designed to help persons from each of the member states of NATO to understand the work of vari-

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 378.

[1] BULLETIN of June 27, 1955, p. 1053.

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ous international bodies and the problems and issues—political, economic, administrative, legal, and cultural—which arise in their work.

Among those who already have accepted invitations to lecture at the seminar are Ambassador John C. Dreier, U.S. Representative to the Council of the Organization of American States; Sir Oliver Franks, former British Ambassador to the United States; Lord Ismay, Secretary General of NATO; Jean Monnet, former Director of the European Coal and Steel Community; and Sir David Kelly, former British Ambassador to the U.S.S.R.

Membership of the seminar will be restricted to approximately 50 persons, representing all the member states. To assure appropriate participation by the United States in this seminar, the Department of State has secured the cooperation of the Conference Board of Associated Research Councils, which will obtain nominations. Panels of nominees will be forwarded in February 1956 to the NATO Sponsoring Committee for final selection.

Prospects for Expanding Spanish-American Trade

by John Lodge
Ambassador to Spain [1]

This evening I would like to discuss certain aspects of the Spanish economic situation, in particular, the prospects for expansion of trade between our two countries. In the past few years visible trade between Spain and the United States has, as you are aware, been rather limited, usually averaging in the neighborhood of $50 million worth of imports from Spain and $70–80 million worth of exports to Spain, with the difference being offset to a large extent by the spending of American tourists. Spain would like to import much more American goods but has for a number of years been faced with an extreme shortage of foreign exchange, and the levels of imports from the United States have been limited by the availability of dollars. The basic reason for this situation is that Spain is a poor country whose economic development has been retarded by the scars of her 3-year civil war, by the effects of the Second World War, and by the shortage of foreign exchange which made it impossible for her to import necessary machinery and materials which would permit her to make the economic advances she desires.

The situation, however, has improved markedly in the course of the past 5 years. This is partly due to two good crop years in 1950 and 1951, but of particular importance recently has been U.S. economic assistance, both in the form of Export-Import Bank loans and direct economic assistance furnished as a result of the military and economic agreements which were signed in September of 1953.[2] Spain has also been an important market for our surplus agricultural commodities. Sales of these commodities to Spain have been part of our economic program in that country and have contributed importantly to the Spanish effort to overcome crises caused by crop failures. Our economic program is giving the Spanish economy a lift and is helping to put it in a position, for the first time in 25 years, where it is not living on a strictly hand-to-mouth basis and can make some plans as to the best use of its not inconsiderable resources.

In assessing the progress which has been made in Spain and the role of our help, we must fully realize the importance of the efforts which Spain has made in the past and is now making to help herself. The Spaniards are a hard-working people, and they have made advances in the past 10 years which I consider truly impressive. Even

[1] Address made before the Spanish-American Board of Trade, New York, N. Y., on Jan. 5.

[2] BULLETIN of Oct. 5, 1953, p. 435.

more important, perhaps, is the fact that the Spaniards have developed concrete programs to improve key deficient sectors of their economy and are moving as fast as they possibly can to achieve these objectives. Through their own efforts and with our assistance, Spain has developed her industry and agriculture to the point where, in a very few years, she should have overcome the worst effects of her dependence on a dry climate which, in years of drought, not only retards economic development but sets it back to a significant degree.

I think I should mention here one aspect of our cooperative efforts in the industrial area which has an interesting potential. For the past century Spain's industrial progress has lagged behind that of other European countries. An important cause of this is the inadequacy of power and power-generating resources, such as coal, water, and petroleum. The keenness now being manifested in official Spanish circles in the possible utilization of atomic energy for generation of electric power is sharpened by their desire to try to make up through atomic energy some of the ground lost. On our part, we have been doing all we can to help the Spaniards move ahead in this field. Our two Governments signed an agreement last summer under which the United States will assist Spain in designing and fueling an experimental nuclear reactor.[3] One element of this assistance provides training for Spanish technicians in the U.S. in operating a reactor; some of them are here now. The most recent development in our cooperative effort in this field took place just prior to my departure from Madrid when I had the privilege of presenting an extensive atomic-energy technical library to the Spanish Nuclear Energy Board on behalf of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Our cooperation on atomic-energy matters with the Spaniards is much appreciated by them, and I look forward to future progress in this area in Spain.

These advances in the Spanish economy are important to American business because I believe that the outlook for expanding trade between Spain and the United States is good, particularly if certain obstacles can be removed. In reaching this conclusion, I have had in mind several important positive factors.

[3] *Ibid.*, June 20, 1955, p. 1018.

Significance for American Business

First, the Spaniards have been cooperating closely with us for the past 2 years in working out the military and economic programs agreed upon in the 1953 accords. Contacts between Americans and Spaniards are increasing rapidly, and they welcome us in their country. In addition to the more than a quarter of a million American tourists who visited Spain in the past year, other Americans are there working on the base construction program, and more American businessmen than ever are now in Spain.

Second, with only limited U.S. assistance, Spain's economy should continue to expand and strengthen in the next few years, and this in itself provides a climate for a greater exchange of goods.

Third, under our technical exchange program, American experts are working with Spanish technicians to stimulate increased production in a number of key sectors of the Spanish economy, such as industry, agriculture, transportation, and mining. The essence of this program is to make available to Spain new developments in production and marketing—not only technical processes but concepts of organization and management relations. Such concepts when put into practice can promote the better use of present facilities as well as the maximum output from new investments. One of the principal means which we are using to make these new methods available to more people is the arrangement of visits to the United States of technicians from other countries, and visits to cooperating countries by American experts. There is strong interest in technical exchange in Spain, and the program is, I think, being successfully carried out. Spanish business leaders and executives in a number of industries have visited the United States to observe our production and managerial methods, and many more will be coming in the course of the next few years. These officials have shown a receptivity to American ideas and will welcome American goods.

Problems Which Must Be Solved

While my optimism remains untempered, there are some real problems which must be solved if the full possibilities of expanding Spanish-American trade are to be realized. Spain needs more capital goods and a greater flexibility in her foreign exchange reserve situation. These cannot be pro-

vided entirely from U.S. economic aid because of our own budgetary and fiscal problems. A mutually beneficial way by means of which some of Spain's requirements could be met is through American private investment. Good business opportunities exist in Spain, and several American companies have during the past year established themselves there, usually in partnership with Spanish interests. At the same time, there are other American businessmen who are hesitant to invest in Spain because of certain obstacles which they have encountered, including difficulties in the transfer of earnings.

This problem is further complicated by a backlog of accumulated blocked peseta earnings. We must remember that the Spanish Government has had a severe shortage of foreign exchange and that it felt that priority had to be given to absolutely essential imports before allowing the blocked peseta accounts to be converted to dollars. There is, however, reason to expect that this situation will improve. One of the provisions of the 1953 Spanish-American economic aid pact included Spain's agreement to work out with us the liquidation of previous earnings which were blocked and the establishment of a regular system for the transfer of future earnings. Certainly there is ample evidence of the steady improvement in the Spanish economic situation during the past year, including its holdings of foreign exchange, and this helps put Spain in a financial situation where she is able to meet the blocked peseta problem without seriously endangering her economic stability.

Another barrier which makes American potential investors reluctant to invest in Spain is the limitations which are now placed by Spanish legislation on the degree of foreign ownership of new manufacturing enterprises. While I can report no specific progress on this question, Spanish officials are certainly aware that American investments would be increased if these restrictions were loosened, and I am hopeful that this can be accomplished in the not too distant future. Expanding American investments in Spain would strengthen the tie between the economies of our two countries and would therefore stimulate the expansion of Spanish-American trade. The importance and desirability of increasing trade between Spain and the United States is recognized at the highest levels of the Spanish Government. Last spring, General Franco sent a special message in this sense to American businessmen in the course of an interview which was published in *U.S. News and World Report*. The Chief of State said:

> We want to increase the purchasing power of the Spaniards so as to multiply and intensify all trade. In this sense we believe that at this moment financiers and promoters of enterprise from the United States have a very vast field for collaboration with us.

The Human Factor

In conclusion, I would like to mention a human factor. Americans who are now in Spain are coming in close contact with the Spanish people at all levels, from high Government officials to the most modest worker. There is a real enthusiasm in Spain for things American, and this is the fundamental basis for my feeling that we can look forward to a period of closer understanding and expanding trade between the United States and Spain. Another important factor is the general attitude of Spanish Government officials and their businesslike approach to commercial and economic problems. I was particularly impressed by a speech made by Minister of Commerce Arburúa last month, in which he noted the improvement of the economy and stated that it was necessary that the "ways of commerce be brought back into their traditional channels, to those classic formulas which base commercial prosperity on the rise in volume of sales at reasonable margins in place of restrictive sales at excessively high profits."

As for the contribution which can be made by you gentlemen, members of the Spanish-American Board of Trade, I want to say again how important I think is the work of this organization. You are already playing an important role in improving overall relations between Spain and the United States, as well as stimulating greater trade between the two countries, and I am sure you will find greater tangible rewards in the future.

In this connection, it is my opinion that too many of our citizens feel that foreign policy is something removed from them and limited to officials in Washington and our diplomatic representatives abroad. In this day of rapid transport and communications, and with an unstable international situation to consider, this is a grave oversight. More than ever before in history, foreign relations have become joined with domestic relations and are, therefore, the concern of each and every one.

The continuance of good Spanish-American relations is a task to which Americans and Spaniards alike should set themselves. An indication of the state of our relations with Spain may be seen in the fact that the Spanish people have contributed recently 1,335,000 pesetas to American flood relief. I am proud and deeply touched by this entirely spontaneous display of friendship and sympathy for our people.

As you know, I have spent the past month here in consultation with officials of the Department of State and other Government agencies, and I return to my post in Madrid within a few days. I look forward with enthusiasm to resuming my duties as Ambassador because I feel that it is not only a unique opportunity for public service but that the alliance we are building with Spain is on firm ground. Prospects for the future are most encouraging for both Spaniards and Americans.

Spain today is playing a more active role in international affairs. The Spanish Government is a dependable ally. It is heartening to see our relationships developing so closely. In my day-to-day association with Spaniards themselves, I have been impressed by the forward-looking enthusiasm with which they welcome military and economic cooperation with us.

Although not a wealthy country, Spain today is a vigorous nation on the march which is making a determined effort to raise the living standards of her people. Any assistance that we can give to bolster her economic potential—and I know of no better one than the encouragement of trade—is a contribution not only to Spain but to our own national safety and that of the anti-Communist nations whose leadership we have assumed.

We can be thankful, gentlemen, that in the present divided and troubled world we have on our side a friend and ally which shares our resistance to Soviet communism and which supports the cause of international peace.

Revisions in Passport Regulations

Press release 16 dated January 12

The Department of State on January 12 made public certain revisions in regulations pertaining to the issuance of United States passports. The amendments to the regulations are designed to provide formalized hearing procedures for all persons who may be denied passport facilities. Except for refusals due to lack of citizenship or general area restrictions, anyone whose application for a passport is denied is entitled to receive a statement of reasons and may appeal to the Board of Passport Appeals.

The Department noted that these revisions are of an interim nature, pending an overall study of the Department's policy and procedures in this field and the outcome of certain cases in the courts.

Amendments to Code of Federal Regulations

TITLE 22—FOREIGN RELATIONS [1]
Chapter I—Department of State
Part 51—Passports
Miscellaneous Amendments

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by Paragraph 126 of Executive Order No. 7856, issued on March 31, 1938 (3 F.R. 687, 22 C.F.R. 51.77), under authority of section 1 of the Act of Congress approved July 3, 1926 (44 Stat. 887, 22 U.S.C. 211a), the regulations issued on August 28, 1952 (Departmental Regulation 108.162, 17 F.R. 8013, 22 C.F.R. 51.135 through 51.143) are hereby amended by revision of sections 51.136 and 51.143, as follows:

§ 51.136 *Limitations on issuance of passports to certain other persons.* In order to promote and safeguard the interests of the United States, passport facilities, except for direct and immediate return to the United States, will be refused to a person when it appears to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State that the person's activities abroad would: (1) violate the laws of the United States; (2) be prejudicial to the orderly conduct of foreign relations; or (3) otherwise be prejudicial to the interests of the United States.

§ 51.143 *Applicability of Sections 51.137–51.142.* Except for action taken by reason of noncitizenship or geographical limitations of general applicability necessitated by foreign policy considerations, the provisions of §§51.137–51.142 shall apply in any case where the person affected takes issue with the action of the Secretary in granting, refusing, restricting, withdrawing, canceling, revoking, extending, renewing or in any other fashion or degree affecting the ability of such person to receive or use a passport.

Dated: *January 10, 1956.*
For the Secretary of State:
LOY W. HENDERSON
Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

[1] 21 *Fed. Reg.* 336.

Third Progress Report on the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT EISENHOWER TO THE CONGRESS [1]

To the Congress of the United States:

I transmit herewith the third semi-annual report on activities under Public Law 480, 83d Congress, as amended, showing operations under the Act during the period July 1, 1955, to December 31, 1955.

The administrative arrangements governing the responsibilities of the various agencies of the Executive Branch of the Government established by Executive Order 10560 of September 9, 1954,[2] continue to function satisfactorily. I believe they have proved effective in accomplishing the purposes of this law.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

THE WHITE HOUSE,
January 12, 1956.

Introduction

The first and second progress reports [3] on the disposal of United States surplus agricultural commodities under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (Public Law 480, 83rd Congress) covered the fiscal year 1955. This report deals with activities under the several Public Law 480 programs during the first six months of fiscal year 1956. During the period covered by this report the Act was amended by Public Law 387, 84th Congress, 1st Session to change the authorized amount under Title I from $700 million to $1,500 million.[4]

[1] H. Doc. 294, 84th Cong., 2d sess.; transmitted on Jan. 12.
[2] BULLETIN of Oct. 4, 1954, p. 501.
[3] *Ibid.*, Jan. 31, 1955, p. 200, and Aug. 1, 1955, p. 197.
[4] For the President's statement on signing P. L. 387, see *ibid.*, Aug. 29, 1955, p. 362.

Summary

During the period July–December 1955, programming under the three Titles of the Act totaled $491 million, bringing to $1,692 million the total amount of programs since the beginning of operations under this Act.

Agreements for the sale of agricultural commodities for foreign currency under Title I total $679 million at Ccc [Commodity Credit Corporation] cost,[5] of which $211 million represents agreements signed during the period covered by this report. Shipments made or authorized for famine relief and other assistance abroad under Title II of the Act total $141 million at Ccc cost of which $32 million was authorized during this period. Donations for domestic distribution and for foreign relief through non-profit voluntary agencies and intergovernmental organizations under Title III of the Act amount to $539 million at Ccc cost of which $197 million were donated during this period. Barter contracts under Title III total $333 million at export market value, of which $51 million represents contracts entered into during this period.

Although the figures cited for the different programs are not comparable the amounts shown above give an indication of the value of commodities being moved or committed under these programs.

(*Continued on page 132*)

[5] As used in this report Ccc cost represents the cost of commodities to Commodity Credit Corporation, including investment, processing, handling and other costs. Export market value reflects the price at which these commodities are sold to foreign buyers under the program. The export market value figures are less than the Ccc cost for those commodities for which special export programs have been developed for dollar as well as foreign currency sales to meet competition in international trade. [Footnote in the original.]

TABLE I

AGREEMENTS SIGNED JULY–DECEMBER 1955 UNDER TITLE I, PUBLIC LAW 480

Country	Date signed	Commodity composition	Market value	Ccc cost
			(*Thousands of dollars*)	
Argentina	Dec. 21, 1955	Edible oils	24, 700	24, 700
		Ocean transportation	600	600
		Total	25, 300	25, 300
Brazil	Nov. 16, 1955	Wheat and wheat flour	32, 100	60, 600
		Feed grains	3, 010	5, 100
		Tobacco	250	250
		Fats and oils	1, 790	1, 790
		Ocean transportation	4, 070	4, 070
		Total	41, 220	71, 810
Colombia	Dec. 20, 1955	Wheat	3, 400	5, 800
		Cotton	6, 000	6, 000
		Edible oils	1, 500	1, 500
		Ocean transportation	700	700
		Total	11, 600	14, 000
Ecuador	Oct. 7, 1955	Wheat	1, 100	1, 859
		Cotton	925	925
		Tobacco	210	210
		Fats and oils	1, 515	1, 515
		Ocean transportation	270	270
		Total	4, 020	4, 779
Egypt	Dec. 14, 1955	Wheat	4, 800	9, 900
		Ocean transportation	800	800
		Total	5, 600	10, 700
France	Aug. 11, 1955	Tobacco	650	650
		Ocean transportation	----------	----------
		Total	650	650
Germany	Dec. 23, 1955	Poultry	1, 128	1, 128
		Ocean transportation	72	72
		Total	1, 200	1, 200
Israel	Nov. 10, 1955	Wheat	5, 900	12, 035
		Feed grains	3, 200	5, 221
		Cotton	1, 500	1, 500
		Tobacco	200	200
		Fats and oils	2, 200	2, 200
		Dairy products	1, 460	2, 346
		Dry edible beans	280	320
		Ocean transportation	2, 300	2, 300
		Total	17, 040	26, 122
Peru	Sept. 20, 1955	Fats and oils	3, 000	3, 000
		Ocean transportation	320	320
		Total	3, 320	3, 320
Spain	Oct. 20, 1955	Fats and oils	10, 000	10, 000
		Ocean transportation	622	622
		Total	10, 622	10, 622

TABLE I—Continued

AGREEMENTS SIGNED JULY–DECEMBER 1955 UNDER TITLE I, PUBLIC LAW 480—Continued

Country	Date signed	Commodity composition	Market value	Ccc cost
			(*Thousands of dollars*)	
Yugoslavia	Oct. 1, 1955	Wheat	17, 900	37, 908
		Ocean transportation	4, 260	4, 260
		Total	22, 160	42, 168
		Total, agreements signed July–December 1955	142, 732	210, 671

(*Continued from page 130*)

Title I—Foreign Currency Sales

AGREEMENTS SIGNED

A total of 11 agreements, involving a Ccc cost of approximately $211 million, were signed during the period July–December 1955. The countries with which these agreements were signed, the dates of signing, commodity composition, market value and Ccc cost are shown in Table I. The commodity composition, market value, and Ccc cost of all agreements signed during the 18-month period ending December 31, 1955 are shown in Table II.

RELATIONSHIPS TO USUAL MARKETINGS

In accordance with the provision of Title I requiring reasonable safeguards that sales of agricultural commodities for foreign currencies shall not displace our usual marketings or be unduly disruptive of world market prices, appropriate assurances have been obtained from governments with which agreements have been negotiated. Also, sales for foreign currencies under Title I have been made at the price level at which these commodities have been available for export sales for dollars.

CURRENCY USES

Under agreements signed thus far in fiscal year 1956 the dollar values of planned foreign currency uses for the eight purposes specified in section 104 of the Act are shown in Table III.

Major currency use activities initiated through December 31, 1955 (related primarily to fiscal year 1955 programs) are discussed below.

Agricultural Market Development—Special emphasis is being given to establishing productive uses of currencies for development of markets for agricultural commodities (Section 104 (a)). Foreign currencies equivalent to about 13 million dollars are earmarked for this activity in agreements signed as of December 31, 1955. Projects

TABLE II

COMMODITY COMPOSITION OF ALL AGREEMENTS SIGNED DURING THE 18-MONTH PERIOD ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1955

Commodity	Approximate quantity	Market value	Ccc cost
		(*Millions of dollars*)	
Wheat and wheat flour.	87 million bushels*	149. 7	279. 8
Feed grains	811 thousand metric tons**.	45. 3	69. 9
Rice	2 million hundredweights.	14. 5	21. 2
Cotton	697 thousand bales	133. 5	133. 5
Tobacco	59 million pounds	39. 1	39. 1
Dairy products	58 million pounds	8. 0	12. 8
Edible oils	462 million pounds	67. 0	75. 8
Poultry	3 million pounds	1. 1	1. 1
Dry edible beans	22 thousand hundredweights.	0. 3	0. 3
Total commodities.		458. 5	633. 5
Ocean transportation.		45. 2	45. 2
Total, including ocean transportation.		503. 7	678. 7

*Wheat equivalent.
**Includes 110 thousand M. T. programed for feed grains and/or wheat.

now under way or being planned include commodity promotion; promoting better nutrition; two-way visits of foreign buyers and specialists to increase familiarity with our products and the advantages of U.S. marketing and grading systems; promotion of agricultural exhibits at foreign trade fairs; education and demonstration campaigns aimed at more effective handling and use of U.S. commodities; market analyses; and the establishment of trade centers.

TABLE III

PLANNED USES OF FOREIGN CURRENCY UNDER AGREEMENTS SIGNED DURING JULY–DECEMBER 1955

	Million dollars equivalent	Percent of total
Agricultural market development (Sec. 104 (a))	4.52	3.2
Purchase of strategic material (Sec. 104 (b))	1.00	0.7
Common Defense (Sec. 104 (c))	19.94	14.0
Purchase of goods for other countries (Sec. 104 (d))	2.06	1.4
Grants for multilateral trade and economic development (Sec. 104 (e))	-------	-------
Payment of United States obligations (Sec. 104 (f))	30.72	21.5
Loans for multilateral trade and economic development (Sec. 104 (g))	82.40	57.7
International educational exchange (Sec. 104 (h))	2.09	1.5
Total signed agreements	142.73	100.0

A cotton promotion project involving education and demonstration, advertising, and exhibits is now under way in Italy. Agricultural commodity and demonstration exhibits were put on at the Bogotá, Colombia, trade fair, and participation in other fairs at Osaka and London is being considered. Arrangements are being made for tobacco buyers from Thailand to visit tobacco centers here.

These market development projects are carried on in close cooperation with the United States private trade. Wherever practicable, agreements are entered into with trade groups to develop and carry out the projects.

Defense Housing—In negotiating Title I agreements a major effort has been made to program local currency proceeds for family housing for U.S. military personnel stationed in foreign countries. Such currency use was authorized by Public Law 161, 84th Congress.

Under agreements negotiated to date a total of $50.2 million in foreign currencies has been programmed for this purpose. Of this amount the equivalent of $15 million is being used in the United Kingdom for family housing. Construction of this housing is expected to begin shortly. The balance of the $50.2 million which is expected to be committed during the next few months is distributed as follows: Japan, $17 million; Spain, $8 million; Finland, $4.8 million; Italy, $3.5 million; Austria, $1.9 million.

Loans—The Act provides that loans of local currency proceeds accruing from sales of surplus agricultural commodities under P.L. 480 shall be made through established banking facilities of the foreign countries or in any other appropriate manner to promote multilateral trade and economic development. Strategic materials, services, foreign currencies or dollars may be accepted in payment of the loans.

Negotiations to conclude loan agreements are conducted by U.S. representatives with foreign governments. The agreements specify terms and conditions of repayment, etc., which have been developed in consultation with the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Fiscal Problems. The Export-Import Bank acts as agent of the U.S. Government in executing the agreements and servicing the loans.

Up to December 31, 1955, loan agreements with four countries had been signed providing for local currency loans of the equivalent of $80.03 million. These include Israel, 7.4 million dollar equivalent; Japan 59.5; Peru 2.63; Spain 10.5. Negotiations are under way to carry out the loan provisions of other surplus commodity sales agreements.

Programs for the utilization of loan funds are usually developed jointly by the foreign government concerned and the United States. The most important emphasis in the expansion of economic development programs through loans of local currency generated by P.L. 480 sales continues to be placed upon projects designed to increase purchasing power and standards of living abroad.

Programs for use of $69.3 million equivalent of local currency loans have been approved for three countries. About 85 percent of the $59.5 million of yen loaned to Japan will be used to finance the local currency cost of additional power facilities. About $8.3 million of yen will be utilized for irrigation and reclamation work in



Northern Honshu and Hokkaido. $2.3 million equivalent of Peruvian soles have been released to help finance a project in Northern Peru to irrigate land primarily for production of tropical crops. About $4.7 million equivalent of Israeli pounds will be used to finance irrigation and development of power facilities in that country. Discussions are under way with other countries on appropriate projects for which loan funds may be used.

International Educational Exchange—Substantially all the agreements negotiated in the period covered by this report have provided for the use of some of the local currency proceeds in international educational exchange programs under Section 104 (h) of the Act. Funds were also provided for this purpose in the agreements negotiated in the fiscal year 1955. Arrangements are being made with the Governments of Chile, Peru and Turkey for three-year programs utilizing such proceeds. Programs are also in active preparation for Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Spain and Thailand.

COMMODITY SHIPMENTS

The first shipments under this program were made in January 1955. Since that time shipments have totalled about 2½ million tons. Approximately 71 percent (by value) of the commodities authorized under all Title I agreements had been exported as of December 31, 1955, and about 80 percent of the total value excluding cotton had been exported by that date. Cotton has moved slowly because of price difficulties, so that only about 53 percent of the cotton programmed has been exported to date. Substantially all shipments of commodities other than cotton covered by agreements signed in the first year of the program have been completed.

The monthly tonnage of all commodities shipped through December 31, 1955, under Title I agreements is shown in the accompanying chart.

Title II—Famine Relief and Other Assistance

Title II of the Act provides that up to $300 million worth of surplus agricultural commodities held by the Commodity Credit Corporation may

be used over a three year period to provide assistance to friendly peoples in meeting famine or other urgent relief requirements.

During the six months covered by this report, transfers of about $32 million (Ccc cost) of surplus commodities were authorized to eight countries. Programs include expansion of a school lunch program in Italy, and transfers of commodities to meet relief requirements in the Near and Far East and Latin America. Commodities include about $11 million of nonfat dry milk, $5 million rice, $11 million of wheat and corn, $3 million fats and oils and about $1 million each of dry beans and raw cotton. The eight countries and the Ccc cost of the commodities, in millions of dollars, are: Italy, $17.4; Libya, $0.8; India, $3.5; Pakistan, $6.6; Cambodia, $2.5; Guatemala, $0.5; Costa Rica, $0.2; British Honduras, $0.3.

Programs authorized since the beginning of the program under Title II total $141.2 million (Ccc cost). Commodities included are $97 million grain, $18 million fats and oils, $15 million milk and milk products, $7 million raw cotton, and over $3 million dry beans.

Title III

Title III of the Act covers donations for domestic use and for distribution abroad by nonprofit voluntary agencies and intergovernmental organizations, as well as Ccc barter activities.

Section 302, Domestic Donations—The volume of surplus foods donated to school lunch programs and needy persons in this country during July–December 1955 was 20 percent larger than the volume distributed in the corresponding period in 1954. Manufactured dairy products, dry beans and rice were available during the entire six-month period under the Section 302 authority. In December, wheat and corn were added under this authority for distribution to schools and other eligible domestic outlets.

Section 302, Foreign Donations—Table V shows the quantity and value of commodities approved for foreign donation through nonprofit voluntary agencies and intergovernmental organizations during July–December 1955 under this authority. This is an increase of over 90 percent as compared with the same period of fiscal year 1955.

On December 12, wheat, corn, dry beans and rice were added to the list of surplus commodities available for foreign donations under this authority. This action is one of a series of steps taken to increase further the utilization of surplus foods in this country and abroad.

TABLE IV

COMMODITIES DONATED TO DOMESTIC RECIPIENTS UNDER PUBLIC LAW 480 JULY–DECEMBER 1955 [1]

Commodity	School lunches	Charitable institutions	Needy persons	Total	Ccc cost
		(*Million pounds*)		(*Million dollars*)	
Butter	28	15	16	59	40.0
Cheese	17	7	20	44	19.0
Nonfat dry milk	15	7	22	44	8.0
Dry beans	6	2	7	15	1.4
Rice	10	5	10	25	3.0
Total					71.4

[1] Based on distribution pattern through October.

TABLE V

COMMODITIES DONATED FOR FOREIGN RELIEF THROUGH NON-PROFIT VOLUNTARY AGENCIES AND INTER-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS JULY–DECEMBER 1955

Commodity	Million pounds	Million dollars Ccc cost
Nonfat dry milk	206.3	39.2
Butter	45.0	28.8
Cheese	60.1	24.6
Butter oil	38.4	33.4
Total		126.0

Section 303, Barter—This section strengthens and reemphasizes prior barter legislation contained in the Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act of 1948, as amended, and in the Agricultural Act of 1949. It directs the Secretary of Agriculture to use every practicable means to expedite the exchange of Ccc-owned agricultural commodities for less-costly-to-store strategic materials and other materials, goods, and equipment needed by U.S. Government Agencies. Agencies of the United States Government procuring such materials, goods, or equipment are directed to cooperate with the Secretary of Agriculture.

In operation, barter is effected through contracts between Ccc and private U.S. business firms

TABLE VI

COMPARISON OF BARTER CONTRACTS ENTERED INTO IN SPECIFIED PERIODS [1]

Materials	1949–50 through 1953–54		1954–55		July–Dec. 1955 [2]	
	Mil. dol.	Percent	Mil. dol.	Percent	Mil. dol.	Percent
Strategic:						
Minimum stockpile	71. 8	67	5. 7	2	0. 4	1
Long term stockpile	----------	--------	152. 8	54	15. 9	31
Supplemental stockpile type [3]	----------	--------	100. 9	36	32. 8	64
Total strategic	71. 8	67	259. 4	92	49. 1	96
Supply: [4]						
ICA	28. 4	26	22. 4	8	2. 3	4
Defense	7. 4	7	----------	--------	----------	--------
Total supply	35. 8	33	22. 4	8	2. 3	4
Total	107. 6	100	281. 8	100	51. 4	100

[1] Years beginning July 1.
[2] Incomplete for December.
[3] Acquired and held as assets by CCC using as a guide the ODM supplemental stockpile list for kinds, quantities and specifications.
[4] Nonstrategic materials, goods, and equipment.

which use commercial trade channels in fulfilling these contracts. The contracts call for the delivery of specified materials with payment to be received in CCC-owned agricultural commodities which must subsequently be exported by the contractor. The origin of materials and the destination of agricultural commodities are limited to friendly countries but are not required to be identical. Materials are valued at not to exceed current market prices when the offer is accepted and agricultural commodities are valued at prevailing CCC export prices applicable to export sales when commodities are taken by the contractor. Contracts generally run for a period of up to two years.

Barter contracts entered into during July–De-

TABLE VII

AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES EXPORTED THROUGH BARTER IN SPECIFIED PERIODS [1]

Commodities	Unit	1949–50 through 1953–54	1954–55	July–December 1955 [2]		
				Under all contracts	1954–55 contracts	1955–56 contracts
		Quantities in 1,000 units				
Wheat	bu	33, 445	46, 261	28, 100	26, 945	1, 155
Corn	bu	9, 388	4, 381	42, 561	29, 648	12, 913
Grain sorghums	cwt	990	4, 725	15, 821	12, 906	2, 915
Barley	bu	----------	5, 244	25, 213	21, 230	3, 983
Cottonseed oil	lb	4, 630	19, 687	14, 434	14, 434	----------
Others [3]	M. T	33	54	194	162	32
Total value (*mil. dollars*)	----------	107. 6	124. 6	167. 4	138. 5	28. 9

[1] Year beginning July 1.
[2] December partly estimated.
[3] Includes oats, flaxseed, rye, cotton, dried skim milk, rice, linseed oil, cottonseed meal, soybeans, tobacco, and peanuts.

TABLE VIII

VALUE OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY EXPORTS BY DESTINATION, 1954–55 AGAINST 1954–55 BARTER CONTRACTS [1]

Country	Value (*thousand dollars*)
Austria	937
Belgium	8, 764
Colombia	643
Denmark	412
Egypt	922
France	482
West Germany	15, 501
Greece	10, 983
India	617
Ireland (Eire)	2, 177
Israel	6, 848
Japan	23, 096
Korea	1, 301
Mexico	91
Netherlands	17, 234
Norway	6, 585
Peru	916
Portugal	187
Spain	789
Sweden	432
Switzerland	212
Taiwan (Formosa)	4, 612
Turkey	5, 815
United Kingdom	9, 433
Venezuela	24
Yugoslavia	1, 408
Others [2]	4, 883
Total	124, 604

[1] Year beginning July 1.
[2] Also includes shipments for which documents listing countries of destination have not been processed.

cember 1955 total $51 million. During the same period agricultural commodities exported by contractors, largely against prior contracts, totaled $167 million and materials delivered to Ccc totaled $46 million. The difference in rates of delivery, between materials and agricultural commodities, is covered by cash deposits or irrevocable letters of credit in favor of Ccc.

Barter contracts entered into in the current period were at a lower rate than during the July 1954–June 1955 period but above that for the first five years of the barter program. Table VI compares barter contracts negotiated since the inception of the barter program for these three periods.

Agricultural commodity exports by contractors in fulfillment of barter contracts with Ccc totaled $167 million for the period covered by this report, which represents an all-time high for agricultural exports under barter. However, as may be noted from Table VII, this high export rate resulted primarily from old contracts entered into during the preceding year and cannot be maintained in view of the sharp decrease in new contracts reported above.

A total of 26 different countries received agricultural commodities exported under barter arrangements in the year 1954–55, as shown in Table VIII.

The rate of material deliveries to Ccc by con-

TABLE IX

VALUE OF MATERIALS DELIVERED BY BARTER CONTRACTORS IN SPECIFIED PERIODS [1]

Materials	1949–50 through 1953–54	1954–55	July–December 1955 [2]		
			Under all contracts	1954–55 contracts	1955–56 contracts
	Values in million dollars				
Strategic:					
Minimum stockpile	71. 8	4. 8	0. 9	0. 9	----------
Long-term stockpile	----------	54. 6	29. 4	29. 4	----------
Supplemental stockpile: Type [3]	----------	3. 1	14. 7	13. 1	1. 6
Total strategic	71. 8	61. 5	45. 0	43. 4	1. 6
Supply: [4]					
ICA	28. 4	20. 7	1. 1	1. 1	----------
Defense	7. 4	0. 3	----------	----------	----------
Total supply	35. 8	21. 0	1. 1	1. 1	----------
Total	107. 6	82. 6	46. 1	44. 5	1. 6

[1] Years beginning July 1. [2] Incomplete for December.
[3] Acquired and held as assets by Ccc using as a guide the ODM supplemental stockpile list for kinds, quantities and specifications. [4] Nonstrategic materials, goods, and equipment.

tractors against barter agreements in the report period increased somewhat over the rate for last year. Materials delivered by contractors, except for supplemental type strategic materials, either have been transferred or are scheduled for transfer to other agencies with full reimbursement to Ccc. Under administration policy, supplemental type strategic materials are retained in the Corporation's inventories thereby holding all strategic materials procured through barter off the market. Further, the acquisition of supplemental type strategic materials has been limited to materials within the Office of Defense Mobilization supplemental stockpile list and of a durable nature for which carrying costs are insignificant as compared with the carrying costs for the agricultural commodities exchanged. Materials delivered in the report period compared with deliveries in the preceding year and the first five years of the barter program are indicated in Table IX.

Current Legislation on Foreign Policy:

84th Congress, 1st Session

Importation of Canadian Bonded Labor. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on S. Res. 98. July 21, 22, and 25, 1955. 181 pp.

Human Rights, Domestic Jurisdiction, and the United Nations Charter. Staff Study No. 11 of the Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Committee Print. October 24, 1955. 28 pp.

The Status and Role of the Secretariat of the United Nations. Staff Study No. 12 of the Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Committee Print. November 1, 1955. 23 pp.

Foreign Economic Policy. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report pursuant to Sec. 5 (a) of Public Law 304, 79th Congress. November 9–17, 1955. 620 pp.

Summary of Reports of American Citizens Abroad on Technical Assistance Programs. Staff Study No. 4 of the Subcommittee on Technical Assistance Programs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Committee Print. December 22, 1955. 23 pp.

84th Congress, 2d Session

Message from the President of the United States Transmitting a Report on the State of the Union. H. Doc. 241, January 5, 1956. 16 pp.

Foreign Economic Policy. Report of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report. S. Rept. 1312, January 5, 1956. 33 pp.

Commemorating the 250th Anniversary of the Birth of Benjamin Franklin. Report to accompany H. Con. Res. 199. S. Rept. 1365, January 9, 1956. 2 pp.

Analysis of U.N. Budget for 1956

Statement by Chester E. Merrow
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly [1]

My delegation will support in this plenary session the total appropriation for 1956 voted by the Fifth Committee, but it does so with some reservations.

With the forewarning which we had received as to the necessity for a large supplemental appropriation for 1955 to cover such items as the Geneva Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, it was the expressed hope of my delegation at the outset of the debate in the Fifth Committee that we could keep the 1956 budget to the level recommended by the Advisory Committee, namely, $46,016,000. Instead, the budget approved by the Fifth Committee has reached $48,566,350—an increase of approximately $1,600,000 over the budget which this Assembly approved last year for 1955.

These increases fall largely into four categories of expenditures, i. e., activities related to peaceful uses of atomic energy, technical assistance in the social-welfare and human-rights field, operation of field offices and special missions, and salary adjustments. My delegation in the Budgetary Committee supported important program expansion and some increased expenditures in all of these items except the one relating to salary adjustments. We opposed some of the appropriations voted for program expansion, and we opposed the increase in headquarters cost-of-living allowance. We recognized that changing economic conditions and particularly the increase in United States Federal Government salaries necessitated a reappraisal of the adequacy of the total level of United Nations remuneration. We were opposed to the Secretary-General's proposal for a

[1] Made in plenary session on Dec. 16 (U.S. delegation press release 2325). For a statement by Representative Merrow in Committee V on Oct. 11, see BULLETIN of Oct. 31, 1955, p. 715.

cost-of-living adjustment at this time because, on the basis of prevailing standards in the United Nations and the specialized agencies, there is no present justification for this kind of salary increase.

However, we believe that the establishment of a committee composed of governmental experts to review the salary, allowance, and benefit system in 1956 is a welcome development. Such a review should make it possible to achieve two objectives, namely: (1) to adjust the common remuneration system of the United Nations and the specialized agencies to present-day requirements for attracting and holding a highly qualified multinational staff in positions in all parts of the world and (2) to make these adjustments in a manner which takes adequate account of the responsibilities and financial resources of international organizations and the standards of remuneration in national public services.

In this connection, Mr. President, may I state that the United States Government is not satisfied with the present level of participation by United States nationals in the various international secretariats and technical assistance programs. We trust the recommendations of the committee will be such as to encourage an increased number of United States nationals to seek international employment not only at the United Nations headquarters but also at other international agency centers as well.

While a number of the proposals for additional budgetary increases were resisted by the committee, my delegation was disappointed that the proposals for increased expenditures were not offset to a larger extent by compensating economies. We had hoped, for example, to make some savings by altering the regulations for publication of treaties. Likewise, we had hoped to defer less essential items, such as expenditures for improvement of facilities for conferences and meetings in Geneva.

The net result of all of the financial decisions taken by the Fifth Committee is that the expenditures to be assessed in respect of the 1955 supplemental appropriation and the 1956 budget will total $51,830,550, the largest in United Nations history. (I might add parenthetically that we hope that this Tenth General Assembly will securely hold this dubious distinction unchallenged for many years to come.) The amount of these appropriations is due not only to the increase of $1,600,000 in the 1956 budget to which I have already referred, but also to the coincidental occurrence of unusually high supplemental expenditures in respect of 1955, without the offsetting savings that were available last year. The supplemental items for 1955 include $1,400,000 of the total cost of $2,361,000 for the International Scientific Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy; $1,630,000 representing the last appropriation for reimbursement of national taxes to staff members; and other unforeseen costs relating to such matters as the disarmament meeting in London and the Secretary-General's successful trip in accordance with the General Assembly's directive to obtain the release of 11 United States prisoners and other personnel of the United Nations Command captured in the Korean war.

Basis for United States Support

Despite its concern over the upturn of United Nations expenditures just at the point when we had anticipated stabilization, the United States will support the appropriation recommended by the Fifth Committee for 1956. We do so in recognition of two facts: (1) that the Secretary-General and the General Assembly have, over the past 2 years, made a real effort and considerable progress in reducing the regular budget and (2) that a sizable amount of the increased assessments being voted for 1956 is of a nonrecurring character. My delegation strongly urges, however, that the upward trend of expenditures reflected in the 1956 budgets of not only the United Nations but also the specialized agencies not be considered as establishing a precedent for future years.

In an earlier statement before the Fifth Committee,[2] I expressed the belief that the support of all member governments for the *causes* served by the programs of the United Nations agencies should be sustained and indeed increased. This should not be interpreted, however, as urging increases in the regular budgets. The avenues by which these causes can be served are many. As I indicated in the Fifth Committee, the form of such support, i. e., whether through the regular budgets of international organizations, through international voluntary programs, or through such other forms of intergovernmental cooperation as bilateral programs, will require a continuing assessment of the following factors, among others:

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 717.

(a) whether an international agency can be demonstrated to be the best instrument for meeting the needs which are justifiably the concern of the international community;

(b) the degree to which the members of such an agency are willing to bear an equitable share of the financial burdens entailed in assuming such international responsibilities. It is an inescapable fact that, if the brunt of the costs falls upon a few member states, the undertaking is not truly international and misunderstandings will surely result;

(c) and lastly, whether international assistance will be adequately supported and supplemented by national endeavor.

One further fact that must be continuously borne in mind by member states as well as the Secretariat was pointed out to us by the Secretary-General last year in his annual report. He stated that—

. . . the very nature of the responsibilities that must be assumed by the Secretary-General and his senior staff imposes a limit on the volume of the tasks that can be handled effectively, irrespective of the additional funds, personnel, and facilities that might be placed at their disposal.

All of these factors dictate caution in the expansion by the General Assembly of the permanent establishments and the regular budgets of international organizations. This does not mean that pressing world problems will be neglected by the community of nations represented here and in the specialized agencies; far from it.

Although the sum total of the regular budgets of the United Nations and currently existing specialized agencies for the period 1946 to 1955 inclusive approximates $686 million, an additional amount of more than $1 billion has been contributed to international programs especially designed to provide relief and rehabilitation for refugees, to give technical assistance for economic and social development, and to promote maternal and child welfare. In addition, very material assistance in promoting economic development is provided through the facilities of the International Bank and Monetary Fund. And augmenting all of these efforts are large national programs of assistance such as the United States technical cooperation plan and regional programs such as the Colombo Plan. The value and results which derive from such a flexible, many-pronged approach to these problems cannot be overestimated and should not be jeopardized by premature or unrealistic expansion of the regular budgets and staffs of international organizations.

Improved Budget Procedure

In expressing our hopes regarding the budget to be presented next year, I should also like to mention our interest in seeing the Advisory Committee and the Assembly develop a more simplified form of the budget that will enable the financial control exercised by the Assembly and the Secretary-General to be more effective and will, at the same time, reduce administrative red tape.

We welcome, too, the initiative taken by the distinguished delegate of Denmark [Finn T. B. Friis] in the Fifth Committee in calling our attention to the need for improving the organization and scheduling of the Fifth Committee's work. This led to a fruitful discussion on ways and means of eliminating delays and of facilitating, in particular, the review of the budget and decisions relating thereto.

The Assembly will note in the report of the Fifth Committee that the United States suggested that the agenda of the 11th session of the General Assembly might include an item entitled "General Assembly Procedures for Consideration and Adoption of the Budget." We are pleased that the Secretary-General will give this matter his attention during this next year.

While experience, particularly this year, has shown the need for procedural improvements, I should like to testify to the skill of the chairman of the Fifth Committee. With the difficulties we faced, only the direction of a superb chairman could save us. My delegation believes that we, therefore, owe a special debt of gratitude to Ambassador [Hans] Engen of Norway.

Coordination of U.N. and Agencies

In matters of coordination with the specialized agencies, the decision of the Fifth Committee to support the Secretary-General's request for increases in salaries and in the education allowance was, in our judgment, without sufficient notice to the specialized agencies. This seems a regrettable departure from the repeated emphasis given by the Assembly to the desirability of coordinating administrative policies and practices among the United Nations and the agencies.

On the other hand, the Fifth Committee did recommend that the United Nations offer its assistance to the International Telecommunication Union and World Meteorological Organization in constructing a headquarters that would

permit them to share the facilities of the Palais des Nations with the United Nations and the World Health Organization. We hope that this will eventuate in closer relationships among these organizations and that it will be ultimately possible for them and us to benefit from the greater use of common services that would result from living under the same roof.

Another step that should be conducive to improved coordination of the United Nations and the specialized agencies in the administrative field is the decision of the Advisory Committee to undertake a more intensive review of problems in this area. This will be possible by consultations at the headquarters of several specialized agencies during the coming year. We commend the agencies, the Advisory Committee, and its distinguished chairman, Ambassador [Thanassis] Aghnides [of Greece], on this constructive approach.

To summarize, Mr. President, my delegation will support the recommended appropriation, in spite of its reservations. We believe that, through the exercise of restraint and the constructive application of our joint efforts, the members of the United Nations should be able to regulate better any further budgetary expansion. We are confident that, by following sound fiscal policies and by inaugurating improved methods of budgetary management and control, the United Nations will be greatly strengthened. The budget is, of course, the reflection of the development of the activities of the organization. The appropriations place in practical effect the provisions of the budget. My delegation firmly believes that, by continued pursuance of sound financial principles, the United Nations during its second decade will increase in influence and effectiveness as the greatest force for helping man to realize his hopes for bringing about a peaceful world.

Atoms-for-Peace Agreement With Uruguay Comes Into Force

On January 13 the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State (press release 19) issued a joint announcement that the cooperative agreement between the United States and Uruguay covering research in the peaceful uses of atomic energy was signed on that day at the Department of State. Ambassador José A. Mora signed the agreement for Uruguay. The Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Henry F. Holland, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Lewis Strauss, signed for the United States.

This agreement was initialed by representatives of the two Governments on June 24, 1955.[1] Under terms of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, certain procedural steps must be taken by executive and legislative branches of the United States Government before agreements of this type may come into force. These steps have now been taken; with the signing, the agreement becomes effective for both countries.

Current Treaty Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention on the international recognition of rights in aircraft. Opened for signature at Geneva June 19, 1948. Entered into force September 17, 1953. TIAS 2847.
Ratification deposited: Chile, December 19, 1955.[2]

Copyright

Universal copyright convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.
Ratification deposited: Switzerland, December 30, 1955.

Postal Matters

Universal postal convention, with final protocol, annex, regulations of execution, and provisions regarding airmail and final protocol thereto. Signed at Brussels July 11, 1952. Entered into force July 1, 1953. TIAS 2800.
Ratification deposited: Chile, December 13, 1955.

Slave Trade

Protocol amending slavery convention signed at Geneva September 25, 1926 (46 Stat. 2183), and annex. Done at New York December 7, 1953. Protocol entered into force December 7, 1953;[3] annex entered into force July 7, 1955.[3]
Acceptances deposited: Greece, December 12, 1955; China, December 14, 1955.

Weather

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.
Accession deposited: Libya, December 29, 1955.

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[1] See BULLETIN of July 11, 1955, p. 55, footnote 1.

[2] Ratification deposited by Chile Nov. 20, 1951, with a reservation which the United States was unable to accept, has been withdrawn. Present ratification deposited without a reservation.

[3] Not in force for the United States.

BILATERAL

Canada

Agreement amending schedule 2 relating to routes annexed to air transport agreement of June 4, 1949 (TIAS 1934). Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa November 22 and December 20, 1955. Entered into force December 20, 1955.

Colombia

Agreement extending agreement for a technical cooperation housing project of June 24 and 30, 1954 (TIAS 3090). Effected by exchange of notes at Bogotá December 1 and 21, 1955. Entered into force December 21, 1955.

Germany

Agreement amending agreement relating to use of the practice bombing range near Cuxhaven (Sandbank), Germany, of August 6 and 28, 1954 (TIAS 3063). Effected by exchange of notes at Bonn/Bad Godesberg November 7, 14, and 29, 1955. Entered into force November 29, 1955.

Agreement to facilitate interchange of patent rights and technical information for defense purposes, and exchange of notes. Signed at Bonn January 4, 1956. Entered into force January 4, 1956.

Libya

Agreement providing for duty-free entry into Libya and exemption from internal taxation of relief supplies and packages. Effected by exchange of notes at Tripoli December 6 and 22, 1955. Entered into force December 22, 1955.

Mexico

Agreement extending the migratory labor agreement of August 11, 1951 (TIAS 2331), as amended. Effected by exchange of notes at México December 23, 1955. Entered into force December 23, 1955.

Pakistan

Agreement further revising the agreement relating to passport visas and visa fees. Effected by exchanges of notes at Karachi August 4, October 20, November 25 and 29, 1955. Entered into force December 1, 1955.

Uruguay

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington January 13, 1956. Entered into force January 13, 1956.

THE DEPARTMENT

Delegation of Authority [1]

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, BONN, AND DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION, VIENNA

DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY

By virtue of the authority vested in the Secretary of State by the act of May 26, 1949 (63 Stat. 111; 5 U. S. C. 151c and 22 U. S. C. 811a),

And by virtue of the authority vested in me by Delegation of Authority No. 78–B, dated October 29, 1955,[2] there is hereby delegated to the Executive Director of the American Embassy, Bonn, Germany, and to the Director of Administration for the American Embassy, Vienna, Austria, the authority contained in the annual appropriation "Government in Occupied Areas, Department of State", to approve and settle tort claims in Germany and Austria in the manner authorized in the first paragraph of section 2672, as amended, of Title 28 of United States Code.

Dated: December 23, 1955.

I. W. CARPENTER, Jr.,
Assistant Secretary-Controller.

[1] Public Notice 146, 20 *Fed. Reg.* 10168.

[2] BULLETIN of Nov. 28, 1955, p. 909.

Designations

William Witman II as Deputy Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs, effective December 3.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Objectives of U. S. Foreign Policy in Latin America. Pub. 6131. Inter-American Series 51. 51 pp. 25¢.

A pamphlet composed of five speeches by Henry F. Holland, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers—October 27–November 16, 1955. Pub. 6156. International Organization and Conference Series I, 30. 307 pp. $1.

A report of the Foreign Ministers Meeting containing proposals of the four delegations, principal statements of Secretary Dulles, and those statements of the other Foreign Ministers issued as conference papers.

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—Negotiations Under the Trade Agreement Act of 1934 as Amended and Extended. Pub. 6183. Commercial Policy Series 153. 14 pp. 15¢.

A pamphlet containing the supplemental notice of U.S. intention to negotiate, supplemental list of products to be considered, and notice of supplemental public hearings by the Committee for Reciprocity Information.

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—Analysis of Renegotiation of Certain Tariff Concessions. Pub. 6201. Commercial Policy Series 154. 36 pp. 15¢.

A pamphlet containing an analysis of the renegotiation of certain tariff concessions with India, Netherlands Antilles, New Zealand, Nicaragua, and Pakistan.

Page

Agriculture. Third Progress Report on the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (Eisenhower, text of report) 130

Atomic Energy
Atoms-for-Peace Agreement With Uruguay Comes Into Force 141
Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . 118

Austria. Delegation of Authority (Carpenter) . . 142

Congress, The
Current Legislation 138
Third Progress Report on the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (Eisenhower, text of report) 130

Economic Affairs
Prospects for Expanding Spanish-American Trade (Lodge) 126
Tariff Concessions to Norway 125

Educational Exchange. Seminar on International Problems for Representatives of NATO 125

Foreign Service. Delegation of Authority (Carpenter) 142

Germany. Delegation of Authority (Carpenter) . 142

Mutual Security
General Assembly Delegation's Views on Economic Aid 117
Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . 118

Near East. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference 118

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Seminar on International Problems for Representatives of NATO 125

Norway. Tariff Concessions to Norway 125

Presidential Documents. Third Progress Report on the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act 130

Publications. Recent Releases 142

Spain. Prospects for Expanding Spanish-American Trade (Lodge) 126

State, Department of
Delegation of authority (Carpenter) 142
Designations (Witman) 142
Revisions in Passport Regulations 129

Page

Treaty Information
Atoms-for-Peace Agreement With Uruguay Comes Into Force 141
Current Actions 141

U.S.S.R. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference 118

United Nations
Analysis of U.N. Budget for 1956 (Merrow) . . 138
General Assembly Delegation's Views on Economic Aid 117
The United Nations: Some New Perspectives After Ten Years (Wilcox) 111

Uruguay. Atoms-for-Peace Agreement With Uruguay Comes Into Force 141

Name Index

Carpenter, I. W., Jr. 142
Dulles, Secretary 118
Eisenhower, President 130
Lodge, John 126
Merrow, Chester E. 138
Wilcox, Francis O. 111
Witman, William, II. 142

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: January 9–15

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

No.	Date	Subject
14	1/11	Statement by General Assembly delegation.
15	1/11	Dulles: news conference transcript.
16	1/12	Revisions in passport regulations.
17	1/13	Wilcox: "The United Nations: Some New Perspectives After Ten Years."
18	1/13	Tariff concessions to Norway.
19	1/13	Atomic agreement with Uruguay.
*20	1/14	Dulles: death of William Pearson.
*22	1/14	Award to Raymond Stegmaier.

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The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in Western Asia is one of the nine sovereign Arab States with which the United States has direct relations. Geographically it occupies a central position in that vast area from the Mediterranean to the Arabian Sea known as the Middle East—the security of which is important to the interests of the free world and the United States. West of the Jordan River, the Kingdom encompasses a significant portion of the Holy Land. Here in this Background is a brief survey of this land with its rich traditions which has for centuries provided an important link in the trade between the East and the West.

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Southeast Asia: Critical Area in a Divided World

Although it sprawls across a vast area more than 3,000 miles from east to west and more than 2,000 from north to south, Southeast Asia has less than half the actual land mass of the United States. Its population is about 10 million greater. The land form is varied, the population more so; and the configuration of the land has created barriers not only between countries but also between communities. This illustrated pamphlet discusses briefly the individual countries of this region—Burma, Thailand, Viet-Nam, Laos, Cambodia, Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines—and the beginnings of a pattern of collective security for the entire Pacific area.

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The Department of State bulletin

Vol. XXXIV, No. 866

January 30, 1956

STRENGTHENING THE DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES • *Excerpts From President Eisenhower's Budget Message* 147

THE NEW SOVIET DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE • *by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy* 168

UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN GATT NEGOTIATIONS AT GENEVA • *Statement by Deputy Under Secretary Prochnow* 184

DEPARTMENT'S RECOMMENDATIONS ON SUGAR LEGISLATION • *Statement by Assistant Secretary Holland* 172

CONVENTION ON INTER-AMERICAN CULTURAL RELATIONS TRANSMITTED TO SENATE
President's Message of Transmittal 175
Report of Acting Secretary Hoover 175
Text of Convention 176

AMBASSADORIAL TALKS AT GENEVA WITH CHINESE COMMUNISTS 164

SECURITY COUNCIL CONDEMNS ISRAEL FOR ACTION AGAINST SYRIA • *Statement by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.* 182

For index see inside back cover

The Department of State bulletin

VOL. XXXIV, No. 866 • PUBLICATION 6273

January 30, 1956

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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Strengthening the Defense of the United States and Its Allies

EXCERPTS FROM PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S BUDGET MESSAGE[1]

To the Congress of the United States:

I send you today the Budget of the United States Government for the fiscal year 1957 which begins July 1, 1956. This budget also includes the fiscal results of all Government operations for the year ended June 30, 1955, and revised estimates for the current fiscal year ending June 30, 1956.

BUDGET TOTALS

[Fiscal years. In billions]

	1955 actual	1956 estimated	1957 estimated
Budget receipts	$60.4	$64.5	$66.3
Budget expenditures	64.6	64.3	65.9
Budget surplus (+) or deficit (−)	−4.2	+.2	+.4

The budget I am proposing for 1957 is a balanced budget. It is my expectation that the budget will also be in balance for the fiscal year 1956.

Although balanced, the margin of estimated surplus in each of these budgets is slim. This calls for the utmost cooperation between the Executive and legislative branches to prevent increases in expenditures or reductions in receipts that would create a deficit.

. . . . .

Budget Policies

We seek, above all, the attainment of a just and durable peace. Thus, the resources of the world can be directed to building a better life for all people. The people of the Soviet Union and of the countries under its domination are undoubtedly as anxious as the people of other nations to achieve this objective. I regret that the Soviet leaders have not as yet given any tangible evidence of an intention to agree on a plan of disarmament that can be verified by adequate inspection. In the absence of such tangible evidence, we must follow the course reflected in this budget of steadily strengthening the defense of the United States and its allies, so that the free world will remain strong enough to deter possible aggressors or to retaliate immediately and effectively if attacked.

At the same time, the Government of the United States will steadfastly seek all possible ways of further progress toward our goal of peace. We will speed the development of the civilian uses of atomic energy and make the resulting benefits available, under appropriate controls, to other nations for the well-being of mankind. We will propose logical methods for advancing disarmament. We will promote international trade and investment. We will not falter in our cooperative efforts to build the economic, as well as defensive, strength of the free world through the Mutual Security Program.

. . . . .

Budget Expenditures

Expenditures by purpose.—When we look at the budget in terms of a few broad purposes, we find that the greatest portion, 64 percent, of the expenditures in the fiscal year 1957 will be for deterring possible aggression and for strengthening the international alliances to which we belong. The next largest part, 21 percent, will be devoted to civil benefits of various kinds. Interest, largely on the public debt, will amount to nearly 11 percent. Expenditures for civil operations and ad-

[1] H. Doc. 256, 84th Cong., 2d sess., transmitted on Jan. 16; reprinted from *Cong. Rec.* of Jan. 16, pp. 469 *ff*. The message, together with summary budget statements, is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C.; price $1.50.

ministration are estimated at 4 percent of the total. . . .

BUDGET EXPENDITURES BY PURPOSE

[Fiscal years. In billions]

	1955 actual	1956 estimated	1957 estimated
Protection, including collective security	$42.7	$41.4	$42.4
Civil benefits	13.7	13.8	13.9
Interest	6.4	6.9	7.1
Civil operations and administration	1.7	2.1	2.2
Reserve for contingencies	--------	.1	.2
Total	64.6	64.3	65.9

Protection, including collective security.—In this summary classification of broad purposes, expenditures for protection include more than the four major national security programs. They embrace the military functions of the Department of Defense, including construction and procurement; the Mutual Security Program; the Atomic Energy Commission; and other programs such as stockpiling, expansion of defense production, civil defense, and our foreign information activities.

EXPENDITURES FOR PROTECTION, INCLUDING COLLECTIVE SECURITY

[Fiscal years. In billions]

	1955 actual	1956 estimated	1957 estimated
Major national security programs:			
Department of Defense—Military functions	$35.5	$34.6	$35.5
Mutual Security Program—Military	2.3	2.5	2.5
Atomic Energy Commission	1.9	1.7	1.9
Stockpiling and defense production expansion	.9	.7	.4
Subtotal	40.6	39.5	40.4
Related programs	2.1	1.9	2.0
Total	42.7	41.4	42.4

In planning such great security programs, it is clear that we must never permit ourselves to be panicked by temporary crises or beguiled by a campaign of smiles without deeds. We continue to maintain and to strengthen our national security forces.

This budget provides for increased expenditures for the military functions of the Department of Defense, emphasizing air-atomic power, guided missiles, research and development, continental defense, and the re-equipping of our forces with new types of weapons. Outlays for conventional weapons and for stockpiling will be decreased. Under the Mutual Security Program, budget expenditures in 1957 for military assistance and for economic and technical assistance are estimated at about the same level as in the fiscal years 1955 and 1956. Expenditures for atomic energy, including peaceful applications, will rise in 1957 to a somewhat higher total than for any previous year. I am also recommending an expansion of our foreign information activities so that we can more successfully advance understanding abroad of our policies and their peaceful intent.

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Major National Security

Budget expenditures for major national security programs in the fiscal year 1957 are estimated at 40.4 billion dollars, 903 million dollars more than estimated for the fiscal year 1956.

To build our military strength effectively and efficiently, peaks and valleys in security spending and in defense production must be avoided. I want to emphasize again the importance of a sound, long-range program which does not arbitrarily assume a fixed date of maximum danger. Military planning must combine present defense with the probable needs of a long period of uncertain peace.

Department of Defense.—During the past 3 years our defense program has been successfully reoriented to reflect the changing nature of the threat to our security, the revised requirements brought about by the end of the Korean conflict, and the increasing availability of new weapons of unprecedented strategic and tactical importance.

This reorientation has been accomplished by developing our defense program on the basis of the following policies and concepts:

1. Gearing our defense preparations to a long period of uncertainty instead of to a succession of arbitrarily assumed dates of maximum danger.

2. Maintaining the capability to deter a potential aggressor from attack and to blunt that attack if it comes—by a combination of immediate re-

MAJOR NATIONAL SECURITY

[Fiscal years. In millions]

Item	New obligational authority			Expenditures		
	1955 actual	1956 estimated	1957 estimated	1955 actual	1956 estimated	1957 estimated
Gross budget expenditures:						
Department of Defense—Military Functions:						
Direction and coordination of defense	$13	$13	$15	$13	$13	$14
Air Force defense	12, 137	15, 490	15, 430	16, 407	15, 960	16, 535
Army defense	7, 764	7, 351	7, 731	8, 899	8, 510	8, 582
Navy defense	10, 221	9, 640	10, 006	9, 733	9, 435	9, 565
Other central defense activities	653	654	607	481	657	651
Proposed legislation			1, 902			200
Transfer from Department of Defense revolving funds to general accounts (proposed legislation)			−785			
Total, Department of Defense	30, 787	33, 147	34, 907	35, 533	34, 575	35, 547
Development and control of atomic energy:						
Present programs	1, 285	1, 179	1, 692	1, 857	1, 715	1, 905
Proposed legislation			144			40
Stockpiling and defense production expansion:						
Present programs	380	521		1, 442	983	678
Proposed legislation						4
Mutual security program—military:						
Present programs	1, 204	1, 022		2, 292	2, 464	2, 100
Proposed legislation			3, 000			400
Total	33, 656	35, 870	39, 743	41, 124	39, 737	40, 674
Deduct applicable receipts:						
Defense production expansion				497	270	304
Other				(b)	(b)	(b)
Net budget expenditures				40, 626	39, 467	40, 370

b Less than one-half million dollars.

taliatory power and a continental defense system of steadily increasing effectiveness.

3. Developing military forces which minimize numbers of men by making maximum use of science and technology.

4. Relating the number and degree of readiness of major units in the active forces to the practical limitations on the rapid deployment of major military forces from the United States immediately upon the outbreak of aggression, and relying, for the remainder, on ready reserve forces.

5. Utilizing military personnel on active duty with maximum effectiveness so as to hold to a minimum the number of men withdrawn from work in the civilian economy.

6. Concentrating our efforts on those forces which best complement the forces our allies are most capable of raising and supporting.

7. Maintaining a strong and expanding peacetime industrial structure, readily convertible to the tasks of defense and war.

The readjustment of our military forces in line with these principles is providing this Nation with the greatest military power in its peacetime history. My recommendations for the fiscal year 1957 continue the same basic policies and concepts.

This budget provides funds for an average of 2,815,700 military personnel on active duty during the fiscal year 1957. Total military personnel on active duty will increase to 2,838,400 at the end of fiscal year 1957 from the number of 2,814,100 estimated to be on active duty at the end of the current fiscal year. In order to permit flexibility in planning and operations, a military personnel ceiling has been authorized for the fiscal year 1957, totaling 2,906,000, excluding Army cadets, Navy aviation cadets, and midshipmen. However, no increase will be made above the military personnel levels provided for in this budget except upon detailed justification to, and approval by the Secretary of Defense.

During the fiscal year 1957 there will be significant increases in certain combat elements, particularly units employing new weapons and units as-

signed to continental defense. These increases, together with the continued modernization of the weapons and equipment, will further enhance the combat power and effectiveness of our forces.

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Development and control of atomic energy.—We have long sought and we continue to seek, jointly with other nations, means to banish the threat of nuclear warfare which still confronts the world. Pending a trustworthy agreement, however, we must continue to increase our nuclear weapons stockpile which, together with the means of delivery, is the principal deterrent to armed aggression in the world. At the same time, we shall speed the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy and make the resulting benefits, under appropriate controls, available to other nations for the well-being of all mankind. To this end we continue to hope that an international atomic energy agency will be established at an early date.

The United Nations Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy at Geneva last summer, which grew out of a proposal by the United States, not only facilitated the exchange of technical information but served to emphasize the great promise of atomic energy for peace.

So that we may further demonstrate this great promise, I recommend again that the Congress take early action to authorize the construction of a nuclear-powered ship, using an atomic propulsion plant already developed, which will carry the message of "Atoms for Peace" to the ports of the world. The Atomic Energy Commission has sufficient funds available for construction and installation of the propulsion plant and machinery, and I shall request additional funds for the fiscal year 1956 for the Department of Commerce for construction of a suitable hull.

Total expenditures for atomic energy in 1957 are estimated at 1.9 billion dollars, 230 million dollars more than in 1956.

Operating expenditures will increase from 1.4 billion dollars in the fiscal year 1956 to 1.6 billion dollars in 1957. Greater quantities of uranium ores and concentrates will be purchased. Production from the Commission's plants will increase but at reduced unit costs as the expanded facilities, soon to be completed, come into full operation. Research and development work in numerous areas, both civilian and military, will be expanded.

Capital expenditures in the fiscal year 1957 are expected to decline somewhat from 1956 levels. I shall propose to the Congress legislation to authorize new construction in 1957, principally for improvements to increase the efficiency, capacity, and safety of production plants and for research and development facilities.

The civilian applications of nuclear energy will receive even greater attention, not only in terms of Government expenditures, but also through the Commission's efforts to stimulate more participation and investment by private and public groups, particularly in the development of atomic power. As such participation increases, the share of power development costs financed by the Government should decrease. As part of its encouragement of the development of atomic power, the Commission plans in 1957 to continue specialized training of nuclear engineers and to expand its support of the training of nuclear engineers through fellowships and through provision of specialized training equipment to a number of universities. The Commission will also construct a special reactor for use by the Department of Defense in developing methods for preserving food through irradiation.

Great emphasis is being placed on the development of a larger variety of nuclear propulsion plants. To this end, funds are included under proposed legislation for additional developmental facilities at the National Reactor Testing Station in Idaho.

The Atomic Energy Commission will also step up research on controlled thermonuclear reactions as new discoveries may justify. This program, while long range, gives promise of yet greater dimensions to the potential peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Continuing progress in basic research is fundamental to further advances in nuclear energy. The Commission will increase in the fiscal year 1957 its support of basic research in the physical and life sciences, including development and design studies of high-energy particle accelerators. The 1957 construction program will include new buildings at three of the Commission's laboratories.

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Mutual Security Program.—Through the Mutual Security Program we shall continue to work jointly with our friends and allies in building and maintaining the defensive and economic strength

of the free world. This long-range program, which includes military, economic, and technical assistance, is essential to our national security. Our assistance supplements the major efforts of other free nations, who themselves are bearing a large proportion of the total cost of our joint efforts. I shall subsequently transmit to the Congress my specific requests for authorization of appropriations for the fiscal year 1957 Mutual Security Program. These requests will cover my recommendations for military assistance and direct forces support, discussed in this section of the message, as well as for economic, technical, and other programs which are discussed in the international affairs and finance section.

Expenditures for the total Mutual Security Program in the fiscal year 1957 are estimated at 4.3 billion dollars, about 100 million dollars more than in 1956. Recommended new authority to incur obligations is 4.9 billion dollars, an increase of 2.2 billion dollars over the 2.7 billion dollars enacted for 1956. Requested new obligational authority for 1957 exceeds estimated expenditures for 1957 by approximately 600 million dollars reflecting the amount for additional funding of long lead-time items for delivery in future years.

Whenever possible, foreign currency proceeds from the sale of surplus agricultural products abroad under the Agriculture Trade and Development Act will be used to meet mutual security objectives.

Mutual Security Program, military.—The program of military assistance for the fiscal year 1957 is planned primarily to continue equipping and training forces which we have helped develop and strengthen over the past years. Total expenditures for military assistance and direct forces support in the fiscal year 1957 are estimated at approximately the current rate of 2.5 billion dollars annually. To carry forward these programs, I am recommending new obligational authority of 3 billion dollars. Within this amount, 445 million dollars is requested for direct forces support in the fiscal year 1957 to supply items such as petroleum, rations, uniforms, and military construction services directly to the military forces of our allies.

In the fiscal years 1955 and 1956, the backlog of unexpended balances made it possible to maintain an adequate level of expenditures and deliveries while the amount of new authority to incur obligations was reduced. The backlog of unexpended balances for military assistance (including reservations for common-item orders) is being reduced from a total of 7.7 billion dollars at the beginning of the fiscal year 1955 to an estimated 4.5 billion dollars at the end of the current fiscal year. If deliveries of military equipment are to be maintained at the current rate, as I believe they must be, this level of unexpended balances should not now be further reduced.

MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM

[Fiscal years. In millions]

	Net budget expenditures			Recommended new obligational authority for 1957
	1955 actual	1956 estimated	1957 estimated	
Military, including direct forces support:				
Present programs	$2, 292	$2, 464	$2, 100	--------
Proposed legislation	-------	-------	400	$3, 000
Economic, technical, and other:[1]				
Present programs	1, 927	1, 726	1, 202	--------
Proposed legislation	-------	-------	590	1, 860
Total	4, 219	4, 190	4, 292	[2] 4, 860

[1] Discussed in the international affairs and finance section of this message.

[2] Compares with new obligational authority of 2,781 million dollars in 1955 and 2,703 million dollars in 1956. Excludes an estimated 130 million dollars of authorizations to use existing balances.

Our planning for the future includes helping to provide modern weapons that the forces which we help support can effectively use. In view of the long lead-time required, funds must be made available in advance so that the necessary negotiations and planning may be undertaken and procurement initiated for complex items such as jet aircraft, missiles, and electronics systems. Hence, for the fiscal year 1957, I am requesting new authority to incur obligations somewhat above the projected level of expenditures. Deliveries of equipment and the expenditure of funds will necessarily be spread over a number of years as defense plans involving modern weapons are completed and as our allies demonstrate their readiness to support a modern defense system adequately.

My recommendations will enable us to provide our NATO partners with the modern defense weapons and equipment which we are furnishing in

increasing numbers to our own NATO forces in Europe. Although many European countries are now in a position to finance a greater share of the cost of maintaining their existing forces, they will require continuing help if our common defense effort is to be strengthened by modern weapons and techniques.

About one-half of the fiscal year 1957 program will be concentrated in Korea, Pakistan, Taiwan, and Turkey. The program will provide for necessary replacements and effective maintenance of materiel furnished in past years, and will also permit the further training of existing forces. In addition, we will continue to supply basic military equipment where necessary to strengthen further defensive capabilities in the Far and Middle East. Likewise, we will continue to provide moderate amounts of equipment to help maintain certain military units of our friends in Latin America who are cooperating in the development of hemispheric defenses.

International Affairs and Finance

The international programs which I am recommending for the fiscal year 1957 will vigorously carry forward our fundamental national policy to maintain peace and help build a strong, prosperous, and unified community of free nations.

During this past year, the United States has made positive new proposals aimed at relaxing international tensions. But it remains clear that the search for lasting peace will require patience, strength, and continued vigilance.

We will persist in exploring every possible means of solving the difficult problems which continue to divide the world. Meanwhile, we must further strengthen and improve the system of collective security. Moreover, it is of the utmost importance that, in cooperation with other free nations, we proceed steadily with long-range, positive programs to sustain and improve the conditions of human well-being which are necessary if peace with freedom is to endure.

To accomplish these objectives, I am proposing expenditures of 2.1 billion dollars in the fiscal year 1957 for our international programs.

Mutual Security Program, economic.—My recommendations for continuing military assistance under the Mutual Security Program were discussed previously, and the amounts involved were included as part of our major national security activities. Some of the countries to which we provide military assistance, however, do not have the economic capacity to support effective defensive forces which are necessary to our mutual security. We must continue to provide assistance to such countries to enable them to support the greater defensive strength that is our common goal. It is particularly important that we con-

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND FINANCE

[Fiscal years. In millions]

Program or agency	Expenditures			Recommended new obligational authority for 1957
	1955 actual	1956 estimated	1957 estimated	
Gross budget expenditures:				
Economic and technical development:				
Mutual Security Program (defense support, development assistance, technical cooperation, and other):				
Present programs	$1, 928	$1, 725	$1, 200	-------
Proposed legislation	------	------	590	[1] $1, 860
Investment guaranty program	3	4	6	-------
Export-Import Bank	229	276	291	-------
International Finance Corporation	------	35	------	-------
Refugee relief	8	13	11	8
Civil assistance (Department of Defense)	32	3	2	2
Emergency commodity assistance (Department of Agriculture)	91	186	192	89
Other	3	13	33	2
Foreign information and exchange activities:				
United States Information Agency	84	86	104	135
Department of State	14	18	18	20
Emergency fund for international affairs	2	6	2	-------
Conduct of foreign affairs (Department of State and others)	121	131	143	215
Total	2, 514	2, 497	2, 591	[2] 2, 332
Deduct applicable receipts:				
Export-Import Bank	330	361	391	-------
Investment guaranty program	4	4	4	-------
Department of Agriculture	------	79	89	-------
Net budget expenditures	2, 181	2, 053	2, 108	-------

[1] Excludes 45 million dollars of authorizations to use existing balances.

[2] Compares with new obligational authority of 2,304 million dollars in 1955 and 2,118 million dollars in 1956.

tinue to help those nations which require assistance in order to participate effectively in regional collective security arrangements, notably those in Asia. This budget, therefore, includes funds for carrying on the defense support program in critical areas in southern Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Far East.

The development of military strength as a deterrent to aggression, however, meets only a part of the challenge which faces the free world. Because the conditions of poverty and unrest in less developed areas make their people a special target of international communism, there is a need to help them achieve the economic growth and stability necessary to preserve their independence against Communist threats and enticements.

For our assistance to be as effective as possible, it must be based upon a realistic appraisal of potentialities for economic development and a careful determination of priorities among the many pressing needs in the less developed areas. My recommendations for the Mutual Security Program include funds for continuing selective loans and grants to certain less developed countries following experience gained in past years.

I am also recommending continuation of the worldwide technical cooperation program at a slightly increased level. Technical cooperation is an indispensable element in the successful attack which is being made on the basic problems of hunger, disease, and illiteracy. Through the efforts of American experts working in cooperating countries and by the training of foreign technicians in the United States, the knowledge and experience of our people are being shared in a cooperative effort to solve fundamental problems in health, education, public administration, agriculture, and industry which confront less developed countries. By these means we are helping to provide the skills which are required for economic development. In addition to continuing our own technical cooperation program, my recommendations provide for our annual contribution to the expanded technical assistance program of the United Nations and to the similar work of the Organization of American States.

We shall also continue and expand in the fiscal year 1957 our international program to provide training in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Funds for this purpose are included in this budget as part of the Mutual Security Program.

Provision should be made for further contributions for the relief and rehabilitation of refugees from Palestine. In view of the current unrest in the Near East, our continued support is essential both for humanitarian reasons and to assist in achieving peace and stability in the area.

The budget also includes amounts for the escapee program and for contributions to the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration and the United Nations Refugee Fund, which aid in the relief and resettlement of refugees from behind the Iron Curtain and in emigration from Europe.

I shall recommend effective flexibility in the use of funds under the Mutual Security Program to enable us to respond to new situations which may arise. I also consider it essential that the Mutual Security Act be amended to assure greater continuity in providing economic assistance for development projects and programs which we approve and which require a period of years for planning and completion. Accordingly, I shall ask for limited authority to make longer term commitments for assistance for such projects, to be fulfilled from appropriations made in future years.

In furtherance of our basic foreign economic policy objective of stimulating international trade and investment, I am requesting a review of existing legislation to determine whether changes will be necessary to permit an expansion of the investment guaranty program. Under this program, private United States investors may be guaranteed against loss of their foreign investments or earnings through expropriation or inconvertibility of foreign currencies. The number of private investors and foreign governments participating in this program has steadily increased. We also need to encourage investment overseas by avoiding unfair tax duplications, and to foster foreign trade by further simplification and improvement of our customs legislation.

Export-Import Bank.—The Export-Import Bank is assisting in the expansion of international trade and investment through direct loans and guaranties of private loans. Its loan and guaranty commitments are estimated at 960 million dollars in the fiscal year 1957, an increase of 255 million dollars over the previous year. Because of greater participation in loans by commercial banks and other sources of private capital, direct Federal disbursements in the fiscal year 1957 are estimated at less than one-third of the total new commitments. Repayments on loans made in prior

years are expected to exceed disbursements from Export-Import Bank funds, thus providing estimated net receipts of 100 million dollars. Sales of portions of the existing loan portfolio to private financial institutions may increase this return.

Foreign information and exchange activities.—The present international situation has made the work of the United States Information Agency increasingly vital to our national interest. I consider it of paramount importance that we expand our effort to bring the truth before the people of the world, explain our peaceful objectives, and show in its true light the Communist attempt to divide and destroy free world unity.

To this end, I strongly recommend that appropriations for our information program be increased by 48 million dollars from the level in the current fiscal year. This increase will provide for expanded use of overseas exhibits and other techniques to emphasize such subjects as our Atoms for Peace program, our proposals for mutual aerial inspection as a first step toward disarmament, and the many scientific and cultural achievements by which progressive capitalism under free, representative government is contributing to a peaceful, prosperous world. Overseas libraries will be expanded, and increased emphasis will be given to supplying books to foreign readers at low prices. Where appropriate, the program will capitalize on the effectiveness of television.

I am recommending a modest increase in appropriations for the educational exchange programs of the Department of State which constitute a basic element of our long-term effort to attain a better mutual understanding with other peoples of the world. These programs bring to this country leaders of public opinion and facilitate the mutual exchange of students, teachers, and research scholars. In addition to appropriated funds, part of the foreign currencies received from the sale of surplus agricultural commodities abroad will be used to meet certain overseas costs of educational exchange.

With the financial support of the President's Emergency Fund for International Affairs, we have sponsored, in cooperation with private industry, agricultural and industrial exhibits at international trade fairs which have effectively demonstrated the achievements of private enterprise in a free economy. Similarly, our cultural achievements have been presented throughout the world by American actors, dancers, and musicians during the past year. These trade fair and cultural presentations have been enthusiastically received abroad and have contributed significantly to a better understanding of our values and objectives as a nation. In view of the effectiveness of these activities, legislation will be recommended to authorize them on a continuing basis.

Conduct of foreign affairs.—The Department of State is not now adequately equipped with either the staff or facilities which are required if it is to provide the timely, informed, and coordinated policy guidance which is vital to the success of our total international effort. I strongly recommend, therefore, that the Congress enact the requested increase of 89 million dollars in the appropriations for the Department of State for the fiscal year 1957.

A substantial part of this increase is for construction of an extension to the present Department of State building. This extension will permit all the Washington staff of the Department, including the International Cooperation Administration, to be accommodated in a single building rather than scattered, as at present, among 30 separate buildings. In addition, my recommendations include funds to cover costs in the first year of a long-range program to provide adequate physical facilities, including housing, for our diplomatic and consular establishments abroad.

Steps are already underway to strengthen the staff of the Department. This budget provides for further improvements, as well as for carrying forward the recruitment, training, employee benefit, and other programs initiated during the past 2 years. Increases are also proposed to permit the prompt and efficient discharge of our expanding consular responsibilities and to provide for the collection of more comprehensive commercial and economic data needed by American businessmen and Government agencies.

To provide for closer international economic cooperation and continued expansion of United States trade abroad, it is particularly important that our membership in the Organization for Trade Cooperation be approved. While this will not alter congressional control of our tariff, import, and customs policies, it will help us to remove discriminations against American exports and further strengthen our ties with other nations of the free world.

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Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference

Press release 26 dated January 17

Secretary Dulles: I have a brief statement to make about a matter which I judge to be of current interest.[1]

An article in *Life* magazine has attracted much comment. Let me say this: I did not write the article, I did not review or censor the article, or know of its title. I did not know in advance of its publication date, and, in fact, I did not read the article until after it was released for publication. Having read it, I authorized our press officer to say that the statements specifically attributed to me did not require correction from the standpoint of their substance.

Most of the statements specifically attributed to me are quotations or close paraphrases of what I had already said elsewhere. One is somewhat ambiguously phrased, but the ambiguity can easily be resolved if read in context and with reference to the many public statements which I have made.

I believe that the United States should adopt every honorable course to avoid engagement in war. Indeed, I have devoted my whole life to the pursuit of a just and durable peace. I believe, however, that there are basic moral values and vital interests for which we stand, and that the surest way to avoid war is to let it be known in advance that we are prepared to defend these principles, if need be by life itself.

This policy of seeking to prevent war by preventing miscalculation by a potential aggressor is not a personal policy; it is not a partisan policy; it is a national policy. It is expressed in mutual security treaties which we now have with 42 nations and which the United States Senate has overwhelmingly approved. It is expressed in Public Law 4, whereby the Congress, by an almost unanimous bipartisan vote, authorized the President to use the armed forces of the United States in the Formosa area, if he deemed it necessary for the protection of Formosa and the Penghus.[2]

This policy of making clear our position in advance, of course, involves risks. As Senator Vandenberg said about the North Atlantic Treaty, it is a calculated risk for peace. But as we have learned by hard experience, failure to make our position known in advance makes war more likely because then an aggressor may miscalculate. The policy of deterrence is only one aspect of the task of maintaining a just and durable peace. It is necessary to be patient; it is necessary to be conciliatory; it is necessary to make our peace a vital force for justice and human welfare so that all men will aspire to share that kind of peace.

My views with respect to peace have been made known on many, many occasions, and there is no reason to think that they have altered because articles dealing with complex subjects of foreign policy inevitably tend to oversimplification and special emphasis.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the article, however, said that it was based on information hitherto undisclosed. I was wondering if you could tell us what the occasion was that—it did say that new information that it was presenting had been submitted by you and the State Department.

A. There is no substantative information in there which I know of which has not been generally a matter of public knowledge and found in the press.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that President Eisenhower would regard an attack on Quemoy and Matsu as an attack on Formosa?

A. That question stands today where it has stood ever since Public Law 4 was adopted and since our treaty of security was made with the Republic of China. As you recall, the treaty area is defined, but the President is authorized to use the armed forces of the United States in relation to related areas if he believes that is important for the defense of the treaty area.

Q. Well, in fact, Mr. Secretary, this article says that you never had a doubt that the President would regard an attack on Quemoy and Matsu as an attack on Formosa. Is that correct?

A. As I said before, I did not read the article in advance and I will not here discuss the views of the author.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said that there is no information here which has not already been made public. Where can one find the statement that the President agreed on your recommendation and on the second occasion decided again when you tel-

[1] The following six paragraphs were also released separately as press release 25 dated Jan. 17.

[2] For text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 7, 1955, p. 213.

ephoned him during the night that, if there was no truce in Korea, the United States would bomb across the Yalu into Manchuria?

A. Well, I have seen that oftentimes in the public press. You will recall that there had already been drawn up at that time the statement by the 16 nations who were in the war there, that if the war should be resumed it would probably not be possible to confine it to Korea.[3] I think it is a fair inference that the same thing would have been true if the war would have gone on.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the same connection, the article states that President Eisenhower concurred in your recommendation that the Communist forces in Indochina be opposed on the ground, and that, if the Chinese forces intervened openly, staging bases in South China would be destroyed by U.S. air power. Did the President concur in a recommendation by you?

A. I am not going to discuss the views of the author. Views of that sort have been expressed and counterviews have been expressed. That is a source of public discussion, I would say.

Q. But did you make such a recommendation, sir?

A. I am not going to discuss the contents of the article because that would make it into a sort of state paper. When I have state pronouncements to make, I make my own speeches.

Q. A year and a half ago, both you and the President told press conferences that you hoped to put out a white paper on the Indochina affair. Nothing yet has appeared until this article. When are we going to get the facts?

A. There have appeared many articles that I am aware of—some written by you.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have just said that our views should be made clear lest the enemy miscalculate and get into war. Why do we not make our position clear on Matsu and Quemoy?

A. I think it is clear.

Q. It is not clear to me, sir.

A. It is not clear to you because you, like me, cannot read the minds of the Chinese Communists. But to them I think it is quite clear.

[3] *Ibid.*, Aug. 24, 1953, p. 247.

Q. What do you think they think we mean to do?

A. I think that they think that, if an attack is started there which comprehends a claim to take by force Formosa and the Penghus, we will fight.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have said, I think, in the beginning that most of the article which didn't—where you were not quoted correctly—were paraphrases or were close statements of what you have said; but you have also just said that you were not going to discuss any aspects of the article which may be the views of the author. I am simply asking you, sir, is there no way to clarify what you do and what you do not accept in the article? Well, let me put it this way: Are there things in the article that you do not accept as statements of fact attributed to you?

A. I said—perhaps I didn't make it as clear as I should—that most of the statements specifically attributed to me are quotations or close paraphrases of what I have already said publicly. That should be made clear.

Q. You said, except for one ambiguous statement. What was that ambiguous statement?

A. That was a phrase—I don't have the text here with me—which went on to say that, which implied that the getting to the brink of war might be our choice rather than a choice that was forced upon us. The whole paragraph I think is perfectly clear. But one phrase taken out of context could be ambiguous.

Q. Could you state now what is the proper concept that you were trying to get across there?

A. Yes. We have faced a situation where in many parts of the world, in Europe and more recently in the Far East, there has been a threat of armed attack against what I referred to here as basic moral values and vital interests. Now, we had the choice of retreating in the face of those threats or making it clear that, if they were pursued, it would involve a war. We believed that the best way to avoid a war was to make that clear. That meant that we stood firm at a point where there was a threat. But I have believed very strongly, as a result of my study of history, particularly the history of this century, that the greatest risk of war comes from not making it

clear that you are prepared to defend the moral values and vital interests of the United States. We have had a history of wars which we got into despite the fact that we were always very eager for peace. I believe that it is not enough to want peace—which surely we all do—but that to get peace requires taking what Senator Vandenberg referred to as a calculated risk and making clear that certain things cannot be attacked with impunity.

Q. *Mr. Secretary, is this the sentence that you considered ambiguous: "The ability to get to the verge without getting into the war is the necessary art"?*

A. Will you read the preceding sentence, I think.

Q. The preceding sentence is—it is two sentences: "You have to take chances for peace, just as you must take chances in war. Some say that we were brought to the verge of war. Of course we were brought to the verge of war. The ability to get to the verge without getting into the war is the necessary art."

A. Yes, that second sentence if read out of context does, I think, give an incorrect impression. The important thing is that we were "brought" to the verge of war by threats which were uttered in relation to Korea, in relation to Indochina, and in relation to Formosa.

Position on Indochina Armistice

Q. Mr. Secretary, in order to help some of us judge whether your past views on the Indochina armistice remain what they were, could you tell us whether you regard the armistice as it was negotiated as a major save for the free world, in that it kept some of the country from going Communist, or whether we just took no view and in effect refused to sanction it by not signing it?

A. Well, we did not, as you know, sign the armistice agreement because we were not a party to the war nor did we want to countenance some of the provisions of that armistice which we believed were very injurious, particularly with relation to the dislocation of the hundreds of thousands of Catholics in the northern area who had to be displaced under very rigorous conditions. We believe, however, that the event has proved that the losses which were taken by that armistice can be limited and do not necessarily involve what was one time feared, that is, the loss of the whole Indochina peninsula.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us what foreign-policy considerations have guided you to collaborate with the writing of this article, why you agreed to it at this time, and whether these conclusions included the fact that Sir Anthony Eden would shortly come to this country?

A. It had no relationship to that whatsoever. My so-called collaboration involved nothing more than what I have done with a good many people here in this room, that is, from time to time have informal chats with certain of you. This particular one took place, I think, about the first of December. I had no knowledge at that time as to when an article would be issued, if indeed it would be issued at all.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Herald Tribune *says in a front-page editorial today that this* Life *magazine article was submitted to the State Department before publication, and that one major change was requested, and that the magazine found it was too late to do that. And the second point is that the article contains at least one error of fact, namely, that a British change of heart prevented the proposed meeting in Washington during the Indochina crisis. I would like to ask whether you or any of your aides suggested the change in the article which could not be made and whether or not you believe the British change of heart did prevent the Indochina meeting?*

A. Well, I am not going to go into the last question because that relates to past history where there obviously have been differences of opinion, and it is not desirable, I believe, to revive possible differences and misunderstandings which may have occurred at that time.

As far as the other question is involved, that is something I have no personal knowledge of and was undoubtedly handled by the public relations division of the Department.

Q. Mr. Secretary, was any verbatim record kept of this conversation in whole or in part?

A. I believe that notes were made of the conversation.

Q. No, I mean in terms of either a recording or a stenographic account.

A. I believe that there was, yes, but I did not

see it; and it was understood that that was merely for the purpose of refreshing the recollections of the author and not for the purpose of supplying any material that could be quoted.

Q. Can that be made available to the press, Mr. Secretary?

A. No.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how did you determine—how did the writer determine—what things you said that were to be quoted directly? Did you guide him on that?

A. I was not conscious at the time that anything that I said would be quoted directly.

Q. Then, are you saying, sir, that the quotations attributed to you were made on the writer's own authority and responsibility?

A. I said on that, I think, that the quotations in the main were actual reproductions of what I had previously said publicly and that otherwise I had no reason to question them from the standpoint of their broad substance.

Q. Well, you understand the difficulty that everyone is in, sir, because, as you remember yourself, when some questions have been put to you, it has been impossible for you to discuss those questions because this is the author's point of view.

A. Right.

Q. On the other hand, you have said that the substance of what he said represents your point of view. At what point are we to determine that the author is speaking, and at what point are we to determine that you are speaking? How are we to know?

A. Well, I suppose that you would know because of the fact that the only portion of the article on which I have commented was where certain statements were attributed to me in quotation marks; and I have felt, as I said, I think, in my last press conference, that in view of that attribution to me in quotation marks of certain statements, I felt that if there was anything that was seriously wrong with them I had a duty to call attention to that lest harm be done. I therefore read the article and came to the conclusion that broadly speaking the substance of what had been attributed to me was substantially accurate and in line with what I previously had said. Therefore, I saw no reason to issue a repudiation or a correction.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in regard to this passage which contains the sentence used here before—I will read it again: "The ability to get to the verge without getting into the war is the necessary art"—that passage is set in quotes as though it were a direct quote from you. Can you tell us whether that passage is taken from a public statement of yours or was quoted from you in the course of that conversation?

A. I have said the substance of that, I think, on a good many occasions: that I believe that peace is not won by seeming to retreat when an aggressor threatened; that it was important to make clear the fact that we were going to stand firm even though that might involve war. That is a sentiment which I have expressed a good many times over a great many years, and I think that this particular statement attributed to me, when read in the light of its context, is a fair reflection of my views.

Q. It is a reflection then, but not a direct quote as it stands?

A. I would never myself have expressed myself in quite that way for publication.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is your reaction to congressional reaction to this article?

A. Well, the article, I'm sorry to say, gives me a great deal more credit than is my due. The title of it gives me too much credit; the article, as a whole, gives me too much credit; and, as such, it was bound to attract criticism in some quarters.

I regret the fact that some people have given me too much credit, although I do not regret the fact that there are some people who seem to approve of what I have done.

Q. Sir, in regard to these three episodes discussed in the article, whether we might have gone to war and did not, were there, in each case, other factors leading to nonwar which were overlooked in the article?

A. I have said that articles such as this dealing with a complex subject inevitably oversimplify and, in that process, tend to overemphasize. I think, undoubtedly, there were a good many fac-

tors in the equation; not all of them are mentioned in this article.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in those same three instances are you satisfied that our allies had a clear impression of what we had planned to do in the event that the talks broke down, or that the war in Korea was renewed? Had we made clear to them the drastic steps that we proposed to take in that event?

A. I think our policy was made clear to our allies, yes.

Q. Are you satisfied, sir, that it was made clear to the responsible committees of the Congress?

A. Well, it was made clear to the congressional leaders. Now, I think we have discussed this particular subject enough. It has been half an hour, and I would like to get on—if you have any questions about any other matters.

Long-Range Foreign Aid

Q. Mr. Secretary, you and the President recently, particularly, have both emphasized the need for an expanded foreign aid on a longer-range basis. There has been some congressional opposition, notably that of Senator George and Senator Knowland. Over the weekend there was speculation printed that the administration was prepared to pull back. My question is, sir: How hard, how vigorously, is the administration prepared to fight for this principle that you and the President have enunciated?

A. Well, I don't think it is a principle that we will have to "fight for," as you put it, although it is a principle which we believe in and which we believe that Congress will concur in once the full picture has been given to them. Under Secretary Hoover is, I think, this morning giving some of the story to the Foreign Relations Committee. I would like to, if I could, just take a moment off of just answering questions to say a few words about our philosophy on this whole subject.

The Soviet Union as a result of its policies of the last 30 years, particularly the last 10 years, has made considerable strides in developing itself into an industrial state which has considerable heavy industry, and it is among those which have developed atomic energy, both for peacetime and wartime purposes. Now that evolution of the Soviet Union has made a considerable impression upon the neighboring countries of Asia. That development has occurred through very cruel and inhumane processes. The needs of the people have been largely ignored. There has been a very large amount of compulsory and slave labor. The methods by which industrialization has been achieved cannot be approved by any right-thinking person who believes in the dignity of man. Nevertheless, there is a result there, and it is a result which has an appeal to the less developed countries who feel that their own independence will not be complete unless they can have a measure of not merely political independence but also a measure of economic independence. And when the Soviet Union sends its emissaries to them, and says, "Now see what we have done; and we will help you do the same thing," that has a certain appeal to countries which are primarily producers of raw materials and which are dependent upon other countries, heretofore the Western countries, for industrial goods.

Now that kind of Russian competition I do not think can be met merely by the kind of economic aid which helps to meet emergencies—famine, floods, and the like—or helps to balance current budgets. It is necessary to help these countries to move forward along the path to which they aspire and along which one neighboring country has largely gone, that is, the Soviet Union.

Now, I believe that these offers of the Soviet Union are coupled with political purposes and that their acceptance would involve untoward political results. Nevertheless, a temptation is there; the need is there; and, even if it were not for the Soviet example, I believe that the United States ought to try to help in ways which will not merely relieve on a year-to-year basis but help to transform these economies into better-integrated economies of the kind that the people aspire to.

Furthermore, if our Government can engage in some of these long-term projects, they not only will have great value in catching the imagination of the people and meeting their aspirations, but also it may make it possible to get from those countries themselves, or from other countries, or from organizations like the World Bank, a considerable amount of money. So our own money will go farther—through some kind of a matching process.

I believe that, when the nature of the problem is understood, there will be a realization that the enlightened self-interest of the United States

requires that we should go forward to meet this situation in terms of projects on the assumption that we would continue to give them some support over a period of years.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you consider that the passage of the enactment of the authority, which the President has requested, is of vital importance at this session?

A. I think it is vitally important at this time that we and indeed the whole world understand that what we really are engaged upon here is not just a single-shot operation but that it is something which is apt to be continuing. Now I realize full well that it is a difficult problem in that one Congress cannot bind a second Congress, and that each Congress is free to make its own appropriations, free of any commitments made by a prior Congress.

The Marshall plan, as I recall, was carried through with year-by-year appropriations, but there was a recognition by the Congress of the importance of carrying through a 4-to-5-year program there. But it is always difficult to work this thing out.

I recall I was in the Senate at the time the first MDAP bill—the military assistance bill—was passed. And I recall that there we worked on a basis of an appropriation I think for the first fiscal year, with contract authority for the next year. The working out of these things is difficult and complicated under congressional procedure; but I have no doubt that it will find a result which will, on the one hand, take account of the problem of the Congress and, on the other hand, take account of the national importance of proceeding here on a long-range basis.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Senator Knowland proposed that a neutralist be required to join collective security agreements against communism in return for such long-term aid from the United States. Would you concur with that view, Mr. Secretary?

A. We believe that each case of aid needs to be considered on its own individual merits; and while, broadly speaking, there is a closer bond of sympathy between the United States and countries who have stood up to be counted with us, nevertheless, I would not want to exclude the possibility of giving some economic assistance to other countries.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how did Congress recognize the importance of continuing or carrying out the Marshall plan? How did it express that recognition?

A. My recollection is that it was expressed primarily in the report of the Foreign Relations Committee and, possibly, the Appropriations Committees, in which they recommended the first installment. I must admit that my memory is somewhat vague on that point.

National Security and the Budget

Q. Mr. Secretary, in another national magazine today, already printed and on the market, General Ridgway says that budgetary and domestic political considerations overrode purely military considerations in the formation of, or the writing of, the Army budget. Would you care to comment on that?

A. I would make only this comment—not having seen the article. The budget-making process is a very complicated process, and each department of the Government asks for the amount of money that it thinks it needs, looking at the situation merely from its own standpoint. And that goes for the different services. Finally, these are all put together, and then the request from one source has to be balanced against requests from another source, and then the whole has to be considered in terms of the national economy and the values to be derived from a balanced budget, from a stable dollar, and the impact upon our domestic economy. The people who act only for one branch or department or agency of Government are unable alone to take into account all of these considerations. The man who finally makes the decision about the budget—and that is, in the end, the Presidential decision—the President makes the decision, in consultation with the Cabinet, with the National Security Council. He evaluates many, many elements of the problem, among other things the fact that national security depends not merely upon military power but upon a whole complex of factors, including the vitality of your economy.

As you all know, the Communists for many, many years counted as a principal weapon, a principal opportunity, the likelihood of the collapse of the capitalistic system and some sort of boom-bust event. They figured that they would

make more progress, perhaps, that way than they would, perhaps, by force of arms. So that when you are considering the national security you have to take into account many more factors than the point of view of any particular department. And that total decision is one which is generally accepted by everyone because it is recognized that there is only one person in the country who can adequately take account of all of the factors and that's the President of the United States.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that Latin America should be included among the areas to be considered for long-range planning?

A. Latin America is very much considered, particularly in the policies and activities of the Export-Import Bank.

. . . . .

Q. Mr. Secretary, have you had time, in your preoccupation with the events of our recent history, to form an impression of the new Soviet 5-year plan, especially in relation to the struggle, the competitive struggle, of which you spoke last week?

A. The impression I have is that it dedicates the Soviet Union to continue to put its primary emphasis upon heavy industry and that the trend toward more consumers' goods which was forecast 2 years ago when Malenkov was temporarily Premier there—that that tendency continues to be submerged, with the primary emphasis upon heavy industry, which does not necessarily mean exclusively war industry but, undoubtedly, is, in very large part, war industry.

Q. Mr. Secretary, has the administration made up its mind on the exact nature of what it would like the International Atomic Energy Agency to be; that is, an actual operating agency, or merely a broker between bilateral agreements?

A. Well, it isn't just a question of making up our mind, our views, as to the optimum result. Our views were set forth pretty fully in the speech that President Eisenhower made to the General Assembly of the United Nations in December. What was it, '53?

Q. '53.

A. That, as you know, contemplated having a world bank into which contributions of fissionable material would be made and out of which material for industrial purposes would be drawn. Now, for the first year and a half, the Soviet Union refused to go along with that program, and, therefore, it tended to develop along other lines. Belatedly, last July as a matter of fact, the Soviet Union indicated that it would be prepared to put up some fissionable material. Now the question as to how it will work out is a matter for international discussion at the present time. I believe that a further conference will be held soon, I think in February, and I will not be able to know until that time just what line will be developed. A good deal depends upon the views of other countries and not just of our own. From our own standpoint we would still think it preferable if the original concept could be carried out.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have events caused you to change your mind about taking to the stump this year—the political stump, that is?

A. No, I think I will stand on what I said before on that subject.

Board of Consultants To Review Foreign Intelligence Activities

White House press release dated January 13

The President on January 13 appointed an eight-man board of consultants to review periodically the foreign intelligence activities of the Government. The President's action is in line with recommendations of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government and after consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence.

The members of the board, in whose qualification and discretion the President has the fullest confidence, are as follows:

James R. Killian, Jr., *Chairman*, President, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass.

Adm. Richard L. Conolly, President, Long Island University, Brooklyn, N. Y.

Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle, New York, N. Y.

Benjamin F. Fairless, Director and Member of the Finance Committee, U. S. Steel Corporation, New York, N. Y.

Gen. John E. Hull, President, Manufacturing Chemists' Association, Inc., Washington, D. C.

Joseph P. Kennedy, Palm Beach, Fla.

Robert A. Lovett, New York, N. Y.

Edward L. Ryerson, Chairman, Executive Committee, Inland Steel Corporation, Chicago, Ill.

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President's Letter to Director of Central Intelligence

Dear Mr. Dulles: In the Hoover Commission Report submitted to Congress on June 29, 1955, relating to the intelligence activities of the Government, there is a recommendation that I appoint a "committee of experienced private citizens who shall have the responsibility to examine and report" on the work of the Government's foreign intelligence activities. I have noted your concurrence.

In accordance with this recommendation, I am constituting a Board of Consultants to review periodically the foreign intelligence activities of this Government, and to report their findings to me. While the review would concern itself with the sum total of these activities, it would be expected that major attention would be concentrated upon the work of the Central Intelligence Agency. A copy of the letter which I am sending to the prospective members of the Board is enclosed.

The work of this Board together with the regular reviews conducted by the appropriate Committees of the Congress will help to provide a method for assuring the Congress, the public, and the Executive Branch that this highly important and sensitive work is being efficiently conducted.

I know that you will afford the Board of Consultants the fullest cooperation in its work.

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower

President's Letter to Members of Board

I am establishing a Board of Consultants on foreign intelligence activities of this Government for the purpose of providing me periodically with independent evaluations of the work of the organizations involved. This Board will consist of eight outstanding citizens in whose high qualifications and discretion I have the fullest confidence. I would like to have you serve as one of the members of this Board.

It is my desire that this Board should meet not less often than once every six months to analyze carefully the work of the Government's foreign intelligence activities. These sessions might involve meetings over a period of several days. While the review by your group would be concerned with all Government foreign intelligence activities, I would expect particular detailed attention to be concentrated on the work of the Central Intelligence Agency and of those intelligence elements of key importance in other departments and agencies. I am particularly anxious to obtain your views as to the over-all progress that is being made, the quality of training and personnel, security, progress in research, effectiveness of specific projects and of the handling of funds, and general competence in carrying out assigned intelligence tasks.

It is my sincere conviction that prompt and accurate intelligence is essential to the policy making branches of the Government in the field of national security and foreign relations. By serving on the Board you can make a real contribution to the task of Government.

It is my hope that you and the others whom I am inviting to serve will be able to meet with Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, and me in the near future to determine the scope of your review of the work in the foreign intelligence field and to draw up terms of reference to permit you effectively to carry out your assigned task.

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower

U.S. Begins Training and Equipment of German Armed Forces

U.S. Embassy (Bonn) press release dated January 4

Training by the United States of Federal Republic forces personnel in accordance with German requests under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement [1] will commence in Germany and the United States in January. Under the same agreement, deliveries of U.S. weapons to the Federal Republic will be initiated.

The training and equipment programs, which are closely linked, are being inaugurated under the U.S.–Federal Republic agreement for the purpose of establishing an integrated defense of the North Atlantic area in accordance with defense plans formulated by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The first equipment deliveries to the Federal

[1] For an announcement of the deposit of the instrument of ratification at Washington on Dec. 27, see Bulletin of Jan. 9, 1956, p. 73. For text of agreement, see *ibid.*, July 25, 1955, p. 142.

The Department of Defense announced at Washington on December 28 the appointment of Maj. Gen. Joseph S. Bradley as Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) attached to the U.S. Embassy at Bonn.

Republic will be made this month and will consist only of light weapons and equipment for basic training purposes. Heavy equipment such as tanks, aircraft, training vessels, and heavy armament items will be moved into the hands of Federal Republic forces as mutually agreed and in step with the progress of German training. The equipment delivered to the Federal Republic will be similar to that which is currently being used by the armed forces of other NATO countries.

Army Training Program

Certain specific training related to U.S. equipment will be provided by American instructors at German and U.S. bases in Germany and at training centers and service schools in the United States. Most of the U.S. Army training assistance to German forces will be conducted by USAREUR [U.S. Army Europe] personnel at German installations. This program will be initiated with the transfer of 29 U.S. Army instructors—ready to begin training courses—to Andernach in mid-January. In addition, individuals from Federal Republic forces will be students in USAREUR schools.

Peak of the training period, as presently planned, should be in mid-1956. Except for students from Federal Republic forces at U.S. schools, it is expected that most of the U.S. Army training assistance will be concluded by the end of the first year of the German Army buildup.

American training groups working on Federal Republic bases will live in German caserns unless facilities are limited, in which event they will live in U.S. installations in the vicinity.

The size of the U.S. Army training group has not been definitely established but will fluctuate in accordance with the training assistance requested by the Federal Republic.

Air Force Training

Early in January, a number of officers and airmen of the new German Air Force will commence arriving at the USAFE [U.S. Air Force Europe] training bases of Fuerstenfeldbruck, Landsberg, and Kaufbeuren. They will undergo indoctrination and orientation training by German officials prior to entry into pilot and technical training courses available to them as a NATO member nation. The pilots will start their flight training at Landsberg in Harvard MK–4's. Upon completion of their training they will move to Fuerstenfeldbruck for training in the T–33 jet trainer.

Personnel scheduled for technical training will receive all of their training at Kaufbeuren, where courses in aircraft maintenance, communications, and electronics will be available. Some of the officers who will receive pilot training at Landsberg and Fuerstenfeldbruck will be utilized as instructors for subsequent pilot trainees. Similarly, many of the airmen and officers going to Kaufbeuren for technical training will be utilized as instructors after they complete their training. This will provide a nucleus of instructors for the German Air Force.

Federal Republic personnel taking training at U.S. air bases in Germany will be accorded the same logistical support as students of other NATO countries until the German Air Force is ready to assume its own support. Operational control of personnel in training at U.S. bases in Germany will be the responsibility of USAFE.

Navy Training Support

The U.S. Navy will give training support by instructing German naval student selectees in a variety of subjects necessary for their later employment at German recruit training bases. These selectees are former German naval personnel who have been employed by the U.S. Navy units at Bremerhaven and Schierstein.

Included in the program will be small-arms indoctrination including the 3.5-inch rocket launcher, study of American training methods and retraining in procedures for training recruits, and a study of modern methods in amphibious operations.

Letters of Credence

James C. Hagerty, press secretary to the President, announced on January 17 that the President had that day accepted the credentials of the newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Haiti, Mauclair Zephirin.

Ambassadorial Talks at Geneva With Chinese Communists

Press release 37 dated January 21

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Chinese Communists issued a misleading statement on January 18 regarding the Geneva discussions which have been taking place between U.S. Ambassador [U. Alexis] Johnson and Chinese Communist Ambassador Wang [Ping-nan]. It is thus necessary that the record be set straight.

These conferences were started last August to discuss the repatriation of civilians and other "practical matters at issue."[1]

Agreement to Repatriation of Civilians

On September 10, 1955, the representatives of both sides, by agreement, issued statements that civilians were entitled to return to their own countries.[2]

The Communist declaration stated:

> The People's Republic of China recognizes that Americans in the People's Republic of China who desire to return to the United States are entitled to do so, and declares that it has adopted and will further adopt appropriate measures so that they can expeditiously exercise their right to return.

As of today, 4 months after this declaration was made, only 6 out of the 19 for whom representations were being made on September 10 have been released. Thirteen Americans are still in Communist prisons.[3]

As for the United States, any Chinese is free to leave the United States for any destination of his choosing, and not a single one has been refused exit. The Indian Embassy, which was designated to assist any Chinese who wished to leave, has not brought to the attention of this Government any case of a Chinese who claims he is being prevented from leaving, nor has it stated that it is impeded in any way in carrying out its functions under the terms of the September 10 agreed announcement.

Discussion of Renunciation of Force

After this agreed announcement was made, the two sides proceeded to discuss "other practical matters at issue between them."

The Communists suggested the topics of the termination of the trade embargo against Communist China and the holding of a meeting by the Foreign Ministers of both sides.

Ambassador Johnson at the October 8, 1955, meeting pointed out that progress in further discussions could not be expected in the face of continuing Communist threats to take Taiwan by military force and suggested that both sides agree to announce that they renounced the use of force generally and particularly in the Taiwan area and agree to settle their differences by peaceful means. The U.S. representatives made clear that this renunciation of the use of force was not designed to commit the Communists to renounce pursuit of their policies by peaceful means with respect to Taiwan. These proposals were in the terms shown as annex B.

Three weeks after the U.S. proposal to renounce the use of force, the Communists on October 27 proposed a draft, a copy of which is shown in annex C. In this proposal, the Communists

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[1] For a joint communique, a Department announcement, and a statement by Secretary Dulles at the time the talks began, see BULLETIN of Aug. 8, 1955, p. 219.

[2] *Ibid.*, Sept. 19, 1955, p. 456.

[3] Of the 19 Americans for whom representations have been made under the agreed announcement, the following 6 have been released: Dr. and Mrs. Homer V. Bradshaw, the Rev. Justin Harvey, Harriet Mills, the Rev. Armand Proulx, and the Rev. Marcellus White. The remaining 13 are: the Rev. John William Clifford, John Thomas Downey, Richard Fecteau, the Rev. Fulgence Gross, the Rev. John Alexander Houle, Paul Mackinsen, Robert McCann, the Rev. Charles Joseph McCarthy, the Rev. Joseph Patrick McCormack, the Rev. Thomas Leonard Phillips, Bishop Ambrose H. Pinger, H. F. Redmond, and the Rev. John Paul Wagner.

pointedly omitted any reference to the Taiwan area or to the recognition of the right of self-defense, and inserted a provision for an immediate meeting of Foreign Ministers.

This proposal was unacceptable because it would have made it possible for the Communists to claim that the proposal did not apply to the Taiwan area, which is the very place against which the Communist threats are directed, and to claim further that the United States had renounced the right to use force in self-defense. Ambassador Johnson further pointed out that consideration of higher level meetings was neither appropriate nor acceptable under existing circumstances.

On November 10, 1955, Ambassador Johnson, in an attempt to reach an acceptable form of declaration, submitted a new draft declaration (annex D). This made clear that the renunciation of the use of force was without prejudice to the peaceful pursuit of its policies by either side; that it had general application but applied particularly to the Taiwan area; and that it did not deprive either side of the right of self-defense.

The U.S. proposal was rejected by the Communists, who, on December 1, 1955, made a counterproposal (annex E). This represented an advance over their previous proposal in that it dropped the provision for talks on the Foreign Minister level in favor of the continuance of ambassadorial talks but still pointedly omitted any reference to the Taiwan area and to recognition of the right of self-defense.

In a further effort to reach agreement, Ambassador Johnson, at the January 12 meeting, suggested two simple amendments to the Communist counterproposal. These were the insertion of the words "without prejudice to the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense" and of the words "in the Taiwan area or elsewhere." This U.S. revision of the Chinese counterproposal is shown in annex F.

The Communist Public Statement

This was the status of the discussions when the Communists released their public statement of January 18.

The Communist statement apparently rejects the U.S. proposal. It states, "Taiwan is Chinese territory: there can be no question of defense, as far as the United States is concerned. . . . Yet the United States has demanded the right of defense of the Taiwan area. Is this not precisely a demand that China accept continued occupation of Taiwan and that the tension in the Taiwan area be maintained forever?" And further, it states: "The American side continues to demand that our side accept that the United States has 'the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense' in China's Taiwan area. This is what our side absolutely cannot accept."

The United States Position

Two points must be made clear. First, the United States is not occupying Taiwan and Taiwan has never been a part of Communist China. The claims of Communist China and the contentions of the United States with respect to this area are well known and constitute a major dispute between them. It is specifically with respect to this dispute that the United States has proposed the principle of renunciation of force and the settlement of differences by peaceful means. This is the principle which the Communists say they have accepted.

In this connection the United States has made completely clear that in renouncing the use of

Statement by Ambassador Johnson

Press release 30 dated January 18

The following is a statement by Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson issued at Geneva on January 18 in reply to a 2,500-word statement issued by the Chinese Communist Foreign Office at Peiping on the same day.

I am disappointed that the Chinese Communists have again chosen to resort to propaganda regarding the talks between Ambassador Wang and myself. At the beginning of our talks we agreed that progress could best be achieved by promptly announcing our agreements and refraining from public airing of our disagreements.

The statement to some extent reflects the progress that it has thus far been possible to make in seeking a commitment by the Chinese Communists to renounce force to achieve their objectives. However the partial quotation and misinterpretation in the statement distorts and perverts the facts with regard to our discussions concerning the exact wording of such a commitment.

The statement also attempts to gloss over the stark failure of the Chinese Communists fully to carry out their commitments of September 10 expeditiously to release all Americans on Mainland China desiring to return.

force neither side is relinquishing its objectives and policies but only the use of force to attain them.

Secondly, the United States has rights and responsibilities in the Taiwan area; also it has a mutual defense treaty. Accordingly it is present in the Taiwan area. The Communist refusal to state that the renunciation of force is without prejudice to the right of self-defense against armed attack can only be interpreted as an attempt to induce the United States to agree that if attacked it will forgo the right to defend its lawful presence in this area.

The right of individual and collective self-defense against armed attack is inherent; it is recognized in international law; it is specifically affirmed in the charter of the United Nations. No country can be expected to forgo this right. Indeed, the Communists should be as anxious to preserve this right as is the United States.

Conclusion

The present exchange makes clear that:

1. Four months after the Communists announced that they would adopt measures to permit Americans in China to return to the United States, 13 Americans are still held in Communist prisons.

2. The United States proposed that the parties renounce the use of force without prejudice to the right of individual and collective self-defense against armed attack, in order that the discussions might take place free from the threat of war.

3. The United States made clear that this renunciation would not prejudice either side in the pursuit of its objectives and policies by peaceful means.

4. The Communists, while stating that they accept the principle of the renunciation of force, have deprived such acceptance of its value by refusing to agree that it is without prejudice to the right of individual and collective self-defense against armed attack and that it is applicable to the Taiwan area.

In short, the Communists so far seem willing to renounce force only if they are first conceded the goals for which they would use force.

The United States, for its part, intends to persist in the way of peace. We seek the now overdue fulfillment by the Chinese Communists of their undertaking that the Americans now in China should be allowed expeditiously to return. We seek this not only for humanitarian reasons but because respect for international undertakings lies at the foundation of a stable international order. We shall also seek with perseverance a meaningful renunciation of force, particularly in the Taiwan area.

ANNEXES

Annex A: Agreed Announcement of the Ambassadors of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China

[For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 19, 1955, p. 456.]

Annex B: United States Statement and Proposal on Renunciation of Force, October 8, 1955

One of the practical matters for discussion between us is that each of us should renounce the use of force to achieve our policies when they conflict. The United States and the PRC [People's Republic of China] confront each other with policies which are in certain respects incompatible. This fact need not, however, mean armed conflict, and the most important single thing we can do is first of all to be sure that it will not lead to armed conflict.

Then and only then can other matters causing tension between the parties in the Taiwan area and the Far East be hopefully discussed.

It is not suggested that either of us should renounce any policy objectives which we consider we are legitimately entitled to achieve, but only that we renounce the use of force to implement these policies.

Neither of us wants to negotiate under the threat of force. The free discussion of differences, and their fair and equitable solution, become impossible under the overhanging threat that force may be resorted to when one party does not agree with the other.

The United States as a member of the United Nations has agreed to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force. This has been its policy for many years and is its guiding principle of conduct in the Far East, as throughout the world.

The use of force to achieve national objectives does not accord with accepted standards of conduct under international law.

The Covenant of the League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand Treaties, and the Charter of the United Nations reflect the universal view of the civilized community of nations that the use of force as an instrument of national policy violates international law, constitutes a threat to international peace, and prejudices the interests of the entire world community.

There are in the world today many situations which tempt those who have force to use it to achieve what they believe to be legitimate policy objectives. Many

countries are abnormally divided or contain what some consider to be abnormal intrusions. Nevertbeless, the responsible governments of the world have in each of these cases renounced the use of force to achieve what they believe to be legitimate and even urgent goals.

It is an essential foundation and preliminary to tbe success of the discussions under Item 2 that it first be made clear that the parties to these discussions renounce the use of force to make the policies of either prevail over those of the otber. That particularly applies to the Taiwan area.

The acceptance of this principle does not involve third parties, or the justice or injustice of conflicting claims. It only involves recognizing and agreeing to abide by accepted standards of international conduct.

We ask, therefore, as a first matter for discussion under Item 2, a declaration that your side will not resort to the use of force in the Taiwan area except defensively. The United States would be prepared to make a corresponding declaration. These declarations will make it appropriate for us to pass on to the discussion of other matters with a better hope of coming to constructive conclusions.

Annex C: Chinese Communist Draft Declaration on Renunciation of Force, October 27, 1955

1. Ambassador Wang Ping-nan on behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China and Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson on behalf of the Government of the United States of America jointly declare that,

2. In accordance with Article 2, Paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United Nations, "All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered"; and

3. In accordance with Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations, "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations";

4. The People's Republic of China and the United States of America agree tbat they sbould settle disputes between their two countries by peaceful means without resorting to the threat or use of force.

5. In order to realize their common desire, the People's Republic of China and the United States of America decide to hold a conference of Foreign Ministers to settle through negotiations the question of relaxing and eliminating the tension in Taiwan area.

Annex D: United States Draft Declaration on Renunciation of Force, November 10, 1955

1. The Ambassador of the United States of America and the Ambassador of the People's Republic of China during the course of the discussions of practical matters at issue bave expressed the determination tbat the differences between the two sides shall not lead to armed conflict.

2. They recognize that the use of force to achieve national objectives does not accord with the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter or with generally accepted standards of international conduct.

3. They furthermore recognize tbat the renunciation of the threat or use of force is essential to the just settlement of disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

4. Tberefore, without prejudice to the pursuit by each side of its policies by peaceful means they have agreed to announce the following declarations:

5. Ambassador Wang Ping-nan informed Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson that:

6. In general, and with particular reference to tbe Taiwan area, tbe People's Republic of China renounces the use of force, except in individual and collective self-defense.

7. Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson informed Ambassador Wang Ping-nan tbat:

8. In general, and with particular reference to the Taiwan area, tbe United States renounces tbe use of force, except in individual and collective self-defense.

Annex E: Chinese Communist Draft Counterproposal for an Agreed Announcement, December 1, 1955

1. Ambassador Wang Ping-nan, on bebalf of tbe Government of the People's Republic of China, and Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson on behalf of the Government of the United States of America, agree to announce:

2. The People's Republic of China and the United States of America are determined that they should settle disputes between their two countries through peaceful negotiations without resorting to the threat or use of force;

3. The two Ambassadors should continue tbeir talks to seek practical and feasible means for the realization of this common desire.

Annex F: United States Revision of Chinese Communist December 1 Counterproposal, January 12, 1956

1. Ambassador Wang Ping-nan, on behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China, and Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, on behalf of the Government of the United States of America, agree to announce:

2. The People's Republic of China and the United States of America are determined that they will settle disputes between them through peaceful means and tbat, without prejudice to the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense, they will not resort to the threat or use of force in the Taiwan area or elsewhere.

3. The two Ambassadors should continue tbeir talks to seek practical and feasible means for the realization of this common desire.

The New Soviet Diplomatic Offensive

by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy[1]

Under our Constitution, our President is charged with the execution of our foreign policy and our Secretary of State acts by virtue of authority delegated to him by the President. The objective of that policy is a simple one. It is the security and the welfare of the American people. All our efforts whether they succeed or fail are bent to that end. I say "succeed or fail" because no government perhaps has ever enjoyed a perfect batting average in the field of foreign affairs and ours is no exception. Looking back, I think that the American percentage of success is far better than the average. Fortunately our foreign policies today are in the hands of men to whom the international field is no mystery and who have not lost intimate touch with the basic aspirations and needs of our own people. Our Nation has played and is playing a role which I believe history will judge as honorable because our Government consistently has put moral considerations above material considerations.

One of the obvious major roadblocks in the way of our basic policy objective, that is, the security and welfare of the American people, is the fact that the postwar years have been overshadowed by a world conspiracy which seeks to dominate all world areas in the name of international communism. Frequently this is only a banner for a movement which may be characterized as old-fashioned Russian expansionism or, to use a discredited word, colonialism. This tenacious and aggressive program is as elastic and ingenious as it is persistent and determined. Controlled by a highly centralized apparatus, it is able to shift and change with a bland rapidity which often leaves its stanchest adherents bewildered. It is backed by the gigantic material resources of a vast area which now controls in the neighborhood of 900 million people.

Many wise commentators on our modern world have noted that we are living in a period when the forces of history have been greatly accelerated. Ours is a contracting world. When I received my scholastic education, we were taught in terms of maps that used Mercator's projection. The maps we studied showed our great North American Continent isolated from the rest of the world by the expanse of great oceans. Today the maps of Mercator's projection with vast reaches of ocean and desert and mountain range need reappraisal. We are living in a day in which guided missiles now in process of development will travel thousands of miles in a matter of minutes.

Oceans and roads and ancient caravan tracks marked out on the Mercator projection maps of our childhood are no longer primary routes of communication. We today must use polar maps to help us understand the lines of communication that modern airplanes and guided missiles will follow.

In this contracting world where space and time have been foreshortened, obviously tremendous demands have been placed upon the people who inhabit it—demands that change traditional ways of thinking, demands that change even our inherited physical reflexes. If we think of what is demanded of us when we drive a car, we become conscious that every day we take it for granted that our bodies make untold thousands of reflex actions, signs of warning and danger that would be absolutely incomprehensible to our great-grandfathers and all who preceded them.

These changes in our world have been accompanied, however, by an acceleration in other

[1] Address made before the Pennsylvania Bar Association at Harrisburg, Pa., on Jan. 20 (press release 35).

forces. It is imperative that we remain aware and alert to this acceleration. When George Washington made his Farewell Address, he spoke of "our detached and distant situation." His words were wise and valid for much of our history. Today, however, we no longer live in a world where we enjoy yesterday's security of a "detached and distant situation." We must not only be aware of the competitive social, economic, and political forces which surround us, to say nothing of the weapons designed and fabricated to cripple any city of the world in a single blow; we must also be aware of the rapidity with which the forces of history change.

Since our childhood the political map of the world has changed almost as tremendously as the physical map—in some cases beyond recognition. Empires, kingdoms, and even the names of countries have disappeared from the map, and the significance of their disappearance demands constant reappraisal because along with these changes on the political map go great changes in the way in which men live. Traditional patterns of commerce and communication between people disappear. The social structure of vast societies changes and with it tremendous new fermenting forces come into being. Vast populations in Asia and Africa, who had through the centuries of recorded history accepted poverty, starvation, disease, and ignorance as inevitable, are unwilling to do so today. They are aware that modern society has at its disposal the means and techniques by which they can improve their lives and those of their children, so that they may have hope for a future where they may live in dignity free from the ancient specters of pestilence and famine.

Postwar Aid Programs

The American people and their Government have been alert to these changes and their implications. We have sympathized with and aided the aspirations of the people of many areas. We have cherished since the birth of our Nation "our detached and distant situation," but twice when the values of freedom and independence for all men were threatened, we have gone to war to protect them. When, after the Second World War, our people became aware that a new threat existed, when they became aware that international communism was extinguishing freedom and independence wherever it could, they reacted rapidly. Starting with the Greek-Turkish aid program in 1947, we undertook two major and related international efforts.

The first was to aid in the rebuilding of the countries that had suffered great destruction during the war and to assist them in developing their economic and social security. The second was to help in building up the military security of the free nations. Military and economic security had to be built simultaneously. Without social and economic well-being and a sense of spiritual progress, a solid security is not possible. Without military security free nations were threatened by domination. Two conspicuous examples of this were Greece and Korea.

We were, of course, not alone in our recognition of the danger. The free nations reacted rapidly and energetically. Out of our common realization of the danger has come united action to build defense and strength. Throughout the free world a system of collective security has been created for mutual defense. In the North Atlantic the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Iceland are joined with 11 European countries from Norway in the north to Greece and Turkey in the south, partners in the great North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In the Near East the United Kingdom has associated itself with Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan in the Baghdad Pact. On this continent the United States and the 20 republics of our Latin American friends have strengthened the Organization of American States. And in the Pacific the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, and New Zealand have joined with the Philippines, Pakistan, and Thailand to create the SEATO Pact. In addition the United States has made security treaties with the Philippines, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Republic of China on Taiwan. The United States today is fortified by security arrangements with more than 40 countries.[2]

These treaties are made pursuant to what the United Nations Charter calls the inherent right of collective self-defense. Together they constitute a worldwide political warning system. We have developed with our allies a collective system of great power which can be flexibly used on whatever scale may be requisite to make aggression costly.

[2] For a map illustrating these arrangements, see BULLETIN of Mar. 21, 1955, p. 478.

Soviet Policy Reversals

A major development in the past year has been the assumption by the Soviet Union of a new form of diplomatic offensive. This offensive grew out of the fact that the Western powers had achieved the admission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and to the Western European Union of the German Federal Republic and the decision to permit the German Federal Republic to provide for the defense of Western Germany. The Soviet reaction to these developments was immediate. We witnessed a quick series of reversals of Soviet policy to adjust itself to the Western accomplishment. These were announced, in fact, by Mr. Molotov at the time of his visit to San Francisco last June. Soviet leaders embarked on an ambitious campaign which embraced the conclusion of a treaty with Austria, a visit of conciliation to the Tito government in Yugoslavia, an invitation to Chancellor Adenauer to visit Moscow, a series of proposals on disarmament, and what might be called high-pressure salesmanship in several areas in Asia.

Our Secretary of State recently released a statement that had been addressed to him by the U.S. delegation to the United Nations General Assembly.[3] This statement said:

> The present period in history may one day be recognized as a major turning point in the struggle between Communism and freedom. It appears to be clearly a shift in the cold war, in which economic and social problems have moved to the forefront.
>
> . . . we [have been] conscious that the Soviet Union . . . was using economic and social collaboration as a means for jumping military as well as political barriers.

This statement by the U.S. delegation to the United Nations is, I think, of importance to the people of the United States. We are entering another stage of our postwar history, and proper understanding of its meaning by us is vital to the security of our country.

In this new stage, as this report says, there "appears to be clearly a shift in the cold war, in which economic and social problems have moved to the forefront." You are aware, I am sure, of this pattern as it has been developing. There have been many examples of it—the Soviet offer of a steel plant to India, arms that are being sold to Egypt, Chinese cotton goods being imported in Indonesia, Soviet offers of assistance to Egypt in building the Aswan High Dam, Hungarian railway equipment for Egypt, cement works and a sugar refinery to be built by Czechoslovakia for Syria, Polish capital equipment to be made available for various countries in the Middle East.

A clear pattern emerges when the individual facts are brought together and analyzed. The U.S.S.R., its satellites in Europe, and China are working together to the extent of their ability to expand their economic influence in the countries of the Near East, Africa, and Asia. Signs of this activity can be seen in Egypt, the Sudan, Afghanistan, India, Burma, and Indonesia.

The pattern of this penetration takes various forms: offers of help, long-range development projects such as the Aswan Dam, the sending of trade missions, the offer to help in disposing of surplus products, offers to furnish complete factories and provide the technicians to train local employees.

Reasons for Policy Shift

What are some of the factors that have led to this change in Soviet policy? Because certainly it is a change. Heretofore the U.S.S.R. has done everything in its power to hinder the economic development of the countries that are not in its bloc or are not its satellites. Since the war it has shown a face of bluster and fulmination to all countries that have not been completely subservient to it. There are two principal reasons, I suggest, for the present change. Unquestionably the first has been the defensive strength that the free world has built up. Secondly, the U.S.S.R. policies of bluster and fulmination have not been successful. Stalinist policies were not paying dividends.

The new Soviet policy of economic penetration and of military assistance is designed to overcome the collective security alliances facing them. It is in imitation of our own program of economic and military assistance, and perhaps the only surprising feature in it is that the Russians have been so slow in adopting it. This Soviet diplomatic offensive presents our American foreign policy and diplomacy an acute and difficult situation.

After the war we recognized that Europe represented an immediate problem of economic and military assistance. Our policies and programs there have succeeded. But we should recall that there we were working with countries that share our basic assumptions about the composition of

[3] *Ibid.*, Jan. 23, 1956, p. 117.

society, about its economic structure and about the common threat of communism. However, in the area from Gibraltar to Djakarta, where the Soviet Union is, for the present at least, making its major effort, we are faced with a variety of situations. This is an area where new nations are struggling for their existence. They have not always been aware of the danger of possible Soviet or Communist control. To some of them the dangers of poverty and want today and tomorrow seem more imperative. These so-called uncommitted areas wish to stand on their own feet economically and socially and to become modern nations. They are willing to risk possible future sacrifices to get immediate material gain.

We are not alone in our diagnosis of these problems. The U.S.S.R. is well aware of them. A recent copy of a Communist publication clearly outlines future Soviet policy toward the West as "prolonged co-existence, and economic competition between the two systems. . . . The future development of society is determined in the last analysis not by means of war but through peaceful economic competition. Only in such competition can the historic superiority of one or other social system be proved in practice."

These are some of the dangers and difficulties that we face. However, let us look at the present and future from our point of view. The U.S.S.R. now is recognizing that it cannot rely on threat and intimidation. They are now engaged in competition with us and cynically have chosen our own methods. Economic and technical assistance, trade missions, aid in long-range economic development are the means that we had traditionally used to build a viable economic and social world among the free nations.

Imitation is a sign of flattery. This challenge we should not fear. Our social and economic system has long been able to tolerate diversity. It is not dependent on monolithic conformity. The area of competition in which the U.S.S.R. has now chosen to enter is one where the results are pragmatic. We believe that our system has more to offer; that it has better tools and techniques at its disposal; that it has greater resources. More important, we know that it is a system of freedom and not of domination. We know that its objective is the dignity of man rather than the power of the state. There will be problems, surely, insofar as the threat of war diminishes. To replace the cement of fear, our alliances will find new strength in the common aspirations for freedom and independence which link the free peoples of the world. I am sure that the members of your great Bar Association will agree with me that the American people will respond to this challenge with the vitality and energy and faith with which they have responded in the past to the challenge of war.

Mr. Randall To Conduct Economic Discussions With Turkey

Press release 24 dated January 17

The Governments of the United States and the Republic of Turkey announce that upon their joint request Mr. Clarence B. Randall has agreed to proceed to Turkey late this month to discuss economic problems of interest to both countries.

Mr. Randall is an eminent industrialist in the United States and Special Consultant to President Eisenhower on foreign economic policy. It is expected that Mr. Randall's visit will greatly contribute to the further development of economic relations between the two nations and the advancement of mutual understanding in the field.

Mr. Randall, who will be guest of the Turkish Government, will take with him to Turkey his associates, Mr. Forest D. Siefkin of Chicago and Dr. C. Edward Galbreath of Washington, D. C. Mr. Randall and his associates will serve without compensation.

Department's Recommendations on Sugar Legislation

Statement by Henry F. Holland
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs [1]

Sugar is of such great importance in United States relations with a number of foreign countries, particularly the Latin American countries, that the State Department is especially appreciative of the opportunity to comment on the legislation which you are now considering.

The Department's general position on sugar legislation is contained in its report on S. 1635, which was filed with the chairman of the committee on June 22, 1955.[2] As certain sections of that report are no longer applicable, I shall not take the time of the committee by reading it into the record. I do request, however, that it be made a part of the record, and I hope that the members of the committee may be able to find time to read it.

As the committee is aware, the present Sugar Act provides fixed quotas for domestic sugar-producing areas and the Philippines. These total 5,424,000 tons. The difference between this total and the total amount of sugar which we consume in the United States is supplied by foreign countries other than the Philippines. These countries might be called the residual suppliers. Among the residual suppliers, Cuba's share is 96 percent; that of the others, 4 percent. The present act is now scheduled to expire January 1, 1957.

When sugar legislation was under consideration by the House Committee on Agriculture, the executive branch made the following recommendations with regard to quotas:

1. That the provisions of the present act apply up to the level of 8,350,000 tons.

2. That beginning January 1, 1956, increases in consumption above the level of 8,350,000 tons be divided 55 percent to domestic producers and 45 percent to Cuba and other foreign countries, excepting the Philippines, whose fixed quota was established under the Philippine Trade Act. These foreign countries other than Cuba and the Philippines are commonly referred to as the full-duty countries, inasmuch as the full tariff duty is paid on all sugar imported from them.

3. The executive branch recommended further that beginning January 1, 1957, the expiration date of the present act, the Cuban share in that portion of increased U.S. consumption allocated to foreign suppliers be reduced from 96 percent to 60 percent, and that the share of the full-duty countries be increased from 4 percent to 40 percent.

4. Finally, the executive branch recommended that the relative share of the major full-duty countries be determined on the basis of their participation in our imports of sugar from such countries during the period 1951–54.

The bill approved by the House of Representatives differs in several important respects from the recommendations of the executive branch. I should like to comment briefly on these.

1. *Dividing increases in consumption between domestic producers and foreign producers.* The bill approved by the House would divide increases in consumption 50–50 between domestic and foreign producers. The State Department supports

[1] Made before the Senate Finance Committee on Jan. 16 (press release 21) regarding H.R. 7030 as approved by the House of Representatives.

[2] For a statement by Assistant Secretary Holland on June 22 before the House Committee on Agriculture, see BULLETIN of July 18, 1955, p. 120.

the recommendation which the executive branch made to the House Agriculture Committee, and is making to this committee, that domestic producers should share to the extent of 55 percent in increases in consumption above the level of 8,350,000 tons.

I should like to emphasize one very obvious point in this connection, however, and to point out two of its implications. The 55–45 division between domestic and foreign producers allows foreign countries to supply less sugar than would the 50–50 division approved by the House. This means that it is especially desirable, from the foreign-policy viewpoint, (1) that the Senate accord as favorable treatment to foreign producers in other respects as was accorded by the House and (2) that it is even more necessary than it was in the House that the division of the foreign share of increases in consumption among foreign producers be made on the basis of an equitable standard which can be applied as uniformly as possible among the interested countries. The problem of allocating quotas among foreign countries is, at best, a very complex one and involves choices as to base periods and standards that are subject to differences of viewpoint. The simpler and more understandable the standards, the more likely it is that these differences will not become serious.

2. *Dividing the foreign share of increases in consumption between Cuba and the full-duty countries.* As was indicated earlier, the executive branch recommended that 60 percent of such increases be allocated to Cuba and 40 percent to the full-duty countries. The bill approved by the House would give the full-duty countries a statutory quota of 175,000 tons for 1957 and would allocate to them an additional 45,000 tons out of increases in consumption each year thereafter. The difference, if any, between the foreign share of increases in consumption and the annual increment of 45,000 tons going to the full-duty countries would go to Cuba. This would, on the average, probably be about one-third the amount received by the full-duty countries. Cuba's share in some years might prove to be nothing, and the Department of State firmly believes that Cuba should not be placed last in line for a share which may or may not materialize.

It is the view of the Department that it would be unwise to allocate to the full-duty countries more than 40 percent of the foreign share of increases in consumption during the period of the bill. The Department is opposed to any larger increase, especially in view of our normal dependence on Cuba for emergency supplies of sugar and the current depressed economic situation of the Cuban sugar industry, and also the fact that Cuba is the country which is most directly affected by the increase in the domestic share.

I should like to call your special attention to the fact that to adopt legislation less favorable to Cuba than that recommended by the executive branch would mean a further worsening of economic conditions in Cuba. Cuba's sugar production has already been reduced from 8 million tons in 1952 to 5 million tons in 1955. Cuba, a small country with a population of about 6 million, is financing a surplus of sugar well in excess of one million tons in addition to necessary carryover. The Cuban Government estimates that, because of the cutback already made in its sugar production, salaries in the industry have had to be reduced by approximately 13 percent. The take-home pay of workers has been reduced by a further 27 percent cut during the "dead season," which is, of course, now of longer duration because of the cutback in production. Care is obviously required to avoid action which would materially worsen Cuba's present economic position, particularly since Cuba has always been our largest source of sugar as well as our most readily expansible source of additional sugar in event of emergency.

It is the policy of our Government to seek by every effective and proper means to assist our partners in the hemisphere in strengthening their economies. We feel that the full-duty countries are entitled to the economic benefits of increased participation in the United States market. The executive branch has recommended that their participation in the foreign share of increased consumption over 8,350,000 tons be increased from the 4 percent allowed by the law now in effect to 40 percent. We must be careful, however, that in seeking to benefit the full-duty countries, we do not cripple the economy of Cuba, who is likewise an important partner in the hemisphere.

3. *Dividing the share of the major full-duty countries among such countries.* As was indicated earlier, the executive branch recommended that the relative shares of the major full-duty countries be determined on the basis of their participation in our imports of sugar from these countries during the period 1951–54. So far as is known,

the bill approved by the House follows no uniform standard in allocating the quotas among this group of countries. The allocation appears to have been based initially on their relative participation in exports of sugar to the world, including the United States, rather than on exports of sugar to the United States. Adjustments appear to have been made from this base, however, which substantially increase the quotas of some countries and reduce the quotas of other countries. The basis for these adjustments is not known to the Department.

I should like to urge this committee to support the following recommendations of the executive branch, which we understand have been incorporated in a committee print: (1) that beginning January 1, 1956, domestic producers should benefit to the extent of 55 percent and foreign producers to the extent of 45 percent from increases in consumption above 8,350,000 tons rather than on a 50-50 basis, as is provided in the House bill; (2) that beginning January 1, 1957, Cuba should receive 60 percent of the foreign share of increases in consumption. The House bill gives to Cuba whatever excess in the foreign share may remain after giving to the full-duty countries 175,000 tons in 1957 and an additional 45,000 tons each year thereafter; and (3) that the relative shares of the major full-duty countries be determined on the basis of their relative participation in our importation of sugar from such countries during the most recent 4-year period, 1951–54, rather than on the undefined basis provided for in the House bill. As I have suggested earlier, these recommendations would provide for a smaller participation by foreign countries, and a larger participation by domestic areas, in increases in consumption than are provided for in the House bill. They would, however, in the opinion of the State Department, provide for a more reasonable and a more defensible distribution of the foreign quota among foreign countries.

I believe that the recommendations of the executive branch regarding sugar legislation reflect one of the finest bipartisan aspects of United States policy in this hemisphere, that is, our desire by every practical means to expand and strengthen inter-American trade. As you know, the major part of our sugar imports comes from Latin America. The enormous trade now being carried on between the nations of this hemisphere is one of the principal factors which account for the amazing economic progress that is going on in Latin America. It is also an important factor in our own prosperity. Twenty-seven percent of all our exports are sold in Latin America, more than in any other comparable area of the world. Thirty-four percent of all our imports come from the Latin American Republics. About 37 percent of all United States direct investment abroad is in this area. The benefits to all of us of protecting and increasing this great volume of trade are obvious.

Wherever it is possible, consistent with our national interest, we must resolutely resist all attempts to reduce inter-American trade or, speaking more broadly, international trade, whether by increased tariffs, reduced quotas, or other restrictive devices. But, in our own interest, we must do more than merely protect existing levels of inter-American trade. We must undertake to expand and strengthen it. This means that we must find ways to increase our imports of Latin America's products. This is true because the level of our imports is the limiting factor in our inter-American trade. The dollars that Latin America earns by selling its products in our market are the same dollars that she uses to pay for our exports. Therefore, as we import more, there is a balancing increase in our exports.

The proposal of the executive branch protects the existing access of every Latin American sugar-producing country to our market and provides that their sales in this market shall grow in the future right along with those of our own domestic producers.

May I, in closing, again thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to express the views of the State Department on the very important legislation which you are now considering.

Treaty of Friendship With Nicaragua

Press release 36 dated January 20

A treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation between the United States and the Republic of Nicaragua was signed at Managua on January 21. Ambassador Thomas E. Whelan signed the treaty for the United States and Oscar Sevilla-Sacasa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, for Nicaragua.

The treaty is designed to provide a comprehensive, integrated legal framework within which

general economic relationships between the two countries may develop along mutually beneficial lines.

The treaty contains 25 articles and a protocol which cover in some detail a wide range of subject matter. In brief, each of the two countries:

(1) agrees to accord within its territories to citizens and corporations of the other, treatment no less favorable than it accords to its own citizens and corporations with respect to engaging in commercial and industrial activities;

(2) formally endorses standards regarding the protection of persons and their property and interests that reflect the most enlightened legal and constitutional principles; and

(3) reasserts its adherence to the principles of nondiscriminatory treatment of trade and shipping.

From the standpoint of aiding the economic interests of Nicaragua, the treaty represents another step in the development of that country's plans for promoting economic development and improving the welfare of its people by various means, including the encouragement of foreign private investment.

The U.S. program for the negotiation of treaties of this type is an integral part of this country's policy for the furtherance of liberal principles of trade and economic relations in general and particularly for creating throughout the world conditions favorable to economic development. This treaty follows the same general pattern as the others of the type that have been negotiated since World War II.

The treaty will shortly be transmitted to the U.S. Senate for advice and consent to ratification and, when the ratification processes of both countries have been completed, will enter into force one month after the exchange of ratifications.

Convention on Inter-American Cultural Relations Transmitted to Senate

S. Exec. C, 84th Cong., 2d sess.

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE OF TRANSMITTAL

THE WHITE HOUSE, *January 12, 1956.*

To the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith a certified copy of the Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations, signed at Caracas on March 28, 1954.

The purposes of the convention are explained in the report of the Acting Secretary of State, which is transmitted herewith for the information of the Senate.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

REPORT OF THE ACTING SECRETARY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, October 29, 1955.

THE PRESIDENT,
The White House:

I have the honor to transmit to you a certified copy of the Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations, signed at Caracas on March 28, 1954, with the recommendation that it be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

The convention, which is concerned with the exchange of students and professors, was formulated and adopted at the 10th Inter-American Conference held in Caracas, Venezuela, from March 1 to 28, 1954.[1] It is a revision of the 1936 Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations, originally sponsored by the United States and adopted at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, Buenos Aires, 1936. This latter convention is at present in force between the United States and 16 other American Republics (51 Stat. 178).

Experience with the application of the 1936 convention had demonstrated that many of its detailed provisions for the selection and support of exchanges were unduly rigid and cumbersome. In light of these experiences, the United States was especially interested in revising the convention in order to introduce greater flexibility in the awarding of fellowships and grants and in the

[1] For a report on the conference, see BULLETIN of Apr. 26, 1954, p. 634.

financing thereof. The amendments proposed by the United States, together with those submitted by the Pan American Union and Brazil, served as the basis for the deliberations at the Conference with respect to the formulation of the revised convention. The majority of the amendments proposed by the United States were accepted by the Conference and are reflected in the revised convention.

The principal modifications incorporated in the new convention are:

1. Obligations on the part of the contracting states have been reduced and made more flexible in frank recognition of the geographic, economic, and other differences between them. The annual quota of fellowships to be awarded by each country has been reduced from "two" to "one or more fellowships, insofar as it may be able to do so," and the interchange of professors has been made entirely optional. The significance of exchange projects in fitting the needs of the respective governments is recognized, and governments are left free to conduct such programs with other contracting governments through bilateral agreements or otherwise. The principles of cooperation between contracting states in the conduct of such projects is not only embodied in the provisions for the award of fellowships and grants to visiting professors and specialists, but is explicitly set forth in the convention as the fundamental principle which should govern its implementation.

2. The procedures provided for have been simplified and strengthened. Specific dates and other such details have been eliminated. The financial responsibilities of the participating governments are specified more precisely and, as regards professors and specialists, are distributed more realistically. At the same time, flexibility in the conduct of programs is assured by provisions for alternative procedures. For example, the governments concerned may develop projects for visiting professors and specialists, and the financial arrangements therefor, directly between one another, or they may, in their discretion, utilize the services of the Pan American Union to assist them in undertaking such projects.

3. The Pan American Union is charged with the responsibility for the annual compilation and circulation among the governments of reports of the contracting states on the nature and extent of the participation of each in the exchange program, including data as to what private, nongovernmental organizations are doing in this field. The importance of such nonofficial projects and the role of governments in encouraging and facilitating them is also recognized.

There is transmitted herewith a summary dealing with the revised convention which does not purport to discuss and analyze the text in detail, but in which an attempt is made to indicate and identity the significant revisions therein in relation to the earlier convention.

It is provided in the 1954 convention that it will come into force between the states that ratify it in the order in which they deposit their respective instruments of ratification. Up to the present time Haiti and Venezuela have deposited ratifications.

The exchange of persons is one of the most effective means for promoting mutual understanding among the peoples of America and maintaining a climate of public opinion conducive to effective inter-American cooperation. It is believed that the revised convention will achieve such exchange on a much more satisfactory basis than was accomplished under the previous convention and therefore represents a significant step forward in the field of inter-American cultural relations. The United States played an active and prominent role in furthering the efforts to revise the convention. It is hoped that this revision will be given favorable consideration by the Senate.

Respectfully submitted.

HERBERT HOOVER, Jr.,
Acting Secretary of State.

Summary of the Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations

ARTICLE 1

Corresponds to article I of the 1936 convention. The essential changes are—

1. Reduction of the annual quota of study fellowships each state is obliged to award from "two" to "one or more, insofar as it may be able to do so."

2. Clarification (in the non-English texts) of the term "graduate student."

3. Broadening of the categories of persons eligible for fellowships. Not only graduate students and teachers but also "other persons with equivalent qualifications" are now formally eligible for fellowships.

4. Clear understanding that contracting governments may award scholarships under other terms also, and that they are not bound in all inter-American scholarship programs to follow the procedures or comply with the specific

terms set forth in the convention but may develop their own foreign fellowship programs as they see fit by formal or informal understandings with other states or unilaterally and on their own initiative.

These revisions are a general attempt to adjust quotas realistically to the differing abilities and resources of the contracting states. Minimum financial obligations are decreased; they are also made flexible. Administrative procedures will be more efficient as a result of the broadening of the categories of candidates, the clarification of the term "graduate student," and the explicit recognition of the right of every participating state to administer fellowship programs without regard to the financial or procedural specifications set forth in the convention.

ARTICLE 2

Corresponds to certain provisions of article I of the 1936 convention. The essential changes are—

1. The financial responsibilities of the host governments have been made clearer and more specific. The phrase "tuition, subsidiary expenses and maintenance" has been changed to read "tuition, textbooks, work materials and, in addition, a monthly allowance to cover lodging, maintenance and other additional necessary expenses." The phrase providing for a sharing of maintenance costs with the recipient of a fellowship has been eliminated, thus placing the responsibility for such expenses more clearly on the host governments.

2. The obligation of a contracting state to provide travel grants to its nationals who receive the fellowships provided for in article 1 is reduced in proportion to the reduction in the number of fellowships to be offered by the other contracting states. The provision for the payment of incidental travel expenses during the period of travel has been clarified and made more precise.

ARTICLE 3

The substance of this article is new. Its effect is to place a certain emphasis on fields of study in relation to the needs of the countries involved, a factor which was lacking in the previous convention. It provides administratively for advance notice regarding fellowship offerings in specific fields. The provision reflects the value placed on these fellowships by underdeveloped countries where there is a need for specialized personnel who must be trained abroad.

ARTICLE 4

The provisions for specific deadline dates set forth in article II of the 1936 convention have been eliminated as have also the provisions for a specified number of names on the panels of candidates. A deadline of 3 months has been set for the announcement of awards. A fellowship may be extended for a second year and in exceptional cases for a third year.

ARTICLE 5

This article is identical in substance with article III of the 1936 convention. It provides that if for any reason it becomes necessary to repatriate the recipient of a fellowship, the government awarding the fellowship may effect the repatriation at the expense of the nominating government.

ARTICLE 6

Corresponds to article IV of the 1936 convention. The essential changes are:

1. The obligation to send or receive visiting professors every other year is eliminated; direct, strictly reciprocal interchange is no longer required. The category of "specialists" was added to that of professors to conform to the broader needs for academic or research personnel on the part of some governments. For the same reason, provision for preference for teaching rather than research work was dropped and a general provision regarding assignments substituted for it, the purpose of which is to clarify and emphasize the nature of the activity for which grants are awarded.

2. The procedures for the awarding of grants have been radically altered and greatly simplified. Elaborate, impossible procedures have been eliminated completely. Now, under the revised convention, a program for the recruitment or selection of professors can be developed directly between the sending and receiving governments. Governments may, if they wish, utilize the services of the Pan American Union in obtaining such professors, but they are not required to do so.

3. In the event that two governments agree on a project for a visiting professor, they may work out between themselves such financial terms as may be mutually agreeable. However, to demonstrate how such terms may be worked out cooperatively, a specific formula is set forth in the convention to the effect that a receiving government could be responsible for salaries at the current, domestic rate, and the sending governments for travel and for any unfavorable difference between the domestic salary scales in the home and host countries.

4. The expressions "full professors" and "outstanding universities" have been eliminated as misleading and impractical.

These changes eliminate impracticable, excessively detailed procedures and impossible financial provisions, and substitute general provisions permitting direct, ad hoc understandings between interested governments with whatever financial arrangements may be mutually acceptable.

ARTICLE 7

This provision for the general encouragement of the interchange of persons in other ways than those specifically set forth in the convention is a change from the provision in article I of the previous convention in that it is not restricted to vacation travel and it covers not only students and teachers but other persons engaged in the professions.

ARTICLE 8

The article is similar to article V of the 1936 convention. It provides that each government shall designate or create an appropriate organ, or appoint a special officer, to have responsibility for carrying out the obligations assumed under the convention.

ARTICLE 9

The article is the same in substance as article VII of the 1936 convention. Each contracting state is to send authenticated copies of the regulations it issues in connection with the convention to the other contracting parties and to the Pan American Union.

ARTICLE 10

The article is entirely new. It provides for an annual report to the Pan American Union by each contracting state on the extent to which it has awarded grants or otherwise participated in the exchange program under the convention during the past year. It provides also for the furnishing of information on the total number of students, teachers, and specialists from other contracting states who have visited or resided in the country, so far as it may be possible for the contracting state to do so. Such information is to be made available to all the contracting states by the Pan American Union.

It is felt that this article will help further the efforts to publicize the programs throughout the Americas and particularly will increase the publicity for the United States programs.

ARTICLE 11

Under this article, which is new, the contracting states declare that while the convention is motivated by the highest principles of cooperation, the extent of the interchange will depend upon the circumstances peculiar to each country. It was prompted by the following considerations:

1. The concern of many states—especially the smaller and less prosperous ones—with their own inability to furnish funds, accommodations, and cultural resources sufficient to attract exchanges from other states.

2. The desire of such states to adjust their obligations under the convention to their financial and other resources.

3. The concern of these states that failure to reciprocate strictly on a basis of numerical equality would result in their nationals receiving no fellowships from the larger countries.

ARTICLE 12

The article provides that the convention shall not affect similar understandings which have been entered into previously by the contracting parties, nor shall it exclude the possibility of their entering into other such understandings in the future. This is a change from article VIII of the 1936 convention, which referred only to international agreements. It is now made clear that informal and ad hoc arrangements are included as well as formal agreements.

ARTICLES 13–16

These are the formal provisions relating to signature, authentic languages, ratification, entry into force, and duration. They are similar to the formal provisions embodied in the 1936 convention.

DELETED ARTICLE

Article VI of the 1936 convention provided that nothing in that convention should be interpreted as obliging a signatory state to interfere with the independence of its institutions of learning or with the freedom of academic teaching and administration therein. This provision was eliminated from the revised convention as being unnecessary.

CONVENTION FOR THE PROMOTION OF INTER-AMERICAN CULTURAL RELATIONS

The governments represented at the Tenth Inter-American Conference,

CONSIDERING:

That greater knowledge and understanding of the peoples and the institutions of the countries members of the Organization of American States will contribute to the realization of the purposes for which the Conference was convened; and

That, among the suitable means for attaining this end, are the exchange of professors, teachers, and students among the American countries and the encouragement of closer relationships among the unofficial agencies that exert an influence on the formation of public opinion,

Resolve:

To revise the text and strengthen the spirit of the Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations, concluded at Buenos Aires in 1936, and to that end agree on the following articles:

ARTICLE 1

Every year each government shall award one or more fellowships, insofar as it may be able to do so, for the ensuing scholastic year, which may be granted to graduate students or to teachers or to other persons with equivalent qualifications from each of the other Member States. The recipients shall be chosen in accordance with the procedure established in Article 4 of this Convention. Notwithstanding the foregoing, each government may award a greater number of fellowships for study if this has been provided in other international agreement or otherwise.

ARTICLE 2

Each fellowship shall include, through such agency as may be deemed appropriate, tuition in an institution of higher learning designated by the country awarding the fellowship, as well as text books, working materials, and, in addition, a monthly allowance to cover lodging, subsistence, and other necessary additional expenses. The expenses of traveling to the designated institution and those of returning to the country of origin and, in addition, an amount for incidental travel expenses during the journey shall be borne by the recipient or by the nominating government.

ARTICLE 3

Each government shall notify the others of the fields of study in which it is prepared to award fellowships at least one month before the period referred to in the following article for the transmission of the panels of candidates.

ARTICLE 4

The fellowships referred to in Article 1 shall be awarded after the governments concerned exchange panels of names in the following manner:

Each government shall send to each of the other governments, at least 6 months before the opening of the scholastic year in the host country, unless otherwise agreed upon by the interested governments, a panel containing the names of candidates of the categories referred to in Article 1, together with the information regarding each that the government awarding the fellowships deems necessary. The panel shall contain a sufficient number of names to permit the country awarding the fellowships to choose from among the candidates. The latter country shall announce the award of the fellowships and the names of the successful candidates to the nominating government at least 3 months before the opening of the scholastic year.

A candidate's name shall not appear on the panels more than twice. The fellowships shall be awarded for one year, but may be extended for a second year and, in exceptional cases, for a third. No government shall be obliged to consider the panel of names of candidates proposed by any other government if it has not been presented in accordance with the schedule indicated.

ARTICLE 5

If for any reason it becomes necessary to repatriate the recipient of a fellowship, the government awarding the fellowship may effect the repatriation at the expense of the nominating government.

ARTICLE 6

Any of the High Contracting Parties which may be interested in obtaining the services of professors or specialists from other countries and which has not chosen specific individuals may do so through the services of the Pan American Union. The Pan American Union will forward the request to the other countries and will send their replies to the interested country within three months, the latter country then choosing from among the candidates suggested.

Visiting professors or specialists shall devote themselves to the duties for which they have been specifically engaged.

The government that is sending the professors or specialists shall provide the expenses of travel of each to the seat of the institution to which he has been appointed, and of return to the country of origin.

Each government shall take the necessary measures for visiting professors or specialists to receive a salary commensurate with the duties which are assigned to them. The government of the country from which the professor or specialist comes shall compensate him for any unfavorable difference between the salary which he is to receive in the host country and that which he has been receiving in the country from which he comes. However, in specific cases, the governments concerned may make other arrangements.

ARTICLE 7

The High Contracting Parties will encourage, in other ways, especially during vacation periods, the exchange, for cultural purposes, of teachers, artists, students, and other persons engaged in the professions, between their respective countries.

ARTICLE 8

Each government shall designate or create an appropriate organ, or appoint a special officer, to have responsibility for carrying out the obligations assumed by virtue of this Convention.

ARTICLE 9

Authenticated copies of the regulations issued by each of the High Contracting Parties to facilitate compliance with this Convention shall be sent to the other High Contracting Parties and to the Pan American Union.

ARTICLE 10

The High Contracting Parties shall transmit annually to the Pan American Union a report enumerating the persons to whom fellowships have been awarded by the governments in accordance with the terms of this Convention. The report shall indicate the nationality of the recipients and the amount of money and the type of assistance which they have received.

This report should likewise include information with regard to persons who have come from other American States and are pursuing university or similar studies in accordance with other exchange-of-persons programs or at their own expense.

The reports referred to above should also include information regarding professors and specialists.

The Pan American Union shall compile the reports received under this Article for the information of the High Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 11

The High Contracting Parties declare that this Convention is motivated by the highest principles of cooperation, the extent of the interchange depending upon the circumstances peculiar to each country.

ARTICLE 12

This Convention does not affect similar understandings which have been entered into previously by the High Contracting Parties, nor does it exclude the possibility of their entering into other such understandings in the future.

ARTICLE 13

This Convention shall remain open for signature by the States Members of the Organization of American States and shall be ratified by the signatory States in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures.

ARTICLE 14

The original instrument, the English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Pan American Union, which shall transmit certified copies thereof to the governments for purposes of ratification. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Pan American Union, which shall notify the signatory States of such deposit.

ARTICLE 15

This Convention shall enter into force between the States that ratify it in the order in which they deposit their respective instruments of ratification.

ARTICLE 16

This Convention shall remain in force indefinitely, but may be denounced by any of the signatory States upon one year's notice, at the end of which it shall cease to be in force with respect to the denouncing State, remaining in force for the other signatory States. The denunciation shall be communicated to the Pan American Union, which shall notify the other signatory States of it.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, whose full powers have been presented and found to be in good and due form, sign this Convention, on behalf of their respective Governments, at the city of Caracas, on March twenty-eight, nineteen hundred and fifty-four.

(Signed on March 28, 1954 on behalf of all of the American Republics except Costa Rica which signed subsequently on June 16, 1954.)

Extension of U.S.-Ecuadoran Trade Agreement

Press release 28 dated January 18

The President on January 17 signed a proclamation which will continue in force until July 18, 1956, the bilateral trade agreement entered into by the United States and the Republic of Ecuador on August 6, 1938.

The agreement was to have expired on July 18, 1955, but was extended 6 months to January 18, 1956.[1]

At the end of 1947 the United States had bilateral trade agreements with some 27 countries, negotiated under the Trade Agreements Act of 1934. A number of these agreements have been terminated by mutual consent or as the countries became associated with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Bilateral trade agreements now exist with Argentina, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Paraguay, and Venezuela.

PROCLAMATION 3122[2]

FIXING A LATER DATE FOR TERMINATION OF ECUADORAN TRADE AGREEMENT PROCLAMATION

WHEREAS, under the authority vested in him by section 350 (a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the act of June 12, 1934, entitled "An Act to amend the Tariff Act of 1930" (48 Stat. 943), the time within which the President was authorized to enter into trade agreements pursuant to such amending act having been extended for three years from June 12, 1937, by the joint resolution of Congress approved March 1, 1937 (50 Stat. 24), the President of the United States entered into a trade agreement with the Supreme Chief of the Republic of Ecuador on August 6, 1938 (53 Stat. 1952), and proclaimed such trade agreement by proclamation of September 23, 1938 (53 Stat. 1951); and

WHEREAS Article XIX of the said trade agreement provides that the agreement shall remain in force and effect until six months from the day on which either Government shall give notice of its intention to terminate it; and

WHEREAS, pursuant to the said Article XIX the Government of the United States of America gave notice on July 18, 1955, of its intention to terminate the said agreement, which notice was withdrawn by the Government of the United States of America on January 17, 1956, and on the same day replaced by a new notice of intention to terminate pursuant to the said Article XIX; and

WHEREAS the said section 350 (a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, authorizes the President to terminate, in whole or in part, any proclamation carrying out a trade agreement entered into under such section; and

WHEREAS by Proclamation No. 3111 of August 27, 1955 (20 F. R. 6485) the President proclaimed that the said proclamation dated September 23, 1938 should be terminated as of the close of January 17, 1956, six months from the day on which notice of termination of the said trade agreement had been given by the Government of the United States of America:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes, including the said section 350 (a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, do proclaim that the said proclamation of August 27, 1955 shall be amended (1) by deleting "July 18, 1955" as the date on which notice of intention to terminate was given and by inserting "January 17, 1956" in place thereof, and (2) by deleting "January 17, 1956" as the date as of the close of which termination will take place and by inserting "July 16, 1956" in place thereof.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this seventeenth day of January in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and fifty-six and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eightieth.

[SEAL]

Dwight D. Eisenhower

By the President:
JOHN FOSTER DULLES
Secretary of State

[1] BULLETIN of Sept. 26, 1955, p. 511.
[2] 21 *Fed. Reg.* 511.

Atoms-for-Peace Agreement With Sweden Comes Into Force

On January 18 the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State (press release 29) issued a joint announcement that the cooperative agreement between the United States and Sweden covering research in the peaceful uses of atomic energy was signed on that day. The agreement was signed for Sweden by Ambassador Erik Boheman. C. Burke Elbrick, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, and Lewis Strauss, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, signed for the United States.

This agreement was initialed by representatives of the two Governments on July 1, 1955.[1] Under the terms of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, certain procedural steps must be taken by executive and legislative branches of the U.S. Government before agreements of this type may come into force. These steps have now been taken, and with the execution of the agreement it becomes effective for both countries.

Current Treaty Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention on international civil aviation. Formulated at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 4, 1947. TIAS 1591.
Adherence deposited: Cambodia, January 16, 1956.

Narcotics

Protocol amending the agreements, conventions, and protocols on narcotic drugs concluded at The Hague January 23, 1912, at Geneva February 11 and 19, 1925, and July 13, 1931, at Bangkok November 27, 1931, and at Geneva June 26, 1936. Signed at Lake Success December 11, 1946. Entered into force December 11, 1946. TIAS 1671.
Acceptance deposited: Hungary, December 16, 1955.

North Atlantic Ice Patrol

Agreement regarding financial support of the North Atlantic ice patrol. Opened for signature at Washington January 4, 1956.[2]
Signatures: France, January 6; Norway, January 10; Sweden, January 18; and Denmark, January 19, 1956.

Trade and Commerce

International convention to facilitate the importation of commercial samples and advertising material. Dated at Geneva November 7, 1952. Entered into force November 20, 1955.[3]
Accession deposited: Czechoslovakia, January 12, 1956.

[1] See BULLETIN of July 11, 1955, p. 55, footnote 1.
[2] Not in force.
[3] Not in force for the United States.

BILATERAL

Ecuador

Reciprocal trade agreement. Signed at Quito August 6, 1938. Modified by exchange of notes at Quito March 2, 1942. 53 Stat. 1951 and 56 Stat. 1472.
United States notice of intention to terminate[4] withdrawn and new notice given: January 17, 1956. (In accordance with article XIX, the agreement will terminate July 17, 1956.)

Germany

Agreement relating to the lease of air navigation equipment. Signed at Bonn August 2, 1955. Entered into force August 2, 1955.

Italy

Agreement amending the surplus agricultural commodities agreement of May 23, 1955 (TIAS 3249) by specifying that funds may also be used for purchase of soy bean oil and cotton seed oil. Effected by exchange of notes at Rome December 13 and 16, 1955. Entered into force December 16, 1955.

Nicaragua

Treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation. Signed at Managua January 21, 1956. Will enter into force one month after the exchange of ratifications.

Pakistan

Agreement concerning the exchange of parcel post, and detailed regulations for the execution of the agreement. Signed at Karachi July 20 and at Washington October 7, 1955. Ratified and approved by the President October 26, 1955. Entered into force January 1, 1956.

Sweden

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington January 18, 1956. Entered into force January 18, 1956.

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Technical Assistance Activities in the ECLA Region as of 30 June 1955. E/Cn.12/372/Add.1, August 17, 1955. 18 pp. mimeo.

[4] Given July 18, 1955; would have been effective January 18, 1956.

Security Council Condemns Israel for Action Against Syria

Statement by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly [1]

Mr. President, the United States has joined in sponsoring the three-power draft resolution which is now before the Council on the Syrian complaint against Israel. In doing so we emphasize the serious purpose and grave concern that motivates the United States Government. We do not advocate the cause of one side or the other. Our sole desire is to prevent the recurrence of the kind of action undertaken by the Government of Israel on December 11, 1955, and to secure for the peoples of the Palestine area and the Near East a peaceful settlement. We believe that the three-power draft resolution can contribute to such a result. But whether or not this is true, we cannot stand aside and fail to condemn the action of the Government of Israel in that incident of December 11.

We have repeatedly said in the past that no government has the right to take the law into its own hands. It is always deplorable for any government deliberately and willfully to plan and carry out an attack against its neighbor in violation of its solemn international commitments. What makes these particular deliberations more serious is the fact that a member of the United Nations—indeed, a member created by the United Nations—should now be before this Council for the fourth offense of this kind in 2 years.

We have therefore had to consider well how best to impress upon that Government not only the fact that its actions ought to be condemned but that the Council will be faced with having to consider other steps which should be taken if unfortunately another such offense is committed.

We are also concerned because Israel and her Arab neighbors continue to avoid their obligations under their armistice agreements and under the charter to strive for the restoration of peace in the area.

We are fully aware of the reasons which Israel has put forward for this, its latest offense. But deeds such as that committed by Israel on the shores of the Sea of Galilee and on Syrian territory on December 11 inflame and intensify the hostility which already exists. No amount of protestations of desire for negotiation and peace can overcome the ground lost by such action. Israel's deed is so out of proportion with the provocation that it cannot be accurately described as a retaliatory raid. Even assuming that it could be called a retaliatory raid we would condemn it. The Security Council must do more than condemn. It must warn the Government of Israel that another transgression will compel it to consider what further measures under the charter are required to maintain or restore the peace.

Question of Compensation

The United States Government, in conjunction with the other sponsors, has given most careful thought to the wisdom of calling upon Israel to pay compensation. We considered this requirement in the light of the fact that there should be reparation for such a deed. But we were ourselves unable, because of all the complications involved, to formulate a procedure which would be equitable for assessing compensation for this act which we condemn or for any act in the future which this Council might unfortunately have to condemn.

To propose something without there being in existence any established means for carrying it out would, by raising false hopes, add to the troubles of those who have been hurt. Nor would such a course, to say the least, contribute to a lessening of tension. This does not mean that we disagree with the principle of compensation, nor does it mean that we are not prepared to establish machinery for the future. On the contrary, we frankly feel that it would be desirable in a separate resolution, should other members of the Council concur, to request the Secretary-General to study ways and means of equitable assessment and payment of compensation for such offenses.

Of utmost importance, however, as regards the future is that the parties live up to their armistice agreement, that they respect the armistice demarcation lines and the demilitarized zones, and that they cooperate fully with the Chief of Staff.[2] The Syrian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission

[1] Made in the Security Council on Jan. 12 (U.S./U.N. press release 2341). For a statement of Dec. 16 by Ambassador Lodge regarding the Israeli military action of Dec. 11 against Syria, see BULLETIN of Jan. 16, 1956, p. 103.

[2] Maj. Gen. E. L. M. Burns, Chief of Staff of the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization.

Resolution on Syrian Complaint[1]

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions of 15 July 1948, 11 August 1949, 18 May 1951, 24 November 1953, and 29 March 1955;

Taking into consideration the statements of the representatives of Syria and Israel and the reports of the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization on the Syrian complaint that an attack was committed by Israeli regular army forces against Syrian regular army forces on Syrian territory on 11 December 1955;

Noting the report of the Chief of Staff that this Israeli action was a deliberate violation of the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement, including those relating to the Demilitarized Zone, which was crossed by the Israeli forces which entered Syria;

Noting also without prejudice to the ultimate rights, claims and positions of the parties that according to the reports of the Chief of Staff there has been interference by the Syrian authorities with Israeli activities on Lake Tiberias, in contravention of the terms of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Syria;

1. *Holds* that this interference in no way justifies the Israeli action;

2. *Reminds* the Government of Israel that the Council has already condemned military action in breach of the General Armistice Agreements, whether or not undertaken by way of retaliation, and has called upon Israel to take effective measures to prevent such actions;

3. *Condemns* the attack of 11 December as a flagrant violation of the cease-fire provisions of its resolution of 15 July 1948, of the terms of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Syria, and of Israel's obligations under the Charter;

4. *Expresses* its grave concern at the failure of the Government of Israel to comply with its obligations;

5. *Calls upon* the Government of Israel to do so in the future, in default of which the Council will have to consider what further measures under the Charter are required to maintain or restore the peace;

6. *Calls upon* the parties to comply with their obligations under Article 5 of the General Armistice Agreement to respect the Armistice Demarcation Line and the Demilitarized Zone;

7. *Requests* the Chief of Staff to pursue his suggestions for improving the situation in the area of Lake Tiberias without prejudice to the rights, claims and positions of the parties and to report to the Council as appropriate on the success of his efforts;

8. *Calls upon* the parties to arrange with the Chief of Staff for an immediate exchange of all military prisoners;

9. *Calls upon* both parties to co-operate with the Chief of Staff in this and all other respects, to carry out the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement in good faith, and in particular to make full use of the Mixed Armistice Commission's machinery in the interpretation and application of its provisions.

[1] U.N. doc. S/3538; sponsored by France, U.K., and U.S.; adopted unanimously by the Security Council on Jan. 19.

machinery does not function. The responsibility for this rests squarely on both parties. The Commission was established by both parties for the specific purpose of resolving differences between them. There are hundreds of cases on the Commission's agenda. Yet the parties will not meet to resolve them. They should do so. The parties must make full use of their Mixed Armistice Commission machinery. Under normal circumstances, the Council should have awaited a finding of the Mixed Armistice Commission. This action of the Council in this case here today should not serve as a precedent for other complaints which have not been processed through the Mixed Armistice Commission. Only the shocking aspect of the attack of December 11 justified the Council's taking up the matter without prior consideration in the established armistice machinery.

Confidence in General Burns

Let me state, Mr. President, that the United States is impressed by the Chief of Staff's suggestions set forth in his report for improving the situation in the Lake Tiberias area.[3] The Council, may I say, is lucky to have such a capable Chief of Staff as General Burns. He has the full backing of the United States Government, and we are confident that he has the full backing of this Council. We hope that we may soon have a report from him that he has been successful in carrying out his own suggestions and that we may once again look forward to an era of greater stability and peace in the Near East. We earnestly hope that the Council will approve unanimously the draft resolution, of which we are a cosponsor, as a necessary step in this direction. We also hope that the par-

[3] U.N. doc. S/3516 and Add. 1 and Corr. 1.

ties will be impressed with the concern of the members of the Council over the present state of tension and insecurity in this part of the world. They must realize surely that they will not benefit by its continuance. The United States stands ready to assist them in any way it can toward a better and safer future for the Near East.

In conclusion, Mr. President, let me recall the statement which I made as United States Representative to the Security Council on March 29, 1955, concerning the Gaza incident.[4]

At that time I stated the belief of the United States that the Gaza incident had interrupted significant progress toward a peaceful settlement of the Palestine problem and that, had it not been for the Gaza incident, the time would have been not too distant when the intermittent fighting which characterized the situation on the borders of Israel and the Arab States would have become a thing of the past. I stated also at that time that one conclusion only could be drawn from the report of the Chief of Staff and the statements of the parties, and that was:

> . . . that armed attack, planned and directed as it has been in this case, is no answer to the problems which rightly concern and distress the people of Israel. It is no service to them to increase internal tension, to bring the area to the brink of war, and to discourage and frustrate honest and sincere efforts to build a constructive peace.

Now, Mr. President, this same thought has been expressed editorially in the press throughout the world. And I would like to quote one typical illustration:

> Surely there has been ample proof by now that this policy (of retaliation) . . . has not been successful and the situation has never been more tense or dangerous than it is today. A policy that is self-defeating is a bad policy. What everybody wants—Israelis included—is peace, and this sort of thing will not bring peace or a settlement.

The conclusions to be drawn are obvious. Each of the incidents from Qibya in 1953, through Nahhalin, Gaza, and now in the Tiberias area, has resulted in a deterioration in the situation in Palestine. This is something that the Security Council cannot ignore, nor can the governments which we all represent here. The United States Government has made the most serious representations to the Government of Israel, pointing out the imprudence from Israel's own standpoint of the actions which Israel has taken. Neither as a government nor as a member of the Security Council can we effectively help to bring about the settlement Israel states it desires if all our efforts are to be frustrated by those we seek to help. We stand ready to help both sides attain a just and lasting settlement. But the parties themselves must also help. It is in this spirit that we have joined in sporsoring the draft resolution which stands in the name of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

[4] Bulletin of Apr. 18, 1955, p. 659.

United States Participation in GATT Negotiations at Geneva

Statement by Herbert V. Prochnow
Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs[1]

President Eisenhower, in his state of the Union message to the Congress of the United States on January 5,[2] re-emphasized the fact that strong economic ties are an essential element in the partnership of the United States with the other nations of the free world. He pointed out that increasing trade and investment help all of us to prosper together, and he mentioned the progress in this direction, most recently through the 3-year extension of our trade agreements legislation. Then the President stressed the importance of the activities under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and requested congressional approval of United States membership in the Organization for Trade Cooperation as the means for effectively administering the general agreement.

I should like to add my personal satisfaction over having this opportunity to take part in one of the activities of the Contracting Parties to the general agreement. As a businessman, I have been concerned for many years with international trade and the practical problems in international relations that affect the movement of commerce. The development of a method and tradition for settling international economic problems through consultation and cooperation is, I consider, one of

[1] Made at Geneva, Switzerland, on Jan. 19 (press release 31) at the multilateral tariff negotiations which were convened on Jan. 18 by the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Mr. Prochnow is chairman of the U.S. delegation to the negotiations.

[2] Bulletin of Jan. 16, 1956, p. 79.

the significant developments in international economic relations in the postwar years.

Today 35 countries meet in international forum as a matter of course to settle their trade problems. These countries include the leading trading nations of the world. They carry on more than 80 percent of the trade of the entire world.

The meetings held by these nations have consistently emphasized action. Every annual session has resulted in concrete steps to settle commercial problems between nations or to remove trade barriers. These actions prove the true interest of these nations in freeing international trade from artificial restrictions.

We are all well aware that the nations of the free world cannot afford to relax the effort to strengthen their economic collaboration. In this effort the method of solving differences and removing barriers to world trade that has been worked out under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade can make an important contribution. But in our concentration on the statistical aspects of these negotiations, we must never forget that actions to remove barriers to trade are not merely steps toward stronger and more prosperous economies. They are steps toward world peace.

One of the most important uses that has been made of the method of multilateral negotiations has been in conferences to reduce tariffs. The several negotiating conferences that have been held since 1947, including the recent negotiations held at Geneva leading to the accession of Japan to the general agreement,[3] have demonstrated the effectiveness of multilateral action in this field. The cumulative result of these conferences has been concessions by the various countries applicable to about 60,000 individual tariff rates. All participating nations have made worthwhile concessions. Approximately two-thirds of the import trade of the Contracting Parties and one-half of the trade of the world is now affected by these agreements.

The United States has participated actively in each conference. Through the negotiations conducted during these conferences, United States duties have been reduced significantly. Since 1934 the rates on over three-fourths of the dutiable imports of the United States have been reduced by 50 percent or more. And on almost one-fifth of these imports the reductions have been 75 percent or more.

The United States believes firmly that this conference can result in an important extension of the work already accomplished. Our delegation is eager to do all in its power to make the conference a success.

We are prepared to begin negotiations immediately. It is vital that the conference proceed as rapidly as possible and that we meet the deadline of the first week of May set by the Contracting Parties. With the traditional spirit of good will and cooperation which has existed under the general agreement, I am sure that this conference will be brought to a successful conclusion.

Members of U. S. Delegation

The Department of State announced on January 17 (press release 27) that Herbert V. Prochnow, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, has been designated by the President as chairman of the U.S. delegation to the multilateral tariff negotiations beginning January 18 at Geneva, Switzerland.

Carl D. Corse, Chief of the Trade Agreements and Treaties Division, Department of State, was designated by the President as vice chairman of the delegation.

Under the authority in the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955, the United States expects to negotiate reciprocal tariff concessions with about 20 other countries, all of which are contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. These other countries will also be negotiating among themselves, with the United States receiving the benefit of the concessions they grant to one another.

As announced on January 4,[4] the U.S. delegation will be assisted by four nongovernmental advisers. Governmental members of the delegation, in addition to the chairman and vice chairman, are as follows:

Forest E. Abbuhl, Trade Agreements and Treaties Division, Department of State

Charles W. Adair, Jr., American Embassy, Brussels

J. Mark Albertson, Office of Technical Services, U.S. Tariff Commission

Deane M. Black, Office of Economic Affairs, Department of Commerce

Gray Bream, American Consulate General, Amsterdam

[3] *Ibid.*, June 27, 1955, p. 1051.

[4] *Ibid.*, Jan. 16, 1956, p. 96.

Edgar B. Brossard, Chairman, U.S. Tariff Commission
Walter Buchdahl, Office of Economic Affairs, Department of Commerce
S. Bertha Burnett, Economic Defense Division, Department of State
Frank P. Butler, American Embassy, Vienna
Bernard J. Cahill, Chemical Division, Department of Commerce
Edward G. Cale, Office of Regional American Affairs, Department of State
Joseph A. Camelio, Office of Economic Affairs, Department of Commerce
Rollin H. Cragg, Chemical Division, U.S. Tariff Commission
John Czyzak, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic Affairs, Department of State
Prentice N. Dean, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense
Edgar I. Eaton, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor
George T. Elliman, Business and Defense Services Administration, Department of Commerce
David Fellman, Office of Economic Affairs, Department of Commerce
Morris J. Fields, Office of International Finance, Department of the Treasury
William A. Fowler, American Embassy, Stockholm
A. Eugene Frank, Business and Defense Services Administration, Department of Commerce
Edward P. Furlow, U.S. Tariff Commission
James W. Gantenbein, American Embassy, Copenhagen
Allen H. Garland, Office of Economic Affairs, Department of Commerce
Philip W. Gates, U.S. Tariff Commission
William F. Gray, American Consulate General, Düsseldorf
Joseph Greenwald, Trade Agreements and Treaties Division, Department of State
Robert Hamerschlag, Office of Economic Affairs, Department of Commerce
William T. Hart, U.S. Tariff Commission
Amelia Hood, Office of Middle American Affairs, Department of State
Borrie I. Hyman, Foreign Service Officer, Department of State
Katherine Jacobson, Trade Investment and Monetary Affairs, International Cooperation Administration
Willard W. Kane, Textiles Division, U.S. Tariff Commission
Paul Kaplowitz, U.S. Tariff Commission
Lowell B. Kilgore, Business and Defense Services Administration, Department of Commerce
James H. Lewis, American Embassy, London
Francis F. Lincoln, Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs, Department of State
Joe McBrian, U.S. Tariff Commission
Harold P. Macgowan, Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Department of Commerce
Edward I. Mullins, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense
Charles P. O'Donnell, American Embassy, Belgrade
Albert E. Pappano, Trade Agreements and Treaties Division, Department of State
Weber H. Peterson, Foreign Agricultural Service, Department of Agriculture
Vernon L. Phelps, American Embassy, Bonn
Loubert O. Sanderhoff, American Embassy, Bonn
M. Louise Schaffner, American Embassy, Ottawa
Robert B. Sarich, Office of Economic Affairs, Department of Commerce
Enoch W. Skartvedt, Office of Economic Affairs, Department of Commerce
Howard F. Shepston, Office of Economic Affairs, Department of Commerce
Ernest S. Shipley, Textiles Division, U.S. Tariff Commission
William O. Shofner, Commodity Stabilization Service, Department of Agriculture
Harry Shooshan, Technical Review Staff, Department of the Interior
Kenneth B. Smith, U.S. Tariff Commission
Constant Southworth, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State
Sidney Weintraub, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State
Jean Mary Wilkowski, American Embassy, Paris
William E. Wright, U.S. Tariff Commission
Boris S. Yane, Division of Foreign Labor, Department of Labor

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Resignation of Ambassador Peaslee

The White House announced on January 13 that on that date President Eisenhower had accepted the resignation of Amos J. Peaslee as Ambassador to Australia and appointed him Deputy Special Assistant to the President. In the latter capacity, Mr. Peaslee will serve as assistant to Harold E. Stassen, Special Assistant for disarmament planning.

American Republics
Convention on Inter-American Cultural Relations Transmitted to Senate 175
Department's Recommendations on Sugar Legislation (Holland) 172

Asia. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference 155

Atomic Energy
Atoms-for-Peace Agreement With Sweden Comes Into Force 181
Strengthening the Defense of the United States and Its Allies (excerpts from budget message) . 147

China, Communist. Ambassadorial Talks at Geneva With Chinese Communists 164

Congress, The
Convention on Inter-American Cultural Relations Transmitted to Senate 175
Department's Recommendations on Sugar Legislation (Holland) 172
Strengthening the Defense of the United States and Its Allies (excerpts from budget message) . 147

Cuba. Department's Recommendations on Sugar Legislation (Holland) 172

Economic Affairs
Department's Recommendations on Sugar Legislation (Holland) 172
Extension of U.S.-Ecuadoran Trade Agreement . 180
Mr. Randall To Conduct Economic Discussions With Turkey 171
The New Soviet Diplomatic Offensive (Murphy) . 168
Strengthening the Defense of the United States and Its Allies (excerpts from budget message) . 147
United States Participation in GATT Negotiations at Geneva (Prochnow) 184

Ecuador. Extension of U.S.-Ecuadoran Trade Agreement 180

Educational Exchange. Convention on Inter-American Cultural Relations Transmitted to Senate 175

Foreign Service. Resignation of Ambassador Peaslee 186

Germany. U.S. Begins Training and Equipment of German Armed Forces 162

Haiti. Letters of Credence (Zephirin) 163

International Organizations and Meetings
Delegation to GATT Negotiations 185
United States Participation in GATT Negotiations at Geneva (Prochnow) 184

Israel. Security Council Condemns Israel for Action Against Syria (Lodge, text of resolution) 182

Military Affairs
Strengthening the Defense of the United States and Its Allies (excerpts from budget message) . 147
U.S. Begins Training and Equipment of German Armed Forces 162

Mutual Security
The New Soviet Diplomatic Offensive (Murphy) . 168
Strengthening the Defense of the United States and Its Allies (excerpts from budget message) . 147
Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . 155

Nicaragua. Treaty of Friendship With Nicaragua 174

Presidential Documents
Board of Consultants To Review Foreign Intelligence Activities 161
Extension of U.S.-Ecuadoran Trade Agreement . 180
Strengthening the Defense of the United States and Its Allies (excerpts from budget message) . 147

State, Department of. Strengthening the Defense of the United States and Its Allies (excerpts from budget message) 147

Sweden. Atoms-for-Peace Agreement With Sweden Comes Into Force 181

Syria. Security Council Condemns Israel for Action Against Syria (Lodge, text of resolution) . 182

Treaty Information
Atoms-for-Peace Agreement With Sweden Comes Into Force 181
Convention on Inter-American Cultural Relations Transmitted to Senate 175
Current Actions 181
Extension of U.S.-Ecuadoran Trade Agreement . 180
Treaty of Friendship With Nicaragua 174

Turkey. Mr. Randall To Conduct Economic Discussions With Turkey 171

U.S.S.R. The New Soviet Diplomatic Offensive (Murphy) 168

United Nations
Current U.N. Documents 181
Security Council Condemns Israel for Action Against Syria (Lodge, text of resolution) . 182

Name Index

Dulles, Secretary 155
Eisenhower, President 147, 162, 175, 180
Holland, Henry F 172
Hoover, Herbert, Jr 175
Johnson, U. Alexis 165
Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr 182
Murphy, Robert 168
Peaslee, Amos J 186
Prochnow, Herbert V 184
Randall, Clarence B 171
Zephirin, Mauclair 163

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: January 16–22

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

No.	Date	Subject
21	1/16	Holland: testimony on sugar legislation.
†23	1/16	Delegation to Inter-American Council of Jurists (rewrite).
24	1/17	Randall trip to Turkey.
*25	1/17	Dulles: news conference statement.
26	1/17	Dulles: news conference transcript.
27	1/17	GATT delegation (rewrite).
28	1/18	Extension of trade agreement with Ecuador.
29	1/18	Atomic agreement with Sweden.
30	1/18	Reply to Chinese Communist allegations.
31	1/19	Prochnow: statement at GATT.
*32	1/19	Educational exchange.
*33	1/19	Educational exchange.
†34	1/19	Delegation to FAO–Caribbean Commission (rewrite).
35	1/20	Murphy: "The New Soviet Diplomatic Offensive."
36	1/20	Treaty of friendship with Nicaragua.
37	1/21	Ambassadorial talks at Geneva.
†38	1/21	U.N. Refugee Fund Executive Committee.

*Not printed.
†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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the Department of State

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) came into existence on January 1, 1948, as an undertaking by eight of the most important world trading countries, including the United States. This agreement sets out general rules for the conduct of international trade and establishes standards for international cooperation through joint negotiation of the reduction of tariffs and the elimination of other barriers to free world trade. Today 34 countries participate in this unique international cooperative assocation. Together, they account for about 80 percent of world trade.

As a result of changes in world economic conditions since 1948, representatives of the countries participating in the General Agreement recently made an intensive review of its provisions. They proposed amendments which are designed to strengthen the agreement and to provide a permanent organization (Organization for Trade Cooperation) to administer the world trade rules. The amendments agreed upon will come into operation after approval by the contracting parties.

Two recent Department of State publications explain this important agreement and the proposed amendments:

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade . . .
Present Rules and Proposed Revisions **45 cents**
(A comparative study.)

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade . . .
An Explanation of Its Provisions and the Proposed Amendments
Publication No. 5813 **20 cents**
(An explanation in layman's language.)

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The Department of State

bulletin

Vol. XXXIV, No. 867

February 6, 1956

EXCHANGE OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN PRESIDENT EISENHOWER AND SOVIET PREMIER BULGANIN 191

INTEGRATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE • *Statement by Secretary Dulles* 211

U.S.-INDIAN COOPERATION FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT • *by Ambassador John Sherman Cooper* . 205

A HISTORICAL VIEW OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST • *by Ambassador Donald R. Heath* 202

THE SAINT LAWRENCE SEAWAY: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1955 215

For index see inside back cover

The Department of State bulletin

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February 6, 1956

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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Exchange of Correspondence Between President Eisenhower and Soviet Premier Bulganin

White House press release dated January 28

THE PRESIDENT TO PREMIER BULGANIN [1]

January 28, 1956

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I wish to thank you for your letter of January twenty-third, delivered to me by Ambassador Zaroubin. I have given it careful thought.

Let me say at the outset that I do indeed believe that the present international situation requires all states, particularly the great powers, to seek to lessen international tension and strengthen international confidence and cooperation.

As the power of destruction grows, it becomes imperative not merely to strive to control and limit that power, but also to do away with antagonisms which could tempt men to use that power. That view, I can assure you, is held by the people of the United States and by their political leaders without any exception whatsoever.

I am confident that that view is also shared by all the peoples of the world, and that those who have been entrusted with political authority have a high duty to respond to the universal longing of the peoples for peace.

As you are good enough to recall, I have more than once alluded to the immensely valuable asset we have in the historic friendship between our peoples. I profoundly believe that upon that foundation better political relations could be established. I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that there is in the whole world no people more sincerely dedicated to building a structure of peace than the American people. Our whole nation longs for a cessation of the strains and dangers now present in the international situation. There is indeed no honorable thing that we would not do if we were convinced that it would promote a just peace in the world.

It is from this viewpoint that I have examined your present suggestion that the cause of peace would now be served by the conclusion between our countries of a treaty of friendship and cooperation of twenty years duration.

I first observe that our countries are already bound to each other by a solemn treaty—the Charter of the United Nations. The treaty which you now propose would consist of three substantive articles. I observe also that each one of these is already covered by the explicit provisions in this United Nations treaty between us.

The first article of your draft would bind our two countries to develop friendly relations between our peoples on the basis of equal rights, mutual respect and non-interference in internal affairs. As members of the United Nations we are already bound through that organization "to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples".

The second article of your proposed treaty would bind us to settle our international disputes by peaceful means alone. This is an undertaking to which our two countries are already bound by the provisions of Article 2 (3) of the Charter of the United Nations which specifies that "all members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means".

The third article would bind us to the strengthening of economic, cultural and scientific cooperation. Chapter IX of the Charter of the United Nations dealing with "International Economic and Social Cooperation" pledges us to work for "solutions of international economic, social, health and related problems", and to "international cultural and educational cooperation".

The Charter of the United Nations constitutes a solemn treaty not only between your country and our own—it is a treaty among many countries, all of whom are bound to us and to each other, and all of whom are concerned with world peace. The

[1] President Eisenhower's letter was delivered by Ambassador Bohlen at Moscow on Jan. 28.

American people sincerely desire to help make reality of these charter goals.

But the present state of international tension was not prevented by the words of the Charter. How can we hope that the present situation would be cured merely by repeating those words in a bilateral form?

I wonder whether again going through a treaty-making procedure, and this time on a bilateral basis only, might indeed work against the cause of peace by creating the illusion that a stroke of a pen had achieved a result which in fact can be obtained only by a change of spirit.

Friendly collaboration between states depends not solely upon treaty promises but upon the spirit that animates the governments of the states concerned and upon actual performance.

It was in the hope of promoting such a spirit and such performance that I went to Geneva last July, a course which had no peacetime precedent in American history. Despite the doubts of many that the mission would, in fact, serve any useful purpose, I felt that the existing situation was so serious that no chance for improvement, however slight, ought to be neglected. In Geneva you expressed similar views and aspirations.

I had earnestly hoped that out of that meeting with you and with the Heads of Government of France and the United Kingdom would come a bettering of international relations, especially as between the four nations there represented and in relation to particular problems for which our four nations had a particular responsibility.

Unhappily, the American people have had sadly to conclude that the events following our meeting have not given substance to their hope.

Permit me to recall to your mind a short record of recent events.

At Geneva we directed our Foreign Ministers to propose effective means for the solution of three specific problems.

The first of these problems was that of European security and Germany. We explicitly agreed that the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany by means of free elections should be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security. However, despite constructive proposals put forward by the three Western powers for German reunification and European security, your Government felt that it could not at this time entertain any proposal dealing with the reunification of Germany by means of free elections.

The second problem was that of disarmament. In our Geneva discussion of that problem I made my "open skies" proposal in the hope that we might actually do something to convince the world that we had no aggressive purposes against each other. But this proposal your Government rejected at the Foreign Ministers meeting.

The third problem was the development of contacts between East and West. The Western Ministers proposed many concrete measures to bring about closer relations and better understanding, none of which was accepted by your Government. Despite that fact there has, as you point out, recently been some improvement in contacts between the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

A further deterioration has taken place because to us it has seemed that your Government had, in various areas of the world, embarked upon a course which increases tensions by intensifying hatreds and animosities implicit in historic international disputes. I share your conviction that an improvement in Soviet-American relations is urgently needed. But frankly, our people find it difficult to reconcile what appears to us to be the purposes of your Government in these areas with your present words—words which so rightly emphasize the special responsibility of our Governments to lessen international tension and strengthen confidence and cooperation between states.

I deal with the history of this past year solely for the purpose of enabling us with better prospect of success to chart our future. This nation holds out the hand of friendship to all who would grasp it in sincerity. I have often said, and I now repeat, that there is nothing I would not do to promote peace with justice for the world. But we know that it is deeds and not words alone which count.

Consider, Mr. Chairman, what a vast change would be effected not only in our relations but throughout the entire world if there were prompt measures to reunify Germany in freedom within the framework of security; if there were carried out our wartime pledge to respect the right of peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; if there were arranged such mutual opening of our countries to inspection that the possibilities of surprise attack would vanish

and if reductions of armament were made practical, with the release of productive power for the betterment of mankind. Consider, also, the mountain of distrust and misunderstanding that would disappear if our peoples freely exchanged news, information, visits and ideas.

These are all matters which you and I have discussed together at Geneva. They are results to which my nation remains dedicated and toward which we are prepared at any moment to move in a spirit of conciliation. May I hope, from your letter, that you too are dedicated to these great ends?

I shall look forward to receiving a further expression of your views.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

PREMIER BULGANIN TO THE PRESIDENT

THE KREMLIN, MOSCOW
January 23, 1956

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In the firm conviction that you share my concern over the present state of the relations between our countries, I should like to impart to you my ideas regarding possible means of improving those relations.

You, I am sure, agree with me that the present international situation requires all States, particularly the Great Powers, which bear special responsibility for assuring world-wide peace and the security of nations, to take measures that may help further to lessen international tension and strengthen confidence and cooperation between States. This would satisfy the heartfelt longing of peoples to live in peace and tranquillity and to devote their material resources and energy to creative and constructive work, cultural advancement, and prosperity.

At the Meeting of the Heads of Government of the Four Powers at Geneva, we all expressed our readiness to strive for a lessening of international tension and an improvement in relations between States in accordance with the principles of peaceful coexistence and economic cooperation.

There is no doubt that for any future lessening of international tension the question of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States has special significance.

This raises the problem of the necessity for taking steps to improve substantially the relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. Such improvement of Soviet-American relations would be a genuine contribution toward ameliorating the entire international situation and maintaining and consolidating world peace.

The history of the relations between our countries is convincing proof of the fact that their friendly cooperation, based on a striving for mutual understanding, mutual respect for sovereignty, and which was later based on the common struggle against the forces of aggression, satisfies the highest interests of the peoples of both countries.

It is certainly not by accident that, with the exception of the period of foreign intervention against the young Soviet Republic, the peoples of our States have never fought each other; that between them there have never been and are not now any irreconcilable differences, nor any frontiers or territories that might become an object of dispute or conflict.

This is why the Soviet people received with complete understanding your statement at the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Four Powers at Geneva, in which you remarked: "The American people would like to be friends of the Soviet people. There are no disputes between the American and Soviet peoples, there are no conflicts between them, there is no commercial hostility. Historically our peoples have always lived in peace."

Life itself has proven that cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. has been based, not on accidental and short-lived motives but on fundamental and enduring interests. This found a significant manifestation, first of all, in the fact that our countries were allies during both World Wars.

You, as one of the outstanding military leaders of the anti-Hitler coalition, are especially aware of the fact that the military cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States during the years of the Second World War played a most important part in crushing the common foe—the Fascist aggressors. Bound by the ties of blood shed by the best sons of the people of both countries, their military alliance, which was also shared by Great Britain, France, China, Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Norway, Greece, and other countries of the coalition of freedom-loving peoples, endured with honor all trials of the war, which was thrust upon our peoples by the forces of aggression in the West and in the East.

It is highly regrettable that in the postwar period the relations of friendship and cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. should have worsened. The impairment of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America, whatever the reasons may be, is contrary to the interests of both the Soviet and the American peoples and adversely affects the entire international situation.

I am sure that you, like myself, are convinced that the differences between the social structures of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. should not prevent our countries from maintaining the political, economic, and cultural relations in which our peoples are interested. In the years preceding the Second World War, Soviet-American relations progressed considerably, especially in the economic field. During the war the relations between our countries reached new heights, which was due to the wide support of the peoples of our countries and which strengthened their mutual sympathies. This helped shorten the war and lessen the sacrifices of nations.

It is of course impossible not to take account of the fact that during the period of the "cold war" between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. serious disagreements have arisen with regard to various international problems connected with disarmament, the assurance of security in

Europe, the German question, together with certain problems of the Far East, and the importance of the above-mentioned problems is recognized. At the last meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers at Geneva, even with the narrowing of the gap between the positions of both sides with regard to individual matters under discussion, substantial divergences became manifest and further efforts will in time be needed to reach the necessary agreement on a solution of the above problems.

Nevertheless, a continuation of the existing state of Soviet-American relations cannot further the settlement of unsolved international problems. At the same time an improvement in Soviet-American relations that would satisfy our peoples' longings for the furthering of friendly relations between our countries might create a new international atmosphere favorable to the settlement of controversial questions by means of negotiations on a mutually acceptable basis.

It is impossible not to see that a practical solution of the problem of a further lessening of international tension and strengthening of confidence between States, including the improvement of Soviet-American relations, is in the interest of both the Soviet and the American peoples as well as of all other nations.

I believe that you, Mr. President, will agree that under existing conditions international tension is fraught with the possibility of breaking the peace, with nations reaping all the dangerous consequences thereof.

Moreover, it is well known to everyone that the newest implements of war, such as atomic and hydrogen weapons, various instruments of present-day jet and rocket techniques, as well as other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, place the peoples of all countries in an equally dangerous situation in the event that international peace is disturbed, threatening to subject their territories and, above all, densely populated districts of highly developed countries to the devastating effects of atomic war.

At the present time more than ever, it is the duty of each State to be concerned with the maintenance and strengthening of peace, the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means alone, in harmony with the aims and principles of the United Nations.

There can be no doubt that the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States of America are equally interested in putting an end to the armaments race, which forces them to waste their strength and resources for unproductive purposes. The existing armaments race not only saddles nations with a heavy burden of military expenditures and thereby creates obstacles to the promotion of their material welfare, but also greatly intensifies the danger of a new war.

The improvement of Soviet-American relations would lighten the task of putting an end to the armaments race and would contribute to a fuller utilization of the economic resources of States in the interest of peace. In this case the resources now going into unproductive military expenditures could be used for purposes of improving the material well-being of nations, lowering taxes, raising real wages, housing and public construction, aiding underdeveloped countries in the interest of peace, and of strengthening international cooperation.

All of this would contribute considerably toward the expansion of the domestic market as well as the furtherance of international trade and would moreover ensure a corresponding increase in production and in employment of the population on the basis of an expansion of the peace economy.

The fact should be recognized that events have recently taken place the positive significance of which could not fail to be reflected in the over-all international situation. The past year was one in which no war was being waged in any part of the world. Recently certain complicated international problems that had remained unsolved after the end of the Second World War have been settled.

For the first time since the last war, a meeting of the Heads of Government of the Four Powers was held in Geneva, and the results achieved by us at that meeting were genuinely and fervently welcomed by the peoples of the entire world as corresponding to their aspirations and hopes.

Recently an improvement has been noted in contacts between countries of the East and West, particularly between the Soviet Union and the United States of America, although it is still far from possible to consider such contacts as broad and adequate. As for the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., these expanded contacts have shown how great are the longings of the peoples of our two countries for the further development of such contacts and of friendly cooperation.

In all these important international events, in which the Soviet Union has been advocating a stronger peace and friendship among nations, the results achieved have to a considerable extent been due to the cooperation that has taken place between our countries.

I am genuinely convinced that an improvement in Soviet-American relations is urgently needed.

In my opinion this purpose could be served by the conclusion of a treaty of friendship and cooperation between our countries.

Such a treaty could make provision for the parties, in a spirit of genuine cooperation and mutual understanding, to develop and strengthen the friendly relations between the people of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. on the basis of the principle of equal rights, mutual respect for State sovereignty, and noninterference in internal affairs, and to settle all their international disputes, in accordance with the provisions of the U.N. Charter, by peaceful means alone.

The treaty might also provide for the agreement of the parties to cooperate in developing and strengthening economic, cultural, and scientific cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., based on the principle of mutual advantage and equality of rights.

My colleagues and I feel that the conclusion of such a treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States of America would be an important contribution to the development of Soviet-American relations and at the same time an act of great international significance.

I firmly believe that the proposal concerning the conclusion of a treaty of friendship and cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. for the improvement of Soviet-American relations in the interest of strengthening peace and for the further lessening of international tension

will be favorably received by you and will evoke a positive response from the Soviet and American peoples, as well as from those of other countries.

It is my opinion that the spirit of the treaty which I propose is embodied in the draft enclosed herewith.

I trust that I may soon receive an expression of Your Excellency's thoughts on this subject.

Respectfully,

N. BULGANIN

His Excellency
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

Soviet Draft Treaty

A TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION
BETWEEN THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
AND THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the President of the United States of America,

Inspired by a desire for a further lessening of international tension and for the establishment of trust between States and acting in the interest of maintaining worldwide peace and security,

Being desirous of strengthening the friendship between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States of America,

Being convinced that a strengthening of friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States of America on the basis of the principles of equal rights, mutual respect for State sovereignty, and noninterference in each other's internal affairs, conforms to the vital interests of both countries,

Asserting their faith in the aims and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to cooperate and live in peace with all peoples and with all governments,

Have resolved to conclude the present Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and have designated as their plenipotentiary representatives:

For the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics _____

For the President of the United States of America _____, who having communicated to each other their full powers, which have been found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Contracting Parties will develop and strengthen, in the spirit of sincere cooperation and mutual understanding, friendly relations between the peoples of the Soviet Union and of the United States of America on the basis of equal rights, mutual respect for State sovereignty, and noninterference in internal affairs.

ARTICLE II

The Contracting Parties have agreed, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to settle all their international disputes by peaceful means.

ARTICLE III

The Contracting Parties will contribute to the development and strengthening of economic, cultural and scientific cooperation between the two States, on the basis of the principle of mutual benefit and equal rights.

To implement the present Article, appropriate agreements may be concluded between the Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE IV

The present Treaty shall be subject to ratification. It shall become effective on the date of exchange of instruments of ratification which is to take place in the City of _____ in the shortest possible time.

The Treaty shall be valid for 20 years from the date of its coming into force. Upon the expiration of the aforesaid period each of the Contracting Parties shall have the right to denounce it. Such denunciation shall become effective one year from the date on which notice thereof is given.

In witness whereof, the Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty and have affixed their seals thereto.

Done at _____ on _____ 1956, in two copies in the Russian and English languages, both texts being equally authentic.

By authority of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

By authority of the President of the United States of America

Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference

Press release 41 dated January 24

Secretary Dulles: I have no prepared statement to make today, so if there are any questions I would be glad to receive them.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the State Department statement on the Geneva talks on Saturday[1] *said that the United States had proposed that both sides renounce the use of force in order to remove the threat of war from those negotiations. In a statement just released by the Chinese Communist Foreign Ministry, they say that the failure to reach agreement does not mean there is a war threat, and they also charge the United States as being guilty of deliberate procrastination and obstruction at the talks. What is your reaction to these latest charges?*

A. The statement which we gave out on Saturday gives a pretty full narrative of events and contains all of the relevant documents, and I think

[1] BULLETIN of Jan. 30, 1956, p. 164.

it pretty much speaks for itself. I do not think it indicates any obstructing or procrastinating tactics—on the part of the United States at least. One can wonder sometimes at the Chinese Communist estimate of time. They said, at first, that the Americans detained in China would be "expeditiously" released. Well, most of them have still not been released, after several months. So that is, perhaps, some sidelight as to their own ideas as to what is "expeditious."

I think the record, as made public, indicates a very sincere desire on our part to get as rapidly as possible to a meaningful understanding with reference to the renunciation of force. As indicated there, some progress has been made. Negotiations with the Chinese Communists are usually slow and prolonged, as we know from past experience. But we are planning to go ahead. The talks are still going on. There is another one scheduled for tomorrow, and we continue to be patient and persistent in our effort to obtain a greater assurance of peace, and renunciation of force, in that area.

U.S.–British Talks

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you specify for us, in broad general terms, the subjects which you expect will be discussed with the British delegation in the conference next week?

A. Well, I could not give any detailed specification. The talks are designed to be of a general character. There are no specific agreements that are on the agenda to be reached, and I imagine that our talks will cover the different parts of the world where our two countries have interests in common and where they can appropriately be discussed without any impropriety as regards other countries who may also be involved. But there are quite a few of those matters, and I imagine most of them will be discussed.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is a report that Marshal Tito has agreed to let the Czech arms purchased by Egypt pass through Yugoslavia. Do you think this is a contribution to peace in the Middle East?

A. Well, you raise a kind of double-headed question—first, whether the shipment of arms to Egypt is in the interests of peace. We have always felt that it would not be in the interests of peace to have an arms race in that part of the world. That position was made clear as far back as the declaration of May 1950 [2]—I think it was—when the position of the United States and the United Kingdom and France was made clear on that point. We still adhere basically to the principles of that 1950 declaration, which, I think, made quite clear that we think that the uncontrolled and large-scale shipment of arms into that area to one side or the other is not a contribution to peace.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in relation to the tripartite agreement that you mentioned, there have been some reports—in the preliminary discussions for the Eden visit—or suggestions of some new agreement to implement that in case war broke out in the Middle East. Is that a likely possibility for this meeting—either between the United States and the United Kingdom, or later on a tripartite basis?

A. Well, that declaration, you recall, indicated that if there were aggression by either side the three countries who were parties to that declaration would take appropriate action within or without the United Nations. And it would be quite possible, I would think, even probable, that that general topic would be discussed, although, of course, France is also a party to that declaration, and anything that we discussed there would also have to be discussed with the French.

Q. Well, is our first reliance the United Nations in such a case? Is that the general position of the United States?

A. Yes. I would think that, if it is at all practicable, we would seek action through the United Nations, or at least explore and try to exhaust the possibilities of action in the United Nations, before we took individual or independent action. Whether or not United Nations action would be feasible is, of course, a somewhat difficult question in view of the present attitude of the Soviet Union, which is on the Security Council and which has veto power there. But certainly we would in the first instance consider, I believe, the possibility of action through the United Nations.

Q. Mr. Secretary, both Senators Knowland and Bridges have indicated that they will oppose the nomination of Mr. Bowie as Assistant Secretary of State. Is there any plan to withdraw that nomination?

[2] For text, see *ibid.*, June 15, 1953, p. 834 (footnote).

A. There is no plan to withdraw the nomination. The nomination is pending now before the Senate, and it has been referred to the Foreign Relations Committee.

Q. They say that they had an agreement that appointments in advance would be cleared with them before they were publicly announced. Is that true?

A. Well, I think the usual, normal procedures were followed in this case. You may recall that Mr. Bowie is now Assistant Secretary of State. He was appointed by the President, as an interim appointment, last August,[3] I think, after the new assistant secretaryship positions were created, and it was made clear to the Congress at that time that one of those positions was being created for Mr. Bowie. That appears explicitly in the report of the Foreign Affairs Committee.[4]

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you say what action the three powers could take if the Security Council took no action on the matter of the Middle East?

A. No. I don't think I could properly go into that.

Middle East Arms Situation

Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with that, have you any information, sir, that Tito during his recent visit to Egypt agreed to supply Egypt with arms?

A. No, I have had no intimation to that effect. You recall that the United States has supplied a certain amount of arms to Yugoslavia, but in accordance with our standard procedure in those matters, and, indeed, in accordance with the law, it is stipulated there that the arms could not be retransferred to a third party without our consent.

Q. Why I asked that question, sir, is that I had heard yesterday over at the Pentagon that there is information to the effect that Tito did agree to supply certain arms to Egypt.

A. Well, all I can say is that I have no such indication.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have any information as to whether we know if Tito has agreed to allow the transshipment of arms through his country?

A. No, I have no official knowledge of that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give us some information on the status of Israel's application for arms to balance the shipment of Communist arms to Egypt?

A. The application is still pending here with the State Department. I shall probably be seeing the Israeli Ambassador during the course of the next few days to talk further about the matter.

Long-Term Foreign Aid

Q. Mr. Secretary, after your talks with congressional leaders are you optimistic on your chances for a long-term foreign aid program?

A. I believe that we will get from the Congress the authority to do the necessary—what we deem to be the necessary things in relation to foreign aid, including an ability to undertake some long-range projects. I do not think that I would want to forecast the precise form which that would take. There are, of course, many possible forms which it could take, and from the legislative standpoint there are a number of choices to be made, and I do not now want to indicate any particular choice.

You may recall that last year, for example, we had this request for a $200 million fund particularly for what was called the "arc of Asia." There the Congress authorized the full $200 million, appropriated for that year $100 million, and we expect to get the second appropriation to fill out the authorization this year. That is one illustration of the way in which these things can be done. There are other ways.

Q. Mr. Secretary, does the administration intend to submit specific proposals on how it believes this problem should be met—the long-term aid program?

A. You mean specific suggestions as to projects?

Q. No, specific suggestions as to the legislation it wants, including the number of years it thinks should be the maximum for such projects and, perhaps, the amount of money involved per year.

A. Yes, I expect that we shall do that. It is probable, although not certain, that that will be expressed in a Presidential message which, in due course, will go up on this subject of the mutual security program.

It has been customary in the past to have a

[3] *Ibid.*, Sept. 12, 1955, p. 442; see also White House press release dated Aug. 11.

[4] H. Rept. 1260, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 3.

Presidential message on that subject, which would elaborate somewhat the broad outlines that are contained in the President's state of the Union message. I imagine that that practice may be followed this year, and, if so, that could elaborate the program along the lines you suggested.

Q. Wouldn't that put it in a precise form, which you said you wouldn't now indicate?

A. I was asked whether I thought we would get the authority that we needed to carry forward a limited number of specific projects on a somewhat long-range basis. I said that I thought we would get that authority in some form or another.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is an idea in what you say. I wonder whether you would say if this is correct: that between now and the time the message goes up you hope to work out with congressional leaders some understanding as to the form and content which would be acceptable there.

A. That is very true. We are having talks of that sort. The whole topic has been discussed already twice before the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees: first, in a rather general way by myself; subsequently, by Mr. Hoover. In addition, I have had talks with Senator George and Congressman Richards, each of whom had lunch with me. We are exploring the different points of view and have good expectation that they will be brought together in some form, although, as I say, I would not want to predict today either the form in which we would ask for the authority or the form in which I think the authority may be given.

Tests of Nuclear Weapons

Q. Mr. Secretary, going back to the question of the Eden visit, the British have been talking about seeking a world agreement under which there would be control, as distinct from banning, of future tests of hydrogen or atomic weapons. Have they discussed that with us, or are we in any way willing to enter into any control system in the field of testing of these weapons?

A. We have had talks on that general subject with the United Kingdom over a considerable period of time. I had the first talks I think somewhere around 2 years ago with Sir Anthony Eden when he was Foreign Minister, and we have been in frequent consultation with each other on that particular subject. I would say that the obstacles in the path are what we both recognize to be technical difficulties relating to control, and as to where you draw the line between what is a new and bigger explosion and what has now become almost a conventional weapon. There are a great many technical difficulties in the way of formulating a proposal which might be put to the Soviet, in a form which would really be protective of the interests of both sides.

Now we have been discussing that thing with the British off and on for a couple of years. I wouldn't be surprised if it would come up again when Sir Anthony is here this time.

Q. There is no specific proposal before you, however?

A. No, there is not.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are these technical difficulties of the kind you think might be overcome so that a specific proposal might be advanced by us and the British?

A. This is out of my field. It is primarily up to the scientists and the experts and the Atomic Energy Commission to judge that. I would say that as far as my observation goes I do not myself see on the horizon any formula which it seems to me would be likely to work, but, as I say, this is at this stage very largely a matter for the scientists.

Talks With Chinese Communists

Q. Mr. Secretary, referring again to the current exchange of statements between this Capital and Peking, would you say that this counter battery-fire has put an end to the negotiations at Geneva, or do you expect them to continue and to continue fruitfully?

A. Well, I expect them to continue. As I said, there is a meeting set for tomorrow, and I hope and believe that the talks will continue to go on. How fruitful they will be is something on which it is very difficult to form an opinion. Obviously, we would not be continuing the talks unless we had some hopes and expectations of positive results coming out of them.

Q. Would you give us your estimate or guess as to why the Chinese chose to break secrecy in this matter?

A. Well, it has been rather traditional in these matters that when they think they have what they

consider a good propaganda position then they break the general understanding about secrecy. I would not want to say that this was bad faith on their part, because they gave us notice in advance that they did intend to make these things public. We had agreed that the talks would be more apt to make good progress if we did not turn them into a propaganda struggle. But we did not have any absolute hard and fast rule that nothing could under any circumstances be given out, and they did give us advance notice of their intention to do this. Therefore I do not accuse them in that particular respect of having technically been guilty of bad faith. I think it was a step which, because it was designed as a propaganda move, is not in the best interests of getting good results.

You ask why they did it. As I say, I can only assume that they did it because they thought their statement would have a propaganda value for them.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to get back to Yugoslavia, has there been any slackening of U.S. military aid shipments to Yugoslavia?

A. I doubt whether I can answer that question except in a very general way, which is that I believe that the bulk of the program has already been carried out and that what is now going forward is normally on a reduced basis, as against what formerly was the case. If there is anything more than that, I don't know.

Q. Mr. Secretary, a report by a study commission of the House Foreign Affairs Committee published on Friday suggested that, since the Czech-Egyptian deal was a proof of Soviet insincerity, the Geneva conference should have been postponed. Would you care to comment on that?

A. Well, I think that the facts perhaps speak for themselves; namely, we did hold the Geneva conference—I assume you are referring now to the October–November conference?

Q. That is right.

A. Well, if we had thought that it should be postponed, we wouldn't have held it.

Foreign Policy and Political Partisanship

Q. Mr. Secretary, after your talk with Senator George, what do you think the prospects are that foreign policy will be kept out of the political arena during the forthcoming campaign?

A. Did you say "will be" kept out?

Q. Yes.

(Laughter)

Q. "Might be," if you wish.

(Laughter)

A. I think perhaps the laughter you have heard is more eloquent than any statement of mine.

Q. Sir, in connection with that last statement may I ask you, on the 13th of January, 1953, you were commenting to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on this matter of politics and what is proper to say in a campaign year.

A. Excuse me, I missed the date.

Q. The date was January 13, 1953, and in your statement of that date you said that it is a part of our normal political system and a proper part, of which you approved, for people to take sides in statement of cases, and you said that in a campaign one does use extravagant terms which would not be used in a more judicious context. Now, do you still subscribe to that theory that it is proper in a campaign year to put aside a more judicial attitude for public affairs?

A. I don't recall my precise words. If I was describing the fact that in a political year there is a less judicial attitude, that is, I am afraid, a fact for which much evidence could be adduced. As far as the propriety of discussion, I think I said here a couple of months or so ago, on that topic, that I believe that it is entirely proper and appropriate that there should be what I think I called a constructive discussion of foreign policy.

I would say this, that there is a danger point which I think all patriotic citizens should observe, and that is to not shake confidence abroad in the solidity of the U.S. position on these basic matters. We do have a basically bipartisan position which has evolved over the last 10 years, which involves the committal of the U.S. prestige and honor to various other countries and various places in the world. If there should grow up any doubt about our determination to stand on those commitments, it would be a very sad day for the United States and in my opinion would greatly increase the risk of war.

I think that most people who are active in this

campaign are fully conscious of that fact and, I hope and believe, will take it into account in what they say.

Q. Have you made any efforts, sir, to get matters in this area which you have defined taken out of partisan discussion this year by agreement or common understanding? Is this the sort of thing which you talked to Senator George about, for example?

A. No. We have discussed the possibility of taking one or two matters out of partisanship. It is very difficult to catalog those things. I recall that my first experience in these matters was back in 1944, when I came down here on behalf of Governor Dewey, the Republican candidate, to confer with Secretary Hull on behalf of President Roosevelt, and we had quite a discussion here. We agreed to try to keep one topic out of the discussion, and that was the broad committal of the United States to join in a world organization for peace, which became the United Nations. We tried to get a broader agreement, and Secretary Hull and I discussed it during the greater part of 3 days. Secretary Hull was very anxious to have a broader agreement, but we did not arrive at any formula. Secretary Hull said at the time, the value of those talks would depend upon the outcome. I think he also indicated, when he wrote his memoirs, that the outcome had been satisfactory. But it was because of what I would consider a broad patriotic attitude on both sides rather than by having arrived at a particular formula which cataloged matters. We did, as I say, take the one matter out, and that was the United Nations, but we could not agree on anything else.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what are the one or two matters which you believe should now be kept out of partisanship?

A. Well, I think I would prefer not to define those at the present time, because what we are trying to do would require an understanding on both sides, and until there is, or unless there is such an understanding, I wouldn't want to talk about them.

Q. Well, are you going to continue discussions with the Democratic leaders with a view to keeping some specific subjects out of partisanship?

A. Well, I will continue, of course, to have talks primarily with the two Democrats who are the chairmen of the Foreign Relations and the Foreign Affairs Committees. Most of our problems, as far as Congress is concerned, focus up to those two men. Now, when you get outside of Congress, the problem is much more difficult to deal with, because one does not know yet who the Democratic candidate for the Presidency is going to be. There are several open or unavowed candidates. And the problem of reaching any agreement becomes pretty difficult when you get outside of the congressional area.

Caracas Doctrine

Q. Mr. Secretary, when the fact of the Communist arms deal with Egypt became generally known, some officials of the Government, of our Government, privately at least expressed a good deal of concern about the danger of Soviet attempts to penetrate Latin America in a similar way or economically. The other day there was a statement, I think it was attributed to Bulganin, that indeed they were inviting new ties, diplomatic, political, and economic, with Latin America. I may have overlooked it, but I haven't seen any particular reaction officially from us on this. Does this mean that we think that things in Latin America are in extremely good shape and that there isn't any particular threat at this time?

A. Well, we never take things for granted, because I feel that if you ever become complacent about any situation that in itself makes an area of danger. The interview that you refer to, the statement that you refer to, was issued as a prospective interview, I think, with the representative of a paper which is widely published or circulated in South America. It is my impression that the paper did not publish the interview, at that time at least, because they feared that it was primarily a propaganda move which they did not care to lend themselves to. So it was published on a unilateral basis by Chairman Bulganin.

Now, I think that there is, of course, a potential danger in Latin America, just as there is in most of the countries of the world. I think that the danger is more under control in that area than in most. This is largely due to the acceptance by the American Republics of what I call the Caracas Doctrine. We agreed at Caracas at the conference of the American States that, if international communism got control of the political institutions of any American state, that would

be a danger to the peace of the entire hemisphere, including the other states, and become a matter of general concern.[5] Now, it was largely that doctrine which I think led to the overthrow of the Communist regime in Guatemala. It creates a very serious hazard to, and somewhat, I believe, slows down, the efforts of the Communists in this hemisphere. So, while we don't take it for granted by any means that there is no danger, we think we are fairly well organized to cope with the danger.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on that same subject, what is your own thought as to whether or not subversion short of taking over a government would invoke the Monroe Doctrine?

A. Well, I would not think one would go beyond the principles that were accepted in the Caracas resolution which deal with the situation which would exist if in fact international communism got control of the political institution of an American state. Now, there was also in that resolution a provision which is to some degree being helpfully implemented at the present time—that is, that there would be an exchange of information as between the American States so that each would know the activities of international communism insofar as relevant for its own purposes. If, for example, state "A" knew that there was a cell within its state which was contemplating activities as against a second state, the second state would be informed. That kind of thing provides for a multilateral defense against subversion, although the full impact of the Caracas resolution only applies to the eradication of international communism by international effort when it gets control of the political institutions of some American state.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you still consider that the vital interests of this country and of the Western World are involved in the defense of Quemoy and Matsu? I would like to know whether you consider whether it is a matter of unilateral American action or whether you plan to discuss the matter with the British next week or some other time.

A. I gave an answer to a Quemoy-Matsu question last week[6] and I don't care to add to it this week.

[5] Bulletin of Apr. 26, 1954, p. 638.
[6] *Ibid.*, Jan. 30, 1956, p. 155.

Q. Mr. Secretary, with respect to a question that came up earlier with regard to limitation of or control of atomic or hydrogen tests, does the U.S. Government have a fixed policy or an official attitude toward this, so that it would like to see such control established? Has there ever been any contact with the Soviet Government on this point?

A. No.

Q. "No" to both parts, to both questions?

A. Oh, excuse me. There has been no contact with the Soviet Union on this subject and there has been no policy, you might say, arrived at pending technical advice which indicates the premises upon which policy could be based.

Q. May I ask just one more question on this? As I understand it, the problem is whether some formula could be found before the number of tests, the size of tests, and other limits could be fixed. Is that it?

A. I would not like to be understood as giving a technically, scientifically accurate description of the problem, because it is in fact much too complex for me to understand. I am not a scientist or engineer, I have never studied in that field, and the whole thing is very much a mystery to me. All I can say is that my impression of what I have been told on this subject is that there are very great technical difficulties in arriving, let us say, at a definition of just where you draw the line, for example, between tests that are permissible and tests that are impermissible, or whether it is possible to draw and police a line. And, well, that is only giving you a vague idea. There are many other aspects of the problem which I am not competent really to go into. But that is the type of problem which we have been studying.

Q. Could I turn it around? What was the purpose—what would be the purpose of the conversation when this matter comes up here with Mr. Eden and Mr. Lloyd?

A. Well, let me say *if* it comes up—I don't know that it will, but it was touched on, I think, in the speech that Sir Anthony made last week, Saturday perhaps, and it is only from that I surmise that it may come up here for discussion. If you will read that speech, you will know as much as I do about what is likely to come up.

Q. Mr. Secretary, will your discussions with

Sir Anthony or the President's discussions with Sir Anthony Eden contain any reference to the problems of German reunification?

A. Well, that is an international problem which is discussed, I think, whenever two or more people get together who are interested in international justice and in the problems that we have before us. We are all committed to that goal, to do everything that we can to pursue it, and I would be surprised if it did not come up for discussion when Sir Anthony was here.

A Historical View of American Foreign Policy in the Middle East

by Donald R. Heath
Ambassador to Lebanon[1]

First of all, let me attempt a general statement of our policy, which is a clear and consistent one, aiming at the maintenance of friendly relations with the peoples and nations of the Middle East, and the support of their independence and their progress.

American interest in the Middle East is almost as old as the United States itself. We Americans are grateful heirs of the culture, the science, the religious and philosophical concepts which in past golden ages this region has so richly produced. We are following with intense interest the renaissance in all fields of human endeavor which is today taking place throughout the Middle East. Our first material interest and appearance on the Middle Eastern scene was maritime. The first decades of our national history were marked by a remarkable expansion of American shipping—the clipper-ship era. Our clipper ships were seen in the harbors of Smyrna, Beirut, North Africa, Mocha, Zanzibar, and Muscat. This was a fine and colorful trade with advantage to all concerned, marked by such dramatic episodes as the war with the Barbary pirates and resulting in some of our earliest treaties. We concluded, for example, a treaty with the Sultan of Morocco in 1789.

With the decline of the clipper ships and their replacement by steam, our formerly brisk trade tended to decline, but its decline coincided with the opening of a new and glorious—I use the word "glorious" advisedly—stage of American relations with the Middle East. That was the era of American missionaries, American educators, and American philanthropists which left such helpful and enduring monuments as Robert College, the American University in Beirut, and numerous other institutions.

It may be argued that our missionary, philanthropic, and educational activities in the Middle East do not enter into a discussion of American policy toward that region since they were carried on by private individuals and organizations. But, if they were not fostered or financed by our Government, they had the sympathetic approval of the Government and the approval and support of a great body of the American public. These private efforts are being carried on today on an expanding scale by American individuals and organizations. These activities are now supplemented by United States Government aid programs, but the spirit of these latter programs is imbued with essentially the same enlightened benevolence.

The close of the First World War opened a new and hopeful chapter in the long history of this region and inaugurated a new phase of American relations with the old states and the new states which came into being following the war. A conspicuous American activity which began between the two wars was in the development of the petroleum resources of the Near East. I have no desire to read a brief for the oil companies, but neither they nor we need be ashamed of their contribution. They contributed know-

[1] Address made before the American Friends of the Middle East at New York, N.Y., on Jan. 26 (press release 42 dated Jan. 25).

how and capital, invested on terms which were generally accepted as fair by the states involved, and their operations have contributed great and increasing financial sinews for the hopeful renaissance which is occurring in the Middle East.

World War II resulted, as did World War I, in a changed picture in the Middle East. New states have arisen in the area, and the independence of others has been confirmed and strengthened as colonialism has tended to disappear or evolve. That process is not complete, but the end is surely almost within human view.

New Threat of Imperialism

The present is a period of great human hopes for the area, but against the realization of these human hopes is a new threat of imperialism dressed in a new garb. I refer to the menace of international communism. I am not going to expound on the nature and aims of international communism. It pretends to have as a goal the betterment of the lot of mankind. Similar arguments were put forth by proponents of unregenerate colonialism of a certain type, but, viewed against their actual and the total record, the Communist claims are even more fallacious. We have hopes—and they are not unfounded—that in the atomic age into which we are entering Communist imperialism can be restrained and perhaps, as a result of such restraint, can be denatured. But meanwhile it is today, with great and increasing energy, endeavoring to extend its thralldom over the great and promising area of the Middle East. It is not, as of today, using the threat of force or actual force as it did respectively in Turkey and Iran immediately after World War II. It is using what has been called by our Secretary of State a "Trojan horse policy" of subversion, masked by offers of economic and arms aid.

The new development in American policy toward the Middle East which followed World War II was our coming to the support, I might say to the defense, of countries such as Turkey and Iran, immediately threatened by Soviet force. We followed it with arms and economic assistance to Middle Eastern countries directly in the shadow of would-be Soviet expansionism. We have since followed it with economic aid programs to countries who are not in the first line of possible Soviet military advance. It is idle to deny that one powerful motive behind these new programs of American governmental aid was the desire to halt the advance of Soviet tyranny. But that is not the whole story. Essential in our aid programs and in the support given them by the American public is the desire to alleviate human suffering and to promote human progress.

Emergence of Israel

In this sketchy review of American policy toward the Middle East I have left for last mention the occurrence which without doubt most perturbs that region—that is, the emergence of Israel in 1947 as an independent state, the war between Israel and her Arab neighbors, and the uneasy armistice and human fears and suffering and, I must add, the hatreds which followed that war. American support for Israel has often been misinterpreted, and it would be folly for us to overlook the effect that the Arab-Israel dispute has had on the attitude of many Arabs toward the U.S.

The factors which brought about the creation of the State of Israel are well known. They include such things as the horror aroused by the Nazi slaughter of millions of Jews in Europe and sympathy for the efforts of the survivors—a minority—to find a haven in which to rebuild their shattered lives. At the same time our Government is deeply aware of the tragic plight of the Palestinian refugees who fled the battlegrounds of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Last August Secretary Dulles, in a speech delivered in this city,[2] set forth the earnest desire of the United States and specifically of our President to offer our help, financial and moral, toward a just and equitable solution of that problem. That desire exists today and, with it, the conviction that, in spite of its complexities and suffering, a just and equitable solution can be found. It is urgent that a solution be found so that the peoples of the region can devote their full efforts toward the great human progress which could be achieved there within less than the span of a human life. I believe it is unnecessary to repeat the Secretary's analysis, the general proposals and offers of financial and other assistance toward the solution of that problem. It is a problem which is receiving the most earnest and continuing study by the President, the State Department, and other branches of the Government.

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[2] BULLETIN of Sept. 5, 1955, p. 378.

One of the hopeful developments in this time of troubles in which we live is the increasing if as yet imperfect realization in the United States and in the free world that in the long run the relations between nations are subject to moral law. I might term this law the golden rule of international relations and would define it by the proposition that if a policy or action by one state is harmful to the long-term interests of another nation then it is not to the true advantage of the state committing the action. I believe that the Soviet Union will eventually discover that its transgression of this law has done dire injury to the true interests of Russia.

I hope that in negotiations that we trust will before long take place between the Arab nations involved and the State of Israel this golden rule will be kept constantly in mind in order that a just and lasting settlement may be achieved.

The benevolent interest of the United States in the countries of the Middle East exemplified by the activities of private American philanthropists and educators since more than a century continues and is manifested by the aid programs of our Government inspired by the same sympathy with the aspirations of the Middle Eastern states. Friendship toward the Middle East is a constant in American foreign policy.

U.S. Policy on Treaty Rights in Morocco

Press release 46 dated January 26

It is the policy of the U.S. Government to relinquish its extraterritorial jurisdiction in Morocco at the appropriate time. The Department intends to request congressional action to this end.

These extraterritorial rights were accorded to us in the treaty of peace and friendship first concluded with Morocco in 1787 and renewed in 1836. These rights were subsequently expanded through the effect of other international agreements concluded by Morocco.

The U.S. Government, pleading before the International Court of Justice in 1952 in the case concerning U.S. treaty rights in Morocco,[1] made clear that it had always stood ready and still stood ready to take steps to relinquish its extraterritorial rights when the circumstances warranted.

The United States is following closely the progress which France and Morocco are making in working out their future relationships. We consider that to modernize our own treaty relationship with Morocco with respect to our extraterritorial rights would be the only course in keeping with this evolution.

[1] For an article on the case, see BULLETIN of Oct. 20, 1952, p. 620.

Allotment of $50 Million to India for Economic Development

Approval of $50 million to India for economic development assistance was announced on January 10 by the International Cooperation Administration. This is the amount authorized for India by Congress from the 1956 mutual security appropriation. The money will augment India's own economic development program.

India has spent more than $4 billion since the start of its first Five-Year Plan in 1951 to raise the living standard of its 372 million population—the largest of any free-world nation. During this period the United States has allotted the South Asian nation $274,464,000 in economic aid.

As a result of India's development program, food and raw materials are more nearly adequate than at any time in recent years. During the first 3 years of the Five-Year Plan, per capita income was raised by 8 percent.

The new $50 million will be applied to India's second Five-Year Plan, which starts April 1, and will bring total U.S. Government economic aid to India to $324,474,000. This amount is exclusive of a $190 million wheat loan to India in 1951 and approximately $21,500,000 in U.S. agricultural commodities distributed in the country by voluntary relief agencies.

The new ICA funds will be used to continue programs such as acquiring steel for railways, fertilizer, DDT for malaria control, grain-storage facilities, and other purposes.

As its own economy has developed, more and more of U.S. economic assistance to India has been in the form of loans rather than grants. In the 1955 program, $45 million out of a total of $60,500,000 of U.S. development assistance was in the form of loans. It is expected that at least 75 percent of 1956 development assistance funds will be loans.

U.S.-Indian Cooperation for Economic Development

by John Sherman Cooper
Ambassador to India[1]

I am here on behalf of my Government to turn over these four locomotives to the Government of India as an expression of the good will that the people of the United States hold for the people of India in their great task of building this nation. Tomorrow I will go to Okha in Saurashtra to participate again in ceremonies turning over to India the first of what will eventually number more than 8,700 freight cars—or, as you call them, railway goods wagons.[2]

I would like the people of India to know that when these four locomotives, manufactured by the Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corporation of Eddystone, Pennsylvania, left the shores of the United States a ceremony was held at the dockside by Americans who were proud to see them going to India as a symbol of America's good will. And it is very good of you to receive them today with this ceremony. For these two simple observances, separated by half the circumference of the earth, emphasize the character of American assistance. It is a cooperative undertaking of our Governments, and in essence it expresses a relationship of mutual respect between our peoples. On my part, I am honored that it has fallen to my lot to take part in this ceremony.

India has one of the great railway systems of the world. Its 34,000 miles of track are approximately equivalent in size to such systems as that of Germany, and it is about four-fifths the size of that of Canada. Although the United States railroad system of 222,000 miles is almost seven times that of India, Indian railways carry more passengers than the total of all United States railroads. On the other hand, due to our expanded economic and industrial development, freight carried in the United States is much larger.

It is inevitable that India's expanding economic and rural development will exert a continuing and increasing burden both in terms of freight and passenger carriage on India's railways. This certainty underscores the fact that the success of India's broad economic program depends in large measure upon the parallel development of its railway system. It is a tribute to the foresight of India's leaders, to you of the Ministry of Transport, to the Railway Board, and to all those who direct and operate India's railways that you have recognized the importance of an improved railway system in the expanding economy of India. On our part, I am glad that we of the United States have supported India's objectives in the transportation sector of its first Five-Year Plan. My country made its first major contribution to India's transport in 1954 through our Indo-American program. This was carried on in the year which has just ended and is being continued in this new year.

In this connection may I say that all of the locomotives and freight wagons provided to India under our assistance program are not manufactured in the United States. Half of the 100 locomotives are being fabricated in the United States shops. The others are being made in the United Kingdom and in Japan. Similarly, the freight cars provided to India by America are being manufactured in the United Kingdom, Austria, and France as well as in the United States, and many axles and wheels will be provided by shops in Japan.

[1] Address made at Bombay on Jan. 3.

[2] For background on U.S. aid to India's railways, see BULLETIN of Jan. 18, 1954, p. 88.

Extent and Purpose of U.S. Aid

I do not want to dwell unduly on American assistance to India, but as you near the end of your first Five-Year Plan and inaugurate the second Five-Year Plan it may be of interest to say something of the extent and purpose of American aid.

The $38,500,000 which has already been made available for the rehabilitation of Indian railways, as a part of your first Five-Year Plan, is but a portion of the total. Since August 15, 1947—the date of India's independence—United States Government aid to India has totaled $477,934,000 or, expressed in your own currency, Rs. 227 crores. Of this total more than half—or $242,934,000—has been in grants and the remainder in the form of loans, chiefly for the delivery of wheat in 1951–52. These figures do not include grants and contributions which have come to India from the American people through such nongovernmental organizations as the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations and other United States private voluntary agencies. This form of assistance to India since 1947 has totaled an additional $48,289,000, or about Rs. 23 crores.

I have mentioned these figures not for their own value but because they represent the continuous effort that the American people have made over a period of years and because they thus illustrate in a larger sense the great effort the Indian people themselves have made. For we pay tribute above all to the effort and achievement of the Indian Government and people in building the economy of their country. I have mentioned the 100 locomotives and 8,700 freight cars which are being furnished to the Indian railways through American assistance, but I have not forgotten that during the first Five-Year Plan India has placed orders for more than 2,000 locomotives, to be paid for from Indian resources. We do not forget that it is the effort of the Indian people themselves that is primary and basic. External assistance, from whatever source, can play at most a minor part in the development of a country. Here in India external aid has no meaning apart from the great effort made by your people under the leadership of your President, your Prime Minister, and Government.

Industrial Improvement

Briefly, we have tried to fit our assistance into the frame of India's first and second Five-Year Plans, and the objects to which our aid has been applied have been approved by the Government of India. They have covered a cross section of industrial, agricultural, and social undertakings. In the field of industrial improvement, the expansion of India's railways which this ceremony emphasizes is a good example. During the past 4 years the people of the United States have also delivered or placed on order for India 660,000 long tons of steel. This does not include the thousands of tons that are represented in the locomotives and railway wagons which have come to India, and I can tell you further that the figure of 660,000 tons that I have quoted will be substantially increased in a few days.

In another field to which India's first Five-Year Plan gave great importance, that of achieving self-sufficiency in agriculture, we have likewise been able to contribute. To date we have provided some $21 million for fertilizer and some $23,500,000 for ground water and irrigation. But we hope above all that our technical assistance and funds have contributed to those human and social endeavors which keep and expand life itself—the human fields of health, of education, and of community development. I stress this because I believe that the great opportunity of understanding and agreement between our two countries lies in our common belief in the value of people as individuals and in the spiritual expression of freedom itself.

U.S. Friendship for India

Before I close I would like to say that American economic aid to India is no new thing, just as American friendship for India is no new development on the international scene. Over a decade ago, when the people of India were striving to achieve independence, I am glad that the United States, acting as a friend both of India and the U.K., urged Indian independence. And in the years that have passed, my country has continued to demonstrate the friendship of our people with those of India. As we gave support to India in its aspiration for political independence, my country for over 5 years has done what it could to assist India in its expressed purpose to achieve economic independence and to raise the living standards of its people.

And, finally, may I say that to whatever degree my country's assistance has been of value, its provision has been the choice and decision of all the American people made through the demo-

cratic process of our institutions. As a citizen of the United States and as representative of the President of the United States in your great nation, I thank you for the honor you have done my country by asking its representatives to meet with you today. I look back with you today on the record of constancy and cooperation, and I look forward to a future in which my country desires to continue and increase its friendship with India and its people.

Letters of Credence

James C. Hagerty, press secretary to the President, announced on January 24 that the President had that day received the credentials of the newly appointed Ambassador of Iran, Ali Amini.

Mr. Katzen Appointed Consultant on Use of Funds in Israel

Press release 43 dated January 25

The Secretary of State on January 25 appointed Bernard Katzen as a special consultant on the use of local currencies acquired by the United States in Israel. Mr. Katzen is a New York attorney and a former assistant district attorney and arbitrator of the New York State Labor Mediation Board. He is a member of the American Judicature Society and of the New York State Bar Association.

Mr. Katzen will make recommendations to the Department of State and the United States Information Agency for using funds which have accumulated to the account of the United States through the sale of American publications in Israel under the Informational Media Guaranty program. The Informational Media Guaranty Agreement of June 9, 1952, between the United States and Israel provides that these funds are freely expendable in Israel by the United States for scientific, educational, and cultural activities or for other purposes as mutually agreed between the two countries. In considering and recommending the most effective and productive use of these funds, Mr. Katzen hopes to facilitate a significant U.S. contribution to the existing close cultural relations between this country and Israel.

Mr. Katzen plans to visit Israel in February for several weeks to discuss with officials of the Government of Israel and with various organizations in Israel the most advantageous uses for the funds. His recommendations are expected to form the basis of a request to the Congress for authorization to use the funds for specific purposes.

SEATO Representatives Prepare for Meeting of Council

Following is the text of a communique issued at Bangkok, Thailand, on January 17 at the close of a meeting of the Council Representatives of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty Organization.

The SEATO Council Representatives today held a further meeting in preparation for the second conference of the SEATO Council of Foreign Ministers which is to be held in Karachi on March 6, 1956.[1] The Council Representatives, who have their headquarters in Bangkok and carry on the business of the treaty organization as directed by the Council of Foreign Ministers, are now engaged in a broad review of SEATO's accomplishments to date. They are examining those accomplishments which have contributed towards the objectives of preserving peace, of strengthening the capacity of the nations of Southeast Asia to defend their independence against aggression and subversion directed from without, and of promoting their economic well-being. This review will be incorporated in a report to be submitted to the Council at Karachi. The report will also contain the Council Representatives' proposals for SEATO activities during the coming year. To obtain expert assistance in this task, the Council Representatives have convened the specialized committees under their jurisdiction to meet in Bangkok this month.

The Committee of Economic Experts, composed of delegates from each of the member nations, met on January 12 and is still in session. It is reviewing the economic problems which confront various member governments, seeking the best means to solve them by self-help and cooperative effort among the eight nations involved.

The Committee on Information, Cultural, Education and Labor activities started its meeting in Bangkok yesterday. It is composed of experts of the member governments and will make

[1] For the final communique issued at Bangkok on Feb. 25, 1955, at the close of the first meeting of the Council, see BULLETIN of Mar. 7, 1955, p. 371.

recommendations to improve the cooperative effort of SEATO in these fields.

The Committee to combat Communist subversion is also meeting to consider matters in its sphere.

The recommendations of the Committees will shortly be forwarded to the Council Representatives and, after review, incorporated in their report. The Council Representatives meeting which opened today is under the Chairmanship of Mr. Max W. Bishop, the new United States Ambassador to Thailand, who serves concurrently as SEATO Council Representative for the United States. The Chairmanship rotates on a monthly basis and fell to the United States during January. The other representatives were: Mr. David O. Hay for Australia, Baron Albert de Schoenen for France, Mr. Foss Shanahan for New Zealand, Mr. Syed Khalil-ur-Rehman for Pakistan, Mr. Jose Alejandrino for the Philippines, Luang Bhadravadi for Thailand, Sir Berkeley Gage for the United Kingdom.

U.S. Gives Viet-Nam $37 Million for Refugee Resettlement

The International Cooperation Administration on January 18 announced approval of a $37-million program to assist free Viet-Nam in the resettlement of political refugees from the north during the 1956 fiscal year. The basic objective of the program is to assist in the integration of the refugees into Viet-Nam's economy within the shortest possible time.

U.S. aid will be used to provide agricultural tools, seeds, fertilizers, work animals, loan credits to refugees, equipment for the preparation and clearing of land, food distribution, and special educational activities. Some of the refugees will be resettled by the Viet-Nam Government on abandoned land in southwest Viet-Nam. American agricultural experts, who recently cooperated with Viet-Nam Government agricultural technicians in making a survey of this land, reported it to be good land with a high fertility level. The exact acreage of this land to be provided to each refugee family has not yet been decided upon by the Viet-Nam Government.

ICA support for the refugee resettlement program will help Viet-Nam to absorb more than 500,000 civilian refugees who fled from the Communists after July 1954.[1] Provided with the land, tools, and equipment which they need to support themselves, these refugees will be able to contribute to the development of Viet-Nam's economy.

The refugees fled from the Communists when Viet Minh forces obtained control of Viet-Nam north of the 17th parallel. President Eisenhower announced that the United States would assist non-Communists from the north to evacuate and settle in the south. Initially U.S. Navy transports and about $10 million for tents and relief supplies were made available for this purpose.

When the magnitude of the flow of refugees to the south became evident, an overall refugee program was developed and the expenditure of $35 million in U.S. aid was authorized. Later, supplementary aid was provided, bringing the total for 1955 to $55.8 million. These funds were used to help cover transportation costs, reception facilities—including tents and housing materials—food, medical supplies, and temporary subsistence allowances. The French and Vietnamese Governments also contributed to this program for civilian refugees.

In fiscal 1955, $320 million in U.S. military and economic aid was provided, primarily to help the Vietnamese Government to rehabilitate war-devastated areas and put the country's economy on a stable and eventually self-sufficient basis.

Revised Regulation on Radioisotope Distribution

Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, on January 10 announced issuance of a revised regulation—"Licensing of By-product Material"—which removes certain restrictions on the sale of radioisotopes abroad and simplifies procedures governing domestic distribution.[2]

The revised regulation sets up procedures by which scientists in other countries may more easily obtain U.S.-produced radioisotopes. It makes more conveniently available to them radioactive materials for use in medicine, agriculture, industry, and the physical sciences. Scientists and research groups in other nations can now deal di-

[1] For a report of the evacuation, see BULLETIN of Feb. 7, 1955, p. 222.

[2] For text of revised regulation, see 21 *Fed. Reg.* 213.

rectly with production and distribution centers in this country.

In the United States the revised regulation will help American researchers and the growing body of radioisotope users by raising the limit on quantities of radioactive materials available to each user under general license. These increased quantities, while far below those which could cause any danger to the general population, are nevertheless of importance to research and to practical applications of radioisotopes in science and industry.

The revised regulation is effective February 10, 1956. It replaces the existing "Radioisotopes Distribution" regulation, first issued in 1951, governing distribution and use of radioisotopes shipped to distributors and consumers from various AEC installations through the Commission's Isotopes Division in Oak Ridge, Tenn.[3]

A system of general and specific licenses is established by the new regulation covering distribution of byproduct radioactive materials produced in nuclear reactors. The revision brings the regulation into conformity with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and liberalizes export procedures as announced by Dr. Willard F. Libby of the Commission during the International Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in Geneva last August.[4]

Foreign Distribution

The revised regulation eliminates a number of administrative steps now required before reactor-produced radioisotopes may be shipped abroad. Except for export to Soviet-bloc countries, Commission licensees in the United States will now be able to ship byproduct materials having an atomic number from 3 to 83, inclusive, directly to persons abroad.

These former requirements are eliminated: (1) appointment by foreign governments of representatives in the United States before users in their countries could obtain radioisotopes from the United States; and (2) reports from foreign representatives, on request, on the results of use of radioactive materials shipped to their countries.

The Commission will keep itself informed as to the kind, quantity, and destination of exports by having U.S. licensees report to the Commission within 90 days after an export, showing the kind and quantity of isotopes exported, the consignee's name and address, and the date of export.

Provision is made for filing applications for specific licenses to export other byproduct materials and to export byproduct material to Soviet-bloc countries, but the Commission will not issue such licenses if, in its opinion, the proposed export would be inimical to the common defense and security.

Domestic Distribution

The revised regulation lists 65 byproduct materials which may, within specified levels of radioactivity, be possessed under general license, provided that no person shall at any one time possess more than 10 scheduled quantities. The old regulation did not list these byproducts by name, but provided generally for exemption from licensing of beta- or gamma-emitting materials up to a total of 11 microcuries. ("Microcurie" means that amount of radioactive material which disintegrates at the rate of 37,000 atoms per second.) The levels subject to general licensing in the revised regulation generally are somewhat higher than those exempted heretofore.

Marketing of a more effective static eliminator containing polonium–210 is aided. Such eliminators must be manufactured in accordance with Commission-approved specifications contained in the manufacturer's license. A similar provision in the old regulation was confined to eliminators containing not more than 125 microcuries of polonium–210. Under the revised regulation licensed manufacturers may distribute to persons not having specific licenses static eliminators containing up to 500 microcuries of polonium–210.

The revised regulation provides a new category of sealed sources—spark gap and electronic tubes containing not more than 5 microcuries of cesium–137 or nickel–63 per tube, or not more than 1 microcurie of cobalt–60 per tube—which, when manufactured according to the approved specifications, may be distributed to persons not having specific licenses.

In issuing the revised regulation the Commission said that its usual practice of publishing a proposed regulation and inviting comment was not followed because the revisions made are for the most part designed to remove certain present restrictions and to clarify present provisions, and

[3] BULLETIN of July 30, 1951, p. 181.
[4] *Ibid.*, Sept. 5, 1955, p. 381.

not to impose additional requirements on licensees or applicants. In connection with consideration of further amendments, interested persons may submit written comments and suggestions to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington 25, D.C., attention the Director, Division of Civilian Application.

Ambassador Wadsworth To Represent U.S. in Atomic Agency Negotiations

The Department of State announced on January 26 (press release 45) that Ambassador James J. Wadsworth has been designated as the U.S. Representative for International Atomic Energy Agency Negotiations. The Agency was first proposed by President Eisenhower for developing the peaceful uses of the atom. Ambassador Morehead Patterson conducted these negotiations for the United States until his resignation on November 30, 1955.

Ambassador Wadsworth, who will have offices in the Department of State, will represent the United States at a meeting in Washington of the 12 countries engaged in the preparation of a statute for the International Atomic Energy Agency.[1] This meeting, which was called by the United States, is to begin on February 27.

Ambassador Wadsworth will continue as Deputy Representative of the United States to the United Nations, where he has been serving since his appointment in February 1953. During this time, he has been active at all subsequent sessions of the General Assembly, has served as U.S. Representative at several sessions of the Economic and Social Council, and has been Deputy U.S. Representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission and on the Disarmament Subcommittee.

U.S. Representatives on WHO Board

The Senate on January 25 confirmed Dr. Frederick J. Brady to be the representative of the United States on the Executive Board of the World Health Organization. On January 27 President Eisenhower appointed Dr. Charles W. Mayo to be alternate U.S. representative.

[1] For text of draft statute, see BULLETIN of Oct. 24, 1955, p. 666.

Under Secretary Hoover To Visit in Berlin and Bonn

The Department of State announced on January 24 (press release 40) that Under Secretary Hoover will leave on February 2 for a 4-day visit to Germany. On February 5 Mr. Hoover will be the principal speaker at ceremonies in Berlin marking the tenth anniversary of radio station RIAS (Radio in the American Sector). Dr. James B. Conant, U.S. Ambassador to the German Federal Republic, will preside, and it is expected that German Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano and other West German, Berlin, and American officials will participate.

While Mr. Hoover is in Berlin, he will also take part in the dedication of a new vocational high school named in honor of his father, former President Hoover.

On the way to Berlin for these occasions, the Under Secretary will call upon Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and Foreign Minister von Brentano at Bonn. He will fly back directly from Berlin to Washington on February 6.

Former Senator Upton Named to Mixed Board at Bonn

The Department of State announced on January 25 (press release 44) that former Senator Robert W. Upton has been appointed as the American member of the Mixed Board sitting at Bonn which deals with matters of clemency and parole for prisoners in German war crimes cases. The Mixed Board, which was established by international agreement, is composed of American, British, French, and German citizens. It is an independent body exercising a quasijudicial function, and its members are not subject to governmental instructions.

Integration of the International Cooperation Administration Within the Department of State

Statement by Secretary Dulles [1]

I am glad to have this opportunity to discuss with you the arrangements which we have made in the Department of State, at the direction of the President, for administering the economic aspects of the mutual security program through the International Cooperation Administration.

The basic principles and philosophy governing the relationships between ICA and the rest of the State Department stem from the President's Reorganization Plan No. 7 of 1953.[2] The studies which culminated in that plan pointed to three general conclusions:

1. the desirability of consolidating foreign economic and technical-assistance programs under a single person for all areas of the world;
2. the basic difference in method and type of activity between these programs and the traditional foreign-policy responsibilities in the Department of State; and
3. the necessity for effective foreign-policy guidance to these programs by the Secretary of State.

These conclusions were embodied in Reorganization Plan No. 7. These arrangements proved to be very useful and satisfactory in actual operation between 1953 and 1955.

In transferring responsibility for mutual security operations to the Secretary of State, the President recognized the success of these principles which he had established in Reorganization Plan No. 7 and reaffirmed them for application in the new arrangements he then set up. In his letter to the Secretary, April 15, 1955,[3] with respect to this transfer, the President said:

> Consistent with this approach we should avoid dispersal of operating responsibilities either within the Department or to agencies outside the Department.
>
> A third objective stated in 1953 was the freeing of the Secretary of State from operating responsibilities so that he, assisted by his Under Secretary, could devote a preponderance of attention to foreign policy. These two important considerations are recognized in the Executive order [4] which will assign maximum responsibilities to a single key official within the Department of State.

In his message to Congress on the 1955 mutual security program, the President referred further to the new organizational arrangement as follows:

> The International Cooperation Administration will be a new semi-autonomous unit within the Department of State. Its director will report directly to the Secretary of State and will, on the Secretary's behalf, give supervision and direction to the mutual security operations performed within the Department of State.
>
> This responsibility will require that the International Cooperation Administration have the capacity to make and carry out operating decisions within broad policy guides established by the Secretary of State. It will likewise require that the Director of the International Cooperation Administration have his own complement of supporting staff and program personnel, both in Washington and in the field. It will be his responsibility to assure that appropriate policy guide lines are secured from the Secretary of State, and within those guide lines he will issue the necessary instructions to the field to carry out its policy.

[1] Made before the Subcommittee on Technical Assistance Programs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Jan. 23 (press release 39).

[2] BULLETIN of June 15, 1953, p. 852.

[3] *Ibid.*, May 2, 1955, p. 715.

[4] *Ibid.*, May 30, 1955, p. 889.

Basis of Organization Plan

This philosophy of organization was not something pulled out of the blue in 1953. It has a solid basis in past experience. The Department has at various times administered the economic portion of the initial program of aid to Greece and Turkey before it was included in the Marshall plan, and the programs of relief assistance and interim aid to certain European countries which preceded the Marshall plan. However, the Department's most extensive operational experience in the foreign-assistance field was with the technical-assistance program which was administered by the Technical Cooperation Administration from 1950 until 1953.

Initially in the technical cooperation program the Administrator was directed to use existing facilities of the Department and the technical capacities of other Government agencies as much as possible in carrying out the program. This in effect meant using the regional bureaus of the Department for the programing process, the Department's administrative facilities for administrative support, and the technical staffs and facilities of other Government agencies for actual program operations in the field. This decentralized arrangement, in which the TCA Administrator was little more than a coordinator, did not, I understand, prove satisfactory, and it became necessary, in the interests of speeding up the program and making it more effective, to centralize program functions and operations much more fully under the TCA Administrator. This reversal of organizational policy as a result of practical experience took place while TCA was in the Department, a year and a half before its transfer under Reorganization Plan No. 7.

This background and the quotations cited from the President's directives make clear that the success of the new organizational arrangement should not be measured by the extent to which the various offices of the ICA have been integrated with the other offices of the Department of State. In fact, the recent reorganization contemplated continuance of the earlier distinction between mutual security operations and the traditional function of the Department in the conduct of international relations. The new plan provided, of course, that both of these would be directly under the Secretary of State. This arrangement is yielding mutual benefits in the form of closer coordination at the staff and working levels as well as among the top officials.

The Secretary of State is, of course, directly responsible for policy formulation and for policy guidance to the Director of the International Cooperation Administration. In matters of broad application or unusual importance I provide this guidance in discussion with Mr. Hollister—or Mr. Hoover does in my behalf.

After this policy guidance has been given, ICA then undertakes to develop and prepare programs to carry out the decided policies in the most effective way. The development of these programs is closely coordinated with the appropriate Assistant Secretary and members of his staff. However, Mr. Hoover or I make the final review of these programs and of the funds believed needed for them before the programs are presented to the Congress.

The ICA is responsible for the numerous details of implementing programs once they are authorized. However, at this stage also the appropriate Assistant Secretary and his staff work closely with ICA and provide policy guidance as the actual carrying out of the programs unfolds. Here, too, Mr. Hoover or I take any steps necessary to assure that the program continues to be in support of our policy objectives.

We are confident that these arrangements are resulting in greater effectiveness both for ICA program operations and for other activities of the Department.

Parallelism in Organizational Structure

This result is facilitated and liaison at all levels has been enhanced by the general parallelism in organizational structure between ICA and the rest of the Department, which was one of the features of the 1953 reorganization. This parallelism does not constitute duplication or overlapping but is a deliberate arrangement to make coordination easier. For example, ICA has country desks generally paralleling those in the regional bureaus of the Department. Departmental desk officers do not have authority over, or responsibility for, ICA operations in their countries. The ICA country desks are used to develop specific country programs; to oversee the orderly execution of these programs; and to control and expedite ICA programs in the countries involved. The Departmental desks collaborate closely with their ICA colleagues at each major step in the program process to assure that the amount, composition, and timing of the country programs are consistent

with U.S. foreign-policy objectives in the countries concerned. The ICA desks are heavily involved in program operations as well as program formulation, and Departmental desks have many other duties which are not related to ICA work. Both the Departmental and ICA desks have full-time and demanding assignments. For this reason no savings would be anticipated if we combined these desk operations, and responsibility for the two different functions would be seriously confused.

The responsibilities of the Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs and of the Director of ICA are also distinct. The Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs is responsible for work involved in developing and establishing the broad foreign economic policy of the U.S. The Director of ICA is responsible for operation of the foreign-assistance programs. Broad economic policy includes, in addition to policy regarding the programs operated by ICA, those areas of trade, transport, financial, and economic policy which are integral parts of our foreign policy for which the Secretary of State is responsible. These activities may be illustrated by the following: reciprocal trade agreements; treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation; bilateral aviation agreements; telecommunications conventions; foreign-policy guidance to United States representatives on the International Bank and State Department participation in Export-Import Bank policies; and cooperation with the Economic and Social Council and the special agencies of the United Nations. These examples serve to indicate the breadth of work involving foreign economic policy which exists irrespective of aid programs.

The work of the Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs and of the Director of ICA are closely related, of course, since the foreign economic policy of the United States is one of the guiding factors within which ICA accomplishes its work. Similarly, the ICA Director quite naturally develops special knowledge, judgments, and points of view about questions of foreign economic policy. His observations on these matters are very useful to the Secretary, to the Under Secretary, and to the Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs. There is a need for mutual consultation between ICA and the Department's Bureau of Economic Affairs on applicability of general policy considerations in individual cases, and while there is a full and complete interchange between the Director of ICA and the Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, therefore, and between their staffs, each of them has separate responsibilities.

Administrative and Housekeeping Operations

The same principles apply to the administrative and housekeeping operations of ICA and the Department of State. For example, ICA still has a separate budget office, a separate personnel office and security system. These are not evidences of overlapping or duplication, since in each case these administrative activities are necessary and integral adjuncts to the performance of the basic and different ICA and State Department functions. Approximately the same number of personnel would be required, regardless of whether the offices are merged or maintained under their respective organizations. We have, however, established much closer coordination between the officials responsible for these functions and are currently examining the functions as performed by both agencies to see how we can coordinate them better. Under Reorganization Plan No. 7 of 1953 we had already effected integration of some housekeeping functions. For example, within FOA we had consolidated three general counsels into one, four budget offices into one, and two personnel offices into one. To consolidate housekeeping functions further, however, would very likely save no money and would inevitably confuse responsibility for mutual security operations with those of the other offices of the Department. Further, there should be noted in the excerpt above from the President's message to Congress his reference to the requirement "that the Director of the International Cooperation Administration have his own complement of supporting staff and program personnel, both in Washington and in the field."

Since ICA has been in the Department, although a separate unit therein, the Director of ICA and senior officials of the Department have initiated a series of specific investigations and studies to improve work coordination and eliminate possible overlapping. As one result of these studies, for example, it has been decided to abolish five ICA missions in Western Europe and to combine the remaining work of ICA with the embassy economic sections. It is anticipated that this development will occur in other countries as aid diminishes.

Plans are also under way to coordinate ICA activities in Latin America more closely with the embassies there. We have also increased direct daily coordination in Washington through such devices as fuller exchange of personnel between staff meetings of ICA and other offices of the Department. A number of joint working groups have recently studied possibilities for improved coordination and closer liaison in administrative and staff service functions, and similar studies are under way in the policy and program areas. We are proceeding, therefore, to take full advantage of ICA's location in the Department to improve coordination and eliminate any actual duplication.

Since the transfer into the State Department of responsibilities relating to the mutual security program, we have continued to carry out operations abroad under the same pattern of relationships as had been provided by Executive order for several years. This pattern provides for communications between the ICA headquarters and ICA mission chiefs in the field through the communications facilities of the State Department. The ambassador is kept fully informed of these communications in order to assist him in discharging his responsibility for general direction and leadership of the entire U.S. effort within the country. The ambassador is responsible for assuring a cooperative country-team operation and for assuring that annual program plans, negotiations with the local government, and all other matters of political importance are treated in accordance with our foreign policy and in the best interest of our relations with the local government.

This basic scheme has worked well in most countries, but we are now obtaining a review of field arrangements by a group of State and ICA officers who are thoroughly experienced with these matters in the field. This review will undoubtedly lead to some adjustments, although it seems likely that no rigid pattern of further integration would be uniformally applicable to all countries. Variations in the size and character of aid programs and other U.S. problems and U.S. representation may require that any basic plan of field organization be adjusted to local circumstances. In the case of the U.S. operations missions in five European countries which we have already abolished, the embassy counselor for economic affairs has been designated as ICA representative and will supervise a combined embassy economic staff and ICA staff. In several other countries the ICA activities and the embassy economic work have been partially or fully combined under common supervision. The current study of these arrangements may indicate the respective local situation in which one or another of these plans would be the best arrangement. There is no evidence that the further integration of State and ICA staffs in the field will produce any substantial economies, although an improvement in operations might result.

In summary, we shall, as a continuing project, make a general effort to improve coordination and eliminate overlapping functions wherever desirable. Although we feel that policy and operations should remain separate in Washington, we are moving toward joint use of staff in the field wherever practicable.

Continuation of Aid to Denmark, U.K., Italy

The International Cooperation Administration announced on January 19 that its Director, John B. Hollister, had on that day notified Congress of a Presidential determination to continue aid under the mutual security program to Denmark, the United Kingdom, and Italy. The Presidential determination is required by the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (the Battle Act) because those countries shipped $282,977 worth of industrial commodities to European Soviet-bloc countries.

As in some previous cases the shipments by Denmark and the United Kingdom were contracted before the commodities came within the purview of the act. The Italian shipment resulted from an administrative error. None of the shipments included arms, ammunition, implements of war, or atomic energy materials.

Presidential determinations are made periodically as required by section 103 (b) of the Battle Act. This section provides that the President "may direct the continuance of . . . assistance to a country which permits shipments of items other than arms, ammunition, implements of war, and atomic energy materials when . . . the cessation of aid would clearly be detrimental to the security of the United States."

The Saint Lawrence Seaway

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE STATUS AND PROGRESS OF THE SAINT LAWRENCE SEAWAY FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1955[1]

The Seaway

The Saint Lawrence Seaway, which is being undertaken jointly by the Governments of the United States and Canada for their mutual security and economic benefit, will constitute a modernized waterway system with canals, seven locks and appurtenant facilities between Montreal and Lake Ontario, a distance of about 185 miles. Also involved is channel enlargement in open-river portions of this reach, as well as channel deepening in the existing 27-mile Welland Canal, connecting Lakes Ontario and Erie.

With these new facilities, modern ocean-going freighters can operate between the upper reaches of the Great Lakes and the Atlantic Ocean through the Welland Canal and the improved Connecting Channels above Lake Erie. Normal water surface of Lake Superior is 602 feet above sea level.

Authorization of a project for deepening the Connecting Channels above Lake Erie in the Detroit, St. Clair and St. Marys Rivers, and in Lake St. Clair and the Straits of Mackinac is now pending in Congress. With such deepening, the controlling channel depth over the full inland route between Montreal and the head of the lakes will be increased to 27 feet.

The eastern frontier of the Great Lakes shipping fleet will be extended from Ogdensburg, New York, 600 miles to Seven Islands, Quebec, and to other points in the Saint Lawrence Gulf. Sailing distance from the ocean to the head of the lakes is some 2,300 miles.

The Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation (generally referred to herein as "the Corporation") is constructing the navigational improvements in United States territory within the 114-mile International Section of the St. Lawrence River, extending from Lake Ontario downstream to St. Regis, New York. The International Section is generally divided into the Thousand Islands Section and the International Rapids Section.

These navigational improvements include (1) the 10-mile Long Sault Canal with two locks and appurtenant facilities which include highway and railway relocation, bridge construction, and a highway tunnel under one of the locks in the International Rapids Section of the river near Massena, New York; (2) channel enlargement in the eastern approach to the Long Sault Canal adjacent to Cornwall Island; (3) lowering of scattered obstructive rock shoals in the Thousand Islands Section, chiefly in the vicinity of Alexandria Bay, New York, and (4) navigation channel markings.

These works, together with the concurrent navigational improvements being provided by Canada between Lake Erie and Montreal, and the related power development in the 46-mile International Rapids Section, Ogdensburg to St. Regis, New York, being performed by the Power Authority of the State of New York in conjunction with the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario, will afford a channel from Lake Erie to Montreal with a controlling depth of 27 feet.

[1] Transmitted to the President by the Administrator of the Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation on Dec. 15 and by the President to the Congress on Jan. 12. (H. Doc. 293, 84th Cong., 2d sess.).

Channel, canal and lock dimensions and other features of the United States portion are as follows:

Minimum channel width in river	450 feet
Bottom width of Long Sault Canal	442 feet
Lock dimensions and data:	
Width	80 feet
Length, between upper and lower service gates	860 feet
Usable length	768 feet
Minimum depth over sills	30 feet
Maximum lift	49 feet
Service gates	miter type
Emergency gate (upper lock)	vertical lift
Height of lower miter gates	85 feet

This modernization will change the controlling channel depth over this waterway, Lake Erie to Montreal, from 14 to 27 feet, reduce the number of lift locks to be transited by ships from 25 to 14, and add seven new locks with controlling dimensions of 768 x 80 x 30 feet as compared to existing controlling dimensions of 252 x 44 x 14 feet.

The scheduled completion date for the new United States Seaway works for initial navigation service is July, 1958. This is the target date for the creation of the power pool in the International Rapids Section, which pool will also serve the Seaway. Full-scale navigation service of these new deep-water seaway facilities being constructed by both countries is expected to begin with the 1959 shipping season.

Organization

The Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation was established by Public Law 358, 83d Congress, 68 Stat. 92, approved May 13, 1954. It is subject to the direction and supervision of the President, or the head of such agency as he may designate. By Executive Order 10534, dated June 9, 1954, this responsibility was given to the Secretary of Defense.

During the month of August, 1955, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert B. Anderson, who had been exercising this supervisory authority on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, resigned from his post, and Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker was chosen by Secretary of Defense Wilson to succeed to the responsibilities of executive supervision of the Corporation.

The Corporation is charged with the responsibility of constructing, operating and maintaining the United States share of the Saint Lawrence Seaway works located in the Thousand Islands Section (68 miles) and International Rapids Section (46 miles) of the Saint Lawrence River, in the interest of national security and economic development.

The Corporation is authorized (1) to consummate certain arrangements with The St. Lawrence Seaway Authority of Canada relative to construction of the Seaway between Lake Erie and Montreal; (2) to finance the United States share of the Seaway costs on a self-liquidating basis by the issuance of revenue bonds to the United States Treasury; (3) to establish with the Canadian Authority mutually satisfactory arrangements for the coordinated control and operation of the Seaway; (4) to negotiate with Canada on agreements for tolls and other purposes, and (5) to coordinate its activities with those connected with the correlated power development.

The Corporation is an instrumentality of the United States operating under the management of an Administrator, a Deputy Administrator, and an Advisory Board, consisting of five members, all of whom are appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

The officials, the Advisory Board, and the Board of Engineering Consultants of the Corporation are:

Lewis G. Castle, Administrator
Martin W. Oettershagen, Deputy Administrator
Raymond F. Stellar, Engineer
E. Reece Harrill, Comptroller-Treasurer
Edward R. Place, Information Officer
Edward L. Laccy, Administrative Officer
Guerin Todd, Jr., General Counsel

Advisory Board

John C. Beukema, North Muskegon, Michigan
Harry C. Brockel, Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Kenneth M. Lloyd, Youngstown, Ohio
Hugh Moore, Easton, Pennsylvania
Edward J. Noble, New York, New York

Board of Engineering Consultants

C. E. Blee, Knoxville, Tennessee
F. W. Edwards, Muscatine, Iowa
E. Mounford Fucik, Chicago, Illinois
Charles M. Wellons, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

On September 2, 1954, pursuant to Section 8 of the Act creating the Corporation, the Corporation designated the Corps of Engineers, United States Army, to serve as its design, contracting and construction agent.

The design and construction are subject to the

direction and approval of the Corporation. Construction is performed by private contractors under competitive bidding.

Officers of the Corps of Engineers concerned with this work include:

Lieutenant General S. D. Sturgis, Chief of Engineers, Washington, D.C.
Major General Charles G. Holle, Deputy Chief of Engineers for Construction, Washington, D.C.
Brigadier General Paul D. Berrigan, Division Engineer, Chicago, Illinois
Colonel Loren W. Olmstead, District Engineer, Buffalo, New York

Colonel Olmstead is the Contracting Officer. These and other officers of the Corps of Engineers and their civilian staffs participate in engineering design, construction scheduling and construction superintendence.

In addition to its supervisory functions, the Corporation coordinates its activities with other Federal Agencies, and the following entities:

The St. Lawrence Seaway Authority of Canada
Power Authority of the State of New York
Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario
Saint Lawrence River Joint Board of Engineers
International Joint Commission

Financing

In order to finance the construction of the United States portion of the Seaway, the Corporation is authorized and empowered to issue to the Secretary of the Treasury revenue bonds payable from Corporation shipping toll revenues, with the provision that not to exceed $105 million shall be outstanding at any one time. It is further provided that not to exceed 10 percentum of the authorized bonds shall be issued during the first year and not to exceed 40 percentum during any subsequent year. The obligations of the Corporation shall have maturities agreed upon by the Secretary of the Treasury not in excess of 50 years, and shall bear interest at a rate determined by the Secretary of the Treasury.

Since the Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation's project is created by law as a self-liquidating undertaking, the Corporation is required to recover from toll revenues all costs of operating and maintaining the works under the administration of the Corporation, including depreciation, payment of interest on the obligations of the Corporation, and payments in lieu of taxes. In addition, the Corporation's revenue from tolls must be sufficient to amortize the obligations of the Corporation over a period not to exceed 50 years.

The Corporation has given special consideration to the subject of its responsibilities under the enabling act and has had extensive consultations with other interested agencies of the government concerning the activities and operations of the Seaway which should be financed by the Corporation, and as to the inclusion of the cost in the toll base.

In ruling on a specific case relating to the installation, maintenance and operation of aids to navigation, the Comptroller General rendered a decision B-215817, dated November 2, 1955, in which he stated:

> These provisions (of Public Law 358, 83rd Congress) reasonably establish an intent by the Congress that responsibility for the administration and cost of the United States portion of the Seaway should be solely that of the Corporation and that all costs related to the construction, operation, and maintenance of the Seaway should be recovered from the tolls collected. . . .

The Corporation is authorized and directed to negotiate with The St. Lawrence Seaway Authority of Canada, or such other agency as may be designated by the Government of Canada, an agreement as to the rules for the measurement of vessels and cargoes, and the rates of charges or tolls to be levied for the use of the Saint Lawrence Seaway, and for an equitable division of the revenues of the Seaway between the Corporation and The St. Lawrence Seaway Authority of Canada.

The financial statement and summary cost and progress report for the year ended June 30, 1955, appear at the conclusion of this report.[2]

Review of Progress and Status of Project

The efforts of the Corporation for the past fiscal year were devoted primarily to organization, to the initiation of design and construction programs in conjunction with the Corps of Engineers, to coordinating negotiations with The Canadian St. Lawrence Seaway Authority and the Power Authority of the State of New York, and to the awarding of initial contracts for the construction effort.

Seaway Corporation headquarters for administrative direction were established in Washington, D.C., in July, 1954. The headquarters consist of

[2] Not printed here.

the Office of the Administrator, the Engineer, the Comptroller-Treasurer, the Information Officer, and the Administrative Officer.

To provide the most efficient working arrangements at the field level with the Corps of Engineers, United States Army, the Corporation established an office in Buffalo, New York, to be operated during the engineering-design and contract-award period in order to expedite day-to-day supervision and processing of engineering and related matters, and supervision of construction activities. The Deputy Administrator with a small staff is presently stationed at Buffalo.

Ground was broken in April, 1955, for the excavation of the 10-mile Long Sault Canal and Locks. A subsidiary office was established in Massena, New York, near the principal worksite of the United States Seaway construction, for the purpose of coordinating, supervising, and representing the Corporation there. Later the Massena office will be the central office and main point of operation for the Corporation when the Seaway is open for traffic. A satisfactory building site has been selected in Massena for an Administration Building, which is scheduled to be completed for occupancy in June, 1957, after which it will become the headquarters of the Corporation.

Throughout the year, concentrated effort was applied to engineering design work originated for the Corporation primarily by the Buffalo District Office of the Corps of Engineers, United States Army. Also hydraulic model studies have been under way in laboratories located at Vicksburg, Mississippi; Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Islington, Ontario; together with extensive hydrographic surveying and probing in the river areas where channel enlargement is involved.

Contracts for major excavation and related dike construction have been awarded in a total amount of $11 million for the removal of 22 million cubic yards of glacial till, clay, and rock, and for dike and embankment work. At the end of June, the overburden excavation included in these contracts was approximately 12 percent complete for the Robinson Bay Lock site, and about 11 percent complete for the Grasse River Lock site.

By the end of 1955, overburden excavation for each lock site was substantially more than half completed, and the excavation for the upper end of the Long Sault Canal was about half finished. The over-all design effort was well advanced toward completion. Summing up the first construction season, 9 percent of the total work has been completed in terms of cost amounting to $8 million.

Seaway contractors are generally working two 10-hour shifts, in daylight, and at night under floodlights, to meet contract completion dates. Construction activity will be restricted during the winter season, but work will be continued to the maximum practicable extent.

Principal project contractors are:

Peter Kiewit Sons' Company, Omaha, Nebraska, and Morris-Knudsen Company, Inc., New York, New York (joint venture), for the main portion of the Long Sault Canal.

Badgett Mine Stripping Corporation, Madisonville, Kentucky, westerly end of the canal.

Tecon Corporation, Dallas, Texas, at Robinson Bay Lock site.

Dutcher Construction Corporation, Queenstown, Maryland, at the Grasse River Lock site.

During the fall, a materials testing laboratory at Massena was erected. Work was well advanced on a 2½ mile section of highway in the Long Sault area.

In February, 1955, negotiations were concluded between the United States and Canada,[3] whereby the United States approved deferment of the construction of the authorized Point Rockway Canal and Lock below Ogdensburg, New York. In lieu thereof, Canada is building the Iroquois Canal and Lock on the opposite side of the river. As stated in an exchange of diplomatic notes with Canada, these arrangements "eliminate uneconomical duplication of navigation facilities" and "retain the development on a joint basis."

By another exchange of notes,[4] agreement was reached by the two Seaway entities for the joint construction of a bridge across Polly's Gut between the mainland of the United States and Cornwall Island in Canada. This will be a combined railway-highway bridge crossing the international boundary northeast of Massena, New York, in replacement of the existing South Channel bridge at Cornwall Island, a low-level fixed structure which will have to be removed to permit passage of Seaway shipping.

Members of United States and Canadian Committees were appointed on March 25, 1955, to initiate preliminary toll studies. These committees have held several meetings, the first of which took

[3] BULLETIN of Mar. 14, 1955, p. 437.

[4] *Ibid.*, Dec. 12, 1955, p. 978.

place at Montreal in June. Members designated are:

United States Committee
E. Reece Harrill, Chairman
Dr. Charles A. Taff
H. M. Hochfeld

Canadian Committee
Charles Gavsie, Chairman
J. C. Lessard
G. A. Scott

On September 22, 1955, Secretary of the Army Brucker made an inspection tour of the project, and proceeded on to Ottawa to meet with the executive staff of the Canadian Seaway Authority, as well as Canadian Government Department of Defense personnel.

Lieutenant General Samuel D. Sturgis, Jr., Chief of Engineers, United States Army, together with Generals C. G. Holle, Paul D. Berrigan, and C. R. Smith, and Colonel L. W. Olmstead also made an inspection tour of the project in September. Relations with the Corps have been exceedingly cordial, and their cooperation and services have meant a great deal in the successful development and progress of the project.

During the year, three meetings were held with the members of the Corporation's Advisory Board. Their contributions have been of great value.

The Corporation's Board of Engineering Consultants is composed of engineers who have specialized in hydraulics, soils, foundations, and canal design, and have had wide experience in other branches of engineering. They have rendered valuable service in the review and solution of major engineering problems.

Several meetings have been held in Ottawa, Montreal, and Washington with the Honorable Lionel Chevrier, President of The St. Lawrence Seaway Authority of Canada, and his staff. The agenda of these meetings included toll studies and also considerable exchange of engineering viewpoints and coordination of design and construction matters which were mutually beneficial. Relations with this Canadian counterpart of the Corporation are most harmonious, and the two entities are working in an atmosphere of cooperative understanding.

The Corporation and the Coast Guard have entered into a memorandum of understanding whereby the Corporation will utilize the technical services of the Coast Guard on a reimbursable basis in developing plans and specifications for the installation of the aids to navigation for the United States waters of the Seaway. The aids to be installed, operated and maintained by the Corporation will be within the Thousand Islands and International Rapids Section of the Saint Lawrence River comprising the 114-mile reach from Lake Ontario downstream to St. Regis.

The Corporation will operate and maintain the locks, canals, channels, and navigational aids, and perform related work, including the collection of tolls. Accordingly, the organization is in the process of expansion to meet these responsibilities.

Cumulative public interest of recent years in the Seaway manifested itself during the first construction season by an ever-increasing influx of visitors to Massena and the St. Lawrence Valley. To accommodate visitors desiring to view the Seaway-Power projects in complete safety and without interference with operations, the Corporation, as well as the New York State Power Authority, provided "overlook stations" at several vantage points. The two entities jointly published educational folders to satisfy many thousands of requests received from the general public for information.

The Corporation wishes to acknowledge with deep appreciation the whole-hearted cooperation it has received from a number of government agencies, particularly the Department of the Army and the Department of Defense, in the performance of its activities.

Correction

BULLETIN of January 30, 1956, p. 176, second column: The first word in line 10 should be "identify."

Calendar of Meetings[1]

Adjourned During January 1956

U. N. Ecosoc Human Rights Commission: 8th Session of Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.	New York	Jan. 3–20
SEATO Committee of Economic Experts: Working Group	Bangkok	Jan. 5–11
U. N. ECAFE Inland Transport Committee: 5th Session	Bangkok	Jan. 9–14
WHO Committee on Administration and Finance	Geneva	Jan. 9–16
SEATO Committee of Economic Experts	Bangkok	Jan. 12–18
Royal Agricultural and Food Exhibition	Colombo (Ceylon)	Jan. 12–26
International Tin Study Group: 31st Meeting of Management Committee.	Brussels	Jan. 16 (1 day)
UNREF Standing Program Subcommittee: 2d Meeting	Geneva	Jan. 18–20
UNREF Executive Committee: 2d Session	Geneva	Jan. 23–27
FAO/ECE Joint Working Party on Forest and Forest Products Statistics.	Geneva	Jan. 23–28
WMO Working Group on Telecommunications of Regional Association V (Southwest Pacific).	Melbourne	Jan. 23–28*
Caribbean Commission/FAO Technical Conference on Cooperatives.	Georgetown (British Guiana)	Jan. 24–31
U. N. ECAFE Committee on Industry and Trade: 8th Session	Bangalore (India)	Jan. 24–31
International Sugar Council	London	Jan. 25–26

In Session as of January 31, 1956

North Pacific Fur Seal Conference	Washington	Nov. 28–
International Fair for Peace and Progress	Ciudad Trujillo (Dominican Republic).	Dec. 20–
U. N. Trusteeship Council: Standing Committee on Petitions	New York	Jan. 3–
WHO Executive Board: 17th Session	Geneva	Jan. 17–
Inter-American Council of Jurists: 3d Meeting	México, D. F.	Jan. 17–
GATT Contracting Parties: 1956 Tariff Negotiations	Geneva	Jan. 18–

Scheduled February 1–April 30, 1956

U. N. Economic Commission for the Far East: 12th Session	Bangalore (India)	Feb. 2–
Pan American Highway Congresses: Technical Committee on Terminology.	Buenos Aires	Feb. 7–
U. N. Trusteeship Council: 17th Session	New York	Feb. 7–
FAO Forestry and Forest Products Commission for Asia and Pacific: Subcommission on Teak.	Bangkok	Feb. 9–
Inter-American Travel Congresses: Technical Committee on Travel Promotion.	México, D.F	Feb. 13–
ICAO Panel on Vertical Separation of Aircraft: 1st Meeting	Montreal	Feb. 14–
ICEM Executive Committee: 4th Session	Geneva	Feb. 14–
U. N./WMO International Hurricane Seminar	Ciudad Trujillo (Dominican Republic)	Feb. 16–
ICEM Council: 4th Session	Geneva	Feb. 20–
ICAO North Atlantic Regional Air Traffic Control Meeting	Montreal	Feb. 20–
Pan American Highway Congresses: Technical Committee on Financing of the Pan American Highway.	Caracas	Feb. 20–
U. N. International Wheat Conference: 2d Session	Geneva	Feb. 20–
Inter-American Travel Congresses: Technical Committee on Travel Barriers.	Buenos Aires	Feb. 21–

[1] Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Jan. 24, 1956. Asterisks indicate tentative dates. Following is a list of abbreviations: U. N., United Nations; Ecosoc, Economic and Social Council; SEATO, Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; WHO, World Health Organization; UNREF, United Nations Refugee Fund; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; WMO, World Meteorological Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, Internationa Labor Organization; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; UPU, Universal Postal Union; OAS, Organization of American States.

Scheduled February 1–April 30, 1956—*Continued*

U. N. Trusteeship Council: Standing Committee on Administrative Unions.	New York	Feb. 21–
International Atomic Energy Agency: Working-Level Meeting on Draft Statute.	Washington	Feb. 27–
ILO Governing Body: 131st Session	Geneva	Feb. 27–
Inter-American Travel Congresses: 2d Meeting of Permanent Executive Committee.	Lima	Feb. 27–
U. N. Ecosoc Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations	New York	Feb. 27–
International Telecommunication Union: Meeting of Chairmen of Seven CCIT and CCIF Study Groups.	Geneva	Feb. 29–
FAO Intergovernmental Consultation on Epizootics	Paris	February
UNESCO Committee on International Exchange of Publications	Paris	February
U. N. ECAFE Subcommittee on Electric Power	India	Mar. 5–
U. N. Ecosoc Commission on Human Rights: 12th Session	New York	Mar. 5–
ITU International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR): Study Group XI, Color Television Demonstrations.	New York	Mar. 5–
UNICEF Executive Board and Program Committee	New York	Mar. 5–
SEATO Council	Karachi	Mar. 6–
Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences: 1st Meeting of Technical Advisory Council.	Turrialba (Costa Rica)	Mar. 8–
WMO Regional Association VI (Europe): 2d Session	Dubrovnik (Yugoslavia)	Mar. 12–
U. N. Ecosoc Commission on Status of Women: 10th Session	Geneva	Mar. 13–
Inter-American Specialized Conference on the Conservation of the Resources of the Continental Shelf and Marine Waters.	Ciudad Trujillo (Dominican Republic).	Mar. 15–
U. N. ECAFE Railway Subcommittee: 4th Session	New Delhi	Mar. 15–
8th International Congress on the Vineyard and Wine	Santiago	Mar. 19–
11th International Congress of Agricultural and Food Industries	Santiago	Mar. 20–
U. N. ECAFE: 4th Regional Conference of Statisticians	Bangkok	Mar. 26–
ITU International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR): Study Group XI, Color Television Demonstrations.	Paris	Mar. 27–
U. N. Scientific Committee on Radiation: 1st Meeting	New York	March *
UNESCO Conference of Experts on the Cultural Integration of Immigrants.	Caracas	March *
ICAO: 3d Caribbean Regional Air Navigation Meeting	Ciudad Trujillo (Dominican Republic).	Apr. 3–
ITU International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR): Study Group XI, Color Television Demonstrations.	London	Apr. 3–
9th Pan American Railway Congress	Buenos Aires	Apr. 3–
U. N. Economic Commission for Europe: 11th Session	Geneva	Apr. 3–
ILO Petroleum Committee: 5th Session (reconvened)	Geneva	Apr. 4–
UNESCO Executive Board: 43d Session	Madrid	Apr. 9–
International Instrumentation-Automation Exhibition	Oslo	Apr. 9–
9th International Film Festival	Cannes	Apr. 10–
ITU International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR): Study Group XI, Color Television Demonstrations.	The Hague	Apr. 10–
UNESCO Conference on Asian-U. S. Cultural Relations	United States	Apr. 10–
5th Inter-American Travel Congress	San José (Costa Rica)	Apr. 12–
U. N. Ecosoc Statistical Commission: 9th Session	New York	Apr. 16–
ITU International Telegraphic Consultative Committee (CCIT): Study Group IV, Phototelegraphy and Facsimile.	London	Apr. 17–
U. N. Economic and Social Council: 21st Session	New York	Apr. 17–
ITU Administrative Council: 11th Session	Geneva	Apr. 21–
South Pacific Commission: 3d Session of the Conference	Suva, Fiji	Apr. 23–
ITU International Telegraphic Consultative Committee (CCIT): Study Group V, Joint CCIT/CCIR Committee on Phototelegraphy.	London	Apr. 23–
U. N. Ecosoc Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 11th Session	Geneva	Apr. 23–
WMO Executive Committee: 8th Session	Geneva	Apr. 24–
WMO Eastern Caribbean Hurricane Committee of Regional Association IV (North and Central America): 4th Session.	Ciudad Trujillo (Dominican Republic).	Apr. 25–
5th International Philatelic Exhibition	New York	Apr. 28–
ILO Coal Mines Committee: 6th Session	Istanbul	Apr. 30–
IPU Executive and Liaison Committee	Bern	Apr. 30–
Inter-American Ministers of Education: 2d Meeting	Lima	April
Pan American Highway Congresses: 2d Meeting of Permanent Executive Committee.	Washington	April
U. N. Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories: 7th Session.	New York	April
UNESCO/OAS Regional Conference on Free and Compulsory Education in Latin America.	Lima	April

Renewed Efforts for Disarmament

Statement by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.[1]

This fiftieth meeting of the Disarmament Commission finds us standing at a crossroads in our quest for agreement.

The resolution of the General Assembly of December 12[2] points to a new and hopeful path. By the overwhelming vote of 56 to 7 the General Assembly has urged us to adopt and execute President Eisenhower's plan for aerial inspection for peace and for exchange of military information. By agreeing to this plan, which could also incorporate Marshal Bulganin's proposal for ground observers, we would at one stroke free the world from the fear of its final war. The resolution also speaks favorably of British, French, and Indian proposals. The United Nations never took a more hopeful action for peace than it did when it adopted this resolution. The countries, therefore, who are represented on this Commission never faced a greater opportunity.

Now I have just heard the representative of the Soviet Union [Arkady A. Sobolev] say that the United States has withdrawn—that is the verb—has withdrawn its support of disarmament. I have heard him say that the United States is backing out—he used that phrase I think at least twice, maybe three times—backing out. I leave it to the members of the Commission to account for this extraordinary statement. I am sure that I cannot because it flies squarely in the face of the facts.

For example, the General Assembly resolution under the authority of which we are meeting this afternoon directs us to start now on any and all measures of disarmament which seem feasible in the near future, which can be adequately safeguarded, and which can be carried out without waiting for full agreement on a comprehensive plan in all its stages. Here it is. You can find it for yourself on page 2, operative paragraph 1 (b), subparagraph ii: "All such measures of adequately safeguarded disarmament as are now feasible." The United States voted for that in common with most of us here around this table. Far from representing a backing out or a withdrawing, this represents a forward step.

The United States remains pledged to work for, it earnestly desires, and it energetically seeks a comprehensive, progressive, enforceable agreement for the reduction of military expenditures, arms, armaments, and armed forces under effective international inspection and control. We are ready to consider any reasonable approach to that goal, including the method of limited approaches or installments, each of which would narrow disagreement and foster an increase of confidence so that the deadlock can be broken. We think that the President's plan would lead promptly and directly to these objectives, that it would promote that international confidence which is indispensable to agreement, that it would provide practical experience in many of the control and inspection measures required to supervise a disarmament agreement.

Well, now, so much for those remarks of the Soviet representative. As has been said here by many members, the immediate task before our meeting is to establish procedures for both the Commission and its subcommittee to pursue these objectives as suggested in paragraph 5 of the General Assembly resolution. I share the view expressed here that it would be most fruitful for the subcommittee to resume its work at the earliest opportunity, in the light of the General Assembly resolution. It seems to us that it should take no more than about 6 weeks to at least get an interim report on the prospects for progress and that at that time the subcommittee would do well to make a report to the Commission.

We hope that this procedure will commend itself to all concerned and that the members of the subcommittee can then arrange through diplomatic channels for an early meeting to resume their deliberations.

Let me say that the United States hopes and believes that when the subcommittee meets again it will be guided by the General Assembly resolution and that this will give it a sense of new urgency and of renewed dedication.

For people in my country, and throughout the world, the General Assembly resolution endorsing the Eisenhower-Bulganin plan has raised great hopes. And, gentlemen, I would be less than frank if I did not say that there was widespread disappointment that the Soviet Union did not join with

[1] Made in the U.N. Disarmament Commission on Jan. 23 (U.S./U.N. press release 2343). Ambassador Lodge is U.S. Representative on the Commission.

[2] BULLETIN of Jan. 9, 1956, p. 63.

the rest of the world in this great manifest of peaceful purpose which would convert air power into peace power, which would open the skies of the world to the advancement of peace.

Gentlemen, let us face it. The world *cannot* believe that any nation which truly hates war, which harbors no aggressive intent, which is ready to outlaw surprise attack from any quarter, can fail to open up its skies to this peaceful inspection, to join in this collective effort for peace.

For this reason I cannot believe that any government can long deny its people this insurance against war because to do so would lay such a government open to the suspicion of contemplating an aggression. No one here wants such a suspicion entertained about himself, or any other member, for that matter.

We believe therefore that the day must come when the guard for peace will be mounted in the sky above the Soviet Union as it will be above the United States.[3]

Improving Hotel Facilities in the Western Hemisphere [1]

Problems of hotel development in Latin America were studied by a technical committee of the Inter-American Travel Congresses at an initial 5-day meeting at the Pan American Union, Washington, D.C., December 12–16, 1955. The discussions resulted in a series of conclusions pointing out important objectives in improving hotel facilities and thereby increasing the volume of international travel in the Western Hemisphere.

Government interest in the work of the committee was demonstrated by the fact that, although only eight countries comprise its basic membership, a total of 13 were represented at the meeting. These were Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Peru, Paraguay, and the United States. In addition, special observers were present from the following international organizations which maintain cooperative relations with the Organization of American States: Inter-American Hotel Association, Inter-American Federation of Automobile Clubs, American Road Builders' Association, and International Road Federation. Secretariat services were provided by the Pan American Union.

This group, officially known as the Technical Committee on Travel Plant, was the first of four committees recently established for the Inter-American Travel Congresses, a governmental body sponsored by the Organization of American States. The other three deal with research and organization, removal of travel barriers, and travel promotion and publicity. They are expected to hold similar meetings before the 6th Inter-American Travel Congress is held at San José, Costa Rica, April 12–22, 1956.

At the Washington meeting, for which the United States provided the chairmanship, the Technical Committee on Travel Plant reviewed the broad field of its work. It recognized the important efforts now being put forth by private and public interests in the hotel field in Latin America and concentrated its initial attention upon subjects which appeared to be most practical and useful for action by an intergovernmental group.

Its final report set forth findings and conclusions on numerous subjects pertaining to the improvement and expansion of tourist facilities in the Latin American countries. Decision was made to obtain up-to-date information on existing hotel accommodations and those now under construction, outstanding problems hindering the construction of new hotels, and the various jurisdictions which establish sanitary requirements for hotels and eating places. The committee urged governments to increase their incentives for hotel construction and expansion by such measures as customs facilities on importation of materials and equipment, admission of expert personnel from other countries, and national hotel credit to provide long-term loans at low rates of interest. Importance of protecting the health of travelers was stressed, and the national public health services were invited to prepare special papers for the 6th Inter-American Travel Congress, giving particular attention to minimum standards for health and sanitary requirements. Governments were urged to take early action to provide adequate and safe lodging and other facilities along the

[3] The Commission on Jan. 23 agreed that the subcommittee should resume its talks and submit an interim report to the Commission in about 6 weeks.

[1] This report of the meeting of the technical committee was prepared by H. H. Kelly of the Commerce Department, who was U.S. representative at the meeting and also served as its chairman.

route of the Inter-American Highway from Guatemala to Panama inclusive, which may be open to through traffic within the next 3 or 4 years. Additional capital for the building or expansion of hotel establishments was recognized as a basic need, and emphasis was placed on private resources, both domestic and foreign. Other subjects on which policy decisions were made included the desirability of organizing national hotel associations, establishment of hotel training schools, and effective business relationships between hotels and travel agencies.

The report will be submitted to the Inter-American Economic and Social Council of the Organization of American States and to the Permanent Executive Committee of the Inter-American Travel Congresses and will provide a basis for further action at the 6th Congress next April.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Inter-American Council of Jurists

The Department of State announced on January 16 (press release 23) that the U.S. Government will be represented by the following delegation at the third meeting of the Inter-American Council of Jurists at Mexico City beginning January 17:

U.S. Representative

William Sanders, Counselor of Embassy, American Embassy, Santiago

Alternate U.S. Representatives

George H. Owen, U.S. member on the Inter-American Juridical Committee and Counselor of Embassy, American Embassy, Rio de Janeiro

David B. Karrick, Washington, D. C.

Advisers

William G. Bowdler, Office of Regional American Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

Marjorie M. Whiteman, Assistant Legal Adviser for Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

Under the terms of the charter of the Organization of American States (OAS), the Inter-American Council of Jurists is one of the three principal organs of the Council of the OAS. The other two principal organs are the Inter-American Economic and Social Council and the Inter-American Cultural Council.

The purpose of the Inter-American Council of Jurists, as stated in article 67 of the charter of the OAS, is "to serve as an advisory body on juridical matters; to promote the development and codification of public and private international law; and to study the possibility of attaining uniformity in the legislation of the various American countries, insofar as it may appear desirable." The work of the Council is performed both at its regular full-scale meetings, the first and second having been held, respectively, at Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires in 1950 and 1953, and by its permanent committee, the Inter-American Juridical Committee at Rio de Janeiro.

FAO–Caribbean Commission Technical Conference on Cooperatives

The Department of State announced on January 19 (press release 34) that the U.S. Government will be represented at the joint FAO–Caribbean Commission Technical Conference on Cooperatives, to be held at Georgetown, British Guiana, January 23–31, by the following delegates:

Kelsey Beeler Gardner, *Chairman*, Director, Management Services Division, Farmer Cooperative Service, Department of Agriculture

Samuel R. Pierce, Jr., Assistant to the Under Secretary of Labor

W. H. Stolting, Assistant Chief, Economics and Cooperative Marketing Section, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior

This will be the second conference resulting from the desire of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the Caribbean Commission to assist in the development of rural cooperatives as a means of removing or reducing the disadvantages under which rural people suffer; enabling rural people to participate in government programs for increasing the production of food, raising nutritional levels, and improving the distribution of agricultural and other commodities; and stimulating the economic and social betterment of people in underdeveloped areas. The first conference was held at Trinidad in January 1951.

The second conference will deal, in particular, with questions relating to (1) training facilities for government cooperative staff and for the employees of cooperatives; (2) coordination with other technical staff of the work done by specialized cooperative personnel; (3) cooperative processing and marketing of agricultural produce; (4)

ooperatives for the supply of fishing requisites nd for the marketing of fish; (5) relationship etween cooperatives and other credit institutions; and (6) taxation of cooperatives.

In addition to member governments of the Caribbean Commission (France, Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States) and the 14 associated local administrations, the following governments, agencies, and institutions have been invited to send observers to the conference: Cuba; Dominican Republic; Haiti; United Nations; U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America; International Labor Organization; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; Pan American Union; and Holy See.

Second Session of U.N. Refugee Committee

Press release 38 dated January 21

The U.N. Refugee Fund Executive Committee is to hold its second session at Geneva, Switzerland, beginning on January 23, 1956.

Christopher H. Phillips, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, is the U.S. representative on the Executive Committee.

Mr. Phillips will be assisted by Edward W. Lawrence, Chief, Program Division, Office of the Field Coordinator, Frankfort on the Main, Germany.

The U.N. Refugee Fund Executive Committee is the successor to the U.N. High Commissioner's Advisory Committee on Refugees. By a resolution of December 14, 1950, the General Assembly of the United Nations created a High Commissioner's Office for Refugees to provide for the legal and political protection of refugees and displaced persons. In 1951 an Advisory Committee on Refugees was created by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations to advise the High Commissioner in the exercise of his functions. Action taken by the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council during 1954 to authorize the High Commissioner to undertake a program for the promotion of permanent solutions for the problems of refugees, as well as to make appeals for funds for this program, made it imperative that a new body be created to maintain continuous review of that program or that the terms of reference and composition of the existing Advisory Committee be expanded. At its 19th session (March 29–April 7, 1955), the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations reconstituted the Advisory Committee as the "United Nations Refugee Fund Executive Committee" and adopted new terms of reference for the committee.[1]

The members of the Executive Committee are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Colombia, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Iran, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, the Vatican, and Venezuela.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Security Council

Letter dated 30 November 1955 from the Representative of Saudi Arabia addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/3465, November 30, 1955. 2 pp. mimeo.

Letter dated 6 December 1955 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/3481, December 9, 1955. 1 p. mimeo.

Letter dated 8 December 1955 from the Representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/3482, December 9, 1955. 2 pp. mimeo.

Letter dated 13 December 1955 from the Representative of Syria addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/3505, December 13, 1955. 2 pp. mimeo.

Letter dated 15 December 1955 from the Representative of Egypt addressed to the Secretary-General. S/3514, December 15, 1955. 3 pp. mimeo.

Trusteeship Council

United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories of Togoland under British Administration and Togoland under French Administration, 1955. Report on Togoland under British Administration. T/1210, November 15, 1955. 90 pp. mimeo.

United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories of Togoland under British Administration and Togoland under French Administration, 1955. Report on Togoland under French Administration. T/1211, November 14, 1955. 105 pp. mimeo.

General Assembly Resolution 860 (IX): The Togoland Unification Problem and the Future of the Trust Territory of Togoland under British Administration. Observations of the Administering Authority on the Mission's Report. T/1214, November 21, 1955. 7 pp. mimeo.

Economic and Social Council

Economic Commission for Latin America. Co-ordination with the Inter-American Economic and Social Council. Note by the Secretariat. E/Cn.12/381, August 20, 1955. 9 pp. mimeo.

Agenda of the Resumed Twentieth Session. Note by the Secretary-General. E/L.687, October 19, 1955. 3 pp. mimeo.

[1] BULLETIN of May 9, 1955, p. 784.

Policy on Regional Projects. Report of the Technical Assistance Board. E/TAC/47, November 1, 1955. 3 pp. mimeo.

Measures for the Cessation of National, Racial or Religious Hostility. Report by the Secretary-General. E/Cn.4/Sub.2/172, November 9, 1955. 51 pp. mimeo.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Germany

Agreement on German external debts. Signed at London February 27, 1953. Entered into force September 16, 1953. TIAS 2792.
Accession deposited: Peru, December 2, 1955.

North Atlantic Treaty

Agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for cooperation regarding atomic information. Signed at Paris June 22, 1955.[1]
Notification of being bound by terms of the agreement: Iceland, January 16, 1956.

Trade and Commerce

International convention to facilitate the importation of commercial samples and advertising material. Dated at Geneva November 7, 1952. Entered into force November 20, 1955.[2]
Accession deposited: Australia, January 6, 1956.

BILATERAL

Cuba

Agreement concerning financial arrangements for the furnishing of certain supplies and services to naval vessels of both countries. Signed at Habana January 10, 1956. Will enter into force April 9, 1956 (90 days from the date of signature).

Korea

Agreement providing for the loan of three additional naval vessels to Korea. Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul December 28, 1955. Entered into force December 28, 1955.

Peru

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington January 25, 1956. Entered into force January 25, 1956.

[1] Not in force.
[2] Not in force for the United States.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on January 18 confirmed Max Waldo Bishop to be Ambassador to Thailand.

The Senate on January 25 confirmed the following:

Thomas C. Mann to be Ambassador to El Salvador
John D. Hickerson to be Ambassador to Finland
John J. Nuccio to be Ambassador to Iceland
Wiley T. Buchanan, Jr., to be Ambassador to Luxembourg
Robert H. Thayer to be Minister to Rumania

THE DEPARTMENT

Confirmations

The Senate on January 25 confirmed Herbert V. Prochnow to be Deputy Under Secretary of State.

The Senate on January 25 confirmed Isaac W. Carpenter, Jr., to be an Assistant Secretary of State.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: January 23–29

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

Press releases issued prior to January 23 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 23 of Jan. 16, 34 of Jan. 19, and 38 of Jan. 21.

No.	Date	Subject
39	1/23	Dulles: testimony on ICA.
40	1/24	Under Secretary Hoover to visit Germany (rewrite).
41	1/24	Dulles: news conference transcript.
42	1/25	Health: Middle East policy.
43	1/25	Katzen appointed consultant.
44	1/25	Upton appointed to Mixed Board at Bonn (rewrite).
45	1/26	Wadsworth designated U.S. representative for atomic energy agency negotiations (rewrite).
46	1/26	U.S. policy on treaty rights in Morocco.

American Republics
FAO-Caribbean Commission Technical Conference on Cooperatives . . . 224
Improving Hotel Facilities in the Western Hemisphere . . . 223
Inter-American Council of Jurists . . . 224
Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . 195

Asia. SEATO Representatives Prepare for Meeting of Council . . . 207

Atomic Energy
Ambassador Wadsworth To Represent U.S. in Atomic Agency Negotiations . . . 210
Revised Regulation on Radioisotope Distribution . 208
Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . 195

Canada. The Saint Lawrence Seaway (text of report) . . . 215

China, Communist. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . . . 195

Congress, The
Continuation of Aid to Denmark, U.K., Italy (Hollister) . . . 214
Integration of the International Cooperation Administration Within the Department of State (Dulles) . . . 211
The Saint Lawrence Seaway (text of report) . . 215

Denmark. Continuation of Aid to Denmark, U.K., Italy (Hollister) . . . 214

Disarmament. Renewed Efforts for Disarmament (Lodge) . . . 222

Economic Affairs
FAO-Caribbean Commission Technical Conference on Cooperatives . . . 224
The Saint Lawrence Seaway (text of report) . . 215
U.S.-Indian Cooperation for Economic Development (Cooper) . . . 205

Foreign Service. Confirmations (Bishop, Buchanan, Hickerson, Mann, Muccio, Thayer) . 226

Germany
Former Senator Upton Named to Mixed Board at Bonn . . . 210
Under Secretary Hoover To Visit in Berlin and Bonn . . . 210

Health, Education, and Welfare. U.S. Representatives on WHO Board . . . 210

India
Allotment of $50 Million to India for Economic Development . . . 204
U.S.-Indian Cooperation for Economic Development (Cooper) . . . 205

International Information. Mr. Katzen Appointed Consultant on Use of Funds in Israel . . . 207

International Organizations and Meetings
Calendar of Meetings . . . 220
FAO-Caribbean Commission Technical Conference on Cooperatives . . . 224
Improving Hotel Facilities in the Western Hemisphere . . . 223
Inter-American Council of Jurists . . . 224

Iran. Letters of Credence (Amini) . . . 207

Israel. Mr. Katzen Appointed Consultant on Use of Funds in Israel . . . 207

Italy. Continuation of Aid to Denmark, U.K., Italy (Hollister) . . . 214

Morocco. U.S. Policy on Treaty Rights in Morocco . . . 204

Mutual Security
Allotment of $50 Million to India for Economic Development . . . 204
Continuation of Aid to Denmark, U.K., Italy (Hollister) . . . 214
Integration of the International Cooperation Administration Within the Department of State (Dulles) . . . 211
SEATO Representatives Prepare for Meeting of Council . . . 207
Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . 195
U.S. Gives Viet-Nam $37 Million for Refugee Resettlement . . . 208
U.S.-Indian Cooperation for Economic Development (Cooper) . . . 205

Near East
A Historical View of American Foreign Policy in the Middle East (Heath) . . . 202
Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . 195

Presidential Documents. Exchange of Correspondence Between President Eisenhower and Soviet Premier Bulganin . . . 191

Refugees and Displaced Persons
Second Session of U.N. Refugee Committee . . . 225
U.S. Gives Viet-Nam $37 Million for Refugee Resettlement . . . 208

State, Department of
Ambassador Wadsworth To Represent U.S. in Atomic Agency Negotiations . . . 210
Confirmations (Carpenter, Prochnow) . . . 226
Integration of the International Cooperation Administration Within the Department of State (Dulles) . . . 211

Treaty Information
Current Actions . . . 226
U.S. Policy on Treaty Rights in Morocco . . . 204

U.S.S.R. Exchange of Correspondence Between President Eisenhower and Soviet Premier Bulganin (letters, text of Soviet draft treaty) . 191

United Kingdom
Continuation of Aid to Denmark, U.K., Italy (Hollister) . . . 214
Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . 195

United Nations
Current U.N. Documents . . . 225
Renewed Efforts for Disarmament (Lodge) . . . 222
Second Session of U.N. Refugee Committee . . . 225
U.S. Representatives on WHO Board . . . 210

Viet-Nam. U.S. Gives Viet-Nam $37 Million for Refugee Resettlement . . . 208

Name Index

Amini, Ali . . . 207
Bishop, Max Waldo . . . 226
Brady, Frederick J. . . . 210
Buchanan, Wiley T., Jr. . . . 226
Bulganin, N. . . . 193
Carpenter, Isaac W. . . . 226
Cooper, John Sherman . . . 205
Dulles, Secretary . . . 195, 211
Eisenhower, President . . . 191
Heath, Donald R. . . . 202
Hickerson, John D. . . . 226
Hollister, John B. . . . 214
Hoover, Herbert, Jr. . . . 210
Katzen, Bernard . . . 207
Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr. . . . 222
Mann, Thomas C. . . . 226
Mayo, Charles W. . . . 210
Muccio, John J. . . . 226
Prochnow, Herbert V. . . . 226
Thayer, Robert H. . . . 226
Upton, Robert W. . . . 210
Wadsworth, James J. . . . 210

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The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) came into existence on January 1, 1948, as an undertaking by eight of the most important world trading countries, including the United States. This agreement sets out general rules for the conduct of international trade and establishes standards for international cooperation through joint negotiation of the reduction of tariffs and the elimination of other barriers to free world trade. Today 34 countries participate in this unique international cooperative association. Together, they account for about 80 percent of world trade.

As a result of changes in world economic conditions since 1948, representatives of the countries participating in the General Agreement recently made an intensive review of its provisions. They proposed amendments which are designed to strengthen the agreement and to provide a permanent organization (Organization for Trade Cooperation) to administer the world trade rules. The amendments agreed upon will come into operation after approval by the contracting parties.

Two recent Department of State publications explain this important agreement and the proposed amendments:

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade . . .
Present Rules and Proposed Revisions **45 cents**
(A comparative study.)

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade . . .
An Explanation of Its Provisions and the Proposed Amendments
Publication No. 5813 **20 cents**
(An explanation in layman's language.)

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ANGLO-AMERICAN DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING COMMON PRINCIPLES AND WORLD PROBLEMS
Declaration of Washington 231
Text of Joint Statement 232

ADDRESSES BY SIR ANTHONY EDEN 235

THE RECORD OF COMMUNIST IMPERIALISM IN EAST GERMANY • *by Under Secretary Hoover* 242

FRANKLIN'S ROLE IN PROMOTING INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING • *by Theodore C. Streibert* 249

CONCLUSION OF AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT WITH INDIA 264

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS • *Excerpts From President Eisenhower's Economic Report* 253

For index see inside back cover

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Anglo-American Discussions Concerning Common Principles and World Problems

Following are texts of a joint Anglo-American eclaration issued at Washington on February 1 nd of a statement made on the same day by President Eisenhower and Sir Anthony Eden concerning their 3-day meeting, together with texts of emarks made at the Washington National Airort on January 30 on the arrival of the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd.

ECLARATION OF WASHINGTON

hite House press release dated February 1

JOINT DECLARATION
OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
ND THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

We are conscious that in this year of 1956, there ill rages the age-old struggle between those who elieve that man has his origin and his destiny n God and those who treat man as if he were degned merely to serve a state machine.

Hence, we deem it useful to declare again cerin truths and aims upon which we are united nd which we are persuaded are supported by all ree nations.

1. Because of our belief that the state should xist for the benefit of the individual and not the dividual for the benefit of the state, we uphold e basic right of peoples to governments of their wn choice.

2. These beliefs of ours are far more than theory doctrine. They have been translated into the tual conduct of our policy both domestic and reign. We are parties to the Atlantic Charter, e United Nations Charter, the Potomac Charr[1] and the Pacific Charter.[2] In them we have, ith other friends, dedicated ourselves to the goal self-government and independence of all countries whose people desire and are capable of sustaining an independent existence. During the past ten and more years 600 million men and women in nearly a score of lands have, with our support and assistance, attained nationhood. Many millions more are being helped surely and steadily toward self-government. Thus, the reality and effectiveness of what we have done is a proof of our sincerity.

3. Further, we know that political independence cannot alone assure men and nations full opportunity to pursue happiness and to fulfill their highest destiny. There is likewise need for economic sustenance and growth. This, too, we have helped to provide. We seek to develop with others a large volume of mutually beneficial trade. Likewise we seek, through Technical Assistance, the Colombo Plan and other programs we support, to help economic progress in the less developed countries and to raise the living standards of their peoples. In these programs we have not sought nor desired extension of either economic or political power. The purpose is not to dilute, but to enrich and secure their freedom.

4. During this period of notable cooperative progress in the free world, those who assert the supremacy of the State and deny the inherent rights of man have also been active. Millions of people of different blood, religions and traditions have been forcibly incorporated within the Soviet Union, and many millions more have in fact, although not always in form, been absorbed into the Soviet Communist bloc. In Europe alone, some 100 million people, in what were once 10 independent nations, are compelled, against their will, to work for the glorification and aggrandizement of the Soviet Communist State.

The Communist rulers have expressed, in numerous documents and manifestos, their purpose to extend the practice of Communism, by every

[1] BULLETIN of July 12, 1954, p. 49.
[2] *Ibid.*, Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393.

possible means, until it encompasses the world. To this end they have used military and political force in the past. They continue to seek the same goals, and they have now added economic inducements to their other methods of penetration.

It would be illusory to hope that in their foreign policies, political and economic, the Soviet rulers would reflect a concern for the rights of other peoples which they do not show towards the men and women they already rule. Any free nation that may be persuaded by whatever threat, promise or enticement to embrace Communism will lose its independence and its people will forfeit their rights and liberties. These contrasting records of recent years reflect the essence of the struggle between free countries and the Communist rulers.

5. In the face of the Communist challenge, almost 50 nations which cherish freedom have drawn together in voluntary associations for their collective security. These associations uphold for all their members the right to independent existence, the right to free expression and the right to differ. The purpose of their union is to preserve those national rights, just as within a state people join together to preserve their individual rights.

6. We reject any thought that the cleavage we have described should be resolved by force. We shall never initiate violence. Moreover, we shall use our full influence to assure that Soviet efforts to inflame old antagonisms will not succeed in breaking the peace. The United Nations provides appropriate machinery to assist countries desiring peacefully to bridge their differences and to settle disputes.

Many nations of the free world are ever anxious to proffer their good offices to promote the same end. Our two countries stand constantly ready to aid in negotiation and conciliation with others directly concerned, so as to achieve just settlements of the concrete issues that now trouble the world.

7. We shall persevere in seeking a just and lasting peace and a universal and effectively controlled disarmament which will relieve mankind of the burden and the terror of modern weapons. Meanwhile, the society of free nations must retain the power needed to deter aggression. We recognize that such power should never serve as a means of national aggrandizement but only as an essential shield for every member of the community of nations.

We are determined to make the conquest of the atom a pathway to peaceful progress, not a road to doom.

8. We will not be deflected from the policies and purposes we have herein stated. On the contrary we will maintain and, where necessary, strengthen and extend them. Thus, we shall help ourselves and others to peace, freedom and social progress maintaining human rights where they are already secure, defending them when they are in peril and peacefully restoring them where they have temporarily been lost.

While resolutely pursuing these aims, which are the products of our faith in God and in the peoples of the earth, we shall eagerly grasp any genuine opportunity to free mankind of the pall of fear and insecurity which now obscures what can and should be a glorious future.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
ANTHONY EDEN

TEXT OF JOINT STATEMENT

White House press release dated February 1

At the end of three days of friendly and fruitful reunion, the President and the Prime Minister issued the following statement.

Conscious of the unity of purpose of our two countries, we have restated in a separate Joint Declaration our view of the challenge which confronts the free world and the principles which it seems to us are required to meet it. In our conversations, we have also reviewed other matters of mutual concern to the two governments in various areas of the world.

I. Europe

We reaffirm that the North Atlantic Treaty is essential to our common security. We regard this association as far more than a military alliance. We welcome the increasing range of consultation in the Council on political and other problems.

In the economic field we recognize the contribution which the OEEC [Organization for European Economic Cooperation] makes to the stability of Europe. Within the framework of the Atlantic Community, and with regard for its broader interests, we support further progress on the continent toward unity, both political and economic.

With respect to Germany, we agree that so long as it remains divided, there can be no genuine and

able peace. We shall continue our efforts to ing about the reunification of Germany in free- om. We regard the Government of the Federal epublic of Germany as the only German Govern- ent freely and legitimately constituted, and erefore alone entitled to speak as the representa- re of the German people in international affairs. We reaffirm our abiding interest in the security d welfare of Berlin. We shall continue, as we ve stated in the past, to regard any attack ainst Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon r forces and ourselves.

. Middle East

We discussed the tensions which prejudice the ability of the area and carry a potential threat world peace. It was agreed that every effort ould be made to decrease sources of misunder- anding between this area and the Western world. e are eager to contribute wherever possible to e settlement of difficulties between states in the gion. We wish to help peoples of this part of e world achieve their legitimate aspirations.

A settlement between Israel and her Arab neigh- rs is the most urgent need. This will be possible ly if both sides are willing to reconcile the posi- ons which they have hitherto taken. Our two overnments have declared their readiness to con- ibute to such a settlement by assisting financially regard to the refugee problem and by guaran- eing agreed frontiers.

In the meantime we are concerned at the state tension in the area and have considered what eps can be taken to reduce it. The Tripartite eclaration of May 25th, 1950, provides for action th inside and outside the United Nations in the ent of the use of force or threat of force or of reparations to violate the frontier or armistice nes. We are bound to recognize that there is now creased danger of these contingencies arising. ccordingly, we have made arrangements for joint iscussions as to the nature of the action which we ould take in such an event. The French Govern- ent is being invited to participate in these dis- ssions.

We believe that the security of states in this area annot rest upon arms alone but rather upon the ternational rule of law and upon the establish- ent of friendly relations among neighbors. The ction of the Soviet bloc in regard to arms sup- lies to Middle East countries has added to the tensions in the area and increased the risk of war. Our purpose is to mitigate that risk.

We express our full support for the efforts of General Burns, head of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization, to maintain peace on the borders. We would favorably consider recommendations for any necessary enlargement of his organization and improvement of its capabilities.

We discussed the work of the Baghdad Pact and agreed upon its importance for the security of the Middle East. We noted that this association, in addition to its defense aspects, has an important part to play in the economic and political development of member countries. We believe that it serves the interests of the area as a whole and provides no reason for impairing the good relations we wish to maintain with non-member countries.

The United States Government will continue to give solid support to the purposes and aims of the Pact and its observers will play a constructive part in the work of its committees.

We reviewed the situation in Arabia and the Persian Gulf, with particular reference to current disputes and differences in that area. We believe that these differences can be resolved through friendly discussions.

III. South and Southeast Asia

We reaffirm our view that the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization is a stabilising influence. We will continue to give it our full support and to work with those countries who are associated with us as our allies in this organization. We welcome the cooperation of our allies and ourselves with other free nations in this important area, through

French Government Invited To Participate in Discussions Concerning Middle East

Press release 50 dated February 1

The Secretary of State and the British Ambassador met with the Ambassador of France this afternoon and communicated to him the text of the passage in the joint statement to be issued by the President and the Prime Minister, relating to the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950, concerning the Middle East. They conveyed an invitation to the French Government to participate in the joint discussions foreseen in that passage of the statement.

The French Ambassador undertook to convey this invitation to his Government.

such organizations as the Colombo Plan, in developing the resources and well-being of all participating countries.

IV. Far East

We discussed the situation in the Far East. We are firmly united in our purpose: to deter and prevent aggressive expansion by force or subversion, and to assist the free nations of the area in their self-defense and in maintaining domestic stability and welfare. We are agreed that our policies must be directed to achieve these ends. After frank discussion, some differences remain in our judgements as to the most effective means to achieve these purposes.

We are agreed that trade controls should continue and should be reviewed now and periodically as to their scope, in the light of changing conditions, so that they may best serve the interests of the free world.

V. Atomic Energy Matters

We noted with great satisfaction that atomic energy information now being exchanged as a result of the agreements concluded between our Governments last June [3] represents a gain to the common security. We discussed the development of our close cooperation in this field. We confirmed our resolve to push forward with the setting up, with suitable safeguards, of the International Agency for the promotion of the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

WELCOME AT AIRPORT

Press release 47 dated January 30

Remarks of Secretary Dulles

It is for me a great honor and a pleasure indeed to welcome here on behalf of President Eisenhower and all the American people the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

He is by no means a stranger here. He has been here many times and a good many of us have also been on the other side and have known him there. I am sure that none of us forget, and none of us ever will forget, the fact that General Eisenhower and a good many others were over there in 1944 as the guests of Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden, at a time when through an example of almost unprece-

[3] *Ibid.*, July 11, 1955, pp. 58, 62.

dented courage the Island of the United Kingdo had been held as a base from which the forces despotism could be rolled back. That, as I sa is something that we shall never forget.

We are very happy that there is also here M Selwyn Lloyd, the new Foreign Secretary of t United Kingdom, who also is known to us as former head of the United Kingdom delegati to the United Nations.

We meet here with a background, a traditio of having worked together for freedom and f a just peace, and the talks which we will be begi ning in a few moments now will proceed from th premise and I am confident will lead to maki both freedom and a just peace more secure.

Sir Anthony, we are very happy indeed that y are here.

Remarks of the Prime Minister

Thank you very much.

Mr. Secretary of State, I am indeed grateful f your welcome on behalf of the President and t people of this great country. For the Foreig Secretary and for myself, it is a real pleasure, a you all know it, to be here again amongst you.

I am deeply grateful, Foster—if I may call y that instead of Secretary of State for a minute- for the welcome you have so kindly extended to and for the generous words you have used abo my country. It so happens that this visit was a ranged at the kind invitation of the Preside some months ago, and yet I don't think it cou have been more timely to judge by recent develo ments. If there is one thing that will make peop at home particularly happy about this event, it the knowledge that your President is fit and we enough for the visit to be possible, because y know that there is no man in our country who is widely loved from any foreign land as your Pres dent. We always regard him as partly ours f the reasons that the Secretary of State express so well just now.

We have all of us, your Secretary of State a I, in times gone by, and the President, and M Selwyn Lloyd, who has come to join us—we ha all worked together in difficult times and in le difficult times, should they ever happen to exis

On this occasion I am quite sure that we ca make a serious and positive contribution to pea by understanding between ourselves. I look fo ward to these talks and we shall be getting dow

o work soon. I am sure you will wish us all suc-
ess in our efforts and we will do all we can to
eserve your confidence.

Thank you very much.

emarks of the Foreign Secretary

I am a very new Secretary of State. Therefore,
feel very honored to have the opportunity of
oming to take part in these talks. I am very
roud to have the opportunity of meeting Presi-
ent Eisenhower again, because I served under
im during the years of which you spoke, Mr.
ecretary.

I am also very glad of having the opportunity of working with you again and meeting many old friends in the State Department.

It is absolutely clear in my belief that the hopes for a peaceful world depend upon the friendship between our two countries. If we stand together, there is almost anything we can do together. If we fall apart, or if we are driven apart, then there is no danger which may not befall the free world.

We want to continue and maintain that cooperation between us by these talks. I hope they will have a very fruitful and profitable progress.

Thank you very much.

isit of Sir Anthony Eden

Following are texts of three addresses made by ritish Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden on Feb-uary 2 before the United States Senate and the ouse of Representatives and, by radio and tele-ision, to the American people.

DDRESS TO THE SENATE [1]

Mr. President and Members of the Senate of he United States, I am deeply sensible of the ompliment which you have paid me in inviting e to address you today. It is a compliment hich, sir, as you know, could not be paid to me my own country. If I were to stray into what e call "another place," I am afraid nobody would ggest that I should say a single word which hows, if I may say so, that your congressional rocedures are very adaptable. I think perhaps it ould be dangerous, sir, to make any further com-ent upon them.

We have just brought to a conclusion a mem-rable Conference in the service of peace.

I must first express my sincere gratitude to the resident of the United States for the patience, itiative, and understanding which alone made ur results possible. It was a privilege to work ith him, and an added pleasure to find him in ch good health.

The Foreign Secretary and I were also very glad of the opportunity to renew our friendship with your Secretary of State, Mr. Foster Dulles.

Mr. President, you will expect me, as a result of our discussions, and in this distinguished company, to speak of world affairs.

It is a somber prospect which we confront together. Uncertainty and fear stalk the world 10 years after the victory was won. The scene shifts: Our problems take on different forms, but we have still to recognize them for what they are.

The most powerful nations on earth today possess the most destructive weapons man has ever had at his command. This has created a mutual deterrent. You and we and the Russians each command or will soon command the means to annihilate each other. But the warning does not end there. New weapons, guided missiles, rockets, and the like bring new powers of destruction to mankind. Is the world, then, in a few years to shoot itself to destruction at long range? You and we alone cannot give the answers to these questions. But we can face and examine them together and determine what conclusions we should draw.

Wars in the past—in the old continent of Europe and elsewhere—have often begun because one power or combination of powers has believed its forces sufficient to win and hold some overwhelming advantage. This has dazzled the eyes and enticed the minds of conquerors down the ages. Sometimes their ambition has brought them victory. It can never do so in this nuclear age, when oblivion confronts aggressor and victim alike.

[1] Reprinted from *Cong. Rec.* of Feb. 2, 1956, p. 1627.

I wish I could go on to say that on this account all possibility of world conflict is excluded. I cannot. The direct danger is reduced. The indirect threat remains and its consequences can equally be mortal.

Brought to a halt in Europe, Soviet expansion now feels its way south and probes in other lands. There is nothing particularly new in this. You can read it all in Russian imperialist history. But the emphasis has changed, and the symbol and methods, too. This is a struggle for men's minds, once expressed in these regions in conflicting faiths, but now in rival ideologies. From the Kremlin streams forth into the lands of what we call the Middle East, and into all Asia, a mixture of blandishment and threat, offers of arms and menaces to individuals, all couched in terms of fierce hostility for Western ideals.

In the face of this, what answer should the West give? We do not intend to base our policies on the revival of old hatreds or the creation of new ones. We know that we can neither hold communism nor beat it back by force of arms alone. Friendship and freedom, and help of all kinds on which to base a rising standard of life—these are what we offer. It is not so much military containment as political enlightenment which is the need of the day. Let us therefore be quite clear about our philosophy in the appeal we make to other lands. We invite nations to share our free way of life. We neither compel them to join our company, nor hold them by force once they have done so. That is the difference between our approach to the rights of nations and the Communist denial of them. No one supposes that the countries under Soviet dominion today, from Prague to Stettin, from Sofia to Warsaw, are under Communist command because they like it. If they did, why do you think that over a quarter of a million refugees have escaped across from East Germany to the West in this last year? How many more would follow them from other lands if they could? But of course these considerations do not influence Communist thought. Soviet rule is absolute: what the people want is immaterial. For them, man exists for the state, not the state for man. The one-party system is, after all, so much simpler to handle, where the people do not have the chance to vex themselves with a political choice. That is why Communists are sincerely convinced that free elections are a great mistake.

The contrast cannot we think be more sharply shown than in our Commonwealth community. Its older members whom you well know—Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa—have for generations played their free and individual parts in world affairs and made their distinctive contributions. More lately they have been joined by the new partners in Asia—India, Pakistan, and Ceylon. But I would not like you to think that the process has stopped there, or can do so. It is a continuing development. Everywhere through the Commonwealth and Empire nations are growing up. This places a heavy responsibility upon the parent. He has to be sure that patience is shown, that guidance is given, that experience is passed on—as a warning but not as a command.

The process is continuing and its consequences will be far reaching.

In many territories of the Commonwealth constitutional progress has reached, or is approaching, the last stage before their peoples assume full responsibility for their own affairs. I could give you examples of this in Africa, in Southeast Asia and in the Caribbean. But I will only mention that, at this very moment, Her Majesty the Queen is in Nigeria, where dwell more than 30 million of her people, with elected legislatures and African Ministers, and the spontaneous enthusiasm of her welcome will have shown how the people really feel. No one can tell you yet to what these great adventures in self-government will lead. There has been nothing like it in the world before. There are risks in it, grave risks, as there are in everything worthwhile. But there are also great rewards.

I have painted you this scene because you will see how different it is from the view of a Soviet leader who recently told us that he could not understand why people should go into other countries except to pump out their wealth and resources. That is just the difference between us, and I am glad of it. The Washington declaration which the President and I signed yesterday sets out the principles of the faith we share.

I suggest to you that we should follow the courses I shall now describe to give it effect.

First, we should maintain our alliances and friendships firmly, loyally, and without apology.

This does not exclude a willingness to meet and talk with Communist powers. We cannot expect all the world to love each other, but we can try to allay hatreds. All such efforts should, how-

ver, be attended by an awareness of the methods hich will be used against us.

Secondly, in the areas where the danger of conict is most acute, we should, whenever we can, eclare our unity of purpose. For instance, beveen the Arab States and Israel, where the daner has increased, we have done well—I hope you ill think—in our communique to make clear that e are to discuss together—we and you—what ction we should take. The more prepared we re, the less likely is an emergency to arise.

Thirdly, it would be a useless exercise to chase oviet activity all around the world in the sense f trying to cap every offer they profess to make y a better on our own account. I doubt whether ven the resources of your great country could and that strain, and it would be a foolish effort nyway. I am convinced that our method should e different, that we should continue to give ecoomic help in those areas where it is most needed, utting first the reasonable requirements of our wn friends, but not forgetting others.

I have spoken of the principles set out in this eclaration of Washington, and I have indicated ie courses which we, for our part, are determined o follow in order to give effect to these principles.

But this is not the only outcome of the conerence. We have done more. We have shown nce again that we can work together and do that ork in the closest comradeship. Of course we o not always agree at every point. Free men ever do; nor, I think, free women either. But it the strength of our unity that we have no need o conceal this. Never, I am sure, has the measure f agreement been so wide and true as it is today. ever has the identity of our common purpose een so plain. This is the keynote of our work ogether in these days.

Above all, this meeting has refreshed our friendiip and reaffirmed our alliance. On their strength ie future of the free world rests secure.

Mr. President, I have given you an account of iis conference and what has passed, and where e are now together. But, you know, there is omething in our relationship which cannot be put ito documents, which cannot be rehearsed in peeches, but which is infinitely more important ian the written word. It is the spirit that aniiates our friendship that you and we can sit down i the way the President and I have done in these days, not always agreeing, but knowing that at he end the greater issue will always exclude the lesser. That is what counts. You cannot analyze what it is due to, but it is something that only the free world enjoys. So long as we treasure and hold it, our nation and yours together, there will be peace in this world.

ADDRESS TO THE HOUSE [2]

Mr. Speaker, and Members of the House of Representatives of the United States:

Mr. Speaker, I am deeply conscious of the honor you have done me in asking me to speak to you. In inviting me to address both Houses of Congress I have today been invested with a dual personality which I fear that the British Parliament at home would never allow. There, you know, they think it is quite bad enough to have me in one House. But, nonetheless, I thank you very much.

Sir, in speaking to the Senate I have shown that the declaration which the President and I issued yesterday reaffirmed to both our countries our determination to promote peace and to defend the free world. It also recognized this, that we cannot contain the enemies of freedom by military action alone. Simply to deter the aggressor is not enough. It is of the constructive part of our work that I would now like to speak to you.

The principles which have guided us, and which I can fairly say influence our two countries, we offer to other lands, you and we: Political understanding, material help with no strings attached. We offer free and friendly association to all peaceloving nations.

It is fair to say that these are generous offers, but having made them we must fulfill them and show ourselves worthy of the trust that the free peoples place in us.

So, Mr. Speaker, I would like, therefore, to speak to you of how we in the United Kingdom believe that we should take our share of this duty.

First, we have to continue vigilance of our own strength; for, if we are weak ourselves we cannot help others either with political guidance or with material assistance; nor can we protect them with military power. To do all these things, of course, places a heavy load upon British resources.

If we are to maintain the mobility of our forces and the means to deal with any emergencies that may arise in these many and distant lands, then

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 1649.

bases, garrisons, harbors, and airdromes and all their attendant paraphernalia must be paid for. That is why the expense of our overseas defense looms so large in our annual budget and places a continuing strain on our balance of payments. These costs are in fact infinitely larger than those of any other country except yours.

Add to this, Mr. Speaker, the direct charges for defense, the medium bomber force which we alone in Europe are today building as part of the deterrent; the cost of the hydrogen bomb which we are engaged in making, and you understand, I hope, that we are not an unworthy partner. Of course, our contribution is small in amount by comparison with yours, but in proportion to our size our effort is comparable to yours.

Mr. Speaker, I know it is sometimes said in this country that the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom only comes to the United States in order to get dollars. Now, with your help, sir, I should like to lay this ghost once and for all.

We are sincerely grateful for the economic aid we have had in the past. It has helped us to repair the consequences of 6 years of bombardment and war, because that is how long it lasted in Britain, nearly 6 years; but apart from a measure of defense aid, which we value, we now stand on our own feet, and we intend to continue to do so.

The scale of the United States assistance to the free world in these past years, has been an act of generosity unmatched in history. I know it is difficult for you to applaud them, but I can assure you any British audience would do so, and any I hope in the free world.

Marshall aid, linked in fame with the name of a courageous and imaginative soldier, brought salvation to Europe at a critical hour. The world should not forget that you offered that help to all on either side of the Iron Curtain.

These policies you have upheld manfully and at heavy cost to yourselves. Never has a nation in years of peace so heavily taxed itself for others.

As I have said, we at home have to continue to build our economic strength, and it is with this in mind that we have never spared our effort, nor shall we, to develop nuclear power. These efforts are taking many forms. As perhaps you know, our first atomic power station will be working this year—perhaps even a little ahead of yours—I hope so. A number of others are under construction and will come into operation in due course.

But machinery and power alone are not enough. To keep pace with these and other scientific needs we are now undertaking an extensive program of technological education. This will be spread over the next 5 years and will bring new opportunity to our young people so that in quality we may hold our own in all these new fields.

Mr. Speaker, I ask you to believe that though Britain is an old country, she is still young in heart, ready to compete even with you in the expansion of this new industry which may well create a new industrial age for us all.

So much for the economic aspects. The free world has also to display a political stability. I think you will agree that the British people have not failed you in this. We have even given the world an example in this respect for a long time past, but, sir, we intend to continue to do so for a long time to come.

With strength at home must be linked imaginative and progressive policies abroad, and here we have special responsibilities of which you know. I have read some of your resolutions about them. We shall discharge those responsibilities.

We are convinced that it is our duty to encourage the steady progress of nations toward self-government. We have applied this principle many, many times. The examples are familiar to you. I will only mention that at this very moment while you and I are grouped here in this great hall, Her Majesty the Queen is in Nigeria where dwell more than 30 millions of her people with elected legislatures and African ministers.

In recent years many territories of the Commonwealth have attained nationhood; others are advancing by stages on the same path.

It is our faith that the confidence which self-government breeds is the best antidote to communism. But we are also aware that a danger of our time is that freedom can be lost by subversion. You will have noticed how these peoples who are just reaching nationhood are the special object of Communist ambitions which seek to take advantage of any inexperience or weakness they may show. Of course we know that these are the attendant hazards, yet we are convinced that the encouragement of these many peoples toward self-government will prove itself as wise statesmanship. Indeed, the recent experience of the Commonwealth shows that this is true.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, the free world has need that its foreign policies should fairly measure up to the realities of the world in which we live.

here are certain principles to which we hold d which we will not give up:

The sanctity of treaties.

Good faith between nations.

The interdependence of peoples from which no untry, however powerful, can altogether escape.

We can join in building a free world.

What of those who lie beyond it? I do not ink we should ever fear contact with those with hom we do not agree. I think if we have faith in rselves and in our convictions we should, therere, be ready to meet with others of contrasting eologies.

And so, Mr. Speaker, I sum up my message to u:

Last night the President and I signed the Decration of Washington together. It embodies r faith; it expresses our principles and shows r confidence in our destiny. If we have the tecity to maintain these before the world and the urage to defend them in conference or in concts we can together face the future unafraid.

Mr. Speaker, in all conferences there are the ritten words of the parliamentary documents, ere are the discussions, there are the communiies—call them what you will—but it is not ough, you know, sir, to talk of this conference erely in that fashion, because there was much ore to these 3 days in value to our countries than at. What was much more valuable was this: e spirit which animates our two countries. It that that counts above all.

These have been the most encouraging 3 days ave ever spent among you here in Washington, d I have been on many of these journeys. They re encouraging not only because it was hearteng to find your President in such wonderful alth; but they were also encouraging because I ought at all times how close we were in mind and ought, and I come away convinced that if we can member that spirit which unites us much closer an any written document whatever you put in then together we can really render service to is troubled universe and maybe bring peace to e world forever.

ANSCRIPT OF RADIO AND TELEVISION DRESS

Good evening. I am glad to have this chance talk with you tonight. It is almost, in a way, though I were visiting with you in your own homes. Of course, we often do this at home in Britain, and I have talked with the folks there, because we have television and use it widely there, too.

Tonight I want to talk to you about the visit I have just paid to Washington and the work I have been doing with President Eisenhower in an attempt to try to strengthen the causes which are working for peace in the world. Now, for me this has been, I think, the most encouraging conference I have ever attended, and I just would like to tell you why.

First of all, because I found your President in such excellent health and, to use one of your expressions, I think, with his eye well on the ball all the time.

The success of our 3 days' work is in the main due to him.

Of course, he and I are old friends; we have known each other for many years, since the war when, as many of you who are watching or listening tonight will know, he commanded not only your troops but ours to victory in the field.

Tonight may I talk about a different kind of work we have done together, because what we were engaged upon this time was an effort to try to promote peace, and we decided in our discussions that it would be well to set out what you might call the philosophy of the free world, that is to say, the thought that lies behind our way of life in your country and in mine, and to express this in simple terms and to embody it in one document, and we called that document the Declaration of Washington.

Now, I would just like to say a few words about what we meant by that document, and also what its special, special message is. It deals with our faith in many matters. It points out how we are determined, so far as in us lies, to lead the peoples of the world to free self-government.

But, of course, you may say that is something that has been going on in the British Commonwealth for a long time, and, of course, that is true. There is one example of how it is actually developing now in the presence of our Queen in Nigeria, where she is being cheered by millions of her subjects and where she will meet African ministers, African legislators.

That process is going on continuously in Asia, in Africa; its older friends are well known to you, and in this large partnership of which we are, we like to think, the heart and center, many great

countries now form part, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa; and then in Asia, more recently, we have been joined by India, Pakistan, and Ceylon.

Now all this is an experiment which has no parallel at all in world history, and it goes forward steadily.

The message I want to leave with you in this connection is this: Nothing of that kind can ever happen in the Communist world behind the Iron Curtain. There is no developing toward free self-government there. That is one of the things with which our declaration deals.

The next is how we can help other countries who are, perhaps, less well placed than ourselves, either in respect of resources or development, and that help can take many forms and should be given with no strings attached; we think it can take the form of actual financial or economic aid or it can take the form of technical assistance. That is part of our faith to carry that through, to do that for these people so as to raise their standard of living, because we know that self-government and economic stability are the strongest antidotes to communism.

So those are some of the things that we are planning to do, and we set out in this Declaration of Washington.

But, of course, apart from what is described in the Declaration, we understand very well that, with a world situation like we see around us now, we have got to work continuously to find opportunities to try to reduce tension, to try to make the acute anxieties that today exist less in the world.

You have the great deterrent power, which we are creating, too, and that is vital to peace, I admit—but it is only one side of our work. No less important is the constructive part, and we think we must take every opportunity that we can so that we may loosen up some of the rigid barriers that divide the world today, and do so with caution, knowing well what it is we have to face.

For those who may feel, amongst you, that you should never have contacts with those whose state is the antithesis of our own, to those I would say I would not myself take up that attitude. If you have confidence in yourself, if you believe in your own conviction, if you trust to your own faith, you need not be afraid and shouldn't be afraid to meet and to argue with others.

There is a third element we must never forget—to hold fast to our allies. The sheet anchor of peace today is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which unites all the countries of Western Europe together in a defensive alliance. They will never attack anyone, but they are a shield of defense against any dangers that may come in the future. That, too, we must do, support and hold fast always to our allies.

Of course, the President and I discussed many other matters. We discussed almost every difficulty you can think of in the world, and there are plenty of them, aren't there?

But there is just one warning I would like to leave about our two countries, about Anglo-American relations.

Usually they run smoothly and easily. Well, of course, when they do, there is no headline in that. There is no news in that; nobody notices it much.

But if ever there is something that goes a little wrong or some difference between us, immediately that is headline news. Everybody writes about it, and perhaps you here and we in Britain get excited about it.

Now, that is unwise. We have got to realize that from time to time two great free peoples will disagree about certain matters. We have got to remember that the greater unity is always so much more important than any rift there may be from time to time on any individual policy.

I think you know that is the most important consideration for us to bear in mind about our two countries. It is the one, at least, to which I attach the most significance.

And so you will discuss the problems of the world in documents, in inscribed charters, in declarations, and so on, and they are of great value to you, but there is something more important for you and for us than that. There is something that, for me, has emerged from this conference which counts far more than any written document, and I wonder whether I can succeed in putting my meaning to you.

It is not declarations, it is not the agreements, it is not the discussions, valued as they are. That can happen between other countries. But what is beyond price in its value to both our nations is that spirit of unity which expresses itself when you and we sit down together to work out our problems.

I know nothing like it anywhere else in the world today, and I say something more to you

' you and we can hold on to it, then there is no nit to the service we can render to peace, and y strong sentiment, after coming once again nong my American friends, is just that—that ver have we had a greater opportunity to work r peace.

We are determined that our efforts shall suc-ed. If we are convinced in that determination, ere is nothing we cannot achieve. So there is y message to you.

As always, it is a pleasure to be in the United ates, to thank you for your welcome, your under-anding, and your friendship. But, as I bid fare-ell to you tonight—for I fly to Canada tomor-w—my message is: Please help us to keep that irit of unity between our two countries alive, cause it can mean peace for the world forever.

.S.-French Cooperation

ess release 63 dated February 4

The following is the text of a letter from Chris-an Pineau, Foreign Minister of the French Re-ublic, to the Secretary of State, delivered by Am-ssador Couve de Murville, on Friday, February 1956, together with the Secretary's reply trans-itted through the American Embassy in Paris on ebruary 4.

oreign Minister Pineau to Secretary Dulles

MR. SECRETARY: On taking over my office, I am atified by the opportunity which it provides to llaborate personally with you. The long stand-g friendship between France and the United ates and the Atlantic Alliance constitute power-l bonds between our two countries which I will deavor to strengthen even more, in the interest security and of general peace.

C. PINEAU

cretary Dulles to Foreign Minister Pineau

DEAR MR. MINISTER: I have just received rough your Ambassador here your kind message. et me assure you that I heartily reciprocate your ntiments and look forward to close and friendly operation with you.

I hope that I may see you next month at Ka-chi.

Sincerely yours,

FOSTER DULLES

Itinerary for Secretary Dulles' Trip to Asia

Press release 62 dated February 3

Secretary Dulles, following his visit to Karachi, where he will attend the SEATO Council meeting March 6–8, will visit a number of other countries in Asia. At the invitations of the Governments concerned, he will pay brief visits to India, Ceylon, Indonesia, Thailand, Viet-Nam, the Philippines, the Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, and Japan.

The Secretary's schedule is as follows:

Friday, March 2	Depart Washington.
Monday, March 5	Arrive Karachi.
Friday, March 9	Depart Karachi. Arrive New Delhi.
Sunday, March 11	Depart New Delhi. Arrive Colombo.
Monday, March 12	Depart Colombo. Arrive Djakarta.
Tuesday, March 13	Depart Djakarta. Arrive Bangkok.
Wednesday, March 14	Depart Bangkok. Arrive Saïgon.
Thursday, March 15	Depart Saïgon. Arrive Manila.
Friday, March 16	Depart Manila. Arrive Taipei.
Saturday, March 17	Depart Taipei. Arrive Seoul.
Sunday, March 18	Depart Seoul. Arrive Tokyo.
Monday, March 19	Depart Tokyo.
Wednesday, March 21	Arrive Washington.

M. Mayer and Party To Visit U.S.

The Department of State announced on February 3 (press release 60) the members of the official party that will accompany René Mayer, President of the High Authority of the European Community for Coal and Steel, when he visits Washington from February 6 to 9. They are as follows:

Pierre Uri, Director, Economic Division, European Community for Coal and Steel

Tony Rollman, Director, Market Division, European Community for Coal and Steel

Fernand Spaak, Special Assistant to the President

The Record of Communist Imperialism in East Germany

by Under Secretary Hoover[1]

It is a great honor for me to represent the United States Government at this 10th anniversary of RIAS—Radio in the American Sector. I bring to the people of Berlin and of all Germany the warm greetings and good wishes of President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles—and of the American people. They know it is your spirited devotion to the cause of freedom that gives meaning and value to the mission of RIAS.

As one who took an active part in radio during its early days, I have followed RIAS from its birth in 1946 with unusual personal interest. During its decade of service RIAS has become an integral part of the German community. It has gained fame far beyond the borders of Germany, for it links the captive population of the Soviet Zone with the free world. RIAS has built countless bridges of thought and spirit between the peoples of the free West and the captive East. It has helped maintain the faith which those men, women, and youth of Germany who are still under Communist domination have in the fundamental concepts of culture and freedom which they cherish. In spite of the drabness and oppression of their present life, it has reenforced their hope for a brighter future when the day of liberation arrives. It symbolizes the deep cultural and spiritual solidarity that exists between the free world and some 17 million Germans who still are unwillingly separated from the rest of their countrymen. To the extent that it helps strengthen this tie, RIAS contributes to the unique role of the people of Berlin in the heart of a divided country. Notwithstanding continued attempts to jam and suppress its voice, RIAS will speak for them until that division has ended.

In the spirit epitomized by your former Mayor, Ernst Reuter, and so well exemplified by the other incumbents of this high office, Frau Schroeder, Mayor Schreiber, and Mayor Suhr, the people of West Berlin have responded to their tasks with a courage and resolve which has won the admiration of the world. Your firmness has been a source of inspiration to everyone dedicated to freedom's cause. During the blockade of 1948–49 you demonstrated an unswerving faith. In turn, the West responded with an unprecedented airlift. Today, as then, the free world regards the people of Berlin as partners in the pursuit of a real peace based on justice and freedom. It is in the cause of these principles that my own country will continue to meet its responsibilities in Berlin and to support the declaration recorded as part of the London and Paris Agreements of 1954.[2] With respect to Berlin, the declaration said that the security and welfare of Berlin, and the maintenance of the position of the Western World there, were regarded as essential elements of the peace of the free world. It said, further, that armed forces would be maintained within Berlin as long as these responsibilities required it. It reaffirmed that any attack against Berlin, from any quarter, would be treated as an attack upon the Western World.

It is not necessary for me to remind the people of Germany of the hardships and injustices coming from 11 years of enforced partition. The personal and family lives of many within the sound of my voice have been directly affected. The source of these painful experiences is well known to all of you. There are few places on earth where the true meaning of Communist imperialism is better understood. This ceremony is a particularly appropriate occasion upon which to review the record.

[1] Address made at Berlin on Feb. 5 (press release 58 dated Feb. 3).

[2] BULLETIN of Oct. 11, 1954, p. 521.

Dedication of Herbert Hoover School

Following are the remarks made by Under Secretary Hoover at the dedication of the Herbert Hoover School in the Wedding District of Berlin on February 6 (press release 59 dated February 3).

I am most happy to be with you today.

My father, who has visited Berlin many times, regrets that he cannot be with you on this special occasion. However, he asked me to give you this message:

"There is no greater honor that can come to a man than to have a school named for him. There is no part of our life with which I would rather be associated than the education of our young people, for within it lies the basis for our future.

"I am particularly pleased that education is playing such an important role in this embattled city, and I feel certain that the students of this school will hold firmly to the maintenance of freedom and justice, even under these most trying of circumstances.

"I am indeed deeply honored by your action in naming this school in Wedding after me.

"I send you all my very best wishes."

I should like to add a few words of my own.

This school symbolizes the spirit of the people of Wedding. It will carry forward your heritage of a thorough technical education that has been the basic foundation of the great industrial economy of your country for so many years.

Both my father and I were trained as engineers. From my own experience I know the close relationship that exists between the practical background of the engineer and the problems that face us in government. The reconstruction of your city, physically and politically, is evidence of the productive combination of professional skills and political progress in your free, modern, and competitive economy.

During recent years, through close association between the people of your country and mine, I believe that a lasting bond of friendship has been established. Your steadfast devotion to freedom has been a constant inspiration to the free world.

One of the vivid recollections of my college days is the motto of Stanford University, from which my father and I both graduated. The words of this motto are written in German and for almost 70 years have been emblazoned on the shield of our university: *Die Luft der Freiheit Weht* (Let the Winds of Freedom Blow). They came originally from Ulrich Von Hutten, a German philosopher of the 15th century. These are words that live with real meaning today and are especially significant to you who long for a united Germany based upon free and democratic institutions. You are fully aware of what freedom brings—the opportunity to choose your own career, your own job, and your own way of life.

In the knowledge that freedom will long be cherished by you and those who follow you in this school, in the name of my countrymen I wish you every possible success.

Nearly 11 years of postwar history have been ritten. This period has a particular significance, ecause it clearly depicts two contrasting philosohies of government. Here in the two adjacent ut divided parts of Germany the forces of Comunist imperialism and the forces of freedom ave each left their imprint for the world to see. Cast Germany has been a tragic example of what appens under Communist domination, particuarly when compared to the progress in West Gerany. Nevertheless, it has been a fair test of hese two contrasting systems. They began at the ame time and under the same conditions followg the war. They dealt with populations of the ame national heritage and the same economic ackground. No nation and no people can afford o ignore the lesson which has been so vividly aught here.

At the beginning of this afterwar period, it as clear that the work of reconstruction would ave to go hand-in-hand with the other tasks of human progress. In 1945 it was formally agreed that the four zones of Germany should be treated as a single economic unit under a single economic administration. Zonal borders were not intended to be barriers. Democratic political parties were to be allowed and encouraged, with rights of assembly and public discussion. Self-government was to be restored on true democratic principles through freely elected councils, first at local and then at regional and state levels. Trade unions were to be encouraged. Speech, religion, and the press were to be free and uncontrolled.

The Division of Germany

Since that time it has become painfully clear that Soviet promises bore no resemblance to Soviet actions. The Soviet Government placed an iron curtain around the 17 million people in the Eastern Zone of the country. Economic servitude was imposed in the Soviet Zone, and their au-

thorities rejected all Western efforts to unify Germany as a single economic unit. While the American offer of July 1946 to join the U.S. Zone with any other zone or zones in common economic administration was accepted by the United Kingdom and France, it was preemptorily rejected by the Soviets. This was the turning point. Germany was arbitrarily divided by Soviet action into a West and an East. As every German knows, from that time on the development and progress of the two areas have taken fundamentally divergent courses.

The phenomenal economic and political recovery in West Germany will stand forever as a tribute to the energy and ability of the German people at work under a free society. Out of this soil of freedom, and with the assistance of the West, there has grown a stable, sovereign, and democratic government that has commanded worldwide respect. Industrial production has doubled over prewar levels. Today West Germany has a thriving, modern, competitive, free-enterprise economy, with a standard of living no one considered possible 10 years ago. It supports not only its own expanding postwar population, but an additional 10 million people who have come from Communist areas. In this new free society all of its elements have contributed and flourished—industry, labor, agriculture, churches, schools, professions, arts, and political parties. The people of the Federal Republic have the right to think freely, to speak freely, and to have a truly free press. They have a constitutional government with their representatives freely elected, without interference or coercion, and free to shape the destiny of their own country. They are in every sense a free nation.

At each stage of West German progress, the Soviets and their satellite government at Pankow attempted to interpose obstructions. There were alternate threats to the physical security and to the economic life of the country. While there were offers of unity, they were on terms designed to force communism on the whole of Germany.

Soviet Rejection of Free Elections

Last year, when the Federal Republic became a sovereign and equal partner in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Soviets cast aside all pretense of true reunification. Despite their solemn agreement at the "summit" that Germany should be reunified by free elections, they later, at the Meeting of Foreign Ministers, openly rejected the possibility of free elections throughout Germany—even though the united German people would be free to choose their own alliances and a proposal was made for a far-reaching agreement on European security. The Soviets dared not risk a test of the free will of the German people. They knew that there would be an overwhelming repudiation of the whole theory and practice of communism.

Starting with the same basic conditions 11 years ago, let us review the progress in the zone that the Soviets have ruled. It is in sharp contrast to that of the Federal Republic. The grim facts are well known here, but they need to be repeated over and over. In no other way can the moral force of humanity in the rest of the world be brought to bear on this travesty of justice.

What are the economic facts of life in this Communist area of Eastern Germany? Workers must meet ever-increasing goals of output without adequate compensation. Their so-called "trade union" is merely a government instrument for propaganda, restraint, and control. They have destroyed the finest traditions of independence and responsibility in the trade union movement. Farmers have been deprived of freedom and incentive by enforced collectivization. They must produce high-delivery quotas at artificially low prices. Basic foods and consumer items are in short supply. The standard of living is ruthlessly depressed below the level that their hard work would be expected to provide. There are three times as many housing units built in the Federal Republic each year, in proportion to the population, as there are in East Germany.

The contrast is there, it is real, and it is appalling. Its proof is in the stubborn refusal of the Soviet Government and its Communist authorities to open East Germany to the view of other parts of the world. The Iron Curtain serves a purpose in controlling captive populations, but it also acts as a shield for Communist failures. In East Germany it has tried to conceal the gross mismanagement of the economy and the callous attitude of the Communist regime toward the basic needs of the German population. It attempted to gloss over the exploitation of the people and their natural resources for the selfish ends of the Soviets themselves. It is recently reported that Khrushchev has said, "Why should a country be occu-

pied unless it is to be pumped out?" The enslaved people of East Germany can attest to the accuracy of this statement.

For example, we know that the uranium mines in the Eastern Zone could some day prove of vital usefulness to the peaceful future of the whole German people. But these are being rapidly depleted by the Soviets to serve their own purposes. A substantial percentage of the uranium mined by the Soviets is actually being taken from the satellites. This serves a double purpose. It permits them to economize on the use of their domestic resources, and when liberty finally comes to East Germany its uranium supplies will be greatly diminished.

And this is but a single incident in the "pumping out" process that goes on continuously. Yet in this regimented state these captive people are powerless even to protest.

The "People's" Army

Only a few days ago the German Communists, acting as agents of the Soviets in East Germany, formally announced the conversion of their police, who have been in training since 1949, to imperial troops on land, sea, and in the air. The very forces which have been used to oppress the East German population are now being called a *People's* Army. The people, who have been so maltreated by such forces, are now urged to support them out of a sense of "patriotic duty."

Those more distant from the actual scene may not readily understand the methods used to conceal the purposes and actions of this imperialism. However, the people of East Germany know only too well that the real rulers have disguised themselves behind a facade of local Communist agents that are hated and despised by the very population they allege to represent. This alien regime spares no effort to cloak itself with a meaningless shell of democracy and to use it for political control over the population. The East Germans clearly recognize that it is a false front to cover the machinery of an iron dictatorship. The mock election in 1954 of a single list of Communist-sponsored appointees left no room for doubt. Widespread popular uprisings in June of the previous year indicated to the world that a free, secret, and uninfluenced ballot would have run the Communist regime out of office by overwhelming vote.

The East German regime has twice gone through the empty ceremony of declaring itself German and sovereign. The device has become elaborate but it deceives few Germans and, least of all, those who are forced to live under it. It is to their everlasting credit that all but a few have steadfastly refused to give up their real ideals and principles despite necessary outward compliance with such enforced measures.

Perhaps the most dramatic testimony to the failures of the Communist East German system is the fact that last year over a quarter of a million East Germans left their homes, farms, relatives, and lifetime surroundings behind them in their determination to seek more freedom. It is particularly significant that a large proportion were from the younger generation. In many cases the parents made the sacrifice of staying behind so that their children could grow up in a free society where they could choose their own careers and their own jobs. They wanted freedom of opportunity.

Those who left the Communist area were not merely protesting political, military, or economic hardships, however desperate they may have been. They were not seeking simply to improve their economic well-being. They were determined to regain the freedom and human dignity which was their birthright.

Exploitation of the Satellites

Notwithstanding the record of oppression in East Germany, the Soviet leaders are currently urging other peoples to accept their economic assistance, their technical aid, and, by implication, their way of life. It seems to have escaped attention that this is being largely accomplished through the exploitation of East Germany and the other satellite countries of Europe. The result is that the freedom and living standards of those under Communist domination have been squeezed, while at the same time the Soviets have attempted to create the illusion of benevolence and achievement by their offers to the outside world. Certainly none of the past 11 years can be translated into terms of benevolence or achievement for the people of East Germany.

The facts of this hypocrisy must be etched clearly on the conscience of civilized society. The moral indignation of the world is a powerful force. It cannot be ignored. Nor can it be brushed lightly aside by those who are forcefully

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imposing a system of imperialism, on a scale rarely witnessed before in the history of mankind, while at the same time they are professing peacefulness and good will.

There has been some concern that emphasis on economic and social competition in other areas of the world may cause my own country to have less concern about the unsolved problems of Europe. I assure you that this is not so. We shall not be deflected from vigorous pursuit of a fundamental goal of our policy—the achievement through peaceful means of a fully free and unified Germany. We will continue to pursue every reasonable and responsible avenue that offers hope for lasting peace. However, there is a vast difference between avoidance of war on the one hand and true peace on the other, which no Communist blandishments will cause us to forget.

In his address to the people of the United States after returning from the summit conference at Geneva, President Eisenhower said that the pursuit of peace must include justice, freedom, security, and prosperity for all nations, great and small. He continued to say:

> That is the spirit in which the American delegation went to Geneva. We asserted then—and we shall always hold—that there can be no true peace which involves acceptance of a status quo in which we find injustice to many nations, repressions of human beings on a gigantic scale, and with constructive effort paralyzed in many areas by fear.

In President Eisenhower's Christmas message to the captive peoples of Eastern Europe [3] and his New Year's message to Chancellor Adenauer are evidences of the determination of my Government to seek an enduring peace in Europe based on justice and freedom. Only last week, in his reply to Bulganin,[4] President Eisenhower again emphasized the primary importance of a free and united Germany and reaffirmed our dedication to that cause.

I would be less than frank if I were to give the impression that the struggle ahead of us in Germany and Europe will be an easy one. But there is a source of confidence in the moral integrity of the free world. It is a force which my country, in combination with the Federal Republic and other free nations, is dedicated to strengthening. It is a force that springs from the unlimited resources of freedom and common purpose. Free-world strength is not only a matter of defense against military aggression, or of industrial production, or of scientific advances, though these all play their part. It is fundamentally the collective power of spiritual, moral, and intellectual values based on political liberty and the recognition of the individual rights of free men. It is a force which unites diverse cultures, creeds, and economic systems. It is the unbreakable bond between captive peoples and the people of the free world. It is the basic strength behind our diplomatic negotiations and international conferences. It is beyond the reach of imperialism and tyranny. It cannot be contained by barbed wire or border guards. Deep within it lies the hope of all mankind for peace, justice, and freedom.

[3] *Ibid.*, Jan. 16, 1956, p. 84, footnote 3.

[4] *Ibid.*, Feb. 6, 1956, p. 191.

Harassment of Legation Employees and Correspondents in Budapest

TEXT OF U.S. NOTE TO HUNGARY [1]

Press release 57 dated February 3

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Minister of the Hungarian People's Republic and has the honor to refer to the note addressed to the Minister on September 1, 1955, and to the related note and accompanying memorandum addressed to the Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs by the American Legation in Budapest on July 1, 1955.[2] These communications protested against the harassment of local employees of the American Legation by the Hungarian authorities and the resultant impairment of normal and proper functions of the American Legation and pointed out that the United States Government was thereby forced to effect some measure of reciprocity of treatment by terminating all information activities of the Hungarian Legation in Washington except those conducted wholly within its own premises. The Hungarian Government made no reply to the United States note of July 1. Moreover, the response of the Hungarian Government on September 30 [3] to the

[1] Presented by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, Jacob D. Beam, to the Minister of the Hungarian People's Republic on Feb. 3.

[2] For texts, see BULLETIN of Sept. 19, 1955, p. 459.

[3] Not printed.

further United States note of September 1 served no purpose other than deliberately to misrepresent the scope of the restriction placed upon the Hungarian Legation—a misrepresentation repeated on several subsequent occasions in public statements of high officials of the Hungarian Government.

The Hungarian official press announced on January 15, 1956 that the Budapest Court and the Military Tribunal of Budapest had jointly tried and convicted Bela Kapotsy and Cornel Balas, both employees of the American Legation in Budapest, "for intelligence work on behalf of a foreign power, for seditious acts and other crimes". Mr. Kapotsy was sentenced to life imprisonment; Mr. Balas, to a term of eight years.

Mr. Kapotsy and Mr. Balas were arrested on February 24 and June 23, 1955, respectively. The American Legation, despite its repeated requests, has never received from the Hungarian Government any satisfactory explanation or justification of the detention of these employees. Their trial, like their arrest, their detention incommunicado, and all other phases of the proceedings against them, was cloaked in secrecy. There are, in addition to these two individuals, seven other local employees of the American Legation who were taken into custody by the Hungarian authorities during the period 1951 to 1954 without explanation to the American Legation and whose whereabouts and fate are unknown to the Legation.

Neither Mr. Kapotsy, Mr. Balas, nor any other employee of the American Legation in Budapest has engaged on behalf of the United States Government in activities such as those charged against Mr. Kapotsy and Mr. Balas.

The Hungarian press announcement of January 15 also referred to the cases of Andrew Marton, Hungarian correspondent of the Associated Press for many years, and his wife, Ilona Marton, Hungarian correspondent of the United Press. The conduct of the Hungarian Government has been similarly arbitrary and secretive in this instance. Mr. Marton, who was arrested on February 25, 1955, was sentenced to six years' imprisonment for alleged espionage and sedition; Mrs. Marton, who was arrested on June 23, 1955, was sentenced to three years' imprisonment on the same charges. The protracted detention incommunicado and subsequent imprisonment of the Martons have not only deprived the Associated Press and the United Press of the legitimate professional services of these experienced local reporters; they have also seriously prejudiced free access to news sources within Hungary and must therefore be regarded as an abridgment of freedom of the press.

The Government of the United States will not remain silent while the Hungarian Government, through its secret police, continues to persecute Hungarian employees of the American Legation. It is obvious that such persons have been singled out as special targets, falsely accused of subversion, and subjected to cruel and wholly unwarranted punishment by Hungarian authorities for the purposes of adding to the terrorization of the Hungarian people, attempting to discredit the American Legation, and undermining the prestige of the United States before the Hungarian people.

For many years now, the Government and people of the United States have looked in vain for some slight sign that the present leadership of Hungary might one day be disposed to act like an independent and responsible government, to honor its international obligations, and to show a decent respect for the rights of the Hungarian people. Whatever its pretensions to principle, the Hungarian Government can command no credence in its words and no confidence in the rectitude of its actions.

Now, as in the past, the Hungarian Government continues unabated its systematic suppression of human rights and liberties in violation of its specific treaty obligations. This policy, together with the irresponsible treatment and abuse of duly-accredited foreign diplomatic missions by Hungarian authorities, stands in stark contrast to the insistent claims long put forward by the Hungarian Government of qualification for membership in the United Nations. The record, including the latest incidents reviewed above, not only contradicts those claims but also places in serious doubt the ability or willingness of Hungary, under its present government, to carry out in good faith the Charter obligations it has assumed upon admission to the United Nations.

The United States Government has given careful thought to the situation which now exists as the result of the failure of the Hungarian Government to explain satisfactorily or to remedy and bring to an end the harmful acts which it has directed over a prolonged period against the American Legation in Budapest and the Legation's Hungarian employees. It has concluded that full responsibility rests upon the Hungarian Government for intensifying the strains and diffi-

culties in United States-Hungarian relations and that, until this situation is altered by positive and constructive steps on the part of the Hungarian Government, there is little prospect for understanding or improvement in the relations of the two Governments.

In keeping with the considerations set forth above, the Minister is informed of the following steps that are being taken by this Government:

1. The United States Government is unwilling in present circumstances either to encourage or facilitate the travel of American citizens to Hungary. The requirement of passport validation, which was previously in effect in respect of travel by American citizens to Hungary but which was withdrawn on October 31, 1955,[4] is being reinstituted.

2. Additional restrictions on the travel of Hungarian Legation personnel in the United States, which effectively establish full reciprocity as between limitations affecting movement by members of the American Legation staff in Hungary on the one hand and those affecting the movement of members of the Hungarian Legation staff in the United States on the other, will be notified to the Minister at an early date.

3. The United States Government no longer considers feasible, and is accordingly abandoning at this time, consideration of possible talks with the Hungarian Government on various problem areas in United States-Hungarian relations.

A copy of this note is being delivered by the American Minister in Budapest to the Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

William H. Jackson Appointed Special Assistant to President

The White House announced on January 28 that the President had that day appointed William H. Jackson as Special Assistant to the President. Mr. Jackson will succeed Nelson A. Rockefeller, who resigned on December 31, 1955. His appointment is effective March 1, 1956.

Mr. Jackson will assist in the coordination and timing of the execution of foreign policies involving more than one department or agency. He will represent the President on the Operations Coordinating Board and will attend meetings of the Cabinet and the National Security Council.

Mr. Jackson has served as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, chairman of the President's Committee on International Information Activities, and more recently as a Special Assistant to the Secretary of State at the Conference of Foreign Ministers at Geneva.

[4] Bulletin of Nov. 14, 1955, p. 777, footnote 1.

Foreign Minister of Spain To Visit Washington

Press release 51 dated February 2

The Foreign Minister of Spain, Alberto Martin Artajo, has accepted the invitation of the Secretary of State to make an official visit to Washington from April 10 through April 12. This will be the first official visit of the Foreign Minister to the United States since he was appointed to office on July 21, 1945. Sr. Martin Artajo played a prominent role in the conclusion of three agreements between the Governments of Spain and the United States signed on September 26, 1953.

During the 3 days he will be in Washington, the Foreign Minister will exchange views with the Secretary of State and other U.S. officials on current aspects of Spanish–U.S. relations and matters of mutual interest to both countries.

Public Committee on Personnel Completes Task

Press release 53 dated February 2

Secretary Dulles on February 2 made public the third audit report of his Public Committee on Personnel, headed by Dr. Henry M. Wriston, former President of Brown University, which met at the State Department December 12 and 13, 1955.[1] This report marks the completion of the task of the Public Committee on Personnel which Secretary Dulles appointed in March 1954 for the purpose of "making recommendations to the Secretary of State concerning measures necessary to strengthen the effectiveness of the professional service."

In releasing the report, the Secretary noted the statement that the principles of reorganization have been established and that the machinery fo

[1] The report (not printed here) was distributed as departmental notice on Jan. 23.

implementation has been framed. He expressed his deep personal appreciation to the members of the committee for their outstanding contribution in counseling the Department on the personnel improvement program which was instituted in May 1954 on the basis of the committee's study and report. The Secretary also thanked them for their additional suggestions for strengthening the Foreign Service, pointing out that, in spite of the heavy demands placed on them by their normal responsibilities, they had once again found the time to bring the benefit of their wide experience in private and public life to the service of the Government.

Franklin's Role in Promoting International Understanding

by Theodore C. Streibert
Director of the U.S. Information Agency[1]

It is a privilege to present to the Library of Congress the Franklin Commemorative Medal, authorized by the 84th Congress to mark the 250th anniversary of the man called the father of American libraries.

Similar medals are being presented, here and abroad, to various learned societies and academies of which Benjamin Franklin was a member, a sponsor, or the founder. Five societies in the United States and 16 overseas will be so honored. Fifty other enterprises, institutions, and societies with which Franklin was associated likewise will receive the medal. This particular presentation recognizes both Franklin's interest in public libraries and his service in the U.S. Congress.

The anniversary is being observed throughout the world, with some 40 nations already scheduled to participate. The exhibit opening here tonight is the work of both the Library and the local chapter of the American Institute of Graphic Arts. Both are our hosts.

The Franklin Commemorative Medal bears on the obverse a profile of Franklin, the wise and benign countenance familiar to all of us. The words inscribed on the reverse are those of Franklin himself: "Wise and good men are the strength of a nation." The full statement, you may remember, continues ". . . far more than riches or arms." Franklin, the revolutionist, was always a man of peace. Franklin, the successful businessman, never overrated wealth. He underrated neither riches nor arms, but wisdom and goodness were the standards by which he judged both men and nations.

The artist, Mrs. Laura Gardin Frazer, has confessed that she found it impossible to cover in one design all of Franklin's manifold interests. She has come very near it, however, and, I think, with simplicity and grace.

In the design the predominant symbol is a key with "tongues of fire," in recognition of Franklin's great discoveries in electricity. The book, of course, is obvious. A weathervane recalls his work on meteorology, with the four points of the compass symbolizing his internationalism. The caduceus stands for his service to medicine. Two diminutive rosettes respectively show a wave—denoting his work in oceanography—and a sheaf of wheat—his contributions to agriculture. As the artist herself has pointed out, here are the elements—earth, air, fire, and water—and in each field Franklin has left an imperishable name.

The design, however, would be incomplete without some symbols of Franklin's Americanism, and here we have them, the eagle and the 13 stars of the 13 original States.

I think Mrs. Frazer can be congratulated upon the artistry and skill with which she executed her commission. The Franklin Commemorative Medal is the art of numismatics at its best.

The design covers only indirectly, by the book and compass points, the Franklin role in which I am particularly interested, the dissemination

[1] Address made at the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., on Jan. 17. For an account of Franklin's diplomatic career, see BULLETIN of Jan. 9, 1956, p. 51.

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overseas of information about the United States as the foundation of understanding our foreign policies and objectives.

I may be biased, but I see Franklin's contribution in this field as one of his greatest achievements, perhaps the greatest. His deep concern that the United States should be understood by other peoples is voiced in the Declaration of Independence, which he helped draft, revise, and edit. I recognize his thinking particularly in the phrase "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind." Franklin believed it only "decent" that the 13 colonies should clearly and truthfully set forth to the world the facts of their difficulties with the English Crown, the difficulties that had led to the fateful decision to seek independence. Therefore, the Declaration says, "let facts be submitted to a candid world." The authors of that document were willing to submit their case, backed by facts, to world opinion.

Earlier, Franklin spent some years abroad explaining the colonies' position. His arguments, indeed, led in 1766 to the repeal of the Stamp Act. During those years he appeared before the learned societies of several countries. His famous autobiography was begun. He visited France, to be honored by the French King and French men of letters.

It was only when he despaired of resolving peacefully the dispute between the English Crown and the colonies that he returned to America, leaving behind him a host of friends for his cause. It was then the Declaration was drafted. A man of peace, Franklin did not believe in peace at any price. Ranking in fame with his many condemnations of war is the statement, "They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety."

The die was cast. Thereafter, Franklin worked heart and soul for military victory. But he always regretted the necessity of even that war. To Richard Price he wrote: "Your great comfort and mine in this war is, that we honestly and faithfully did every thing in our power to prevent it."

Explaining U.S. Policies

Franklin was not content to let the case of the colonies rest upon the Declaration alone. During the troubled years that followed, his voice and writings were devoted to explaining overseas the policies and objectives of the new United States of America.

At the time of the Declaration of Independence, Franklin was 70 years old. Most men of that time would have thought themselves too old to undertake so perilous a journey as crossing the Atlantic. But not Franklin. Five months later, Franklin arrived in France, and for the next 7 years his was the "Voice of America" overseas.

Franklin talked America. He wrote America. At his villa in Passy he set up a little printshop where his pamphlets were printed and from which they were distributed. That shop may be called the first United States overseas information post, and Franklin, the director of the first United States overseas information service.

Franklin had signed the Declaration in full realization of the consequences. He knew the Americans would have to fight for their independence.

But Franklin despised war. He believed war morally wrong, but he also believed war—all wars—stupid. "I think," he wrote upon one occasion, "that it [war] is wrong in point of prudence. . . . If statesmen had a little more arithmetic, or were more accustomed to calculation, wars would be less frequent." "There never was a good war, or a bad peace" is another often-quoted Franklin statement.

There is something very modern in Franklin's contention that wars are a waste. "What vast additions to the conveniences and comforts of living might Mankind have acquired," he lamented, "if the money spent in wars had been employed in works of public utility!"

Franklin yearned to see a plan that would, as he wrote, "induce and oblige nations to settle their disputes without first cutting one another's throats. When will human reason," he continued, "be sufficiently improved to see the advantage of this! When will men be convinced, that even successful wars at length become misfortunes to those who unjustly commenced them, and who triumphed blindly in their success, not seeing all its consequences."

This was a new doctrine indeed for the 18th century, but Franklin was convinced that he was expressing the foreign policy of the new Nation. To a writer who had predicted the future military glory of the United States, he wrote in rebuke:

> We have not the occasion you imagine of fleets or standing armies, but may leave those expensive machines

for the pomp of princes and the wealth of ancient states. We propose, if possible, to live in peace with all mankind.

Franklin was eager that the peoples of other nations should understand the Nation, so newly born, and its people. He was convinced that men of good will everywhere would sympathize with these new doctrines, once they were understood. To that end he established correspondence with such men wherever he could contact them. His letters are among the treasures of American literature. Many are in the collection of the Library of Congress.

Franklin believed in free and open communication between the peoples of all countries. He was convinced, and repeatedly said, that man's greatest service to man was the free and thoughtful exchange of ideas and information. Knowledge he saw as universal. Practicing that philosophy, he eagerly shared his own scientific discoveries with men of science in every country.

Franklin was particularly interested in the practical application of this theory in the problem, even then great, of feeding the world's hungry millions. He saw this problem solved not by war or conquest but by agricultural progress and the exchange of agricultural information. The United States, he felt, should not be backward in profiting by the experience of other nations. He himself introduced in the new country such European products as Scotch kale, kohlrabi, turnips, yellow willows, and other plants. From Asia, by way of Europe, he brought Chinese rhubarb, then chiefly used as a medicine. He introduced a number of nut-bearing trees, new varieties of apples, and several kinds of grasses. He experimented in fertilizers.

Franklin was a city man, but he rated agriculture "the most useful, the most independent, and therefore the noblest of employments." This at the end of a long life and a career that had included the several roles of printer, publisher, merchant, musician, scientist, soldier, statesman, and diplomat, touching on all manner of activities, both rural and urban.

If I should attempt, this evening, even to touch on all of Franklin's interests, I should find myself in the same difficulty that confronted Mrs. Frazer when she was considering the design for this medal. The temptation, of course, is strong. Practically all of Franklin's interests have some modern application, and, it seems to me, every page of his story leads back to my own particular interest. Franklin's deep belief in international understanding as the basis of enduring peace, freedom, and progress is the philosophy of good men everywhere. One of the primary tasks of the U. S. Information Agency is to further international understanding by explaining the policies and objectives of the United States.

Observance of Anniversary

It is no exaggeration to say that more and more the world today is turning to the principles of Franklin in its search for a lasting peace. The world's eager response to this anniversary year is proof of this contention.

The U.S. Information Agency is, of course, cooperating extensively in publicizing the Franklin anniversary. Through all the communication techniques at our command—radio, television, films, pamphlets, libraries, exhibits—we are telling, throughout the world, the story of this great American.

Frankly, we view this year's commemoration of the birth of Franklin as a great opportunity. No better vehicle could be found to carry out our mission, stated by President Eisenhower in these words:[2]

> . . . to submit evidence to peoples of other nations by means of communication techniques that the objectives and policies of the United States are in harmony with and will advance their legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress and peace.

Franklin believed that the principles of the Declaration of Independence were universal, that they voiced the aspirations of mankind.

The United States today shares that belief. The foreign policies and objectives of the United States today are rooted in those principles. We are convinced that understanding of those policies and objectives will serve to unite all men of good will in an effort to realize those aspirations.

There are those, I am sure, who will question my referring to Franklin as the director of a United States information service. They will remind me that he was, rather, a diplomat and that his efforts to create understanding and sympathy for the United States came within the purview of that position.

True enough, but the activity of the U.S. Information Agency has been called by no less an

[2] *Ibid.*, Nov. 30, 1953, p. 756.

authority than George Allen, Assistant Secretary of State, "a new kind of diplomacy." In the past, Secretary Allen points out, diplomats dealt only with the officials of other countries, and we expected nothing more. It was not thought necessary to explain a nation's policies and objectives to the people. Today we think differently. We recognize that widespread public understanding of our foreign policies is necessary to their success.

Other diplomats, and not only of this country, have expressed the same views. Ambassador after ambassador has assured me personally of the value they place on the Agency's activities. Franklin himself was a great pamphleteer, and invariably his pamphlets were addressed not only to the rulers of other countries but to the people. Franklin was honored not only in royal courts, but in the market places—the same market places to which the U.S. Information Agency now addresses its pamphlets, posters, leaflets, radio programs, TV shows, and the like. . . .

Today the principles for which Franklin fought are again under attack, and on a scale and with an intensity even he did not foresee. President Eisenhower has put it this way:

> The central fact of today's life is the existence in the world of two great philosophies of Man and of Government. They are in contest for the friendship, loyalty, and the support of the world's people.

I do not need to identify for you these two great philosophies. I would not need identify them for Franklin himself. The truth is that communism, as practiced today, is little different from the totalitarian philosophy which Franklin fought throughout his lifetime. It wears a new dress. It uses new terminology. But today's struggle is the same old conflict between the many and the few, between freedom and slavery, between those who recognize the universality of freedom, progress, and peace and those to whom such aspirations are only obstacles to their own ambitions for power.

Franklin fought his battles with ideas. The U.S. Information Agency is using the same weapons—ideas.

Current Legislation on Foreign Policy: 84th Congress, 2d Session

Report on Audit of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1954. H. Doc. 278, November 28, 1955. 24 pp.

Increase the Fee for Executing an Application for a Passport. Report to accompany H. R. 5844. S. Rept. 1370, January 12, 1956. 3 pp.

Relating to the Allowance of the Credits for Dividends Received, for Dividends Paid, and for a Western Hemisphere Trade Corporation in Computing the Alternative Tax of a Corporation with Respect to Its Capital Gains. Report to accompany H. R. 7282. S. Rept. 1378, January 12, 1956. 2 pp.

Foreign Service Retirement and Disability Fund. Message from the President transmitting a report by the Secretary of State, showing the condition of the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability Fund for the fiscal years ended June 30, 1954 and 1955, pursuant to section 862, Foreign Service Act of 1946 (Public Law 724, 79th Cong.). H. Doc. 295, January 12, 1956. 3 pp.

Convention Concerning Customs Facilities for Touring and Customs Convention on the Temporary Importation of Private Road Vehicles. S. Exec. A and B, January 12, 1956. 42 pp.

Convention on Inter-American Cultural Relations. S. Exec. C, January 12, 1956. 10 pp.

International Plant Protection Convention. S. Exec. D, January 12, 1956. 14 pp.

Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights with Iran. S. Exec. E. January 12, 1956. 13 pp.

Protocol Relating to Certain Amendments to the Convention on International Civil Aviation. S. Exec. F, January 12, 1956. 4 pp.

Study of Immigration and Naturalization. Report to accompany S. Res. 172. S. Rept. 1384, January 16, 1956. 5 pp.

Investigation of European Refugees and Escapees. Report to accompany S. Res. 168. S. Rept. 1389, January 16, 1956. 2 pp.

Study of Administration of the Trading with the Enemy Act. Report to accompany S. Res. 171. S. Rept. 1391, January 16, 1956. 3 pp.

Sugar Act Extension. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance on H. R. 7030, January 16 and 17, 1956. 398 pp.

Extending the Time for a Study of Matters Pertaining to the International Control and Reduction of Armaments. Report to accompany S. Res. 185. S. Rept. 1396, January 17, 1956. 1 p.

Control and Reduction of Armaments. Interim report of the Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations pursuant to the provisions of S. Res. 93, 84th Congress, 1st Session. S. Rept. 1397, January 17, 1956. 3 pp.

Nomination of Samuel C. Waugh. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on the nomination of Samuel C. Waugh to be President of the Export-Import Bank of Washington. January 20, 1956. 24 pp.

Foreign Operations Administration Grain Storage Elevators in Pakistan. Report of the Senate Committee on Government Operations made by its Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, together with individual views of Mr. Bender. S. Rept. 1410, January 23, 1956. 28 pp.

The Role of the United States in International Economic Affairs

EXCERPTS FROM PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S ECONOMIC REPORT[1]

Following are two excerpts from the President's Economic Report: his recommendations for promoting the international flow of goods and capital and a summary of U.S. economic relations with foreign countries during 1955.

PROMOTING THE INTERNATIONAL FLOW OF GOODS AND CAPITAL

The orderly growth of our economy exerts a strongly favorable influence throughout the world. In turn, economic developments abroad are of profound importance to us. Recent experience illustrates this interdependence. By 1953 the nations of the Free World had achieved sufficient economic strength to be able to absorb the adverse reactions from the mild contraction that got under way in the United States that year. Not only that, but they continued buying from us on a scale that helped to check our economic decline and to speed renewed expansion. In turn, the resumed rise of our imports toward the end of 1954, reinforced by a heavy outflow of private capital, helped to sustain economic expansion in other parts of the Free World and thereby stimulated further expansion in our own exports during the past year.

It is clear that our long-term interests are well served by expansion of the international flow of goods, capital, enterprise, and technology. Sound policies to promote these ends will powerfully advance our national security and economic welfare, and help to build a stronger and more unified community of free nations.

Current restrictions on the flow of goods and capital hamper enterprise and limit the real income of consumers both here and abroad. Despite the progress in trade liberalization achieved in recent years, restrictions are still numerous and widespread. Reduction of these barriers requires both direct action on our part and cooperation with other nations. Our proper and necessary course was outlined in a special Message of March 1954, following the report of the Commission on Foreign Economic Policy. The Congress responded with important legislation in 1954 and 1955, but additional action is urgently needed.

The Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955 has continued for another three years, with certain modifications, the authority initially granted in 1934 by the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. The 1955 Act grants new powers to the President to lower tariffs on a reciprocal and selective basis. Individual tariff rates may be reduced by 5 percent per year for three years, and rates that are in

CHART 35

[1] H. Doc. 280, 84th Cong., 2d sess.; transmitted Jan. 24. Copies of the report are for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C.; price 70 cents.

TABLE B-22.—*Balance of payments, 1953–55*

[Billions of dollars]

Purchase, acquisition, or payment	1953 quarterly average	Fourth quarter 1953	1954				1955		
			First quarter	Second quarter	Third quarter	Fourth quarter	First quarter	Second quarter	Third quarter
Foreign purchases and acquisition of assets in United States:									
United States exports of goods and services, excluding military aid transfers	4. 24	4. 44	3. 95	4. 69	4. 15	4. 98	4. 68	4. 86	4. 75
Merchandise exports, excluding military	(3. 06)	(3. 18)	(2. 82)	(3. 48)	(2. 91)	(3. 50)	(3. 44)	(3. 54)	(3. 38)
Foreign gold and dollar assets acquired in transactions with United States	. 57	. 37	. 50	. 26	. 60	. 39	. 19	. 57	. 48
Errors and omissions	. 07	—. 03	. 03	. 16	. 08	—. 23	. 02	. 20	. 09
Total	4. 88	4. 78	4. 48	5. 11	4. 83	5. 14	4. 89	5. 63	5. 32
Payments from United States:									
Nonmilitary imports of goods and services	3. 49	3. 27	3. 13	3. 54	3. 37	3. 24	3. 44	3. 69	3. 83
Merchandise imports, excluding military	(2. 74)	(2. 60)	(2. 52)	(2. 75)	(2. 46)	(2. 58)	(2. 76)	(2. 80)	(2. 81)
Military expenditures abroad	. 63	. 68	. 62	. 69	. 64	. 65	. 65	. 76	. 68
U. S. Government grants and private remittances, excluding direct military aid, net	. 61	. 59	. 54	. 49	. 52	. 61	. 73	. 63	. 51
Private capital investment and U. S. Government loans abroad, net	. 15	. 24	. 19	. 40	. 30	. 64	. 07	. 56	. 29
Total	4. 88	4. 78	4. 48	5. 11	4. 83	5. 14	4. 89	5. 63	5. 32

NOTE.—Detail will not necessarily add to totals because of rounding.

Source: Department of Commerce.

excess of 50 percent ad valorem may be reduced by annual stages to that level. Experience has shown that the "escape clause" and "peril point" provisions of the Act, which are designed to protect domestic industries against serious injury from duty reductions, are broadly consistent with our basic policy of trade liberalization. Experience has also shown that efforts to expand world trade are most effective when tariff reductions are negotiated on a reciprocal, multilateral basis. Under the authority of the Trade Agreements Act, selective reductions in tariffs on thousands of items have been made during the past twenty years, and they have helped materially to enlarge our exports as well as imports. The 1955 Act has paved the way for a new series of tariff negotiations, which opened at Geneva on January 18, 1956.[2]

The chief instrument through which the United States has for eight years cooperated with other countries of the Free World in reducing trade barriers is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Negotiations under the GATT are more effective than bilateral negotiations. They have won for us tariff concessions on items accounting for about 50 percent of the value of our exports. Moreover, through consultations with other GATT members, we have secured the abolition of discriminatory restrictions on our exports of such important items as coal, apples, cigarettes, lumber, potatoes, textiles, automobiles, tobacco, petroleum, wool, and motion pictures. Several European countries have removed all discriminatory restrictions against dollar trade.

To correct certain shortcomings in the working rules and administrative machinery of GATT which have been recognized for some time, the 34 GATT members completed in March 1955 a revision of the basic Agreement and proposed an administrative agency—the Organization for Trade Cooperation (OTC). Membership in the OTC would

[2] For text of a statement made at Geneva by Deputy Under Secretary Prochnow, see BULLETIN of Jan. 30, 1956, p. 184.

ılarge the advantages the United States already ıjoys under the GATT. It would also give assurıce to the rest of the Free World of our continuıg interest in expanding the international flow f goods and capital. Early passage of legislation ıthorizing our membership in the Organization ır Trade Cooperation is of high importance.[3]

Customs regulations are capable of creating ırriers to international trade, no less serious than ıe customs duties themselves. Delays and inconenience arising from customs regulations have een reduced in the past two years, and the Treasry Department is continuing to review its proceıres with a view to simplifying them. Congresonal action, however, is needed to facilitate furıer progress. The basic purpose of the Customs implification Bill of 1955, which the House ıssed in the first session of the 84th Congress, is diminish uncertainties and delays by simplifyıg the present system of customs valuation. odifications of this bill have been suggested to oid unintended reductions in individual duties ıat would result from the proposed change in ıluation procedures. Early enactment of such a ıitably revised bill will constitute a significant lvance in our foreign economic policy.

The need for simplifying our tariff rate structure, which the Commission on Foreign Economic Policy had emphasized, was recognized by the Congress in the Customs Simplification Acts of 1953 and 1954. As directed by the latter Act, the Tariff Commission is studying present commodity classifications and rate structures. Legislation will be needed in due course to authorize revisions of our tariff classification schedules. In the meantime, other restraints on international commerce, those arising under the Buy-American Act of 1933, were modified by an Executive Order of December 1954,[4] which has resulted in the removal of a great deal of uncertainty for foreign bidders who seek government contracts.

The field of foreign investment also offers opportunities to encourage economic activity and trade on a world scale. A larger outflow of American capital would benefit both ourselves and other economies. By helping to develop the resources of friendly countries, it would enlarge and diversify the supply of materials on which we can draw. At the same time, it would enable less developed countries to achieve higher rates of economic growth and to become more active partners in the trade of the Free World. To the greatest extent possible, the funds for foreign investment should come from private sources. When private capital moves abroad, it is often accompanied by

[3] For text of the OTC agreement, see *ibid.*, Apr. 4, 1955, 579; for a Presidential message on OTC, see *ibid.*, Apr. , 1955, p. 678.

[4] *Ibid.*, Jan. 10, 1955, p. 50.

TABLE B-23.—*Agricultural exports under specified governmental programs, 1953–55*

[Fiscal years, millions of dollars]

Program	1953	1954	1955
ports: Total	2, 819	2, 936	3, 143
Special programs: Total	546	711	920
Grants [1]	436	448	381
Loans [2]	96	113	69
Foreign currency sales	----------	116	345
Barter [3]	14	34	125
Exports for "free" dollars: Total	2, 273	2, 225	2, 223
Subsidized exports	(4)	(4)	486
Public Law 320, section 32	(4)	(4)	36
Other	(4)	(4)	450
Nonsubsidized exports	(4)	(4)	1, 737

[1] FOA regular and special program, Army civilian supply program, Department of Agriculture donations under ricultural Act of 1949, section 416, and program under Public Law 480, title II.
[2] Loans by the Export-Import Bank and Department of Agriculture to Pakistan, Afghanistan, Spain and India.
[3] Deliveries to contractors.
[4] Not available.

Source: Department of Agriculture.

the export of technical, managerial, and financial skills. Such benefits cannot be realized as effectively through government loans.

It is highly desirable, as stressed in last year's Economic Report, that we "encourage investment in all countries whose desire to speed their economic development has led them to create a hospitable climate for business investment." The recommendations made in that Report, with respect to the taxation of corporate income from foreign sources, have not yet been acted on by the Congress. Legislation on these proposals, which can have a significant influence on foreign investment, is again requested. Also, the lending authority of the Export-Import Bank should be extended beyond June 30, 1958. This would enable the Bank—which has actively encouraged the outflow of private capital by its loan participation, credit guarantees, and loan supplements to private venture capital—to finance projects that call for advances over a period longer than two years.

The United States has recently taken steps to participate in the International Finance Corporation (IFC),[5] which is to be affiliated with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The IFC will begin operations as soon as at least 30 countries, out of the 44 member countries of the Bank that have indicated an intention to join, have together subscribed 75 million dollars. The IFC will make loans to supplement venture capital going into productive private enterprises abroad, particularly in the less developed areas of the world, and it will also help to find experienced management where needed. The new institution is expected to expand investment abroad by its own lending and also by helping to create an investment climate in foreign countries that will be more attractive to their own citizens as well as those of other nations.

The rate of economic progress is bound to play a vital role in the struggle between the principles of freedom and those of regimentation in the poorer and less developed areas of the Free World. Our economic development and technical cooperation programs for raising living standards in these areas are proving helpful and should be moderately expanded, with special emphasis on activities that encourage local private enterprise and the inflow of private capital from abroad. The Mutual Security Program, of which these economic programs are a part, must be continued. High though our expenditures on national security are, they would be vastly higher if we did not have strong allies.

The United States can take pride in the progress that has been achieved in cooperation with other countries in enlarging the mutually advantageous flow of goods, capital, technology, and enterprise within the Free World community. Continuance

[5] *Ibid.*, Jan. 9, 1956, p. 54.

TABLE B-24.—*Distribution of nonmilitary merchandise exports (including reexports) and general imports, by areas, January–October, 1954 and 1955*

[Millions of dollars]

Area	Exports		Imports	
	January–October 1954	January–October 1955	January–October 1954	January–October 1955
Total	10, 455	11, 682	8, 429	9, 306
Continental Western Europe	2, 142	2, 690	1, 222	1, 399
United Kingdom [1]	542	764	408	505
Canada	2, 470	2, 812	1, 949	2, 184
Latin America	2, 764	2, 683	2, 740	2, 722
Sterling area exclusive of the United Kingdom [1]	768	905	854	998
Japan [1]	580	518	227	340
Other	1, 190	1, 311	1, 028	1, 152

[1] Excludes special category exports.

NOTE.—Detail will not necessarily add to totals because of rounding.

Source: Department of Commerce.

of this trend will build an international environment that is increasingly favorable to the maintenance of peace and the extension of prosperity.

ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Economic and Financial Progress Abroad

During 1955 economic expansion continued at an accelerated pace in the developed countries of the Free World. Industrial output rose to new peaks in most countries—that in Canada and Japan reaching new highs after mild recessions during 1954. The rapid rise in European output, which began early in 1953, has taken place without a substantial rise in consumer prices in most countries. Except in Italy, unemployment in most of Western Europe has been reduced to low levels and in some countries is virtually negligible. Moderate rates of growth have been achieved in many of the less developed countries in Latin America and Asia. Some, however, have failed to participate in the economic growth and prosperity of the industrial nations. This is particularly true of certain countries that are heavily dependent upon exports of agricultural commodities, the prices of which have declined over the past year.

The expansion of world production has been accompanied by a rise in the volume of international trade above the postwar record achieved in 1954 and by a strengthening of the financial positions of many countries. During 1955 gold and dollar holdings of foreign countries increased by an estimated 1.7 billion dollars, chiefly in Continental Western Europe (Table D-65). The gold and dollar holdings of international institutions, including the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, increased by about 200 million dollars. The most adverse movement in the international financial picture was the decline in British gold and dollar reserves by about 640 million dollars. In the early part of the year, balance of payments difficulties arose in Scandinavia, and a number of the less developed countries also experienced difficulties during 1955. The international economic position of Western Europe as a whole remained strong; its exports in the first three quarters of 1955 were considerably above those in the corresponding period of 1954. There was also a striking improvement in the foreign trade balance of Japan, which still meets a part of its foreign expenditures with dollars obtained from the sale of goods and services to United States military forces.

There has been a general relaxation of trade and exchange restrictions during 1954 and 1955, which has benefited exports from the United States. In January 1955, the members of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation raised from 75 percent to 90 percent their target for the liberalization of intra-European trade from quota restrictions. Eleven members have already achieved the new goal, and four others have achieved or exceeded the 75 percent goal. In addition, over half of the private dollar imports of the OEEC countries have been freed from quota and licensing restrictions, compared with less than one-third at the beginning of 1954. In the same vein, there has been a notable relaxation in the administration of the remaining quantitative restrictions against exports from the dollar area. Several European countries, including Belgium-Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Greece, and Switzerland, now have virtually no import restrictions discriminatory against United States commodities, and free international commodity markets for a number of commodities have been restored in Britain and the Netherlands. The improved financial position abroad has also promoted an expansion of long-term private international investment during the past two years.

World Commodity Developments

The industrial boom in Western Europe, together with our stockpile purchases, tended to offset the slackening of United States industrial demand for nonagricultural materials in the first three quarters of 1954. Since that time, the continued economic expansion in Europe and the resurgence of industrial activity in this country have led to sharp advances in world prices of industrial raw materials, particularly scrap metals, copper, zinc, and rubber. Europe's accelerated industrial growth has also raised the demand for coal and steel well beyond European production. Consequently, a strong element in the expansion of our exports between the third quarter of 1954 and the first quarter of 1955 was the rise in sales of coal, steel scrap, and steel, and these exports have continued to be large. High rates of indus-

TABLE D-60.—*United States balance of payments, 1953–55, excluding transfers under military grant programs*

[Millions of dollars]

Item	1953	1954	First 3 quarters	
			1954	1955
Exports of goods and services: Total	16, 964	17, 764	12, 788	14, 292
Merchandise, adjusted, excluding military	12, 245	12, 707	9, 206	10, 357
Transportation	1, 231	1, 222	908	965
Travel	527	538	418	467
Miscellaneous services	903	952	669	688
Military transactions	192	179	141	150
Income on investments:				
Direct investments	1, 398	1, 665	1, 125	1, 321
Other private	216	229	167	187
Government	252	272	154	157
Imports of goods and services: Total	16, 467	15, 872	11, 978	13, 052
Merchandise, adjusted, excluding military	10, 954	10, 304	7, 729	8, 374
Transportation	1, 059	1, 001	763	862
Travel	895	958	790	883
Miscellaneous services, excluding military	597	595	447	478
Military expenditures	2, 512	2, 595	1, 944	2, 089
Income on investments:				
Private	364	360	262	303
Government	86	59	43	63
Balance on goods and services, excluding military transfers	497	1, 892	810	1, 240
Unilateral transfers, excluding military: Total	−2, 449	−2, 158	−1, 549	−1, 864
Private remittances	−477	−452	−327	−326
Government	−1, 972	−1, 706	−1, 222	−1, 538
United States capital, net: Total	−587	−1, 528	−888	−926
Private, net: Total	−369	−1, 621	−989	−635
Direct investments, net	−721	−761	−536	−572
New issues	−270	−309	−277	−90
Redemptions	139	124	108	182
Other long-term, net	316	−40	64	−143
Short-term, net	167	−635	−348	−12
Government, net: Total	−218	93	101	−291
Long-term capital, outflow	−716	−306	−180	−271
Repayments	487	507	377	255
Short-term, net	11	−108	−96	−275
Foreign capital, net	1, 105	1, 459	1, 135	1, 184
Gold sales	1, 161	298	228	48
Foreign capital and gold	2, 266	1, 757	1, 363	1, 232
Errors and omissions	273	37	264	318

NOTE.—Detail will not necessarily add to totals because of rounding.

Source: Department of Commerce.

trial activity here and abroad have raised prices of industrial materials and semifinished goods. On the other hand, prices of coffee and cocoa dropped sharply in late 1954 and the first half of 1955, and world prices for agricultural commodities, partly because of the huge supplies in the United States, were generally weak during the past year. Moreover, increased freedom of trade and advances in productivity have helped to hold down prices of manufactured products.

World agricultural production outside the United States exceeded the high levels of 1954 in such important commodities as wheat, rice, cotton, tobacco, peanuts, and soybeans. Foreign wheat

production in 1955 is estimated at some 400 million bushels higher than in 1954, and stocks of wheat are at record levels in the principal exporting countries. Foreign production of cotton increased by about 1.2 million bales in 1955, and foreign countries as a group are producing within 2 million bales of the quantity which they have been consuming. These developments partially explain the shrinkage of our cotton exports from 5.5 million bales for the 1951 crop year to about half as much in the current crop year.

Favorable growing weather in many parts of the world contributed to expanded production during 1955. However, of particular significance has been the trend toward higher production arising from technological progress and numerous government-sponsored programs to increase farm output. In the years immediately following World War II, output remained low in many areas because the disruptions caused by the war could not be quickly overcome. By 1955 the results of intensive efforts to enlarge agricultural yields and output were clearly evident.

Total Exports and Imports

In the twelve months ended September 30, 1955, our exports of goods and services, excluding military aid transfers, totaled 19.3 billion dollars—2 billion above such exports in the corresponding period ended September 30, 1954 and 2.3 billion above those in the calendar year 1953 (Table B–22). These exports constituted about 5 percent of our gross national product, compared with about 4 percent for nonfarm residential construction and 6 percent for the output of producer durable goods, two significant determinants of business activity. Military aid transfers declined from 4.3 billion dollars in 1953 and 3.1 billion in 1954 to 2.3 billion for the twelve months ended September 30, 1955.

The relatively high level of exports in 1954 occurred in the face of a moderate decline in nonmilitary imports of goods and services. This was made possible in considerable measure by a heavy outflow of private capital and increased military expenditures abroad, which helped to provide the dollars to support the expanding foreign demand for our goods. In fact, total payments to foreigners arising from nonmilitary imports of goods and services, military expenditures abroad, foreign investments, and nonmilitary grants, were slightly higher in 1954 than in 1953, and were significantly higher in the first three quarters of 1955 than in the corresponding periods of 1953 and 1954 (Table B–22).

During the first three quarters of 1955, nonmilitary imports of goods and services rose to an

CHART B-14



average quarterly rate of 3.7 billion dollars, compared with 3.3 billion in the corresponding period in 1954 and 3.5 billion in the calendar year 1953. Nonmilitary commodity imports rose steadily after the third quarter of 1954, and in the third quarter of 1955 were 14 percent above such imports in the third quarter of 1954. The rise in foreign travel and the increase in transportation and other service expenditures helped to push total nonmilitary imports of goods and services during the year ended September 30, 1955 to the highest level in our history.

Total payments to foreign countries on account of imports of goods and services, foreign investments, and grants to foreign countries (exclusive of military aid shipments) reached 21 billion dollars during the year ended September 30, 1955 (Table B–22). This amount exceeded foreign purchases of United States goods and services during the same period. Foreigners therefore accumulated 1.6 billion dollars in gold and dollar assets in their transactions with the United States, only a little less than in the corresponding period ended September 30, 1954. This level of foreign accumulation was maintained in spite of an increase of over a billion dollars in the United States current account surplus (excluding military exports and imports), as our military expend-

TABLE D-64.—*United States merchandise exports and imports for consumption, by leading commodities, 1936–38 average and 1950–55*

[Millions of dollars]

Commodity [1]	1936–38 average	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	January–October	
							1954	1955
Exports of United States merchandise: Total	2, 925	10, 142	14, 879	15, 049	15, 652	14, 966	12, 422	12, 674
Nonmilitary exports: Total [2]	-------	9, 860	13, 814	13, 052	12, 141	12, 711	10, 350	11, 575
Agricultural commodities	-------	2, 873	4, 040	3, 431	2, 847	3, 050	2, 377	2, 586
Nonagricultural commodities [2]	-------	6, 987	9, 774	9, 620	9, 293	9, 662	7, 973	8, 989
Exports, excluding "special category" commodities: Total [3]	-------	9, 479	13, 310	12, 435	11, 525	12, 112	9, 852	11, 035
Agricultural commodities: Total	778	2, 873	4, 040	3, 431	2, 847	3, 050	2, 377	2, 586
Raw cotton, excluding linters	313	1, 017	1, 138	862	517	780	612	413
Vegetable oils, fats, and oilseeds [4]	5	158	253	158	173	305	207	226
Tobacco, unmanufactured	143	251	326	246	341	304	237	281
Wheat, including flour	62	489	997	942	589	425	335	414
Other grains and preparations	54	350	494	541	470	322	273	372
Other agricultural commodities	201	608	832	682	757	914	713	880
Nonagricultural commodities, excluding "special category": Total [5]	2, 147	6, 606	9, 270	9, 004	8, 677	9, 062	7, 475	8, 449
Machinery [5]	440	1, 907	2, 451	2, 678	2, 747	2, 732	2, 143	2, 288
Automobiles, parts, and accessories [5]	292	717	1, 182	987	963	1, 036	855	1, 017
Chemicals and related products [5]	129	711	981	801	800	983	813	887
Textile manufactures	87	517	819	660	640	622	513	513
Iron and steel-mill products, including scrap	199	393	514	621	495	515	416	656
Petroleum and products [5]	344	381	585	572	498	431	359	371
Coal	56	269	585	494	335	304	246	393
Nonferrous metals, including ferroalloys	114	124	161	219	176	305	255	263
Other nonagricultural commodities [5]	486	1, 587	1, 992	1, 972	2, 023	2, 134	1, 875	2, 061
Imports for consumption: Total	2, 461	8, 743	10, 817	10, 747	10, 779	10, 235	8, 471	9, 279
Agricultural commodities: Total	1, 260	3, 987	5, 179	4, 519	4, 185	3, 972	3, 323	3, 297
Coffee	141	1, 092	1, 362	1, 376	1, 469	1, 486	1, 205	1, 095
Cane sugar	152	381	387	416	425	410	387	367
Cocoa or cacao beans	35	167	197	178	167	252	203	158
Other foodstuffs	323	751	888	890	908	826	686	661
Crude rubber	179	458	808	619	332	262	214	356
Wool, unmanufactured	57	428	714	382	296	223	191	224
Other agricultural commodities	373	710	823	658	588	513	437	436
Nonagricultural commodities: Total	1, 201	4, 756	5, 638	6, 228	6, 594	6, 263	5, 149	5, 982
Nonferrous metals and ferroalloys	178	967	963	1, 563	1, 662	1, 389	1, 175	1, 234
Petroleum and products	42	592	601	692	762	828	666	825
Paper and paper-base stocks	221	747	960	928	937	926	761	806
Textile manufactures	174	451	539	513	464	440	352	478
Machinery and vehicles	21	158	243	354	353	359	302	361
Sawmill products	18	265	229	222	236	252	204	277
Chemicals and related products	87	170	301	244	293	249	211	212
Fish, including shellfish	31	157	157	181	194	210	178	174
Iron and steel-mill products, including scrap	19	131	343	213	256	121	99	119
Other nonagricultural commodities	410	1, 118	1, 302	1, 318	1, 437	1, 489	1, 201	1, 496

[1] Commodity data for 1936–38 and 1950–54 have been adjusted to conform as nearly as possible to 1955 statistical classifications. The distribution of nonagricultural exports by principal commodities, however, is based on total exports for 1936–38 and on exports excluding "special category" items thereafter. (See note 3.)

[2] Data represent total exports minus shipments of military equipment and supplies by the Department of Defense under the Mutual Security Program. Commodity breakdowns of nonmilitary exports are not available.

[3] "Special category" commodities are those to which security restrictions apply as regards publication of detailed export statistics.

[4] Data exclude essential oils.

[5] Data for 1950 and later periods exclude "special category" exports.

NOTE.—Detail will not necessarily add to totals because of rounding.

Source: Department of Commerce.

itures abroad, nonmilitary grants, and foreign investments rose.

Merchandise Trade

During the first three quarters of 1954, nonmilitary merchandise exports were maintained at approximately the same high levels as in 1953. In the fourth quarter of 1954, exports rose sharply in response to the accelerated expansion in world demand, especially in Western Europe and the sterling area. This rise in exports gave an additional stimulus to our business expansion in the fall and winter of 1954–55, and the high level of world demand during 1954 helped to sustain the prices of internationally traded commodities. Exports continued to rise during 1955. In the year ended September 30, 1955 exports reached 13.9 billion dollars, the largest total since the year 1951 (Table B–22).

During the first ten months of 1955, nonmilitary merchandise exports from this country were about 12 percent higher than in the corresponding months of 1954 and about 16 percent above the corresponding period of 1953. The rise in agricultural exports over 1954 was 8.8 percent: exports of wheat, coarse grains, tobacco, meats, and dairy products rose, while exports of cotton and rice fell (Table D–64). On a fiscal-year basis, agricultural exports increased from 2.9 billion dollars in 1953–54 to 3.1 billion in 1954–55. In 1954–55 agricultural exports under special programs including grants, loans, sales for foreign currencies, and barter represented nearly 30 percent of the total, and an additional 15 percent were subsidized (Table B–23).

The principal increases in nonagricultural exports were in steel products, motor vehicles and parts, chemicals, coal, and paper. The rise in exports of steel, steel scrap, and coal represented about 40 percent of the total increase in nonagricultural exports from the first ten months of 1954 to the first ten months of 1955. Total export sales to Canada, Western Europe, and the sterling area increased, while those to Latin America and Japan declined (Table B–24).

Commodity imports during the first ten months of 1955 were nearly 10 percent above the corresponding period of 1954, and 2.6 percent above the corresponding period in 1953 (Table D–64). Economic expansion in this country in 1955 led to increased imports of raw materials, including rubber, lumber, iron ore, and petroleum, but imports of some industrial raw materials were held down by supply shortages abroad. Imports of agricultural commodities declined in value largely as a result of the fall in prices of coffee and cocoa, and lower demand induced by expectations of further price declines. A significant development was the increase in imports of finished manufactures—a 17 percent rise in the first ten months of 1955 over the corresponding period in 1954. The

TABLE D–65.—*Estimated gold reserves and dollar holdings of foreign countries, 1928, 1937, and 1947–55*

[End of year, billions of dollars]

Area	1928	1937	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955[1]
All foreign countries	8.8	15.1	15.2	15.0	15.4	19.1	19.2	20.5	23.1	25.0	26.7
Sterling area: Total	1.4	4.9	3.7	2.9	2.7	4.5	3.8	3.3	4.1	4.2	3.7
United Kingdom	1.1	4.4	2.3	2.2	1.9	3.6	2.8	2.3	3.0	3.2	2.6
Continental OEEC countries and dependencies	4.3	6.8	5.3	5.6	6.0	6.6	6.9	8.1	9.8	11.4	13.0
Other Europe	.8	1.0	.8	.7	.6	.6	.5	.6	.5	.6	.7
Canada	.4	.4	.7	1.2	1.4	2.0	2.2	2.5	2.4	2.6	2.6
Latin American Republics	1.1	1.0	2.9	2.7	3.1	3.5	3.4	3.4	3.6	3.7	3.8
All other countries	.8	1.0	1.8	1.9	1.6	1.9	2.4	2.6	2.7	2.5	2.9

[1] Preliminary.

NOTE.—Includes gold reserves and dollar holdings of all foreign countries with the exception of U.S.S.R. gold reserves. Holdings of the Bank for International Settlements (both for its own and EPU accounts) and of the Tripartite Commission for Restitution of Monetary Gold are included with the holdings of Continental OEEC countries and dependencies. Figures represent (1) reported and estimated gold reserves of central banks and governments, and (2) official and private dollar holdings reported by banks in the United States, including foreign-held deposits, U.S. Government securities maturing within 20 months after date of purchase, and certain other short-term liabilities to foreigners. Year-end estimates for all years except 1928; the 1928 figures are estimated on the basis of gold reserves at the end of that year plus dollar holdings reported by certain New York City banks as of May 31, 1929.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

increased demand and rising prices for raw materials resulted in higher imports from Canada and South East Asia, while Western Europe and

CHART B–15



Japan shared in our growing markets for manufactures. Reduced values of imports of coffee and other agricultural commodities were responsible for the lower purchases from Latin America, especially from Brazil and Colombia.

Capital Movements and Government Loans

The value of United States private investments abroad has risen steadily throughout the postwar period; at the end of 1954 it was 26.6 billion dollars, including long-term investments of 24.4 billion. The outflow of American private capital in 1954 was greater than in the previous year, mainly because of a sharp increase in short-term lending abroad. Direct investments slightly exceeded the 1953 level, and the net movement of portfolio capital changed from an inflow of 185 million dollars in 1953 to an outflow of 225 million in 1954. In 1955, large redemptions and repayments and a smaller volume of Canadian and International Bank borrowings reduced the net outflow of long-term portfolio capital to 51 million dollars in the first three quarters of the year; direct investments were somewhat higher than in the corresponding period of 1954 (Table D–60).

There has been a modest revival during the last two years of American private investment in foreign equity securities outside of Canada. During 1954 and the first three quarters of 1955, net purchases of outstanding equity securities of foreign corporations totaled 278 million dollars, about two-thirds of which represented British and Continental European securities. Medium- and long-term bank loans abroad totaled 282 million dollars during the same period; a large part of these were made to Latin America and some of them represented a conversion of short-term loans made in 1954.

Outstanding foreign loans of the United States Government declined by 100 million dollars, to 15.6 billion dollars, in 1954, reflecting repayments in excess of new credits. Repayments, which have been running at about a half billion dollars annually in recent years, are in large part to reduce government loans made during the early postwar years. Total net capital outflow on government account in the first three quarters of 1955 was 291 million dollars, of which 275 million was short-term (Table D–60).

Earnings on our foreign investments amounted to 2.4 billion dollars for the twelve-month period ended September 30, 1955 (excluding reinvested earnings of foreign subsidiaries). This is a major item in our receipts from foreign countries. Over 200 million dollars of these receipts represent interest payments on government loans abroad. The bulk of the earnings comes from direct private foreign investments.

Tariff Negotiations With Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

Press release 54 dated February 2

The Department of State announced on February 2 that the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland will negotiate new tariff concessions with the United States to compensate for changes in certain concessions which had previously been granted by Southern Rhodesia to the United States.

The Government of Southern Rhodesia granted these previous concessions to the United States and other participating countries in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade between 1947 and 1951. In the course of the formation of a federation by Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland and the establishment of a new

ederal tariff, the rates of duty on five of the egotiated tariff items were altered.

These five items are:

outhern Rhodesia
Tariff Item No.

ex 130 (a)	Motor trucks, vans, and trailers
ex 130 (b)	Tractor parts
199	Lubricating oils
295 (e)	Paper, wrapping
299	Beads

(NOTE: "ex" means excerpt from tariff item indicated.)

The Government of the Federation of Rhodesia nd Nyasaland has offered under article XXVIII f the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) renegotiate.

Under article XXVIII, a country wishing to ithdraw or modify a concession must try to each some basis of agreement with other inter- sted contracting parties concerning such with- rawal or modification. The usual basis for greement is the granting of new concessions as ompensation for the withdrawn concession.

Interested persons are invited to submit their iews with regard to the possible effect on United tates trade of possible modification or with- rawals of the concessions on the five items listed. n addition views are also desired regarding im- orts into the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasa- nd from the United States on which the United tates might request new or further tariff con- essions as compensation to the United States for ny modifications or withdrawals of concessions n the listed items.

Views on the foregoing matters should be sub- itted to the Committee for Reciprocity Infor- ation, which is the interdepartmental committee stablished to receive views on trade-agreement atters. It is requested that any such views be ubmitted by the close of business on March 3, 956.

All communications on these matters, in 15 opies, should be addressed to: The Secretary, ommittee for Reciprocity Information, Tariff ommission Building, Washington 25, D. C. If ny interested party considers that his views can- ot be adequately expressed to the committee in a ritten brief, he should make this known to the ecretary of the committee, who will then arrange or oral presentation before the committee.

Earlier announcements have been issued on the ntention of Cuba, India, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Sweden, Austria, France, Finland, and the Dominican Republic to renegotiate certain of their concessions with the United States. Some of these negotiations have been completed (see Department of State publications 5881, 6001, and 6201).

Current Treaty Actions

MULTILATERAL

Copyright

Universal copyright convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.
Notification regarding withdrawal of accession received:[1] Philippines, November 16, 1955.
Ratification deposited: Japan, January 28, 1956.

Protocol 1 concerning application of the convention to the works of stateless persons and refugees. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.
Ratifications deposited: Switzerland, December 30, 1955;[2] Japan, January 28, 1956.

Protocol 2 concerning application of the convention to the works of certain international organizations. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.
Ratifications deposited: Switzerland, December 30, 1955;[2] Japan, January 28, 1956.

Protocol 3 concerning the effective date of instruments of ratification or acceptance of or accession to the convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force August 19, 1954. TIAS 3324.
Ratification deposited: Japan, January 28, 1956.

Safety at Sea

Regulations for preventing collisions at sea. Done at London June 10, 1948. Entered into force January 1, 1954. TIAS 2899.
Acceptance deposited: Czechoslovakia, November 9, 1955.

Slave Trade

Procotol amending the slavery convention signed at Geneva September 25, 1926 (46 Stat. 2183), and annex. Done at New York December 7, 1953. Protocol entered

(*Continued on page 270*)

[1] The instrument of accession was deposited by the Philippine Government Aug. 19, 1955. In a communication received by the State Department Jan. 17, 1956, UNESCO stated that by a note dated Nov. 14, 1955, the Philippine Government informed the Director General that "the President of the . . . Philippines has directed the withdrawal of the . . . accession . . . to the Universal Copyright Convention prior to the date of November 19, 1955, at which time the Convention would become effective" for the Philippines. The Director General notified the Philippine Government that he "proposed to submit their communication to the States concerned, upon whom it is incumbent to declare what legal inference they intend to draw from it."

[2] For ratification of the Universal Copyright Convention by Switzerland, see BULLETIN of Jan. 23, 1956, p. 141.

Conclusion of Air Transport Agreement With India

Press release 52 dated February 2

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Government of India and the Government of the United States on February 3 signed an air transport agreement governing the operation of air services between the two countries. Jagjivan Ram, Minister of Communications, signed for the Government of India, and Livingston L. Satterthwaite, Special U.S. Representative, for the United States. In addition, the Government of India and the Embassy of the United States entered into an exchange of notes noting the unique nature of air transport between the United States and India and setting forth certain procedures which would guide them in interpreting and carrying out the agreement.

The agreement, together with the exchange of notes, replaces the Air Transport Agreement signed November 14, 1946,[1] which expired on January 15, 1955.[2] U.S. air services to India since the expiration of that agreement have been carried on under a temporary permit issued by the Government of India.

The Government of India and the Government of the United States recognized that in many respects their philosophies differ as to the methods through which to achieve the orderly development of air transportation but were agreed that air transportation between the two countries would continue the rapid growth of the last few years. Accordingly the two Governments contemplate consultations in order to insure that the arrangements entered into remain adequate, not only to deal with any situation which might arise but also to provide the necessary viability to insure a permanent foundation upon which their respective air transport systems would prosper. Both delegations were gratified with the progress which had been made in developing the new agreement and the exchange of notes, and were confident that both nations would benefit from the successful aviation relationships which would ensue.

[1] For a summary of the 1946 agreement, see BULLETIN of Nov. 24, 1946, p. 966.

[2] *Ibid.*, Jan. 24, 1955, p. 157.

TEXT OF AGREEMENT

Air Transport Agreement Between the Government of India and the Government of the United States of America

The Government of India and the Government of the United States of America, hereinafter described as the contracting parties, being parties to the Convention on International Civil Aviation opened for signature at Chicago on December 7, 1944, and desiring to establish the reciprocal operation of air transport services between their two countries as contemplated by the Convention have accordingly appointed plenipotentiaries who, being duly authorized, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

For the purpose of the present Agreement:

(A) The term "aeronautical authorities" shall mean in the case of India, the Director General of Civil Aviation and any person or agency authorized to perform the functions exercised at present by the said Director General of Civil Aviation and, in the case of the United States of America, the Civil Aeronautics Board and any person or agency authorized to perform the functions exercised at the present time by the Civil Aeronautics Board.

(B) The term "designated airline" shall mean an airline that one contracting party has notified the other contracting party, in writing, to be the airline which will operate a specific route or routes listed in the Schedule of this Agreement.

(C) The term "territory" in relation to a State shall mean the land areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection, or trusteeship of that State.

(D) The term "air service" shall mean any scheduled air service performed by aircraft for the public transport of passengers, mail or cargo.

(E) The term "international air service" shall mean an air service which passes through the air space over the territory of more than one State.

(F) The term "stop for non-traffic purposes" shall mean landing for any purpose other than taking on or dis-ıarging passengers, cargo or mail.

ARTICLE 2

Each contracting party grants to the other contracting ırty rights necessary for the conduct of air services by ıe designated airlines, as follows: the rights of transit, ' stops for non-traffic purposes, and of commercial entry ıd departure for international traffic in passengers, cargo, ıd mail at the points in its territory named on each of ıe routes specified in the appropriate paragraph of the cheduie annexed to the present Agreement.

ARTICLE 3

Air service on a specified route may be inaugurated by ı airline or airlines of one contracting party at any time fter that contracting party has designated such airline : airlines for that route and the other contracting party as given the appropriate operating permission. Such ther party shall, subject to Article 4, be bound to give iis permission provided that the designated airline or irlines may be required to qualify before the competent eronautical authorities of that party, under the laws and egulations normally applied by these authorities, before eing permitted to engage in the operations contemplated y the Agreement.

ARTICLE 4

Each contracting party reserves the right to withhold : revoke the operating permission provided for in Article of this Agreement from an airline designated by the ther contracting party in the event that it is not satisfied ıat substantiai ownership and effective control of such iriine are vested in nationals of the other contracting ırty, or in case of faiiure by such airline to comply with ıe laws and regulations referred to in Articles 11 and 13 f the Convention on International Civil Aviation, or in ıse of the failure of the airline or the government desig-ating it otherwise to perform its obligations hereunder, r to fulfill the conditions under which the rights are ranted in accordance with this Agreement.

ARTICLE 5

In order to prevent discriminatory practices and to ssure equality of treatment, both contracting parties gree that:

(a) Each of the contracting parties may impose or per-ıit to be imposed just and reasonable charges for the se of public airports and other facilities under its con-rol. Each of the contracting parties agrees, however, ıat these charges shall not be higher than would be paid or the use of such airports and facilities by its national ircraft engaged in similar international services.

(b) In respect of customs duties, inspection fees and imiiar charges on supplies of fuel, lubricating oils, spare arts, regular equipment and aircraft stores introduced ıto or taken on board aircraft of the designated airlines f one contracting party in the territory of the other con-racting party and intended solely for use by or in such ircraft and remaining on board on departure from the last airport of call in that territory the designated air-lines of the first contracting party shall be accorded treat-ment not less favorable than that granted by the second contracting party to the airlines of the most favored nation or to its national airlines engaged in international air services: Provided that neither contracting party shall be obliged to grant to the designated airlines of the other contracting party, exemption or remission of customs duty, inspection fees or similar charges unless such other con-tracting party grants exemption or remission of such charges to the designated airlines of the first contracting party.

ARTICLE 6

There shall be a fair and equal opportunity for the air-lines of each contracting party to operate on any route covered by this Agreement.

ARTICLE 7

In the operation by the airlines of either contracting party of the international services described in this Agree-ment, the interest of the airlines of the other contracting party shall be taken into consideration so as not to affect unduly the services which the latter provides on all or part of the same routes.

ARTICLE 8

The air services made available to the public by the airlines operating under this Agreement shall bear a close relationship to the requirements of the public for such services.

It is the understanding of both contracting parties that services provided by a designated airline under the present Agreement shall retain as their primary objective the provision of capacity adequate to the traffic demands be-tween the country of which such airline is a national and the countries of ultimate destination of the traffic. The right to embark or disembark on such services interna-tional traffic destined for and coming from third countries at a point or points on the routes specified in this Agree-ment shall be applied in accordance with the general prin-ciples of orderly development to which both contracting parties subscribe and shall be subject to the general prin-ciple that capacity should be related:

(a) to traffic requirements between the country of

Ambassador Cooper Expresses Gratification

Press release 55 dated February 2

Ambassador John Sherman Cooper today ex-pressed his gratification at the conclusion of the air agreement between the United States and India. The Ambassador is impressed by the earnest good will evidenced by both sides toward reaching an agreement in this important field. Ambassador Cooper believes that the agreement is another evi-dence of our basic ties of friendship with India and ability to work together by composing differences without sacrifice of principle.

origin and the countries of ultimate destination of the traffic;

(b) to the requirements of through airline operation; and,

(c) to the traffic requirements of the area through which the airline passes after taking account of local and regional services.

ARTICLE 9

In a spirit of close collaboration, the contracting parties will, in accordance with Article 12, consult from time to time, or at the request of one of the parties, to determine the extent to which the provisions of this Agreement, particularly Articles 6, 7, and 8, are promoting the orderly and economic development of air transportation by the designated airlines of the two contracting parties. The procedures which may be agreed to from time to time by the contracting parties and which may be expressed in an exchange of diplomatic notes or otherwise shall govern the operation of the provisions of the Agreement.

ARTICLE 10

(A) The designated airline or airlines of each contracting party shall supply to the aeronautical authorities of the other contracting party, at least thirty days in advance, copies of time tables, including any modification thereof, and all other similar relevant information concerning the operation of their air services under this Agreement.

(B) Each contracting party shall, upon request, cause to be provided to the other contracting party such statistical reports relating to the traffic carried by its designated airline or airlines to, from and over the territory of the other contracting party as may reasonably be required from time to time to carry out in an orderly manner the purposes of this Agreement.

ARTICLE 11

Rates to be charged by the airline or airlines of either contracting party for transportation from the territory of one contracting party to a point or points in the territory of the other contracting party referred to in the annexed Schedule shall be reasonable, due regard being paid to all relevant factors, such as cost of operation, reasonable profit, and the rates charged by any other carriers, as well as the characteristics of each service, and shall be determined in accordance with the following paragraphs:

(A) The rates to be charged by the airlines of either contracting party between points in the territory of the United States and points in the territory of India referred to in the annexed Schedule, shall, consistent with the provisions of the present Agreement, be subject to the approval of the contracting parties, who shall act in accordance with their obligations under this Agreement, within the limits of their legal powers.

(B) Any rate proposed by an airline of either contracting party shall be filed with both contracting parties at least thirty (30) days before the proposed date of introduction; provided that this period of thirty (30) days may be reduced in particular cases if so agreed by the contracting parties.

(C) During any period for which the Civil Aeronautics Board of the United States has approved the traffic conference procedures of the International Air Transport Association (hereinafter called IATA), any rate agreements concluded through these procedures and involving United States airlines will be subject to approval of the Board. Rate agreements concluded through this machinery may also be required to be subject to the approval of the Government of India pursuant to the principles enunciated above.

(D) The contracting parties agree that the procedure described in paragraphs (E), (F), and (G) of this Article shall apply:

1. If, during the period of the approval by both contracting parties of the IATA traffic conference procedure, either, any specific rate agreement is not approved within a reasonable time by either contracting party, or, a conference of IATA is unable to agree on a rate, or

2. At any time no IATA procedure is applicable, or

3. If either contracting party at any time withdraws or fails to renew its approval of that part of the IATA traffic conference procedure relevant to this Article.

(E) In the event that power is conferred by law upon the aeronautical authorities of the United States to fix fair and economic rates for the transport of persons and property by air on international services, the contracting parties will consult in accordance with Article 14 for the purpose of amending this Article to provide for the handling of rate matters under such circumstances.

(F) Prior to the time when such power may be conferred upon the aeronautical authorities of the United States, if one of the contracting parties is dissatisfied with any rate proposed by the airline or airlines of either contracting party to a point or points in the territory of the other contracting party, it shall so notify the other prior to the expiry of the first fifteen (15) of the thirty (30) day period referred to in paragraph (B) above, and the contracting parties shall endeavor to reach agreement on the appropriate rate.

In the event that such agreement is reached, each contracting party will use its best efforts to cause such agreed rate to be put into effect by its airline or airlines.

It is recognized that if no such agreement can be reached prior to the expiry of such thirty (30) days, the contracting party raising the objection to the rate may take such steps as it may consider necessary to keep the existing rate in effect and to prevent the inauguration or continuation of the service in question at the rate complained of.

(G) When in any case under paragraphs (E) or (F) of this Article the two contracting parties cannot agree within a reasonable time upon the appropriate rate after consultation initiated by the complaint of one contracting party concerning the proposed rate or an existing rate of the airline or airlines of the other contracting party, upon the request of either, the terms of Article 13 of this Agreement shall apply.

ARTICLE 12

Consultation between the competent authorities of both contracting parties may be requested at any time by either contracting party for the purpose of discussing the inter-

pretation, application, or amendment of the Agreement or Schedule. Such consultation shall begin within a period of sixty (60) days from the date of the receipt of the request by the Department of State of the United States of America or the Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India as the case may be. Should agreement be reached on amendment of the Agreement or its route schedule, such amendment will come into effect upon confirmation by an exchange of diplomatic notes.

ARTICLE 13

Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any dispute between the contracting parties relative to the interpretation or application of this Agreement which cannot be settled through consultation shall be submitted for an advisory report to a tribunal of three arbitrators, one to be named by each contracting party, and the third to be agreed upon by the two arbitrators so chosen, provided that such third arbitrator shall not be a national of either contracting party. Each of the contracting parties shall designate an arbitrator within two months of the date of delivery by either party to the other party of a diplomatic note requesting arbitration of a dispute; and the third arbitrator shall be agreed upon within one month after such period of two months.

If either of the contracting parties fails to designate its own arbitrator within two months, or if the third arbitrator is not agreed upon within the time limit indicated, either party may request the President of the International Court of Justice to make the necessary appointment or appointments by choosing the arbitrator or arbitrators.

The contracting parties will use their best efforts under the powers available to them to put into effect the opinion expressed in any such advisory report. A moiety of the expenses of the arbitral tribunal shall be borne by each party.

ARTICLE 14

This Agreement, all amendments thereto, and contracts connected therewith shall be registered with the International Civil Aviation Organization.

ARTICLE 15

If a general multilateral air transport convention accepted by both contracting parties enters into force, the present Agreement shall be amended so as to conform with the provisions of such convention.

ARTICLE 16

Either of the contracting parties may at any time notify the other of its intention to terminate the present Agreement. Such a notice shall be sent simultaneously to the International Civil Aviation Organization. In the event such communication is made, this Agreement shall terminate one year after the date of its receipt, unless by agreement between the contracting parties the notice of intention to terminate is withdrawn before the expiration of that time. If the other contracting party fails to acknowledge receipt, notice shall be deemed as having been received fourteen days after its receipt by the International Civil Aviation Organization.

ARTICLE 17

This Agreement will come into force on the day it is signed.

The Agreement shall be in the Hindi and English languages. In the case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed the present Agreement.

Done in duplicate at New Delhi this 3rd day of February, 1956.

For the Government of India:

M. M. PHILIP

For the Government of the United States of America:

LIVINGSTON L. SATTERTHWAITE

SCHEDULE

1. An airline or airlines designated by the Government of India shall be entitled to operate air services on each of the air routes specified via intermediate points, in both directions, and to make scheduled landings in the United States at the points specified in this paragraph:

Route 1. From India via points in Asia, Africa, Europe, U.K., Ireland, Canada to New York; and beyond to points on Route 2 or to such points as may be mutually agreed upon at a later date.

Route 2. From India via points in Asia, the Philippines, Japan, Canada to San Francisco or Los Angeles and beyond, to points on Route 1 or to such points as may be mutually agreed upon at a later date.

2. An airline or airlines designated by the Government of the United States shall be entitled to operate air services on each of the air routes specified via intermediate points, in both directions, and to make scheduled landings in India at the points specified in this paragraph:

Route 1. From the United States via points in Canada, Ireland, U.K., Europe and Asia to Delhi/Calcutta and beyond to points in Burma and Thailand, and beyond to the United States over various routes.

Route 2. From the United States via points in Canada, Ireland, U.K., Europe, Africa, and Asia to Bombay/Calcutta and beyond to points in Ceylon, Burma, Thailand and beyond to the United States over various routes.

3. (A) Points on any of the specified routes may, at the option of the designated airline, be omitted on any or all flights.

(B) Not more than one traffic stop shall be made by a designated airline of either country on any flight transiting the territory of the other country.

(C) If at any time scheduled flights on any of specified air services of one contracting party are operated so as to terminate in territory of the other contracting party and not as part of a through air service extending beyond such territory, the latter party shall have the right to nominate the terminal point of such scheduled flights on

the specified air route in its territory. The latter party shall give not less than six months notice to the other party if it decides to nominate a new terminal point for such scheduled flights.

(D) Changes made by either contracting party in points on its routes described in the Schedule except changes in points in the territory of the other contracting party, shall not require amendment of the Schedule. The aeronautical authorities of either contracting party may therefore proceed unilaterally to make such changes, provided, however, that notice of any change is given without delay to the aeronautical authorities of the other contracting party.

EXCHANGE OF NOTES

U.S. Note

DEAR MISS NAIDU: I have the honor to refer to the Air Transport Agreement signed today between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India and to say that the understanding of the Government of the United States of America with regard to the procedures agreed between the contracting parties in pursuance of Article 9 of the Agreement is as follows:

During the discussions between the Delegation of India and the Delegation of the United States which led to the conclusion of the Air Transport Agreement between the two countries, there was an extensive exploration of the air transport problems of the two countries. Important features of these problems were noted to be the great geographic distances separating the two countries and the fact that no air services are operated by an Indian carrier to the United States. The Delegation of India presented to the United States Delegation its continued apprehensions with respect to the inauguration of such air services between the United States and India as might result in an undue effect upon the development of the international and regional services of the Indian airlines. The United States Delegation noted the concern of the Delegation of India and expressed confidence that by reason of the unique characteristics of the service between India and the United States, practical arrangements as described below could be made to give additional assurance to the Government of India that its interests in the orderly development of air transportation would be safeguarded. As an indication of these unique characteristics, mention was made of the complexity of adding new schedules over the 9,000 mile distance between the two countries and other elements of traffic and operations over the routes involved.

2. It was noted by both Delegations that under the temporary authorizations previously issued by the Government of India the level of service was at present two round trips per week for each of the two United States airlines serving India—Trans World Airlines and Pan American World Airways—and that upon the coming into force of the Agreement, the services under the operating permission would continue at that level until increased in accordance with the procedures set forth hereafter. The Indian Delegation stated that the Government of India would issue appropriate operating permits. It was agreed that if, while this Agreement is in force, any time the Government of India designate an airline or airlines such designated airline or airlines will be granted full operating permission pursuant to Article 3 of the Agreement.

3. The United States Delegation pointed out that under Article 12, the air services under the Agreement could be considered by the two nations at any time, and in order to facilitate such consideration, the United States Government would notify the Government of India through diplomatic channels of any new schedule proposed by one of its carriers to serve India at least 90 days before the effective date of the new schedule. The United States Delegation stated that while the United States might notify the Government of India more than 90 days in advance, the 90-day period would be a minimum. The possibility, however, of sudden and unexpected traffic demands justifying an increase in frequency on less than 90 days notice was recognized; and the parties expressed the belief that in such an event they would be able through diplomatic channels to evolve a procedure which would deal adequately with the situation as it then exists.

4. Both Delegations noted the importance to the public and the carriers of having certainty as to the availability of services. To this end they agreed that any request for intergovernmental consideration of the proposed additional schedule should be made within 30 days of the date upon which the notification was received by the Government of India, and that any consultations should be started within 30 days of that request and completed as soon as possible thereafter. The Delegations agreed that at the consultations, in addition to all other matters to be brought forward by India and the United States, the parties would have relevant traffic statistics available. It was further agreed that such consultations would be held in India.

5. (A) Both Delegations recognized that if the consultations did not result in agreed conclusions, and if the notice of the increase is not withdrawn, the Government of India might withhold or modify or revoke the operating permission with respect to the increase in frequency which had been the subject of consultation.

(B) Furthermore, it was agreed that if an increase in frequency is established on the basis of estimates of anticipated traffic and subsequently in consultation asked for by the Government of India and held in accordance with Article 12 of the Agreement, it is determined that such estimates have not been substantially fulfilled within a reasonable time, then such increase would be withdrawn. It was recognized that an appropriate length of time would be allowed during which the airline, which made the increase in frequency, would seek to realize the anticipated traffic for which the increase in frequency was provided. It was likewise recognized that should consultations under this paragraph not result in agreed conclusions, the Government of India might modify or revoke the operating permission with respect to the increase in frequency which had been the subject of consultation.

(C) It was also agreed that action to withhold or modify or revoke an operating permission as provided for in paragraphs (A) and (B) above would not be subject to arbitration in accordance with Article 13 of the Agreement.

6. The Delegation of India referred to its unique geographical position which results in making India an airline crossroads with a large number of the worlds' airlines carrying traffic to and through India, and pointed out the difficult competitive position in which the Indian airlines are presently placed, particularly in relation to the movement of their own third and fourth freedom traffic. Along the same line the Indian Delegation referred specifically to the operations of United States airlines, and pointed out the relatively low level of third and fourth freedom traffic and the relatively high level of fifth freedom traffic being carried by them. The Indian Delegation expressed its concern that the operations of foreign carriers result in impairing the economic development of Indian airlines. The United States Delegation recognized the unique position in which India is placed, as well as the concern expressed by the Indian Delegation as to the development of their air services.

7. The United States Delegation pointed out the high level of Indo-United States traffic and the substantial annual growth which is occurring, but indicated the difficulties with which their international airlines are faced in serving this traffic. In addition, the United States Delegation referred to the level of operations by the United States carriers on the long routes from the United States to India, and pointed out that by reason of this level of service, the United States airlines are losing the patronage of the public desiring service between India and the United States who are turning to the more frequent services offered by competing foreign carriers. It was the opinion of the United States Delegation that this traffic whether moving wholly by foreign carriers, or partially by foreign and partially by United States carriers, should receive consideration in assessing capacity. It was further observed that under all of these circumstances, particularly as they relate to routes of this length, the level of third and fourth freedom traffic is necessarily relatively low as the ends of the routes are approached, and correspondingly if an airline is to operate economically, the fifth freedom traffic must be relatively high. The Indian Delegation noted these difficulties.

8. The two Delegations discussed the application of Articles 6, 7, and 8 and reached the general conclusion that at present in the unique circumstances prevailing between India and the United States, in a consultation to consider a proposed increase in the capacity offered by the United States airlines, both Governments would bear in mind the reciprocal objectives of assuring the orderly and economic development of both the Indian and United States airlines and make special application as follows:

(1) Any increase in frequency for a United States airline will be required to be justified primarily for the provision of capacity needed on account of the increase in the amount of the traffic originating in the United States and destined for India and vice versa which is carried by that airline or which that airline can reasonably establish as its anticipated needs for the carriage of the traffic originating in the United States and destined for India and vice versa;

(2) In addition it was agreed that due consideration, which would vary with the facts in appropriate cases but which would not be taken to justify an amount of traffic between India and third countries which is excessive, would be given to:

(a) factors affecting the requirements of through airline operations including the effect which the growth of traffic to other points along the routes specified in the Agreement may have on the capacity offered in the United States–India market,

(b) the size of the United States–India air traffic market, its rate of growth, and the needs of the public for direct, as well as connecting services, and

(c) the total traffic between India and the United States carried by airlines foreign to both countries, and by other means, and

(3) Appropriate provision will be made for the carriage of such transit traffic as is disclosed by the trends of such traffic actually carried or which could be reasonably carried on flights making traffic stops in India, but the increase in capacity provided for such traffic will not be utilized for an amount of traffic between India and third countries and vice versa which is unreasonable.

9. By reason of the extensive discussions between the two Governments concerning the capacity to be provided by United States airlines and the complexity of the capacity problems presented by operations over the routes concerned, both Delegations recognized the necessity of having available accurate and more complete statistical data on the movement of traffic.

(1) Accordingly, the United States Delegation agreed that the United States Government would transmit to the Government of India statistical reports giving by alternate months the following data:

(a) True origin and destination of all traffic embarked or disembarked in India by the United States airlines, classified as to passengers, cargo and mail, and the points of embarkation and disembarkation of this traffic by such airlines. If such traffic originates in or is destined for a third country, the traffic will be broken down so as to show that which is competitive with the Indian airlines and that which is not.

(b) All transit traffic on United States airlines carried on flights making traffic stops in India.

(2) The Indian Delegation agreed that the Government of India would, upon request, transmit to the United States Government similar statistical reports giving for alternative months the traffic carried by its airlines to, from and across United States territory.

(3) In addition, both countries agreed to work closely together in developing more adequate information as to the nature and growth of traffic between their territories.

10. It was agreed by both Delegations that the nature of air transportation, its expected rapid development, and the somewhat differing philosophies held by India and the

United States with regard to achieving this development, make it essential that the arrangements discussed herein be subject to consultation at any time by the two countries in order to make certain that they provide a continuously satisfactory method of dealing with the subject matters described above.

11. If at any time agreement is not reached in consultation under the foregoing provisions of this note, either contracting party may notify the other of its intention to terminate said provisions; and, in that event the said provisions shall terminate at the expiration of ninety days after the date of receipt of such notice; provided, however, that in such event, while each of the parties retains its freedom of action to terminate the Agreement in accordance with Article 16 thereof, both parties shall refrain from making any changes in the arrangements prevailing on the date of termination of the provisions of this note, until either (1) such arrangements are modified by mutual agreement between the Parties or (2) the Agreement is terminated in accordance with Article 16 thereof.

12. Both Delegations noted their understanding that their Governments would be guided by the general conclusions set forth above.

I have the honor to request you kindly to confirm that this is also the understanding of the Government of India.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERIC PEARSON BARTLETT
Chargé D'Affaires A.I.

Miss LEILAMANI NAIDU, I. F. S.,
Director, American Division,
Ministry of External Affairs,
Government of India,
New Delhi.

Indian Note

DEAR MISTER BARTLETT: We have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated 3 February 1956, stating that, with reference to the air transport agreement signed today between the Government of India and the Government of the United States of America, the understanding of the Government of the United States of America wtih regard to the procedures agreed between the contracting parties in pursuance of Article 9 of the agreement is as follows:

[Repeated here is text of Mr. Bartlett's letter of February 3.]

I have the honour to confirm that the above represents also the understanding of the Government of India.

Yours Sincerely

LEILAMANI NAIDU
Director
American Division

THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES, A. I.,
Embassy of the United States of America,
New Delhi.

Current Treaty Actions

(*Continued from page 263*)

into force December 7, 1953.[3] Annex entered into force July 7, 1955.[3]
Senate advice and consent to ratification given: January 25, 1956.

Trade and Commerce

Protocol modifying the convention signed at Brussels July 5, 1890 (26 Stat. 1518) relating to the creation of an International Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs. Done at Brussels December 16, 1949. Entered into force May 5, 1950.[3]
Senate advice and consent to ratification given: January 25, 1956.

Protocol of terms of accession of Japan to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, with annex A (schedules of the contracting parties) and annex B (schedule of Japan). Done at Geneva June 7, 1955. Entered into force September 10, 1955. TIAS 3438.
Notification of intention to apply concessions received: Sweden, January 16, 1956 (effective February 15, 1956).

BILATERAL

Dominican Republic

Agreement concerning period of validity of and fees for nonimmigrant visas. Effected by exchange of notes at Ciudad Trujillo December 14 and 16, 1955. Entered into force February 1, 1956.

Finland

Agreement amending the surplus agricultural commodities agreement of May 6, 1955 (TIAS 3248) by providing for the sale of butter to Finland. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington January 12, 1956. Entered into force January 12, 1956.

Korea

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington February 3, 1956. Entered into force February 3, 1956.

THE DEPARTMENT

Designations

William Belton as Deputy Director, Office of South American Affairs, effective January 30.

Bainbridge C. Davis as Officer in Charge of North Coast Affairs, Office of South American Affairs, effective January 30.

Ernest V. Siracusa as Officer in Charge of West Coast Affairs, Office of South American Affairs, effective January 30.

[3] Not in force for the United States.

Africa. Tariff Negotiations With Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 262

American Principles. Franklin's Role in Promoting International Understanding (Streibert) . 249

Asia
Anglo-American Discussions Concerning Common Principles and World Problems (text of declaration and statements) 231
Itinerary for Secretary Dulles' Trip to Asia . . . 241

Atomic Energy. Anglo-American Discussions Concerning Common Principles and World Problems (text of declaration and statements) . . 231

Congress, The
Current Legislation 252
The Role of the United States in International Economic Affairs (excerpts from economic report) . 253
Visit of Sir Anthony Eden (texts of addresses) . 235

Economic Affairs
Conclusion of Air Transport Agreement With India (texts of agreement, notes, and Cooper statement) 264
M. Mayer and Party To Visit U.S. 241
The Role of the United States in International Economic Affairs (excerpts from economic report) 253
Tariff Negotiations With Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 262

Europe
Anglo-American Discussions Concerning Common Principles and World Problems (text of declaration and statements) 231
M. Mayer and Party To Visit U.S. 241

Foreign Service. Public Committee on Personnel Completes Task 248

France
French Government Invited To Participate in Discussions Concerning Middle East 233
U.S.-French Cooperation (Dulles, Pineau) 241

Germany
Anglo-American Discussions Concerning Common Principles and World Problems (text of declaration and statements) 231
Dedication of Herbert Hoover School 243
The Record of Communist Imperialism in East Germany (Hoover) 242

Hungary. Harassment of Legation Employees and Correspondents in Budapest (text of U.S. note) 246

India. Conclusion of Air Transport Agreement With India (texts of agreement, notes, and Cooper statement) 264

International Information. Franklin's Role in Promoting International Understanding (Streibert) 249

Near East
Anglo-American Discussions Concerning Common Principles and World Problems (text of declaration and statements) 231
French Government Invited To Participate in Discussions Concerning Middle East 233

Presidential Documents. The Role of the United States in International Economic Affairs (excerpts from economic report) 253

Spain. Foreign Minister of Spain To Visit Washington 248

State, Department of
Designations (Belton, Davis, Siracusa) 270
Public Committee on Personnel Completes Task . 248

Treaty Information
Conclusion of Air Transport Agreement With India (texts of agreement, notes, and Cooper statement) 264
Current Actions 263

U.S.S.R.
Anglo-American Discussions Concerning Common Principles and World Problems (text of declaration and statements) 231
The Record of Communist Imperialism in East Germany (Hoover) 242

United Kingdom
Anglo-American Discussions Concerning Common Principles and World Problems (text of declaration and statements) 231
Visit of Sir Anthony Eden (texts of addresses) . . 235

Name Index

Belton, William 270
Cooper, John Sherman 265
Davis, Bainbridge C. 270
Dulles, Secretary 234, 241
Eden, Anthony 232, 234, 235
Eisenhower, President 232, 253
Hoover, Herbert, Jr. 242
Jackson, William H. 248
Lloyd, Selwyn 235
Martin Artajo, Alberto 248
Mayer, René 241
Pineau, Christian 241
Siracusa, Ernest V. 270
Streibert, Theodore C. 249

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: January 30–February 5

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

No.	Date	Subject
47	1/30	Dulles–Eden–Lloyd statements.
*48	1/30	Educational exchange.
*49	2/1	Educational exchange.
50	2/1	Invitation to France on Middle East discussions.
51	2/2	Visit of Spanish Foreign Minister.
52	2/2	Air transport agreement with India.
53	2/2	Wriston Committee completes task.
54	2/2	Tariff negotiations with Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.
55	2/2	Cooper statement on air transport agreement with India.
†56	2/2	Bulganin letter to Eisenhower.
57	2/3	Note to Hungary on suppression of human rights.
58	2/3	Hoover: 10th anniversary of RIAS.
59	2/3	Hoover: dedication of Herbert Hoover School.
60	2/3	Mayer itinerary (rewrite).
†61	2/3	Atomic agreement with Korea.
62	2/3	Dulles itinerary.
63	2/4	Dulles–Pineau letters.

*Not printed.
†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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The Department of State

bulletin

Vol. XXXIV, No. 869

February 20, 1956

RECOMMENDED CHANGES IN IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION ● *Message of the President to the Congress* . 275

UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST ● *Exchange of Correspondence between Secretary Dulles and Members of Congress* 285

THE PRESENT SITUATION IN GERMANY ● *by Under Secretary Hoover* 290

POLICIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE ON THE DISPOSAL OF SURPLUS AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES ● *by Willis C. Armstrong* 301

INTERNATIONAL PLANT PROTECTION CONVENTION TRANSMITTED TO SENATE ● *President's Transmittal Message, Report of Secretary of State, and Text of Convention* 311

TERRITORIAL WATERS AND RELATED MATTERS ● *Report on Meeting of Inter-American Council of Jurists* . . 296

For index see inside back cover

The Department of State bulletin

VOL. XXXIV, NO. 869 • PUBLICATION 6292

February 20, 1956

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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Recommended Changes in Immigration Legislation

MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS[1]

To the Congress of the United States:

Throughout our history immigration to this land has contributed greatly to the strength and character of our Republic. Over the years we have provided for such immigration because it has been to our own national interest that we do so. It is no less to our national interest that we do so under laws that operate equitably.

The Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization have made a thorough study of the operation of our present immigration laws, and have advised me concerning the changes and additions which they consider necessary in the national interest. I have carefully reviewed their findings and concur in their conclusions. The recommendations now made are based on those findings and conclusions.

This Message takes up four separate and distinct subject matters respecting our immigration policies: (1) the quota system and the use of national origins, (2) the private-relief-bill system of handling hardship cases, (3) unnecessary restrictions and administrative provisions of our immigration laws, and (4) judicial review in deportation. Each such subject matter is treated separately because the problems in each are wholly distinct from the others. Accordingly, the recommendations as to each subject matter will, I hope, be considered separately and each on its own merit.

I

The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952[2] was developed essentially as a codification of many separate, and sometimes overlapping and inconsistent, immigration and nationality laws. It was thought inappropriate, in connection with that legislation, to revise our basic immigration policies. Moreover, at that time 1950 census information was incomplete.

The time has now come to consider those policies. Experience in the post-war world demonstrates that the present national-origins method of admitting aliens needs to be re-examined, and a new system adopted which will admit aliens within allowable numbers according to new guidelines and standards.

The Congress has traditionally formulated our basic immigration policies, and will doubtless wish to make its decision as to what new system should be established only after its own study and investigation of all possible choices. There are many factors that must be taken into consideration. Among these are: the needs of this country for persons having specialized skills or cultural accomplishments; close family relationships; the populations and immigration policies of countries sending immigrants to this country; their past immigration and trade relationships with this country; and their assistance to the joint defense of the friendly free nations of the world.

Pending the completion by the Congress of such study and investigation, it is essential that we take interim measures to alleviate as much as possible inequities in the present quota system. Accordingly, I recommend the immediate enactment of the following proposals.

First, the present quota system sets a maximum annual authorization of 154,657 quota immigrants. This figure is derived from a formula based upon the 1920 population. I recommend that total population as shown by the 1950 census be used as the base for determining the overall ceiling. I

[1] H. Doc. 329, 84th Cong., 2d sess.; transmitted on Feb. 8.

[2] For an article analyzing the act, see BULLETIN of Feb. 2, 1953, p. 195, and Feb. 9, 1953, p. 232.

believe that economic growth over the past thirty years and present economic conditions justify an increase of approximately 65,000 in quota numbers. I recommend that Congress provide for such an increase by fixing the overall ceiling in terms of a percentage of total population as shown by the 1950 census. The new ceiling recommended would be approximately 220,000 quota numbers annually.

In order to eliminate some of the inequity resulting from the fact that several countries have large quotas which they do not use while others have small quotas which are usually oversubscribed, I recommend that the additional quota numbers—i.e. those over and above the 154,657 numbers now provided for—be distributed among countries in proportion to their actual immigration to this country since the establishment of the quota system in 1924.

This method of allocation will help to alleviate the problem of oversubscribed quotas. At the same time no country will have a lesser number of quota numbers allocated to it than at present.

Second, I recommend that the Congress set aside from the increased annual quota 5,000 numbers to be available for admission of aliens without regard to nationality or national origin. Use of these numbers would enable us to meet some of the needs of this country which develop from time to time for persons with special skills and cultural or technical qualifications.

The existing immigration law recognizes somewhat similar criteria for quota immigrants by giving a preference to those ["]whose services are determined by the Attorney General to be needed urgently in the United States because of the high education, technical training, specialized experience, or exceptional ability . . . and to be substantially beneficial prospectively to the national economy, cultural interests, or welfare of the United States.["] Our needs and requirements should be determined on the basis of consultation among the various departments and agencies of the Government, and also with the advice and testimony of private organizations.

This special pool has further value as an experimental plan departing entirely from our present system of distributing quotas on a basis of nationality or place of birth. It also would enable us to give greater assistance to persons abroad who have undergone suffering and hardship resisting Communist aggression, who would make beneficial contributions to this country, and who will not have the benefit of the Refugee Relief Act after that Act's termination.

Third, quota numbers that are unused by countries to which they are allocated should be made available for use elsewhere. Under our present law quota numbers which are unused by any particular country in the year in which they are available become void and may not be used by any other country.

I recommend enactment of legislation that will permit the utilization of unused quota numbers in the succeeding year. This should be done by pooling the unused quota numbers in each of the following areas: Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Pacific ocean area. These pooled quota numbers would then be distributed during a twelve-month period on a first come, first served basis among eligible applicants of the area, without regard to country of birth within the area. These quotas should be limited to aliens who qualify for preference status under existing law—persons having special skills or close relatives in the United States.

There is a further inequity in the quota system by virtue of the so-called mortgage on quotas resulting from the issuance of visas under the Displaced Persons Act and other special acts. The law provides that visas issued under these acts are chargeable against quotas authorized under the Immigration Act. The result is that the quotas of many countries are mortgaged far into the future. For example, fifty percent of the quota for Greece is mortgaged until the year 2017; for Lithuania, until 2090; for Latvia, until 2274. The total number so mortgaged for the year 1955 amounted to about 8,000, and over the total span of years the aggregate could be as much as 328,000. I recommend the elimination of this unfairness. This is consistent with the action of the Congress in enacting the Refugee Relief Act of 1953. Congress did not then impose additional mortgages on quotas but provided special non-quota visas for eligible refugees.

II

For some time I have considered that undue and largely useless burdens are placed upon the Congress and the President by the avalanche in recent years of private bills for the relief of aliens. The number of these bills is strikingly high in comparison with the number of public enactments. In the First Session of the Eighty-Fourth Congress

private immigration enactments alone accounted for 413 of 880 enactments, public and private; 3,059 such bills were introduced. During the Eighty-Third Congress, private immigration enactments accounted for 753 of 1,788 enactments, both public and private; 4,797 such bills were introduced. At the beginning of the present Session, there were 2,159 private immigration measures pending.

The Congress, in the performance of its constitutional duties, must consider the worthiness of each private immigration bill introduced. The President, in the performance of his constitutional duties, must consider the worthiness of each bill enacted. The Nation's interest would surely be better served if the bulk of these private immigration claims were handled through suitable administrative machinery and if the Congress and the Executive could thus give their full attention to more urgent national problems.

Under the private-bill system of handling individual immigration cases, many persons fail to obtain the very relief which others have received, because Congress has not had the time to take up and act on the bills introduced for their benefit. Indeed there are many whose plight has not even come to the attention of the Congress.

For these reasons it is my belief that action is called for to provide the necessary administrative authority to take care of such cases. I hope that such action will be taken without delay so that it may be of help this year. The enactment of such authority, in my opinion, would substantially eliminate the need for private legislative redress in this area. I suggest that there should be vested in the Attorney General limited discretionary powers to grant relief with respect to admission and deportation of aliens. Such discretion should be limited to aliens with close relatives in this country, to veterans, and to functionaries of religious organizations, regardless of the technical statutory ground on which the alien is inadmissible or subject to deportation. These classes of cases embrace the great bulk of the hardship cases which appeal to our sense of fairness. However, no relief ought to be accorded aliens whose presence here would be dangerous to the safety and security of the United States. An appropriate charge against the applicable quota would be made in each case where relief is granted.

It should further be provided by the Congress that there shall be a ceiling on the number of cases in which such discretionary authority may be exercised.

III

Experience under the existing immigration law has established that there are a number of changes, aside from the quota provisions, which should be made in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. Some provisions create unnecessary restrictions upon travel to the United States, while others inflict great hardships upon the aliens affected. Consequently, I make the following recommendations:

Under the present law, every alien applying for a visa must be fingerprinted; and every alien admitted without a visa and remaining in the United States for thirty days or longer, even if here temporarily, must be fingerprinted. Although in our minds no stigma is attached to fingerprinting, it is not a requirement of travel in other countries. We should be the first to remove travel obstacles which hamper the free exchange of ideas, cultures and commerce. Further, experience over the last three years has shown that this requirement does not significantly contribute to our national safety and security. The law should be amended to permit the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to waive the requirement of fingerprinting, on a reciprocal basis, for aliens coming here for temporary periods.

We must recognize the tremendous increase in air and surface travel in recent years. Aliens traveling from one country to another often find it necessary to pass through the United States without any intention to remain in or even visit this country. A South American flying to or returning from Europe, for example, will often pass through the United States. He should not be required to meet all of the standards for admission, coupled with inspection and examination, that normally apply. These requirements result in unnecessary hardships to the traveler, expense to the carrier, and loss of good will, without proportionate benefit to the United States. The law should be amended accordingly.

The present statute contains a restrictive requirement which makes it necessary for immigration authorities to inspect and apply all grounds of exclusion to aliens seeking admission to the mainland of the United States from Alaska and

Hawaii. This requirement results in expense to the Government and causes delays and inconvenience in travel. It must be remembered that, by definition in the law, these Territories are part of the United States, and aliens who have entered or are present in them are subject to all the provisions of the Act. If the alien was deportable before he came to the mainland, he remains deportable. I recommend the elimination from the law of this unnecessary restriction upon travel.

The immigration laws presently require aliens to specify race and ethnic classification in visa applications. These provisions are unnecessary and should be repealed.

A large group of refugees in this country obtained visas by the use of false identities in order to escape forcible repatriation behind the Iron Curtain; the number may run into the thousands. Under existing law such falsification is a mandatory ground for deportation. The law should be amended to give relief to these unfortunate people.

The inequitable provisions relating to Asian spouses and adopted children should be repealed.

The Immigration Act grants special naturalization benefits to veterans of our Armed Forces who have completed at least three years' honorable service and who can submit proof of admission for permanent residence. Many have been unable to submit this proof. I recommend that proof of admission be not required in such cases.

The present statute is unnecessarily restrictive as to aliens who marry United States citizens. It forbids adjustment to permanent residence if the alien has been in the United States less than one year before the marriage. This disrupts the family and is expensive for the alien who must go abroad to obtain a nonquota visa, without proportionate benefit to the United States. I recommend that the requirement of one year's presence in the United States before marriage be repealed.

The above covers the principal changes which I recommend as a minimum toward amelioration of the immigration laws. Others will be suggested by the Attorney General.

IV

Just as the Nation's interests call for a larger degree of flexibility in the laws for regulating the flow of other peoples to our shores, there is at the same time a significant need to strengthen the laws established for the wholesome purpose of ridding the country of the relatively few aliens who have demonstrated their unfitness to remain in our midst. Some of these persons have been found to be criminals of the lowest character, trafficking in murder, narcotics, and subversion. Constitutional due process wisely confers upon any alien, whatever the charge, the right to challenge in the courts the Government's finding of deportability. However, no alien who has once had his day in court, with full rights of appeal to the higher courts, should be permitted to block his removal and cause unnecessary expense to the Government by further judicial appeals the only purpose of which is delay. I am concerned by the growing frequency of such cases involving as they often do the depraved and confirmed criminal. Accordingly, I have asked the Attorney General to submit to the Congress a legislative proposal that will remedy this abuse of legal process.

I believe that these changes in our immigration and nationality laws, together with the amendments to the Refugee Relief Act which I have heretofore recommended to the Congress,[3] not only will advance our own self-interest, but also will serve as living demonstrations that we recognize our responsibilities of world leadership. I urge their careful consideration by the Congress.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

THE WHITE HOUSE
February 8, 1956

U.S. Chiefs of Mission in Asia To Meet at Tokyo

Press release 69 dated February 8

A conference of the U.S. Chiefs of Mission in the Far East will be held at Tokyo for 3 days beginning March 19. The purpose of the conference is to enable the principal U.S. diplomatic officials in the area to confer together on general aspects of Far Eastern policy and to discuss overall problems.

This conference is another in a series of regional meetings of U.S. Ambassadors which are held periodically in the various geographic areas of the world.

The Secretary of State plans to attend the open-

[3] *Ibid.*, June 13, 1955, p. 951.

ng session of the conference following the meeting in Karachi of the SEATO Foreign Ministers.

The principal officers from the following U.S. posts will participate in the conference: Bangkok, Canberra, Djakarta, Hong Kong, Manila, Phnom Penh, Rangoon, Saïgon, Singapore, Seoul, Taipei, Tokyo, Vientiane, and Wellington.

The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Walter S. Robertson, will act as chairman of the conference. Certain other U.S. Government agencies will be represented by observers.

Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference

Press release 68 dated February 7

Secretary Dulles: I will be glad to answer any questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there was a second letter received by the Government from Mr. Bulganin last week on the question of a friendship treaty. Are you working with the President now on a reply?

A. Well, we haven't really gotten around to working on that. The urgency, I think, is not very great. The position of the United States was pretty fully set out in the letter which President Eisenhower wrote to Chairman Bulganin in answer to the first letter.[1] I think if you recall the history of what happened it would be illuminating. You see, the Soviet Government did not feel, apparently, that they could let their people hear of President Eisenhower's letter until they had some further information to cover it up with. So they held their own people in ignorance, I think for 6 days—it may have been 7 days—in complete ignorance of the fact that there had been any letter from President Eisenhower. All the rest of the world knew it; indeed, in the satellites they knew it. But in the Soviet Union nobody was allowed to know that there was such a reply, or that the reply had taken a negative view toward the Bulganin proposal. During that period they wrote another letter, which they published at the same time that they published the letter from President Eisenhower. So I think the second letter can be interpreted as being designed very largely for domestic consumption. The essence of it is already covered, I think, and dealt with by President Eisenhower's letter. Nevertheless, we are giving it careful study to see if we can find in it anything which might possibly be useful. But we haven't dealt with it on an urgent basis.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you do not preclude the possibility of an answer to this letter?

A. Oh, no. There will, undoubtedly, be an answer.

Q. Are you saying, sir, that you feel the point of diminishing returns has been reached in a public exchange of this kind—that there is no fruitful possibility in their going forward with this kind of exchange?

A. Well, that isn't quite what I said. But I think it is a fact that this has gotten pretty much into a propaganda channel. The handling of the President's letter to Premier Bulganin and his reply, that is, the second letter, indicates that it is largely treated as a propaganda matter by the Soviet rulers. When these matters get essentially into the propaganda field, it is not as easy to make any progress as though there was a sincere desire to arrive at a result, which generally implies confidential exploratory contacts.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when we were talking about the release by the Chinese of their version of the Geneva talks, you said that there had been no breach of faith on their part for they had told you in advance that they were going to make this release. Now when it comes to this latest exchange of notes, was something said at the time that the note was submitted to make it clear that they intended publication, that is, were we taking the initiative in making public what might otherwise have been a confidential exchange, or did we make public what they would make public if we didn't, and how do you know those things?

A. Well, we had a discussion about this whole subject with the Soviet Ambassador here, Mr. Zaroubin, and we also drew certain inferences from the fact the Soviet had chosen the most spectacular possible way to make the first communication to the United States; namely, an unprecedented demand that the Soviet Ambassador should personally see the President, and that was publicized. That very initial act threw around the whole operation a glamour of publicity, which, obviously, must have been intended.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it was reported from Bonn

[1] BULLETIN of Feb. 6, 1956, p. 191.

yesterday that the German Government would refuse continuation of financial contributions. Now, according to the reports, a spokesman for the Finance Ministry said that the request was unfounded and a threat against Bonn's balanced budget. I was wondering whether you could give us your views on this?

A. There are conversations that took place. In the first place, as I recall, it was when I was in Paris at the NATO meeting last December, with reference to the contribution by the Federal Republic of Germany to the maintenance within Germany of certain of the NATO forces that are provided by the United States, the United Kingdom, and by France. The talks at that time did not come to any positive conclusion. They were held rather hurriedly, and they are being continued at the present time. There is a problem which is due to the fact that the maintenance of the forces I mentioned in Germany entails certain costs, particularly in terms of local currency, and that is a considerable burden, of course, on the countries who maintain their troops there—particularly those who are getting short of external currency, notably the United Kingdom. The question has been raised whether, in view of the fact that the defense costs of the Germans themselves have not gone up as rapidly as was expected because of the lag—slippage—in the timetable of their forces, it would be within the spirit of the North Atlantic Treaty that consideration should be given to a further contribution by the Germans to the foreign exchange costs of those who are maintaining troops within Germany. That matter is being discussed. I do not think there has been any final conclusion reached.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you saying that there is nothing new in this second Bulganin letter?

A. No. I said that in the main it would seem that its points were covered already by the President's reply to the first letter. But I said we were examining it carefully to see whether there were any nuggets hidden there out of which something constructive could be built.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it has been reported this morning that the note which was dispatched to the Hungarian Government,[2] through its Minister in Washington, was not delivered, but was returned to the Department. Have you received the note? Was it returned to you, and, if so, what would be the next step?

A. Well, it hasn't been returned physically to me because I am a little removed from the spot. I believe that it was physically returned to our Minister there on the ground; that they regard it as offensive.

Q. Was it returned to our Minister in Budapest?

A. Yes, that is my understanding.

Q. The report was that it was not delivered by the Hungarian Minister here—he did not transmit it to his Government; they brought it back to the Department.

A. Well, I have not been informed of that.

Meteorological Balloons

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us what the position is, under international law, of balloons—meteorological balloons—and also other experiments, such as the circling satellites?

A. I wish I could tell you, but that whole subject, as I think somebody once said about Russia, is "a mystery wrapped in an enigma" or something to that effect. The question of the ownership of the upper air is a disputable question, and also of the ether above the air. In the main, it is a recognized practice to avoid putting up into the air anything which could interfere with any normal use of the air by anybody else. I understand that these meteorological balloons that have been sent up all around the world—I believe several thousands of them, as a matter of fact—have been drifting over the United States, and they have been launched in California, Alaska, Hawaii, Okinawa, and various places. As I understand it, they have arranged that unless they go up to a height in excess of 30,000 feet they are at once destroyed, and they are supposed to be up at a height of around 50,000 feet, which is way above any normal use of the air, far above any commercial flights. And, as I say, I think several thousands of these have been launched and have been carried by the winds to various places, and there is no known record of their having caused any interference in any commercial flights, or any other flights for that matter.

The legal position is quite obscure. And, for one thing, it is not very easy, when you put up a balloon, to tell with any confidence where it is going to go. It is true that in the main the winds

[2] For text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 13, 1956, p. 246.

flow from the west to the east, but that's not uniformly true. Not infrequently they turn around and go in the other direction.

There was one that was put up in California, and which practically went all the way round the world. It transited the United States, the Atlantic, Europe, somewhere through the Asian area, and was last heard of, I understand, in the Western Pacific. I am told that they are gathering an extraordinary amount of useful and new information about these jet stream air currents and, in doing so, at a height which does not practicably involve any risk to anyone. What the legal position is, I wouldn't feel in a position to answer, because I do not believe that the legal position has even been codified, you might say.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are any other countries similarly launching balloons of this kind, for instance, the Soviet Union, or England, or France?

A. No. They are not, as far as I know, although several of them are cooperating with us in this particular project.

Q. There is a balloon that was found 2 or 3 days ago in Japan which came from the Soviet Union. There were reports today from Tokyo.

A. Well, it is quite likely that they are doing that. I don't know anything about that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the Middle East question, has there been any word from General Burns [Maj. Gen. E. L. M. Burns, Chief of Staff of the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization] in response to the statement in the communique after the Eden visit last week? [3]

A. Could I postpone that question a minute? I would just like to make clear, in connection with this talk about balloons, that the United States Government has not directly or indirectly sent up any propaganda balloons whatever designed to transit into the Soviet Union. The note received from the Soviet Union apparently, perhaps deliberately or perhaps not, seemed to confuse these meteorological balloons with certain propaganda balloons which have been sent up by some organizations, I believe primarily in relation to some of the satellite countries. But I want to repeat that the United States Government has not directly or indirectly attempted to send any propaganda material whatever by air into the Soviet Union.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on that same question, would you care to clear up the other implication—that these balloons carry photographic equipment which are photographing ground installations?

A. Well, I do believe that they do carry some photographic equipment as part of the devices which, on the one hand, keep track of the speed at which the balloons travel and, on the other hand, reproduce cloud formations which are usually under the balloons. When you fly at 50,000 feet or thereabouts you generally find cloud conditions underneath, and there is some recording, I believe, photographically of certain cloud conditions. It would be quite accidental, I believe, if the photograph happened to pick up anything significant on the ground. Of course, they fly by day and by night. During daytime there are apt to be cloud conditions, so that that aspect of the matter I think could only be quite accidental.

Q. On that same question, sir, you received the note from the Soviet Union covering this matter?

A. Yes, we did. And I hope we will get a reply out today or tomorrow.[4]

Q. Mr. Secretary, is this material made available to scientific organizations of other countries?

A. Yes, after it is collated, it will, if it is of value—and, in fact, I think they already are satisfied that it will be of value. We hope to make it available, probably on a broad basis, in connection with this forthcoming Geophysical Year.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what are we doing, if anything, to codify the international law on the question of the balloons?

A. I don't know whether it is being considered by the international law group of the United Nations or not. I just don't know.

Q. Would we favor such a consideration, sir?

A. I would think so, yes.

Q. Does the American Air Force, for instance, start these balloons from fields in Germany, or other parts of the NATO countries?

A. I don't know. An announcement was made on this subject—I was looking at it yesterday. A

[3] *Ibid.*, Feb. 13, 1956, p. 232.

[4] For the correspondence with the Soviet Union and a Department of Defense press release of Jan. 8, see p. 293.

full press release on this was given out, I think, on the 8th of January, and it spoke about various places in Europe, as well as, I think, it mentioned Okinawa, Alaska, Hawaii, and the like. I don't know just where they are coming from in Western Europe.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on another subject, Russia seems to be making a certain—

A. If you are going on to another subject, I have got to give some gentleman here that I cut off first place. Was it you?

Middle East

Q. To go back to the Middle East, Mr. Secretary—

A. Yes.

Q. Have you had any word from General Burns in response to the part of the Eden-Eisenhower communique saying that you would look with favor on the request for additional observers?

A. No, we have not had a reply, but we would hardly expect one. We sent a copy of our communique in that respect to the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations, and he in turn, I understand, forwarded it to General Burns, who is now in the Near East. But we have had no reply yet.

Q. A second point on the Middle East—is it correct, as it has been widely reported, that the United States would favor a one-kilometer withdrawal by the Arabs, Egyptians, and Israeli forces, to make a two-kilometer-wide zone along the border in which these unarmed U.N. observers could more carefully monitor the frontier?

A. That was not discussed at all during the Eden visit here, and I suppose it would be a suggestion which, if it had merit, would be made by General Burns. If he thought it had merit, we would certainly carefully consider it, but we have not, as far as I am aware, put it forward.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to go back to the other subject, Russia seems to be making a sudden drive in the last week or two along with Red China to create a new feeling of friendship with Pakistan, as though to break down the Baghdad Pact and interfere with SEATO. I wonder if you would give us your evaluation of Pakistan as a member both of the Baghdad Pact and of the SEATO organization.

A. We believe that Pakistan is a member of SEATO and also a member of the Baghdad Pact because they are aware of the inherently predatory nature of Soviet foreign policy and also because their people, being deeply religious people, find repugnant the attitude which the Soviet rulers take toward religion. I believe that those two elements are dominant in making the foreign policy of Pakistan. They are fundamental, and I do not think it likely that anything that is now being said by the Soviet rulers would change the feeling of the Pakistani toward Soviet communism.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been published an interview with President Gronchi of Italy which has circulated fairly widely. In it he made certain suggestions he said he would bring to your attention when he comes later this month. I wonder if you have seen this and if you have any comment about it.

A. Well, I observed that there seemed to be some difference of opinion between President Gronchi and the writer of the article, and I think I had better leave that dispute to be settled as between them.

Visit of President Mayer

Q. Mr. Secretary, you met Mr. Mayer yesterday.[5] *Could you tell us the general line of the talk and especially what are the views of his Government about EURATOM? Are you planning to do something to help achieve this project?*

A. Well, our talks with President Mayer were designed primarily to express the deep interest which the Government of the United States has in the project reflected by the Coal and Steel Community. That concept of integration, of which this is the first expression, is a matter of deep concern to us, and we made clear our desire to be helpful and constructive in any way we can. We already have been quite helpful in the granting of a loan of $100 million by the Export-Import Bank and by the establishment of an ambassadorial diplomatic mission to the Coal and Steel Community and by the official status accorded to the President of the High Authority on his visit here.

[5] For a communique on the visit of René Mayer, President of the High Authority of the European Community for Coal and Steel, see p. 289.

Now, you refer to the question, I think, of EURATOM, and I think you referred to and asked whether President Mayer dealt with the views of his Government. Now, at the moment his Government is not the French Government but is the High Authority, and the High Authority is not itself officially involved in this matter. We did have some casual conversation last night at dinner about the whole matter, but President Mayer did not purport in any way to speak for the French Government.

Q. It has been widely reported that the British were reluctant on the scheme. I wonder whether Mr. Mayer in his position as President talked about that to you or insisted about it.

A. Well, I expect that he will find some opportunity to express while he is here his own views on that subject. All I think that I can properly say is that President Mayer believes very strongly in the concept which is now embodied in the Coal and Steel Community, and I think he would be sympathetic to an extension of that concept into broader fields.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to go back to balloons, my impression of what you said earlier is in effect you deny that any balloons have been sent over Soviet territory for military purposes, and say that if any have crossed Soviet frontiers it has been by accident or the chances of the winds, and so on. Is that correct?

A. I think we had to assume that some of these weather balloons put up into these high jet-stream areas might go a long way and would probably cover many, many countries. I suppose in this whole project so far that weather balloons put up in the air probably have covered 20 to 30 different countries. The meteorological information sought can only be obtained by having these balloons travel greater distances than just the territory of a single state. So the concept of their high flying and wide flying is inherent in the project, as I think was made clear in the announcement. But the information that is being sought is not essentially or even at all military information. There is information about the movement of these jet streams which has a bearing upon a great many things. Some people think that the climatic changes which have occurred recently in various parts of the world are due to the shifting of these great jet streams of air at high altitudes. So, to locate those streams and measure their velocity and, from time to time, to measure their shifts, is a part of a project which has worldwide significance.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in anticipating that these balloons would go over the territory of other countries, did the Government take any action or consider the question of notifying other countries that they might?

A. There was a public notice which was given to all the world at the time when this project was conceived and about to be launched. I am told that the gondolas that these balloons carry have in them requests in various languages, including the Russian language, that if the gondola is found a reward will be paid for its return, so that the information that is available in the apparatus can be obtained and collated with that from other sources.

Q. Mr. Secretary, does that mean that, provided that there is no determination to the contrary, the United States feels that they have the right to send these balloons at a certain height anywhere around the globe?

A. Yes, I think that we feel that way, although, as I say, there is no clear international law on the subject. We would be disposed to be respectful of the strong views of any country which was opposed to it. While one can never be sure of where a balloon is going to go when you put it up 50,000 feet into the air, we would be disposed to try to avoid the territory of any country which felt violent objection to it. We would do this, not as a matter of their right but as a matter of decent, friendly relations.

Arab-Israel Relations

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your letter to the 40 Congressmen released yesterday,[6] *you spoke of the necessity of establishment of friendly relations between Israel and her neighbors and you said we are actively working toward the establishment of such relations. Would you in some way elaborate for us as to the nature of these efforts?*

A. The efforts are those which were, I think, most officially expressed in my speech of August

[6] See p. 285.

26,[7] which I have often referred to. The principles of that seem to be sound. We constantly are keeping those proposals before the governments of the countries concerned—the Government of Israel and the Governments of the Arab countries concerned—and emphasizing the great gains which would be achieved if the economic benefits that are portrayed in that program could be realized and the resources of the area devoted to the well-being of the people rather than to the barren effort to build up armament.

Q. Mr. Secretary, as I understand it, this Geophysical Year is being, taken part in by all countries, including Russia. Can you tell us whether the projects which each country is engaged in were divided up or whether each country decided on its own what projects it would undertake?

A. No, I don't know the answer to that question. But I do want to make clear I do not mean to suggest that this particular project is part of the Geophysical Year. I do suggest that it will probably garner information of a kind which would be interesting to those scientists who get together for the celebration of the Geophysical Year.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said that the United States would be respectful of any strong, opposition of any country which had strong opposition to having balloons over its territory. The Russians obviously feel strongly about having balloons over their territory. Will we do something to prevent their drifting over the U.S.S.R.?

A. Well, I would prefer not to answer that question until the note which we are preparing on that subject is released, which I hope will be by tomorrow or the day after.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could I ask one more technical question on this? At what point does—at what height, I mean approximate height, does the balloon leave the area of sovereignty?

A. I just can't answer that question. I am very sorry. But it is the same problem that we get on a minor scale when you deal with a question as to whether a man who has a house near an airfield has a right to prevent planes flying over his piece of land and his home. There have been lawsuits, as you know, brought by the owners of homes near airfields, to try to prevent the airplanes from going over, on the theory that if you own a piece of land you own the air up a certain distance in the air. Well, in the main those lawsuits have been rejected, although certainly everybody admits that, if you own a piece of land, you do control the air to a certain distance up. But precisely what the distance is has never been decided, even in domestic law. When you get into international law, the problem is also obscure. I don't know how high a balloon has to go before you get out of the bounds of sovereignty, so to speak.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you prepared to make the information obtained by these balloons available to those countries who do not object to having them fly over their territory?

A. Yes, I expect we will make it available to all countries.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it pretty well established that these balloons are what people used to see as flying saucers?

A. I wouldn't be surprised if some of the so-called flying saucers were these balloons.

Q. Do you know other things that were flying saucers that weren't these things?

A. No, I don't.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is the United States Government's attitude toward these privately launched propaganda balloons?

A. Well, those are efforts in the main by private citizens, some of them refugees of some of the satellite countries, to communicate with their fellow countrymen back home. They operate outside of the United States. Since these are private activities, it is not a situation which we feel disposed to try to control.

Q. What is the position, sir, on radio broadcasts into the Soviet world? Is that similarly undefined as to airspace? That is done both by official United States Government and non-Government sources.

A. You know, I used to be an international lawyer, or thought I was. But I haven't practiced for so long that I am getting a bit rusty. I should have brought along, I think, Mr. Phleger, who is my Legal Adviser, to this particular conference. That is another question, I think, where inter-

[7] BULLETIN of Sept. 5, 1955, p. 378.

ıational law is quite obscure: whether you have ı right to send ether waves carrying messages into ınother country or whether you have the right to ry to jam those waves. We have tried, as you ınow, at the last Geneva conference to get an ıgreement that what you might call straight news broadcasts would be recognized and not sought to be jammed, but we could not get very far with he Soviets on that score. What the law is, I don't know, but it is a case where I would suppose it would be extremely difficult to make any rule that you couldn't send radio messages into another country because they automatically go there. It is in ways sometimes like these balloons. You send them up and you can't tell where they are going to go. In the case of the radio, of course, some of it is directly, openly beamed to another country for deliberate purposes. I don't think it has ever been suggested that that was illegal.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

United States Policy in the Middle East

Following is an exchange of correspondence between Secretary Dulles and a group of 40 members of the House of Representatives.

SECRETARY DULLES TO MEMBERS OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Press release 65 dated February 6

FEBRUARY 6, 1956

GENTLEMEN: I have your letter of February 3. I share your concern at the continuing tense situation in the Near East, and at the persistent threat it represents to the peace. Let me say that the foreign policy of the United States embraces the preservation of the State of Israel. It also embraces the principle of maintaining our friendship with Israel and the Arab States.

The Government of Israel, feeling that its peaceful existence is threatened by the large amount of arms now made available to certain Arab countries by the Soviet bloc, desires to purchase from the United States and other countries additional armament to balance what it considers to be the increased threat against it.

The United States recognizes that current developments would create a disparity in armed force between Israel and its Arab neighbors. However, we are not convinced that that disparity can be adequately offset by additional purchases of arms by the State of Israel. Israel has a population of under two million, whereas the Arab population amounts to tens of millions, and they apparently have been offered access to huge stores of Soviet bloc material. Under this circumstance the security of Israel can perhaps better be assured by means other than an arms race.

The having in hand, by Israel, of equal or superior arms is not the only deterrent to aggression. Israel is a creation of, and member of, the United Nations; the Arab States are also members, and all are solemnly bound by that Charter to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force. The United Nations organization is capable of providing many forms of protection. Furthermore, the United States in 1950 joined with the United Kingdom and France to declare a policy of action within and without the United Nations to deter aggression by either side against the other. United States policy in that respect has recently been reemphasized in the statement issued on February 1, 1956, by President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Eden.[1] The combined influence of the nations which would, under the United Nations Charter and the Tripartite Declaration, be against any armed aggression is a far more effective deterrent to any potential aggressor than any amount of arms which could be obtained by either side.

We do not exclude the possibility of arms sales to Israel. But it is our belief that the security of states in the Near East cannot rest upon arms alone but rather upon the international rule of law and upon the establishment of friendly rela-

[1] BULLETIN of Feb. 13, 1956, p. 232.

tions among neighbors. We are actively working toward the establishment of such relations.

In my speech of August 26, 1955,[2] made with President Eisenhower's concurrence, I referred to the fear and tension arising in the area from the lack of fixed permanent boundaries and indicated U.S. willingness to assist the parties in substituting agreed frontiers for armistice lines. To encourage the parties to work toward such agreement and to assure them that the United States would be prepared to make its contribution to the maintenance of international respect for such boundaries, I stated that the President would recommend that the United States participate in an international guarantee of agreed frontiers. That statement still stands.

Tripartite Meeting on Situation in Middle East

Press release 73 dated February 8

Representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France met on February 8 to consider the situation in the Middle East. As members of the United Nations, the three Governments share in the responsibility of all members to be alert and vigilant to threats to international peace and security.

In light of the increased tension in the Middle East and in accordance with their undertakings in the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France believed it would be useful to discuss their responsibilities under that declaration.

This was a preliminary exchange of views, and further consultations will take place.

You inquire about economic aid. United States policy in the extension of economic aid is based upon the desire to strengthen other free nations. In the case of each aid program we take into account the nature of the project in question and the purpose for which it was intended. I can assure you that United States aid would not be extended for purposes or under circumstances which we judged would undermine peace in any part of the world.

The Arab refugees remain perhaps the most important single source of bitterness existing between the Arab States and Israel. In my speech of August 26, 1955, I proposed that the problem of the Arab refugees be attacked in several ways. I suggested United States participation in an international loan to Israel to assist her in funding her obligation to pay compensation for property left in Israel by the refugees and which is now being utilized by Israel. I recommended assistance to Israel and the Arab States in the rehabilitation of the refugees both by repatriation to Israel to such extent as may be feasible and resettlement in adjoining Arab States. In this connection the Arab States and Israel have accepted, on a technical basis, the Jordan Valley plan which would provide new economic opportunities for several hundred thousand refugees. But final political approval remains to be achieved. Thus, some progress has been realized, but much remains to be done.

I know that you all understand that it is not practical, or in the interest of the goals we seek, to discuss publicly all of the factors involved in this complicated situation. I know you also recognize that the problems of this area must be studied in the larger context of the free world's unceasing struggle against international communism. I have, however, no hesitation in declaring that the United States, seeking for itself to avoid involvement in war, is earnestly striving as a friend of both Israel and its Arab neighbors to relieve the present tension in the area. If the political and economic developments should subsequently become such as to make Congressional action desirable or necessary, the President would, of course, promptly communicate with the Congress.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

[2] *Ibid.*, Sept. 5, 1955, p. 378.

MEMBERS OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO SECRETARY DULLES

FEBRUARY 3, 1956

The Honorable JOHN FOSTER DULLES
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: As you know many of us, in our individual capacity of Members of Congress, have been in continuing communica-

on with the Department of State concerning e tragic increase of tensions in the Middle East. our statement of August 26, 1955, outlined the sic concepts which could, through effective im- lementation, bring peace to this troubled area. your statement, you outlined certain specific oblems requiring solution in order to bring out peaceful conditions. You referred to the ck of fixed permanent boundaries between Israel d its Arab neighbors, the fear of an imbalance power which might lead to violence on the part one of the parties to the controversy against e other, and to the tragic plight of the 900,000 fugees whose displacement presents a continual oblem.

We, therefore, proceed from the premise that u recognize the great danger to peace in the iddle East. We and the millions of constitu- ts whom we, collectively, represent are gravely ncerned about the immediate necessity for find- g means to bring about a treaty of peace between rael and the Arab world.

We, therefore, would like to state in further tail some of the problems which we consider ed to be met by our Government and associated vernments particularly Great Britain and rance. Under the Tripartite Declaration of 50, our Government recognized "that the Arab tates and Israel all need to maintain a certain vel of armed forces for the purpose of assuring eir internal security and their legitimate self- fense and to permit them to play their part in e defense of the area as a whole". Because of a ar of growing imbalance of arms, the Govern- ent of Israel desires to purchase through private urces defensive arms strictly for purposes of self- fense. We have individually, and now collec- vely, taken the position that Israel as a firm part f the free world should be allowed to obtain in e open market such weapons as would assure her otection against aggression. What is the posi- on of the State Department on this matter?

We do not contend that tension in the Middle ast can be finally resolved by the provision of efensive arms alone. We are convinced that im- ediate negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty f peace between Israel and the Arab world should e undertaken. These negotiations should be ef- ectively implemented by our Government in asso- iation with those governments which joined in e Tripartite Declaration of 1950.

It is vital that prompt and decisive measures be taken to end the threat of war in the Near East.

To achieve this end, the negotiation of formal treaties guaranteeing the existing frontiers of Israel and the Arab nations is essential but essential also is a willingness to negotiate such treaties. We believe that a treaty of peace and a guarantee of existing frontiers should be offered to all interested parties in the Middle East and should be implemented promptly as to the frontiers of that nation or those nations which accept the proposed peace terms. Otherwise we continue to be faced with the refusal of some nations to enter into peace negotiations or even to recognize the existence of the State of Israel. What is the position of the State Department in this regard?

There are two additional matters as to which we seek information from the Department: first, we do not believe that economic aid should be extended to any nation which is engaging in warlike or aggressive maneuvers against any part of the free world. Therefore, we would like to go on record as urging our Department of State to consider most carefully further extension of economic aid, denying such aid to those countries which by their actions endanger the peace and security of free nations. What is the position of the State Department in this regard?

Second, we agree with your August 26th, 1955, statement concerning the immediate desirability of economic and technical help in resettling those Arab refugees whose continued presence in their present location delays or impedes the possibility of a total solution of the Arab-Israel problem. What progress has been made by our Government and associated nations toward the solution of this matter?

We recognize that the continuing effort of our Government to counter the spread of world Communism has many facets. Action taken anywhere may have repercussions in all parts of the world. But we do urgently feel that our constituents will be better informed by frank statements of the position of the Department of State wherever that is possible, consistent with national security. As Members of Congress, who support the aims and objectives of this Administration, we are particularly anxious that our constituents be advised that the Department is taking positive steps toward the protection of free nations such as Israel and toward the dissolution of dangers which in threaten-

ing the peace of Israel, threaten also the peace of the free world.

We would much appreciate an early response to this urgent expression of our concern.

Member	*District*	*State*
Hugh Scott	6th	Pennsylvania
Albert P. Morano	4th	Connecticut
Kenneth B. Keating	38th	New York
Edmund P. Radwan	41st	New York
James G. Fulton	27th	Pennsylvania
Thomas M. Pelly	1st	Washington
Thor C. Tollefson	6th	Washington
Karl M. LeCompte	4th	Iowa
R. Walter Riehlman	35th	New York
Albert W. Cretella	3rd	Connecticut
Howard H. Baker	2nd	Tennessee
Horace Seely-Brown, Jr.	2nd	Connecticut
Timothy P. Sheehan	11th	Illinois
Alvin M. Bentley	8th	Michigan
Laurence Curtis	10th	Massachusetts
Gordon Canfield	8th	New Jersey
Robert W. Kean	12th	New Jersey
John P. Saylor	22nd	Pennsylvania
Joseph L. Carrigg	10th	Pennsylvania
Stuyvesant N. Wainwright	1st	New York
Steven B. Derounian	2nd	New York
Frank J. Becker	3rd	New York
Francis E. Dorn	12th	New York
Katharine St. George	28th	New York
Bernard W. Kearney	32nd	New York
William R. Williams	34th	New York
Harold C. Ostertag	39th	New York
Thomas B. Curtis	2nd	Missouri
James T. Patterson	5th	Connecticut
William E. Miller	40th	New York
Robert J. Corbett	29th	Pennsylvania
Jackson B. Chase	2nd	Nebraska
Paul A. Fino	25th	New York
Ruth Thompson	3rd	Michigan
Gordon L. McDonough	15th	California
DeWitt S. Hyde	6th	Maryland
Frederic R. Coudert, Jr.	17th	New York
Carroll D. Kearns	24th	Pennsylvania
Donald L. Jackson	16th	California
Peter Frelinghuysen, Jr.	5th	New Jersey

ICA Gives Gamma Globulin To Combat Epidemic in India

A half million cubic centimeters of gamma globulin have been sent by air to India by the International Cooperation Administration as a gift of the people of the United States to help that country combat an epidemic of infectious hepatitis in the New Delhi area, Ica announced on January 27.

Gamma globulin is recognized as an effective preventive of hepatitis, sometimes called yellow jaundice, among persons exposed to the disease. The 500,000 cc.'s sent to India is estimated to be enough to provide protection for more than 200,000 persons who might have been exposed.

The gamma globulin was made available to Ica by the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis at well below existing prices. The cost, including air freight, was about $425,000. The Foundation was able to supply the gamma globulin from its reserves in Chicago without any danger of depletion of supplies needed for U.S. domestic purposes. It has been stockpiling gamma globulin for several years because of its effectiveness against polio, but the Salk vaccine has lessened the need for this purpose in this country.

Director John B. Hollister of Ica has expressed appreciation to the Foundation for making the supplies available so that the United States could help India in combating the epidemic.

Exchange of Views With President of Coal and Steel Authority

Following are the texts of a joint announcement released on February 8 and a joint communique released on February 9 regarding the visit to Washington of René Mayer, President of the High Authority of the European Community for Coal and Steel.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF FEBRUARY 8

White House press release dated February 8

The President of the High Authority of the European Community for Coal and Steel, M. René Mayer, called on the President this morning. M. Mayer discussed developments in the European Coal and Steel Community and its prospects for the future.

The President expressed to M. Mayer the friendly interest of the United States in the program of the European Coal and Steel Community, and in the activities of this first supranational institution in Europe. He assured M. Mayer that the United States regards continued progress towards European integration as a vital contribution towards security, welfare and freedom during the years ahead.

COMMUNIQUE OF FEBRUARY 9

ress release 75 dated February 9

During the past three days, the President of the High Authority for Coal and Steel, M. René Mayer, has been in Washington for an exchange of views with officials of the United States Government.

President Mayer called on President Eisenhower. M. Mayer discussed with President Eisenhower developments in the European Coal and Steel Community and its prospects for the future.

The President expressed to M. Mayer the friendly interest of the United States in the program of the European Coal and Steel Community, and in the activities of this first supranational institution in Europe. He assured M. Mayer that the United States regards continued progress towards European integration as a vital contribution towards security, welfare and freedom during the years ahead.

In addition to his conversation with the President, President Mayer discussed questions of mutual interest between the European Coal and Steel Community and the United States, among other things the present situation of coal and scrap markets. These conversations took place with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of the Interior, the President of the Export-Import Bank, and the Chairman of the Board of the Federal Reserve System.

As President of the Executive of Europe's first supranational institution, M. Mayer reviewed the achievements of the European Community for Coal and Steel; this review was also made in relation to other initiatives being taken in Europe to extend European economic unity.

During President Mayer's call on Mr. Dulles, the Secretary of State pointed out that the United States had recognized the importance of its friendly relationship to the European Community for Coal and Steel by establishing recently a Mission to the High Authority headed by an officer of ambassadorial rank.[1] President Mayer and Secretary Dulles voiced the expectation that this Mission would contribute to the strengthening of the close and cordial relations which exist between the European Community for Coal and Steel and the United States.

[1] BULLETIN of Oct. 24, 1955, p. 643.

Tariff Concessions to Sweden

Press release 64 dated February 6

As announced by the Department of State on August 22, 1955,[1] in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol for the Accession of Japan to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, U.S. concessions to countries other than Japan in connection with the negotiations for Japan's accession will be made effective 30 days after such countries notify the Executive Secretary of the general agreement that their concessions to Japan are being placed in effect.

On January 16, 1956, the Government of Sweden gave such notification regarding the concessions contained in its schedule to the Protocol. Accordingly the United States will on February 15, 1956, apply the concessions initially negotiated with Sweden which are not already in effect. The products affected are:

Item Designation	*Description*
38	Extracts, dyeing, and tanning, not containing alcohol: Oak
1409 [second]	Sulphite wrapping paper not specially provided for
1536 [first]	Candles

The President has notified the Secretary of the Treasury of the effective date for these concessions to Sweden. The text of the notification follows.

President's Letter to Secretary Humphrey[2]

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, February 6, 1956.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Reference is made to my proclamation of July 22, 1955[3] carrying out the Protocol of Terms of Accession by Japan to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

On January 16, 1956, Sweden gave to the Executive Secretary to the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement the notification, referred to in paragraph 3 of the Protocol for the accession of Japan, regarding the application of concessions which it had negotiated initially with Japan. Accordingly, pursuant to the procedure described in Part I (b) (1) of the above-mentioned proclama-

[1] BULLETIN of Sept. 5, 1955, p. 397.
[2] 21 *Fed. Reg.* 829.
[3] BULLETIN of Aug. 8, 1955, p. 226.

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tion, I hereby notify you that items 38, 1409 [second], and 1536 [first] in Part I of Schedule XX to the said Protocol shall not be withheld pursuant to paragraph 4 of the said Protocol on or after February 15, 1956.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Honorable GEORGE M. HUMPHREY,
Secretary of the Treasury.

Visit of Prime Minister of Ireland

White House press release dated February 8

The Prime Minister of Ireland, John A. Costello, has accepted an invitation to be the guest of the United States Government in March. It is anticipated that the Prime Minister will be in Washington from March 14 to 17. The official visit will also include 3 days in New York City later in the month.

The Present Situation in Germany

by Under Secretary Hoover [1]

A few days ago I returned from a brief visit to West Germany and Berlin. The purpose of my trip was to take part in the 10th anniversary of RIAS—Radio in the American Sector of Berlin—whose programs are primarily directed to the captive population in the Soviet Zone of East Germany.[2]

After visiting Berlin, one begins to realize how very important an institution like RIAS can be to the lives and hopes of these people. It has served for a decade as a link between the East Germans, who are being held against their will behind the Iron Curtain, and the outside free world. It has helped to maintain their faith in the fundamental concepts of freedom and justice.

A similar role is being played by the Free Europe Committee, financed by the privately organized Crusade for Freedom. Through broadcasts over Radio Free Europe, and by other nongovernmental means, the support and sympathy of the free world is communicated to the captive people of Eastern Europe. This private endeavor plays a vital role in carrying the message of freedom and hope and is worthy of the widespread assistance it receives each year from the American people.

I would like to discuss with you today one of the most vital problems affecting world peace—the reunification of Germany as a free and sovereign country.

A trip to Bonn and Berlin, no matter how brief, impresses one with the harsh facts of the artificial partition that dominates German life today. What should have been a single state, with the traditional seat of its central government in Berlin, remains divided into two basic areas: the Federal Republic, with its provisional capital in Bonn, and the Soviet Zone or so-called German Democratic Republic.

The injustice of this continuing division of Germany by the Soviets, 10 years after the end of World War II, must be peacefully resolved. But unification cannot be achieved at the cost of true liberty for the German people. Much as the West Germans want to be joined with their countrymen who are being held captive by the Soviets in the Eastern Zone, they know unity must be based on freedom if it is to have lasting meaning.

In the two adjacent but divided parts of Germany the forces of communism and the forces of freedom have each left their imprint for the world to see. Because it so clearly depicts two contrasting philosophies of government, the postwar period has a particular significance. No nation and no people can afford to ignore the lesson which has been so vividly taught in Germany during this time.

[1] Address made before the Foreign Policy Association at New York, N. Y., on Feb. 10 (press release 76).

[2] For text of Mr. Hoover's address at Berlin, see BULLETIN of Feb. 13, 1956, p. 242.

Following the war these two systems began to function side by side and under the same conditions. They dealt with populations of the same national heritage and the same economic background.

East Germany has been a tragic example of what happens under Communist domination. West Germany affords a shining example of liberty and prosperity.

A Tribute to German Energy

The phenomenal economic and political recovery in West Germany will stand forever as a tribute to the energy and ability of the German people at work under a free society. Out of this soil of freedom, and with the assistance of the West, there has grown a stable, sovereign, and democratic government that has commanded worldwide respect. Industrial production has doubled over prewar levels. Today West Germany has a thriving economy with a standard of living no one considered possible 10 years ago. It supports not only its own expanding postwar population but an additional 10 million people who have come from Communist areas.

In this new free society, all of its elements have contributed and flourished—industry, labor, agriculture, churches, schools, professions, arts, and political parties. The people of the Federal Republic have the right to think freely, to speak freely, and to have a truly free press. They have a constitutional government—with their representatives freely elected, without interference or coercion, and free to shape the destiny of their own country. They are in every sense a free nation. In his dedication to those principles, Chancellor Adenauer has been a source of inspiration to free men everywhere.

Progress—if you want to call it that—in the zone that the Soviets have ruled is in sharp contrast to that of the Federal Republic. The grim facts are well known, but they need to be repeated over and over. In no other way can the moral force of humanity in the rest of the world be brought to bear on this travesty of justice.

What are the economic facts of life in this Communist area of East Germany? Workers must meet ever-increasing goals of output without adequate compensation. Their so-called "trade union" is merely a government instrument for propaganda, restraint, and control. They have destroyed the finest traditions of independence and responsibility in the trade union movement. Farmers have been deprived of freedom and incentive by enforced collectivization. They must produce high-delivery quotas at artificially low prices. Basic foods and consumer items are in short supply. The standard of living is ruthlessly depressed below the level that their hard work would be expected to provide. Only one-third as many housing units are built in East Germany each year, in proportion to the population, as there are in the Federal Republic.

Contrasts in Berlin

The contrast is there, it is real, and it is appalling. It is even more striking between the two sections of Berlin.

The free sector of Berlin, despite its geographic isolation from West Germany and its artificial separation from the surrounding countryside, has made a remarkable recovery. Its 2 million people are far better off than the million East Berliners whose part of the city is directly linked to the economy of the surrounding Soviet Zone. The contrast was obvious during my brief visit. East of the Brandenburg Gate, life seemed drab and oppressive. One could sense the depressed outlook of a regimented people under Communist domination.

In West Berlin, however, one is impressed by the open countenances and confident manner of a people for whom freedom has become a matter of real personal significance. They are cheerful and going about their lives with a definite purpose. They have raised the level of their economy, primarily as a result of their trade with the Federal Republic in the West, until they are now virtually self-supporting.

It would be hard to find any area in the world more stanch in its repudiation of communism than the Federal Republic, and particularly the free part of Berlin.

The full force of the anti-Communist attitude is difficult to comprehend without visiting Germany and learning firsthand of the deep-rooted nature of German hostility toward the Communist system. One-fifth of the population in free Germany are refugees from Communist oppression. Several million more are veterans who have experienced life under Communist domination. Their appreciation of the values of freedom is firm and

unwavering. Furthermore, West Germans are constantly reminded of the real meaning of life under communism by the reports that come from their relatives and friends who are still in the Soviet Zone. They want none of it.

During my visit in West Berlin I had occasion to stop in one of the industrial districts close to the dividing line with the Soviet sector. I found that in the days soon after the war the Communist vote was over 35 percent. As time went on, however, the people of the area had a firsthand opportunity to observe the regimentation and the loss of freedom in the Soviet Zone. The Communist vote dwindled steadily, until in the last election it reached an alltime low of less than 5 percent. This is a dramatic example of the increasingly deep-seated feeling against communism that is so prevalent in the free parts of Germany.

A similar attitude appears in the Communist-dominated territory. It is reliably estimated that an overwhelming proportion of the captive German population would repudiate communism if they could exercise their free will in a truly free election. Obviously the Communist regime in East Germany cannot speak for the population under its domination.

The Soviets are constantly telling the world of the social and economic gains of communism in East Germany. The East Germans clearly recognize these claims are a false front to cover the machinery of an iron dictatorship. Widespread popular uprisings by them indicated to the world that a free, secret, and uninfluenced ballot would have run the Communists out of office by an overwhelming vote.

Refugees From East Germany

Perhaps the most impressive testimony to the failures of the Communist East German system is the fact that last year over a quarter of a million East Germans left their homes, farms, relatives and lifetime surroundings behind them in their determination to seek more freedom. It is particularly significant that a large proportion were from the younger generation. In many cases the parents made the sacrifice of staying behind so that their children could grow up in a free society where they could choose their own careers and their own jobs. They wanted freedom of opportunity.

Those who left the Communist area were not merely protesting political, military, or economic hardships, however desperate they may have been. They were not seeking simply to improve their economic well-being. They were determined to regain the freedom and human dignity which was their birthright.

There are certain inescapable conclusions to be reached, as one returns from Germany, and after reviewing the last 10 years of German history:

First, were it not for the Communist apparatus that has been imposed by the Soviets and backed up by some 22 Soviet Army divisions, the East German people would move immediately to join their 50 million countrymen in West Berlin and the free Federal Republic. This urge for reunification is overwhelming in all parts of Germany.

Second, the puppet regime that has been set up within the Soviet Zone cannot truly represent the people of East Germany. Irrespective of what it is called, it is still a puppet and not a nation. It is an affront to free nations everywhere.

Third, the moral indignation of the world must be brought to bear on the injustices of Communist occupation. We must drive home to free nations everywhere the insincerity and falsity of the Soviet pretensions to peace and good will, while they continue to hold 17 million East Germans in captive domination with no opportunity to express their free will. The world must not be allowed to forget the injustices of Soviet imperialism in Europe. So long as the Soviet Union maintains its grip on 100 million people in East Germany and the other satellite countries, the conscience of the world must be kept fully aware of these injustices. To be lulled into acceptance of the *status quo* is to prepare the way for further loss of freedom. As Secretary Dulles said in Chicago last December, "We shall not seek to cure these injustices by ourselves invoking force. But we can and will constantly keep these injustices at the forefront of human consciousness."[3]

Fourth, the Western World has given full support to the efforts of the German people to maintain their freedom in West Berlin and in the Federal Republic. We must leave no doubt in their minds, nor in the minds of the Communists, that we will continue to do so.

The struggle ahead will not be easy. It will require patience and persistence. But there is a source of confidence in the moral integrity of

[3] *Ibid.*, Dec. 19, 1955, p. 1003.

e free world which we share with the Germans ıd with other free nations everywhere. Free-orld strength is not only a matter of military de-nse, or of economic and scientific development. is above all else the strength of the moral, iritual, and intellectual heritage of the Western orld. It recognizes political liberty and the dividual rights of free men as inherent in a st and lasting peace.

rotest on Para-Military Units ı East Berlin

Following is the text of a note from U. S. Am-ıssador James B. Conant to Soviet Ambassador . M. Pushkin delivered at Berlin on February 10. imilar notes were delivered by the British and rench Ambassadors.

ess release 77 dated February 10

I am instructed to inform you of the growing ɔncern of my Government over the development recent months of para-military activities in e Soviet Sector of Berlin. These activities as-ımed an ominous form when some thousands of vilians, armed with machine pistols and other eapons, marched through East Berlin in a ɜmonstration on January 15. We note that this ɜmonstration even included the participation of ɔung boys and girls carrying firearms.

The formation of para-military groups and ıeir employment in provocative displays have rious implications which my Government can-ɔt ignore. Their continued activity can only eate unrest among the population and result in heightening of international tension in the Ber-n area.

Such activity could have the gravest conse-ıences. As your Government is aware, the nited States, in common with the United King-ɔm and France, has formally undertaken to de-ɜnd the safety and welfare of the populations in ıeir sectors against attack from any quarter. he United States cannot recognize any waiver of sponsibility by the Soviet Government for acts hich could lead to any such attack.

As you are aware, the bearing of arms by mem-ers of the general public is prohibited by a body f quadripartite legislation to which the British, rench and United States commandants attach reat importance and which they have been care-ıl to observe in their sectors. My Government hopes that the Soviet Government as the responsible authority will prevent the local authorities in the Soviet Sector from creating dangers to the peace of Berlin through the sponsorship of activities by armed civilian groups or through other threats directed at the Western Sectors.

Correspondence With U.S.S.R. Concerning Weather Balloons

U.S. NOTE OF FEBRUARY 8

Press release 72 dated February 8

Following is the text of the U.S. reply to the Soviet note of February 4, 1956, regarding meteorological balloons which was delivered on February 8 by the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Ambassador of the United States of America presents his compliments to the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs and, under instructions from his Government, has the honor to reply as follows to the Soviet Government's note of February 4, 1956.

In the Soviet Government note there is an apparent confusion between a publicized meteorological operation and previous Soviet allegations concerning the launching of propaganda balloons directed toward the Soviet Union. In this latter connection, the U.S. Government recalls certain oral observations were made by the Soviet Foreign Ministry on September 28 to the American Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow who denied any U.S. Government responsibility for activities of which the Soviet Government complained. The U.S. Government wishes to reaffirm that it is not directly or indirectly participating in any project to despatch propaganda balloons over the Soviet Union.

Insofar as the Soviet Government's note pertains to meteorological balloons, the U.S. Government is happy to supply information complementary to what is already public knowledge. Under United States auspices, a meteorological survey is being carried out by the launching of balloons which are in effect miniature "satellites" and which remain aloft for several days at a very considerable height placing them out of the range of commercial aircraft. A number of balloons have been launched in several parts of the world and many have been passing over the United

States. For example, a balloon sent up on January 8 in California, transited the U.S., the Atlantic Ocean, and the Eurasian Continent and was identified on January 20 transmitting homing signals from the Western Pacific.

The project was explained in a press release issued in Washington on January 8 which included pictures and details of the balloons. The Soviet Government is presumably aware of this announcement, but for convenient reference a copy is attached. While most of the balloon flights have taken place in the U.S., the announced opening of additional research stations in Europe, Alaska and Hawaii raised no objection by any government.

The balloons are equipped with instruments to measure and record meteorological phenomena such as air jet streams, and with photographic apparatus to provide pictures of cloud formations which bear on air movements at various velocities. Much valuable scientific information is being accumulated. It is hoped that this method of meteorological research will contribute substantially to the forthcoming International Geophysical Year programs.

The declared purpose of the project is made clear by the fact that the equipment itself contains instructions in several languages, including Russian, for its recovery and delivery to the authorities charged with the evaluation of the data obtained. In the interest of scientific research, it would be much appreciated if the Soviet Government would return the instruments which have come into its possession.

Similar surveys have been conducted for some time through the launching of some thousands of meteorological balloons over the United States. These have been equipped with safety devices and have constituted no hazard even to dense civilian air traffic. As explained in the announcement, the balloons observed by the Soviet Government are equipped with the same safety devices.

The United States Government would be happy to explain further to the Soviet Government the safety measures incorporated in the project. Provisionally, however, in order to avoid misunderstandings, and in view of the Soviet Government's objection, the United States Government will seek to avoid the launching of additional balloons which, on the basis of known data, might transit the USSR.

Department of Defense Press Release Dated January 8, 1956

AIR FORCE METEOROLOGICAL SURVEY EXPANDED IN NORTHERN HEMISPHERE

An Air Force meteorological survey, commonly known as "Moby Dick" here in the United States, is being expanded to include other areas in the Northern Hemisphere.

This research program has been in progress for the past two years to obtain meteorological research data above 30,000 feet. Large plastic balloons, which have often been mistaken for "flying saucers", will carry meteorological instruments, including cameras and radio equipment to record and telemeter atmospheric information. This method of obtaining meteorological research data might be of great use in the International Geophysical Year programs that will be conducted during 1957–1958.

Balloons are, in effect, miniature "satellites" that can remain aloft for several days and thereby collect continuous research data. The research data thus obtained will enable our scientists to better understand the many meteorological phenomena that exist in the vast unexplored region surrounding the earth. It is likely that information will be obtained that will be of importance when a man-made satellite is fired into the ionosphere within the next few years.

The program is designed to obtain simultaneous meteorological observations in the Northern Hemisphere. It is expected that new information will be obtained on jet streams, frontal systems, storm formations, electromagnetic radiation and radio propagation.

By studying the complete general circulation and pressure patterns we can learn more about the causes of severe weather. It is hoped that the information obtained may help explain recent climatic changes that have affected the United States. The 1955 hurricane paths shifted from their normal courses and brought disaster along our Eastern coastal area. Dust storms and gale winds caused extensive damage to crops in the Midwest. Heavy rainfall caused floods in the West and Northwest that have never been experienced before.

The U.S. Weather Bureau is interested in this program and the data will be analyzed in an attempt to improve forecasting and to provide early warnings of severe weather phenomena.

In the course of more than 4,000 balloon flights that have been conducted, no instances of personal injury or severe property damage has occurred. In order to preserve and continue this excellent safety record, foolproof safety devices are used on all balloon flights. Experience has also shown that balloon flights are not a hazard to aviation when flown at altitudes above 30,000 feet. Since commercial aviation and most military aviation are presently conducted below 30,000 feet, balloons are prevented from floating below this level by safety devices. A balloon that fails to reach 30,000 feet within 50–60 minutes after release is automatically destroyed and the equipment is lowered to earth by parachutes. Likewise, any balloon that descends to 30,000 after once passing through that altitude, is also destroyed.

The destruction of the balloon is rather simple. By ıtting away the attached equipment by use of a safety evice, the balloon rises rapidly into the sub-freezing ratosphere where expansion of lifting gas will cause it burst, just as ordinary meteorological sounding balloons xpand and burst at high altitude. As plastic material ecomes brittle at sub-freezing temperatures, the balloon, pon bursting actually shatters into many small pieces ıat float harmlessly to earth.

Most of the balloon flights have been conducted in the .S., however, the cooperation of other governments has ıade it possible for small research stations to be estab-shed in other countries. Meteorological balloons have een flown from Brazil, Panama, Scotland, Japan and kinawa. The addition of research stations in Europe, laska and Hawaii during 1956 will increase the scope of ıis program.

OVIET NOTE OF FEBRUARY 4

[Unofficial translation]

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to state ıe following to the Government of the USA:

During January of this year there have been seized in ıe air space of the Soviet Union a large number of aerial alloons up to fifteen meters in diameter with apparatus f various types, devices and other cargoes suspended herefrom. The above-mentioned balloons are balloons f polyethylene with capacity of up to 1600 cubic meters. 'he total weight of the cargo suspended from one such alloon reaches 650 kilos.

According to information at the disposal of the Soviet Government the release of these aerial balloons is carried ut by American military organizations from the territory f Western Germany, and also from American air bases ocated on the territory of certain states bordering on the Soviet Union. The apparatus suspended from these aerial alloons includes automatically operated photo cameras or aerial survey, radio transmitters, radio receivers and ther things. An examination of the captured balloons hows that both the balloons themselves and the apparatus uspended therefrom are manufactured in the United States of America. This is shown in part by such labels n various parts of the apparatus as "Made in USA" and he names of the American firms producing these parts—Atlas Engineering Company, Roxbury, Massachusetts; Elgin Neoxatic, Inc., Los Angeles, California; American 'henolic Corporation, Chicago, etc.

In addition to the above-mentioned balloons American organizations continue to release into the air spaces of the Soviet Union balloons with cargo consisting of leaflets ıostile to the USSR and propaganda literature.

As is known, already on September 28, 1955 the Soviet Government approached the Government of the United States on the question of the adoption of necessary measures in order that American organizations should cease the release from the territory of Western Germany of aerial balloons with cargo suspended therefrom. The Soviet Government pointed out that the flights of such balloons create a danger for airplanes flying on the internal lines of the Soviet Union and also on international lines going over the territories of the Soviet Union and of a series of European states.

The Soviet Government notes that the Government of the United States up to the present has not taken measures for the cessation of the above-mentioned impermissible activities of American organizations. According to information at the disposal of the competent Soviet organs the flights of such aerial balloons over the territory of the Soviet Union have not only not ceased but have recently assumed greater proportions.

It is not difficult to imagine the situation that would arise if states into whose air space the above-mentioned aerial balloons with cargo suspended therefrom are released embarked on the same path and began to release comparable flying mechanisms in the direction of the air space of those countries which bear responsibility for the illegal activities mentioned above.

The release into the air space of the Soviet Union of balloons with the cargoes mentioned above which are carried out by American military organizations represents a crude violation of the air space of the Soviet Union and a violation of the generally accepted principle of international law in accordance with which each state has full and exclusive sovereignty in regard to the air space over its territory.

In accordance with this principle of the sovereignty of states over their air space the flight of any form of flying apparatus into the air space of any state can take place only with the permission of the state in question. In view of the foregoing the above-mentioned activities of the American military organizations represent violation of the territorial integrity of the USSR, are contrary to the obligations assumed by the United States Government under the Charter of the United Nations and are incompatible with normal relations between states.

The Soviet Government makes a decisive protest and demands from the United States Government the taking of measures for the immediate cessation of the above-mentioned impermissible activities of the American military organizations.

Letters of Credence

James C. Hagerty, press secretary to the President, announced on February 7 that the President had that day received the credentials of the newly appointed Ambassador of Chile, Mario Rodriguez Altamirano.

Territorial Waters and Related Matters

ACTION TAKEN BY THE THIRD MEETING OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COUNCIL OF JURISTS MEXICO CITY, JANUARY 17–FEBRUARY 4, 1956

At its meeting at Mexico City, January 17–February 4, the Inter-American Council of Jurists adopted a resolution on the subject of territorial waters and related matters by a vote of 15 to 1, with 5 abstentions (Annex 1). This resolution, entitled "Principles of Mexico on the Juridical Regime of the Sea," was vigorously opposed by the United States Representative, who, in a statement included in the Final Act of the meeting, attacked the resolution on the grounds of both its substance and the manner in which it was adopted (Annex 2).

The Tenth Inter-American Conference (Caracas, 1954) in Resolution LXXXIV resolved, among other things, that the Council of the Organization of American States should convoke a Specialized Conference for the purpose of studying as a whole the different aspects of the juridical and economic system covering the submarine shelf, oceanic waters, and the natural resources in the light of present-day scientific knowledge, and that the Council request pertinent inter-American organizations to render necessary cooperation in the preparatory work that the Specialized Conference requires.

Pursuant to this decision, the Council of the OAS convened the Specialized Conference for March 15, 1956, at Ciudad Trujillo. In preparation for the Conference, it requested the Inter-American Council of Jurists, its technical advisory organ on legal matters, to make a preparatory study on the legal aspects of the matters to be considered at Ciudad Trujillo. It was made clear that the purpose of this study was to furnish the Specialized Conference with pertinent background information and that any conclusions or decisions were to be reserved to the Conference. The agenda item for the Third Meeting of the Inter-American Council of Jurists covering this matter was formulated by the Council of the OAS in the following terms:

"Topic I (a)—Regime of Territorial Waters and Related Matters: Preparatory Study for the Inter-American Specialized Conference Called for in Resolution LXXXIV of the Caracas Conference."

Situation Confronting the Council of Jurists

The Council of Jurists found itself handicapped at the very outset of its consideration of the topic by lack of any kind of working document on the subject. The Inter-American Juridical Committee, the Council's permanent committee, had been requested to prepare a preliminary study but for a variety of reasons declined to do so. In view of the complete absence of preparatory materials, which as a method of procedure the Council of Jurists had consistently maintained to be necessary to enable it to proceed on a sound basis in the consideration of a topic, the United States early in the general debate indicated that in its opinion the most constructive contribution which the Council of Jurists could make to the work of the Specialized Conference under the circumstances would be: (1) to have an exposition of views of the respective governments on the general subject and to transmit the proceedings of the discussions to Ciudad Trujillo; and (2) to request the appropriate technical agency of the OAS to undertake a collection and systematic organization of pertinent background materials, particularly national and international acts and practices.

General Debate

During the first week of the meeting, action on the topic was limited to informal conversations

among the delegations. This procedure was agreed upon considering that it would be advisable to allow time for an exchange of views on the controversial issues involved before taking them up in public session.

During the general debate on the subject, 17 delegations took the opportunity to present the views and attitudes of their respective governments on various aspects of the general problem. This general debate served the useful purpose of affording an opportunity for a very substantial number of the American governments for the first time to state their views on principal aspects of this important subject. The debate, however, did not include a discussion of the issues raised, being confined to the presentation of the general statements of governments, nor were any draft resolutions submitted for consideration.

Nine-Country Resolution

As the general debate came to an end, copies of a draft resolution sponsored by eight countries (Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay, later joined by Costa Rica) were distributed in Committee I. The proposal incorporated, in extreme terms, one of the two principal points of view expressed during the general debate. In its presentation no statement was made by any of the proponents in explanation or justification of its contents.

The resolution declared that the three-mile limit of territorial waters "does not constitute a rule of general international law." In its place, according to the resolution, "each State is competent to establish its territorial waters within reasonable limits, taking into account geographical, geological, and biological factors, as well as the economic needs of its population, and its security and defense."

The extreme character of the resolution is also reflected in its articles dealing with the conservation of living resources. The coastal States have, the resolution asserts, "the right of exclusive exploitation of species closely related to the coast, the life of the country, or the needs of the coastal population"—a formula which is sufficiently elastic to suit the requirements of the most extravagant claims.

On the highly technical subject of base lines and bays, the resolution also came to firm conclusions despite the fact, as the United States Representative pointed out in the one session when an opportunity was given to comment upon the resolution, that there had been virtually no consideration of these highly technical points during the entire session of the Council.

United States Declaration and Reservation

The reasons for the United States opposition to the resolution are summarized in the declaration and reservation included in the Final Act. The United States delegation made this important statement after consultation with, and upon the authorization of, the Department of State.

As the U.S. declaration points out, the resolution suffers from serious substantive defect in that it seeks to lay down rules which fail to take into consideration fundamental and well-accepted principles of international law, such as the principle of freedom of the seas, and the rights and interests derived from international law and treaty by States other than the adjacent coastal State. Furthermore, the resolution contains pronouncements based on scientific and economic assumptions for which no supporting evidence was presented.

Perhaps of greater concern to the United States is the manner in which the resolution was adopted. On the day after the resolution was introduced in Committee I, the delegates of Cuba, the Dominican Republic, the United States, and Venezuela raised various questions and considerations regarding the resolution. The proponents refrained from answering these observations and on the following day, rejecting appeals for more time to consider the proposal, put the resolution through by a vote of 15 in favor, 1 against (United States), and 5 abstentions (Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua). The same vote was repeated in the plenary session.

In signing the Final Act, 11 countries entered reservations to the "Principles of Mexico" resolution. These included the United States and the five countries which abstained on the resolution, as well as five which had voted in the affirmative.

Cuban Proposal

Immediately following the vote on the nine-country resolution, the Cuban delegate introduced a resolution providing that the proceedings of Committee I relating to territorial waters and related matters, together with any conclusions

reached through the discussions, be transmitted to the Specialized Conference with the character of a preparatory study. Although objected to by proponents of the first resolution on the grounds that it modified the declaratory nature of their document, the Cuban resolution was approved by a vote of 11 to 9 (Annex 3). This resolution served, at least from a procedural standpoint, to bring the nine-country resolution more within the terms of the assignment made to the Council of Jurists by the Council of the OAS.

ANNEX 1

Resolution XIII

Principles of Mexico on the Juridical Regime of the Sea

Whereas:

The topic "System of Territorial Waters and Related Questions: Preparatory Study for the Specialized Inter-American Conference Provided for in Resolution LXXXIV of the Caracas Conference" was included by the Council of the Organization of American States in the agenda of this Third Meeting of the Inter-American Council of Jurists; and

Its conclusions on the subject are to be transmitted to the Specialized Conference soon to be held,

The Inter-American Council of Jurists

Recognizes as the expression of the juridical conscience of the Continent, and as applicable between the American States, the following rules, among others; and

Declares that the acceptance of these principles does not imply and shall not have the effect of renouncing or weakening the position maintained by the various countries of America on the question of how far territorial waters should extend.

A

Territorial Waters

1. The distance of three miles as the limit of territorial waters is insufficient, and does not constitute a rule of general international law. Therefore, the enlargement of the zone of the sea traditionally called "territorial waters" is justifiable.

2. Each State is competent to establish its territorial waters within reasonable limits, taking into account geographical, geological, and biological factors, as well as the economic needs of its population, and its security and defense.

B

Continental Shelf

The rights of the coastal State with respect to the seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf extend also to the natural resources found there, such as petroleum, hydrocarbons, mineral substances, and all marine, animal, and vegetable species that live in a constant physical an biological relationship with the shelf, not excluding th benthonic species.

C

Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas

1. Coastal States, following scientific and technical pri ciples, have the right to adopt measures of conservatio and supervision necessary for the protection of the livin resources of the sea contiguous to their coasts, beyond th territorial waters. Measures that may be taken by coastal State in such case shall not prejudice rights de rived from international agreements to which it is party, nor shall they discriminate against foreig fishermen.

2. Coastal States have, in addition, the right of ex clusive exploitation of species closely related to the coas the life of the country, or the needs of the coastal popu lation, as in the case of species that develop in territoria waters and subsequently migrate to the high seas, o when the existence of certain species has an importan relation with an industry or activity essential to th coastal country, or when the latter is carrying out impor tant works that will result in the conservation or increas of the species.

D

Base Lines

1. The breadth of territorial waters shall be measure in principle, from the low-water line along the coast, a marked on large-scale marine charts, officially recognize by the coastal State.

2. Coastal States may draw straight base lines tha do not follow the low-water line when circumstances re quire this method because the coast is deeply indente or cut into, or because there are islands in its immediat vicinity, or when such a method is justified by the exis ence of economic interests peculiar to a region of th coastal State. In any of these cases the method may b employed of drawing a straight line connecting the oute most points of the coast, islands, islets, keys, or reef The drawing of such base lines must not depart to an appreciable extent from the general direction of the coas and the sea areas lying within these lines must be suf ciently linked to the land domain.

3. Waters located within the base line shall be subje to the regime of internal waters.

4. The coastal State shall give due publicity to th straight base lines.

E

Bays

1. A bay is a well-marked indentation whose penetra tion inland in proportion to the width of its mouth such that its waters are *inter fauces terrae* and constitu something more than a mere curvature of the coast.

2. The line that encloses a bay shall be drawn betwee its natural geographical entrance points where the in dentation begins to have the configuration of a bay.

3. Waters comprised within a bay shall be subject t the juridical regime of internal waters if the surfac

hereof is equal to or greater than that of a semicircle rawn by using the mouth of the bay as a diameter.

4. If a bay has more than one entrance, this semicircle hall be drawn on a line as long as the sum total of the ength of the different entrances. The area of the islands ocated within a bay shall be included in the total area f the bay.

5. So-called "historical" bays shall be subject to the egime of internal waters of the coastal State or States.

(Approved at the Fourth Plenary Session, February 3, 1956)

NNEX 2

DECLARATION AND RESERVATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF MERICA ON RESOLUTION XIII, "PRINCIPLES OF MEXICO ON HE JURIDICAL REGIME OF THE SEA"

For the reasons stated by the United States Representa- ive during the sessions of Committee I, the United States oted against and records its opposition to the Resolution n Territorial Waters and Related Questions. Among he reasons indicated were the following:

That the Inter-American Council of Jurists has not ad the benefit of the necessary preparatory studies on he part of its Permanent Committee which it has con- istently recognized as indispensable to the formulation f sound conclusions on the subject;

That at this Meeting of the Council of Jurists, apart rom a series of general statements by representatives of arious countries, there has been virtually no study, nalysis, or discussion of the substantive aspects of the Resolution;

That the Resolution contains pronouncements based on conomic and scientific assumptions for which no support as been offered and which are debatable and which, in ny event, cover matters within the competence of the Specialized Conference called for under Resolution LXXXIV of the Tenth Inter-American Conference;

That much of the Resolution is contrary to international aw;

That the Resolution is completely oblivious of the in- erests and rights of States other than the adjacent coastal States in the conservation and utilization of marine re- ources and of the recognized need for international ooperation for the effective accomplishment of that com- non objective; and

That the Resolution is clearly designed to serve political urposes and therefore exceeds the competence of the Council of Jurists as a technical-juridical body.

In addition, the United States Delegation wishes to ecord the fact that when the Resolution, in the drafting f which the United States had no part, was submitted o Committee I, despite fundamental considerations aised by the United States and other delegations against he Resolution, there was no discussion of those con- iderations at the one and only session of the Committee eld to debate the document.

ANNEX 3

RESOLUTION XIV

SYSTEM OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND RELATED QUESTIONS

The Inter-American Council of Jurists

Suggests to the Council of the Organization of American States that it transmit to the Specialized Conference provided for in Resolution LXXXIV of the Caracas Conference the Resolution entitled "Principles of Mexico on the Juridical Regime of the Sea" approved by this Council, together with the minutes of the meetings in which this subject has been considered during the Third Meeting, with the character of the preparatory study called for in Topic I (a) of its Agenda, "System of Territorial Waters and Related Questions".

(Approved at the Fourth Plenary Session, February 3, 1956)

Export-Import Bank Loan to Brazilian Railway

A loan of $19,625,000 to the Santos-Jundiai Railway of Brazil, for purchase of railroad equipment in the United States, was announced on January 27 by Samuel C. Waugh, President of the Export-Import Bank of Washington.

American manufacturers will participate in the transaction by extending credit for $5,375,000 to the Santos-Jundiai Railway, thereby making a total of $25,000,000 to be spent for the U.S. railroad equipment. This will include diesel-electric locomotives, multiple-unit electric cars, centralized traffic control equipment, track materials, and shop equipment.

The Santos-Jundiai Railway, owned by the Brazilian Government, is a trunkline connecting São Paulo, the principal industrial center of Brazil, with the port of Santos, and serves as the line from Jundiai into São Paulo for the Paulista Railway. The greater part of the export products of the State of São Paulo, including coffee, have their outlet by the Santos-Jundiai. The railroad has earned substantial profits and supported high operating and maintenance standards.

The present financing by the bank will be repayable in semiannual installments over a period of 10 years, commencing in June 1958. The Export-Import Bank advanced a credit of $8,600,000 in 1952 to the Santos-Jundiai Railway for freight cars, airbrakes, and automatic couplers and $320,000 in 1954 for signaling equipment.

$20 Million Development Aid for Bolivia

The International Cooperation Administration on January 26 announced approval of $20 million development assistance for Bolivia in continuation of U.S. policy to help Bolivian efforts to build a stronger, more diversified economy. The aid will be in the form of about $14 million in U.S. foods and fibers and the remaining $6 million in agricultural equipment, supplies, motor vehicles and parts, and iron and steel finished products.

The bulk of local currency generated from the sale of these commodities will be used for continuing joint Bolivia-U.S. economic development projects in transportation, communications, supervised agricultural credit, irrigation works, farm-to-market roads, bridge construction, road maintenance, resettlement, and health and sanitation. The commodities, supplied under section 402 of the Mutual Security Act, include wheat and wheat flour, rice, lard and vegetable oil, nonfat dry milk, and cotton.

The U.S. program of economic assistance to Bolivia began during 1953 as an emergency operation to help Bolivia avoid immediate economic crisis. World prices for tin, which accounts for 70 percent of Bolivia's foreign exchange, fell from about $1.20 a pound in the first quarter of 1953 to about 80 cents a pound in the second quarter of that year and the resulting severe drop in foreign exchange earnings has continued.

The average production cost for tin is reported at about $1.10 to $1.25 a pound, compared with recent world prices of less than $1 a pound. Bolivia has 8 percent of the world reserves of tin, accounts for about 20 percent of the free-world production output, and supplies 17 percent of United States tin.

With the dip in tin prices, Bolivia's foreign exchange earnings fell sharply. Because Bolivia had been using some $30 million annually of foreign exchange on food imports, the country has undertaken a major program of land reclamation to increase her own agricultural production, thereby reducing her dependence on imported foodstuffs.

The $20 million development assistance for fiscal year 1956 brings to almost $50 million the total economic aid the United States has provided Bolivia since 1953. In addition, from 1943 through fiscal year 1956 the United States contributed about $12.5 million toward the joint Bolivia-U.S. technical cooperation programs.

World Bank Reports $13.7 Million Net Income for 6-Month Period

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on February 6 reported a net income of $13.7 million for the 6-month period ending December 31, 1955, compared with $12.3 million for the corresponding period in 1954. This income was placed in the supplemental reserve against losses on loans and guaranties, and raised the reserve to $135.2 million. Loan commissions amounted to $7.2 million and were credited to the bank's special reserve, increasing that reserve to $69.4 million. Total reserves on December 31, 1955, were $204.6 million.

Gross income, exclusive of loan commissions, was $31 million, compared with $29.3 million in 1954. Expenses for the 6-month period totaled $17.3 million.

The bank made 15 loans totaling $146.3 million in Algeria, Guatemala, Honduras, Japan, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Thailand, Union of South Africa, and Uruguay. This brought the total number of loans to 139 in 41 countries and raised the gross total of commitments to $2,470.4 million. Disbursements on loans were $139.2 million, bringing total disbursements to $1,818.9 million on December 31.

Private investors participated directly in 12 of the 15 loans made since July 1. These participations, together with sales of other loans during the period, amounted to $20.6 million. The total of participations and sales of loans amounted on December 31 to $224.6 million, of which $165.7 million was without the bank's guaranty.

Repayments of principal received by the bank amounted to $12.6 million. Total principal repayments, including prepayments, amounted to $226.5 million on December 31; this included $152.9 million repaid to the bank, and $73.6 million to investors who had purchased borrowers' obligations from the bank.

During the 6-month period the bank redeemed the outstanding balance of Can.$13.6 million of the 4 percent Ten Year Bonds of 1952, due 1962, and Sw fr 2.5 million of the 2½ percent Swiss franc Serial Bonds of 1950.

licies of the Department of State on the Disposal Surplus Agricultural Commodities

by Willis C. Armstrong
Deputy Director, Office of International Trade and Resources[1]

We in the State Department are aware that metimes comments are made about us and agri-ltural disposal. Some of the notions that get ound are pretty far removed from the facts. We e therefore happy to have this opportunity to ow the interest and concern of the Department the problems of agricultural exports and sur-us disposal. I shall try my best to explain what e do to foster agricultural export trade and to l in disposing of surpluses.

One point of fact must first be stated. The title this talk contains the term "policies of the De-rtment of State." This is not quite correct. ne policy of the State Department, as of other epartments, is the President's policy, and the epartment is faithful to this policy. All of e Departments and agencies of the Government ork together as a team in trying to resolve the mplex problems of surplus disposal. Such a rocess requires understanding, appreciation of e viewpoints of others, hard work, and real co-eration. All these are present, and all the eople concerned with this great problem are imated by that spirit. Furthermore, concrete d effective results are being achieved.

At the risk of making some statements that are rfectly obvious to everybody in the room, I ould like to begin with a brief examination of e surplus problem itself. I am sure you will ree with me that it is sometimes helpful to get ck to the simple basic facts.

We all know, for example, that we have surpluses because supply has raced ahead of demand. Let us remind ourselves just how it happened. For the 12 years from 1940 to 1952 there was a tremendous demand throughout the world for agricultural products, especially American products. American agriculture responded magnificently to this challenge and overcame all known production records. World War II and the war in Korea accounted for a good deal of the demand, and, in the period between, great quantities were needed to restore economies and populations to a reasonable level of nutrition and comfort.

Now another basic fact is this: In a free market situation, supply adjusts itself to demand in a process which is in some measure automatic. These adjustments can be very severe for some producers. Therefore, governments have developed programs of assistance and support. These programs have come into effect mainly in agriculture, of course, for the simple reason that it is a lot harder for an agricultural producer to adjust himself to such changes than for an industrial producer. Industrial producers can adjust production much more readily than farmers.

In recent times a new factor has arisen which makes the adjustment of supply to demand even more difficult in the United States. The great efforts to expand production were successful in large part because of the ingenuity and resourcefulness of American farmers, equipment manufacturers, and research people, which when applied to the problem greatly boosted productivity and operating efficiency on our farms. And so, when demand fell off, we found ourselves geared to a higher production per acre and loaded with a rapidly growing burden of surpluses. I know

[1] Address made before the Texas Federation of Co-eratives, the Texas Cooperative Ginners Association, d the Houston Bank for Cooperatives at Austin, Texas, Feb. 7 (press release 66).

we can all agree that perfectly understandable economic events have produced the situation in which we now find ourselves.

The demand for American farm products has two parts. The domestic market accounts for 90 percent of what farmers produce. Domestic demand has not fallen since 1952. Instead, it has grown with our population and has been stimulated further by the high level of industrial prosperity of the past several years. Assuming that this level of prosperity continues, we can reasonably count on a sustained domestic demand for our farm products. In this connection, I would urge that you examine the recent economic report of the President to the Congress, dated January 24.[2] It contains an excellent account of the state of our economy today and is a most encouraging and heartening report.

Decline in Foreign Demand

This is not the case, however, with the other part of our demand. Other countries have been making good economic progress, but their demand for our farm products has not kept pace with this progress. In fact it has been declining since 1952, and for perfectly understandable reasons.

The first reason is that foreign agricultural output, starting in many areas from a devastated condition in 1945, began to catch up with local demand. Why was this? Partly, it was due to the normal revival in devastated areas. Partly, it grew out of the fact that almost every country was very short of gold and dollars, and of foreign currencies in general, during the period after the war. A country in such circumstances will very logically try to produce at home the things it would normally buy abroad, even though the local cost might be higher than the price of goods bought with scarce foreign exchange. Indeed, some of these countries were traditionally agricultural exporters; they too were short of foreign exchange and needed money for imports of all kinds. What would be more logical than for them to expand their output of things in which they already specialized, with the hope of earning more foreign exchange to take care of their import needs?

This brings us to a second reason for the decline in foreign demand for our farm products. Ou system of pricing agricultural products has serve as an incentive to other exporting countries, whic have often captured markets as a result. Thus our own inducements to farmers to expand out put when demand was high made our prices les competitive when farm output in the rest of th world increased and total world market deman became satisfied.

Furthermore, countries which are traditiona importers, having encouraged high-cost domesti production of agricultural goods so as to sav foreign exchange, found themselves under pres sure to protect their own farmers by limiting thei imports.

This admittedly oversimplified analysis of th problem shows that our highly efficient and pro ductive farms have been faced with a serious de cline in one part of their market. Much of th burden of adjustment of supply to demand i world agricultural markets has fallen on th United States, with consequences which are all to familiar to everyone in this room.

Suppose we now turn to consider what is bein done and what can be done to enable the Unite States to meet this problem through export First and foremost, we wish to retain our com mercial markets abroad. These markets are th base upon which we must build to achieve th kind of situation we want.

By commercial markets, I mean those market where we are competitive and where we get pai in dollars. We much prefer this kind of marke to one we get from making great concessions o price and payments. Our long-run goal must b the expansion of our markets on a sound economi basis so that we are not continually faced with th need for so much Government action in the proces of adjustment of supply to demand; we also mus avoid the kind of consequences for farm incom which the country experienced in earlier times c crisis and adjustment.

President's International Trade Policy

One of the continuing strengths of our agricu tural export policy is the general internationa trade policy laid down by the President. Th President's foreign economic program, placed be fore the Congress in 1954, based on the report of distinguished commission headed by Clarenc Randall, calls for a reduction or elimination c

[2] For excerpts from the President's economic report, see BULLETIN of Feb. 13, 1956, p. 253.

barriers to trade.[3] For purposes of discussion, we may divide these barriers into two groups: the first, the barriers created or maintained by other countries against our exports. Whether they are tariffs, exchange controls, internal subsidies, or quotas, we have steadily pressed other countries to reduce or eliminate these barriers, and with success.

In this struggle against the protectionism of other countries, we have two kinds of leverage. One is the demand of people in other countries for our products because they may be cheaper or better than domestic ones. The other kind of leverage is directly related to a discussion of the other kind of barrier. If we can offer other countries a reduction in our barriers, we can expect them to reciprocate. If they can sell more of the products in which they specialize, they can buy more of our goods.

Consequently, the President's program included a request for new legislation to extend the Trade Agreements Act and to enable the United States to make further moderate reductions in tariffs in exchange for concessions made by other countries. This legislation was adopted last June. The President is now authorized to reduce tariff rates by 5 percent each year for 3 years, or, if a rate is above 50 percent, he may reduce it to that level. Negotiations in accordance with this law are now going on in Geneva with a substantial group of countries, and the United States is asking in these negotiations for a reduction of trade barriers which impede the export of our farm products.[4]

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

In order to make trade agreement concessions more effective, we have merged most of our trade agreements into one large one called the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or GATT. This agreement is a list of agreed tariff concessions and a set of common principles for international trade. One of the chief purposes of the agreed principles is to prevent countries from using some device other than the tariff to defeat tariff concessions. In the development of these principles, full recognition has been given to the special interests of American agriculture in international trade.

In order for the general agreement to be more effective and so that the United States can use it better, the President is advocating that the United States join a proposed international organization to administer it. This would be called the Organization for Trade Cooperation, or OTC.[5] It is a very simple thing. Countries which participate in the general agreement will all belong to it. It will have no authority to impose any obligation on any country. The United States would not give up any of its sovereignty to belong. The OTC would, however, provide a forum in which we could more promptly obtain compliance with the rules of the general agreement. The President has asked the Congress to approve U.S. membership in the Organization for Trade Cooperation. This step is an important part of the President's program and an important event in the history of international trade.

The general agreement and OTC are related to our agricultural problems because they serve the need for building a sound structure of international trade in which we can sell our goods in expanding markets over a long period in the future. The general agreement and the OTC are thus an investment in the long-term future of American farm exports. They are not designed to solve problems of accumulated surpluses.

To deal with surpluses, special programs have been devised. Let us now move on to examine these programs.

The first of these is section 402 of the Mutual Security Act of 1955, which requires that $300 million worth of surplus agricultural commodities be included in the foreign aid extended during the current fiscal year. This program is administered by the International Cooperation Administration, now a part of the Department of State. The officers of that Administration are vigorously pursuing this program and are seeking to place these surpluses where they will do the most good. This $300 million worth of aid is useful directly to friendly and allied countries. It is over and above the amounts that would be sold if there were no such aid. When countries receive these goods, they put up their own money in amounts equivalent

[3] *Ibid.*, Apr. 19, 1954, p. 602. For the report of the Randall Commission, see *ibid.*, Feb. 8, 1954, p. 187.

[4] For a statement at the Geneva negotiations by Herbert Prochnow, Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, see *ibid.*, Jan. 30, 1956, p. 184.

[5] For the President's message to Congress on OTC, see *ibid.*, Apr. 25, 1955, p. 678; for the text of the OTC agreement, see *ibid.*, Apr. 4, 1955, p. 579.

to the value of the goods, and this money can be used for other desirable purposes.[6]

Public Law 480

The second important special export program is that provided under title I of Public Law 480, called the "Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954," which was passed by the preceding Congress and amended by the present Congress. Title I enables the Government to sell up to $1,500,000,000 worth of agricultural surplus commodities to foreign governments in exchange for local currency. The local currency is used to pay United States Government expenses in the other country, to promote the common defense, to provide for international educational exchange, to acquire strategic materials for our stockpile, and to develop new market opportunities for American products. It may also be used as a loan to the local government for the kind of economic development and trade projects which should help our future export trade.

This title I program began in September 1954, and as of now agreements have been concluded with 22 countries, covering $769 million worth of goods. At the moment, we are negotiating several other agreements; total agreements reached by June 30, 1956, should cover $1,200,000,000 worth of farm products. The Department of State has primary responsibility for negotiating these agreements with other countries. The Department of Agriculture is responsible under the law for determining the countries and the quantities and the types of commodities.

Title II of Public Law 480 enables the Government to give away up to $300 million worth of agricultural surpluses when flood, famine, or disaster overtake other countries. So far, nearly half of this authority has been used. This part of Public Law 480 is administered by the International Cooperation Administration.

Title III of Public Law 480, administered by the Department of Agriculture, provides for donations to international organizations or to American private charitable institutions operating abroad. Thus far, $126 million worth of goods—all dairy products—have been provided for th needy in other countries through these channel The list of products available for such purpos has recently been expanded to include wheat, corr rice, and dry beans.

In addition, title III authorizes the barter o our surpluses for strategic materials, and mor than $300 million worth of goods has been bar tered during the past 2 years.[7] Many of thes contracts run well into the future. Furthermor the President's new farm program, placed befor the Congress on January 9, calls for increase barter activities through which we can exchang our perishables for nonperishables for use in th case of emergency. The goods received are place in a stockpile and carefully insulated from th domestic market, so as to insure an incentive fo foreign countries to produce goods without inte fering with their normal sales in commercia markets.

Now let us get back to title I of Public La 480 and the international agreements negotiate under that title.

On September 9, 1954, the President issued a Executive order specifying the way in which Pul lic Law 480 was to be administered.[8] The Pres dent assigned to the Secretary of State th responsibility for negotiating and entering int agreements under this title of the act. Thes agreements are usually negotiated abroad, with th Ambassador or Chief of Mission in charge of th negotiations on the United States side. He is sup ported and aided by officers of the Internation Cooperation Administration mission and the agr cultural attaché. He operates on instruction from the Department of State, which have bee agreed to by the other agencies of the Govern ment. Each negotiation involves questions suc as how the local currencies are to be used, wha exchange rates will govern, the mechanics of ship ping, and other transfer arrangements. Eac agreement needs the advice of lawyers, financia experts, and commodity and shipping experts; an each agreement requires the talent of goo negotiators.

As I indicated above, many agreements hav

[6] For a chart on surplus agricultural commodities sold by the Foreign Operations Administration in fiscal years 1954 and 1955, see *ibid.*, July 4, 1955, p. 30. For an excerpt from the eighth semiannual report to Congress on the mutual security program, see *ibid.*, Sept. 12, 1955, p. 428.

[7] For a memorandum from J. Lee Rankin, Assista Attorney General, to Gerald D. Morgan, Special Couns to the President, on the barter authority under Public La 480, see *ibid.*, Apr. 4, 1955, p. 569.

[8] *Ibid.*, Oct. 4, 1954, p. 498.

been negotiated and a substantial number of additional ones are in process. In some cases where we have tried to negotiate agreements, we have not succeeded. In some cases we have not even been able, for good reason, to get the negotiations under way.

In general, however, all our agreements accomplish two things: They help the foreign country to get needed commodities on advantageous terms, and they move American farm surpluses into consumption.

Care must be taken not to damage our own country's markets by displacing cash sales with Public Law 480 sales, and care must also be exercised to see that our transactions do not unduly disrupt world markets. On all counts, and with full regard for specific provisions of the law and the President's policy in administering it, we have reason to be proud of our achievements. A total of approximately two and a half million tons in goods had been shipped under title I by the end of 1955.

Every 6 months the President reports to the Congress on the operation of Public Law 480. The most recent report is House of Representatives Document 294.[9] In it you will find the facts on commodities, amounts, and methods of operation.

Delegation of Functions

Now, as I have said, the President's Executive order of September 9, 1954, delegated to the Secretary of State the responsibility for negotiating and entering into agreements. It stated further that "All functions under the Act, however vested, delegated, or assigned, shall be subject to the responsibilities of the Secretary of State with respect to the foreign policy of the United States as such policy relates to the said functions." The President's accompanying letter to the various agencies pointed out that this delegation of authority was "intended to give recognition to the State Department's central responsibility in this area"—that is, in the area of foreign relations and policy.

In addition to the delegation of functions to the specific agencies of the Government, such as the Departments of Agriculture and State, the Executive order provided for the establishment of an interagency committee, headed by a representative of the White House, to coordinate policies. The Secretary of Agriculture was given the task of coordinating all operations. The transmittal letter of the President to the Congress which accompanies his most recent report on the operation of Public Law 480 states that these administrative arrangements "continue to function satisfactorily" and "have proved effective" in accomplishing the purpose of the law.

Regardless of whether exports are commercial, or handled under economic aid or Public Law 480, it is important that they be competitive in price. The Commodity Credit Corporation has the authority, and uses it, to make exports of commodities acquired through price support operations competitive in foreign markets. This is at the base of cash sales, aid, and Public Law 480, because it determines the price paid by the individual importer in the receiving country, regardless of the method of financing. Without the use of the authority, our sales would be far smaller than they are.

This authority must be used wisely and with scrupulous care because it is a matter of a Government decision on prices, in competition with private business, or government, in other countries. Unsound operations along these lines could lead to price wars and cutthroat competition of the type which helps no one. We define this as a matter of making our exports competitive. Many people in other countries say that, if we are selling abroad at a lower price than we are at home, we are subsidizing our exports. When other countries do this in our market, we sometimes call it "dumping" and apply additional tariffs.

Thus, there are international problems connected with action by the Government to sell products competitively with other producers. It has been necessary to engage in a great deal of international discussion to explain that prices resulting from our support operations were not intended to be an umbrella over other producers in other countries, and that we do not intend to use the export subsidy device to acquire more than our fair share of the world market. Now and then there may be a difference of opinion as to what constitutes a fair share, but a measure of tolerant understanding on the part of other countries can be achieved under conditions of moderation.

There are other means available to the Government to aid our export trade in agricultural products. The Export-Import Bank has on many

[9] *Ibid.*, Jan. 23, 1956, p. 130.

occasions financed exports, and the Commodity Credit Corporation may also extend credit to encourage agricultural shipments.

In terms of competitiveness, it is important that our products appeal to consumers on grounds of quality and conformity to specifications. I understand that the Department of Agriculture has under way a program to encourage the adoption of better quality standards and a measure of better conformity to them in respect to many of our agricultural commodities.

Basic Policies

We have reviewed the various means the Government is using to help move our surpluses abroad. Let us now return to the basic policy which guides the Government in its action. The policy of the President has been set forth at various times, on various occasions, but the major policy statement was issued at the time the President signed the Executive order which I have already mentioned regarding the administration of Public Law 480.

The first point in this policy statement was that the general foreign economic policy contained in the President's message to Congress of March 30, 1954, based on the Randall Commission report, was applicable to agriculture and that farm policies should be consistent with that policy.

The statement went on to indicate that prices of many of our farm products were not competitive and that production was out of balance with demand. The statement further indicated that the magnitude of the United States holdings of many commodities was "such as to be capable of demoralizing world commodity markets should a policy of reckless selling abroad be pursued." Then came this sentence: "The United States cannot accept the role of limiting its sales in world markets until other countries have disposed of their production." The answer has to be found in expanding consumption abroad through greater purchasing power, better distribution, and marketing. The statement promised orderly and gradual reduction of United States surpluses. It also said that the United States "will offer its products at competitive prices" but will not use its surpluses "to impair the traditional competitive position of friendly countries by disrupting world prices of agricultural commodities."

The statement went on to say that the United States would use its surpluses, in cooperation with other countries, to increase consumption in areas where there is underconsumption and where there are practical opportunities for increasing the use of food and fiber in a manner designed to stimulate economic development in friendly countries and to enhance their security position.

The most recent indication of the policies of the President in respect to the disposal of our surpluses abroad is to be found on page 58 of the economic report of the President transmitted to the Congress on January 24. This statement reads as follows:

> The Administration is intensifying its efforts in these directions [i.e., increased disposals and competitive sales]. Yet experience shows that there are limits to expanding the noncommercial disposal of farm products. Beyond some point, commercial sales are merely displaced, without increasing total consumption. At home, the displacement may be of the same or competing commodities; abroad, our own commercial exports or those of friendly nations may be displaced. Moreover, domestic producers in an importing country, even if its people are ill-fed and ill-clothed, may feel adversely affected. The difficulties are greatest with our large surpluses, those of cotton and wheat. Extreme care is necessary to avoid disrupting world markets and damaging the delicate fabric of our foreign relations.

We must remember that, regardless of what any one of us might wish, our ability to dispose of surplus agricultural commodities is limited by certain specific and identifiable phenomena.

We cannot sell our goods for dollars if people do not have the dollars, or if they prefer to spend the dollars they have for products other than agricultural ones.

We cannot barter our surpluses unless other countries are prepared to make available the kind of goods we want for stockpiling.

There is a limit to the extent to which we can dispose of goods as a part of our aid programs within the purposes of the mutual security legislation.

If we sell for foreign currencies under Public Law 480, title I, without regard to our usual marketings, we may simply displace our commercial exports with exports of a less commercial character. Furthermore, excessive disposal under title I can unduly disrupt world markets and run counter to our national interests and our national security. This is not merely something the Department of State is concerned about; it is something the whole Government and the whole country have to be concerned about, for the world has become much smaller and everyone is now our neighbor.

Shipments of commodities donated for the relief suffering or in the event of famine are limited by e extent to which other countries are visited by lamities, and we can scarcely wish that they have ore of them.

I think you will find that everyone who has udied this problem has concluded that there are ready limits on our ability to solve our surplus roblems by exports if our objective is to do ourlves more good than harm. I am sure you will gree that it would be inappropriate for an officer the State Department to expound on matters fecting domestic agricultural policy, but I think is reasonable to recognize the implications for omestic policy in the situation in which we find irselves.

irplus Disposal and Foreign Policy

I shall try to give you an evaluation of the relaonship of our surplus disposal to our foreign olicy and foreign relations.

In the first place, our authority to dispose of gricultural goods under Public Law 480 or under ction 402 of the Mutual Security Act is a real sset in our foreign relations. Many countries are oor; many countries have crop failures; all counies wish to expand the level of consumption of eir populations; many countries politically very iendly to the United States are in serious ecoomic difficulties. In these cases we can do much improve our relations with these countries by idicious use of our surpluses.

In the field of barter, we can obtain through our irpluses goods we may need for security purposes and which might otherwise be lacking marets. These goods may be the product of indusies in other countries which otherwise have a roblem of unemployment. Employment, prouction, surplus disposal, and improved foreign lations can result from the use of the barter ithority.

In the countries which are not experiencing onomic difficulties, and where we wish to maintain our cash sales, it is not reasonable to expect big outlet for our surpluses, but in certain unerdeveloped areas we can use our surpluses as a al investment in the future welfare and prosrity of the country and thus create an improved arket for our own commercial exports. Public aw 480 enables us to make loans for economic velopment purposes and a better level of emoyment and purchasing power. In this way, we can also demonstrate our genuine interest in the development and progress of these countries.

In the second place, there is another side of the coin. Reckless or excessive disposal of surpluses can injure countries which make their living by selling the same goods and which cannot afford to dispose of them on the terms we are in a position to offer. Many of these countries are among our best political friends. If we hurt our friends, we hurt ourselves. This is just as true in international affairs as it is in human relations. Furthermore, the American people have made a tremendous investment, in the past 10 years or so, in the economic health of the free world. This investment was made as a matter of our own national interest, and it would be foolish to impair it.

If we start a downward spiral in world agricultural prices, we also tend to eliminate our own cash export business in the process and encourage by example other countries to adopt policies which in the end will hurt our exports.

Let us not forget that the Communist movement is watching us very closely, ready to seize an opportunity to advance its interests at our expense. Recently we have seen the U. S. S. R. launching an apparently new international economic policy. It has offered loans, grants, technical assistance, and trade to many countries.

Often these are countries which would be especially vulnerable to "all-out" disposal efforts by the United States. For example, Burma lives by selling rice, and the Russians have offered to buy whatever Burma has in surplus; a rash policy of United States rice disposal in Asia could very well push Burma, against its will, into the arms of the Communist imperialists. Much the same can be said of Egypt and cotton. Thus, in a period of nuclear-weapon standoff, the Communist economic offensive may be the chief means by which the U. S. S. R. tries to convert our allies into neutrals, and to enshroud neutrals in an iron or bamboo curtain.

We therefore must be careful, in our disposal policy, not to manufacture political ammunition for the Communists. In the struggle between international communism and freedom, we are working to make the free world strong, not to play into the Communists' hands. The U.S.S.R. is a dictatorship which can be highly flexible and ingenious in the development of its policies and actions. We want no part of *that* kind of flexibility, but we can't ignore its existence. It behooves

us to combat the efforts of communism by a demonstration of the superiority of the democratic way of life. Moderation and a proper concern for the interests of others are the earmarks of a democratic approach. Incidentally, these are also the earmarks of good business.

In closing, I should like to say a few words more about cotton. In many respects the disposal of our cotton surplus presents the most serious problems of all—in terms of competitiveness, foreign policy, and the domestic economy. I have been much impressed by reading a study put out by the staff of the National Cotton Council called *Price and the Future of United States Cotton.* It seems to me that this serious and penetrating study sheds a great deal of light on the cotton problem.

We all know that our cotton has not been competitive in foreign markets this past year. There is a question whether drastic price reductions will in fact make it competitive. Part of the competition with United States cotton comes from other cotton-producing countries, many of which are important to us in our international relations. Much competition comes from rayon staple fiber, both domestic and foreign. If it were easy to devise a national program which would make an inroad on our surplus without damaging our friends abroad or injuring our domestic industry, this would have been done some time ago. The search for a rational solution is certainly under way, and I am hopeful that it will be rewarding in terms of the national interest of the United States.

Our general surplus problem is a tough one. The United States has made considerable progress in attacking it, with the cooperation of farmers, businessmen, the Congress, and the various agencies of the executive branch of the Government. There is much more to do and there are many conflicting interests and extremely difficult questions, all of which must be taken into account in the democratic process of arriving at a reasonable solution.

Agricultural Agreement With Burma

Press release 70 dated February 8

An agricultural commodities agreement was concluded at Rangoon on February 8 between the Government of the Union of Burma and the Government of the United States of America. U. Raschid, Minister for Trade Development, signed the agreement on behalf of the Government of the Union of Burma, and Ambassador Joseph C. Satterthwaite on behalf of the Government of the United States of America.

Under this agreement, the Government of the Union of Burma will purchase and the Government of the United States of America agrees to sell approximately $20.8 million (kyats 98 millions) worth of the following surplus agricultural commodities: raw cotton, $17.5 million; dairy products, $2.0 million; tobacco, $1.1 million; fruit, $0.2 million; total commodity value, $20.8 million. Transportation costs of $0.9 million are also included in the agreement. All payments for these commodities will be made in Burmese currency.

Negotiations for this agreement were initiated in Washington with informal discussions early in September 1955. The agreement will enable Burma to increase the import of consumer goods without expenditure of dollar or other foreign exchange. At the same time it will permit the United States to make available to Burma agricultural products which at the moment are surplus in the United States.

P. L. 480 Agreement With Austria

Press release 67 dated February 7

The Department of State announced on February 7 that an agreement for the sale of surplus agricultural commodities has been concluded between the United States and the Government of Austria. The agreement was negotiated under the authority of title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (Public Law 480). It was signed at Vienna on February 7 by the Chancellor of Austria, Dr. Julius Raab, and the American Chargé d'Affaires, James K. Penfield.

Under the agreement approximately $22.3 million worth of U.S. agricultural commodities will be sold to Austrian importers for schillings. Sales under this program will be made by U.S. traders. Commodity details of the program are being announced by the Department of Agriculture.[1]

In announcing the agreement, U.S. officials stated that this was the second such agreement with the Austrian Government. The previous agreement, signed on June 14, 1955, provided for financing purchases of corn, tobacco, and cotton

ıving a U.S. market value of approximately $6 illion including certain ocean transportation sts.

It was also emphasized that a substantial portion the schillings accruing from sales under the new ogram would be made available to the Govern- ent of Austria in the form of long-term loans for onomic development purposes. This program ill also enable Austria to increase consumer im- ırts without expenditure of additional dollar or her foreign exchange holdings during the period hen the very real economic burdens imposed on ustria under the terms of the State Treaty, par- cularly the payments to the Soviets, have their eatest adverse impact on Austrian foreign ex- ange resources.

EC Regulation Concerning oreign Atomic Energy Activity

Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman of the Atomic nergy Commission, on January 20 announced suance of a regulation to help U.S. citizens con- ıct atomic energy business abroad.[2]

Entitled "Unclassified Activities in Foreign tomic Energy Programs," the regulation is effec- e immediately and formalizes action taken by e Commission as announced on October 3, 1955.[3]

The regulation generally authorizes, without vance Commission approval, unclassified for- gn atomic energy activity by U.S. firms and indi- duals in countries not members of the Soviet oc. It includes a reporting requirement covering ecified activities engaged in by Americans road.

The general authorization does not relieve any rson from compliance with license requirements d other applicable laws and regulations.

A procedure is set up for filing applications for specific Commission approval of activities not generally authorized by the regulation and not covered in international agreements for cooperation to which the United States is a party.

Reports required by the regulation are to be made within 30 days of the start of the activity. (Persons who have already engaged in activity required to be reported have until February 19 to submit reports.) Activities which must be reported include design, construction, or operation outside the United States of nuclear reactors and certain other facilities; the design or fabrication of component parts specially designed or fabricated for these facilities; and the furnishing of designs, drawings, or other technical data for use in the construction or operation of the facilities or component parts. Reports are also required when U.S. citizens engage, outside the United States, in the separation of the isotopes of uranium, plutonium, or thorium; the production of heavy water, zirconium (hafnium-free or low-hafnium content), reactor grade graphite, or beryllium; or in the processing, fabricating, or alloying of special nuclear material.

No reporting is required covering normal sales promotion activity. Specifically excluded from the reporting requirement are activities consisting only of (1) communicating information generally available to the public in published form; (2) giving financial assistance; (3) transmitting information relating only to conceptual designs or performance characteristics of reactors or facilities; (4) giving comparative evaluations of types of reactors or facilities; or (5) combinations of these activities. Neither do activities specifically authorized by the Commission need to be reported.

The general authorization, which has been effective since its announcement on October 3, 1955, is based on Section 57a(3) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The section makes it unlawful for any person to engage directly or indirectly in the production of any special nuclear material outside the United States except:

(a) Under an agreement for cooperation made with a foreign nation, or

(b) Upon Commission authorization after it has determined that the activity will not be inimical to the interest of the United States.

The general authorization is issued under (b). Its effect is to eliminate the need for individual Commission authorizations in advance for many

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[1] The Department of Agriculture on Feb. 7 announced at the commodity composition of the program is as lows:

	Million dollars
Wheat (approximately 2 million bushels)	3.4
Corn (approximately 4 million bushels)	6.1
Cotton (approximately 30,000 bales)	5.6
Tobacco (approximately 5 million pounds)	3.0
Lard (approximately 15 million pounds)	2.4
Fruit	.3
Ocean transportation (estimated)	1.5
Total	22.3

[2] For text, see 21 *Fed. Reg.* 418.

[3] 20 *Fed. Reg.* 7399.

activities. The action, consistent with the U.S. national policy of encouraging peaceful uses of atomic energy at home and abroad, is designed to help American companies and citizens doing business in foreign markets.

The reporting requirements of the regulation will keep the Commission informed of significant activities under the general authorization.

U.S. Contributes $6 Million to U.N. Technical Assistance

U.S./U.N. press release 2346 dated January 31

A United States contribution of $6,000,000 was made on January 31 by the U.S. Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., to the United Nations Technical Assistance Program. This is the first contribution by the United States on its 1956 pledge of $15,500,000.

The U.S. pledge for the current year is $500,000 more than the 1955 pledge. It is subject to the limitation that the United States shall not exceed 50 percent of the total contributed by all governments.

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nternational Plant Protection Convention Transmitted to Senate

Exec. D, 84th Cong., 2d sess.

RESIDENT'S TRANSMITTAL MESSAGE

THE WHITE HOUSE, *January 12, 1956.*

o the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice and consent f the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith certified copy of the International Plant Proction Convention, which was open for signature Rome from December 6, 1951, to May 1, 1952, nd during that period was signed on behalf of e United States of America and 36 other states.

The purposes of the convention are explained the report of the Secretary of State which is ansmitted herewith for the information of the enate.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

EPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, October 21, 1955.

HE PRESIDENT,
The White House:

I have the honor to transmit to you, with the ecommendation that it be sent to the Senate for s advice and consent to ratification, a certified opy of the International Plant Protection Conention, which was open for signature at Rome rom December 6, 1951, to May 1, 1952, and during at period was signed on behalf of the United tates of America and 36 other states.

The convention is designed to provide for interational cooperation in controlling pests and iseases of plants and plant products and in preenting their introduction and spread across nternational boundaries. It outlines the policies nder which import restrictions for phytosanitary asons can be justified, describes the type of naonal organization for plant protection that each overnment should provide to the best of its ability, recognizes the advantage of regional organizations under which governments having similar interests can participate to improve pest and disease control, and prescribes a standard form for phytosanitary certificates. A summary of its provisions accompanies this report.

In the United States the determination of quarantine action with respect to the importation of plants is a responsibility of the Secretary of Agriculture under the Plant Quarantine Act of 1912 (37 Stat. 315), as amended. The present convention does not disturb this responsibility. Under it the parties agree to maintain adequate pest control and regulatory organizations and to issue export certificates only under the authority of technically qualified officers. The convention does not attempt to take over any of the responsibilities of individual governments for final decision on needed plant-quarantine measures, nor require that the judgment of the contracting governments be superseded by decisions of an international body.

Representatives of the Department of Agriculture participated in 1950 and 1951 in the negotiations for the formulation of the convention, and that Department desires that the United States become a party thereto. It is the belief of the Department of Agriculture that the convention will be helpful in the control of insect and plant disease outbreaks throughout the world and in preventing the spread of such diseases from one country to another. It will be the means of bringing about a better understanding of mutual plant protection problems and should at the same time afford an opportunity for study of the biological basis of existing or proposed plant-quarantine restrictions. Further, it is felt that under the provisions of the convention and under the leadership of the Food and Agriculture Organization continued improvement in the dependability and competence of the pest-control organizations of the contracting governments throughout the world can be expected.

During the period of formulation of the convention, representatives of the Department of Agriculture were in consultation with the various State plant quarantine officers of this country and discussed the provisions of the proposed convention at meetings of the four regional plant boards into which the plant-quarantine officers of the 48 States are organized. The convention in its final form was endorsed by the National Plant Board of the United States, comprised of representatives of the four regional boards, at its annual meeting held in Washington, October 17–18, 1951.

The convention, in accordance with article XIV, came into force on April 3, 1952. It is now in force with respect to 29 countries which have completed the ratification or adherence procedure. They are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, India, Iraq, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Laos, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Republic of the Philippines, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Yugoslavia.

This document is considered by the Departments of State and Agriculture to be an important and constructive convention, and it is believed it will be useful in providing a forum for discussion of problems involving the control and prevention of the international spread of pests and diseases of plants. It will not require any increase in appropriations for agricultural or quarantine work, since it does not change present United States policies. It is hoped, therefore, that the Senate will give the convention favorable consideration. Support and ratification of the convention will be advantageous to American agriculture and will help to promote the health of agricultural industry throughout the world.

Respectfully submitted.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES.

Summary of the Provisions of the International Plant Protection Convention

Article I states that the purpose of the convention is that of securing common and effective action to prevent the introduction and spread of pests and diseases of plants and plant products and to promote measures for their control.

Article II defines the terms "plants" and "plant products" and extends the scope of the convention to cover facilities for storage and transportation of such products.

Article III authorizes supplementary detailed agreements which would become applicable to the signatories of such agreements after acceptance.

Article IV requires that each contracting government shall to the best of its ability make provision for (1) a competent official plant protection organization, (2) distribution of information within the country regarding pests and diseases of plants, and (3) research and investigation in the field of plant protection.

Article V provides that the contracting governments shall issue phytosanitary certificates only under conditions that make such certificates dependable documents.

Article VI provides for the establishment of necessary quarantines by contracting governments which agree to limit such quarantines to those made necessary by phytosanitary considerations.

Article VII provides for international cooperation in reporting the occurrence, outbreak, and spread of economically important pests and diseases, and for the participation of contracting governments in appropriate international action when necessary to meet emergencies.

Article VIII provides for the establishment of regional plant protection organizations of which several have already been formed or are in the process of organization. It is not contemplated that it will be necessary to form a North American regional plant-protection organization in view of the fact that only Canada, Mexico, and the United States would be involved and that cooperation between the United States and those countries is being maintained continuously on a bilateral basis.

Article IX outlines a procedure for the settlement of disputes that may arise out of the operation of the convention. If a contracting government considers that any action by another contracting government is in conflict with the obligations under the convention, the Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization appoints a committee of experts who consider the question in dispute. The contracting governments agree that the recommendations of such a committee, while not binding in character, will become the basis for renewed consideration by the governments concerned of the matter out of which the disagreement arose.

Article X provides for termination and replacement of certain prior conventions.

Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, and XV include formal provisions relating to the extent to which the convention is applicable to dependent territories and prescribe procedures for ratification, adherence, amendment, entry into force, and denunciation of the convention. Amendments involving new obligations come into force for each contracting government only on acceptance by it. Denunciation takes effect one year from the date of receipt of the notification by the Director General of the Food and Agriculture Organization.

TEXT OF INTERNATIONAL PLANT PROTECTION CONVENTION

PREAMBLE

The contracting Governments, recognizing the usefulness of international co-operation in controlling pests and diseases of plants and plant products and in preventing

heir introduction and spread across national boundaries, nd desiring to ensure close co-ordination of measures lirected to these ends, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I—PURPOSE AND RESPONSIBILITY

1. With the purpose of securing common and effective ction to prevent the introduction and spread of pests and liseases of plants and plant products and to promote neasures for their control, the contracting Governments ndertake to adopt the legislative, technical and adminstrative measures specified in this Convention and in upplementary agreements pursuant to Article III.

2. Each contracting Government shall assume responsiility for the fulfillment within its territories of all reuirements under this Convention.

ARTICLE II—SCOPE

1. For the purposes of this Convention the term "plants" hall comprise living plants and parts thereof, including eeds in so far as the supervision of their importation nder Article VI of the Convention or the issue of phytoanitary certificates in respect of them under Articles IV 1), (a), (iv) and V of this Convention may be deemed ecessary by contracting Governments; and the term plant products" shall comprise unmanufactured and illed material of plant origin, including seeds in so far as hey are not included in the term "plants."

2. The provisions of this Convention may be deemed by ontracting Governments to extend to storage places, conainers, conveyances, packing material and accompanying nedia of all sorts including soil involved in the internaional transportation of plants and plant products.

3. This Convention shall have particular reference to ests and diseases of importance to international trade.

ARTICLE III—SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENTS

1. Supplementary agreements applicable to specific egions, to specific pests or diseases, to specific plants and lant products, to specific methods of international transortation of plants and plant products, or otherwise suplementing the provisions of this Convention, may be roposed by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the nited Nations (hereinafter referred to as "FAO") on he recommendation of a contracting Government or on s own initiative, to meet special problems of plant proection which need particular attention or action.

2. Any such supplementary agreements shall come into orce for each contracting Government after acceptance n accordance with the provisions of the FAO Constitution nd Rules of Procedure.

RTICLE IV—NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR PLANT PROTECTION

1. Each contracting Government shall make provision, s soon as possible and to the best of its ability, for

(*a*) an official plant protection organization, with the ollowing main functions:

(i) the inspection of growing plants, of areas under ultivation (including fields, plantations, nurseries, garens and greenhouses), and of plants and plant products n storage and in transportation, particularly with the bject of reporting the existence, outbreak and spread of lant diseases and pests and of controlling those pests nd diseases;

(ii) the inspection of consignments of plants and plant products moving in international traffic, and, as far as practicable, the inspection of consignments of other articles or commodities moving in international traffic under conditions where they may act incidentally as carriers of pests and diseases of plants and plant products, and the inspection and supervision of storage and transportation facilities of all kinds involved in international traffic whether of plants and plant products or of other commodities, particularly with the object of preventing the dissemination across national boundaries of pests and diseases of plants and plant products;

(iii) the disinfestation or disinfection of consignments of plants and plant products moving in international traffic, and their containers, storage places, or transportation facilities of all kinds employed;

(iv) the issue of certificates relating to phytosanitary condition and origin of consignments of plants and plant products (hereinafter referred to as "phytosanitary certificates");

(*b*) the distribution of information within the country regarding the pests and diseases of plants and plant products and the means of their prevention and control;

(*c*) research and investigation in the field of plant protection.

2. Each contracting Government shall submit a description of the scope of its national organization for plant protection and of changes in such organization to the Director-General of FAO, who shall circulate such information to all contracting Governments.

ARTICLE V—PHYTOSANITARY CERTIFICATES

1. Each contracting Government shall make arrangements for the issue of phytosanitary certificates to accord with the plant protection regulations of other contracting Governments, and in conformity with the following provisions:

(*a*) Inspection shall be carried out and certificates issued only by or under the authority of technically qualified and duly authorized officers and in such circumstances and with such knowledge and information available to those officers that the authorities of importing countries may accept such certificates with confidence as dependable documents.

(*b*) Each certificate covering material intended for planting or propagation shall be as worded in the Annex to this Convention and shall include such additional declarations as may be required by the importing country. The model certificate may also be used for other plants or plant products where appropriate and not inconsistent with the requirements of the importing country.

(*c*) The certificates shall bear no alterations or erasures.

2. Each contracting Government undertakes not to require consignments of plants intended for planting or propagation imported into its territories to be accompanied by phytosanitary certificates inconsistent with the model set out in the Annex to this Convention.

ARTICLE VI—REQUIREMENTS IN RELATION TO IMPORTS

1. With the aim of preventing the introduction of diseases and pests of plants into their territories, contracting

Governments shall have full authority to regulate the entry of plants and plant products, and to this end, may:

(*a*) prescribe restrictions or requirements concerning the importation of plants or plant products;

(*b*) prohibit the importation of particular plants or plant products, or of particular consignments of plants or plant products;

(*c*) inspect or detain particular consignments of plants or plant products;

(*d*) treat, destroy or refuse entry to particular consignments of plants or plant products, or require such consignments to be treated or destroyed.

2. In order to minimize interference with international trade, each contracting Government undertakes to carry out the provisions referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article in conformity with the following:

(*a*) Contracting Governments shall not, under their plant protection legislation, take any of the measures specified in paragraph 1 of this Article unless such measures are made necessary by phytosanitary considerations.

(*b*) If a contracting Government prescribes any restrictions or requirements concerning the importation of plants and plant products into its territories, it shall publish the restrictions or requirements and communicate them immediately to the plant protection services of other contracting Governments and to FAO.

(*c*) If a contracting Government prohibits, under the provisions of its plant protection legislation, the importation of any plants or plant products, it shall publish its decision with reasons and shall immediately inform the plant protection services of other contracting Governments and FAO.

(*d*) If a contracting Government requires consignments of particular plants or plant products to be imported only through specified points of entry, such points shall be so selected as not unnecessarily to impede international commerce. The contracting Government shall publish a list of such points of entry and communicate it to the plant protection services of other contracting Governments and to FAO. Such restrictions on points of entry shall not be made unless the plants or plant products concerned are required to be accompanied by phytosanitary certificates or to be submitted to inspection or treatment.

(*e*) Any inspection by the plant protection service of a contracting Government of consignments of plants offered for importation shall take place as promptly as possible with due regard to the perishability of the plants concerned. If any consignment is found not to conform to the requirements of the plant protection legislation of the importing country, the plant protection service of the exporting country shall be informed. If the consignment is destroyed, in whole or in part, an official report shall be forwarded immediately to the plant protection service of the exporting country.

(*f*) Contracting Governments shall make provisions which, without endangering their own plant production, will reduce to a minimum the number of cases in which a phytosanitary certificate is required on the entry of plants or plant products not intended for planting, such as cereals, fruits, vegetables and cut flowers.

(*g*) Contracting Governments may make provision for the importation for purposes of scientific research of plants and plant products and of specimens of plant pest and disease-causing organisms under conditions affordin ample precaution against the risk of spreading plan diseases and pests.

3. The measures specified in this Article shall not b applied to goods in transit throughout the territories c contracting Governments unless such measures are nece sary for the protection of their own plants.

ARTICLE VII—INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

The contracting Governments shall co-operate with on another to the fullest practicable extent in achieving th aims of this Convention, in particular as follows:

(*a*) Each contracting Government agrees to co-operat with FAO in the establishment of a world reporting servic on plant diseases and pests, making full use of th facilities and services of existing organizations for th purpose, and, when this is established, to furnish to FA periodically the following information:

(i) reports on the occurrence, outbreak and spread c economically important pests and diseases of plants an plant products which may be of immediate or potenti danger;

(ii) information on means found to be effective in co trolling the pests and diseases of plants and pla products.

(*b*) Each contracting Government shall, as far as practicable, participate in any special campaigns f combating particular destructive pests or diseases whic may seriously threaten crop production and need intern tional action to meet the emergencies.

ARTICLE VIII—REGIONAL PLANT PROTECTION ORGANIZATION

1. The contracting Governments undertake to c operate with one another in establishing regional pla protection organizations in appropriate areas.

2. The regional plant protection organizations sha function as the co-ordinating bodies in the areas covere and shall participate in various activities to achieve th objectives of this Convention.

ARTICLE IX—SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

1. If there is any dispute regarding the interpretatio or application of the Convention, or if a contracting Go ernment considers that any action by another contrac ing Government is in conflict with the obligations of th latter under Articles V and VI of this Convention, e pecially regarding the basis of prohibiting or restrictin the imports of plants or plant products coming from i territories, the Government or Governments concerne may request the Director-General of FAO to appoint committee to consider the question in dispute.

2. The Director-General of FAO shall thereupon, aft consultation with the Governments concerned, appoi a committee of experts which shall include representativ of those Governments. This committee shall conside the question in dispute, taking into account all document and other forms of evidence submitted by the Governmen concerned. This committee shall submit a report to th Director-General of FAO who shall transmit it to the Go ernments concerned, and to other contracting Gover ments.

3. The contracting Governments agree that the recommendations of such a committee, while not binding in character, will become the basis for renewed consideration by the Governments concerned of the matter out of which the disagreement arose.

4. The Governments concerned shall share equally the expenses of the experts.

ARTICLE X—SUBSTITUTION OF PRIOR AGREEMENTS

This Convention shall terminate and replace, between contracting Governments, the International Convention respecting measures to be taken against the *Phylloxera vastatrix* of 3 November 1881, the additional Convention signed at Berne on 15 April 1889 and the International Convention for the Protection of Plants signed at Rome on 16 April 1929.

ARTICLE XI—TERRITORIAL APPLICATION

1. Any Government may at the time of ratification or adherence or at any time thereafter communicate to the Director-General of FAO a declaration that this Convention shall extend to all or any of the territories for the international relations of which it is responsible, and this Convention shall be applicable to all territories specified in the declaration as from the thirtieth day after the receipt of the declaration by the Director-General.

2. Any Government which has communicated to the Director-General of FAO a declaration in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article may at any time communicate a further declaration modifying the scope of any former declaration or terminating the application of the provisions of the present Convention in respect of any territory. Such modification or termination shall take effect as from the thirtieth day after the receipt of the declaration by the Director-General.

3. The Director-General of FAO shall inform all signatory and adhering Governments of any declaration received under this Article.

ARTICLE XII—RATIFICATION AND ADHERENCE

1. This Convention shall be open for signature by all Governments until 1 May 1952 and shall be ratified at the earliest possible date. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Director-General of FAO, who shall give notice of the date of deposit to each of the signatory Governments.

2. As soon as this Convention has come into force in accordance with Article XIV, it shall be open for adherence by non-signatory Governments. Adherence shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument of adherence with the Director-General of FAO, who shall notify all signatory and adhering Governments.

ARTICLE XIII—AMENDMENT

1. Any proposal by a contracting Government for the amendment of this Convention shall be communicated to the Director-General of FAO.

2. Any proposed amendment of this Convention received by the Director-General of FAO from a contracting Government shall be presented to a regular or special session of the Conference of FAO for approval and, if the amendment involves important technical changes or imposes additional obligations on the contracting Governments, it shall be considered by an advisory committee of specialists convened by FAO prior to the Conference.

3. Notice of any proposed amendment of this Convention shall be transmitted to the contracting Governments by the Director-General of FAO not later than the time when the agenda of the session of the Conference at which the matter is to be considered is dispatched.

4. Any such proposed amendment of this Convention shall require the approval of the Conference of FAO and shall come into force as from the thirtieth day after acceptance by two-thirds of the contracting Governments. Amendments involving new obligations for contracting Governments, however, shall come into force in respect of each contracting Government only on acceptance by it and as from the thirtieth day after such acceptance.

5. The instruments of acceptance of amendments involving new obligations shall be deposited with the Director-General of FAO, who shall inform all contracting Governments of the receipt of acceptances and the entry into force of amendments.

ARTICLE XIV—ENTRY INTO FORCE

As soon as this Convention has been ratified by three signatory Governments it shall come into force between them. It shall come into force for each Government ratifying or adhering thereafter from the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification or adherence.

ARTICLE XV—DENUNCIATION

1. Any contracting Government may at any time give notice of denunciation of this Convention by notification addressed to the Director-General of FAO. The Director-General shall at once inform all signatory and adhering Governments.

2. Denunciation shall take effect one year from the date of receipt of the notification by the Director-General of FAO.

Annex

MODEL PHYTOSANITARY CERTIFICATE

PLANT PROTECTION SERVICE OF_____ No.____

This is to certify
that the plants, parts of plants or plant products described below or representative samples of them were thoroughly examined on (date) _____
by (name) _____ an authorized officer of the (service) _____
and were found to the best of his knowledge to be substantially free from injurious diseases and pests; and that the consignment is believed to conform with the current phytosanitary regulations of the importing country both as stated in the additional declaration hereon and otherwise.

Fumigation or disinfection treatment (if required by importing country):

Date _____

Duration of exposure _____

Treatment _____
Chemical and concentration_____

Additional declaration

_____ 19__

_____
(Signature)

_____
(Rank)

(Stamp of the Service)

DESCRIPTION OF THE CONSIGNMENT

Name and address of exporter: _____
Name and address of consignee: _____
Number and description of packages: _____
Distinguishing marks: _____
Origin (if required by importing country): _____
Means of conveyance: _____
Point of entry: _____
Quantity and name of produce: _____
Botanical name (if required by importing country):
_____

DONE *at Rome, Italy, on the sixth day of December, one thousand nine hundred and fifty-one, in a single copy in the English, French and Spanish languages, each of which shall be of equal authenticity. This document shall be deposited in the archives of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Certified copies shall be transmitted by the Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization to each signatory and adhering Government.*

IN WITNESS WHEREOF *the undersigned, duly authorized to that effect, have signed this Convention on behalf of their respective Governments on the dates appearing opposite their signatures.*

For Austria:
R PHILLIP — 6th of December 1951

For the Kingdom of Belgium:
A VAN HOUTTE — 6 décembre 1951 ad referendum

For Brazil:
JOSUE DE CASTRO — 6 de décembre 1951 ad ref.

For Canada:
H. BARTON — Dec. 6, 1951 ad ref.

For Ceylon:
G. C. S. COREA — 7th December 1951

For Egypt:
On account of the fact that the Royal Egyptian Government does not acknowledge and has not up till now acknowledged the existence of Israel, my signature to this Convention does not bind my Government by any means to Israel and has been allowed with all rights reserved in this connection.
MOHAMED ALI EL KELANY — 6.12.51 ad ref.

For France:
ANDRE MAYER — 6 décembre 1951 ad referendum

For India:
J. N. KHOSLA — 30/4/52

For the United States of Indonesia:
SURYO-DI-PURO — December 6, 1951

For Ireland:
THOMAS WALSH — 6th December 1951 ad ref.

For Israel:
D MOSHE ISHAY — 6.12.51

For Japan:
R. YAMAZOE — 6.12.51 ad ref.

For Lebanon:

For the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg:
BRUCK — 16 1 52 ad ref.

For the Kingdom of the Netherlands:
S. L. LOUWES — 6.12.51 ad ref.

For New Zealand:
C. S. M. HOPKIRK — 6.12.51

For Pakistan:

For the Republic of the Philippines:
J S CAMUS — 12/6/51 subject to confirmation

For Portugal:
ANTONIO PEREIRA DE SOUSA DA CAMARA — 6 Dec. 51

For Spain:
CARLOS REIN — 10 décembre 51

For Switzerland:
L MAIRE — 6 déc. 1951

For Thailand:
PHRA CHUANG KASHETRA — Dec. 6, '51

For the Union of South Africa:
S. J. DE SWARDT — 6th Dec. 1951

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
CARRINGTON — 6.12.51 ad ref.

For the United States of America:
P. V. CARDON — 6:12 '51 ad ref.

For Viet-Nam:

For Yugoslavia:
DALIBOR SOLDATIC — 6 Dec. 51 ad ref.

For Cuba:
CARLOS MARTINEZ — 6 de decembre de 1951 ad ref.

For Denmark:
A P JACOBSEN — 6 Dec. 1951 ad ref.

For El Salvador:
ROD B. SCHONENBERG — 6 Dec. 1951 ad ref.

For Sweden:
JOHAN BECK-FRIIS — 11 Dec. 1951

For Italy:
AMINTORE FANFANI — 2 fevrier 1952 ad ref.

For Ecuador:
R JACOME — 12 marzo 1952 ad referendum

For Chile:
C. CAMPO R. — 3 abril 1952

For Guatemala:
F COSENZA G — 23 abril 1952 ad referendum

For Costa Rica:
TEODORO B CASTRO — 28 abril 1952 ad referendum

For Colombia:
EDU ZULETA ANGEL, *Ambassador of Colombia* — 29 abril de 1952

For the Federal Republic of Germany:
CLEMENS BRENTANO, *Ambassador of Germany* — 30 avril 52 ad referendum

For the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia:
C. V. KELLWAY — 30th April 1952

For Uruguay:
C GIAMBRUNO — 30 de abril de 1952 ad referendum

I hereby certify that this text is a true copy of the International Plant Protection Convention as signed in Rome by the representatives of 37 governments between December 6, 1951 and 1 May 1952.

NORRIS E. DODD
Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

Current Treaty Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Convention on road traffic with annexes. Done at Geneva September 19, 1949. Entered into force March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487.
Accession deposited: Turkey, January 17, 1956.

Protocol providing for accession to the convention on road traffic by occupied countries or territories. Done at Geneva September 19, 1949. TIAS 2487.
Accession deposited: Turkey, January 17, 1956.

International Court of Justice

Statute of the International Court of Justice (59 Stat. 1055).
Declaration recognizing compulsory jurisdiction deposited: Portugal, December 19, 1955 (with a reservation); India, January 9, 1956.[1]

North Atlantic Ice Patrol

Agreement regarding financial support of the North Atlantic Ice Patrol. Opened for signature at Washington January 4, 1956.[2]
Signatures: United Kingdom, February 9, 1956.

[1] Termination deposited Jan. 9, 1956, of Declaration of Feb. 28, 1940, accepting as compulsory the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice.
[2] Not in force.

BILATERAL

Burma

Agricultural commodities agreement. Signed at Rangoon February 8, 1956. Entered into force February 8, 1956.

India

Air transport agreement and exchange of notes. Signed at New Delhi February 3, 1956. Entered into force February 3, 1956.

Israel

Agreement modifying the agricultural commodities agreement of November 10, 1955 (TIAS 3429) to permit sales for Israel pounds of an additional 1,000 metric tons of butter. Exchange of notes at Washington January 31, 1956. Entered into force February 1, 1956.

Spain

Agreement amending the surplus agricultural commodities agreement of April 20, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3246, 3455), by providing for the sale of soybean oil and cottonseed oil to Spain. Signed at Madrid January 21, 1956. Entered into force January 21, 1956.

Yugoslavia

Agreement amending the surplus agricultural commodities agreement of January 5, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3167, 3252, 3253, 3446), by providing for the sale of wheat, cotton, and lard to Yugoslavia. Signed at Belgrade January 19, 1956. Entered into force January 19, 1956.

Agreement providing for certain economic assistance on a loan basis pursuant to section 402 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 (68 Stat. 403). Effected by exchange of notes at Belgrade January 19, 1956. Entered into force January 19, 1956.

Atoms-for-Peace Agreement With Korea Comes Into Force

On February 3 the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State (press release 61) announced that a cooperative agreement between the United States and the Republic of Korea covering research in the peaceful uses of atomic energy was signed on that day at the Department of State. Ambassador You Chan Yang signed the agreement for Korea. The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Walter S. Robertson, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Lewis Strauss, signed for the United States.

This agreement was initialed by representatives of the two Governments July 1, 1955. Under terms of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, certain procedural steps must be taken by executive and legislative branches of the United States Government before agreements of this type may come into force. These steps have now been taken; with the signing today, the agreement now becomes effective for both countries.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Germany—Boundary Changes Between United States and Soviet Zones of Occupation. TIAS 3081. Pub. 5972. 4 pp., map. 20¢.

Agreement between the United States and the U.S.S.R.—Signed at Wanfried, Saxony, Germany, September 17, 1945. Entered into force September 17, 1945.

Defense—Offshore Procurement Program. TIAS 3083. Pub. 5694. 58 pp. 20¢.

Agreement between the United States and Italy. Exchange of notes—Signed at Rome March 31, 1954. Entered into force March 31, 1954.

Defense—Use of Facilities in the Azores. TIAS 3087. Pub. 5716. 8 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Portugal—Signed at Lisbon September 6, 1951. Entered into force September 6, 1951.

Technical Cooperation—Program of Housing. TIAS 3090. Pub. 5709. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Colombia. Exchange of notes—Signed at Bogotá June 24 and 30, 1954. Entered into force June 30, 1954.

Technical Cooperation—Program of Agriculture. TIAS 3091. Pub. 5710. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Mexico. Exchange of notes—Signed at México June 17, 1954. Entered into force June 17, 1954.

Defense—Offshore Procurement Program. TIAS 3094. Pub. 5717. 30 pp. 15¢.

Agreement between the United States and Spain. Exchange of notes—Signed at San Sebastián July 30, 1954. Entered into force July 30, 1954. And amending agreement. Exchange of notes—Signed at Madrid October 26, 1954. Entered into force October 26, 1954.

Agriculture—Cooperative Program in Peru. TIAS 3095. Pub. 5718. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Peru—Providing for termination of agreement of April 1 and 9, 1952, as modified and extended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Lima April 27 and May 11, 1954. Entered into force May 11, 1954.

Defense—Use of Five Islands for Recreational Purposes. TIAS 3096. Pub. 5719. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Trinidad and Tobago. Exchange of letters—Signed at Port-of-Spain November 19, 1953, and July 19, 1954. Entered into force July 19, 1954.

Mutual Defense Assistance—Facilities Assistance Program. TIAS 3098. Pub. 5721. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Spain. Exchange of notes—Signed at Madrid April 9, May 11 and May 19, 1954. Entered into force May 19, 1954.

Free Territory of Trieste—Administration of Zones A and B by Italian and Yugoslav Governments. TIAS 3099. Pub. 5723. 13 pp., map. 25¢.

Understanding, with annexes, between the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Yugoslavia—Dated at London October 5, 1954. Entered into force October 5, 1954. And related notes—Signed at London October 5, 1954.

Trade-Marks. TIAS 3100. Pub. 5725. 3 pp. 5¢.

Declaration between the United States and Viet-Nam. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington November 3, 1953, and October 25, 1954. Entered into force October 25, 1954. And note—Signed November 22, 1954.

Mutual Defense Assistance—Facilities Assistance Program. TIAS 3102. Pub. 5736. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Belgium. Exchange of notes—Signed at Brussels November 23, 1954. Entered into force November 23, 1954. And agreed minute.

Economic Aid to Yugoslavia. TIAS 3103. Pub. 5737. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Yugoslavia. Exchange of notes—Signed at Belgrade January 4 and 5, 1954. Entered into force January 5, 1954; operative retroactively July 1, 1953.

Technical Cooperation Civil Aviation Mission to Costa Rica. TIAS 3104. Pub. 5755. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Costa Rica. Exchange of notes—Signed at San José August 7 and September 11, 1951. Entered into force September 11, 1951.

Military Mission to Costa Rica. TIAS 3109. Pub. 5744. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Costa Rica—Extending agreement of December 10, 1945, as amended and extended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington July 2 and September 18, 1953. Entered into force September 18, 1953.

Hospitals and Medical Care for Philippine Veterans. TIAS 3111. Pub. 5746. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines—Modifying agreement of June 7, 1949. Exchange of notes—Signed at Manila October 6, 1954. Entered into force October 6, 1954.

Copyright. TIAS 3114. Pub. 5758. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and India. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington October 21, 1954. Entered into force October 21, 1954.

Relief Supplies and Equipment—Duty-Free Entry and Exemption From Internal Taxation. TIAS 3115. Pub 5759. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Viet-Nam. Exchange of notes—Dated at Saïgon August 20 and 26, 1954 Entered into force August 26, 1954.

Air Transport Services. TIAS 3117. Pub. 5763. 3 pp 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Venezuela—Amending annex to agreement of August 14, 1953. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington December 30, 1954 Entered into force December 30, 1954.

Agriculture
Agricultural Agreement With Burma 308
International Plant Protection Convention Transmitted to Senate (Eisenhower, Dulles, text of convention) . . 311
Policies of the Department of State on Disposal of Surplus Agricultural Commodities (Armstrong) 301
P.L. 480 Agreement With Austria 308
American Republics. Territorial Waters and Related Matters (text of report) 296
Asia. U.S. Chiefs of Mission in Asia To Meet at Tokyo . 278
Atomic Energy
EC Regulation Concerning Foreign Atomic Energy Activity 309
Atoms-for-Peace Agreement With Korea 317
Austria. P.L. 480 Agreement With Austria 308
Bolivia. $20 Million Development Aid for Bolivia . . . 300
Brazil. Export-Import Bank Loan to Brazilian Railway . 299
Burma. Agricultural Agreement With Burma 308
Chile. Letters of Credence (Rodriguez) 295
China, Communist. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference 279
Congress, The
International Plant Protection Convention Transmitted to Senate (Eisenhower, Dulles, text of convention) . . 311
Recommended Changes in Immigration Legislation (Eisenhower) 275
United States Policy in the Middle East (Dulles, Congressional letter) 285
Economic Affairs
Export-Import Bank Loan to Brazilian Railway . . . 299
Tariff Concessions to Sweden (announcement, Eisenhower letter) 289
Territorial Waters and Related Matters (text of report) . 296
World Bank Reports $13.7 Million Net Income for 6-Month Period 300
Europe
Exchange of Views With President of Coal and Steel Authority 288
Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . . . 279
Foreign Service. U.S. Chiefs of Mission in Asia To Meet at Tokyo 278
France. Tripartite Meeting on Situation in Middle East . 286
Germany
Protest on Para-Military Units in East Berlin (text of note) 293
The Present Situation in Germany (Hoover) 290
Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . . . 279
Health, Education, and Welfare. ICA Gives Gamma Globulin To Combat Epidemic in India 288
Hungary. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference 279
Immigration and Naturalization. Recommended Changes in Immigration Legislation (Eisenhower) 275
India. ICA Gives Gamma Globulin To Combat Epidemic in India 288
International Law
Territorial Waters and Related Matters (text of report) . 296
Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . . . 279
International Organizations and Meetings. Territorial Waters and Related Matters (text of report) . . . 296
Ireland. Visit of Prime Minister of Ireland 290
Korea. Atoms-for-Peace Agreement With Korea . . . 317
Mutual Security
ICA Gives Gamma Globulin To Combat Epidemic in India 288
$20 Million Development Aid for Bolivia 300
Near East
Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . . . 279
Tripartite Meeting on Situation in Middle East 286
United States Policy in the Middle East (Dulles, Congressional letter) 285
Pakistan. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference 279
Presidential Documents
International Plant Protection Convention Transmitted to Senate (Eisenhower, Dulles, text of convention) . . . 311
Recommended Changes in Immigration Legislation (Eisenhower) 275
Tariff Concessions to Sweden (announcement, Eisenhower letter) 289
Publications. Recent Releases 318
Science. Correspondence With U.S.S.R. Concerning Weather Balloons 293
Sweden. Tariff Concessions to Sweden (announcement, Eisenhower letter) 289
Treaty Information
Agricultural Agreement With Burma 308
Atoms-for-Peace Agreement With Korea 317
Current Actions 317
International Plant Protection Convention Transmitted to Senate (Eisenhower, Dulles, text of convention) . . . 311
P.L. 480 Agreement With Austria 308
U.S.S.R.
Correspondence With U.S.S.R. Concerning Weather Balloons (text of notes) 293
Protest on Para-Military Units in East Berlin (text of note) 293
Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . . . 279
United Kingdom. Tripartite Meeting on Situation in Middle East 286
United Nations
Current U.N. Documents 310
U.S. Contributes $6 Million to U.N. Technical Assistance . 310

Name Index

Armstrong, Willis C. 301
Conant, James B. 293
Costello, John A. 290
Dulles, Secretary 279, 285, 311
Eisenhower, President 275, 289, 311
Hoover, Herbert, Jr. 290
Mayer, René 288
Rodriguez Altamirano, Mario 295

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: February 6–12

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Press release issued prior to February 6 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 61 of February 3.

No.	Date	Subject
64	2/6	Tariff concessions to Sweden.
65	2/6	Dulles: letter on Middle East policy.
66	2/7	Armstrong: disposal of agricultural surpluses.
67	2/7	Surplus commodities agreement with Austria.
68	2/7	Dulles: news conference transcript.
69	2/8	Conference of Far East chiefs of mission.
70	2/8	Agricultural commodities agreement with Burma.
*71	2/8	Educational exchange.
72	2/8	Note to U.S.S.R. on weather balloons.
73	2/8	Tripartite meeting on Middle East.
*74	2/9	Educational exchange.
75	2/9	Communique on Mayer visit.
76	2/10	Hoover: "The Present Situation in Germany."
77	2/10	Protest on East Berlin military units.

*Not printed.

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The Department of State

bulletin

Vol. XXXIV, No. 870

February 27, 1956

EFFORTS TOWARD WORLD PEACE • *by Under Secretary Hoover* 323

UNITED STATES–BRAZILIAN FRIENDSHIP • *Address by Vice President Nixon* 335

TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF AMERIKAHAUS IN MUNICH • *by Ambassador James B. Conant* 327

NATO—OUR GREATEST INSTRUMENT FOR PEACE • *by Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther* 332

THE ACCESSIBILITY OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE MATERIALS RELATING TO AMERICAN–FAR EASTERN RELATIONS • *Article by Herbert Spielman*. 343

For index see inside back cover

The Department of State bulletin

VOL. XXXIV, No. 870 • PUBLICATION 6298

February 27, 1956

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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Efforts Toward World Peace

by Under Secretary Hoover[1]

I am very glad to have the opportunity of talking to you briefly about efforts toward world peace.

We are living in a complex and difficult era. The last decade has been a period of radical change. The Soviet Union has emerged as the second strongest nation in the world. Some 800 million people, primarily in the Far East, who were formerly under colonial rule are now independent nations. Mainland China is in the grip of a Communist regime. The nature of warfare has been completely transformed by nuclear weapons, which are now in the hands of the Soviet Union as well as ourselves.

Today the U.S. occupies a unique position as the strongest nation in the free world. Yet the rise of the Soviet Union poses an unparalleled threat to our own security. This threat takes many forms. With the newer weapons, our continent is now directly exposed to devastating attack. And our interests do not stop at our own shores. Our security would be gravely imperiled if other friendly nations should lose their liberty. Nor is the Soviet threat merely military. Communism has developed to a fine art the techniques of subversion and propaganda. Today the world presents many opportunities for the use of these techniques. The Soviets can play upon fears, discontents, and hopes, and can exploit historic cleavages and political inexperience, especially in the newer nations.

In the face of this situation, the President, in his state of the Union message,[2] declared that our international effort must be directed to the "waging of peace" with all the resourcefulness and sense of dedication and urgency that we have mustered in defense of our country in time of war.

Our efforts for peace must take many forms.

Collective Security

In the forefront is the maintenance of our system of collective security.

We now live in a world in which security lies beyond the attainment of any one nation, however strong. The massive Communist threat, backed by more than 6 million men under arms, can be met only by mutual defense. Some 42 nations are allied with the United States for collective security. The NATO Pact binds together 15 states of Europe and North America. The Rio Pact covers Latin America. The Manila Pact extends the principle to southern Asia. In a few days Mr. Dulles will be leaving for Pakistan to meet in annual conference with the Foreign Ministers of the other member countries. These alliances threaten no one. They have come into being solely in response to threats of Communist aggression.

These alliances serve as a warning to any potential aggressor that he will encounter the combined opposition of a powerful coalition of free nations. We have also gone far, especially in Europe, to create the material means for resisting an attack. Thus, collective security contributes powerfully to the maintenance of peace.

Building Political and Economic Strength

Military strength is essential but it is not enough. The United States and its partners must also create conditions of political stability and eco-

[1] Address made before the U.S. Conference of Mayors and the American Municipal Association at Washington, D. C., on Feb. 16 (press release 84).

[2] BULLETIN of Jan. 16, 1956, p. 79.

nomic health if they are to resist the Communist threat.

Just after the war this effort took a dramatic form in Europe. The foundations were laid in the Marshall plan, which restored the shattered economies of the European nations. Today those nations are standing on their own feet economically and are cooperating for their mutual benefit. Six of them are engaged in initial steps toward even closer unity.

In Asia the task is still formidable. There, new nations are struggling to achieve economic growth and political stability in the face of serious obstacles. The continued independence of these states may depend on their success in this struggle.

That is why the United States is extending economic assistance to many of them. Our aim is not to buy their friendship. Our purpose is to help them become strong enough to remain free. This task is likely to be a lengthy one. The Secretary of State has recently said that such programs will "need to go on for a considerable period of time at about the present level." In order to make them more effective we are asking the Congress to permit longer-term commitments for limited amounts. This should help in mobilizing funds from other sources, such as the World Bank, other countries, and private investors.

Resolving Disputes

We are convinced that an enduring peace must be based on freedom and justice. That is why we have devoted so much effort in trying to settle outstanding disputes and correct injustices. Rejecting the use of force, we want to negotiate in good faith to remove these causes of tension. That was our purpose at the summit conference at Geneva last summer and at the Foreign Ministers Conference later in the fall.

We shall persevere in that purpose despite the disappointing results so far. We will not sacrifice freedom or justice. We will continue to seek unification of Germany, restoration of independence to Eastern Europe, and renunciation of force in the Far East. We will maintain our own strength, assist our friends, and hope that the leaders of the Communist regimes may be brought to see that a just peace will best serve their own legitimate security interests.

Within the free world there are disputes which disrupt its unity, such as that in the Middle East. Even now we are meeting with the British and the French in an attempt to find ways to avert a tragic outbreak of hostilities there.

Disarmament

Our efforts for peace take still another form. We want if possible to tame the atom.

As the President has said:

> . . . a nuclear war would be an intolerable disaster which must not be permitted to occur. . . . The awesome power of the atom must be made to serve as a guardian of the free community and of the peace. . . .

For over 10 years the United States has sought to bring nuclear weapons under control. So far the Soviet Union has not been willing to agree to the safeguards essential for the security of all.

We are continuing that effort. The obstacles are serious. The steady growth of stockpiles of nuclear material gravely increases the difficulty of effective inspection.

Last summer, as you will recall, at the Geneva meeting, the President made a new offer to the Soviet Union as a first step. In his "open skies" proposal he suggested that our two countries should open up to aerial inspection in order to protect against surprise attack. This too the Russians have so far rejected.

In the United Nations meetings on disarmament, which will resume shortly, the United States will continue to press for practical steps to control and reduce armaments, especially the nuclear threat.

Meanwhile, we are trying to move ahead in the peaceful use of atomic energy. For this purpose, we are engaging with other interested nations in creating an international agency which will foster use of nuclear material for power and other beneficent purposes.

No Easy Road to Peace

I have given you a thumbnail sketch of our efforts toward world peace. At best, it could cover only a small segment of those efforts. But even this outline shows how diverse and widespread they must be.

There is no easy road to peace. We must be prepared for a long haul, calling for steady nerves and persistence. We cannot afford to slacken our efforts or to become impatient of the sacrifices we are called on to make. They are part of the price of the liberties we cherish.

We are the heirs of a great tradition. We must how ourselves worthy of our heritage. If we do, ve can hope to preserve peace with freedom. With atience and fortitude the free world can expect o see its ideal of human dignity and liberty pre-ail over tyranny.

Last week in Berlin, I spoke to the Mayor and eople of that great city reaffirming our dedica-ion to the cause of a free and united Germany.[3] should like to close by saying to you what I said o them:

"Free-world strength is not only a matter of efense against military aggression, or of indus-rial production, or of scientific advances, though hese all play their part. It is fundamentally the ollective power of spiritual, moral, and intellec-ual values based on political liberty and the rec-gnition of the individual rights of free men. It s a force which unites diverse cultures, creeds, nd economic systems. It is the unbreakable bond etween captive peoples and the people of the ree world. It is the basic strength behind our iplomatic negotiations and international confer-nces. It is beyond the reach of imperialism and yranny. It cannot be contained by barbed wire r border guards. Deep within it lies the hope of ll mankind for peace, justice, and freedom."

hipment of Military Equipment o Countries of Near East

ress release 91 dated February 18

On February 17, the temporary suspension of utstanding export licenses covering shipment of rms to certain countries in the Near East was an-ounced. The Department of State considers it ppropriate to clarify the position of the United tates with respect to this action.

On May 25, 1950, the Governments of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States issued a oint declaration setting forth their deep interest n promoting the establishment and maintenance f peace and stability in the Near East area.[1] In his declaration the three Governments recognized hat the Arab States and Israel all need to main-ain armed forces for the purposes of assuring heir internal security and their legitimate self-defense and to permit them to play their part in the defense of the area as a whole. At the same time, the three Governments reaffirmed their opposition to the development of an arms race between the Arab States and Israel.

During recent years there have been many requests from these countries for arms from the United States. These requests have been scrutinized in the light of all circumstances, including their justification within the framework of the tripartite policy. Limited arms deliveries have from time to time been authorized to the Arab States and to Israel. In each instance an export license is required before shipment is made, as required by an Act of Congress the administration of which is under the Department of State.[2]

Purchases of arms and materiel of a military character may be made either through ordinary commercial channels or from the U.S. Government in accordance with authority provided under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 and by the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended. Sales by the U.S. Government require an agreement by the purchasing country that the arms will be used only for purposes of internal security and for self-defense. Such agreements have been negotiated with several of the Arab States and with Israel, as well as with many other countries. Purchases, whether from U.S. governmental or private sources, require the application of the export licensing procedures whenever they fall within the carefully defined criteria of military items. These include all aircraft and replacement parts, whether they are commercial or military.

Pursuant to the procedures outlined above, the United States has, at the request of various countries in this area, authorized shipments of arms in accordance with the principles of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950. The United States has since August of last year authorized licenses covering a total of less than $16 million for the Near East countries in question, much of the materiel already having been shipped. A substantial part of these involves spare parts, communications equipment, and miscellaneous small items for maintenance and other purposes. It also includes commercial aircraft and parts. All presently outstanding

[3] Bulletin of Feb. 13, 1956, p. 242.

[1] Bulletin of June 15, 1953, p. 834, footnote.

[2] For an article on munitions control, see *ibid.*, May 30, 1955, p. 884.

licenses, which include the shipments now in New York harbor, are within this total.

During the past year numerous applications were received by the United States from countries in that area for large quantities of arms. These requests totaled more than $150 million. When the massive shipment of arms by the Soviet bloc to the Near East was confirmed in September of last year, it was a clear signal for the starting of an arms race that would increase the danger of war in the area. The United States is maintaining a continuous review of the whole question of Near East arms shipments, and no action has been taken to authorize any of these large requests.

Meanwhile, questions have been raised concerning the particular shipment of tanks from New York to Saudi Arabia. The following are the facts:

On April 28, 1955, the Saudi Arabian Government, pointing out that it had no tanks, requested the United States to sell a limited number to be used for training purposes. Negotiations for this sale took place over a period of several months and resulted in the United States agreeing on August 25, 1955, to sell eighteen light reconnaissance N–41 tanks. The Saudi Arabian Government was informed by the Department of State on September 3 of this commitment on the part of the United States Government. The tanks were paid for by Saudi Arabia on November 26, 1955, and its Government was informed that shipment would take place in mid-February. This sale was subjected to the usual careful scrutiny to determine that it would meet the conditions established in the Mutual Security Act. It was also considered in the light of general discussions which took place in 1951 during the negotiation of the cash-reimbursable agreement of June 18 of that year.

On the evening of February 16, when numerous inquiries were made concerning the tank shipment about to leave the New York harbor, it was decided to suspend all outstanding export licenses for the area in question pending an examination to assure that such exports were being made in compliance with pertinent laws and regulations and were in conformity with the policies of the United States with respect to the maintenance of peace and stability in the area. This examination has taken place, and it was confirmed that all licenses conformed with the above criteria. The President has therefore decided to permit the export of those items covered by outstanding valid export licenses for the Arab States and Israel which have not already gone forward.

As in the past, outstanding requests for arms which have not been approved and future requests will, of course, be subjected to most careful scrutiny in the light of policies enunciated in the Tripartite Declaration and applicable Acts of Congress, and within the context of a continuing review of the situation in the area.

The President has been kept currently informed of the situation outlined above, and fully approves of the foregoing.

Research Reactor Agreement With Germany

Press release 78 dated February 13

JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT

An agreement for cooperation in the field of research in the peaceful uses of atomic energy between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany was signed in Washington today.

The agreement was signed by Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, for the United States, and by Ambassador Heinz L. Krekeler for the Federal Republic.

As previously stated, the United States has negotiated this type of agreement with 24 other countries. All of these agreements provide a basis for cooperation in the design and construction of research reactors and in the training of personnel in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, and provide the legal framework necessary for the lease of a limited amount of fissionable material for use as fuel in research reactors. They also provide for the exchange of unclassified information in the research reactor field, related health and safety problems, and on the use of radioactive isotopes in physical and biological research, medical therapy, agriculture, and industry. It is expected that the research reactor agreement will assist the German Government in meeting the problem of training personnel in the peaceful fields of nuclear science.

A copy of the agreement is attached.[1]

[1] Not printed here. For text of a similar agreement with Turkey, see BULLETIN of July 11, 1955, p. 55.

Tenth Anniversary of Amerikahaus in Munich

by James B. Conant
Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany[1]

During the last few days we celebrated two happy events, an anniversary and a new beginning: the 10th birthday of the Amerikahaus [United States Information Center] in Munich, and the *Richtfest* of the new home of the Information Center. This double celebration compels us to turn our thoughts both forward to the future and back to the years that lie behind us. We think today with justified pride of the achievements in the German Federal Republic during 10 difficult postwar years, and we look ahead to our future tasks and problems. (To speak of "our" problems when addressing this audience of Germans and Americans seems to me more than justified since the problems to which I am referring are of equal concern to Germans and Americans, or rather, are directly or indirectly of concern to all people of the free world.)

Let us first of all look back. Within the German Federal Republic and beyond its borders the work of reconstruction accomplished in the Federal Republic during the postwar years has been praised frequently, and the praise is well deserved. However, in these eulogies emphasis was usually laid on material reconstruction. Much was said about the industriousness and the energy displayed by German workers, industrialists, and civil servants engaged in the rebuilding of cities, bridges, railroad lines, industrial plants. In this connection American aid, which made possible and speeded up German economic recovery, was often mentioned, also other impressive examples of German-American cooperation—for instance, the airlift for the city of Berlin during the 10 months of the Berlin blockade.

Though they are certainly praiseworthy, I do not want to discuss these achievements today on the 10th anniversary of the Amerikahaus Munich. Rather I should like to direct your attention to other accomplishments of momentous importance. I should like to speak of certain aspects of intellectual and spiritual reconstruction achieved during the same period. And even though I hesitate to revive painful memories of a tragic past, I should still like to ask you to look back briefly to the situation 10 years ago.

You know how completely Germany, cut off from its neighbors by the measures of its Government after 1933 and later also by the bitterness of the war, had lost contact with the rest of the world. You know how deeply the rest of the world, remembering the terrible events of the previous 12 years, distrusted Germany in 1945 and even later. Of course, Hitler had never quite succeeded in breaking off all contacts between the people in his power and the people living beyond the borders of his state. But he had succeeded in making all contacts with the outside world extremely difficult, especially because he had tried to exploit all remaining contacts as propaganda tools for his ideology.

I know from my own experience the dilemma of those persons abroad who had friendly feelings for Germany but detested Hitler. They were in a dilemma similar to that of the people in Germany who loved their country but hated its dictator. A friendly act of a foreigner toward Germany could, in those years, always be misinterpreted as a friendly act toward Hitler. On the other hand, a repudiation of Hitler could always be interpreted as a repudiation of Germany.

In the thirties I found myself in this dilemma more than once—for instance, when a former

[1] Translation of an address made in German at Munich on Jan. 28 during the 10th anniversary celebrations of the Amerikahaus (U.S. Embassy, Bonn, press release).

student of Harvard University, a friend of Hitler's, offered Harvard University a scholarship for an American student who was to study in Germany and, no doubt, be indoctrinated in the Nazi ideology. Quite obviously, the offer was no more than a propaganda trick. And because I had no illusions whatsoever about Hitler's intentions, I considered it proper to reject the offer in unmistakable terms. The answer of Harvard University made it quite clear that we detested Hitler and all of his works.

A few years later the problem presented itself in a somewhat different form. In 1936 Harvard celebrated its tercentenary, and for this occasion we wished to invite professors from all over the world, including Germany. During the anniversary celebrations we conferred honorary doctors' degrees on some of our guests, including some German scholars.

Both our rejection of the proffered scholarship and our invitation to the German scholars were violently attacked. In the first case Harvard was accused of having been too unfriendly; in the second case Harvard was accused of having been too friendly. I mention these painful details only because I want to show how difficult it became after 1933 to maintain any kind of contact with Germany and how difficult it was even after 1945 to reestablish the broken contacts.

Reestablishing Broken Contacts

Considering these difficulties, the Amerikahaeuser in Germany can be very proud of the fact that from the earliest postwar days they dedicated themselves to the task of reestablishing the broken contacts between Germans and their neighbors.

Recently I saw some reports about the sometimes amusing, sometimes annoying, sometimes even tragic difficulties with which the Amerikahaeuser had to contend in the days right after the close of the war. At first it was not easy for the people in Germany to understand the functions of an Amerikahaus. Some visitors came because they assumed that an Amerikahaus was a travel agency, or an officers' mess, or a labor office, or a hotel, or a department store, or a bank, or even a hospital. Some came because, as one of the visitors put it, "it was warmer here than at home." But the others came too: the correspondent looking for background material for an article on America, the music lover who had never heard an American musician before, the politically interested citizen looking for books on comparative political science, the school boy trying to improve his English, the emigrant wishing to prepare himself for his future homeland. The largest group consisted of people who, painfully aware of the fact that they had been cut off from all foreign countries for a period of many years, were eager to look once again across the frontiers and see what the scientists, artists, poets, and political leaders in the rest of the world had thought and done during the past years.

It is indeed admirable and amazing that people struggling with the daily cares and problems of the early postwar years—with hunger and cold, unemployment, housing shortage—still had the time, interest, and energy for lectures, concerts, books, and phonograph records. Within a short time each Amerikahaus had its steadily expanding circle of constant visitors, and German participation in the program of the Amerikahaus increased consistently.

Among the visitors there were, of course, many who had only the vaguest notions about life in the United States. A very youthful visitor said a few years ago, when he was asked how much he knew about the United States: "In the United States there are, first of all, skyscrapers; secondly, Indians; and thirdly, Greta Garbo. Skyscrapers I know from a picture I have at home; about Indians I read in the books of Karl May; and my sister told me about Greta Garbo."

Well, perhaps this answer was not particularly surprising. After all, skyscrapers do look very imposing even in a picture; authors of adventure stories have used Indian settings ever since James Fenimore Cooper; and the private lives of actors and actresses probably have been a favorite topic of conversation as far back as ancient Greece.

But if this youth has meanwhile become a good customer of the Amerikahaus, his picture of the United States will certainly be more complete and include much more than the quaint triad, skyscrapers–Indians–Greta Garbo. By now he probably has read in translation or in the original language a number of American books, has attended lectures of famous Americans like Thornton Wilder, has heard American musicians like the harpsichordist Ralph Kirkpatrick or the Juilliard Quartet, has learned some American history, perhaps knows some English, and probably has participated in a number of discussions on the common problems of the free world.

I believe any objective observer would agree that this sort of knowledge can be of great value to every citizen of the free world. I am using the formulation "every citizen of the free world" quite deliberately, for we must remember that the Amerikahaus program is by no means limited to Germany. There are U.S. Information Centers in Great Britain, in France, in Greece, in the Scandinavian countries, in South America, in Africa, and in Asia.

There was no need to convince me of the value of the Amerikahaeuser. My experiences in academic life had convinced me long ago that any educated person today must have some knowledge about the cultural, political, and social developments in other countries. In the United States it is one of the tasks of the colleges to transmit such knowledge. My university, Harvard, for instance, set up the Busch-Reisinger Museum, which, while its activities are much more restricted than those of an Amerikahaus, does acquaint the Harvard students with the cultural heritage of another nation and thus carries out one of the functions of an Amerikahaus. The Busch-Reisinger Museum shows, partly by means of copies and plaster casts, partly by means of original works of art, the development of German art from the sculptures of Naumburg Cathedral to the works of the members of the *Bauhaus;* on its organ, Bach concerts are performed Sunday mornings; in its library, the inquisitive visitor can find information about German art and music.

Fostering Mutual Understanding

The better mutual understanding which can be created by institutions like the Amerikahaeuser and, in a more limited way, by institutions like the Busch-Reisinger Museum makes possible a much closer and more effective cooperation within the free world than was possible in the past. In your country, in my country, and in other countries of the free world it is recognized more and more clearly that such cooperation is vitally important and that only through united efforts can peace, prosperity, and a free intellectual and spiritual life be established and protected. The new instruments of cooperation developed in the postwar years—OEEC, the European Payments Union, the Council of Europe, and NATO—show clearly how strong the desire for cooperation has become.

Today no nation can hope to buy its own separate safety from the general danger by staying apart from the common efforts of the free nations of the world or by trying to curry favor with the totalitarian powers. The history of the past 10 years is full of unmistakable warnings against such wishful thinking. You remember that 8 years ago Czechoslovakia, under considerable pressure, withdrew its consent to participate in the Marshall plan. The Czech political leaders may have believed that by keeping their country apart from the other free nations and by making far-reaching concessions to the antidemocratic forces within the country, they might be able to buy security for their country. A few months later a coup d'état took place in Prague. The fate of Czechoslovakia and the fate of the Czech political leaders of those days—the fate of Masaryk and Benes, the fate of Fierlinger, yes, even the fate of Clementis and Slansky—show where such a road leads.

Too late did Masaryk and Benes realize that a nation cannot buy security for itself by making concessions to a totalitarian power; too late did Fierlinger realize that a democratic party which allies itself with a totalitarian group is committing suicide; too late did Clementis and Slansky realize that even the lives of Communist politicians are much safer in a democracy than under a dictatorship.

Only the vigorous cooperation of all free nations will enable us to create and preserve for ourselves and our children peace, prosperity, security, and intellectual and spiritual freedom; only the vigorous cooperation of the free nations will enable us to end injustices like the division of Germany.

It must be clear to every unprejudiced observer that under the present circumstances it is vitally important for the Atlantic community to protect its peace and security through common defense efforts. As long as we are living in a divided world and as long as the possibility exists that the Soviet Union may be dreaming of taking Europe by surprise some day and of subjecting all Europe to Soviet power, such a defense system will be necessary.

But the free nations must protect themselves not only against a military surprise attack; they must also protect themselves against defeat in the economic competition—perhaps "struggle" would be the better word—between the free and the un-

free world. Anyone who knows the history of Germany after the First World War will understand only too well what difficulties may arise when severe unemployment or a severe inflation afflicts a country. If the free world does not keep its economic system in order, the unfree world might some day be victorious without even engaging its military forces. We must employ as much imagination, intelligence, and energy in our efforts to solve our economic problems as we must employ in our efforts to solve our political and military problems.

Voluntary Cooperation

Imagination and intelligence develop most readily when minds are free. I do not have to point out to this audience that the Communist dictatorship beyond the Iron Curtain, which does not hesitate to suppress anything not fitting into the Communist ideological pattern, considers intellectual and spiritual freedom subversive. The free world on the other hand considers the regimentation practiced beyond the Iron Curtain an abomination. The free world does not want unity through regimentation; the goal of the free world is and must be the voluntary cooperation of free men, of free nations.

Voluntary cooperation, unlike regimentation, is possible only on the basis of mutual understanding—and it is indeed fortunate that the nations of the free world during the last 10 years have made such rapid progress toward mutual understanding.

During the first postwar winter, when the Amerikahaus was opened in Munich, an American official stationed in another part of Germany wrote about a discussion between Germans and Americans: "For 2 hours we talked to each other without coming any closer to an understanding. Germans and Americans started from premises which were unknown and incomprehensible to the other side. The participants simply did not know enough about each other to carry on a sensible discussion."

That certainly is not the situation today, and we may be grateful for the improvement. But we have not yet reached our goal; we cannot afford to rest on our laurels; we must continue our efforts.

To contribute to a better understanding between his country and the country to which he is accredited—that always seemed to me to be the most important and the finest task of an ambassador; and during my 3 years here in Germany, I have endeavored to do everything in my power to carry out this task. And because I am sincerely interested in the urgent task of promoting mutual understanding, I welcome the contributions made by the Amerikahaeuser and welcome all other efforts directed toward the same goal, for instance the exchange program. I am happy to report that the exchange program so far has given more than 10,000 Germans the opportunity to visit and get to know the United States, and I am equally happy that the Fulbright program gives American students and teachers the opportunity to study in Germany as well as in other countries. I also should like to use this opportunity to thank the German Federal Government, the Land governments, and the city governments for their friendly hospitality toward many American visitors. Of course, I do not want to create the impression that only official or semiofficial institutions are able to work toward a better understanding; the efforts of private citizens in Germany and in America and of groups of private citizens—religious groups, trade unions, universities, and other groups—should not be forgotten.

The history of the last 10 years has brought us many a bitter disappointment such as the new threat to world peace and the still continuing division of Germany. But the history of these 10 years has also recorded some extremely gratifying accomplishments, especially here in the Federal Republic of Germany. Ten years ago Germany was a country devastated by war and the Germans were close to starvation; Germany was in a state of war with practically all its neighbors; all governmental power was exercised by the occupation armies; the economic situation was catastrophic; a mood of hopelessness and complete exhaustion prevailed. Since then the German Federal Republic has been able not only to raise the living standard of its citizens and to build up a democratic system of government but also, through its clear repudiation of the Nazi ideology, has been able to win back for Germany the moral credit lost under the Nazi dictatorship, to reestablish a close and friendly relationship with its democratic neighbors, and to win a position of equality in the free world.

Many of these successes would not have been possible if the members of the free world had not been willing to seek and promote mutual understanding and effective cooperation.

Mutual understanding and effective cooperation will also enable us to solve the difficult tasks still before us. I am convinced that through their effective cooperation the free nations will be able to promote and protect peace, security, freedom, and prosperity. I am convinced that through their cooperation they will be able to bring to an end injustices like the division of Germany.

The history of the Amerikahaus Munich shows, on a small scale, how fruitful effective cooperation can be. Indeed, the Amerikahaus program could not have succeeded without the support, understanding, and freely given cooperation of the people of Munich. I am thinking particularly of such joint efforts as the atoms-for-peace exhibit at the Deutsche Museum and the Steichen "Family of Man" photographic exhibition at the Staedtische Galerie. Also, a special word of appreciation is due the distinguished members of the German advisory committee, who have given unsparingly of their time and valuable counsel, and to the devoted German staff of the Amerikahaus itself.

I understand that during the past 2 weeks many tributes to the work of the Amerikahaus have been expressed here in Munich by prominent members of the community, among them Kulturminister Rucker, Finance Minister Zietsch, Mayor Wimmer, and Frau Dr. Bruecher. Amerikahaus may indeed be proud of these tributes and of the encouragement offered by the Munich newspapers and radio and television stations during the 10th anniversary celebrations. I would now like to add my congratulations and good wishes to the many good wishes already received by the Amerikahaus. May the Amerikahaus in the future and in its new home be even more successful than during the past 10 years in its efforts to bring about a better understanding between our two nations. And, let me add, I am fully convinced that this wish will come true.

President of Italian Republic To Visit United States

The Department of State announced on February 17 (press release 90) that arrangements have been completed for the state visit to the United States of Giovanni Gronchi, President of the Italian Republic, February 27 to March 14, 1956. The President's party will include Signora Gronchi, Foreign Minister Gaetano Martino, and Signora Martino.

The visitors will arrive at Washington on February 27 and will leave on March 2 for a tour that will include Norfolk, Va., where they will visit the Headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic; Ottawa, Canada; Detroit, Mich.; San Francisco, Calif.; and New York, N. Y. The party will leave New York for Rome on March 14.

U.S. Attitude Toward Plight of Baltic Peoples

Statement by Secretary Dulles

Press release 80 dated February 15

This year the peoples of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia will commemorate the 38th anniversaries of their declaration of independence from Russia. On this occasion, it is appropriate to call attention once more to the determination and self-sacrifice which the peoples of those countries showed in the community of free nations.

Though the Baltic peoples have been deprived of this freedom, we know that they retain their will to be free.

We continue to believe in the principle that sovereign rights and self-government should be restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them. We are confident that this principle will one day be realized.

NATO—Our Greatest Instrument for Peace

by Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe[1]

I think, on this almost-the-fifth anniversary of the date when General Eisenhower arrived in Europe to set up a headquarters for defense of the free world there, it is appropriate to review some elements of our progress, some of the problems which still face us, and some of the solutions.

When General Eisenhower came to Europe, the defenses of the free world were in a distressingly low condition. Prior to his arrival, there had been a series of incidents: the Czechoslovakian coup, the Berlin blockade, and, finally, on the very day of his arrival, January 8, 1951, there was a depressing report from Korea. It seemed that it would only be a matter of weeks until the United Nations forces would be ejected from that peninsula. The atmosphere of Europe, and of the entire free world, was one of danger—almost despair.

When General Eisenhower surveyed his resources, he found that they were very, very low. But what was even worse, the resources he did have could not be used to implement a common strategy, because there was no such strategy.

I am pleased to be able to report now, 5 years later, that there *is* such a strategy, that there *is* an organization in being, and that if an attack should suddenly develop at this very moment, all of our commands know exactly what to do.

The resources themselves are approximately four times what they were at that time, but that, of course, does not give an answer to the question, "Is that good enough? Would we be able to repel successfully an all-out act of aggression tonight?" The answer, unfortunately, is "probably not."

[1] Address made at the congressional dinner of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Washington, D.C., on Feb. 7 (Department of Defense press release).

The Soviet might is increasing steadily, and when you consider the status of our defenses when we started, it would have required almost a miracle to be able to give an entirely favorable answer tonight. Our progress has been great, but it is not yet great enough.

We are facing today the largest aggregation of military power in the peacetime history of the world: some 175 Soviet land divisions, nearly all of them good; some 20,000 operational aircraft. That is about the number of aircraft in 1951, but at that time 80 percent of them were piston-driven planes. Now, 80 percent of them are jets. Moreover, the Soviets are engaged in an all-out production program of the latest type of jets.

In the naval field they have given high priority to submarines. There are now approximately 400 submarines in the Soviet Navy. That figure does not mean much until we recall that, when the Germans started World War II on the first of September 1939, they had less than 75 submarines.

This, then, represents a very powerful force in being. In addition, the Soviets have made substantial progress in the nuclear field. It is also clear that they are giving great emphasis to their guided missile program.

Soviet Production Goals

Just 2 weeks ago the Soviets published their sixth Five-Year Plan, in which there is a heavy concentration once again in the war industries.

In 1946 Stalin announced a program for 1960 which he said would be enough to protect the country against what he called "all possible accidents." There are three items in that program which deserve a moment's attention. At that time he said, "We will need 500 million tons of coal a

year." In 1955 they reached the figure of 390 million tons, but they have increased the objective for 1960 to 593 million tons.

"In steel," Stalin said, "we need 60 million tons." Last year they produced 45 million tons, and they have upped their objective to 68 million tons for 1960. In case that does not impress us, we should bear in mind that in 1929 the Soviets had a steel production of only 5 million tons.

In oil, which was the third major element of his program, he said, "We need for 1960 a production of 60 million tons." Last year, they already exceeded that with 70 million tons, and they have upped their program now to 135 million tons.

Those are very formidable figures.

I do not want to leave the impression that everything the Soviets have tried to do has turned to success. That is not so. In the agricultural field they have had great difficulty, and the indications are that these problems will continue. For example, last year they had 8 million fewer head of cattle than they had in 1928, which was the year before the collective farm system started. That is a very definite failure, which the Soviet leadership is trying to correct. They have also had major failures in connection with their grain programs.

All of these increases in Soviet industrial potential, all of this emphasis upon Soviet military might, is at the expense of the Soviet citizen. Today, in the Soviet Union a suit of clothes costs between 1,300 and 1,600 rubles. When one realizes that a painter or a carpenter gets a salary of 700 rubles a month, you recognize the austerity of his living standards.

In case this might cause us to think that a revolution is likely in the Soviet Union—that we could look forward to a time when the populace would revolt—I feel that would be misguided wishful thinking. The people are well disciplined, and they know no better way of life. The chances of a revolution are very slight. I feel that the Soviet Union is going to continue to make progress in its production goals.

Of course, they are having difficulties with the satellites. There again, though, they are making considerable progress in the armed forces. The satellite countries have 75 divisions, not all good ones by any means, and some 2,500 planes. They have a public relations problem with the satellite people, but they know that and they are working on it. They are concentrating on the children through indoctrination and education on a long-term basis.

The Soviets feel that time is on their side and, if they wait it out, they will have the strength for their system to prevail. Within the past year there have been new indications that they have absolute confidence that their system will win in the end. With their ability to marshal scientific, technical, and economic resources under centralized direction—without regard to the wishes of the people—they constitute a very strong opponent. They have a leadership group of 6½ million Communists who are dedicated to their materialistic philosophy. They believe in it with all of their hearts and souls, and they are able to control easily the remaining 210 million people of the Soviet Union.

Europe's Present and Potential Strength

That tremendous strength is the reason why I say, as of now, we are probably not strong enough in Europe. I want to emphasize here, however, that I am talking about only one part of the problem, namely, Europe. That does not mean that we would lose a global war if it took place, because, as of today, we still have a very substantial advantage in long-range air power. At the present stage of technological development, the offense in air power has a very big advantage over the defense. To summarize, as of today, we have this situation: in Europe we are not strong enough yet, but on a global basis we still have an advantage. How long we are going to retain that advantage is, of course, a speculative matter.

As for our defense in Europe, we expect to be able to give a positive answer to the question that I have posed after the German contribution is effective. We will have by the middle of '59 some 12 German divisions, some 1,300 aircraft, and naval craft largely for use in the Baltic. When we reach that level, and if we can use atomic weapons, which we feel are an essential part of our armament, we then will be able to give reasonable assurance that we can defend Europe successfully against an all-out attack.

I do not want to give the impression that I am depressed over this situation, because I am not. We are actually farther ahead than we thought we would be when we made our forecasts in those dark, dreary days in the early part of 1951.

I also want to make clear that I think that the next 5 years are probably going to be more difficult

than the first 5 years. I say this because we are moving into an era where the battle for men's minds has become increasingly important, where the necessity for having unity among our own people, where the importance of their understanding of the issues is absolutely vital. Basically, this gets down to a question of convincing the 450 million people in NATO to have confidence that this alliance can—and is the best way to—meet this threat.

We think—and that is the principle on which NATO was organized—that collective security is the only answer. Generally speaking, most people agree to that thesis. However, the great progress we have made has generated a confidence which, in turn, has caused a certain relaxation of tension. These elements, coupled with certain changes in the immediate tactics of the Soviets, are creating difficulties for the free world. We are faced with the task of seeing to it that our people do *not* relax but continue their support for this alliance so that it can continue effectively to prevent a war from taking place.

In that endeavor the partnership of the United States is of supreme importance. Whether we like it or not, the mantle of world leadership has fallen upon our shoulders. This alliance will succeed, in large measure, in the degree to which we are able to exercise that leadership. Please know that the competition is tougher than ever before.

Take the most recent Soviet maneuver, which happened just a few days ago: Bulganin's response to President Eisenhower's letter is being circulated and broadcast all over the world now. The Soviets are working on the uncommitted billion among the 2½ billion people of the world. They are not concentrating on trying to win the 165 million people in the United States, or even the rest of the 450 million people of NATO. In this psychological struggle we face very severe difficulties. As propaganda experts, they are masters. We are far behind them in getting our story told. Our effort is very small; theirs is a massive one, cleverly put over, and it does produce results.

Combating Soviet Pressures

I am certain we can meet this challenge, but it will require a determination and a dedication on the part of the free world, and particularly on the part of the United States.

The Soviets get their unity by the gun-in-the-back method. We have to get ours through the more laborious processes of democracy. There are 15 nations in this alliance, all of them sovereign—and we want them that way—but it is time-consuming and sometimes difficult to reach common programs.

Some Americans have the impression that the United States' support of NATO—and I have actually heard this occasionally—is a type of charity. That is simply not true. We must be unmistakably clear that we need Europe just as much as it needs us. Our participation in this enterprise is a matter of our own survival. It is most important that we act in such a way that our allies know that their interests and ours are mutual.

I feel that, if we are able to furnish encouragement to some of these countries which are having trouble, they are going to remain firm in spite of the tremendous pressures that the Soviets are applying to them.

Take one illustration, East Germany. This is Tuesday, the 7th. A week ago Saturday in Prague the Warsaw Pact powers met, and once again Mr. Molotov, as he has done many times in the last year, issued a strong denunciation of NATO, charging that it is an aggressive organization. However, the Soviets introduced a new factor into this particular meeting—they admitted Eastern Germany to the Warsaw Pact military command.

The East German forces, consisting of some seven divisions and more than 100,000 men, have now been raised to the status of armed forces and operate under Marshal Koniev, whom I knew in Vienna in 1945. At this meeting, which ended last Saturday, they made a very shrewd maneuver. They said, "We feel that no German forces, be they East German or West German, should ever have atomic bombs." That is a clever play directed toward the West Germans to get them, who feel very exposed if a nuclear war should take place, gradually to assume a neutral attitude. If they should be successful in that endeavor, it would be very disadvantageous for our cause and for the West Germans. I do not think this maneuver will be successful. However, it demonstrates clearly the cleverness of their tactics and the need of alertness on our part in the battle for men's minds. This is only one of a series of thrusts that the Soviets are making, all of great ingenuity.

If our people understand the issues, if they remain stout of heart, I am certain we can succeed.

You may say that I am an optimist. I plead guilty to that charge, but I feel that I am more than an optimist. I feel that I have faith in our civilization, in our concept of religion, with their dedication to the dignity of the human individual.

I feel that we have the ability to approach these problems with an understanding and with a point of view which will definitely match the Soviet materialistic ideology.

I am confident that, if we can preserve the unity which we have already developed, no power, however menacing, will be able to prevail against us.

United States–Brazilian Friendship

Address by Vice President Nixon[1]

It is a great honor to be here as head of the delegation named by President Eisenhower to represent the United States at the inaugural ceremonies for President Kubitschek. Our delegation represents all sectors of our public and private life in the United States. Yet, even so, it is an inadequate expression of the feelings which these ceremonies inspire in the hearts of all the people of the United States. Such an occasion turns our minds to all those common traditions, those bonds, those achievements which we most cherish in the Americas.

First, we are reminded that in this hemisphere we are in the finest sense of the word a family, an American family of nations.

Today, the largest member of that family celebrates a great event in its national life.

I have been deeply moved to see the number and importance of the delegations which have come from all quarters of the hemisphere to demonstrate by their presence here that such an occasion as this has great significance not only in Brazil but throughout the Americas. This kinship which unites us as friends, as neighbors, and as partners is, I believe, our finest joint achievement in this hemisphere.

This occasion also turns our minds inevitably to those great religious and moral principles to which each of our governments is dedicated, principles on which we have firmly based our entire inter-American system.

First is the sanctity and dignity of the individual man. Our governments exist to make the lives of their citizens more wholesome and more abundant. The freedom and happiness of our men and women is not to be sacrificed to build the prestige or might of any government.

We believe that material progress achieved through the inhumanity of slave labor degrades those who benefit from it and must be repulsive in the eyes of God, who created mankind in his own likeness.

Another principle for which we have deep reverence is that nations, like men, are entitled to equal dignity and freedom. Preservation and respect for the sovereign integrity of our smaller States is among the most sacred obligations of the greater powers of our hemisphere.

Our 21 Republics did not break away from their mother countries to achieve economic benefits. Our revolutions were to achieve freedom, freedom

[1] Made at Volta Redonda, Brazil, on Feb. 3. Mr. Nixon headed the U.S. delegation to the inauguration of President Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira on Feb. 2. Other representatives designated by the President and given the rank of Special Ambassador were James Clement Dunn, U.S. Ambassador to Brazil; Henry F. Holland, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs; and John B. Hollister, Director of the International Cooperation Administration. In addition, Secretary Dulles designated the following delegation members: Sen. Theodore F. Green, Sen. H. Alexander Smith, Rep. James P. Richards, Rep. John M. Vorys, Mrs. Nicholas Longworth, John F. Simmons, Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., Vance Brand, William C. Doherty, Daniel Gainey, Earl E. T. Smith, and the Rev. Joseph F. Thorning.

as individuals and as nations. And we prize those freedoms even more today than we did over a hundred years ago when we first won them.

In our hemisphere there is no nation that would reduce its neighbor to the degrading role of a satellite. There is no nation, however small, but would perish before accepting such a role. We Americans throughout the hemisphere cherish our independence and have never tolerated and will not tolerate foreign domination of any kind or character.

Among our finest achievements in the Americas is recognition and acceptance of the fact that each of us has direct and personal interest in the welfare of every other member of our great family.

The time has passed when any American State can disregard the problems of any other. We must progress as a whole. We are truly partners in the development of this vast hemisphere. As good partners each of us must in his own interest try to make a constructive contribution to the progress of every other.

Nowhere else in the world today, never before in history, have so many nations lived so long at peace among themselves, each with respect and understanding for the other; each confident that the strength that defends its sovereignty and territorial integrity is the combined strength of all; each determined that its strength and resources shall contribute to raising standards of life, not only among its own people but everywhere in the hemisphere.

Together we have worked with our sister Republics to erect the structure of our inter-American system, the most advanced and successful of its kind. Wherever one goes in our hemisphere he sees signs of this great inter-American system at work; he sees these principles I have mentioned perpetuated in public works, in communications systems, and industrial enterprises. All of these mean new opportunities, new employment for our industrious peoples, new sources of income, in short, better and more abundant lives for our men and women and for their children.

Significance of Volta Redonda

We stand at the great steel mill of Volta Redonda, a symbol of Brazilian progress. It is inspiring to see this vast enterprise which has become the backbone of the industrial development of this great nation.

I am moved to think that my country has contributed to the realization of the forward-looking dream of the Brazilian founders of this great plant. I wish that more people from beyond the borders of Brazil could see the miracle that has occurred here.

Fifteen years ago Volta Redonda was a little creek. Today it is a thriving metropolis with tens of thousands of inhabitants. What was farmland has become the Pittsburgh of Brazil—a modern city with its complete water system, paved streets, excellent schools, general and specialized hospitals, thousands of comfortable homes with electric power, and all the conveniences of modern life.

This is only a part of what the great steel mill of Volta Redonda has meant to the people of Brazil. Thousands of business and industrial enterprises prosper throughout the country, born as a result of the establishment of your basic steel industry.

As a citizen of the United States, I am proud of the fact that Volta Redonda was the first major development loan made in Latin America by our Export-Import Bank. That was 15 years ago, in 1941. Since that day our interest in the Volta Redonda and in the economy it serves has never ceased. The first loan was for $45 million. Nine years later, in 1950, we joined in a new program to expand the plant capacity. A second loan for $25 million was made.

Announcement of New Loan

During the past year we have been studying with the Government of Brazil still another program of plant expansion. This would contemplate still a third loan, this one of $35 million. It would serve to increase the production of Volta Redonda from its present level of 650,000 to a million tons of annual ingot capacity. After having seen this great enterprise at firsthand I am indeed most happy to be able to state that my Government is announcing in Washington today that the Export-Import Bank has approved the $35 million loan necessary for the plant expansion.[2]

[2] In a statement issued at Washington on Feb. 3, the Export-Import Bank said that the new loan will enable Brazil's steel industry to expand its operations, thereby assisting the country in advancement toward a higher standard of living and an improved economy. The dollars advanced will be used for purchase in the United States of materials, equipment, and engineering services required for the expansion.

Volta Redonda is a living example of how by helping another American nation every one of us can help himself. Before the great plant was constructed, Brazil imported each year from the United States about 300,000 tons of fabricated steel products. Today she produces more than 1 million tons of steel, but her imports of fabricated steel products from the United States have increased to 550,000, or nearly twice the level before Volta Redonda was built. Furthermore, the money that our Government has loaned for the plant has been spent to pay for U.S. goods and services. Those loans have meant not only jobs in Brazil but jobs in the United States as well.

The present and future greatness of Brazil is due overwhelmingly to the industry, genius, and capital of its own people. Our U.S. contribution to the progress of this great country has, of course, been small compared to that of the Brazilians themselves. That is as it should be.

But our contribution in the past and today has been one of which our Government and U.S. private enterprise, and I, as a representative of our Government, can be justly proud; one which we must continue loyally and generously in the future. In the past 15 years we have contributed through loans and investments in Brazil developmental capital amounting to almost $2 billion. About $1 billion of this has come from our private investors such as those represented by many of the U.S. and Brazilian citizens sitting here today.

The Export-Import Bank has authorized loans in Brazil amounting to a total of $900 million. These have meant progress in such fields as electric power, railways, mining, shipping, agricultural equipment, and various fields of industry. Only last week the Export-Import Bank announced the authorization of a new loan of almost $20 million for further improvement of the Santos-Jundiai Railway.[3]

We have not forgotten that it was here in Rio at the economic conference in 1954 that our Government promised the other American Republics that through the Export-Import Bank we would do our utmost to satisfy all applications for sound economic development loans for which capital was not reasonably forthcoming from private sources or from other official lending institutions.

That policy has already meant that the volume of loans authorized by the bank in Latin America increased during the last fiscal year over 500 percent above those for the preceding year. It is also important that the number of loans has increased greatly. We are anxious that the bank meet the credit needs of small- and medium-sized enterprises as well as those of the large ones.

We are pleased that Brazil will shortly have access to still another official credit institution, one which will also emphasize loans to private industry. I refer to the fact that Brazil has joined with the United States and other nations in creating the International Finance Corporation, which should soon become active.

Our sales of agricultural surpluses have proved to be another way in which the United States can help Brazil by helping itself. We have sold $41 million of agricultural products to Brazil. These are being paid for in cruzeiros, of which our Government has lent 76 percent back to Brazil for use in a variety of economic development projects.

There is another important contribution which each of our countries makes to the economic progress of the other. I like to speak of it because it lies in the field of private enterprise from which the real strength and future growth of both of our countries must be drawn. That is the trade between us. In 1954 we bought over $680 millions of Brazil's exports. She spent somewhat less, or about $450 million, purchasing our own export products. Roughly speaking we have accounted for about half of Brazil's exports and for about half of her imports.

We are keenly interested in all opportunities which might increase this wholesome trade between our countries, and, as you know, over 95 percent of all imports from Brazil enter the United States without duty. Coffee is, of course, the most important single item in our trade relations. We share with the people of Brazil and of other producing countries their desire for stability in this important industry to prevent violent price fluctuations which harm both producers and consumers.

We have, as you know, participated in the committee of the Organization of American States which has been studying the problems of this industry.

Finally, we welcome the opportunity to participate in many of the programs which the Brazilian Government has undertaken in the technical field. Our contribution to those programs

[3] BULLETIN of Feb. 20, 1956, p. 299.

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is the largest we have undertaken in the hemisphere; yet it represents but a small part of their total cost. We hope and believe that this United States assistance will give added assurance that in a number of fields including education, public health, agriculture, mining, and public administration where we are participating, the Government of Brazil will achieve its far-sighted objectives.

Motive for U.S. Policies

Why do we offer financing and technical cooperation for the economic and industrial development of this great country? To gain good will for the United States? No. We, of course, are gratified when such credits contribute to the understanding and friendship between our peoples. But we know that the respect and affection of the people of Brazil, just like our own and those of every other American State, cannot be purchased, though freely and generously given to all who earn them by a record of fair and honorable dealing.

We in the Americas welcome the friendship of all peoples and all countries, but we reject the Communist definition of friendship, which in the past has meant "a friend today is a satellite tomorrow." Let it be understood once and for all that the friendship, the independence, and the freedom of the governments and peoples of the Americas are not now and never will be for sale at any price.

Do we offer economic aid to our friends in this hemisphere primarily as a defense against communism? No. Such help to our friends is not a recently developed device to protect our free governments against Communist subversion. Our policy of assistance to our sister Republics was adopted long ago before any of us fully understood the danger of the Communist plot to overthrow our free governments and destroy our way of life.

Our offer of such credits and technical cooperation simply means that we, like the other peoples and governments of our hemisphere, know that, for one country of the Americas to go forward, all must go forward. When we help our friends in Brazil achieve the greatness and progress that surely lie ahead of them, we help our own people. There is no more striking proof of the truth of that statement than what has happened at Volta Redonda. The motive behind our policies is a simple as that.

We stand today at another milestone on the lon road which for more than a century of clos friendship our two nations have traveled. As w turn and look behind us we see much that is goo much that draws us together; for in war and i peace we have shared both joys and sorrow Your honored dead, and our own, fallen in a wa in which neither of us sought or achieved an material reward, lie together as they fought, sic by side on the hillsides of Italy. The past giv us courage and faith to continue on the road tha we have traveled together for so many years, su that, wherever it may lead us, it is the best an most honorable for our peoples.

I have said we are at a milestone. A new co stitutional President, freely elected by the pe ple of Brazil, has taken office. For the next years the problems of his people, the problems c the free world in which Brazil plays and mus play so important a role, can never be far fro his thoughts.

Many government officers carry heavy responsi bilities, but there is only one in every constitu tional democracy who in the last analysis canno share his burdens with others; who again an again must face crucial issues and alone carry th responsibility for their ultimate decision. Tha man is the President.

As President Kubitschek takes up the awesom burdens which he shall for 5 years carry in you name, men of good will in all the Americas pra with you that he may have abundantly the physi cal and spiritual strength, the wisdom and seren ity of mind that his great task requires, and tha all his decisions may be those which God woul dictate in the interest of his people.

May I finally make a prediction for the future I confidently believe that Brazil is on th threshold of an era of progress unequaled in th history of any nation in this hemisphere. I an confident that with its abundant resources, it great people, its dedicated leadership, Brazil' progress in the next 5 years will startle the world You can be sure that we in the United States wil view your progress with the pride and good wil and affection which true friends, good neighbors trusting partners, and fellow members of the sam great American family have one for the other an for all.

Costa Rica and Nicaragua Sign Friendship Agreements

The Organization of American States announced on January 9 that Costa Rica and Nicaragua had signed two bilateral agreements at the Pan American Union that day, bringing to a successful conclusion the mediation of the OAS in the year-old dispute between the two Central American republics.

One of the agreements[1] implements the 1949 Costa Rican-Nicaraguan Amity Pact by binding the two countries to specific methods of reducing the possibility of future hostilities. The other[2] defines the operation of the Committee of Investigation and Conciliation of the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, which Costa Rica and Nicaragua formed at the request of the OAS Council.

The documents were signed in the Pan American Union's Hall of the Americas by Costa Rican Ambassador Fernando Fournier and Nicaraguan Ambassador Dr. Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa in the presence of most of the diplomats of the Western Hemisphere accredited to both the OAS and the U.S. Government.

Speaking at the ceremony which marked the end of a situation that menaced the peace of the Americas were Colombian Ambassador Dr. Cesar Tulio Delgado, chairman of the OAS Council, which acted as a provisional Organ of Consultation to cope with the emergency; Mexican Ambassador Dr. Luis Quintanilla, head of the Investigating Committee which made an immediate on-the-spot report of the conflict; and Uruguayan Ambassador Dr. José A. Mora, chairman of the nine-nation OAS special committee which assisted the two affected countries in reaching the agreements.

The 21-country regional security organization was called into the Central American dispute on January 8, 1955, when Costa Rica sent a note to the OAS Council alleging that its territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence were threatened by acts that had their origin in Nicaragua and invoked the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.

By the terms of the Reciprocal Assistance Treaty, which was signed at Rio de Janeiro in 1947, an attack against one American state is considered an attack against all, and any threat to the peace or security of an American state justifies the calling of a meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics to consider what countermeasures shall be taken.

Pending a meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the hemisphere, the OAS Council immediately constituted itself a provisional Organ of Consultation to deal immediately with the situation. A Committee of Investigation, composed of representatives of Mexico, the United States, Brazil, Ecuador, and Paraguay, was appointed to proceed to Costa Rica and Nicaragua to determine the facts. The Committee took office during the evening of January 11 and left Washington for Costa Rica by plane several hours later.

Because the area to be surveyed was the northwestern part of Costa Rica near the Nicaraguan frontier, a hilly region, difficult of access, the Council requested those governments in a position to do so to place planes at the disposal of the Committee for the purpose of carrying out observation flights. The United States responded to this request,[3] as did also Ecuador, Mexico, and Uruguay. The two governments directly involved likewise placed planes at the disposal of the Committee.

On January 14, on the basis of reports received from the Committee, the Council condemned the acts of intervention of which Costa Rica was the victim and called attention to the grave presumption of the violation of international treaty obligations. It made a formal appeal to all American governments to strengthen measures they might already have adopted, and especially to the Government of Nicaragua since the Investigating Committee had reported that a substantial part of the war material entering Costa Rica was coming across the northern frontier.

Two days later, acting on information received from the Committee that the Government of Costa Rica did not possess planes of the type necessary to defend itself against the attacks of foreign planes that were then in the hands of the attacking forces, the Council requested the governments of the member states to expedite the sale to Costa Rica of aircraft it had ordered from them. That same day, the United States announced it had sold four P-51s to Costa Rica.[4]

The measures of the Council were taken on

[1] For English text, see OAS doc. C-d-394.
[2] For English text, see OAS doc. C-d-395.
[3] BULLETIN of Jan. 24, 1955, p. 131.
[4] *Ibid.*, Jan. 31, 1955, p. 182.

behalf of the Government of Costa Rica. But they were not directed against any other government. Nicaragua repeatedly declared it was respecting its international obligations in what it declared to be the internal disturbance in Costa Rica. It urged the Investigating Committee to come to Nicaragua and manifested its willingness to cooperate with the Committee in the establishment of a frontier control system.

A plan for the effective supervision and control of the common frontier of the two countries was drawn up by the Investigating Committee and was in effect from January 20 to January 25. It provided for a buffer zone along the affected section of the frontier to be supervised by a group of military aides from the countries represented on the Committee. After the attacking forces operating in Costa Rica withdrew and were interned in Nicaragua, the military observers, however, continued their surveillance of the border and the Committee continued its inquiry in both countries.

The Committee returned to Washington January 28. On February 24, the Council adopted a series of resolutions to give practical effect to the recommendations of the Investigating Committee and designed to bring about a complete solution of the situation between the two countries.

Among the resolutions of the Council were the suggestions to the two countries that they appoint their members to a Committee of Investigation and Conciliation as provided for in the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, and that they also conclude a bilateral agreement to implement their 1949 Amity Pact.

To assist Costa Rica and Nicaragua in their direct negotiations, the Council appointed a committee which reported in August that both nations had demonstrated "a sincere desire to reach an agreement." On September 8, the Council agreed that the emergency situation in Central America had ended and canceled the proposed assembly of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics.[5]

The agreement implementing the Amity Pact, which was signed on January 9, pledges both countries to cooperate to the maximum of their capabilities in carrying out enterprises that require a common effort and which will be of mutual benefit.

[5] *Ibid.*, Oct. 3, 1955, p. 546.

It provides for surveillance of the commo frontier by each nation as a means of avoidin the entry of either arms or armed groups fro one territory into the other. It prevents the us of either country as a basis for revolutionar movements against the other signatory and als requires each government to halt subversive o terroristic activities, by either nationals or for eigners, against the chief of state and officials an their families of the other state.

The agreement puts into effect in both Cost Rica and Nicaragua many of the provisions of th Convention on Territorial Asylum adopted at th Tenth Inter-American Conference which was hel in Caracas, Venezuela, in 1954.

The addition to the Amity Pact also provide for two committees composed of officers from th armed forces of each country to coordinate frontie supervision and to investigate and try to settle an border disturbance that could disturb the harmon between the two nations.

The agreement goes into effect after its ratifi cation by the two Central American countries in volved has been deposited in the Pan Americai Union. Members of the frontier committees wil be appointed within 30 days after ratification o the agreement.

The second agreement signed by Ambassador Fournier and Sevilla Sacasa agrees to give th members of the Committee of Investigation an Conciliation free access to all parts of both coun tries, making available transportation and ob servation facilities. It exempts Committee mem bers from immigration formalities and sets u other safeguards for the operation of the Com mittee which will be at the disposition of bot countries when needed.

President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

EXECUTIVE ORDER 10656[1]

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President o the United States, and in order to enhance the security o the United States and the conduct of its foreign affairs b

[1] 21 *Fed. Reg.* 859. For list of members of the board an letters from President Eisenhower to the members and t the Director of Central Intelligence, see BULLETIN of Jan 30, 1956, p. 161.

urthering the availability of intelligence of the highest rder, it is ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. There is hereby established the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, ereinafter referred to as the President's Board. The embers of the President's Board shall be appointed by he President, from among persons outside the Government and on the basis of ability, experience, and knowledge f matters relating to the national defense and security, nd shall serve without compensation, but may receive ransportation and per-diem allowances as authorized by aw for persons serving without compensation.

SEC. 2. The President's Board shall conduct an objective eview of the foreign intelligence activities of the Government and of the performance of the functions of the entral Intelligence Agency and shall report its findings o the President semi-annually or at more frequent intervals as the President's Board may deem appropriate. uch reports shall embrace the quality of the foreign ntelligence provided to the Executive Branch of the overnment, the performance by the Central Intelligence gency of its functions, the performance of their respective foreign intelligence functions by the principal intelligence elements of executive departments and other agencies, and any other related foreign intelligence matter hich the President's Board deems appropriate.

SEC. 3. The members of the President's Board, individually and sitting as the President's Board, shall consult rom time to time with the Director of Central Intelligence concerning the activities of the Central Intelligence gency and with intelligence elements of other departments and agencies. The Director of Central Intelligence nd the intelligence elements concerned are authorized to ake available to the President's Board or to its individual embers any information concerning foreign intelligence ctivities relating to the national interest which the President's Board or its members may require to fulfill their esponsibilities to the President under this order.

SEC. 4. Each member of the President's Board shall execute an undertaking not to reveal any classified information obtained by virtue of his service on the President's oard except to the President or to such persons as the resident may designate.

SEC. 5. The transportation and per-diem allowances referred to in section 1 of this order, and any other expenditures arising in connection with the activities of the resident's Board, shall be paid from the appropriation ppearing under the heading "Special Projects" in Title I f the General Government Matters Appropriation Act, 956 (Public Law 110, approved June 29, 1955), without egard to the provisions of section 3681 of the Revised tatutes and section 9 of the Act of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 027, (31 U. S. C. 672 and 673).

SEC. 6. This order shall be effective as of January 13, 956.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

HE WHITE HOUSE,
February 6, 1956.

Definition of Functions of Air Coordinating Committee

EXECUTIVE ORDER 10655[1]

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, and in order to provide for the fullest development and coordination of the aviation policies and activities of Federal agencies, it is ordered as follows:

1. (a) The Air Coordinating Committee (hereinafter referred to as the Committee), established by Executive Order No. 9781 of September 19, 1946,[2] as amended by Executive Order No. 10360 of June 11, 1952,[3] shall have as members one representative from each of the following-named agencies (hereinafter referred to as member agencies): the executive Departments of State, Treasury, Post Office, and Commerce, the military departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Civil Aeronautics Board, and the Federal Communications Commission. The members of the Committee shall be designated by the respective heads of the member agencies. The President shall name one of the members as Chairman of the Committee. The Director of the Bureau of the Budget and the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization shall each designate one representative of his agency as a non-voting member of the Committee.

(b) Each officer or body authorized under subparagraph 1 (a) hereof to designate a member of the Committee shall also designate one or more alternate members, as may be necessary.

(c) The Committee shall establish procedures to provide for participation, including participation in voting, by a representative of any agency not named in paragraph 1 (a) hereof in connection with such aviation matters as are of substantial interest to that agency.

2. The Committee shall examine aviation problems and developments affecting more than one member agency; develop and recommend integrated policies to be carried out and actions to be taken by the member agencies or by any other Government agency charged with responsibility in the aviation field; and, to the extent permitted by law, coordinate the aviation activities of such agencies except activities relating to the exercise of quasi-judicial functions.

3. The Committee shall consult with Federal interagency boards and committees concerned in any manner with aviation activities; shall consult with the representatives of the United States to the International Civil Aviation Organization; and, where appropriate, shall consult with other international bodies concerned with civil aviation and recommend to the Department of State general policy directives and instructions for the guidance of the said representatives.

[1] 21 *Fed. Reg.* 665.
[2] BULLETIN of Oct. 6, 1946, p. 647; 11 *Fed. Reg.* 10645.
[3] 17 *Fed. Reg.* 5337.

4. The Committee, after obtaining the views of the head of each agency concerned, shall submit to the President, together with the said views, (a) such of the Committee's recommendations on aviation policies as require the attention of the President by reason of their character or importance, (b) those important aviation questions the disposition of which is prevented by the inability of the agencies concerned to agree, and (c) an annual report of the Committee's activities during each calendar year, to be submitted not later than January 31 of the next succeeding year.

5. The heads of the member agencies shall cause their respective agencies to use the facilities of the Committee in all appropriate circumstances, and, consonant with law, to provide the Committee with such personnel assistance as may be necessary.

6. This order supersedes Executive Order No. 9781 of September 19, 1946, and Executive Order No. 10360 of June 11, 1952.

7. This order shall not be construed as necessitating the re-designation of members of the Committee, or the renaming of the Chairman of the Committee, serving on the date hereof.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

THE WHITE HOUSE,
January 28, 1956.

UNESCO Grants for Regional Cultural Studies

In order to promote firsthand studies of the basic cultural, historical, and social characteristics of various regions of the world, the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization is offering partial grants to research specialists. Grantees would spend from 6 to 9 months in a university situated in a cultural region different from their own, in order to carry on advanced study and research on some aspect of the country visited. The main purpose of the programs of study will be to enable specialists in such fields as language, literary or cultural history, geography, economics, and social problems to use their special knowledge in order to orient themselves in the broader problems of the culture and social life of the region or country visited.

One grant for the 1956–57 academic year is being reserved for an American scholar. The Department of State has secured the cooperation of the Conference Board of Associated Research Councils in recommending a panel of candidates. It is expected that the panel of nominees will be assembled in March. It will then be forwarded to UNESCO Headquarters in Paris for final selection.

Foreign Service Examination

Press release 89 dated February 17

The Department of State announced on February 17 that a Foreign Service officer examination will be given on June 25 at more than 65 centers throughout the United States. This examination is open to anyone who meets the age and citizenship requirements.

Department of State officials estimate that several hundred new Foreign Service officers will be required during the next year to fill positions both in Washington and overseas. After completing training at the Foreign Service Institute in Washington, many of the new officers will take up their duties at any one of the 272 embassies, legations and consulates around the world. At these posts which range in size from the large mission in London to the two-man post in Perth, Australia the new officer may expect to do a variety of tasks such as administrative work; political, economic commercial, and labor reporting; consular duties and assisting and protecting Americans and their property abroad. Other new officers may be assigned to Washington, where they would engage in research or other substantive work, or in the many junior administrative tasks which are essential to the day-to-day conduct of foreign affairs.

To publicize fully these opportunities in the Foreign Service which await the qualified young men and women of America, a number of Foreign Service officers will visit more than 200 colleges and universities in all 48 States this spring. In order to meet all the diversified needs of the Foreign Service, these officers will talk not only with the promising students of history, political science, and international relations but also with those who are studying economics, foreign languages, and business and public administration.

Those successful in the one-day written examination, which tests the candidate's facility in English expression, general ability, general background, and proficiency in a modern foreign language, will be given an oral examination by panels which will meet in regional centers throughout the United States. Those candidates who successfully pass the orals will then be given a physical

examination and a full field investigation. Upon completion of these phases, the candidate will be nominated by the President as a Foreign Service officer and his name submitted to the Senate for confirmation as vice consul and secretary in the diplomatic service.

To be eligible to take the examination, candidates must be at least 20 years of age and under 31, American citizens of at least 10 years' standing, and, if married, married to an American citizen.

Starting salaries for successful candidates range from $4,725 to $5,475 per year depending upon the age, experience, and family status of the individual. In addition, generous insurance and retirement benefits are granted, as well as annual and sick leave.

Application forms may be obtained from the Board of Examiners, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C. The closing date for filing the application is May 11, 1956.

The Accessibility of Department of State Materials Relating to American-Far Eastern Relations

by Herbert Spielman

This paper aims to present an informal overview of materials available on United States relations with the Far East as found in the records of the Department of State. At the outset it might be pointed out that the policy of the Department, both with respect to access to its records and in the reasonably expeditious publication of its foreign relations documents, is perhaps the most liberal of any major foreign office. This policy conforms with a fundamental maxim in the Department of State that the Congress, the world of scholarship, and the public at large be kept as fully informed about our foreign affairs as is consistent with sound diplomacy and national security. The opportunities, therefore, of research among primary sources on United States foreign relations are probably richer than those on the foreign affairs of any other country.

It should be noted that since World War II there has been unusual interest among academicians as well as people from many other walks of life in recent American relations with the Far East. This interest, which has to a great extent inspired considerable journalistic and popular writings, has also tended to inhibit highly necessary basic research in less recent United States relations. Thus, at a time when the need is greatest for such monographic output and the accessibility of materials is widest, there is far too little work being done on the period before 1930. Without proposing any neglect of the more recent period, this paper, therefore, will largely emphasize the resources available before that date in an attempt to dramatize the need for much more monographic and dissertation work in that period and to highlight the richness and ready availability of source materials.[1]

For purposes of accessibility, the records of the Department of State fall into three chronological categories. For the period up to January 1, 1930, Department records, with the exception of a few categories of passport, visa, unsettled claims, and

[1] The following general bibliographies and guides are useful in the period before 1922: Samuel F. Bemis and Grace G. Griffin, *Guide to the Diplomatic History of the United States, 1775–1921* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1935); Tyler Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1922); and Adelaide R. Hasse, comp., *Index to United States Documents Relating to Foreign Affairs, 1829–1861* (Washington: Carnegie Institution, 1914–1921, 3 vols.). [All footnotes except the last two were in the original.]

• *Mr. Spielman, author of the above article, is an historian in the Department of State. This paper was delivered as an address before the Far Eastern Association on March 30, 1955, and is reprinted from* The Far Eastern Quarterly, *November 1955.*

personnel data, are completely open. By this it is meant that any researcher with a legitimate need to explore these materials is entirely free to do so merely through application at the National Archives in Washington. It is assumed, of course, that the researcher's requirements cannot be met through normal library facilities and published primary and secondary sources.[2]

The second category of materials spans the years 1930 to 1942, which is known as the limited access period; these records are generally available under certain conditions to more mature and especially-qualified researchers, including Ph.D. candidates. Permission to use these materials must be obtained through the Chief of the Historical Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C., and application should be made sufficiently early so that necessary processing may be completed before the researcher wishes to come to Washington.

The final category embraces the period since 1942, which is called the closed period, and almost no access is available to materials falling therein. Notes taken from records of a date later than January 1, 1930, are subject to review by the Department.

Let us compare this access policy with that of the British and French Governments. British Foreign Office records are completely open down to December 31, 1902, and all papers after that date are completely closed, except as published by the Foreign Office itself. The records of the Quay d'Orsay prior to January 1897 are open to historical research, but notes on the period after January 1871 must be submitted for review to the French archives service. All French records beyond 1896 are closed to non-official researchers.

In the Department of State records there is a variety of fairly broad, largely-unexplored subjects on United States Far Eastern relations before 1930, such as: (1) inter-relationship of Far Eastern and European policy in the first three decades of the twentieth century; (2) relations with Japan, 1905–1922; and (3) consular activities in Southeast Asia since 1839. These are but a few possible subjects deserving further exploration, and many more would suggest themselves through a check of the most important published primary source on United States Far Eastern relations, the *Foreign Relations* volumes.

This series, through 1931 entitled *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States* and beginning with 1932, simply *Foreign Relations of the United States*, spans the seventy-sever year period from 1861 to 1938 (except for th year 1869) and is fully indexed from 1861 to 1918. These volumes provide a selection of the most im portant documents dealing with United State foreign affairs, and with respect to the Far Eas give good coverage throughout to China and Ja pan. They give special attention to the Far Eas since 1931, and beginning with 1932 separat volumes have been issued on that area, the lates of which covers the year 1939. A special two volume compilation was published on *Japan 1931-1941. Foreign Relations* is especially useful fo the period since 1910 in providing the file number that can lead the researcher directly to the manu script material, which, of course, is much mor voluminous and detailed than the printed selec tion.

The manuscript material, for the most part de posited in the National Archives in Washington falls into three general record groups and is file under three separate systems. The record group are "General Records of the Department o State,"[4] the major source for manuscript materia of all descriptions dealing with the Far East u to 1941; "Records of the Foreign Service Post of the Department of State,"[5] which contain dip lomatic and consular post records up to 1943; an "United States Participation in Internationa Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions," covering international meetings up to 1940.

[2] Concerning the appropriate regulations, see National Archives, "Regulations for the Public Use of Records in the National Archives," dated March 24, 1953.

[3] *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the Unite States 1861–1932* (Washington: Government Printing O fice, 1862–1948); *Foreign Relations of the United Stat 1933–1938* (Washington: Government Printing Offic 1949–1954). See also Dennett, for further possible topi worthy of exploration in United States–Far Eastern r lations.

[4] An indispensable finding aid for use in the Nation Archives is the latter's *Guide to the Records in the N tional Archives* (Washington: Government Printing O fice, 1948), cited hereafter as *National Archives Guid* The "General Records of the Department of State" con prise National Archives Record Group 59, described i *National Archives Guide*, 221–244.

[5] National Archives Record Group 84, described in *N tional Archives Guide*, 332–334.

[6] National Archives Record Group 43, described in *N tional Archives Guide*, 153–156.

Down to 1906 all these records are filed accord-ng to country or post and are arranged chrono-ogically thereunder as to whether they were eceived by or sent from the Department of State n Washington. In 1906 a new system of arrang-ng the documents was put into effect, whereby or the next four years they were filed under a case ystem (numerically and topically), and since 1910 nder a decimal system by topic. To use the nanuscript material for the period since 1910, herefore, the most useful finding aid is the deci-nal file number under which a group of documents s filed. These file numbers are found in a card-ile index in the National Archives and, as ex-plained above, are noted on documents appearing n the *Foreign Relations* volumes since 1910. For he period from 1906 to 1910 there is a cross-eference file at the Archives guiding the re-earcher to the manuscript material.

Indispensable in the use of these records are arious guides and finding aids, several of which f a general nature have already been cited. Most seful are those issued by the National Archives such as its *Guide*), including various prelimi-ary inventories and special lists which supple-nent the *Guide*. For example, by consulting the *Guide* and a special "List of Foreign Service Post Records in the National Archives,"[7] one discovers hat the following records of diplomatic posts are ow in the National Archives, though it should ot be taken for granted that these are always omplete either chronologically or substantively: China, 1843 to 1945; Japan, 1855 to 1936; Korea, 884 to 1905; Thailand, 1882 to 1935, including onsular records from Bangkok, 1856 to 1912. The foregoing, involving the records of the prin-ipal United States diplomatic establishments in ach of these countries, is supplemented by the ecords of forty-three consular posts in the Far East covering the period from 1830 to 1946.

An appreciation of the general nature of these onsular post records may be gained by consulting preliminary inventory on "Records of Selected Foreign Service Posts."[8] This describes, among thers, the records of the United States Consulate General at Hong Kong from 1843 to 1935, out-lining the various categories of records maintained and indicating the types of consular records avail-able for other Far Eastern posts.

Of particular interest to those researchers deal-ing with the nineteenth century are the activities of special agents of the Department of State, thirty-two of whom were sent on missions to the Far East from 1832 to 1905. Documentary mate-rial pertaining thereto is indicated in another spe-cial "List of Documents Relating to Special Agents of the Department of State, 1789–1906."[9] It is likely that much of this material has not yet been thoroughly exploited and that a number of dissertation and monographic subjects might be gleaned from it.

Of similar assistance in pinpointing United States participation in international meetings of Far Eastern interest is another preliminary in-ventory, "Records of United States Participation in International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions."[10] This outlines the availability of materials dealing with the International Opium Commission and Conferences, 1909–1913; the Washington Conferences of 1921–1922; the [Ge-neva] Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armament, 1927; and the London Naval Confer-ences of 1930 and 1935. Generally, these confer-ence materials should be used in conjunction with the general records of the Department of State.

As is true of the *Foreign Relations* volumes, much of the manuscript material found in the Na-tional Archives relates not merely to United States relations with, and activities in a Far Eastern country, but also surveys internal political, eco-nomic, social, and military developments. Fre-quently, diplomatic relations between one country and another are discussed. The research materials in *Foreign Relations* and in the Archives are therefore of value, especially as a check on other sources, in research involving the domestic and foreign affairs of a Far Eastern country, and the international relations of the Far East.

One of the most valuable aids to research in National Archives materials on the Far East is

[7] Mark G. Eckhoff and Alexander P. Mavro, "List of Foreign Service Post Records in the National Archives," Special List No. 9 (Washington: National Archives, 1952).

[8] Alexander P. Mavro, "Records of Selected Foreign Service Posts," Preliminary Inventory No. 60 (Washing-ton: National Archives, 1953).

[9] Natalia Summers, "List of Documents Relating to Special Agents of the Department of State 1789–1906," Special List No. 7 (Washington: National Archives, 1951).

[10] H. Stephen Helton, "Records of United States Par-ticipation in International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions," Preliminary Inventory No. 76 (Washington: National Archives, 1955).

the microfilming of many of the records of the Department of State up to 1906. A special guide, "List of National Archives Microfilm Publications 1953,"[11] lists, among others, nearly 500 rolls of microfilm that document diplomatic, consular, and naval relations between the United States and Far Eastern countries from the late eighteenth century until 1906. These are especially useful to researchers who find it impossible or inconvenient to come to Washington, for copies of this microfilm collection are available on the West Coast at the Universities of Washington and Southern California; in the Midwest at the Universities of Indiana and Wisconsin; and in the South at the University of Florida. Furthermore, individual rolls of microfilm may be ordered directly from the National Archives at nominal cost.

This microfilm collection makes readily available the manuscript material (except for post records) up to 1906 on United States relations with China from 1843, with Japan from 1855, with Korea from 1883, and with Thailand from 1882. United States relations with the Great Powers concerning the Far East may be checked by going through the registers (each on a single roll of microfilm) of diplomatic despatches with France, Great Britain, and Russia. Available on microfilm are the consular despatches of various dates from twenty-one Far Eastern posts including Amoy, Canton, Hankow, Hong Kong, Kanagawa, Macao, Nagasaki, Nanking, Seoul, Shanghai, Tientsin, and Yokohama. On microfilm also are notes to and from the Chinese, Japanese, and Korean legations in the United States, the reports of special agent Edmund Roberts in the period from 1832 to 1837 on his two missions to the Far East, and the naval records of the East India Squadron from 1841 to 1861 and the Asiatic Squadron from 1865 to 1885. The latter are extremely useful in exploring early United States relations with China, Japan, and Korea.

For those whose research falls in the more recent period, it is well to note the National Archives two-volume inventory of *The Federal Records of World War II*, compiled in 1950.[12] This guide outlines the existing records of virtually all wartime government agencies and should be checke if research is contemplated in any aspect of Unite States relations with respect to the Far East i World War II. It is supplemented by two pr liminary inventories of the records of the Foreig Economic Administration and the Office of Wa Information.[13]

Concerning the publication policy of the D partment of State with respect to *Foreign Rel tions*, we note that during the Lincoln Administra tion when these volumes were first produced, the was approximately one year's lapse of time b tween the diplomatic negotiations and publicatio of the pertinent documents.[14] This procedu prevailed down to 1905 from which time the developed a steadily-widening gap between t event and publication of the documents, so th in recent years publication has taken place a proximately seventeen years after the event This situation resulted largely because of tw concurrent developments: first, the vastly i creased volume of diplomatic documentation fo lowing World War I, and secondly, the propo tionately smaller staff available to compile an edit this immense proliferation.

Now just what is involved in preparing a *Fo eign Relations* volume? First there is the pro lem of combining all the files of the Departme of State (and other appropriate agencies) for a material in a given period. Then all of these do uments are given a preliminary screening duri which the obviously routine or inconsequential a discarded. Through this preliminary selectio and collation process a subject breakdown is a rived at and all pertinent files are examined f additional material. The compiler next rescree the selection, inserts headings, annotations, a footnote references, and passes the material to t chief of section for review. Following this revie and any modification of the proposed selectio the material is then sent to the chief of bran who reviews the entire selection and fits it in

[11] Albert H. Leisinger, Jr., "List of National Archives Microfilm Publications 1953" (Washington: National Archives, 1953).

[12] National Archives, *The Federal Records of World War II* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950).

[13] H. Stephen Helton, "Records of the Foreign Econon Administration," Preliminary Inventory No. 29 (Washi ton: National Archives, 1951); Helton, "Records of t Office of War Information," Preliminary Inventory N 56 (Washington: National Archives, 1953).

[14] For an informative account of the history of *Forei Relations*, see E. R. Perkins, "'Foreign Relations of t United States': 91 Years of American Foreign Polic *Department of State Bulletin*, 27 (Dec. 22, 1952), 10 1007.

he over-all arrangement of the appropriate volume. When the compilation is completed by the Historical Division, it is edited by a professional staff in the Division of Publishing Services, and is then sent to the Government Printing Office to be put into galley form. The galleys are submitted to the appropriate areas of the Department of State, and, if necessary, to other governmental agencies and to foreign governments concerned, for clearance. Following this, the galleys are returned to the editors who put them in shape for page proof; they are then indexed and finally published.

The foregoing process involves three to five years from initial selection to publication, but when one considers the vast volume of material that must be dealt with all along the line, the achievement is not inconsiderable. Compilation of the *Foreign Relations* volumes provides not only an objective and scholarly presentation of the most significant documents in the Department of State files, but also compares most favorably with the publication policy of other governments.

Indeed, the record of United States relations with the Far East has been revealed down to a later date than those of any other major power. For example, the comparable British publication, *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939*, has not yet included a volume on Britain's Far Eastern relations, although there have been separate publications of documents of the London Naval Conferences of 1930 and 1935. Similarly, *Documents diplomatiques français* include material down to 1914 on French foreign relations, but are extremely thin on the Far East. A selection of documents on the Washington Conference of 1921–1922 was put out by France in 1923, however.

By way of contrast the latest volume of *Foreign Relations* on the Far East, as mentioned earlier, is for the year 1939. As a result of an accelerated compilation and publication program since 1953, moreover, it is anticipated that the present seventeen-year gap between the event and publication of the documents will be narrowed considerably. Thus, it is expected that during 1955 the Far East volume for 1940 will be issued,[15] and the work is well along on the two volumes for 1941. There is also in progress preparation of a special compilation on United States relations with China from 1942 to 1949, and on the important World War II conferences. The Yalta documents have already been made public, and will be published shortly.[16] Other wartime conference documentation will be published as expeditiously as clearances permit.

The ever-increasing accessibility of the diplomatic record remains the continuing policy and objective of the Department of State. Within the limitations of availability of personnel, sustaining high standards of documentary compilation and editing, and obtaining necessary clearances both within and outside the Government, the Department is moving forward with its publication program. Concurrently, the Department is continuing to make available its limited-access records to qualified researchers, thus permitting liberal research opportunities for those working in the Far Eastern as well as other fields of United States foreign relations.

U.S. Gratified by Assurance of Independence for Malaya

Press release 85 dated February 16

The people and the Government of the United States take great satisfaction in the outcome of the negotiations just ended in London between authorities of the United Kingdom and representatives of the people and the Malay rulers of the Federation of Malaya. They regard the promise of early independence of the Federation as a tribute to the people of Malaya, as evidence of the progressive wisdom of the Malay rulers, and as one more proof of the good faith of the people and the Government of the United Kingdom in their relations with the people of their overseas dependencies.

The assurance of independence to the Federation of Malaya within the Commonwealth of Nations conclusively demonstrates the beneficial, evolutionary character of societies in which freedom is not simply a word but a deed. The cause of freedom has been strengthened not only in Southeast Asia but throughout the world.

[15] *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940, Volume V, The Far East*, Department of State publication 5916, for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C.; price, $3.75.

[16] *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, Department of State publication 6199, for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C.; price, $5.50.

ICA Aid Programs in Nepal, Yugoslavia, and India

GRANT OF $2 MILLION TO NEPAL

A grant of $2 million in U.S. economic assistance to help Nepal raise the living standards of its 8 million people was announced on February 2 by the International Cooperation Administration.

The funds will be equally divided between technical cooperation and development assistance in a country which is one of the most isolated in the world. Land-locked and mountainous, the Kingdom of Nepal lies between India and Tibet.

Technical cooperation funds will go to continue programs combating insect-borne diseases, developing village training schools, and teacher training.

The teacher-training program is being carried out under an ICA contract with the University of Oregon to assist Nepal in training 1,750 schoolteachers and establishing a 4-year teachers' college.

Most of the development assistance funds will be used for the development of the Rapti Valley. This will include extensive malaria control measures, construction of an access road, a land survey for establishing boundaries, and soils studies. This valley, located approximately 60 miles southwest of Katmandu, capital of Nepal, has potentially more than 100,000 acres of land which, through malaria control, clearing, and irrigation, can be used for agricultural purposes. Development would make the valley an additional source of food and timber supply for the nation's 8 million population living in a country with about the same area as Arkansas.

The United States has been extending economic assistance to Nepal since January 1951. Up to the 1956 fiscal year, U.S. allotments totaled $4,020,000, of which $1,600,000 was for flood relief in fiscal 1955 when the country was stricken with its worst floods in half a century. The floods, which occurred in September 1954 and were accompanied by an earthquake, took a toll of 1,000 dead and made 132,000 homeless.

The Nepalese are almost completely isolated from the outside world. Because of its mountainous terrain, land transportation in Nepal is primitive, but there is travel by air between Katmandu and India. The majority of the people farm f a living. Modern industry is virtually no existent.

Nepal's external trade is largely with Indi which also is providing the nation with econom assistance.

ALLOTMENT OF $24 MILLION FOR FINANCIN OF FARM GOODS FOR YUGOSLAVIA

The International Cooperation Administrati on February 6 announced the allotment of $ million to finance the sale and shipment of U. agricultural commodities to Yugoslavia.

Under the allotment the United States w ship 175,000 metric tons of wheat, valued at $1 million; 11,400 metric tons of cotton, valued $9.6 million; and 7,000 metric tons of tallow, valu at $1.36 million. In addition, $2.74 million provided for ocean freight.

Of the Yugoslav currency (dinars) to be pa by Yugoslavia for these commodities, $15 milli will be loaned back to Yugoslavia and the remai ing $9 million equivalent will be granted. All it will be used in Yugoslavia for defense suppo

Defense support is economic assistance provid to nations undertaking military defense efforts conjunction with the United States. It contri utes to the maintenance of mutual security strengthening the economies of such nations that they can support the large military establis ments necessary to deter aggression.

The $24 million allotment, the first in fiscal ye 1956 for Yugoslavia, is made under the provisio of section 402 of the Mutual Security Act of 195 This section provides that at least $300 million the mutual security program funds authoriz by Congress is to be used to finance the sale surplus U.S. agricultural commodities for forei currencies. The foreign currency proceeds are be used to promote mutual security.

Prior to the new allotment, U.S. economic a for Yugoslavia had amounted to more than $4 million since 1950. It has been chiefly in the for of foodstuffs and feed, including more than $1 million in wheat and $13 million in corn; ra materials and commodities for industrial use, su as about $60 million in cotton and more than $ million in iron and steel mill commodities a chemicals; and fuel, including more than $35 m lion in coal and $13 million in petroleum.

In addition, the United Kingdom and France ave participated in a tripartite aid program for ugoslavia of about $80 million, in coordination ith the United States program.

Yugoslavia's efforts to rebuild its economic posi- ion, as well as its defensive strength, from the evastation of World War II and from the break- ng off of trade relations with Russia in 1948 have een hampered in recent years by droughts and ther weather conditions affecting wheat and other rops.

The foodstuffs and feed provided by the United tates have helped to alleviate these crop short- ges, while the raw materials and commodities for ndustrial use have helped to develop industrial roduction for export.

URVEY OF INDIA'S RAILWAY SYSTEM

The Government of India on February 10 signed contract with an American engineering firm to tudy that nation's railway transportation system ith a view to recommending steps to increase its arrying capacity and to make maximum use of he facilities.

The survey is to be in connection with a large- cale program for providing expanded transporta- ion facilities on Indian railways, to be undertaken n India under that country's second Five-Year Plan.

The contract was signed at Washington in the resence of the Indian Ambassador to the United tates, Gaganvihari Lallubhai Mehta, and the merican Ambassador to India, John Sherman ooper, who is now in the United States for onsultation.

The contract is with the engineering firm of anderson and Porter of New York and extends ver a period of 20 months. The firm will send n 18-man team of American engineers to India o make a study of existing and future problems f Indian railways and submit recommendations.

The dollar cost of the project up to $450,000 ill be paid by the International Cooperation dministration. India will contribute substan- ially in rupees toward meeting local expenses.

The contract was signed on behalf of the Indian overnment by B. S. Kalkat, Director of the India upply Mission in Washington, and for Sander- on and Porter by Robert Hamill, a partner.

The engineering team, which is expected to leave for India within the next few weeks, is to study and determine the most practical methods for equipping India's rail system, both from a short-term as well as a long-term basis, to cope with the rapidly expanding traffic load.

These studies will cover railway yard layouts, marshaling yards, signals and operations, increased utility of equipment, techniques to increase train weights and lengths, car design, motive power, coupling design, and the possibility of double-tracking some of the heavily used routes.

A study also will be made of coordinating rail-sea movement of bulk commodities, particularly coal, with the objective of relieving congestion and releasing capacity for other traffic.

With more than 34,000 miles of track, the Indian railway system is the fourth largest in the world, exceeded only by the United States, the Soviet Union, and Canada. The system carries more than 80 percent of internal freight traffic and 70 percent of the passenger traffic.

The U.S. Government, through the Indo-American technical program jointly administered with the Government of India by ICA, under the Mutual Security Act, has been cooperating with India in railway rehabilitation since 1954 in support of India's first Five-Year Plan.[1]

India's rail system suffered considerable depreciation during World War II when large parts of the rolling stock were moved to the Middle East war theater, and internally the system was subjected to heavy strain of military traffic in goods and personnel.

Since independence there has been increased pressure on India's railways arising from the increasing movement of agricultural produce and industrial output as well as supplies and equipment for development projects. The railway rehabilitation program has been an important part of India's first Five-Year Plan, soon to be followed by the second Five-Year Plan, and has been given high priority in the joint Indo-ICA program of economic development.

The joint Indo-American program in its present form dates from the signing of a general agreement between India and the United States on January 5, 1952. From then to June 30, 1955, U.S. commitments to the joint program totaled $267,900,000, and it has been announced $60 million will be allotted during the 1956 fiscal year.

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[1] For background, see BULLETIN of Jan. 18, 1954, p. 88.

Of the funds so far committed, $38,800,000 was for railway rehabilitation. This sum included the financing of 100 steam locomotives and 8,730 freight cars, some of which are being built in the United States, to supplement the purchase of 2,000 locomotives and 40,000 freight cars financed by India under its first Five-Year Plan.[2]

Other projects include cooperation in developing agricultural and natural resources, industry and mining, health and sanitation, education and community development programs, and providing technical personnel.

The program, in the words of Ambassador Cooper, is in line with U.S. policy "to assist in world economic development, wherever acceptable—to advance the standard of living, provide equality of opportunity, and promote friendship and peace."

As the largest democracy in Asia and the world, economic progress in India is of great importance to the future of Asia and the rest of the world.

Renegotiation of Tariff Concessions With Five Countries

Press release 81 dated February 15

The United States has agreed to the withdrawal or modification of certain tariff concessions previously granted to this country by Austria, Ceylon, Cuba, the Netherlands (on behalf of the Benelux countries), and Sweden. In return, these countries have granted new concessions on trade items in which United States exporters have an interest.[3]

Negotiations to this end followed decisions by the designated countries to invoke article XXVIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which permits GATT participating countries, s specified but infrequent periods, to withdraw c modify concessions previously granted. ("Co cessions" are either reductions in tariff rates c "bindings"—that is, agreements not to increa tariff rates. Neither of these may be altere except in accordance with specified procedures

When a country invokes article XXVIII, holds new negotiations with the country wit which the concession was originally negotiated an with other countries which have a substanti trade interest in the concession. The purpose c this renegotiation is to endeavor to maintain tl previous level of reciprocal concessions.

In the present cases, the United States took a vantage of its right to negotiate with the name countries with a view to obtaining equivalent ne concessions. In accordance with established pr cedures, U.S. participation in the renegotiatio was guided by the recommendations of the Inte departmental Committee on Trade Agreement which advises the President on trade agreeme matters.

No changes in U.S. duties were involved.

A summary of the principal changes involv in the present set of renegotiations follows.

Austria

The results of these negotiations permitted Au tria to alter 13 concessions directly granted to tl United States. Three were withdrawn, and rat of duty on the other 10 items were raised and th bound at the higher level. Austria is also reneg tiating with other countries to increase rates duty on 12 items in which the United States has substantial trade interest. Among the 25 iten the most important commodities are precision i struments, prepared medicines, and elastic goo The value of U.S. exports of these 25 items Austria was approximately $509,000 in 1954.

To compensate for these withdrawals and mo ifications, Austria reduced rates of duty on 8 ite below the levels at which they were previous bound to the United States and granted new co cessions on 23 items which had not been in t schedule of concessions. The value of U.S. expo of these 31 items to Austria in 1954 was abo $1,374,000. The principal items were fixed veg table oils, fruit and vegetable juices, and calcul ing and other office machines.

[2] For an address made at Bombay by Ambassador Cooper on turning over the first four locomotives to the Indian Government, see *ibid.*, Feb. 6, 1956, p. 205.

[3] For details of the negotiations, see *General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Analysis of Renegotiation of Certain Tariff Concessions (Austria, Ceylon, Cuba, the Netherlands, and Sweden)*, Department of State publication 6291, for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., 15 cents. For an announcement concerning renegotiations with Canada and Belgium, see BULLETIN of June 27, 1955, p. 1051; with Italy, Peru, Turkey, and South Africa, see *ibid.*, Oct. 10, 1955, p. 578; with India, the Netherlands Antilles, New Zealand, Nicaragua, and Pakistan, see *ibid.*, Jan. 2, 1956, p. 26.

ylon

One Ceylonese concession originally negotiated th the United States (glass and glassware) was thdrawn entirely. In addition, the United ates has a substantial trade interest in canned uits and pumping machinery and parts which ylon is negotiating to withdraw from other untries. In 1954 Ceylonese imports of all of ese items from the United States was $65,000.

As compensation, Ceylon reduced the rate of ty on rosin, in which our 1954 trade amounted $125,000. Indirect benefits will also accrue to e United States from the results of Ceylonese negotiations with other countries seeking to re-ce rates of duty on wireless goods and parts.

ba

Duties on 41 items are being increased by Cuba. e most important include automobile tires and bes, various types of copper wire, and paper and per manufactures. The value of U.S. exports these items to Cuba in 1953 (the last year for ich statistics are available) was slightly more an $7,750,000.

As compensation for these increases, Cuba is lucing the rates of duty on 23 items on which esser concession had previously been granted to e United States and is also reducing the rate on e item which had not been in the schedule of ncessions. In 1953 imports of these 24 items o Cuba from the United States amounted to 0,800,000. The principal products on which new luctions were obtained are parts and accessories r industrial machinery, motors of all kinds, ck chassis, and pumps.

e Netherlands

The tariff concession renegotiated by the Neth-ands on behalf of the Benelux countries related oranges and mandarins. It was modified to rmit these fruits to be imported into the Benelux untries at a preferential duty-free rate between gust 1 and October 14 from the Belgian Congo, e territories in Africa administered by Belgium, d the Netherlands overseas part of the realm.

Balancing this modification, the Benelux coun-es bound in favor of the United States rates of ty on hazel nuts, almonds, and walnuts already und under the general agreement to other coun-es. This joint binding extended to the United ates the rights of an initial negotiator to compensation if these concessions are modified at some future date.

Sweden

Swedish duties on apples and pears granted as direct concessions to the United States in 1947 were increased and rebound at the higher level. During the period in 1954 to which the modified rates would apply, the value of apples and pears imported into Sweden from the United States was about $129,000. These fruits were under quantitative import restrictions until January 1955, however; hence the potential trade under liberalized conditions cannot be realistically estimated.

As compensation, Sweden reduced duties on walnuts, milled rice, and certain canned fruits, whose imports from the United States in 1954 were about $1,408,000.

Public Hearing on Concession on Woolens and Worsteds

Press release 86 dated February 16

The Committee for Reciprocity Information on February 16 issued notice that a public hearing will be held with a view to possible action by the United States under the terms of the note applying to the concession made by the United States on woolens and worsteds under items 1108 and 1109 (a) of Part I Schedule XX (Geneva) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. This note reads as follows:

> NOTE: The United States reserves the right to increase the ad valorem part of the rate applicable to any of the fabrics provided for in item 1108 or 1109 (a) of this Part to 45 per centum ad valorem on any of such fabrics which are entered in any calendar year in excess of an aggregate quantity by weight of 5 per centum of the average annual production of similar fabrics in the United States during the 3 immediately preceding calendar years.

The U.S. Government has been requested to take action under this note on the grounds that imports of woolens and worsteds into the United States in 1955 appear to have reached 5 percent of domestic production in the preceding 3 years. The Committee for Reciprocity Information is accordingly scheduling public hearings to obtain the views of interested persons as to whether action should be taken under the terms of the above note. Interested persons are invited to present

views and pertinent information concerning conditions in the domestic industry and the effect of imports thereon. All views and information will be carefully considered by the interdepartmental trade-agreements organization in arriving at a decision regarding action under the note to the concession on woolens and worsteds.

Hearings before the Committee for Reciprocity Information will open April 2, 1956. Applications for oral presentation of views and information should be submitted to this Committee not later than 12 noon, March 19, 1956. Persons desiring to be heard should also submit written statements to the Committee for Reciprocity Information by 12 noon, March 19, 1956. Only those persons will be heard who submit written statements or file applications to be heard by the date indicated. Written statements of persons who do not desire to be heard should also be submitted by 12 noon, March 19, 1956. Details concerning the submission of statements and applications to be heard are contained in the notice of the Committee for Reciprocity Information.

COMMITTEE FOR RECIPROCITY INFORMATION

Possible Action Under Note to the U.S. Concession on Woolens and Worsteds in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

Submission of Information to the Committee for Reciprocity Information

Closing date for applications to be heard, March 19, 1956
Closing date for submission of briefs by those desiring to be heard, March 19, 1956
Closing date for submission of statements by persons not desiring to be heard, March 19, 1956
Public hearings open April 2, 1956.

The Committee for Reciprocity Information hereby gives notice that a public hearing will be held with a view to possible action by the United States under the terms of the note applying to the concession made by the United States on woolens and worsteds under items 1108 and 1109 (a) of Part I Schedule XX (Geneva) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. This note reads as follows:

NOTE: The United States reserves the right to increase the ad valorem part of the rate applicable to any of the fabrics provided for in item 1108 or 1109 (a) of this Part to 45 per centum ad valorem on any of such fabrics which are entered in any calendar year in excess of an aggregate quantity by weight of 5 per centum of the average annual production of similar fabrics in the United States during the 3 immediately preceding calenda years.

The purpose of the hearing is to enable th interdepartmental trade-agreements organizatio to obtain the views of interested persons as t whether action should be taken under the term of the above note.

The Committee for Reciprocity Informatio hereby gives notice that all applications for ora presentation of views in regard to the abov matter shall be submitted to the Committee fo Reciprocity Information not later than 12 noo March 19, 1956. Such application shall includ an estimate of the time required for such presenta tion. Persons who desire to be heard in regar to the foregoing shall also submit written state ments to the Committee for Reciprocity Informa tion not later than 12 noon, March 19, 195 Written statements of persons who do not desir to be heard shall also be submitted not later tha 12 noon, March 19, 1956. Any such written state ments shall be addressed to "Committee for Reci procity Information, Tariff Commission Building Washington 25, D.C." Fifteen copies of writte statements, either typed, printed, or duplicate shall be submitted, of which one copy shall b sworn to.

Written statements submitted to the Committe except information and business data proffered i confidence, shall be open to inspection by intereste persons. Information and business data proffere in confidence shall be submitted on separate pag clearly marked *For Official Use Only of Com mittee for Reciprocity Information.*

The public hearings before the Committee fo Reciprocity Information will open at 10 a. m. o April 2, 1956, in the Hearing Room in the Tari Commission Building, 8th and E Streets, NW Washington 25, D.C.

Witnesses who make application to be hear will be advised regarding the time and place o their individual appearances. Appearances hearings before the Committee may be made onl by or on behalf of those persons who have file written statements and who have within the tim prescribed made written application for oral pre entation of views. Statements made at the publ hearings shall be under oath.

All communications regarding this notice, i cluding requests for appearance at hearings befo the Committee for Reciprocity Informatio should be addressed to the Executive Secretar

mmittee for Reciprocity Information, Tariff mmission Building, Washington 25, D. C.

By direction of the Committee for Reciprocity formation this sixteenth day of February 1956.

EDWARD YARDLEY
Executive Secretary
Committee for Reciprocity Information

ecision on Lighter-Flints cape-Clause Case Deferred

ite House press release dated February 14

The President on February 14 announced that is deferring action on the "ferrocerium (lighter its) and all other cerium alloys" escape-clause e until the Attorney General has had an op-rtunity to advise him with respect to a legal ue that has arisen in connection with the case. e reasons for the President's action are set forth letters to the Chairmen of the Senate Finance d House Ways and Means Committees, Harry ood Byrd and Jere Cooper, respectively.

The lighter-flints escape-clause investigation s made by the United States Tariff Commission rsuant to section 7 of the Trade Agreements tension Act of 1951, as amended. On Decem-r 21, 1955, the Commission reported to the Presi-nt and unanimously recommended escape-clause ief.

esident's Letter to Chairmen of Congressional mmittees

February 14, 1956

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: On December 21, 1955, e United States Tariff Commission submitted to a report of its escape clause investigation on rocerium (lighter flints) and all other cerium oys. The Commission, which made its investi-tion pursuant to Section 7 of the Trade Agree-nts Extension Act of 1951, as amended, has commended that escape clause relief be granted this case.

The Commission's report has been the subject careful study in the Executive Branch. Dur-g the course of this review a question relating to e legal aspects of the competitive situation in the mestic industry emerged. Preliminary con-leration of this issue has established that it of sufficient substance to warrant thorough ploration.

My decision in this case might have some effect upon the competitive situation in the domestic industry, and it would therefore be of importance to me, in arriving at my decision in this matter, to have before me a determination of the legal question that has been raised. I have decided accordingly that it is in the public interest for me to defer my decision in this escape clause case until such time as the Attorney General has had ample opportunity to advise me definitely with respect to this legal matter.

This letter is to advise you of my reasons for not taking final action on this case during the statutory 60 day period within which I would normally decide a Section 7 proceeding. I have already asked the Attorney General to study the legal question referred to above and as soon as he has reported his findings and conclusions to me I shall be in a position to reach a final decision in this case.

With kind regard,
Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Current Legislation on Foreign Policy

84th Congress, 1st Session

Administration of Overseas Personnel. Part 1: Management Survey of the Department of State. Hearings before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations. June 6–August 2, 1955. 451 pp.

Administration of Overseas Personnel. Part 2: White House Task Force; Part 3: Wriston Committee Program; Part 4: Foreign Service Promotions Under the Wriston Program. Hearings before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations. September 14–December 15, 1955. 237 pp.

Debt Claims and World War I Assets. Hearing before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1147, to amend the Trading with the Enemy Act relating to debt claims, and S. 2226, to amend the Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended, and the War Claims Act of 1948, as amended. September 29, 1955. 71 pp.

84th Congress, 2d Session

Foreign Service Promotions Under the Wriston Program. Ninth intermediate report of the House Committee on Government Operations. H. Rept. 1663, January 23, 1956. 16 pp.

Economic Report of the President. H. Doc. 280, January 24, 1956. 236 pp.

International Control and Reduction of Armaments. Report to accompany S. Res. 185. S. Rept. 1454, January 26, 1956. 2 pp.

Investigation of Problems Related to Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Report to accompany S. Res. 163. S. Rept. 1455, January 26, 1956. 5 pp.

Investigation of Foreign Technical Assistance and Related Programs. Report to accompany S. Res. 162. S. Rept. 1459, January 26, 1956. 2 pp.
Extension of Sugar Act of 1948. Report to accompany H. R. 7030. S. Rept. 1461, January 26, 1956. 31 pp.
Activity of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 84th Congress, 1st Session. Report of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce pursuant to section 136 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Public Law 601, 79th Congress, and House Resolution 105, 84th Congress. H. Rept. 1681, January 26, 1956. 18 pp.
Committee Studies Overseas. Report pursuant to sec. 136 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Public Law 601, 79th Cong. H. Rept. 1682, January 26, 1954. 5 pp.

Sudan Recommended for U.N. Membership

Statements by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
U.S. Representative to the United Nations [1]

U.S. VIEWS ON SUDANESE MEMBERSHIP

U.S./U.N. press release 2349

The United States asked for this meeting, and it cosponsors the pending resolution [2] recommending the election of the Sudan as a member of the United Nations.

We do so, in the first place, because it is our simple duty to do so under the provisions of the charter.

But there is more to it than that.

We here in the United States have watched the progress of the people of the Sudan with keen interest. We see in the Sudan many traits which we like to think that we and the people of the Sudan have in common. We are both new nations filled with love of independence and a desire for the education and improvement of the individual. Both our nations admire courage and both face the future with hope.

The United States hopes that this resolution will be promptly adopted. In fact, let me say that we think it should be adopted here today and that it would be most superfluous for any technical reason to refer it to a committee of any kind. We hope that action will be taken today and that in the General Assembly the Sudan will take its place as a full-fledged member of the United Nations.[3]

[1] Made in the Security Council on Feb. 6.
[2] U.N. doc. S/3545, sponsored by France, U.K. and U.S.
[3] The Council voted unanimously to recommend to the Assembly that the Sudan be admitted.

EXCLUSION OF JAPAN FROM U.N.

U.S./U.N. press release 2350

The United States is delighted that the applic tion of the Sudan for membership in the Unit Nations has been so promptly and unconditional recommended by the Security Council.

But even on such an auspicious occasion we ca not forget that, as President Eisenhower said r cently, "grave injustices are still uncorrected." refer to the exclusion of Japan from the Unit Nations. That nation, whose stature before t world is beyond dispute and which has alrea contributed so much to the work of the specializ agencies and other bodies of the United Natio clearly deserves full representation at the Unit Nations. The United Nations, in order to car out its responsibilities, also needs the full parti pation of that important nation, which has demo strated its devotion to the purposes and principl of the United Nations Charter.

The United States will continue to work for t early admission of Japan to the United Natio and the righting of a grave wrong. Today have dealt with the application of the Sudan in t way all applications for membership should dealt with—unconditionally, on their merits, a expeditiously. The United States hopes that t Security Council will continue to act this way the future.

[Following Mr. Lodge's statement, Soviet Represen tive Arkady A. Sobolev, president of the Security Coun said that, out of respect to the Representative of United States, he had not interrupted him although remarks had been out of order; the agenda for the Co cil's meeting dealt solely with the admission of the Sud Mr. Lodge later replied as follows:]

Mr. President, the Representative of the Unit States wishes just to take a moment so that t record will show that in his opinion he was i out of order when he spoke immediately after t vote. Mr. President, in the opinion of the Rep sentative of the United States it is in order in t Security Council to explain one's vote. There nothing in the rules that is contrary to a meml doing that.

Moreover, the subject of my statement was tremely germane to the agenda because I had c cussed the method which was used in electing Sudan. It was a method which was unconditio which judged the candidate on its merits, wh did not link the candidate up with some ot candidature, which was not a package deal. Th

said that that was the method that we should fol-
ow in the case of Japan.

Now in his statement just a minute ago, the
oviet Representative ignored the views of all the
ther members of the Council and he also ignored
he provisions of the charter that the admission of
ne applicant should not be linked to that of
nother. He simply restated a Soviet position
hat in fact has been repudiated by all other mem-
ers of this body.

Now, Mr. President, it was not the Representa-
ive of China who kept Japan out. It was the
epresentative of the Soviet Union who kept
apan out. The member of the Security Coun-
il who vetoes Outer Mongolia does not keep out
apan. The member of the Security Council who
etoes Japan keeps out Japan. Now, that is crys-
al clear and I am sure that no one, either in this
oom or anyone who follows the proceedings of
he Security Council in any country of the world,
s in any doubt about it.[4]

J. S. Delegations to nternational Conferences

ntergovernmental Committee for European ligration

The Department of State announced on Feb-
uary 16 (press release 83) that Scott McLeod,
dministrator of the Department's Bureau of Se-
urity and Consular Affairs, will head the U.S.
elegation to meetings of the Intergovernmental
ommittee for European Migration (ICEM) at
eneva, Switzerland. ICEM already has moved
70,000 persons to various parts of the world.

Twenty-six member governments will be rep-
esented at the fourth annual Council meeting of
CEM February 20–24, which will be preceded by
week's meeting of the nine-member Executive
ommittee, February 14–18.

Representative William M. McCulloch of Ohio
ill act as Chief Congressional Adviser. Public
embers include Blase Bonpane, Los Angeles at-
orney; Richard Everds, Chairman of the Iowa
tate Refugee Committee; C. Henry Glovsky,
assachusetts State Senator; Robert S. McCol-
um, President of the Denver, Colorado, City
Council; and Edward C. Sweeney, Washington, D.C., attorney.

Other advisers for the Council meeting are William R. Foley, General Counsel of the House Judiciary Committee, and Francis C. Rosenberger, staff member of the Senate Judiciary Committee.

George L. Warren, Adviser on Refugees and Displaced Persons, Department of State, will be alternate U.S. Representative to both the Executive Committee and Council meetings of ICEM. Wendell B. Coote, Office of International Administration, Department of State, and Dayton H. Frost, Chief, Intergovernmental Refugee Programs Division, International Cooperation Administration, will act as advisers to both meetings.

ICEM was established on U.S. initiative at Brussels, Belgium, in December 1951 to facilitate the movement of migrants and refugees from Western Europe to new homes overseas—primarily in Australia, Canada, Latin America, and the United States.

[4] For Mr. Lodge's statements on membership during
e Council debate in December, see BULLETIN of Dec. 26,
55, p. 1069, p. 1070, and p. 1072.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Convention on road traffic, with annexes. Dated at Geneva September 19, 1949. Entered into force March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487.
Ratification deposited: Denmark, February 3, 1956.

Customs Tariff

Convention creating the international union for the publication of customs tariffs, regulations of execution, and final declarations. Signed at Brussels July 5, 1890. Entered into force April 1, 1891. 26 Stat. 1518.
Notification of adherence given: Libya, December 13, 1955.

Protocol modifying the convention signed at Brussels July 5, 1890 (26 Stat. 1518), creating an international union for the publication of customs tariffs. Done at Brussels December 16, 1949. Entered into force May 5, 1950.[1]
Notification of adherence given: Libya, December 13, 1955.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention. Signed at Buenos Aires December 22, 1952. Entered into force January 1, 1954. TIAS 3266.

[1] Not in force for the United States.

Ratifications deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 12, 1956; Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, January 16, 1956.

Trade and Commerce

Fourth protocol of rectifications and modifications to annexes and texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva, March 7, 1955.[2]
Signature: Haiti, November 28, 1955.

Protocol on terms of accession of Japan to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, with annex A (schedules of the Contracting Parties) and annex B (schedule of Japan). Done at Geneva June 7, 1955. Entered into force September 10, 1955. TIAS 3438.
Signature: Indonesia, December 3, 1955.
Notification of intention to apply concessions received: Greece, December 9, 1955 (effective January 8, 1956).

Protocol of rectification to French text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva June 15, 1955.[2]
Signature: Dominican Republic, November 10, 1955.

BILATERAL

Canada

Agreement regarding the application of the Forces Convention (TIAS 3425), the Finance Convention (TIAS 3425), and the Tax Agreement (TIAS 3425) to Canadian forces and their members stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany. Effected by exchange of notes at Bonn April 29, 1955, and January 26, 1956. Entered into force January 26, 1956.

Egypt

Agreement modifying the surplus agricultural commodities agreement of December 14, 1955 (TIAS 3439) by providing for the sale of additional wheat to Egypt. Effected by exchange of notes signed at Washington February 8, 1956. Entered into force February 8, 1956.

France

Agreement amending agreement of September 2, 1953 (TIAS 2907) to extend loan of aircraft carrier "Belleau Wood" to France. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington February 3, 1956. Entered into force February 3, 1956.

Germany

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington February 13, 1956. Will enter into force on the day on which each Government shall receive from the other a written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

Israel

Agreement amending agreement of November 10, 1955 (TIAS 3429) regarding surplus agricultural commodities. Signed at Washington February 10, 1956. Entered into force February 10, 1956.

Japan

Agreement modifying the agreement of July 12, 1955 (TIAS 3314) by providing additional Japanese cash contributions during the current Japanese fiscal year for United States administrative and related expenses. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo February 3, 1956. Entered into force February 3, 1956.

[2] Not in force.

Liberia

General agreement for technical assistance and coopera tion, and memorandum of understanding on the Joir Liberian-United States Commission for Economic De velopment. Signed at Monrovia October 6, 1955. Er tered into force February 3, 1956.

THE DEPARTMENT

Confirmations

The Senate on February 17 confirmed Robert R. Bowi to be an Assistant Secretary of State.

Resignations

On February 15 President Eisenhower accepted th resignation of Thruston B. Morton as Assistant Secretar of State. The effective date of the resignation is Fel ruary 29. For the texts of Mr. Morton's letter c resignation and the President's reply, see White Hous press release dated February 16.

Designations

Arthur L. Richards as Operations Coordinator, effectiv January 18.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Liaison Office in the Sudan Becomes Embassy

Press release 87 dated February 17

The Department of State announced on February 1 the elevation of the U.S. Liaison Office in Khartoum the capital city of the Sudan, to the status of Embass as of February 15. Arthur E. Beach, U.S. Liais Officer at Khartoum, has been appointed Chargé d'Affaire

Consular responsibilities in the Sudan, formerly ha dled by the American Embassy in Cairo, have be assigned to the new Embassy.

The United States recognized the Sudan as an ind pendent sovereign state on January 1, 1956.[1]

[1] BULLETIN of Jan. 16, 1956, p. 85.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Career Opportunities With the U.S. Department of State. Pub. 6069. Department and Foreign Service Series 48. 10 pp. Limited distribution.

This pamphlet outlines the requirements for employment and the manner in which appointments are made to positions in the Department and the Foreign Service.

Foreign Affairs—Statement by President Eisenhower. Pub. 6265. General Foreign Policy Series 106. 15 pp. Limited distribution.

This pamphlet contains excerpts from State of the Union message January 5, 1956.

Technical Cooperation, Program of Industrial Productivity. TIAS 3123. Pub. 5780. 24 pp. 15¢.

Agreement between the United States and El Salvador—superseding agreement of May 14, 1953—Signed at San Salvador August 31, 1954. Entered into force October 7, 1954. With implementing agreement—Signed at San Salvador December 30, 1954.

Mutual Defense Assistance in Indochina. TIAS 3131. Pub. 5788. 24 pp. 15¢.

Agreement between the United States and Cambodia, France, Laos, and Viet-Nam—amending Annex to agreement of December 23, 1950. Exchanges of notes between the United States and France—Dated at Saigon August 10 and September 8, 1951; between the United States and Viet-Nam—Dated at Saigon August 10 and September 17, 1951; between the United States and Laos—Dated at Saigon August 16, 1951; and at Vientiane November 6, 1951; between the United States and Cambodia—Dated at Saigon August 16, 1951, and at Phnom-Penh January 7, 1952. Entered into force January 7, 1952; operative retroactively July 1, 1951.

Mobile Radio Transmitting Stations. TIAS 3138. Pub. 5793. 3 pp. 5¢.

Understanding between the United States and Canada—providing for conditional cancellation of interim arrangement of June 25 and August 20, 1947. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington March 9 and 17, 1953. Entered into force March 17, 1953.

Relief Supplies, Duty-Free Entry and Free Inland Transportation. TIAS 3145. Pub. 5796. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Jordan. Exchange of notes—Dated at Amman May 1 and June 29, 1954. Entered into force June 29, 1954.

Oil Shale Study in Brazil. TIAS 3149. Pub. 5820 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Brazil—extending agreement of August 16, 1950, as modified and extended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Rio de Janeiro June 23 and 30, 1954. Entered into force June 30, 1954.

Relief Supplies and Packages, Postal Charges. TIAS 3151. Pub. 5822. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and China—amending agreement of November 5 and 18, 1948, as amended. Exchange of notes—Dated at Taipei July 12 and October 26, 1954. Entered into force October 26, 1954.

Passport Visa Fees. TIAS 3154. Pub. 5833. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Guatemala. Exchange of notes—Signed at Guatemala December 1, 1954. Entered into force December 1, 1954.

Development Assistance to Guatemala. TIAS 3155. Pub. 5834. 12 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Guatemala—Signed at Washington December 13, 1954. Entered into force December 13, 1954.

Technical Cooperation, Economic Development Program. TIAS 3156. Pub. 5835. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Egypt. Exchange of notes—Signed at Cairo November 6, 1954. Entered into force November 6, 1954.

Mutual Security, Purchase by Iceland of Military Equipment, Materials, and Services. TIAS 3157. Pub. 5836. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Iceland. Exchange of notes—Signed at Reykjavik October 4 and December 10, 1954. Entered into force December 10, 1954.

Settlement of Japanese Claims for Personal and Property Damages Resulting From Nuclear Tests in Marshall Islands in 1954. TIAS 3160. Pub. 5842. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Japan. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tokyo January 4, 1955. Entered into force January 4, 1955.

Mutual Defense Assistance, Transfer of Military Equipment and Materials to Japan. TIAS 3161. Pub. 5855. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Japan. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tokyo January 7, 1955. Entered into force January 7, 1955.

Mutual Defense Assistance, Loan of United States Naval Vessels to Japan. TIAS 3162. Pub. 5856. 5 pp. 5¢.

Procès-Verbal between the United States and Japan—relating to agreement of May 14, 1954—Signed at Tokyo January 18, 1955.

Certificates of Airworthiness for Imported Aircraft. TIAS 3164. Pub. 5868. 12 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Italy—replacing Article 9 of air navigation arrangement of October 13 and 14, 1931. Exchange of notes—Signed at Rome November 12, 1954, and January 26, 1955. Entered into force January 26, 1955.

Economic Cooperation, Informational Media Guaranty Program. TIAS 3166. Pub. 5869. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Chile. Exchange of notes—Signed at Santiago January 14, 1955. Entered into force January 14, 1955.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3167. Pub. 5870. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement and exchange of letters between the United States and Yugoslavia—Signed at Belgrade January 5, 1955. Entered into force January 5, 1955.

Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and Protocol. TIAS 3170. Pub. 6144. 9 pp. 10¢.

Treaty and protocol between the United States and other governments—Signed at Manila September 8, 1954. Entered into force February 19, 1955.

Pacific Charter. TIAS 3171. Pub. 6145. 2 pp. 5¢.

Charter between the United States and other governments—Dated at Manila September 8, 1954.

Mutual Defense Treaty. TIAS 3178. Pub. 5850. 24 pp. 15¢.

Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China—Signed at Washington December 2, 1954. Entered into force March 3, 1955. And exchange of notes—Signed at Washington December 10, 1954.

Mutual Defense Assistance, Disposal of Redistributable and Excess Property. TIAS 3182. Pub. 5861. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Belgium—Signed at Brussels November 17, 1953. Entered into force March 10, 1955.

Exchange of Commodities and Sale of Grain. TIAS 3204. Pub. 5903. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Turkey—supplementing agreement of November 15, 1954—Signed at Washington April 28, 1955. Entered into force April 28, 1955.

Exchange of Commodities and Sale of Grain. TIAS 3205. Pub. 5904. 3 pp. 5¢.

Understanding between the United States and Turkey—relating to Part II of agreement of November 15, 1954. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington April 28, 1955. Entered into force April 28, 1955.

Parcel Post. TIAS 3229. Pub. 5954. 24 pp. 15¢.

Agreement and detailed regulations between the United States and India—Signed at New Delhi July 29, 1954, and at Washington September 17, 1954. Entered into force January 1, 1955.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3417. Pub. 6200. 31 pp. 15¢.

Agreement and exchanges of notes between the United States and Brazil—Signed at Rio de Janeiro November 16, 1955. Entered into force November 16, 1955.

Emergency Relief Assistance, Establishment of a Joint Council for Economic Aid. TIAS 3430. Pub. 6216. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Haiti. Exchanges of notes—Signed at Port-au-Prince April 15, 16, 26, and 27, 1955. Entered into force April 27, 1955.

Emergency Relief Assistance, Joint Council for Economic Aid. TIAS 3431. Pub. 6219. 14 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Haiti. Exchange of notes—Signed at Port-au-Prince November 25 and 28, 1955. Entered into force November 28, 1955.

Technical Cooperation, Program for Technical Assistance to Medium and Small Industry. TIAS 3432. Pub. 6223. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Chile—amending agreement of June 30, 1952, as extended—Signed at Santiago October 28, 1955. Entered into force October 28, 1955.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3439. Pub. 6224. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Egypt—Signed at Washington December 14, 1955. Entered into force December 14, 1955.

Mutual Defense Assistance. TIAS 3443. Pub. 6237. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany—Signed at Bonn June 30, 1955. Entered into force December 27, 1955. With related note—Dated June 30, 1955.

Mutual Defense Assistance, Disposition of Military Equipment and Materials. TIAS 3444. Pub. 6238. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement, with Annex, between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. Exchange of letters—Signed at Bonn June 30, 1955. Entered into force December 27, 1955.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities, Sale of Poultry. TIAS 3445. Pub. 6240. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany—Signed at Washington December 23, 1955. Entered into force December 23, 1955.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3448. Pub. 6245. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Colombia—Signed at Bogotá December 20, 1955. Entered into force December 20, 1955.

United States Educational Foundation in Norway. TIAS 3118. Pub. 5764. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Norway—Amending agreement of May 25, 1949. Exchange of notes—Dated at Oslo August 12 and October 30, 1954. Entered into force October 30, 1954.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: February 13–19

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

No.	Date	Subject
78	2/13	U.S.–German research reactor agreement.
*79	2/14	Moffat nominated Ambassador to Australia.
80	2/15	Dulles: statement on Baltic independence.
81	2/15	Renegotiations under the GATT.
*82	2/15	Educational exchange.
83	2/16	Delegation to ICEM meeting.
84	2/16	Hoover: "Efforts Toward World Peace."
85	2/16	U.S. views on independence for Malaya.
86	2/16	Hearings on wool tariff.
87	2/17	U.S. liaison office at Khartoum, Sudan, elevated to embassy.
†88	2/17	Foreign Relations volume.
89	2/17	Foreign Service examination on June 25.
90	2/17	Visit of Italian President Gronchi (rewrite).
91	2/18	Shipment of arms to Near East.

*Not printed.
†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

merican Republics. Costa Rica and Nicaragua Sign Friendship Agreements 339

sia. The Accessibility of Department of State Materials Relating to American Far Eastern Relations (Spielman) 343

tomic Energy. Research Reactor Agreement With Germany (joint announcement) . . . 326

ustria. Renegotiation of Tariff Concessions With Five Countries 350

viation. Definition of Functions of Air Coordinating Committee (Executive order 341

razil. United States-Brazilian Friendship (Nixon) 335

eylon. Renegotiation of Tariff Concessions With Five Countries 350

ongress, The. Current Legislation 353

osta Rica. Costa Rica and Nicaragua Sign Friendship Agreements 339

uba. Renegotiation of Tariff Concession With Five Countries 350

conomic Affairs
Decision on Lighter-Flints Escape-Clause Case Deferred 353
Public Hearing on Concessions on Woolens and Worsteds 351
Renegotiation of Tariff Concessions With Five Countries 350

ducational Exchange. UNESCO Grants for Regional Cultural Studies 342

urope
NATO—Our Greatest Instrument for Peace (Gruenther) 332
U.S. Attitude Toward Plight of Baltic Peoples (Dulles) 331

oreign Service
Foreign Service Examination 342
Liaison Office in the Sudan Becomes Embassy . 356

ermany
Research Reactor Agreement With Germany . 326
Tenth Anniversary of Amerikahaus in Munich (Conant) 327

ndia. ICA Aid Programs in Nepal, Yugoslavia, and India 348

nternational Information. Tenth Anniversary of Amerikahaus in Munich (Conant) . . . 327

nternational Organizations and Meetings. Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration 355

taly. President of Italian Republic To Visit United States 331

Malaya. U.S. Gratified by Assurance of Independence for Malaya 347

Military Affairs
NATO—Our Greatest Instrument for Peace (Gruenther) 332
Shipment of Military Equipment to Countries of Near East 325

Mutual Security
Efforts Toward World Peace (Hoover) . . . 323
ICA Aid Programs in Nepal, Yugoslavia, and India 348

NATO—Our Greatest Instrument for Peace (Gruenther) 332

Near East. Shipment of Military Equipment to Countries of Near East 325

Nepal. ICA Aid Programs in Nepal, Yugoslavia, and India 348

Netherlands. Renegotiation of Tariff Concessions With Five Countries 350

Nicaragua. Costa Rica and Nicaragua Sign Friendship Agreements 339

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO—Our Greatest Instrument for Peace (Gruenther) 332

Presidential Documents
Decision on Lighter-Flints Escape-Clause Case Deferred 353
Definition of Functions of Air Coordinating Committee 341
President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities 340

Publications. Recent Releases 357

Refugees and Displaced Persons. Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration . 355

Saudi Arabia. Shipment of Military Equipment to Countries of Near East 325

State, Department of
Confirmations (Bowie) 356
Designations (Richards) 356
Resignations (Morton) 356
The Accessibility of Department of State Materials Relating to American-Far Eastern Relations (Spielman) 343

Sudan
Liaison Office in the Sudan Becomes Embassy . 356
Sudan Recommended for U.N. Membership (Lodge) 354

Sweden. Renegotiation of Tariff Concessions With Five Countries 350

Treaty Information
Current Actions 355
Research Reactor Agreement With Germany (joint announcement) 326

U.S.S.R. NATO—Our Greatest Instrument for Peace (Gruenther) 332

United Kingdom. U.S. Gratified by Assurance of Independence for Malaya 347

United Nations. Sudan Recommended for U.N. Membership (Lodge) 354

Yugoslavia. ICA Aid Programs in Nepal, Yugoslavia, and India 348

Name Index

Beach, Arthur E 356
Bowie, Robert R 356
Conant, James B 327
Dulles, Secretary 331
Eisenhower, President 340, 341, 353
Gronchi, Giovanni 331
Gruenther, Alfred M 332
Hoover, Herbert, Jr 323
Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr 354
Morton, Thruston B 356
Nixon, Richard M 335
Richards, Arthur L 356
Spielman, Herbert 343

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XXIV, No. 871

rch 5, 1956

FREEDOM'S NEW TASK • *Address by Secretary Dulles* . . 363

EFFORTS TOWARD PRESERVING PEACE IN THE NEAR EAST • *Statement by Secretary Dulles* 368

FOR A BETTER WORLD • *by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy* 371

INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS IN SPAIN • *by Ambassador John Lodge* 379

THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN ASIA • *Statements by Howard P. Jones and Walter M. Kotschnig* 388

PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH: A LOOK AT THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION • *Article by Mrs. Katherine G. Howard* 375

For index see inside back cover

The Department of State bulletin

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March 5, 1956

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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'reedom's New Task

Address by Secretary Dulles [1]

As we meet here at Independence Square, our ıoughts inevitably turn to the world scene, where :eedom is at stake. It is a moment of unusual :gnificance. The Soviet rulers are reforming ıeir lines. The Soviet 20th Congress, which ; journed last night, was busy revising the Soviet Ommunist creed. We cannot yet fully appraise ıat has happened. And, in any event, it takes tne for doctrinal changes to get fully reflected i the mind and conduct of the party members.

But two things at least we know. One is that t:re is already a notable shift in Soviet foreign ı licy. And the other is that these Soviet policies ıich they change are being changed not be-cıse they succeeded but because they have been t warted by the free world.

Until recently the foreign policy of Soviet cnmunism was based on fanatical intolerance of a other systems and upon the organization of v lence to overthrow all other systems. Marx, Inin, and Stalin all taught that it was necessary t hate all who differed from the Soviet Com-n nist creed; and they also taught that only by v lence could international communism achieve it destined goals.

But the free nations, when confronted by this p icy, grew more strong, more resolute, and more u ted. Consequently the Soviet pattern of h red and violence produced ever-diminishing rcırns.

n Europe the defensive strength of NATO was rcnded out by the addition of the Federal Re-pılic of Germany.

n the Western Pacific freedom was consoli-dıed by adding to our ANZUS, Philippine, and Jıanese treaties the new Mutual Defense Treaties with Korea and with the Republic of China. And the Congress, you will recall, authorized the President to use the armed forces of the United States in the Formosa area, if necessary, for its defense.

In Southeast Asia the Western powers joined with Asian powers in a treaty for collective security, and they transformed the Indochina struggle from a struggle against colonialism to a struggle by truly independent nations—Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia—to maintain their freedom.

In the Middle East the "northern tier" concept, without challenging the concept of Arab unity, has drawn together for collective defense four nations which, for 2,500 miles, lie just south of Russia's frontiers.

Back of these formulations of free-world resolve lay the vast mobile power of the United States, which constituted a formidable deterrent to open armed aggression.

So the Soviets had either to give up their expansionist aims or turn to other means to advance them. Lenin and Stalin had taught that, under these circumstances, there should be no giving up but rather a shift to new methods. So, last year, the Soviet rulers concluded that the time had come to change basically their approach to the non-Communist world.

Shift in Soviet Methods

In May of 1955 the Soviet rulers signed—at last—the Austrian State Treaty; they made their pilgrimage of repentance to Tito; they offered to establish diplomatic relations with Germany and to make a belated peace with Japan. In Asia the Chinese Communists, at the Bandung conference, gave at least lipservice to methods other than outright violence. The Soviet rulers trumpeted all

[1] Made before the Philadelphia *Bulletin* Forum at Philadelphia, Pa., on Feb. 26 (press release 92 dated Feb. 25).

this throughout the world as proof that Soviet Communist policy was no longer predatory.

We hoped that this was so. But we were highly skeptical. We well knew that under Leninism any tactic is admissible and that the change had come about, not through change of heart, but because old methods had failed.

On the other hand, we knew that the new Soviet tactics of increased tolerance and less dependence upon violence required a basic change in Soviet Communist doctrine. This can, in the long run, have major internal consequences and set up within Russia powerful liberalizing trends.

But, of course, the fanatical teaching of a generation cannot be erased all at once. Also the change had not gone so far that there could not almost overnight be a sudden reversal to the old practice of intolerance and violence. Also we could only safely assume that the new tactics were designed as a new means of conquest. So we did not relax our vigilance or allow our military posture to slump.

But, on the other hand, we do not assume fatalistically that there can be no evolution within Russia or that Russia's rulers will always be predatory. Some day—I would not want to guess when—Russia will be governed by men who put the welfare of the Russian people above world conquest. It is our basic policy to seek to advance the coming of that day.

So last spring, when Soviet conduct began to change, we determined to do all that we safely could to make that change a first installment toward an eventual Russian state that would be a normal, not abnormal, member of the society of nations. One major step we took was to join with Britain and France to invite the Russian rulers to a conference of Heads of Government. At that "summit" conference at Geneva, President Eisenhower did more than any other man could have done to open up to the Soviet rulers the vista of a new era of friendly relations between our countries.

We cannot yet measure the full effect of that conference. The gains will be measurable only in the future. For the time being, the Soviet rulers, finding that the road of intolerance and violence was blocked, have subordinated those elements of their old creed in the hope that, in a new garb, they could still pursue conquest. Now they pursue their foreign policy goals with less manifestation of intolerance and less emphasis on violence. Their foreign policy now puts la emphasis upon seeking political cooperation w left-wing socialists, whom formerly they detest Finally, there is heavy emphasis on trade a economic assistance. It is this economic aspect the Soviet "new look" that I would consider tod

Soviet Economic Campaign

This Soviet economic campaign is a varied c It includes the barter of surplus arms into ar where tensions were already high. There highly publicized purchases of agricultural co modities from a few countries where mount surpluses have exposed the vulnerabilities of ec omies lacking in diversity. Incidentally, Soviet bloc, with typical cynicism, has reexpor some of these commodities to markets that original sellers normally would supply. And bloc has made loans to a selected number of co tries.

This policy has been directed especially tow certain peoples in the Near East and South A There the Soviet rulers believe that they can a exploit historic grievances for their own en But the new Soviet policy roams far and wi Even African and South American countries receiving Soviet economic propositions.

What is the import of this new economic ca paign of the Soviet-bloc countries?

The first thing to note is that Soviet capital ports divert resources from the Soviet people, w still lack many of the ordinary decencies of l On this we have the testimony of Mr. Khrushc in his recent speech to the 20th Communist Pa Congress. There he stated:

> It must be said that we do not yet have an adequ quantity of consumer goods, that there is a shortag housing, and that many of the important problems nected with raising the people's living standards have yet been solved.

Still quoting Mr. Khrushchev:

> Production of many important foodstuffs and m factured goods still lags behind growing demands. S towns and communities are still insufficiently supp with such items as milk, butter, and fruit. There even cases where supplies of potatoes and other vegeta are irregular. There are also difficulties in supplying population with certain high grade manufactured go

The Soviet Union, of course, has the capa to do much to lift up the living standards of Russian people which Mr. Khrushchev descri and to give them opportunities for greater ha

ss. There was indeed a moment when it seemed at this might become the Soviet policy. Mr. alenkov, as the Prime Minister who first succeded Stalin, advocated more consumer goods d better quality goods for the Soviet people. t Mr. Malenkov was quickly removed from dership, and his successors resumed the policy forcing the Russian people to work primarily build up the power machine of the State. The tput of consumer goods—food, clothing, and using—was firmly relegated to a secondary ce.

Under these conditions can we accept at face lue the Soviet professions that its foreign economic activities are primarily designed to help ers? Actually in this campaign the Soviet ion is seeking to advance its interests.

It is important, therefore, to examine how the viet Union sees its interests.

varying Soviet Pattern

Throughout its 38 years of existence, the Soviet ttern has been unvarying. Whenever the opportunity has arisen, the Soviet Union has swallowed up its neighbors, or made satellites of them, subordinated them in other ways.

The future may well produce a different Russia. t today changes in creed and conduct are looked on as ways to make it easier to achieve old goals conquest. If there is less apparent intolerce and less reliance on violence, there is perhaps re reliance than ever on division, enticement, d duplicity.

On December 29, 1955, speaking to the Suème Soviet, Mr. Khrushchev stated the fundantal precept:

> f certain people think that our confidence in the vicy of socialism, the teaching of Marxist-Leninism, is a lation of the Geneva spirit, they obviously have an inrect notion of the Geneva spirit. They ought to ember once and for all that we never renounced and will never renounce our ideas, our struggle for the tory of communism.

In his lengthy speech to the 20th Party Conss, Mr. Khrushchev promised "fundamental ial transformations"—this means a Communist rty dictatorship—to any nation unwary enough llow its political life to be undermined by the mmunist apparatus.

We must assume that the intent behind the viet economic campaign is to subvert and comnize the nations that are its targets.

Purpose of U.S. Aid Programs

The United States is engaged in programs of economic assistance to the less developed countries. Our programs have been in progress for a number of years and have totaled billions of dollars.

By these programs we too hope to advance our legitimate national interests. We have never pretended otherwise.

But again the crucial question is: What are those interests and how are they intended to be served?

Our interests will be fully served if other nations maintain their independence and strengthen their free institutions. We have no further aims than these. We want a world environment of freedom. We have shown this, time after time, by electing to give freedom where we could have had conquest. Our historic policy, reflecting the will and the views of our own free people, is wholly compatible with the interests of the less developed countries as their leaders themselves have expressed them.

"Industrialization" a Magic Word

The political leaders in the less developed countries are entirely capable of judging the purposes and principles of other nations. They are for the most part men of political experience. In many cases they have had an active part in winning for their countries political independence. They have no desire to preside over the loss of that independence.

The wisdom and patriotism of the political leaders of the newly independent nations are among freedom's greatest assets. These men are not blind to Soviet purposes and past actions.

But we must also recognize that the Soviet Communist experiment has won for itself a considerable popular prestige in the less developed countries. In these countries "industrialization" is a word of magic. It is a slogan that the people have come to believe will solve all domestic economic and political problems. The peoples of these countries do not like to be dependent upon the industrialized West for manufactured goods. For the most part they now have political independence, but they do not yet have what they consider to be adequate economic independence.

The neighboring Asian peoples have seen the Soviet Union within a generation develop itself into a major industrial power. These observers

are but only dimly aware of the fact that the Soviet rate of progress was possible only because natural conditions favored and that, even so, its cost in human servitude has been tragically high. They are like those of us who admire the pyramids, the palaces, the temples, and the coliseums which despotic rulers once produced out of slave labor. We are only dimly conscious of the cost in terms of human misery.

So it is with the peoples of less developed lands who are informed in extravagant terms of the industrial monuments which have been built by the Soviet masters of 220 million subject peoples.

And when Soviet propaganda says to less developed peoples, "See what we have done for ourselves—with our help, you can do the same," there is a strong temptation to accept that so-called "help."

The political leaders of these countries, however wise they may be and however patriotic they may be, will find it difficult to resist the public pressures which Soviet propaganda arouses, unless there is some alternative.

The industrial nations of the West, with matured and vigorous economies and much well-being, can and must provide such an alternative.

Support Needed for Long-Range Projects

Western efforts to advance the economic well-being of the less developed countries are nothing new. We need not be panicked by the new Soviet economic policy.

With or without the so-called "competition" of the Soviet Union we propose to go forward with sound policies to aid the economic progress of less developed countries.

Normally under our system private capital could and should do the job. And indeed much private capital today flows into many less developed countries. But it flows only where the political and economic risks are deemed tolerable. In much of the world these risks are such that private capital is not ready to take them. If capital is to be found, a substantial part must be provided on a public basis which spreads the risk so that it is not appreciable in terms of any single individual.

This is one of the purposes of our Mutual Security Program, which now, in one form or another, is in its eighth year. The economic part of that program amounts this year (ending June 30) to about $1,700,000,000. Much of this is used to help our allies, particularly in the Far Ea and in Asia, to support adequate military esta lishments of their own. Of the total, appro mately $600 million will assist, by loan or grant, capital developments in other lands.

This year we are asking Congress to approp ate for next year's economic program $100 m lion more than is available for this year. T capacity to spend wisely depends on many facto and we should not appropriate, in a panic, mere because of Soviet economic activities. There however, need for somewhat greater flexibility a for greater continuity, as regards support f long-range projects.

Some of the development projects which a most significant will take several years to co plete. It is difficult for the countries concern to arrange for financing these projects unl United States support can be relied upon not ju for one year at a time but for several years. Al with United States support it is easier for th to procure funds from other sources, such as t World Bank.

We believe, therefore, that the United Sta Government should have authority to commit so such amount as $100 million a year for seve years for long-range projects which will devel to an important degree the economic strength less developed countries. Without that limit long-range authority we take a risk which is qu unjustified having regard to the relatively sm cost of avoiding it.

Facing the Future With Confidence

If our Nation and the other free nations pl their proper part, we can face the future not w complacency that would be disastrous but w confidence.

I do not wish to minimize the threat of the S viet "new look," of which the economic campai is a part. It is true that economic assista knows no territorial limits. And we must co on the Soviets and their local Communist Part to press their policies with vigor.

But we should reflect that Communist succes in the world so far have come when Red arm were at hand. No people has willingly accep the Soviet type of Communist dictatorship.

Communist open aggression has now b checked by the cohesion, resolution, vigilance, a strength of the free nations. Let us never for that this is what deflected the Soviet rulers fr

mary reliance upon violence, to which they were licated by creed and which they are skilled to ıctice.

They came up against the granite of a declared l strong resolve. If that granite should turn to ty, then violence and threat of war could again ome the order of the day. These will require v efforts without relaxation of the old cohesion, ilance, and strength.

Meanwhile we have new problems, but the new orts will be of a kind that is in accord with our dition.

This Nation was conceived with a sense of mis- n and dedicated to the extension of freedom oughout the world. President Lincoln, speak- at this very Independence Hall, said of our claration of Independence that there was mething in that Declaration giving liberty, alone to the people of this country, but hope the world for all future time. It was that ich gave promise that in due time the weights uld be lifted from the shoulders of all men and t all men should have an equal chance."

That has been the spirit which has animated our ple since they came together as a Nation. We e, it is true, acquired much for ourselves. But we have had in large measure the greatest of satisfactions—that is the satisfaction which es from creating and from sharing.

We have created at home and we have also ated abroad. We have shared here at home we have shared abroad. Today the greatest ortunity for creation and for sharing lies in se areas which, possessed of great economic human potentials, have not yet realized the ortunities which are theirs.

We have unprecedented resources with which reate and with which to share. Our 160 mil- people, working in freedom and with ample ure, produce over three times as much as do the million of the Soviet Union working in servi- e. Our industrial techniques are beyond com- e. Our desire to create and to share with ers is not a political plot; it is an expression he spirit which has long animated our Nation. s not a product of government; it is a product he faith of our people.

et me conclude with words which Benjamin nklin wrote from Paris on May 1, 1777:

It is a common observation here that our cause he cause of all mankind, and that we are fighting for their liberty in defending our own. It is a glorious task assigned us by Providence; which has, I trust, given us spirit and virtue equal to it, and will at last crown it with success."

Offer of Aid to Countries Affected by Severe Winter

Statement by the President

White House Office (Thomasville, Ga.) press release dated February 19

I have observed with growing concern the reports that have come from Western European countries regarding the suffering and damage that has been caused by one of the worst winters in that area—possibly the worst in the past two or three decades.

I want to extend my country's deep-felt and sincere concern for the suffering peoples in the afflicted areas.

The United States stands ready to make supplies of agricultural commodities which we have in abundance available for relieving the distress of the people in these areas. I have consulted with the Secretary of Agriculture, and, while it is now too early to assess the damage realistically, both for the present and the immediate future, there is every indication that there will be need for such supplies. It has been reported, for example, that France alone has lost about one-third of her current wheat crop.

I know that the people of the United States will deem it a real privilege to put these agricultural commodities to the great service of relieving the suffering of our Western European neighbors. Such commodities can be made available for this purpose under authorities which already exist, pursuant to past actions taken by the Congress.

Statement by Lincoln White Acting Chief, News Division [1]

In line with the President's expressed intention, our Ambassadors in all European and Near Eastern countries affected by the present storm and cold-wave disaster have been instructed to inform those countries of the desire of the United States to assist them in alleviating suffering and

[1] Made to correspondents on Feb. 21

overcoming immediate damage resulting from the extreme temperatures and possible floods that will result therefrom.

The Ambassadors have been asked for estimates of the damage and the extent and means by which the United States might be of assistance in the various countries. The Ambassadors have been further requested to expedite their recommendations with regard to emergency cond tions in order that maximum alleviation of suffe ing may be accomplished.

Our offer of assistance is being made by o Ambassadors in London, Paris, The Hague, Bru sels, Oslo, Copenhagen, Rome, Athens, Ankai Luxembourg, Lisbon, Madrid, Bonn, Vienna, Be grade, Bucharest, Budapest, Warsaw, and Pragu

Efforts Toward Preserving Peace in the Near East

Statement by Secretary Dulles[1]

Almost 3 years ago I visited practically all of the Arab States and Israel.[2] This is a region sacred to three great religions—Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. Also I was impressed with the strategic importance which the Near East possesses in its geographic situation between Europe, Asia, and Africa. This area has great significance to the free world from the standpoint of communications—land, sea, and air—and because of its resources. The countries of Western Europe, for example, especially those associated in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, are large users of petroleum from the Near East.

The United States has long been interested in the course of events in the Near East. The people of the United States and its Government have many interests and objectives there.

I should like to deal this afternoon especially with our efforts toward the preservation of peace in that area and steps which we are taking to assist the Arab States and Israel to resolve their problems.

During recent years, especially following the outbreak of hostilities in the Near East in 1948, the members of the United Nations have become increasingly concerned with respect to peace in the area. In 1949 a series of armistice agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors convert the truce into a more permanent arrangeme Great credit goes to the United Nations represent tives: Count Bernadotte, who tragically lost h life there; Mr. Ralph Bunche, who succeed Count Bernadotte; and General Burns, who presently supervising the activities of the Unit Nations Truce Supervision Organization. T United States throughout has strongly support the representatives of the United Nations in the efforts.

In a move consistent with the efforts of t United Nations, the United States joined with t United Kingdom and France on May 25, 1950, the issuance of a joint declaration which set for their deep interest in promoting the establishme and maintenance of peace and stability in the Ne East.[3] The three Governments there recogniz that the Arab States and Israel all needed to mai tain armed forces for the purposes of assuri their internal security and their legitimate se defense and to permit them to play their part in t defense of the area as a whole. The three Gover ments reaffirmed at the same time their oppositi to the development of an arms race between t Arab States and Israel. A third and vital p of the declaration of 1950 is contained in the sta ment of their unalterable opposition to the use force or threat of force between any of the stat

[1] Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Feb. 24 (press release 96).

[2] For a report on this visit, see BULLETIN of June 15, 1953, p. 831.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 834, footnote.

the Near East. The three Governments stated ıt, should they find that any of these states was eparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, ey would, consistently with their obligations as embers of the United Nations, immediately take ion, both within and without the United Na-ns, to prevent such violation.

During the past 6 months substantial amounts Soviet-bloc arms have been sent to the area. e Soviet bloc has thus complicated the problem ich the United Nations has sought to solve. nditions for an arms race now exist as certain ntries of the Near East vie with one another the purchase of military items. Israel now shes to obtain arms from the United States and ewhere, and we have received similar requests om several of the Arab States which have not quired arms from Russia or its satellites. While lizing that the introduction of large quantities Soviet-bloc arms could upset the balance of ms within the area, we do not believe that a e peace can be based upon arms alone.

In requesting arms from the United States, presentatives of Israel have expressed fear that eir country's peaceful existence is threatened. is natural that in the circumstances they would sh to increase their military capabilities. How-er, Israel, due to its much smaller size and pulation, could not win an arms race against abs having access to Soviet-bloc stocks. It uld seem that Israel's security could be better sured, in the long run, through measures other an the acquisition of additional arms in circum-nces which might exacerbate the situation.

These other measures include reliance on the nited Nations, by which Israel was created and which Israel and the Arab States are important embers. The charter of the United Nations nds all of them not to threaten or use force. The nited States, United Kingdom, and France, as I dicated earlier, announced their intentions in the claration of 1950. More recently, President senhower and Prime Minister Eden referred to is declaration[4] and stated that they had made rangements, in which the French have joined, r joint discussions as to the nature of measures be taken in light of that declaration. All of ese possible measures add up to a more effective terrent than additional quantities of arms.

As I have indicated on previous occasions, the United States does not exclude the possibility of arms sales to Israel at a time when it will preserve the peace. We do not exclude the possibility of arms sales to the other Arab States under similar conditions.

Arab-Israel Problems

Beyond the basic and pressing problems of the preservation of the peace is the urgent need for a settlement between Israel and her Arab neighbors. A solution to this deep and bitter struggle is the key to the future prosperity of the region.

As I reported in my statement of August 26, 1955,[5] three problems require conspicuously to be solved: the plight of the refugees, the pall of fear that hangs over the Arab and Israeli people alike, and the lack of fixed boundaries between Israel and its Arab neighbors. There are other important problems, but I believe that, if these three principal aspects could be dealt with, the way would be paved for the solution of others.

During the intervening months we, as a friend of both Israelis and Arabs, have continued to give the situation deep and anxious thought. We have discussed the manifold problems and their ramifications with the representatives and governments of the countries in the area, as well as with our British and French colleagues who joined us in the Tripartite Declaration. Such discussions take place on a continuing basis through diplomatic channels. We maintain regular contact with the United Nations and particularly with General Burns, who is in active pursuit of means to preserve the peace. We have reiterated to each our readiness to contribute to a just and equitable settlement.

In my August 26 statement, with the authority of the President, I expressed in concrete terms how the United States would be willing to assist toward such a settlement. I believe it would be of value to review these suggestions again; they were put forward after the most serious and comprehensive review of the situation. They remain valid offers today.

To end the plight of the 900,000 refugees through resettlement and, to such an extent as may be feasible, through repatriation requires that more arable land in the area be created and

[4] *Ibid.*, Feb. 13, 1956, p. 233.

[5] *Ibid.*, Sept. 5, 1955, p. 378.

that adequate compensation be paid to the refugees. If Israel cannot now, unaided, make adequate compensation, we proposed consideration of an international loan for this purpose, to which the United States would contribute. President Eisenhower further authorized me to state that he would recommend that the United States contribute to the realization of water development and irrigation projects which would facilitate the creation of more cultivable land. The United States, through the support given to the consideration of the Jordan Valley Development Plan (the "Johnston Plan"), has already indicated its willingness to assist in this aspect of the problem.

Border Guaranties

Given a solution to other related problems, the President has further indicated his willingness to recommend that the United States join in formal treaty engagements to prevent or thwart any effort by either side to alter by force the boundaries between Israel and its Arab neighbors. We would hope other countries would participate in such a security guaranty and that it would be sponsored by the United Nations. Through such measures we believe that we would reduce substantially the acute fears which now plague the life of the area.

We recognize, in speaking of guaranteeing borders, that prior agreement on what the borders are is essential. The present existing armistice lines were not designed to be permanent frontiers in every respect. A more permanent and agreed line is necessary. In spite of conflicting claims and sentiments I believe the achievement of such a line is possible, and the United States remains willing to assist in the search for a solution.

We are not unmindful of the other problems, such as those of economics and of the status of Jerusalem. I have not attempted to enumerate all the issues, but if agreement can be reached on the basic problems of refugees, boundaries, and fear, we firmly believe it should be possible to find solu tions to the other remaining questions.

The attainment of peace in the Near East wa much in our mind during the recent talks wit Prime Minister Eden and his associates. In ou final joint communique we reiterated that our tw Governments have declared their readiness to cor tribute to a settlement by assisting financially i regard to the refugee and by guaranteeing agree frontiers.

The permanent security of the states in the are and their future peace and prosperity will not re primarily upon arms but upon the internation rule of law and the establishment of friendly rel tions among neighbors. It is our firm policy, as friend to both sides, to work toward the creatio of such an atmosphere in the Near East.

Current Legislation on Foreign Policy 84th Congress, 2d Session

Effects of Malnutrition and Other Hardships on the Mo tality and Morbidity of Former United States Prisone of War and Civilian Internees of World War II: A Appraisal of Current Information. Message from t President transmitting the report of the Secretary Health, Education, and Welfare pursuant to Public La 744, 83d Congress. H. Doc. 296, January 12, 1956. 69 p

Report of the Study Mission to Europe of the Hou Committee on Foreign Affairs pursuant to H. Res. 9 a resolution authorizing the Committee on Foreig Affairs to conduct a full and complete investigation matters relating to the laws, regulations, directives, a policies including personnel pertaining to the Depa ment of State and such other departments and agenci engaged primarily in the implementation of Unit States foreign policy and the overseas operations, pe sonnel, and facilities of departments and agencies the United States which participate in the developme and execution of such policy. H. Rept. 1683, Janua 26, 1956. 30 pp.

Proposed Supplemental Appropriations for the Depa ment of State in Form of Amendment to the Budg H. Doc. 322, January 30, 1956. 2 pp.

Authorizing the Loan of Two Submarines to the Gover ment of Brazil. Report to accompany H. R. 8100. Rept. 1687, January 30, 1956. 4 pp.

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or a Better World

by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy[1]

The New York Province of the Newman Clubs s greatly honored me by inviting me to take rt in your convention dedicated to the theme 'or a Better World." This is a goal to which all aspire. We can find guidance in our search r a better world in the life of Cardinal Newman mself and from the principles to which your ıbs are devoted. Newman's *Apologia* and *The ea of a University* remain classics today and re fitting inspiration for Timothy Harrington ıen he called his fellow students together to und a Newman Club at the University of nnsylvania.

John Henry Newman is a symbol of those who uggled for and attained happiness based on ith and spiritual understanding. His life was voted to service of our faith and to increasing man understanding. We of the 20th century ould do well to approach the difficult problems our world in the spirit of calm and detached ntemplation Cardinal Newman achieved.

Although he lived in what now seems a simple e, Newman's life-span covered a period of great rment and change. In the 19th century, indus- alization was gathering momentum in Western ırope and the United States. New economic d social theories were challenging and testing e existing order. The concerns of the times re concerns about material things. It was said ıt men should have more goods; that goods ould be more equitably distributed; that society ould be reorganized to provide the maximum terial benefits, to provide the greatest good the greatest number.

Most of the economic and social ideas of the 19th century were idealistically conceived. They were intended to solve the problems created by new political institutions, by growing populations, and by the industrial revolution. The 20th century, however, has seen some of these schemes and theories used in practical life, and used in such a way as to destroy whatever may have been good and to bring to dominance the error and evil they contain.

The materialist creed of Karl Marx, with its negation of faith and spirituality, its worship of the state alone, has become the enforced gospel of nearly a billion people, almost half the population of the world. Its economic dogmas have been adapted by Lenin, Stalin, and their successors to political and imperialist programs designed to promote Soviet communism into every part of the world. While this is an ideological purpose of vast significance, it serves handily as a cover, and an effective cover, for Russian expansionism.

These doctrines have strong appeal for many peoples who are striving to improve their conditions and their standards of living. These peoples are often reluctant to believe that Communist intentions are predatory, that economic gain under the Marxist system will inevitably be at the expense of political liberty and spiritual freedom.

International Communism Well Armed

International communism is well armed for the struggle to which it is so fully committed. Its military forces include the two largest land armies in the world. It possesses substantial air power and a growing stock of nuclear weapons. A huge percentage of the budgets and the resources of the U.S.S.R., of Red China, and of course the Eastern European satellites is devoted

[1] Address made before the New York Province of the 'wman Clubs at New York, N.Y., on Feb. 12.

to "national defense, armament and internal security." Vast quantities of manpower are allocated to these purposes. As you know, these millions of men and women have little or no choice when it comes to military service or, in fact, any labor for the state. Political and economic control is maintained by power in the hands of a few at the top and by tight organization in the ranks.

By denying the needs of its own and subject peoples, the Soviet Union can set aside goods and equipment for export where it foresees political gain. Thus it can focus its resources on a given world area if it sees in that region a possibility of political gain. In the same way it can export technical assistance. And to the war of ideas it devotes vast resources which it can mobilize without much regard for public opinion. It has mastered the art of making the worse appear the better cause, of making the undemocratic sound democratic, of cloaking aggressive aims with peaceful words.

To meet this threat, a threat to the security of nations in addition to our own, the United States cooperates in an immense effort by the free nations to build their common strength. As a great power we have special responsibilities whether we welcome them or not. We have formed a system of alliances not only for mutual defense but for economic and social cooperation. We are doing much to drive home the story of what the free nations stand for and what international communism means. Our strength is great, and we intend to remain strong. We intend to remain economically strong, militarily strong, and in particular morally strong. We must maintain faith and confidence in the values for which the United States stands. As Secretary Dulles has said:

> The Government of the United States has, I like to believe, a rather unique tradition in this respect. Our Nation was founded on an experiment in human liberty. Our institutions reflect the belief of our founders that all men were endowed by their creator with inalienable rights and had duties prescribed by moral law. They believed that human institutions ought primarily to help men develop their God-given possibilities, and that our Nation, by its conduct and example, could help men everywhere to find the way to a better and more abundant life.

We share the tradition of a respect for human liberty and moral law with a number of the nations with which we are now in close alliance. We must build upon these traditions and concepts if we are to build a better world. We must teach the new nations emerging in Asia and Africa the importance of these ideals. We must sho them they can and must be adapted to their ow conditions. We must teach by example that society without moral value and without princ ples is doomed to fail, no matter how hard struggles to build up economic and military powe

Battle for Men's Minds

Not long ago Archbishop O'Boyle of Washing ton delivered a thoughtful and stimulating sermo on the conflict we face. "When mercy is consi ered treason," he said, "when truth is classed as lie, and good is called evil, we are indeed face with a monstrous perversion of human nature, denial of every ideal that civilized man ha cherished."

The Archbishop accurately noted that com munism appeals not only to the disgruntled, th bitter, and the neurotic members of a communit but also to men of sensitive nature and high ideal He declared that there is danger we may look a the world struggle too narrowly, that we may con centrate too much on the economic, military, an political menace of communism, and so neglect th battle for men's minds. "The American peop should speak out," he concluded, "through the proper organizations and representatives, on th real nature of communism. We should reali that the struggle is total, and not merely a matt for government action only."

This is where I think you members of the n tional Newman Clubs have a major role to pla Why not mobilize your talents and your gre abilities to spread an affirmative doctrine of th things for which your Government stands?

The United States is today making a tremendo effort to win the battle for men's minds. O Government has a worldwide information pr gram which is doing an effective job in many are Many nongovernmental groups are also doing e cellent work in meeting foreign peoples and e plaining our way of life. Missionaries, lab leaders, businessmen, and thousands of oth Americans are a vital part of our effort here a abroad to increase international understanding.

In the battle for men's minds, we should ma a particular effort to reach those men wh thoughts and ideas will be decisive in guiding t policies of the new nations in Asia and Afri As Archbishop O'Boyle said: "In wide areas f the world, men of learning are the real leaders f their nations. This is particularly true in the n-

ns newly freed from colonial status. It is in ese very areas that the power of communism is owing with sobering speed."

Sometimes Americans have trouble understand- g the attitude of the people of new nations. ually these young nations want to solve their n problems their own way. They distrust for- gn help and advice. They have an intense de- e for rapid economic development. They know tle about the Soviet Union, but they are told achievements are vast. Efforts are being made persuade them that the pattern of Soviet in- strial development has more meaning for them an the freer, more humane process by which the stitutions of the United States and Western urope were developed.

The tours of Bulganin and Khrushchev to In- a, Burma, and Afghanistan are efforts by the viet Union in the new direction. We would be olish to deny that the new Soviet policy presents with dangers and a challenge. Where formerly e Iron Curtain implacably shut off the Soviet ion and its satellites from the rest of the world, now see "traveling salesmen," with broad smiles d back-slapping, offering tempting "bargains" the uncommitted nations. There are offers of onomic and military aid, proposals for treaties friendship, requests to set up diplomatic posts, d plans for interchange of experts in many lds.

It is ironic and typical, however, that at the me moment they speak of peace and friendship India, Burma, and Afghanistan, the Soviets d their Communist allies continue their nuclear sts, their threats of war to take Taiwan, and eir warnings of reprisal upon Iran and Pakistan r participation in the Western defense system. a sense, the Soviets have put a new wrinkle in eir traditional policy of "zigzag." They have und it possible to "zig" and "zag" at the same me. They continue to show plainly, for anyone ho cares to look, that aggression is still their d, to be pursued by peaceful talk or warlike reats, or both—whatever suits the need of the oment.

By their own deeds they warn us again that e cannot relax our vigilance, we cannot lower ur guard.

I have spoken to you already of the means— ilitary, political, and economic—by which we ust keep ourselves and our allies prepared to defend themselves. But the willingness and the ability to undertake our defense, while essential for avoiding war, is neither the only means nor the best means, in the long run, for preserving peace. We believe in a forward strategy not only in the military sense but in the political and social sense. As President Eisenhower put it earlier this year:

> The sum of our international effort should be this: the waging of peace, with as much resourcefulness, with as great a sense of dedication and urgency as we have ever mustered in defense of our country in time of war.

One of the highest tests, I think, of the greatness of a nation is the test, in times like these, whether we can be strong enough to win a war, yet gentle enough to help the weak; resourceful enough to gain great wealth, but wise enough to use it well.

Responsibility for Moral Leadership

Moral leadership is a great asset in any struggle. It is especially important in the present world battle for the minds of men and women everywhere. The responsibility for moral leadership in our country certainly rests upon our Government, but not upon government alone. It is also the direct responsibility of our churches and schools, of youth organizations such as the Boy Scouts and the 4–H Clubs, and especially of all these Newman Clubs of which we are justly proud. These agencies, civic and religious, must maintain the spiritual vigor and moral strength of the people who run our Government, who man our fighting forces, who carry on our dealings with other lands, who cast the votes that decide the course our Nation follows.

I am certain that your organization is doing a great deal, but you can do more. I have had close contact over the years with many young men and women who have been trained by our Catholic colleges and universities and shaped under the guidance of the Newman Clubs and other groups. Most of them measure up admirably to the challenges they face.

But none of us must forget that the evil forces that oppose are tireless in their self-criticism, in their manipulation of government programs, educational institutions, and youth programs. Their brutal efficiency is high, and, in all realism, we can expect it to go higher.

The moral superiority that our values, our sys-

tem, have over those of the Soviets *can* and *should* be decisive in this contest between us. But it is not inevitable. Our values must be applied. Our system must be made to work. We must match their tirelessness with our own, their efficiency with ours, if our moral superiority is to be decisive. As we seek to win the allegiance of the uncommitted nations to our standards and our values, we must do it by our deeds as much as by our words.

These nations will watch us, first, to see how we apply our values among our own people. Our record in this respect is good, though certainly not perfect. The opening of the channels of opportunity, the emphasis on free choice and private initiative in the past few years has brought prosperity for nearly all Americans. In addition, progress has been made through legislative and judicial efforts to bring about greater social justice among our people.

Not only are we being watched in applying our values to our own people, we are being watched in applying them to other peoples. Here, again, we do not need to apologize for our efforts. In the past 10 years a number of nations have won their freedom from colonial control. It has been our policy to respect this new freedom. By our economic strength and in many ways we have helped it to survive and to grow.

It has also been our policy to support the further attainment of freedom by subject peoples who desire it. In particular we support the liberation by peaceful means of the peoples of Eastern Europe, who have been unwillingly made subjects of the "new colonialism" of the Communists.

Another means by which we have given moral leadership is through our efforts to bring about disarmament. The whole world was thrilled by President Eisenhower's proposal of "atoms for peace" in 1953, and again by his proposal for aerial inspection to insure disarmament in 1955.

The final means by which the United States has rendered moral leadership in the world is the courage, the determination, the high principle, the good faith with which President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles, and the leaders of our Government, with the full backing and support of the American people, have faced the perils and the opportunities of this age in which we live.

Your convention is dedicated to the theme "For a Better World." In these remarks I have triec to outline for you, perhaps inadequately, some o the obstacles that lie in the road to a better worl and, more important, some of the means by whicl we will surmount these obstacles. You who are o the threshold of your careers will play, I know, major role in achieving our national objectives.

To all of you I wish Godspeed and good luc as you go forward with your own efforts to brin this better world into being.

President Appoints U.S. Members of Great Lakes Fishery Commission

The White House announced on February 1 that the President had that day appointed th following to be members of the U.S. section of th Great Lakes Fishery Commission:

John L. Farley, Director, Fish and Wildlife Service Department of the Interior
Lester P. Voigt, Director, Conservation Department State of Wisconsin
Claude Ver Duin

The Commission was established by the Con vention on Great Lakes Fisheries, which enterec into force on October 11, 1955.[1]

Aviation Talks With United Kingdom

Press release 95 dated February 24

Discussions between United Kingdom an United States civil aviation officials will be re sumed in London on March 5. The talks wil cover various civil aviation matters of interes to both countries including possible route modi fications.

The U.S. delegation will include Livingsto Satterthwaite, Special Assistant to the Deput Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs *chairman*; Chan Gurney, member of the Civi Aeronautics Board, *vice chairman*; Joseph H FitzGerald, Director of the Bureau of Air Op erations, Civil Aeronautics Board; and Edwar A. Bolster, Chief of the Aviation Division of th Department of State.

[1] For background, see BULLETIN of Oct. 24, 1955, p 677.

eace Through Strength: A Look at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

by Katherine G. Howard

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization came to being as the result of a treaty signed at ashington on April 4, 1949. What are the ctors that helped bring NATO into being? What its purpose? How can it contribute to the fense of the free world? I'd like to go back the beginning of NATO and recount how it all arted.

Ten years ago there was the end of the war in urope. We all breathed a sigh of relief. We all sbanded our armies.

Meanwhile the Soviet Union continued to main-in the biggest peacetime army in history. While e Western nations moved promptly to restore eedom and democracy to lands occupied during e war, the Soviet Union absorbed the nations Eastern Europe one by one. By 1948 Poland, ast Germany, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and zechoslovakia were all behind the Iron Curtain. he Soviet Union constantly pressed forward to pand its territory and power and finally tried take Berlin through the Berlin blockade—so oriously broken by the United States airlift.

Under these circumstances it was evident that e United Nations (in which the Soviet has a to) could not *alone* assure security and peace. ut the United Nations Charter had guaranteed s members the continued right of individual d collective self-defense, and the resolution oposed by Senator Arthur Vandenberg, and ssed by the Senate 64 to 4, became the corner-one of NATO. This resolution provided for ssociation of the United States, by constitutional ocess, with such regional and other collective rangements as are based on continuous and fective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect s national security."

Twelve nations signed the treaty at Washington—twelve nations diverse in size and in language but sharing the long cultural background of Western civilization and bound together in a fierce determination to withstand aggression and preserve the peace. These twelve nations were, alphabetically, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In 1952 they were joined by Turkey and Greece and, in 1955, by the West German Federal Republic.

As the first and only woman delegate to NATO from any country, I have found it a stirring experience to be associated with what Lord Ismay, Secretary General of NATO, has described as "the most challenging and constructive experiment in international relations that has ever been attempted." Peace is NATO's overriding objective. NATO seeks to prevent aggression through the maintenance of strength and unity on the part of the free world.

Field Marshal Montgomery, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, says that "as a regional pact within the United Nations Organization, NATO is the most effective organization in the world today. The strengthening of NATO on both the political and military side is all-important." He also quotes Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, as saying that peace in the

• *Mrs. Howard, author of the above article, is Special Adviser to the Federal Civil Defense Administrator and Permanent Alternate U.S. Delegate to the NATO Civil Defense Committee. This article is based on a series of recent addresses by Mrs. Howard.*

modern world cannot be assured without military power, and that military strength is necessary not only to resist aggression if we are attacked but also to give our political leaders a firm basis on which to bridge the gap between the East and the West. We all know how desperately the Soviets tried to dynamite NATO and wean Germany away from NATO at the Geneva conference.

The accession of Germany as the 15th member of NATO was a great triumph for the Western democracies. I was in Germany in October and in Paris in November of 1954, at the time the London and Paris Agreements were being made. In fact, the United States NATO Civil Defense Delegates—Federal Civil Defense Administrator Val Peterson and I—were the first to welcome the Germans into the family of nations at an official reception. They are valuable allies and have much to offer to NATO on both the military and civilian sides.

Unity and Strength

How does NATO preserve the peace? By unity and strength. The NATO treaty in article 5 provides that an armed attack against one is an attack upon all. That means that no potential enemy in the future can devour his victims one by one.

Under article 3 of the treaty, the nations agree to develop their individual and collective capacity to resist aggression. And so to the collective forces, first under General Eisenhower, then General Ridgway, and now General Gruenther, the United States contributes 6 divisions, Great Britain 4 divisions, and West Germany will contribute 12 divisions.

It has been natural to give primary emphasis to military strength, but do not think for a moment that NATO is purely a military alliance. If it were, there certainly would be no place in it for me! One prays that the day will come when it is no longer necessary to spend vast sums on unproductive things—like tanks and guns. Under article 2, the signatories pledge themselves to promote cooperation between each other in social, cultural, economic, and political fields. And the NATO treaty proclaims as its first objective the determination of the member governments to "safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law."

North Atlantic Council

As part of this pattern of the rule of law, th governing body of NATO is civilian. Many yea ago Clemenceau said as a wisecrack, "War is muc too important to be entrusted to the military, and we might add—peace even more so. In NAT where peace, through the twin instruments c strength and unity, is the goal, the top governin body is the North Atlantic Council, composed c the Secretaries of State or Foreign Ministers c the member countries. They constitute a sort c North Atlantic cabinet for NATO affairs. It is council of governments, not individuals. It ha no authority independent of national governmen and can reach decisions only if all the gover ments agree. Therefore, it is clear that NATO do not affect the sovereignty of the United States c any other government.

Naturally, Secretaries of State and Foreig Ministers have important business at home an cannot be in Paris all the time, but the work c the alliance has to go on. Therefore, each counti has a permanent representative in Paris with th rank of ambassador. Our representative is An bassador George W. Perkins, former Assista Secretary of State. The countries take turns i alphabetical order in chairing the foreign mi isters' meetings, but Lord Ismay is the permane Vice Chairman of the North Atlantic Counc and the Secretary General of NATO. He is a sisted by an international staff, composed of me and women from all 15 nations.

Military Committee

Another important unit in the organization setup is the Military Committee, on which ea member nation is represented at the Chief of Sta level. This group plans the broad military pc icies of NATO. The task of giving regular gui ance and direction to NATO's operating milita agencies has been given to the Standing Grou which consists of one member from France, o from the United Kingdom, and one from t United States. This group helps direct the oper tion of NATO's Supreme Commands, includi SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powe Europe].

And, speaking of the Standing Group—o morning last fall when I was in Paris, Sir Jo Hodsoll, the Senior Civil Defense Adviser NATO, telephoned me and said: "I've arrang

r you to meet Lord Ismay this afternoon. I ought I'd tell you in advance so that you can ear your prettiest hat." And so I met the Secretary General for the first time. He has tremendous warmth, strength, and personality. A eat friend of Winston Churchill's, he seems to ve many of the same qualities. He quoted Winon Churchill as saying to him when he went bid Churchill goodbye before leaving London r Paris and NATO: "I hope you won't find it cessary to put Britain absolutely last on every ssible occasion!"

Lord Ismay has the quality of putting you at ur ease and drawing you out, so that I found yself telling him a great deal about my impresons of Germany and the reactions of the people ere to German rearmament and the adherence Germany to NATO. When my 15 minutes were , his secretary came in and I rose to leave. Don't go," he said, "I want to talk to you a little nger." His secretary looked troubled. "It's ly the military," he said. "In civil defense," I plied, "we usually have to stand aside for the ilitary." Ten minutes later when I emerged with r John Hodsoll into the outer office, it was filled th the generals who compose the Standing roup, and I gasped.

Let us return to the civilian side of the NATO ornization. In addition to the Civil Defense Comittee, there is a Medical Committee, a Refugees d Evacuees Committee, a Planning Board for cean Shipping, a Petroleum Planning Board, d several others. A recent important development on the civilian side has been the establishent of the Senior Civil Emergency Planning ommittee, which is on the same level as the Miliry Committee and which coordinates the work all the civilian committees.

vil Defense

It was natural that, when NATO was first ornized, emphasis was on a unified command of nd, sea, and air forces. With the great progress ade under the Supreme Commanders, and with e advent of thermonuclear warfare and the owing realization that, in coming wars, cities d people will be the targets, there is increased phasis on the civilian side of NATO. No army n fight if the home front is gone. No factories n produce the sinews of war if the factories and e people who work in them are gone. No war can be won if the people's morale is broken.

I was told in one European country that after severe bombing the people said to their government, "Give up—give up—we can take no more"; whereas in England, where more bombing was absorbed, the nation survived because of the indomitable courage of all the people from Winston Churchill to the newsboy on the corner. And whereas Winston Churchill's courage sustained the whole free world, civil defense helped sustain the newsboy on the corner and others like him.

And so there is increasing importance attached to the civilian side of NATO. All civilian committees have been asked to examine their work in view of thermonuclear warfare, and I am pleased to hear from many quarters that the Civil Defense Committee is outstanding in the scope and grasp of its work.

Lord Ismay told me that, when he first reported to NATO, he called on General Eisenhower, who said to him: "I wish you'd get something going on civil defense." Consequently, the first Planning Committee for Civil Defense met at Paris in February 1953, just before I joined the Federal Civil Defense Administration. Another meeting was held in November of that year which I attended, as I have all subsequent meetings, as Alternate United States Delegate when Governor Peterson, the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, attends, or as Chief United States Delegate in his absence.

Much preparation is necessary. One must be thoroughly familiar with all aspects of civil defense, as well as with the contents of the NATO documents under discussion. Most NATO documents are classified "secret" and can only be studied in one's office or at the United States Mission in Paris. Before leaving the country, one is given a security clearance marked "cosmic" and promises never to leave NATO documents in a hotel room or to discuss NATO affairs in a public place.

In the beginning, the Civil Defense Committee worked largely on World War II concepts of how to deal with fire, rescue, etc., in a war waged with conventional bombs. Great Britain's heroic and valiant work was the model, and we owe her a tremendous debt of gratitude. With the development of atomic and hydrogen weapons, the scope of the Committee's work has broadened to cover all aspects of saving life and property and maintaining morale and the will and the means to survive and win under conditions of total warfare. The United States has willingly shared, within

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security limits, all her knowledge and know-how with the other NATO nations.

The Civil Defense Committee is composed of the heads of civil defense in all the NATO countries—General Worthington of Canada, General Erwin of Great Britain, the head of Civil Defense in Norway, etc.

All Decisions Unanimous

Unity is a keynote of NATO, for all decisions must be unanimous. Think what that means when dealing with countries as diverse as the United States and Luxembourg, or Norway, Iceland, and Turkey. And yet in both the Council and the Civil Defense Committee decisions are made, and the last word is, "It is agreed," for all decisions must be unanimous. NATO is not a supranational power. No country or group of countries, however powerful, can tell any country, however small, that it must do this or must do that.

It is a useful and heartwarming exercise in international relations to have full and free discussion and then to hear these words, "It is agreed."

What, then, has NATO accomplished?

First of all, NATO has helped to prevent war. Secretary Dulles has said that this is due in large part to the strength and unity of the Atlantic peoples.

Secondly, NATO has helped to protect free Europe against Communist aggression, and we in the United States realize that the enslavement of free Europe would give the Soviets the means to attain industrial and scientific superiority over our own country. It is significant that the Communists have not gained any new territory in Europe since NATO was formed. NATO has supplemented our national defense system, for the protection we get from our own armed forces is increased by allied forces of even greater size, and we and our allies have worked together in constructing joint air bases to be used for rapid and effective retaliation in case of attack.

Third, between the NATO countries there has been a great increase in cooperation, in mutual sympathy and understanding, and in willingness to help each other. Things are agreed and done today that would never have been thought possible 5 or even 3 years ago.

I would like to conclude with a quotation from General Eisenhower, who said:

"NATO symbolizes the unity of free men in a age of peril. Fourteen [now fifteen] nation diverse in language and economy and custom ar political structure, are joined within it becau each nation is determined to sustain its own ind pendence. Dedicated to a common purpose, the strength is multiplied, their inexhaustible energi are pooled.

"During my service with NATO there were ma uniforms worn, many tongues spoken at my hea quarters. But daily I found new inspiration the unity of spirit among my comrades.

"The inspiration remains with me; a cherish memory, a heartening proof that free men, unite can face any peril unafraid. NATO is visible ev dence that, in cooperation among the free people we can best preserve our common heritage of fre dom against any threat."

Negotiations With Netherlands for Air Transport Agreement

Press release 94 dated February 24

The Department of State announced on Febr ary 24 that arrangements have been made betwe the United States and the Netherlands for t initiation in Washington on April 5, 1956, of n gotiations concerning an air transport agreeme between the two countries.

New Certificate Forms for Strategic Imports

A new, improved import certificate form now available to U.S. importers of strategic goods, t Bureau of Foreign Commerce, U.S. Departme of Commerce, announced on February 9.

The new form, FC–826, has been revised reduce paperwork for U.S. importers by incorp rating certain statements which formerly had be entered separately. A French translation al is included to make it easier for foreign gover ments to use the certificate.

Use of the revised form will become mandato on March 10, 1956. It is available at all Depa ment of Commerce field offices and from t Bureau of Foreign Commerce in Washington.

U.S. import certificates are used in the Imp Certificate-Delivery Verification (IC/DV) p cedure which became mandatory in October 19 It is operated by the United States in cooperati

th 15 other countries to prevent transshipment strategic goods.

Under this procedure, the U.S. or foreign im-rter certifies to his government that the ategic goods he wishes to import will not be reexported without official authorization. The importer's government then issues an import certificate which the importer must transmit to his foreign exporter in support of the export license application.

dustrial Progress in Spain

by John Lodge
Ambassador to Spain[1]

Today I would like to talk about some of my pressions of the state of the Spanish economy—pressions, believe me, of a sympathetic observer o is interested in learning all he can about your ntry, your people, and how you work. I think is particularly appropriate to talk at this time out the Spanish economy, for the Spanish mili-y effort—the world position of Spain—rests on Spain's economic strength.

I have had the privilege to be in your country more than 10 months now, and I have visited ny parts of Spain and talked to thousands of ur citizens. As a result of these visits and these ociations, I have formed a number of impres-ns. Five weeks in the United States put me in ch once more with some of our own problems, d my return to Spain has given me the oppor-ity to evaluate my earlier impressions of your nomic situation. Then too the advent of a w year is always a time for stocktaking. And it seemed to me appropriate to make those im-ssions the theme for my talk today.

Before going any further, however, I think I uld change the emphasis in the description I ve used of myself as a "sympathetic observer." tually, I could have used a considerably stronger m to describe my interest and the interest in country in Spain. Since the signature of the anish-American agreements of September 1953,[2] have been partners. We are much more than sympathetic—the United States has an important stake in a vigorous and expanding economy in Spain, and we are glad to be in a position to cooperate with our Spanish friends in the realization of that objective.

One of the strongest impressions I have gained of Spain is that her people are industrious and that they possess the will to improve their economic status. I have seen many examples of this and of the ingenuity and determination of the Spanish worker, who can make the best of situations despite lack of adequate resources and the most modern equipment. It is precisely these qualities which enabled Spain to recover from the ravages of the Civil War to the extent that she did even prior to 1953. Since then the tempo has greatly increased. Those advances are recognized both inside and outside of Spain, and this considerable achievement under great handicaps has gained for Spain many admirers abroad.

Furthermore, there is a shortage of the equipment which would permit Spanish workers to expand the production of those goods needed to raise the standard of living. Part of these shortages stem from the physical destruction which took place during the Civil War, while others reflect a shortage of foreign exchange to purchase modern machinery which is obtainable only from a few foreign sources. With the gradual acquisition of proper equipment, production is being significantly expanded in a number of sectors of the Spanish economy where deficiencies now exist. The solid progress which has recently been made in these areas is encouraging to the friends of

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Address made before the American Chamber of Com-ce at Seville on Jan. 26.

BULLETIN of Oct. 5, 1953, p. 435.

Spain. Members of the Embassy staff who have been in Spain as long as 3 or 4 years have repeatedly remarked to me about the vast improvements which have been made during the time that they have been here. We Americans are pleased to be participants in this effort.

Condition of Spanish Economy

I was glad to note in the press a few days ago statements by several ministers of the Spanish Government which confirmed some of our impressions of the condition of the Spanish economy. A study of these statements reveals the real advances which have been made during the past 5 to 10 years. Minister Planell's summary of the industrial progress made in 1955 pointed up the significant gains which were made in several key sectors of the economy, particularly electric power and steel production. These industries are fundamental to economic development, and Spanish Government programs have emphasized their expansion in order to support a higher level of economic activity in Spain. Nearly 35 percent of U.S. economic assistance available for capital equipment has been allocated to the Spanish electric power and steel industries. We are glad to note the progress which is being made in these important sectors of the economy. After recurring periods of electricity restrictions, which hold back production of all kinds of goods needed in the domestic economy, the increase of 16 percent in production of electricity in 1955 over 1954 is particularly gratifying.

With respect to an adequate supply of consumer goods on the domestic Spanish market, recent statements of Minister of Commerce Arburúa are especially significant. His comments also referred to imports to meet the need for these commodities as well as to provide items of capital equipment. The Minister stressed the fact that the value of imports in 1955 had risen to a new high. This expansion in the volume of imports is, of course, encouraging. The capacity to pay in foreign exchange for this greater amount of imported goods is largely due, of course, to expanded production in Spain and increasing sales abroad. It also reflects Spain's rise as one of the key tourist centers in Europe. I am informed that last year more than a quarter of a million Americans visited Spain, as compared to 4,500 visitors in 1947.

The beauties, the traditions, the hospitality and the charm of Spain, and the warm friendliness o the Spanish people have proved to be great attrac tions for thousands of my compatriots. They tel their friends in the United States about their in teresting and pleasant sojourn in this fascinatin country, and they return themselves.

A portion of the goods imported into Spain las year was financed through the Spanish-America economic programs. Some of the commodities be ing imported under these programs are consume goods or raw materials which immediately ente the Spanish market. Primary examples are cotto and vegetable oil, the major portion of which i made available to Spain in exchange for pesetas part of which we loan to the Spanish Government There is, therefore, a very direct American interes in this phase of our economic programs, which a the same time provides a means for supplementin the supplies of these commodities available in th Spanish market without requiring the expenditur of any foreign exchange.

U.S. Financing of Capital Equipment

However, a large portion of the economi assistance which the United States is providin to the Spanish economy is not felt immediately as it is in the case of consumer goods or ra materials. It is, I think, important to recogniz this. Much of our program is designed to financ the procurement of capital equipment which gen erally takes a comparatively long time to buil and deliver, and a longer time to begin the pro duction of consumer goods. For example, a blas furnace for a steel mill will, when installed, ad to the availability of steel products in the economy but the timelag between the funds and the pro duction of finished steel products may be as lon as 3 years. We are also cooperating to provid other types of assistance the effects of which ar not readily apparent, as in the case of an item suc as a tractor. We are, for instance, glad to be abl to contribute rails and ties for the reconstructio of the RENFE lines between Seville and Madri and between Seville and Cádiz. This will pro vide faster, safer, and more economical trave between these points.

With respect to the immediate future, Ministe Arburúa stated in his interview that he expecte increased availabilities of goods in the domesti market. I can assure you that we in the Embass are tremendously interested in helping the Min ister to bring this about. Officials of our ecc

omic mission are currently discussing with Minister Arburúa and his associates the final details of the American economic programs for Spain for the current fiscal year. The economic aid projects are directed particularly to those sectors of the economy where additional support is needed. I consider it especially notable that we are negotiating a program for the sale of American surplus agricultural commodities in Spain this year totaling more than $92 million, greater even than last year's agricultural commodity program.

It is only logical that you members of the Spanish-American Chamber of Commerce in Seville should be interested in the effect of the United States programs in this particular area. I have already mentioned the project for the reconstruction of the railway lines connecting Seville with Madrid and Cádiz. Reconstruction work is also being undertaken on the highways to those two cities, using machinery brought to Spain under the economic assistance program. Other economic projects include supplying equipment to increase production in certain sectors of the industry and agriculture of the region.

Air Base Construction Program

However, the aspect of the new relationship between our two countries which is most evident in this area is the military base construction program. Three bases for joint Spanish–U.S. use are now being built near Seville—one at San Pablo airport, one at Morón de la Frontera, and a naval base at Rota. This program has brought a number of Americans far from their homes to this part of Spain to work on these projects which are so vital to the security and safety of the entire Western World. I cannot stress too strongly the importance of this program. When the construction of the bases is completed, the places of the civilian technicians will be taken by members of our air and naval forces in the three areas named. They will be Americans from all parts of the United States, and I am confident that you will give them a warm welcome. If any problems do arise, I can assure you that our citizens will have foremost in mind the importance to our very existence of our common effort and that solutions will be found in the spirit of good will and mutual understanding which exists between our two peoples.

There will, of course, be some very positive effects of our joint military programs in this area, in addition to the economic assistance projects which I have already mentioned. The Americans who will be among you will provide a new market for local products. This will benefit the producers, the artisans, and the tradesmen. In addition, the construction work on the bases is providing employment to a considerable number of persons, and there will be a need for many Spanish workers on the bases when they are completed.

In more general terms, trade between Spain and the United States is expanding. But a good deal more can be done to increase Spain's dollar earnings by selling to us.

In conclusion, the economic prospects for the Seville area and for other parts of Spain seem to me encouraging. The hard work of past years is paying off with the increase in the production of the fields, new factories, and modernization of industrial plants. The result will be more consumer goods.

An improvement in Spain's economy will be also in the interest of my country. We want Spain to be strong economically. In the tense international situation that exists today, the nations of the Western World must be unified against a common danger. In this unity they must base their defense on economic as well as military strength.

Spain thoroughly understands the true nature of this danger—international communism with its aggressive designs. We Americans know this, and we know that we can rely upon the courage and honor of Spain in the defense of Western civilization. We welcome, therefore, and support Spain's undertaking of increasing responsibilities in the field of international diplomacy. We rejoice over Spain's entry into the United Nations, and we look forward to an ever-increasing friendship between our two peoples.

U.S. Economic Aid to Thailand

The International Cooperation Administration announced on February 6 that thus far this fiscal year it has approved projects in Thailand totaling $33.3 million to help that country achieve economic and political stability and maintain its security. Two other major projects, involving U.S. ex-

penditures of about $1 million, have been suggested by Thailand and are under consideration.

The approved projects include $4.8 million for technical cooperation, which provides specialized training to improve the professional and technical capacity of the Thais, and $28.5 million for defense support, which is aimed essentially at expanding the economic base and improving the defense posture of Thailand.

In addition, the Department of Defense administers an undisclosed amount of military aid—weapons and supplies—from mutual security funds.

The level of ICA-administered assistance to Thailand is about the same as last year, except for the fact that this year all direct-forces support is being handled by the Department of Defense. Last year ICA provided $12.2 million worth of commodities and contract services to Thailand's armed forces as direct-forces support.

Ten million dollars of the ICA funds this year is being provided to Thailand on a loan basis.

Thailand occupies the heartland of Southeast Asia and is in a strategic position in the free-world struggle against communism. It has been improving its defensive capabilities since the signing of the Geneva accords and the partitioning of Viet-Nam. U.S. aid was substantially increased last year after Thailand's economic situation had seriously deteriorated, leaving the country without adequate resources to properly support its defense budget, which had more than doubled since 1950.

Nonmilitary aid from 1951 through fiscal 1955 amounted to $70 million, and this year's program will bring the cumulative total to over $103 million.

Leadership in Southeast Asia

Thailand has assumed increased international responsibilities under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, and its leadership among neighboring countries has demonstrated its key role in the development of greater regional solidarity. About three-fourths the size of Texas, it is a constitutional monarchy with about 20 million population. Thailand's orientation to the free world has been evidenced by its participation in the United Nations action in Korea, by its charter membership in the SEATO treaty, and by its cooperation with the free world in opposition to communism in other specific ways.

The Mutual Security Program objectives support the overall U.S. objective of strengthening Thailand's position as a center of non-Communist influence in Southeast Asia and a bulwark against further Communist expansion in the area.

The projects approved for financing under this year's aid program are intended to improve public administration, especially fiscal management; expand transportation and communications facilities; provide budgetary support for Thai defense forces; expand and diversify agricultural production and the economic base of the country generally; improve essential government services to the people; and promote increased solidarity within mainland Southeast Asia by joint planning and execution of projects of mutual interest.

Highway Improvement

The defense-support portion of the program includes the improvement of key parts of Thailand's road network to increase the mobility of defense forces and facilitate economic development. Another transportation project will assist in the completion of the engineering and construction of a new strategic highway between Saraburi, near Bangkok, and Korat, principal city in the underdeveloped northeast. Total cost of the road is to be about $22 million, of which about $13 million has now been provided by ICA.

The 200-mile road is a key to the economic development of the potentially rich but now backward northeast region. It will strengthen the economic and social ties of the northeast with the Bangkok area, bringing about more export of produce from the northeast and enabling that area to import other needed goods to improve the standard of living of the people. Lack of communication has been a great factor in the backwardness of this part of the country.

New roadbuilding equipment sent to Thailand for the job will be turned over to the Thai highway department upon completion of the highway to make possible a much-needed expansion of the whole northeastern road network, of which the northeast road will be the central trunk.

Upon completion of the road, Thai private capital is expected to begin to flow into the northeast to stimulate economic development. New land may be opened to agriculture, new small industries may be launched, and a trend away from the present one-crop rice economy is expected.

The highway project will serve as a dramatic emonstration to the people of that area of the iterest held by the Thai Government and the 'nited States in their welfare and as an example f U.S. proficiency in peaceful pursuits. Special .S. assistance has been channeled into northeast 'hailand in the last 2 years to help improve liv- ıg conditions as rapidly as possible in the face of ıcreasing Communist pressures and propaganda ctivity.

Other projects, such as the improvement of eronautical ground services and meteorological ervices, are intended essentially to meet the needs f the Thai Air Force, which has been equipped rgely through the U.S. Mutual Defense Assist- ıce Program. Commercial aviation operating ı Southeast Asia also will benefit from these rojects.

Approximately one-third of the $28.5 million efense-support funds will be used to generate cal currency to help finance construction of ilitary and naval training facilities and for ther military activities. This local currency is btained through the sale in Thailand of Ica- nanced imports from the United States and else- here.

Assistance to the Thai State Railway is not ıcluded in this year's program because the rail xtension project undertaken last year has been ompleted and a recent World Bank loan is ex- ected to satisfy the more critical and immediate eeds of the railway. The railway's military- ıpport potential is being increased also by the rrival of special types of rolling stock and tele- ommunications equipment which were ordered nder last year's program.

A new project in automotive maintenance has een approved to help Thailand realize maximum enefit from the motor vehicles which are now vailable in the country. The vehicle mainte- ance project is a logical supplement to the ighway construction activities being undertaken ı the program.

Other defense-support projects include a tank rrigation and water conservation program and a ıalaria control program. U.S. aid in combat- ıg malaria has helped the Thai Government to ıake rapid progress against the disease thus far, nd it is expected that this year's program will rovide one of the final steps in countrywide ontrol of the disease, once Thailand's number-one iller.

Diversification of the Economy

Because the improvement of Thailand's predominantly agricultural economy is largely contingent on diversification, attention is being given to activities in industry and mining, and efforts are being made to stimulate the expansion and improvement of small- and medium-size industries through advisory services, improvement of basic facilities such as power and transportation, market surveys, and other means of attracting the participation of private industry. Although aid for this general purpose is expected to remain relatively small, it is felt to be an important part of the program and it is hoped that the aid will act as a strong catalytic force in stimulating the development of industry by private investment.

The improvement of Thailand's public administration practices is of primary importance, serving to encourage the Thais to utilize their own resources more effectively and lessen their need for external assistance.

Of the $4.8 million provided for technical cooperation, about a third will be used to aid Thailand's program for the improvement of educational activities. Primarily through the provision of contractual and other technical services, as well as the supplying of specialized equipment, the current program includes projects to improve technical education in the Bangkok Technical Institute and in trade schools throughout Thailand; to train elementary and secondary school teachers; to improve facilities for the training of physicians, nurses, and public health officers; to establish training and demonstration centers for mechanics; and to up-grade agricultural education. In all, 25 percent, or $1.2 million, of the technical cooperation funds is for the training of Thais in the United States.

Some of the technical cooperation funds are for the continuance of Ica-financed contracts which have sent faculty members from the Universities of Indiana and Texas and from Oregon State College to Thailand on 3-year assignments to work with Thai institutions in the fields of teacher training, engineering education, and agricultural education.

A small amount has been programed for a new project to provide training and consulting services in connection with peaceful uses of atomic energy.

Many examples of progress resulting from joint Thai–U.S. efforts are now available. The first

phase of a project to modernize budgetary procedures and improve fiscal management throughout the government has been completed, and a contract is under negotiation to launch the second phase of fiscal management improvement. Thailand's revenue collection, especially customs, has been improved, and more progress in the fiscal field is expected to increase the availability of domestic financial resources for productive economic undertakings and for support of the defense effort.

A factfinding reconnaissance survey of the Mekong River is being undertaken with ICA aid by Thailand in conjunction with Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam to determine the potentialities for development of navigation, irrigation, hydroelectric power development, and flood control.[1] The possibilities for immediate low-cost projects on segments of the river to bring immediate benefits to the people of the area will be shown, as well as recommendations for a series of long-range studies necessary for proper development of the river.

The Thai Railway has been extended for 30 miles to link Udorn and Nongkai, and important segments of the highway network are being rebuilt. The railroad extension, financed jointly by the Thai Government and the United States with an ICA contribution of $4 million, is of especial importance to land-locked Laos; it will permit greatly increased trade at substantially lower transportation costs than have prevailed heretofore.

Economic development will benefit substantially from improved transportation, the lack of which has been a major deterrent to economic growth and progress.

Accomplishments in Agriculture

Increasing accomplishments are being reported in agriculture, especially in the area of agricultural diversification. The livestock improvement effort is moving ahead rapidly with the use of about 400 head of cattle and hogs which have been imported for use as breeding stock. Disease control facilities are having an increasing effect on the health and productivity of local livestock. Experiments and demonstrations on the production of forage crops have indicated that corn production, the storage of grain sorghum silage, and the production of improved grasses are quite feasible in Thailand in support of livestock productio

Yellow dent corn seed has been propagated su cessfully in the northeast, and field demonstratio have proven its adaptability. Enough prov corn seed has become available during the la harvest season to supply most farmers in Nort east Thailand.

Puerto Rican sweet potatoes introduced by t U.S. technical cooperation program into Northe Burma, have been transplanted into Northe Thailand. Stock is now being made available fr distribution to farmers in areas surrounding fi different experimental stations. This new swe potato produces twice the quantity of potatoes the native variety and is of higher quality. t has a shorter growing period and is better lik by both the Thai people and the local livesto

Essential government services to the people ha been improved in many ways. Spraying of hous with DDT under the government health servi has been under way since 1951, but last year one the final major operations was undertaken with t objective of extending protection to all malario areas in Thailand, areas containing 10 milli people. The homes of about 7 million people h previously been sprayed. After 3 successive yea of housespraying, malaria has been eliminated a number of areas.

$26.4 Million Allotted to Pakistan in Mutual Security Funds

Allotment of an additional $26.4 million mutual security funds to Pakistan was announce on February 18 by the International Cooperatio Administration, bringing the total of U.S. ec nomic assistance to the country thus far from 19 fiscal year funds to $62.4 million. The new allo ment will be used to help Pakistan develop agr culture and natural resources, industry and mi ing, health and sanitation, and transportation.

Previously allotted this year was $6 million fo technical cooperation and $30 million to purchas such commodities as iron and steel, industrial m chinery, motor vehicles, nonferrous metals, an chemicals. Commodities are now moving int Pakistan at the rate of $1 million a week under commodity allotment of $40 million from 195 fiscal funds.

The largest single development to be aided b

[1] BULLETIN of Jan. 9, 1956, p. 52.

e new $26.4 million allotment is a multipurpose rth dam on the Karnafuli River in crowded ıst Pakistan, for which $8.4 million is being rmarked. This project, located 30 miles upream from the port of Chittagong on the Bay Bengal, is designed to raise the economic standds of the people of East Pakistan, which is out the size of the State of Alabama but has a pulation of more than 45 million—15 times that Alabama.

With an initial capacity of 80,000 kw., the dam ll be a source of cheap power for industrial d home use, improve flood control measures on e Karnafuli River, and provide water storage r irrigation. The project has been under conruction by the East Pakistan Government since 52. Total cost in all currencies is the equivalent $65 million. The U.S. contribution to date, cluding the new allotment, is about $12.6 million.

ew Procedures for Distribution Stable Isotopes

Simplified procedures for the domestic and reign distribution of stable (nonradioactive) otopes and rare earths produced by the U.S. tomic Energy Commission were announced on bruary 15 by Chairman Lewis L. Strauss.

Under the revised procedures neither domestic r foreign applicants will be required to file and tain Commission approval of applications bere purchasing the materials. Requests and purase orders will be handled directly between the er and the AEC facility supplying the materials. lectromagnetically concentrated stable isotopes ill be available for sale to domestic users; they ere previously available only on a loan basis. eports of results of experiments using the mateals will not be required from either U.S. or forgn applicants.

The export of deuterium or deuterium comounds to any country listed as a subgroup A Soviet bloc) country in section 371.3 of the comehensive Export Schedule of the U.S. Departent of Commerce is prohibited. Export of euterium or deuterium compounds to any other untry requires a special export license from the epartment of Commerce. Prior approval of the tomic Energy Commission must be obtained for sale of any other stable isotope to a person in a Soviet-bloc country.

The Commission will establish annual or special quotas of the total quantity of each item to be distributed and the maximum amount which will be available to any one person, firm, or institution without special Commission approval. Samples of rare and expensive items may be loaned, provided they will not be diluted or contaminated during use.

Sale prices and charges for loan of the materials will be established by the Commission. The Commission will distribute only those materials which are not available commercially, unless the requester certifies that the commercial product does not meet purity or quantity specifications required for his research.

Stable isotopes have had important applications in basic research in such fields as biology, medicine, chemistry, and metallurgy. Rare earths also are of research interest. Stable isotopes currently available for distribution include deuterium, helium–3, boron 10 and 11, oxygen 18, argon 38, and the electromagnetically concentrated isotopes of approximately 80 elements. The rare earths included in the distribution program are those in the lanthanide series: elements 58 to 71 inclusive. Other items may be added to the list as they become available.

Stable isotopes, except deuterium, are distributed by the Stable Isotopes Research and Production Division, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tenn. Under the revised procedures the Commission's Savannah River plant will sell deuterium oxide (heavy water) in bulk quantities to any domestic distributor. The minimum and maximum amounts that may be purchased are 200 and 400 pounds respectively. Inquiries should be sent to the Savannah River Operations Office, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Post Office Box A, Aiken, S. C.

Purchasers may resell deuterium oxide in the smaller quantities used for research and development. Previously, such quantities were distributed only by the Stuart Oxygen Company, San Francisco, Calif., under contract with the Commission.

Rare earth elements are available from the Commission's Ames Laboratory, Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa.

Calendar of Meetings [1]

Adjourned During February 1956

Inter-American Council of Jurists: 3d Meeting	México, D. F.	Jan. 17–Feb.
U.N. Economic Commission for the Far East: 12th Session	Bangalore (India)	Feb. 2–14
UNESCO Committee on International Exchange of Publications	Paris	Feb. 6–10
Pan American Highway Congresses: Technical Committee on Terminology.	Buenos Aires	Feb. 6–13
FAO Forestry and Forest Products Commission for Asia and Pacific: 1st Session of Subcommission on Teak.	Bangkok	Feb. 9–18
FAO Consultation on Imports of Livestock and Livestock Products	Paris	Feb. 13–17
Inter-American Travel Congresses: Technical Committee on Travel Promotion.	México, D. F.	Feb. 13–18
ICEM Executive Committee: 4th Session	Geneva	Feb. 14–18
ICAO Panel on Vertical Separation of Aircraft: 1st Meeting	Montreal	Feb. 14–22
U.N./WMO International Hurricane Seminar	Ciudad Trujillo (Dominican Republic).	Feb. 16–25
Philippine World Abaca Conference	Manila	Feb. 20–24
Pan American Highway Congresses: Technical Committee on Financing of the Pan American Highway.	Caracas	Feb. 20–27
ICEM Council: 4th Session	Geneva	Feb. 20–24
Inter-American Travel Congresses: Technical Committee on Travel Barriers.	Buenos Aires	Feb. 21–25
U.N. Ecosoc Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations	New York	Feb. 27–29
FAO Meeting on Desert Locust Control	Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)	Feb. 27–29

In Session as of February 29, 1956

North Pacific Fur Seal Conference	Washington	Nov. 28–
International Fair for Peace and Progress	Ciudad Trujillo (Dominican Republic).	Dec. 20–
U.N. Trusteeship Council: Standing Committee on Petitions	New York	Jan. 3–
GATT Contracting Parties: 1956 Tariff Negotiations	Geneva	Jan. 18–
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 17th Session	New York	Feb. 7–
ICAO Special North Atlantic Regional Air Navigation Meeting	Paris	Feb. 20–
U.N. International Wheat Conference: 2d Session	Geneva	Feb. 20–
U.N. Trusteeship Council: Standing Committee on Administrative Unions.	New York	Feb. 21–
International Atomic Energy Agency: Working Level Meeting on Draft Statute.	Washington	Feb. 27–
ILO Governing Body: 131st Session	Geneva	Feb. 27–
Inter-American Travel Congresses: 2d Meeting of Permanent Executive Committee.	Lima	Feb. 27–
International Telecommunication Union: Meeting of Chairmen of Seven CCIT and CCIF Study Groups.	Geneva	Feb. 29–

Scheduled March 1–May 31, 1956

ITU International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR): Study Group XI, Color Television Demonstrations.	New York	Mar. 5–
U.N. Ecosoc Commission on Human Rights: 12th Session	New York	Mar. 5–
SEATO Council	Karachi	Mar. 6–
U.N. ECAFE Subcommittee on Electric Power	New Delhi	Mar. 7–
Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences: 1st Meeting of Technical Advisory Council.	Turrialba (Costa Rica)	Mar. 8–
WMO Regional Association VI (Europe): 2d Session	Dubrovnik (Yugoslavia)	Mar. 12–
U.N. Ecosoc Commission on Status of Women: 10th Session	Geneva	Mar. 12–
UNICEF Executive Board and Program Committee	New York	Mar. 12–

[1] Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Feb. 23, 1956. Asterisks indicate tentative dates and place Following is a list of abbreviations: U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultur Organization; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migratio ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization; Ecosoc, Economic and Soci Council; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; ILO, International Labor Organization; CCIT, Internation Telegraphic Consultative Committee (Comité consultatif international télégraphique); CCIF, International Telepho Consultative Committee (Comité consultatif international téléphonique); ITU, International Telecommunication Unio SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; UNICEF, Unit Nations Children's Fund; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; OAS, Organization of American States; UPU, Univers Postal Union; SUNFED, Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development; UNREF, United Nations Refug Fund; CIGRE, Conference internationale des grands reseaux electriques; ECLA, Economic Commission for Latin Americ

ılendar of Meetings—*Continued*

ıeduled March 1–May 31, 1956—*Continued*

er-American Specialized Conference on the Conservation of the Resources of the Continental Shelf and Marine Waters.	Ciudad Trujillo (Dominican Republic).	Mar. 15–
. Ecafe Railway Subcommittee: 4th Session	New Delhi	Mar. 15–
International Wheat Rust Conference	México, D. F.	Mar. 18–
h International Congress of Agricultural and Food Industries	Santiago	Mar. 20–
International Congress of the Vineyard and Wine	Santiago	Mar. 21–
. Ece Coal Committee	Geneva	Mar. 21–
. Ece Timber Committee	Geneva	Mar. 26–
. Ecafe: 4th Regional Conference of Statisticians	Bangkok	Mar. 26–
International Radio Consultative Committee (Ccir): Study Group XI, Color Television Demonstrations.	Paris	Mar. 27–
. Scientific Committee on Radiation: 1st Meeting	New York	March
esco Conference of Experts on the Cultural Integration of Immigrants.	Caracas*	March
o: 3d Caribbean Regional Air Navigation Meeting	Ciudad Trujillo (Dominican Republic).	Apr. 3–
International Radio Consultative Committee (Ccir): Study Group XI, Color Television Demonstrations.	London	Apr. 3–
Petroleum Committee: 5th Session (reconvened)	Geneva	Apr. 4–
. Economic Commission for Europe: 11th Session	Geneva	Apr. 5–
ernational Instrumentation-Automation Exhibition	Oslo	Apr. 9–
esco Executive Board: 43d Session	Madrid	Apr. 9–
International Radio Consultative Committee (Ccir): Study Group XI, Color Television Demonstrations.	The Hague	Apr. 10–
esco Conference on Asian–U. S. Cultural Relations	United States	Apr. 10–
Inter-American Travel Congress	San José (Costa Rica)	Apr. 12–
. Ecosoc Statistical Commission: 9th Session	New York	Apr. 16–
o Executive Committee: 8th Session	Geneva	Apr. 17–
International Telegraphic Consultative Committee (Ccit): Study Group IV, Phototelegraphy and Facsimile.	London	Apr. 17–
. Economic and Social Council: 21st Session	New York	Apr. 17–
ernational Meeting of Technical Experts and Administrative Heads of Women's Labor Bureaus.	México, D. F.	Apr. 18–
Administrative Council: 11th Session	Geneva	Apr. 21–
th Pacific Commission: 3d Session of the Conference	Suva (Fiji)	Apr. 23–
International Telegraphic Consultative Committee (Ccit): Study Group V, Joint Ccit/Ccir Committee on Phototelegraphy.	London	Apr. 23–
. International Law Commission: 8th Session	Geneva	Apr. 23–
. Ecosoc Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 11th Session	Geneva	Apr. 23–
esco/Oas Regional Conference on Free and Compulsory Education in Latin America.	Lima	Apr. 23*–
o Eastern Caribbean Hurricane Committee of Regional Association IV (North and Central America): 4th Session.	Ciudad Trujillo (Dominican Republic).	Apr. 25–
er-American Port and Harbor Conference	San José (Costa Rica)	Apr. 25–
. Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories: 7th Session.	New York	Apr. 27–
International Philatelic Exhibition	New York	Apr. 28–
Coal Mines Committee: 6th Session	Istanbul	Apr. 30–
Executive and Liaison Committee	Bern	Apr. 30–
o Working Group on the International Geophysical Year 1957–58.	Geneva	April
er-American Cultural Council: 2d Meeting	Lima	May 3*–
er-American Ministers of Education: 2d Meeting	Lima	May 3*–
th Pacific Commission: 15th Session	Suva (Fiji)	May 4–
. Ecosoc Commission on International Commodity Trade: 3d Session.	New York	May 7–
. *Ad Hoc* Committee on Sunfed	New York	May 7–
ernational Cotton Advisory Committee: 15th Meeting	Washington	May 8–
Building, Civil Engineering, and Public Works Committee: 5th Session.	Geneva	May 14–
er-American Technical Cacao Committee: 6th Meeting	Salvador (Brazil)	May 20*–
American Highway Congresses: 2d Meeting of Permanent Executive Committee.	Washington	May 21–
. International Sugar Conference	New York	May 21*–
. Ecafe Working Party of Senior Geologists on the Preparation of a Regional Geological Map for Asia and the Far East: 2d Meeting.	Tokyo	May 22–
ıef Standing Program Subcommittee: 3d Session	Geneva	May 23–
ıef Executive Committee: 3d Session	Geneva	May 28–
Governing Body: 132d Session	Geneva	May 28–
ı International Conference on Large Electric High Tension Systems (Cigre).	Paris	May 30–
. Ecafe Subcommittee on Minerals Resources Development: 2d Meeting.	Tokyo	May 30–
ibbean Commission: 22d Meeting	Cayenne (French Guiana)	May
. Ecla Committee of the Whole	Santiago	May

The Economic Situation in Asia

Following are statements made at Bangalore, India, by U.S. representatives to the meetings of the U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) and of the Commission's Industry and Trade Committee.

ECAFE SURVEY OF ECONOMIC SITUATION [1]

The survey of the economic situation in Asia and the Far East,[2] prepared by the Secretariat, reached Washington in time to provide me with interesting reading material during the long plane trip out here. I have read the survey with keen interest, and on behalf of the Government of the United States wish to commend the Secretariat for the excellent piece of work it has turned out. The chapter "Post-War Economic Progress" is particularly searching in its analysis, and we agree with the conclusions reached.

I have one observation to make in connection with the survey which is offered by way of constructive criticism on a matter which unquestionably mars the otherwise general excellence of the report. The U.S. delegation believes the inclusion in the ECAFE annual survey of the section on Communist China is questionable since it is not possible to compare the verifiable achievements of the rest of the countries here represented with the unverifiable claims emanating from the Mainland. It may, therefore, result in an injustice to the other countries in the region who are putting forward facts and not propaganda. Despite the extensive efforts made by the Secretariat to present an objective report on the Mainland, I suspect it would be the first to admit the frustrations of such an attempt. Not only does it have to base its observations on secondary and unreliable sources, but by its very terms of reference a character it is prevented from pointing up cost to the Chinese people in human dignity a happiness involved in the alleged progress of country. As Dr. Lokanathan[3] pointed out y terday, this chapter presents the Secretariat w almost insurmountable difficulties of acquisit and analysis impossible of any scholarly solut and perhaps takes staff time out of all proport to its value.

Overall Increase in Output

It is gratifying to note that in 1955 output the countries of Asia and the Far East has creased overall, although there were conflicti economic movements during the year. On t one hand, cereal production in the 1954–55 c year was somewhat below the record crop 1953–54. On the other hand, there were increa in the production of other agricultural produ and of industrial goods, mineral output, and pow generation. Especially encouraging has been notable increase in the volume of foreign tra conditioned by growth of production in t ECAFE area, relaxation of trade and paymen restrictions, and generally improved econon conditions throughout the world.

We welcome the fact that food producti throughout the area generally increased, partic larly because better levels of nutrition are essent to economic development in all sectors of the ecc omy. Industrial production also has begun develop promisingly in some countries. At t beginning of the year, rice-exporting countr still found themselves in a difficult position, b toward the end of the year it became evident th rice-exporting countries were endeavoring to e pand exports through various measures, includi the adjustment of prices, and thereby were al to move much of the burdensome surplus whi

[1] Statement made on Feb. 4 by Howard P. Jones, chairman of the U.S. delegation to the 12th session of ECAFE (Feb. 2–14).

[2] *Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East, 1955* (available at U.N. sales offices; price, $2.50).

[3] P. S. Lokanathan, executive secretary of ECAFE.

rlier was a major problem. The continued velopment of irrigation facilities and the emasis on improving agricultural production techques throughout the area are encouraging idence of the tremendous progress that is being ade toward the solution of the basic problem of oviding adequate food for the increasing popuion of the Far East.

The U.S. recognizes the importance to most untries of the region of the production of priry commodities by doing all we can to maintain r purchases from this region at a high level. believe my colleagues here will agree that the cess of our efforts has made a positive contribun to the economic development of the region d to the stability of markets for these comdities.

As pointed out by M. De Seynes,[4] during 1955 world market price for natural rubber reached evel which enabled rubber-producing countries this region to increase their foreign exchange nings from rubber. There is little need to int out to this group the importance to these untries of the large volume of natural rubber rchased by the U.S. Of interest to you also the fact that the U.S. Government, during 55, sold all but one of the government-owned thetic rubber plants to private enterprises. is action will make it possible for the producers both kinds of rubber, synthetic and natural, reap the maximum benefits from the interplay the free market forces. Meanwhile, natural bber producers should continue their efforts to luce costs of production in order to compete ectively with synthetic rubber.

The world price of tin has maintained a relaely high level and has increased substantially recent months as a result of continued heavy mand, particularly from the U.S. Recognizg the situation as regards price and supply, the S. announced that it would not dispose of excess stocks under existing or expected conditions. e U.S. purchases of tin have served to strengthen world market by keeping tin surpluses at low els.

The continued progress in the ECAFE region vard the goal of economic development is enuraging. Indeed, there is evidence that in 1955 ogress toward the establishment of a broad se of essential output and services, such as power, transportation, fertilizer, cement, etc., may have been accelerated. Significant contributions have been made by foreign capital in the form of both private investment and intergovernmental or international grants and loans.

Living Standards Still Low

As the survey shows, however, the region has moved but a short distance toward solution of the problem of poverty. Despite gains of the last few years, living standards show no real advance over prewar levels. It would be too much to expect that these difficulties can be overcome between any two consecutive meetings of this Commission. As Mr. Nehru, the distinguished Prime Minister of India, has pointed out, it is generally recognized that the rate of savings and capital formation of the countries in the region is not commensurate with rates achieved by the industrialized countries of the West during the 19th and 20th centuries. The countries of the region must therefore give priority attention to the simultaneous mobilization of its human, natural, and financial resources to accelerate development. As most of the ECAFE countries are well aware, there are, in addition to the problem of mobilizing capital, a multiplicity of factors bearing on economic development, such as the problems of planning, developing, and identifying individual projects, of administration, and of reaching agreement on approaches and priorities.

We appreciate the generous mention of the U.S. bilateral aid programs in connection with the report's consideration of contributions of foreign governments. The survey refers to U.S. aid of $322 million to Colombo Plan countries during fiscal year 1955. Total U.S. aid to the ECAFE region in fiscal year 1955 is more than double that figure. The total 1955 obligations to Asian and ECAFE countries for economic aid and technical assistance amounted to $668 million. It seems unnecessary to take time here to review these programs, except to emphasize that in each country we are told they are contributing substantially to technical advance, economic progress, and general stability, thus directly assisting in the maintenance of the freedom and independence of these countries.

You will be interested to know, too, that President Eisenhower has asked for a continuation of these programs and assistance in the budget recently submitted to the U.S. Congress for the

[4] Philippe De Seynes, U.N. Under Secretary for Economic l Social Affairs.

forthcoming fiscal year.[5] He has recommended for economic and technical assistance a global total of $1.8 billion for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1957, of which the major portion is to go to the countries of the ECAFE region. This recommendation includes provision for our international programs to provide training in the peaceful uses of atomic energy and also the annual U.S. contribution to the Expanded Technical Assistance Program of the U.N. The President has also recommended greater flexibility in the use of funds under the program and amendment of the act so as to assure greater continuity in providing assistance for development projects and programs which require a period of years for planning and implementation. I think you all are familiar with the President's fund for Asian development of $100 million. This also is proposed to be continued in an effort to emphasize activities of benefit to the region in addition to individual countries.

There was some criticism last year of another aspect of our aid programs—that relating to the disposition of surplus commodities. We were glad to note that in the Industry and Trade Committee these criticisms were not repeated by the countries concerned and trust that the fears expressed last year have been somewhat allayed. I should like, however, to report briefly on developments since that time. First, my Government has adopted the policy that in the disposal of surpluses there will be no interference with normal markets and no sale to those countries which possess foreign exchange for purchases from their normal suppliers. Pursuant to this, my Government has conferred with the two great rice-producing countries, Burma and Thailand, when any program has been under consideration for disposal of our surplus rice. This policy has also been followed with respect to other commodities and the major producers of those commodities. These surpluses have, in brief, been distributed in such a manner as not to hurt our friends, while, at the same time, enabling other friends to feed hungry people and meet difficult and unexpected domestic shortages.

There is another substantial benefit to the surplus agricultural commodity—or P.L. 480 program as it is commonly referred to, from the number of the law which applies in the U.S. These surplus crops are sold for local currency as most of you here present know. It is then our po to loan most of the receipts at low interest ra and on a long-term basis for the purpose of e nomic development. Thus, countries participat in this program receive a double benefit without trust, harming in any way the primary suppli In this world of great human need, it would criminal not to use surpluses to help meet this ne We shall maintain our efforts to find ways to this without affecting adversely other prima producers.

These surpluses have also been used as outri gifts in situations of extreme emergency wl people were starving. As all of you know, have in recent years made available over 3 milli tons of relief food grains for Afghanistan, Ind and Pakistan. This is just one example the alleviation of human suffering through the fective utilization of our surplus commoditi Let me reiterate—our policy is to help our frien without hurting our other friends.

Role of Atomic Energy

We should also like to make a few comments atomic energy and its role in the economic develo ment of this region. The whole world has be stirred by the promise held out by the peaceful us of atomic energy. It is, of course, impossible know the full potentialities of this great for which we have mastered, nor can we foresee or es mate the profound changes which it will bring our lives. We do know, however, that atom energy's potential, in many fields closely alli to economic development, is great. In medic diagnosis and therapy, in agriculture, in biolog in industry, as well as in the field of power, atom energy can make an important contribution. W know that the interchange of information at t atomic energy conference held in Geneva last sun mer (and presided over by India's famed Dr. Hon Bhabha) will contribute greatly to the rapid a vance in the peaceful applications of atomic e ergy in the years ahead.

The President of the United States desires ou atoms-for-peace program to become one of the i struments for making widely available the grea benefits inherent in the application of atomic e ergy to the peaceful pursuits of man. At th recent Colombo Plan conference at Singapore, th U.S. Government proposed that a regional nu clear center be established and announced that th

[5] For excerpts, see BULLETIN of Jan. 30, 1956, p. 147.

S. would be prepared to contribute substantially ard such a center.[6]

n order to meet the need for training and ex-ience in this field, the U.S. has initiated a eefold program: (a) We are offering courses instruction in the U.S. to foreign students in lioisotope and reactor technology, as well as other atom-related fields; (b) we have assem-d extensive libraries of information about the m and furnished them to countries and univer-es all over the world, including one presented India last month; and (c) we have developed a gram of bilateral agreements with other coun-s to encourage and support the installation of earch reactors. Private American groups, ndations, and universities also provide know-v and assistance in various fields of scientific, hnical, industrial, and agricultural activities, l they have also advised governments in eco-nic planning and in administration.

Turning to the area of private foreign invest-nt, while private U.S. investment in this area s not been large, it must be recognized that here s an important source of external capital. The S. continues to seek measures, both within the S. and abroad, to encourage a greater flow of vate capital, and we are stepping up advisory vices to businessmen and informational pro-ms on the existing investment situation in the ntries of the region. The U.S. Congress re-tly authorized U.S. participation in the Inter-tional Finance Corporation. The U.S. signed Articles of Agreement of the Corporation on cember 5, 1955.[7]

Furthermore, we continue to encourage the ntries in the region to negotiate friendship, nmerce, and navigation and investment guar-ty agreements with the U.S.; and through other ans, such as participation in trade fairs, we are iving to bring about a mutuality of interest and king of commercial channels so vital to the en-ragement of interest by private capital in the AFE countries. The U.S. in many other ways tinues to promote measures to strengthen the nomy of the free world. The Trade Agree-nts Act has been extended. Negotiations for rther tariff reductions are at present taking ce, and customs procedures have been further plified. One of the major developments of the year relating to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was the accession to it of an important ECAFE country, Japan, bringing to 12 the total number of ECAFE members participating in the General Agreement.

It may be worth pointing out that the U.S. is the number-one customer of a number of the countries in the ECAFE region and a principal customer of all. This trade is conducted by the U.S. relying upon private competitive enterprise and principles of multilateralism. It therefore reflects the free choice of buyers and sellers without governmental constraint and without discrimination.

The U.S. Economic Situation

The U.S. has seen a prosperous 1955 and looks forward to a prosperous 1956. Production of goods and services has reached an annual rate of $390 billion or better.

A swift upsurge set in toward the close of 1954, as our economy became fully adjusted to the principles laid down by the President when he took office. Industry and trade switched to full peacetime operations and took on new momentum despite reduced military and general government spending.

In 1955, the rising trend carried through from quarter to quarter, beginning with a rapid expansion in the automobile and housing industries and broadening out into a sustained general advance. New high levels of production, employment, and income made the year the most prosperous the nation has ever enjoyed.

Many factors have contributed to the current expansion. Our population has grown and continues to grow; science, research, and technology open up new vistas; new distribution methods have been developed to match mass production; industry is plowing back large portions of its profits into business; and what is most important, our people are earning more than ever before. Our governmental policies have concentrated on building an economic environment that favors an orderly expansion of private activities. At the same time we have laid the groundwork for continued stability by building into our economic system appropriate safeguards to prevent any undue fluctuation. In an aura of intense business competition which creates better and better products for more people, the individual is allowed to harvest in freedom, security, and peace the fruits

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Ibid., Nov. 7, 1955, p. 747.
Ibid., Jan. 9, 1956, p. 54.

of his ideas and initiative. Our people are thus stimulated to achievements of moral and spiritual value within the the framework of the privileges and obligations of democracy. The social consequences of all this have been manifested in greater redistribution of income, increasing levels of income, and a constantly rising standard of living.

Organized labor has contributed to the general welfare of our Republic—a "unique contribution," according to the President—in the development of the American philosophy of labor, a philosophy encompassing the values of liberty, human dignity, opportunity, and equal rights and justice; recognizing that the economic future and interests of employers and employees are inseparably entwined in a mutual prosperity; and encompassing the concept of free collective bargaining between employers and unions without government's unwarranted interference. Within this framework, industrial maturity has developed as is demonstrated by our splendid record of labor peace and unparalleled prosperity.

Finally, I should like to express appreciation for the work of ECAFE and to say it is in such meetings as this that the future of Asia is being determined. A famous American, during a time of one of our greatest trials as a nation, said, "No nation can exist half slave and half free." I think this may be paraphrased to say that no world as small as ours has become can exist without an equalization of opportunity and improved standards of living for every individual, whether he be a Batak of the North Sumatra mountains or a worker in one of India's new factories. The human spirit is on the march, and, while its promise is bright, it takes the hard thinking that is going on in meetings like this to channel this spirit into effective realization of the goals which are sought.

REPLY TO SOVIET CHARGES [8]

As everyone here knows, we have our differences with our Russian colleagues. I regret, however, that the distinguished leader of the Russian delegation [P. A. Maletin] has in his remarks seen fit to bring some of those differences, which are basically political, before this body and to attack by implication virtually all the countries represented here. Mr. Chairman, the United States delegation did not come to Bangalore for the purpose of taking the time of this distinguished group in further discussing those differences or to use this forum as an arena in the cold war. We came rather with the intent to ignore political conflicts and concentrate on the economic problems of Asia with which this body was created to deal.

The Soviet delegation has, however, made certain statements to which the United States delegation must take exception.

The Soviet delegate has referred to pacts and blocs as increasing fear and tension and impelling countries of the region to divert resources for military purposes. I submit, Mr. Chairman, that the fear and unrest in the world has hardly been caused by a nation which peacefully withdrew its troops from South Korea in order to permit the Koreans to govern their own affairs, only to have an unwarranted attack launched upon an almost defenseless nation by the Communists after our withdrawal. This act of aggression was not only denounced by the United Nations, but U.N. forces are still in the field ready to repel a further invasion. Meanwhile, in both North Korea and North Viet-Nam, military buildup continues in violation of the terms of the armistice. On this subject the Russian delegate may retort that the U.S.S.R. is not involved in these matters. Mr. Chairman, international communism operates under one guise in one country and another guise in another country, but it is all part of the same global drive to enslave free peoples.

The Soviet Union talks of reduction in its own armed forces, but fails to mention that the U.S.S.R. and Communist China continue to maintain the largest armies in the world. The United States has for decades stressed the reduction of military expenditures in order to divert the resources to peaceful constructive uses and has proposed practical disarmament plans with adequate supervision which would insure that no action would take place contrary to words. I refer to our President's "open skies" plan, which the Soviet Union has rejected. The U.S.S.R. stands practically alone in opposing every other proposal for disarmament made by the Disarmament Commission of the U.N.

The reference to monopoly by the Soviet delegate is a strange one if intended to apply to the United States. There is no country in the world where the principle of free enterprise and open

[8] Statement made by Mr. Jones on Feb. 7.

ompetition has been so jealously guarded. On ie contrary, there is no country in the world here the entire government has been turned into giant monopoly as in the Soviet Union. The entacles of this monopoly are reaching into many ountries of the world, and trade with these mo-opolies forces in turn the creation of other mo-opolies. The pattern set by the Soviet Union is eing slavishly followed in Communist China and ie satellite countries. Under this pattern, the .S.S.R. is able, as experience has shown, to change s trade position from one day to the next, to stop eliveries whenever it pleases, and in general to anipulate trade with a view to bringing their ading partners under Soviet control.

The Soviet delegate has referred somewhat ightingly to the aid received by the countries f Asia from the U.S. All I have to say on this ibject, Mr. Chairman, is that imitation is the ncerest form of flattery and that the sudden in-rest of the Soviet Union in rendering technical ssistance and economic aid of itself testifies to the fectiveness of these programs. The U.S. stands n the record to which I referred the other day: lore than $600 million of aid during 1955 has been nneled from the American taxpayers by the U.S. overnment to members of ECAFE and an even reater amount is being considered for the forth-oming year. This aid has been given in full ecognition of the sovereignty of the recipients nd, as their earlier testimony indicates, has been elcomed by them. In India alone, excluding ommercial transactions, which have been on an xtensive scale, the aid of the U.S. has been nearly alf a billion dollars and, of this total, more than alf has been in the form of grants.

The Russian delegate has referred to the indus-rial buildup of Red China. This is a balloon hich should be pricked. From all sides we hear f the tremendous accomplishments of this region this field. ECAFE's own economic survey of sia and the Far East, which we are presently scussing, in table 11 on page 20 shows the indus-rial production of various Asian countries from 953 to 1955. The table shows, Mr. Chairman, at the percentage increase over the previous year or Mainland China was the smallest recorded for ny of the countries listed. The table shows fur-ermore that the rate of increase in industrial roduction in Communist China has declined from 1.4 percent in 1953 to 16.7 percent in 1954, and 5.4 percent in 1955. This is based on their own figures. It is interesting to note, for example, that India's rate of increase in industrial production over the previous year was nearly 50 percent greater than that of Communist China.

The Soviet delegate has attacked the economic policies of certain powers who, he says, are "trying to hamper the development of an independent national economy" in countries of the ECAFE region. He then went on to make special mention of India's development of irrigation projects and said this was a "demonstration of the Indian people's firm desire to go forward along the path of consolidation of their full economic independence." Using the very field of development cited by the Soviet delegate as a good example of how India is advancing, it is interesting to note that the U.S.S.R., despite all its platitudes, has not provided aid to India in this field, whereas the U.S. has been helping India in this field in a major way almost since the date of its independence. Many Indian technicians have been given training in this field in the United States; many American technicians are and have been working in India's Central Water and Power Commission on the design of irrigation projects and in the field of river valley development, tube well, and other water development projects; and more than $50 million has been made available under the U.S. aid program alone to purchase construction equipment and materials needed for these projects.

The Soviet delegate also announced that it was ready to provide about 50 scholarships in its universities and technical institutions for students from the countries of the ECAFE region. It is interesting to note that in the booklet issued by the Government of India on the occasion of this session of ECAFE it is stated that more than 3,000 training awards have already been provided by the U.S. during the 4½-year period ending in 1955 to the countries in the Southeast Asian region. On the basis of these examples selected by the Soviet delegate, may I suggest that the action of the United States speaks much louder than the words of the U.S.S.R.

Mr. Chairman, I do not wish to prolong discussion, but I should like to reiterate that the aims of the Government of the United States as expressed in its bilateral aid programs and through the medium of the Colombo Plan are to promote sound economic development and expansion of trade on a multilateral basis to the end that the countries

of Asia which still possess freedom and independence may continue to maintain them.

In conclusion, I should like simply to raise two questions. The Soviets are apparently urging the countries of Asia to give up their defenses—why? The Soviets are urging the countries of Asia to refuse aid from sources other than their own—why?

U.S. SURPLUS COMMODITY PROGRAM [9]

Yesterday the representative of the U.S.S.R. saw fit to accuse the United States of dumping its agricultural surpluses on Asia and the Far East and of thus dislocating normal market operations and interfering with international trade. Such blatant misstatements cannot be allowed to stand unchallenged.

Even the most rudimentary knowledge of United States legislation on the subject of surplus disposal—and the administration of that legislation—should keep anyone from using the term "dumping." If there have ever been any fears that the United States might engage in such practices in view of its large surpluses, such fears surely have been allayed by now. However, if the term "dumping" had to be used, we must admit that the United States has repeatedly "dumped" food into countries of the region—in times of flood, famine, and disaster to feed suffering people. This kind of "dumping" was of the same order as the help extended by other countries, including countries in the [ECAFE] region, to the United States when we were faced with disaster caused by floods and hurricanes. It was in the same spirit that the United States "dumped" 2 million tons of wheat in India in 1951–52 when crops failed and famine stalked the land. The United States passed special legislation to "dump" up to a million tons of food grains to help the people of Pakistan. Just last week the United States "dumped" on the docks of Bombay and Madras 20,000 tons of grain worth over $2 million, not including shipping costs, as a gift to replace grain distributed free by the Government of India during the floods last autumn.

[9] Statement made on Jan. 29 by Walter M. Kotschnig, chairman of the U.S. delegation to the 8th session of the Industry and Trade Committee (Jan. 24–31). Mr. Kotschnig also was a U.S. representative to the 12th session of ECAFE.

Most people know that the surplus commodi program of the United States, which provid food for this so-called "dumping," also provid that local currency receipts from any sales in tl country getting the products may be used f economic development. It thus helps to me some of the financial needs of the all-importa development programs. We firmly believe th the development of the economies of the countri of the region with the help we give by this pr gram to supplement the countries' own efforts w create expanding economies which will, in tur promote trade for the benefit of all concerned.

In these programs involving economic develo ment, the commodities are supplied to meet i creased consumption by the people. In these tim of rapid economic progress and expanding econ mies, we believe this purpose is not only achievab but is also vital in some cases to sustained ec nomic effort under democratic institutions.

Let me add one other observation in this co text. Let me invite you to think and feel you selves into the difficulties the American peop and our Government are facing in this matt of surpluses. We did not seek these surpluse They can be explained in the light of the situ tion which prevailed during and at the end the last World War. At that time the America people strained their resources and energies provide for the needs of our allies and friend the needs of the hungry millions. We had increase by every means at our disposal the pr ductive capacities of our agriculture and brin large new territories under cultivation. I belie it is safe to say that as a result of this effort mi lions of people are now living who otherwise woul not be alive.

As agricultural production in other parts of tl world regained and surpassed the losses suffere during the war, a development which we warml welcomed and in which we assisted, America agriculture found itself in a difficult positio We could not reverse overnight our drive for i creased production or take millions of acres o of cultivation from one year to the next. W are doing our best in this respect, and only r cently the administration in Washington sul mitted a new program which it is expected wi reduce production without injuring the interes of our farmers, who are already in a difficu position.[10] In the meanwhile, we are not unloa

[10] H. Doc. 285, 84th Cong., 2d sess.

ıg or "dumping" our surpluses on the world. ›n the contrary, we are spending hundreds of ıillions of dollars on storage every year to pre-ent any serious disturbance of the world markets ıd are thus showing a restraint which I submit ıight deserve some recognition. It certainly does ›t call for the kind of comments which the rep-›sentative of the U.S.S.R. saw fit to make.

Mr. Chairman, we expect to continue these pro-rams and other forms of economic aid during the ›ar before us. We hope to carry on our programs ı external economic assistance alone at the rate f over $5 million every 24 hours. This economic ssistance, we believe, can be deemed unprece-ented in the annals of the world. We believe ıat it is without precedent also in regard to its nderlying policy of worldwide tenders—a policy hich we consider a prime stimulant to interna-onal trade.

We fervently hope and pray that this aid will elp to speed up the economic development of the nderdeveloped regions and particularly those of sia and the Far East. We profoundly admire ıe efforts made in this respect by our friends in ıis region. Speaking personally, I was deeply ıoved by what I saw the other day at the exhibi-on of the achievements of the first Five-Year lan in this country which is our host. We are ıppy to be able to participate in this great coop-ative effort of all the countries in the region. he welfare of untold millions of people, the cause f freedom for all, and the growth of peaceful rela-ons are dependent on the success of this effort. entlemen, we are with you in your great, con-ructive endeavors, and let no one tell you herwise.

HE U.N. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM[11]

I should like on behalf of the U.S. delegation ıd as the U.S. member of the Technical Assist-ıce Committee of the U.N. to make a few obser-ıtions. I think we all agree that the Technical ssistance Program of the U.N. and the partici-ating specialized agencies represents the most onstructive program that the U.N. has been able develop in the economic field. It has proved an fective means of making the fruits of scientific knowledge and advance available to the less developed countries. It is thus helping them to escape the toil through which some of the more advanced countries went in developing modern techniques and technology. And it will, we believe, greatly accelerate the development of the countries of the region and the closing of the gap between the developed and the underdeveloped countries.

The program is important also because it is distinctly a program of aided self-help. As the Prime Minister of this great country has said, the success of any effort at development rests primarily with the people of the country. My country and the American people are deeply impressed by the sacrificial efforts made in this direction by the peoples of the countries of this region. We are only too happy to be able to have a share in assisting this upsurge of determined self-help.

Finally, this program is important—and I think it is a point which cannot be made often enough—because it is a multilateral program. It is one of the greatest cooperative efforts which have ever been made in the economic field. The great majority of the countries of the world are contributing to it, as is the entire family of U.N. organizations, particularly the major specialized agencies.

Perhaps the most encouraging aspect of the development of this program is the fact that a great many of the so-called underdeveloped countries today are themselves increasingly providing experts and training facilities to other underdeveloped countries. One of the most impressive figures given in this session of ECAFE is the information that India, while using the services of 59 foreign experts in 1955 under the U.N. program, had provided 50 Indian experts for service in other underdeveloped countries. There can be no better illustration of the outstanding cooperative effort which is going on.

We are pleased to note that, according to the statement of the distinguished chairman of the Technical Assistance Board [David Owen], some 36 percent of the resources of the United Nations Technical Assistance Program was being channeled in 1956 into the ECAFE region. We are also impressed by the fact that ECAFE is playing an important role in connection with the Technical Assistance Program. The ECAFE Secretariat is advising experts from foreign lands as they come into the region, which is an important aid to these

[11] Statement made by Mr. Kotschnig before ECAFE on eb. 8.

experts. ECAFE is also advising governments in many ways set forth in the work program of our organization. The ECAFE Secretariat is providing a large number of studies, analyses, and reports which are of great usefulness not only to the U.N. Technical Assistance Program but also to the various bilateral programs which are being carried on. A satisfactory division of labor has developed in this respect between ECAFE as a regional commission and the operating bodies of the U.N. responsible for technical assistance. We do not believe that it would be advisable for ECAFE itself to assume such operating functions. The existing machinery operating the entire program is already highly complicated and should not be complicated any further. We believe that ECAFE as of now is already making its most important contribution to the success of the Technical Assistance Program.

U.S. Support for U.N. Technical Assistance

Mr. Chairman, after what I have said, it should be quite evident that the U.S. fully and strongly supports the Technical Assistance Program of the U.N. Our Chairman will forgive me if I permit myself to take a little credit for the United States for the initiation of this entire program within the U.N. It was the U.S. which first proposed the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance following the initiative taken by the President of the U.S. in inaugurating the point 4 program. At the same time we are the first to recognize the great contributions made by other countries and their representatives in the U.N. Special credit is due to such men as our Chairman,[12] who, in 1949, had a leading share in hammering out Resolution 222 of the Economic and Social Council, which created the framework for the Expanded Technical Assistance Program. Bonds of friendship and of cooperation were then forged which nothing can break.

Ever since those days in 1949, my country has strongly supported this program in every possible way. We are trying our very best to coordinate our bilateral programs with this multilateral program of the U.N. These programs pursue the same purpose, which is to offer assistance in the unhampered development of the various countries in the region. In this context, we are grateful for the way in which the leaders of the multilateral program of the U.N. have been wil ing to sit down with us to hammer out the de tails of close coordination and cooperation.

I should like now to touch on another poin It is a point which requires clarification and whic raises some major policy issues. I am prompte to do so by the remarks made by the represent tive of the U.S.S.R., which reflect some conside able confusion regarding the nature of our wor and program and an attitude which is not in ac cord with the best interests of the program. T make my point, I have to go back somewhat i history.

Until 3 years ago, the U.S.S.R. and its sate lites not only showed little interest in the pro gram but were given to attack it on every possibl occasion. In session after session of the Economi and Social Council and the General Assembl they denounced the program as another siniste attempt of "imperialists and monopolists" t establish their control over the underdevelope countries, to keep them in a colonial state, an to exploit them and retard their developmen Neither the U.S.S.R. nor its satellites contribute any funds or services to the program.

Three years ago the U.S.S.R. for its own rea sons and probably impressed by the effect of th program on the underdeveloped countries ar nounced that it was going to make a contributio of 4 million rubles to the program, which at th artificial rate imposed by the U.S.S.R. was repre sented as a contribution of $1 million. We wer glad about this apparent change of heart, althoug the contribution appeared small indeed measure by the contributions of other countries. It migh be noted in passing that the U.S.S.R. has not in creased its contribution during the last 3 years as have most of the other countries. Thus, th U.S.S.R. continues to contribute 4 million ruble per year as compared with the $15 million of th U.S.; the $2¼ million of the United Kingdom the $1½ million of France; and the $1,800,000 o Canada, a country of 14 million inhabitant Other countries much smaller also really straine their resources to provide substantial contribu tions, such as Belgium with $440,000; Australi with more than $300,000; Denmark, $580,000 Netherlands, $760,000; and Norway, $380,00 These are the pledges which these countries mad for the year 1956. The disparity in support be tween these countries and the U.S.S.R. is all th

[12] D. P. Karmarkar of India.

re striking since we are being told over and r again that the U.S.S.R. is outrunning economically every other country.

iet Policy of Inconvertibility

Mr. Chairman, we welcomed in 1953 the offer a contribution from the U.S.S.R. What was t made clear at that time was that the U.S.S.R. uld refuse to convert any part of its contition into currencies that could be used outside U.S.S.R. and a small group of other coues within the economic orbit of the U.S.S.R. ere is every evidence that this insistence on onvertibility reflects the determined policy on part of the U.S.S.R. to use these funds in its n political and economic interest. It is this onvertibility, stubbornly adhered to, which at st resulted in the fact that the Soviet contition proved unusable. Since then, the Soviet ion has done everything possible to have these nds used along bilateral rather than multilateral es.

Inconvertibility has meant that the Russian ntribution can only be used to provide Soviet perts. It forces the U.N. to use these funds for rchases exclusively in the Soviet Union or its tellite countries. Any part of the funds alloted for scholarships can only be used for scholarips in the Soviet Union. They have been emoyed to finance study tours, but again only in e Soviet Union. It is a matter of note that the rious invitations for visits to Soviet Russia ade in this very session of ECAFE do not prode for any additional funds but again are degned to help use up the inconvertible Soviet ntribution to the Program of Technical Assistce.

All this means, to be blunt, Mr. Chairman, that is contribution is used really in a bilateral sense d for the Soviet Union's own purposes. It eans that the great multilateral effort in which e are engaged is being used as a smokescreen r a bilateral operation. It is evident that the oviets are not interested in the multilateral aracter of our work and do not really want to pport a multilateral program. They are not terested in securing supplies where they can be est secured, in offering training facilities where ey can be most usefully used, or in supportg experts from such countries as India, Mexico, r Turkey to go to other countries seeking their services. They are only interested in placing their own experts, or whatever they may be.

To highlight the situation, Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest what it would mean if the U.S. took the same position. As has been pointed out, our contribution amounts to 50 percent of all the contributions made to the program. I wonder what the reaction would be if we insisted that 50 percent of all the supplies bought by the Expanded Technical Assistance Program had to be bought in the U.S.; that half of all the scholars and trainees supported by the program had to go to the U.S.; that half of all the experts would have to be U.S. experts; and that, of all the study tours, one half would have to go to the U.S. Such a policy might be in our interest, but it certainly would not help to sustain the great cooperative effort in which we are engaged. For this reason we have at no time attempted to impose such conditions on the U.N. and on the participating countries. As a matter of fact, speaking of experts, only 16 percent of all the experts employed under the program by the U.N. and specialized agencies are American citizens. We are perfectly willing to have our funds used to help finance the experts of other countries and particularly experts from the underdeveloped countries. We are not interested in political or economic gain for ourselves. We are interested in getting the best qualified experts into the field. In one word, we are wedded to this program as a multilateral program.

Mr. Chairman, we shall continue this policy because we believe that, unless we do so and unless the other participating countries maintain this policy, the whole multilateral U.N. program will be jeopardized. We have scrupulously observed the policies laid down in Resolution 222 as it was written in 1949. The policies laid down there are essential to the success of our common efforts. If this U.N. program is to be used as a coverup for various bilateral programs, there is real danger not only that it will break up into a large number of unrelated bilateral programs but that our whole great effort will be wrecked.

Mr. Chairman, I apologize for having spoken with some feeling on this subject, but I do feel strongly about it. The issue I have raised is an important issue on which much of the future of the program depends. I would like to conclude this part of my observation with an appeal to the Soviet delegation to fall in line with the rest of

us, to uphold the principles on which this multilateral program is built, and to make their funds freely available so that they can be used in the best interest of the underdeveloped countries and in such a way as to render them most effective.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

North Atlantic Ice Patrol

Agreement regarding financial support of the North Atlantic ice patrol. Opened for signature at Washington January 4, 1956.[1]
Signatures: Netherlands, February 17, 1956; Greece, February 23, 1956.

Postal Matters

Convention of the Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, final protocol, and regulations of execution. Signed at Bogotá November 9, 1955. Entered into force March 1, 1956.
Signatures: Argentina,[2] Bolivia, Brazil,[2] Canada,[2] Chile,[2] Colombia, Costa Rica,[2] Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,[2] El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,[2] Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,[2] Spain, United States,[2] Uruguay,[2] Venezuela.

Agreement relative to parcel post, final protocol, and regulations of execution of the Postal Union of the Americas and Spain. Signed at Bogotá November 9, 1955. Entered into force March 1, 1956.
Signatures: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Spain, United States,[2] Uruguay, Venezuela.

Agreement relative to money orders and final protocol of the Postal Union of the Americas and Spain. Signed at Bogotá November 9, 1955. Entered into force March 1, 1956.
Signatures: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Spain, United States,[2] Uruguay, Venezuela.

[1] Not in force.
[2] With reservations.

Universal postal convention, with final protocol, annex regulations of execution, and provisions regarding air mail and final protocol thereto. Signed at Brussels July 11, 1952. Entered into force July 1, 1953. TIAS 2800.
Ratification deposited: Israel, January 27, 1956.

Weather

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.
Accession deposited: Korea, February 15, 1956.

BILATERAL

Austria

Agricultural commodities agreement. Signed at Vienna February 7, 1956. Entered into force February 7, 1956.

Egypt

Agreement further modifying the surplus agricultural commodities agreement of December 14, 1955 (TIAS 3439, 3496) by providing for the sale of approximately 120,000 metric tons of wheat to Egypt. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington February 17, 1956. Entered into force February 17, 1956.

THE DEPARTMENT

Designations

Ellis K. Allison as Facilitation, Travel, and Tourism Officer, Aviation Division, with responsibility for coordinating Department of State action concerning the encouragement of international travel and the reduction of border-crossing formalities, and Department representative on the Interdepartmental Committee on Foreign Travel, effective February 21.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on February 23 confirmed Douglas Maxwell Moffat to be Ambassador to Australia.

erican Principles. For a Better World (Murphy) 371
a. The Economic Situation in Asia (Jones, Kotschnig) 388
omic Energy. New Procedures for Distribution of Stable Isotopes 385
stralia. Confirmations (Moffat) 398
ation
iation Talks With United Kingdom 374
signations (Allison) 398
gotiations With Netherlands for Air Transport Agreement 378
nada. President Appoints U.S. Members of Great Lakes Fishery Commission 374
ngress, The
rrent Legislation 370
forts Toward Preserving Peace in the Near East (Dulles) 368
onomic Affairs
dustrial Progress in Spain (Lodge) 379
w Certificate Forms for Strategic Imports . . . 378
esident Appoints U.S. Members of Great Lakes Fishery Commission 374
e Economic Situation in Asia (Jones, Kotschnig) 388
reign Service. Confirmations (Moffat) 398
ernational Organizations and Meetings. Calendar of Meetings 386
tual Security
eedom's New Task (Dulles) 363
fer of Aid to Countries Affected by Severe Winter (Eisenhower, White) 367
6.4 Million Allotted to Pakistan in Mutual Security Funds 384
S. Economic Aid to Thailand 381
ar East. Efforts Toward Preserving Peace in the Near East (Dulles) 368
therlands. Negotiations With Netherlands for Air Transport Agreement 378
rth Atlantic Treaty Organization. Peace Through Strength: A Look at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Howard) 375
Pakistan. $26.4 Million Allotted to Pakistan in Mutual Security Funds 384
Spain. Industrial Progress in Spain (Lodge) . . 379
State, Department of. Designations (Allison) . . 398
Thailand. U.S. Economic Aid to Thailand 381
Treaty Information. Current Actions 398
U.S.S.R. Freedom's New Task (Dulles) 363
United Kingdom. Aviation Talks With United Kingdom 374
United Nations. The Economic Situation in Asia (Jones, Kotschnig) 388

Name Index

Allison, Ellis K 398
Dulles, Secretary 363, 368
Eisenhower, President 367
Howard, Katherine G 375
Jones, Howard P 388
Kotschnig, Walter M 394
Lodge, John 379
Moffat, Douglas Maxwell 398
Murphy, Robert 371
White, Lincoln 367

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: February 20–26

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

No.	Date	Subject
92	2/25	Dulles: "Freedom's New Task."
*93	2/24	Program for President Gronchi's visit.
94	2/24	Negotiations for air transport agreement with Netherlands.
95	2/24	Civil aviation talks with U.K.
96	2/24	Dulles: testimony on Near East.

*Not printed.

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bulletin

XXXIV, No. 872

rch 12, 1956

FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION 403

THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT ● *Statement by Secretary Dulles* 415

VISIT OF ITALIAN PRESIDENT GRONCHI ● *Texts of Statements and Addresses* 417

U.S. TRADE POLICY AND PROBLEMS ● *by Ambassador Robert D. Coe* 429

UNITED EFFORTS TO MEET THE WORLD AGRICULTURAL SITUATION ● *Article by Assistant Secretary of Agriculture Earl L. Butz* 434

For index see inside back cover

The Department of State bulletin

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irst Annual Report of the Council Representatives f the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

ss release 108 dated March 1

reword

The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty ned at Manila on 8th September, 1954[2] came o force on 19th February, 1955, following the posit of ratifications by the eight member coun- es—Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom d the United States. Thus one year has passed SEATO's history—a year of planning and of ganization. This report is issued by the SEATO uncil Representatives on the eve of the second eting of the Council of Ministers to explain purposes and functions of SEATO, to record progress made in the course of the Organiza- n's first year and to examine the outlook for future.

roduction

SEATO is a defensive alliance by which Australia, ance, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, ailand, the United Kingdom and the United tes cooperate to provide for their security inst further armed aggression, and also against version, in Southeast Asia and to promote the nomic progress and social well-being of their ples.

he Council Representatives find that substan- progress has been made towards these ectives.

irst, the Council Representatives are convinced t the determination of the members to prevent deter further aggressive expansion into South- Asia by armed force and subversion has made important contribution to the preservation of ce in the area.

econd, under the protection of the Treaty all member states have registered significant progress in their economic development. The Council Representatives recognize that this progress is the cumulative effect of the efforts of the governments themselves and the contributions of the Colombo Plan, the United Nations and its specialized agencies, and bilateral aid programs. Under various programs of mutual assistance, member states have in the past two years made more than $700,000,000 available to countries covered by the Treaty, apart from financial assistance for military purposes.

Third, there has been definite progress in the combat effectiveness of the armed forces of SEATO members. Extensive military aid programs under the Treaty's mutual aid provisions have played an important role in this. The plans of the Military Advisers for the coordinated use of these forces in an emergency are now taking firm shape.

Fourth, progress has been made in countering Communist subversion, although it remains a major threat to the area. The SEATO organization provides its members with an increasingly useful forum for consultation and planning measures of mutual support. Direct cooperation between member governments has increased.

The Treaty has thus provided an element of security indispensable to economic, social and cultural progress and has been an effective stabilizing influence.

The Origin and Nature of SEATO

When World War II ended, the peace which people everywhere desired did not come to Asia. In many parts of Asia a pattern of Communist inspired insurrection and aggression developed, culminating in the violent assault on the territory of South Korea.

In the Philippines, a subversive movement, in-

[1] Released on Mar. 1 at Washington, Canberra, Paris, ington, Karachi, Manila, Bangkok, and London.
[2] BULLETIN of Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393.

stigated and abetted by Communists, attempted to undermine the government.

In Malaya, terrorists endeavored to spread the scourge of international Communism by methods of murder and intimidation. Seeking to obtain by force what they could not gain by persuasion—domination of the Malayan independence movement—they stood revealed before the world as alien inspired and alien directed.

In Indochina, the Communist-led Viet Minh movement after a period of terrorism waged full-scale war to bring the countries of that area within the Communist orbit. This campaign, aided from without, reached its climax in the Viet Minh offensive of 1954, which coincided with the opening of the Geneva Conference.

Against this sombre background, representatives of eight Governments met at Manila in September, 1954. They decided that their countries should form an alliance to ensure their mutual safety. They considered such an alliance essential for the preservation of peace in Southeast Asia. They emphasized that it was entirely defensive in its aims and would strengthen the ability of member countries to resist aggression. Its members pledged that it would never be used for purposes of aggression. But while in its origin it is based on self-defense its aims are constructive and extend far beyond the military field.

The SEATO Governments were firmly resolved to resist subversion and other forms of aggression by which men's minds are warped and their will to resist weakened. They recognized that, in the long run, subversion is as great a threat to national independence as overt military aggression.

The SEATO States also emphasized their desire to improve the economic, cultural and social well-being of their people. They made these objectives clear in Article 3 of the Manila Treaty and in a separate declaration of governing principles called the Pacific Charter.[3] The declaration proclaims SEATO's basic principles in relation to equal rights, self-determination, self-government and national independence.

In the Treaty signed at Manila on September 8, 1954, the eight member governments agreed to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacities to resist armed aggression and subversion directed from without. They also stressed their intention to build up better understanding between their people and to promote economic a social progress.

The signatory Governments agreed that, in t event of aggression against any of the parties, ea would take action to meet the common danger accordance with its own constitutional processe For the purposes of the Treaty the States of Ca bodia and Laos and the free territory under t jurisdiction of the State of Viet-Nam were desi nated as areas, attack against which would e danger the peace and safety of member countrie The Treaty also made provision for consultatio between the signatory Governments in the eve of a threat to any member State or to any desi nated States or territory. The Treaty stresse that action could only take place on the territo of a designated State at that State's invitation with its consent.

With the signing of the Treaty the eight memb countries, all members of the United Nations, r affirmed their determination to uphold the princ ples of the United Nations Charter and recognize the responsibilities of the United Nations for t maintenance of international peace and securit

Self-Help and Mutual Aid

In the "self-help and mutual aid" articles of t Treaty, the members of SEATO pledged themselv to take steps individually, and to help one anoth to develop their capacity to meet an armed atta and to foil attempts at subversion. They al undertook to strengthen their free institutions a to cooperate with one another for the econom progress and social well-being of their peoples.

What has been done since the Treaty was signe to carry out these undertakings?

In the military sphere there has been a defini increase in the overall capacity of member gover ments to resist armed aggression in the Treat area. This has resulted primarily from the d votion by governments of considerable effort a resources to increasing the combat effectiveness their armed forces. Modernization, re-equipme more efficient disposition and more intensive trai ing of forces have been the main themes.

A most important contribution to the success these efforts has been made by mutual aid p grams. Thus, there has been a considerable i crease in the military assistance rendered by t United States to Pakistan, the Philippines a Thailand under bilateral arrangements. This a

[3] *Ibid.*

ınce has taken various forms—including free ɔly of equipment, financial assistance in meet- defense costs, the training of personnel in the ted States and in their own countries. Under last heading almost 11,000 officers and non- missioned officers from the SEATO area had pleted or were attending United States oper- service schools in the first nine months of 1955. er cadets from Thailand and Pakistan have attended military schools in France and the ted Kingdom too has trained naval, army and force personnel from Australia, New Zealand, istan and Thailand.

he danger of subversion today confronts gov- nents throughout the Treaty area. Neverthe- the appropriate authorities in all of the ıber governments are keeping an increasingly tive watch over Communist activities. Meas- are being taken to increase the ability of police security forces to deal with subversive Com- ist activities. Governments and national in- ıation services have increasingly directed their ts at exposing and countering Communist ɔaganda.

his is in part a battle for minds—a battle h in the last resort must be won by each on in its own country and with its own political psychological resources. But even here there ıuch that governments can do to assist one her by putting the special experience of coun- ıg the subversive threat in their respective ıtries at the service of their SEATO allies. Sev- mutual aid programs in training security es are under way. Exchanges of information ommunist subversive activities are playing an more important role.

esides the threat from subversion, some of the ıtries of the area are faced with armed violence ırious forms, but the danger these pose to the rity of the countries concerned has been dimin- l as the result of continued and effective coun- ction. In the Philippines, the Communist led balahaps have been reduced to virtual impo- e. In Malaya the Communist terrorists in the le, against whom a sustained and increasingly essful war is being waged, have failed to halt peaceful development of the Federation.

ember governments have continued their ef- s to promote economic progress and social well- g in the area. Generally increasing public nditure has contributed to an accelerated rate of development in the member countries. Economic aid programs have made a major contribution. For example, the United States has allocated approximately $500 million in economic aid to the Treaty area on a bilateral basis since June 30, 1954. Moreover, it was recognized by the Council at their meeting in Bangkok in February 1955[4] that certain economic matters such as trade, payments, development, investment and sound economic progress involved a wider area than that covered by the Treaty and desirably included cooperation with many friendly states as well as the member states. Such cooperation, through the United Nations, its specialized agencies, including the International Bank, and through the Colombo Plan, has played an important part in furthering the economic progress of the Treaty area. Altogether somewhere between $800 and $900 million has been made available in the past two years to countries of the Treaty area in economic assistance.

SEATO at Work

This is the structure of the Treaty Organization.

1. Article V of the Treaty set up

The Council of Foreign Ministers who meet at least once a year, usually in the Treaty area, to set the broad policy for the implementation of the Treaty.

2. At their first meeting in Bangkok from February 23–25, 1955, the Council decided to set up

The Council Representatives who carry on the business of the Treaty Organization when the Council is not in session within terms of reference laid down by the Council. They meet in Bangkok, usually at least every two weeks.

The Military Advisers advise the Council on measures for the common defense. Through various sub-committees and periodic meetings of the Advisers, they make plans to resist attacks against the territory of member states in the area.

3. Three Committees work under the general direction of the Council Representatives. They meet several times a year, usually in the Treaty area.

The Committee of Security Experts is a highly expert group of specialists dealing with certain problems of subversion directed from the outside.

The Committee of Economic Experts serve as the principal advisers of the organization in the economic sphere.

[4] For text of communique, see *ibid.*, Mar. 7, 1955, p. 371.

The Committee on Information, Cultural, Education and Labor Activities provides expert advice on the SEATO activities indicated by its title.

Until more permanent arrangements are made, the Royal Thai Government have kindly provided a provisional *Executive Secretariat*, currently headed by an official of the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Vadhana Isarabhakdi, which is located at Bangkok and has very efficiently serviced the meetings of the Council Representatives and of the Committees. The Council Representatives take this opportunity to express their sincere thanks to the Royal Thai Government for their generosity and hospitality.

The Council Representatives recently appointed a *Public Relations Officer*, Mr. Narciso Reyes of the Philippines, who is also located at Bangkok. Mr. Reyes is an official of the Philippine Government, which has generously contributed his services for this post pending more permanent arrangements.

SEATO states recognize that Communist subversion still constitutes a major threat to the peace and security of the Treaty area. Because subversion manifests itself in so many ways, it is naturally a concern of all elements of the organization. The Council Representatives have established the Committee of Security Experts primarily to help them deal with particular technical aspects of counter subversion work. This Committee has met three times. At a joint meeting with the military authorities, agreement was reached on the best method of dealing with subversive problems of interest to both civil and military branches of the Organization.

The Information Committee deals not only with information but also with social, educational, labor and cultural problems and with the provision of technical aid in these fields. At its first meeting in May, 1955, the Committee asked member countries to submit detailed reports on information projects, social and labor legislation, and technical resources. On the basis of this survey the second meeting of the Committee at Bangkok in January 1956 was able to analyze and tabulate SEATO resources which could be made available to assist member states in the development of their information and cultural activities. Thus, each member government which finds that it needs assistance of a particular kind knows immediately to which other nation it can turn. The Committee also drew up a program to publicize the aims and wo of SEATO and to counter hostile propaganda. the labor field, recommendations were made member governments on measures to encoura the development of free trade union moveme and to promote a continuing exchange of inforn tion concerning progress in the fields of la legislation and trade union development.

Member nations have bound themselves togetl by Treaty because they have common ideals a hopes for the future of their peoples and are termined to resist interference with peaceful pr ress towards their goal. History shows that e can only be overcome by a positive faith. SE has such a faith. It is that each member nat should be free to work out its own destiny in own way without interference from subvers directed from without or from aggressive pro ganda by militant ideologies. Consequently, need is both to stress the positive side of SEA work and to make the people of the area aware the extent and nature of Communist propagan the aim of which is to jeopardize those very fr doms. SEATO is fully resolved to promote clo contacts between member states so that they face the challenge of subversion with a feeling mutual solidarity.

At its first meeting in February 1955 the Cou of Ministers agreed upon the importance of im menting Article 3 of the Treaty. This Artic specifically designed to promote economic pr ress and social well-being and to further the ir vidual and collective efforts of governments wards these ends. From the outset the Econo Committee has given particular attention to s cial economic questions arising out of the Tre commitments of the members, such as the imp of defense costs on national economies. In do so it has kept firmly in mind the broad objec of promoting the general economic progress prosperity of member nations.

The Military Advisers met for the first tim Bangkok in February, 1955, in conjunction w the first Council Meeting, and exchanged vi concerning the military aspects of the Tre They decided that their Staff Planners sh meet shortly afterwards at Baguio in the Phi pines to initiate planning in the military field prepare a programme of future work as necess steps in the ultimate development of plans for implementation of certain defense aspects of Treaty.

The Staff Planners further determined a need r study in technical and specialized fields. As a ult, eight subcommittees were set up to deal th technical and specialized subjects.

In July, 1955, the Military Advisers met again Bangkok and approved the program of work epared by the Staff Planners. Much work has ce been done in putting this into effect.

The various military committees have held meet-gs throughout the past year in places ranging om Karachi to Auckland and to Pearl Harbor. addition to the normal processes of military nning, committees have met to decide what asure of standardization can be achieved in the ganization, methods of training and equipment the member nations. Particular attention has o been paid to the provision of training facili-s by one nation to assist the forces of another, h in technical and specialist subjects.

It has been most gratifying to the Military Ad-ers to see how closely the armed forces are perating and what a great measure of mutual st and confidence has grown up between them. The great distances which separate the member ntries do not make it easy to arrange for joint rcises to take place, but a start has already been de in this important field. In June, 1955, ob-vers of all the SEATO Nations participated in mmonwealth Naval Exercises in the waters be-een Singapore and Bangkok in which units of Powers' maritime air forces also took part. the conclusion of the exercise visits were paid the participating forces to the ports of Bang-k and Manila. The presence of a Pakistan Na-squadron in Far Eastern waters has also en-ed them to participate in joint exercises. At invitation of the Royal Thai Government, a nt exercise was held in and around Bangkok in ornary 1956.

Recently the Staff Planners met at Pearl Harbor review the work of their committees and their ort was considered by the Military Advisers their meeting in Melbourne in January, 1956. this meeting, they approved the various studies le by their Staff Planners and the reports of various committees which had met since July, 5. This completed the first full year's activity the Military Advisers and their staffs and has ured that the SEATO military organization and nning can develop smoothly and efficiently in future.

Thus, the work with which the Military Advisers were entrusted by the Council is making good progress. The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty made it clear that the member governments were determined to stand together to resist any act of aggression directed against the peace and security of the Treaty area. The military side of the organization has as its task to ensure that no aggressor can rely upon a lack of cohesion between the military planning of the Treaty Nations. This the Military Advisers are putting into practice.

SEATO Looks Ahead

The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty is of indefinite duration. SEATO is now one year old and in that time a great deal of progress has been made. It is anticipated that the coming year will see a number of developments in the organization, which will increase its efficiency and the scope of its work. Various proposals submitted by the Council Representatives and the Military Advisers will be considered by the Foreign Ministers at their forthcoming meeting in Karachi.

The political situation in the area has also developed during the year. In the Pacific Charter and in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty signatory members reaffirmed that they upheld the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. Moreover they declared that they would strive by every peaceful means to promote self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose people desire it and who are able to undertake its responsibilities. With this in mind the Council Representatives have welcomed the steps in train in the Federation of Malaya and Singapore towards this goal. At the conclusion on February 8, 1956, of a conference of representatives of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and of the Federation Government recommendations were made which, if accepted according to constitutional procedure, will result in the Federation becoming internally self-governing in the very near future. Further steps are also envisaged so that by August 1957 it is intended that the Federation should be fully self-governing and independent within the Commonwealth. In Singapore there is already a majority of elected Ministers in the Government and a delegation will go to London in April 1956 for discussions about further constitutional progress there too.

In 1954 the shadow of armed Communism lay

over the States of Indochina. The conclusion of the Geneva Agreements in July of that year brought to an end active military operations and International Commissions were established to supervise the Armistice. Since that time election or referenda have taken place. Under the stabilizing influence of the Treaty, and with material and moral assistance from the members of SEATO, the Governments and peoples of these countries, the security of which is of special importance to members of SEATO, have brought about notable improvements in the general political situation. Nevertheless, the evidence of continued subversive activities in certain areas of Indochina in which can be seen the hand of the Viet Minh, is very disquieting.

The work of SEATO has so far been of necessity preparatory. In the forthcoming year it will pass into the fields of achievement. As a result of the collection and collation of information in the economic, social, publicity and labor fields it will now be possible to take practical steps to advance the work of the Organization and of member governments in these fields.

Much has been done to develop understanding and friendship between the peoples of the member nations through exchanges of official and private visits. Moreover within SEATO itself a spirit of good fellowship has grown up as a result of the frequent meetings of the representatives of the member countries. But the Council Representatives hope that this spirit can be extended by widening the scope of these exchanges. In this way each nation will achieve a better understanding of the problems and way of life of its neighbors.

While developing these positive plans for peaceful progress the SEATO countries must increase their capacity to deter would-be aggressors by building up a vigorous collective defense system.

At the same time the Council Representatives realize that Communist subversion remains a major threat to the area. However, the experience and assistance which can be made available by member governments to each other through the Treaty Organization will help to increase the confidence and efficiency of the responsible authorities in member states in carrying out their vital work of counter-subversion.

The objectives of SEATO will not be realized until the peoples of the member nations know that their defense against any aggressor is assured; that their social and economic lot has been improved; anc that the internal structure of their countries ha: been so strengthened as to ensure that subversioı directed from without cannot succeed.

Meanwhile SEATO enters its second year of lif with a high sense of optimism based on the knowl edge of what has already been achieved.

U.S. Delegation Leaves for SEATO Council Meeting

SECRETARY DULLES' DEPARTURE STATEMEN

Press release 112 dated March 2

I am leaving for Karachi to attend the secon meeting of the Council of the Southeast Asi Treaty Organization.

It has been just a year since the first Counci meeting was held in Bangkok.[1] In this year th organization, comprised of eight countries, eas and west, has made substantial progress in estab lishing collective self-defense in that region an advancing the cause of a secure peace togethe with freedom and independence.

This trip affords me an opportunity to visi other countries in Asia.[2] I am looking forward t talking with the leaders and peoples of these Asia countries and studying sympathetically at firs hand their problems.

I hope to be able to inform myself further of th seeming shift in Soviet Communist tactics. shall emphasize in the countries I visit that th United States is the real friend of free Asia an that it can count upon us and that we have a understanding regard for the aspirations of it people to obtain the blessings of peace an freedom.

MEMBERS OF U.S. DELEGATION

Press release 102 dated February 29

U.S. Representative

John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State

Special Assistant

William B. Macomber

[1] BULLETIN of Mar. 7, 1955, p. 371.

[2] For the Secretary's itinerary, see *ibid.*, Feb. 13, 195 p. 241.

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glas MacArthur II, Counselor, Department of State

puty Coordinator

nneth T. Young, Director, Office of Phillppine and Southeast Asian Affairs, Department of State

or Advisers

ge V. Allen, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs
ew H. Berding, Assistant Director for Policy and Programs, United States Information Agency
W. Bishop, U.S. Council Representative and Ambassador to Thailand
rt R. Bowie, Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning
dge Durbrow, U.S. Consul General, Singapore
ce A. Hildreth, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan
W. McCardle, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs
er S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
Felix B. Stump, USN, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
les A. Sullivan, Director, Office of Special International Affairs, Department of Defense

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s D. Bell
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las M. Cairns, Col., USAF
am J. Galloway
rt A. Hewitt, Col., USA
C. Hill
rt Jantzen
s L. Meader
F. Pickering
Queenin, Lt. Col., USA
Scott, Capt., USN
ck Smith
am V. Turnage
am Witman, II

tary of Delegation

e Grainger

rts Officers

ne V. McAuliffe
r Kirk

nscript of Secretary Dulles' vs Conference

release 100 dated February 28

ecretary Dulles: I want first of all to express ehalf of myself and my associates in the State artment our deep sorrow at the death of Sen- Kilgore. He was associated with the State artment in many ways, most notably as the Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee which dealt with State Department appropriations. We have always found that he was conscientious, sympathetic, and understanding of the needs of the Department, and his loss is very deeply regretted by us all.

I suspect most of you know I am leaving on Friday—I think at 2 o'clock—for a trip to South Asia and the Far East that will take me to 10 countries, 2 of which I have never visited before, Ceylon and Indonesia. The primary purpose of the trip is to attend the meeting of the SEATO Council which will be held at Karachi. I think we will at that meeting record progress that has been made during the past year and map out programs for new progress for the future, giving increasing strength and vitality to that very important organization for the security of Southeast Asia.

There and in the other countries I will have a chance to appraise at first hand the new Soviet and Chinese Communist tactics and will perhaps come back better prepared and more fully informed to help to shape U.S. policy to take account of those new tactics.

That is all I care to say. Do you have any questions?

Q. Mr. Secretary, it has been suggested by your Democratic critics that you have been too optimistic in your appraisal of the success or lack of success of these tactics. Would you say that you have been too optimistic?

A. I would not say so. I feel that, if what I have said is considered as a whole, it strikes a fair balance. I don't want here to get into a political controversy or to turn these press conferences into an arena for political controversy. But I think I could say fairly as dealing with the substance of the matter and not on a political basis that I do feel that a very considerable result has been accomplished over the past 10 years.

I looked back the other day to an article on Soviet foreign policy and what to do about it, which I wrote 10 years ago. In it I pointed out that, if the Soviet policy continued to emphasize intolerance and dependence on violence, it would almost surely lead to a third world war. I said that American foreign policy for the next few years must be devoted to getting the Soviets to give up those elements of violence and intoler-

ance. And in my book, which I wrote 6 years ago, I said that I hoped the time would come when such volumes as Stalin's *Problems of Leninism*, which taught Stalinism, would no longer be accepted as a "bible" within the Soviet Union, and that if that result could be brought about there would be a greatly decreased likelihood that the competition—the rivalry—between our countries would lead to war.

Therefore, I believe that the strength and stability of the free world is demonstrated over these last 10 years. They have been hard years where we have had war—we fought the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists, and we have been close to war in relation to Berlin and Greece, and other places. To have gotten through that decade and to see now a very considerable revision of the Soviet policy and a very considerable burying of Stalinism—that to my mind is ground for satisfaction, and there is in it a reward for all the sacrifices that have been made by the American people and our allies during this past 10-year period.

Of course, as I made clear in my speech on Sunday,[1] this does not mean that the struggle is over. One round is perhaps over, assuming these Soviet changes are persisted in. The second round may be beginning. The second round will be different in character from the first or may be, and, as I said in my speech on Sunday, an attitude of complacency would be disastrous. I certainly do not preach any attitude of complacency. There is a continuing Soviet purpose of predatory character, as I pointed out on Sunday, in the Soviet present tactics and more guile, although perhaps less force, than heretofore. Therefore, it is necessary to be fully alert to meet that problem, and we may have to adapt our own policies to it. But I think it is fair to say to the American people that all the sacrifice which they have made not only in treasure but in blood during this past 10 years has at least brought about a change which can mark a first installment toward a Russia that will be a decent member of the society of nations, which is our ultimate goal.

Adapting to Soviet Tactics

Q. Mr. Secretary, may I ask one more question? You have implied in two comments, one on your trip to Southeast Asia and the Far East, and the other in what you just said, that you think you may find it necessary to have further adaptation o change of American policy to meet the new Sovie tactics on the second round.

A. Yes, I have said here some time ago, I hav said in my testimony before the Senate on Friday and I said in my speech on Sunday, that it is goin to be quite important to have two things, greate flexibility and greater assurance of continuity. believe those two elements are quite indispensabl I said there that without those two elements w incur serious risks, a risk which I consider to b quite unjustifiable relative to the small cost c eliminating that risk. We may need somewha larger amounts, although we do not estimate tha is substantial at the present time. We are seekin as I pointed out, approximately $100 million mo for the economic side of our mutual security pr gram than we have for this year, and that re resents only a fractional percentage of the total.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your Philadelphia speec you used the phrase "several years" in connectio with the long-range foreign economic aid pr gram. Will the administration ask for legislatio authorizing such commitments over a specific nu ber of years, say, 10, in the special message th is going up soon?

A. That message has not been finally form lated as yet, but I think we will probably specif the number of years. It will not necessarily b 10 but will be something of that general order- somewhere between 5 and 10, I expect.

Q. Mr. Secretary, apart from possible partisa aspects of the speech, Senator Fulbright has ass ciated himself with you in support of long-ter foreign aid. However, in the speech that he ma on the floor of the Senate yesterday he said, asked, roughly, "Have not the people been pr vided by the Secretary of State with a reason f resisting such outlays"—referring to foreign a authorizations—"on the ground that the Secr tary of State by his testimony Friday said th Soviet designs had been frustrated already"? M question, sir, is in two parts. Do you have a comment on that? And (b), in the light of d velopments, would you amend or change any the statements you made before the committee Friday?

A. I don't care to comment on what Senat

[1] Bulletin of Mar. 5, 1956, p. 363.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 368.

bright said. I believe that, if what I said on lay and what I said on Sunday is read as a le, it is very clear. I hope and I think that ill constitute a very strong and persuasive ment, to the American people and to Con-s, to give the increased flexibility, the in-sed continuity, and the slightly increased unt which we expect to ask for in the way of omic funds.

et Parliamentary Maneuvering

. *Mr. Secretary, in your speech on Sunday identified, it seemed to me, two plain menaces he Soviet tactics, one foreign economic assist- and one the parliamentary maneuvering. dealt with the economic matter. Could you with us about what can be done to deal with united-front tactic?*

. Well, I would prefer not to comment on , as I would have to do it extemporaneously . It is a pretty delicate subject, touching, t does, upon the internal politics of a good y other countries. Therefore I think any-g I said on that subject ought to be pretty fully weighed before I spoke on it. I believe there is a general awareness within most of countries where that political tactic is being posed of the fact that it has considerable dan-. But beyond that comment I would prefer to go at this time.

. *Would you expect that at some time you ht give it as full a treatment as you did the ign economic problem on Sunday?*

. Perhaps not quite as full, because the for-n economic problem is primarily a matter for United States. The other inevitably touches very considerable extent upon the internal tics and political affairs of other countries. if I may find it within the limits of prudence, n say something about it.

. *Do you feel it can be dealt with?*

. In a public speech?

. *No, that the problem can be dealt with.*

. Yes, I do.

. *Mr. Secretary, in reference to greater flexi-ty and greater assurance of continuity, in talk- about changes in our policy to meet the Soviet policy, are you referring only to changes regard-ing foreign economic aid, or does that embrace other changes?*

A. I was speaking of it primarily in terms of foreign economic aid, not perhaps limited wholly to the normal scope of our mutual security legislation, because it might also usefully include some modifications with reference to the disposal of agricultural surpluses. But in general I am talking about the greater flexibility to be given by Congress in the areas where it has the decision as to what will be the conditions and limitations under which economic aid can be dispensed.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think that Representative Richards was justified in saying that you treat the Senators like big boys and the House Members like kids?

A. Well, I don't want to comment on what Representative Richards said. He is a very fine Congressman and a very good personal friend of mine, and he is coming to lunch with me this week.

Q. Of course what he had in mind was that he was insinuating that you did not consult with his committee as much as you did with the Senate committee. Can you enlarge on that?

A. I believe that our consultations are pretty closely balanced between the two committees. Actually it is the committees themselves which largely determine when they want to hear me. As far as I know, I have been as responsive to them as I can be, having regard to my other obligations. I have met, I think, now since I have been Secretary of State for the last 3 years, upward of 120 times with bipartisan congressional groups, principally the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees, and while I haven't made a tabulation I would expect that it would show that it is about 50–50 as between the Senate and the House. Certainly there is no intention on my part to make any discrimination except for the fact that in certain areas, of course, such as treaty-making, the Senate does have a special constitutional authority which is not shared by the House. So that, perhaps, brings about a somewhat increased appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, particularly because we have had in the last few years quite a few treaties which I have had to deal with, and deal with almost exclusively with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

U.S. Policy Toward India

Q. Mr. Secretary, during Ambassador Cooper's recent visit here he made several speeches in which he suggested that American policy toward India maybe should be overhauled in all aspects—diplomatic, economic, and particularly personal relations. Did you discuss those things with him, and could you give us your views on our policy toward India?

A. The answer is I have discussed with him very fully not only here in the Department but he came around to my house one weekend and we spent a couple of hours talking over this whole situation. I look forward very much on this trip to the Far East to visiting New Delhi. He will be back there at that time, and I will have a chance to talk to Prime Minister Nehru. That might lead me to suggest some modifications. But as I now see the situation, I think the United States has on the whole adopted pretty reasonable policies toward India. We have made very substantial contributions to its first Five-Year Plan, and I hope, if Congress approves, we certainly will make further contributions to the second Five-Year Plan. I believe that, while there are superficial irritations, there is no reason why the relations of our two countries shouldn't be on a relation of friendliness and confidence.

Middle East

Q. Mr. Secretary, as you know, there is a lot of concern about the two agreements with our country—one with Saudi Arabia that permits them to veto American soldiers of Jewish faith and the other with Egypt that permits them to veto American firms that are blacklisted—and I was wondering if you think there is anything the American Government could do about either of those problems, beyond what has been done?

A. Those agreements—certainly the one with Saudi Arabia—were made prior to this administration. It is a difficult problem to cope with. We are trying to deal with it. It's like some other problems that we find here in the United States. They are not always easy to deal with quickly or abruptly. It requires a gradual process. We hope that there will be greater moderation and greater tolerance, but we cannot prescribe it from abroad or expect to bring it about suddenly.

Q. Mr. Secretary, your testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee seems to have been interpreted both in Israel and the Arab countries as an indication that there is no intention to approve Israel's arms request in the near future. Is that interpretation correct?

A. Well, I think I would have to let my statement speak for itself. I don't care to elaborate on it or add to it or subtract from it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have the Big Three powers agreed on a program of joint action in event of aggression by either side in the Middle East? There are reports to this effect from London.

A. Well, I heard of those reports. I think those reports go somewhat beyond anything that has yet been agreed upon. As was pointed out. I think at the time of the visit here of Sir Anthony Eden, there was an agreement that we should have an exchange of views as between the three members of the tripartite pact of 1950—that is, the United Kingdom, France, and the United States—to consider, broadly speaking, how we interpret it and how we would apply the provisions of that tripartite agreement. That exchange of views has been taking place and is still in process. But I think it would not be correct to say there has been anything like a war plan or anything of that sort that has been agreed to.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you say in the light of the agreement reached at the time the Prime Minister was here that there has been agreement on general lines of action up to this point?

A. There has been no attempt to formalize any agreement. I think that there is an increasing understanding of lines of action that might be followed. When I say that, I want to have it clearly understood that when I talk about lines of action I'm not just thinking about military action because, as I have several times pointed out, this seems to me to be peculiarly a problem where the United Nations should have an important place. Israel is a creation of the United Nations, and the original truce and the armistice agreements were negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations. I feel that in a sense Israel is a ward of the United Nations. I'm looking forward to having a full talk on that aspect of the matter with Secretary-General Hammarskjold, who is lunching with me tomorrow, who has been to the area, and whose views I shall look forward to receiving with great interest.

Q. Has there been any reply from General Burns[3] *to the suggestion that his organization be provided with additional observers?*

A. There has been no specific suggestion on his part as a result of our indication that we would respond to such a request. I do not exclude at all the possibility that he may ask for somewhat more observers, but he has not yet formulated any specific request.

Q. Mr. Secretary, has the President discussed with you whether he should run again?

A. I don't report on my private talks with the President.

Q. Do you know whether he is going to?

A. I don't believe that is a proper subject for inquiry here.

Economic Cooperation

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your reappraisal of latest developments in Soviet policy, do you envisage that it may lead to a strengthening of, or giving greater emphasis to, the economic phase of NATO, which I understand has been advocated by President Gronchi and several other European leaders?

A. We have not had a chance yet to talk with President Gronchi. At least, I have not. He is, I believe, at this very minute talking at the White House, and I would be there were it not that I felt that, in view of the fact I had not had a press conference for several weeks and will not have another one for several weeks, I asked Under Secretary Hoover to attend that conference in my place. That subject may come up at that time. My own general feeling is that, while the North Atlantic Treaty does deal to some extent with economic problems, in that it calls upon the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to cooperate among themselves, I think that the economic problems can be dealt with probably more effectively through organizations other than the North Atlantic Treaty. The membership of the North Atlantic Treaty was picked primarily, I would say, for strategic and military considerations and not for economic considerations. There is omission in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of some Western European countries who are important from the standpoint of economics.

The OEEC, that is the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, is set up primarily to deal with economic problems and may be a better forum for dealing with economic problems than the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is. Then you have the problem of those economic problems which involve a special integration of certain European countries with each other, such as is represented by the present Coal and Steel Community, the prospects of a so-called EURATOM organization, and the prospects of a so-called common market. Those would be dealt with primarily by a lesser number of states than are in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, namely, by the six countries which are now members of the Coal and Steel Community. So that, while there are certain aspects of economic problems which can be properly dealt with by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, I would think that in the main they would be dealt with more effectively on a cooperative basis by the OEEC and on an integration basis by the members of the Coal and Steel Community.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned the hope of further contributions to India's second Five-Year Plan. Is that the type of thing that might be on a 2- or 3-year or some long-term basis rather than on a year-to-year basis?

A. Well, that would depend to some extent upon how it is handled. If it is handled in terms of a specific United States contribution to a particular long-term project of India, then it could very well be comprehended within this suggestion of ours for greater continuity.

Q. Mr. Secretary, does your feeling toward the economic strengthening of NATO also pertain to the economic phase of SEATO, where the different nations have different needs?

A. Somewhat the same problem exists there. We do have in our Southeast Asia Treaty perhaps somewhat stronger language with reference to economic matters than is in the North Atlantic Treaty. On the other hand again, the area covered by the treaty does not embrace all of the countries which fit into the optimum economic pattern for the area. For example, Japan, which could properly play a very considerable part there, is not in SEATO, and, of course, India and Burma and Indonesia are not members. Therefore, it is not

[3] Maj. Gen. E. L. M. Burns, Chief of Staff, U.N. Truce Supervision Organization.

possible, I think, to work out an economic program for SEATO which wholly ignores the nonmembers, although there is a very considerable reason for giving special consideration, I think, to those countries which through an undertaking like SEATO have pledged themselves to help each other in a security way and which by so doing have perhaps incurred obligations which are not carried by nonmember countries.

Canada-Mexico-U.S. Meeting

Q. Mr. Secretary, what sort of problems might come up at the meetings next month between the leaders of the North American countries—Canada, the United States, and Mexico?

A. Well, they are not going to come to discuss any agenda or any agreed problems. There never has been yet a meeting of the heads of the Governments of the three great North American countries—Canada, Mexico, and the United States. There are problems which are of common interest, and it was thought by President Eisenhower that it would be useful for those three Heads of Government, which represent the three countries that embrace the North American continent, just to get together on a quite informal basis and chat together and develop a greater sense of fraternity and unity than has been the case heretofore. But there will not be any particular agenda, nor will it be directed to any particular problem.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is there anything new on that trip that was planned last fall for Mr. Nixon through the Middle East? Any new developments on that?

A. No. That trip was planned for the fall, when the Congress was not in session. It would not be practical for the Vice President to take a trip while Congress is in session.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Senator George has consistently expressed opposition to this long-range aid program, and I wonder, in the light of that, whether you could appraise the prospects for getting this thing approved by the Congress?

A. Well, I think the prospects are good for getting in some form an assurance of continuity. Now, just what form that will take, I would not want to predict. But I believe it will be in a form which will in fact justify us in indicating a continuing interest in some of these specific projec to a degree which will in turn enable the countri concerned to pledge themselves to the consumma tion of these long-term projects and perhaps g some financial help from other quarters.

That is the important thing. We should b confident in our own mind that we will be ab to carry forward, and that the countries who wa to embark upon these things will be sufficient confident that they will embark upon them and n feel that they run the risk that they will get project into which they will put a lot of mon and then they may have to abandon the proje when it is only half completed.

Also, as I indicated, it is much easier to g money from other sources, such as the Wor Bank—perhaps even from private sources— there is confidence the United States will make substantial continuing contribution of its ow It may be even that it will be less costly for t United States to have this assurance of continui than if we don't, because money from other sourc will then become more readily available. I b lieve that that will be obtained, and I do not sen myself that the opposition of Senator George such that he would not go along with some su program.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you saying in essence th we have reached a point where economic aid, mea ing in a sense defense, is more important to us th our military defenses abroad?

A. Well, I do not think that we have yet reach a point where we could look with equanimity up any substantial disbanding of the forces n maintained by such organizations as the NA and its members. Much less so in the Far Ea where there is perhaps a greater menace still the use of violence against the countries that a close to the Soviet Union. That period may con But until the Soviet policy and perhaps t Chinese Communist policy is more clearly in n grooves, I think it would be reckless for us advocate or be acquiescent in any substantial duction of the present military forces because t Soviet policy is in perhaps a transitional sta It hasn't gone so far in the new direction that could not quickly again be reoriented in the d direction.

I believe that all the evidence that we ha particularly from the studies of this 20th Sov Congress, indicate that there probably is a p

nanent shift of direction. But, after all, that Congress only adjourned last Saturday night and re have not yet had an adequate opportunity ither to appraise it fully or to see what the words of that Congress mean when interpreted into actual teaching and acting within the Soviet Union.

Q. Thank you, sir.

The Problem of Disarmament

Statement by Secretary Dulles [1]

Disarmament is the most difficult and the most ompelling of all world problems.

The difficulties are obvious. They are illustrated y the Treaty of Versailles, where elaborate—and utile—precautions were taken to prevent German earmament; by the very limited Naval Agreement f 1922, which nevertheless was evaded; and by he prolonged and inconclusive negotiations of 926 to 1933 for the reduction of armament as etween the Allies of World War I.

Since those days, the problem has become imensely more complicated because of the growth nd multiplicity of new weapons, coupled with inense distrust and new screens of secrecy as between ajor countries of the world.

One can, therefore, be easily tempted to say that cceptable limitation of armament is impossible f achievement.

However, we cannot and do not say that. The *nportance* of solution has grown even more apidly than the *difficulty* of solution.

The destructive power of modern weapons is ich that a major war with those weapons would evitably destroy a great part of the human race. o much is this realized that, so far as major war concerned, there is developing a situation of utual deterrence. But it would be reckless to ssume that this is a permanently reliable prevenve of war. Events could happen which would ad, perhaps by successive stages, to the use of ese awesome weapons. The human race, if it esires to survive, must find a way to free itself of is constant menace of destruction which could come about even through mistake or miscalculation.

Furthermore, the cost of modern weapons is constantly mounting so that the drain upon economic resources is reaching a measure which it will be intolerable to sustain.

The Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941, called for the abandonment of the use of force "for realistic as well as spiritual reasons" and for "all . . . practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments."

The United Nations is required to promote the maintenance of international peace and security "with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources." [2]

The United States fully adheres to these principles, which, indeed, it cosponsored.

Furthermore, we insist, as a working hypothesis, that any problem that *must* be solved *can* be solved. Therefore, difficult as the problem of limitation of armament is, we assume that it can be solved, and we are determined to solve it.

It seems to us that the most effective approach to a solution of the problem of armament lies in trying to create conditions which will make armament seem less necessary.

President Eisenhower's Proposal

It was pursuant to that belief that President Eisenhower proposed at Geneva on July 21 of last year that as a major step toward limitation of armament the Soviet Union and ourselves,

[1] Made before the Subcommittee on Disarmament of the nate Foreign Relations Committee on Feb. 29 (press lease 101).

[2] U.N. doc. A/Res/383, adopted Dec. 16, 1955. For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 9, 1956, p. 63.

initially, should provide each other with information as to our military establishments and provide facilities for unrestricted aerial reconnaissance of the other.

At the opening of the United Nations General Assembly last September, I said:[3]

> Long experience makes it apparent that, when there is a sense of insecurity, when there is an ominous unknown, then arms seem needed and limitation of armament becomes virtually unattainable. Reductions of armament occur when fear is dissipated, when knowledge replaces exaggerated speculation, and when in consequence arms seem less needed.

The logic of this approach is simple and clear. Major aggression is unlikely unless the aggressor can have the advantage of surprise and can hope to strike a blow which will be devastating because unexpected. But the preparation of an attack of such magnitude can hardly be concealed from a combination of aerial and ground inspection. This, in turn, makes it unnecessary to maintain vast defensive forces in a constant state of up-to-the-minute alert.

Therefore the United States advocates as a first step a system of inspection so thoroughgoing and comprehensive that it will exclude for practical purposes a sudden surprise attack of devastating magnitude and give substantial advance notice of any preparation for such an attack.

We believe that if conditions can be created so that neither the Soviet Union nor ourselves feel in danger of a crippling surprise attack from the other, then potential power can to some extent replace actual force in being, and that would open the way to some substantial limitation of armament.

Margin of Error

We are quite aware of the fact that it will be difficult, perhaps impossible, to arrive at a formula of limitation which would guarantee, with absolute precision, some agreed mathematical ratio or parity in different kinds of armament. Some margin of error must be accepted. But some error becomes acceptable under conditions where inspection gives assurance against a sudden surprise attack of serious proportions. In this matter, as in others, there are risks either way.

In the case of the Western European Union, created by the London and Paris Accords of 195 a new and important step was taken toward t limitation of armament by the members. The was first of all agreement on a certain level f forces for the members of Western Europe Union. Then there was agreement that stocks f armaments should be held at quantitative lev s appropriate to the agreed level of forces. Th there was established an agency for the control f armaments with authority to check and insp t the stocks of armaments in each member count to be sure that they were not in excess of the qu tities required by the level of forces that had be agreed to.

The underlying assumption was that it is eas r to control armament than it is to control m power, which is a particularly elusive factor h ing regard to the multiple possibilities of tra ing, the establishment of reserves, "police," etc

This scheme has, of course, not yet receive thoroughgoing test. But it holds good promise f possibilities and might perhaps be developed on extended scale.

The high priority given to this problem by e United States is indicated by the designation y the President of Mr. Stassen as his personal r resentative to work on the problem. Mr. Stas has already testified before this committee.[5] Y can be sure that his effort has the full support a cooperation of the Department of State and f myself personally.

We do not minimize the difficulties of deal g in these matters with a potential enemy who is u trustworthy and who in manifold ways has de onstrated that he is a past master at the art f evasion and secretiveness. We shall not jeopard e the security of the United States by relying u n promises which cannot, in all essentials, be c trolled. However, there is some reason to beli e that the Soviet Union itself would greatly welc e relief from the present burden of armament.

We have faith that man, who has been endo d with enough wit to devise the means of his s f-destruction, also has enough wit to keep th e means under effective control.

[3] *Ibid.*, Oct. 3, 1955, p. 528.

[4] *Ibid.*, Oct. 11, 1954, p. 515, and Nov. 15, 1954, p. 71

[5] Mr. Stassen's testimony on Jan. 25 has been pri d as part 1 of the subcommittee's hearing on control d reduction of armaments.

'isit of Italian President Gronchi

Following are texts of statements and addresses ade during the visit to Washington of Giovanni 'ronchi, President of Italy, from February 27 to larch 2.

'ELCOME AT NATIONAL AIRPORT

ress release 97 dated February 27

tatement by Vice President Nixon

Mr. President, it is a very great honor to extend you and to the members of your party a welcome Washington, D.C., on the occasion of your visit the United States and to welcome also the First ady of Italy and the members of your party, the 'oreign Minister and others that we have met efore.

This is a particularly significant visit, we beeve, not only because it is your first visit to the 'nited States since you have assumed your high ffice, but because this is the first visit to our counry of an Italian chief of state. And also because e feel it marks the end of one era and the begining of another. This marks the completion of 0 years of democracy and progress for Italy since 946, and it marks, we believe, the beginning of nother great era of your leadership in the years head.

I can assure you that as you travel through our ountry you will find a warm welcome from the merican people every place you go. It will be rue not only because the sons and daughters of taly have contributed so much to our culture and our progress, but also because we Americans alue the friendship which it has been our privi-ge to have between our two countries, our asso-ation in NATO, and our association now in the 'nited Nations, in which Italy has now taken its ghtful place.

And so, as I say, welcome again, and we wish ou Godspeed in the days ahead, both here and at ome.

Response by President Gronchi

Arriving in the United States, I wish first of all to say how grateful I am to President Eisenhower for having expressed with so much cordiality his desire that the head of the Italian state for the first time since the unification of Italy should visit as a guest your great country. The relations of sincere friendship existing between the United States and Italy for many years have now been strengthened by well-defined bonds of alliance for the defense of freedom and democracy. The Italians feel for the North American people much sympathy and admiration: two sentiments which go very rarely together, and which our common ideals and our common purposes are making ever more spontaneous and profound.

As the head of the Italian state, I am bringing to your country the most heartfelt expression of these sentiments, which I am sure will continue to govern relations between the United States and Italy.

The large flow of Italians to the United States since the time the prodigious progress of your country was in the making has shown how natural is cooperation between our two peoples and how constructive it can be in every field.

We intend not only to deepen and to extend such cooperation to our mutual advantage but to place it at the service of peace, of freedom, and of social and human progress. These are the immutable foundations of civilization that the United States and Italy have undertaken to defend.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENTS

Statement Released February 28

The President of the United States and the President of the Republic of Italy had a cordial and interesting exchange of views on various subjects. Particularly they discussed participation of both countries in the North Atlantic Treaty

377377—56——3

Organization. Both expressed their full and unqualified support of NATO and explored means of strengthening the solidarity of that organization and its members in the political, economic and psychological fields as well as in the military field.

The President of the Italian Republic emphasized again his firm support of European unification.

The President of the United States expressed his appreciation to the President of the Italian Republic for the Italian nation's unswerving devotion to the cause of liberty and individual freedom. The President also praised the important role Italy has always played as a charter member of NATO.

If further official meetings prove to be desirable, both Presidents agreed that they should be held.

News Conference Statement by President Eisenhower, February 29

. . . I would like to say . . . how gratified I am that President Gronchi and his wife have come over to visit this Nation so early in his administration. It is evidence of his great concern in the Western alliance and in the organization of free nations.

It is the first time that the head of an Italian state has visited us, and I think that it should be especially gratifying to the many millions of our citizens of Italian extraction.

Certainly to me, both officially and personally, it is a source of gratification, and I am certain that wherever they go, and they are going to be in the North American Continent about 2 weeks, I hope that wherever they go they will experience that same kind of warm welcome and gain the feeling that we really respect this great member of the Western alliance.

Statement Released March 1

The President of the United States and the President of the Italian Republic met again today to complete their discussion of problems of mutual interest. They reaffirmed their intention to direct their action toward the preservation of peace, freedom and democracy. They reaffirmed that, while all possible efforts will continue to be made to achieve a reduction of armaments, the present situation does not allow any relaxation of the Western defense efforts. Concurrently, the President of the United States and the President of the Italian Republic agreed on the necessity of further deepening and extending the solidarity among th members of the North Atlantic Communit through increased cooperation among them in al fields.

The two recognized that to the extent that i is possible to improve the Western world econom and to facilitate the development of the less a vanced economies within it, the Atlantic Com munity and indeed the entire free world wil benefit. In particular, as far as Italy is concerne they agreed that Italy no longer needs gra economic aid. The area that President Eise hower and President Gronchi agreed should b increasingly explored, within the framework established Western economic cooperation, is t possibility that, in addition to her own effort Italy could meet some of her problems by the e tension of sound public and private, long-ter foreign investments. The problem facing Ital it was agreed, is the improvement of the conditio which are necessary to her industrial developmen particularly in the south, and further to attra private, national and foreign investments.

PRESENTATION OF STATUE

At a ceremony in the White House Rose Gard on February 28, President Gronchi presented reproduction of the Discus-Thrower to Preside Eisenhower. Following are President Gronch remarks, as interpreted, together with Preside Eisenhower's reply.

President Gronchi: Mr. President, it is an hon for me to present to you on behalf of the Itali people this statue which reproduces one of t most famous masterpieces of the antiquity. Th presentation has the purpose of expressing o gratitude to the people of the United States for t restitution of the works of art which were remov from Italy during World War II.

This restitution has been made possible by t understanding and the interest of the Unit States and has been an accomplishment of in timable significance for the restoration of t Italian artistic wealth in its integrity.

Probably not everybody is aware of the imp tance of such restitutions. They included t treasures of the National Museum of Naples, whi contained the celebrated paintings of the Farn collection and the superb collection of ancient go works of Herculaneum and Pompei; the treasu

f the Uffizi and Pitti's Galleries, of the churches nd convents of Tuscany, together with numerous rivately owned works which still are, in Italy, a ving part of its history since they often still be- ong to descendants of families which commis- ioned them directly from the great masters of the Renaissance.

These works were returned to Italy thanks to the fforts of men motivated by a sense of right as well s by love of culture, who had been entrusted y the American Government with the difficult nd delicate task of such restitution and who, in he performance of their tasks, gave constant evi- ence both of their great love for Italy and of heir deep respect for the most sacred principles f law and international life. Among those who xerted themselves the most in this task, collabo- ating with the Chief of the Italian Restitution Iission, Rodolfe Siviero, I wish to mention Gen. ucius Clay, Mr. Robert Murphy, and Mr. Richard Ioward. The German Federal Government itself ooperated in a cordial and friendly spirit in that oble task.

Mr. President, in renewing to you an expression f the deep appreciation of the Italian people, I ish to add that I am particularly pleased at hav- ng been able to hand over this statue to you, for he American people, during my present journey in he United States which promises to bring a new eaffirmation of the strong ties and the deep friend- hip which unite our two nations.

President Eisenhower: Mr. President, I am par- icularly happy to act as the agent of the American eople in receiving from your hands, on behalf of he Italian people, this replica of the art of an- iquity, together with objects which you did not ention—the column and the beautiful capital on op of it that I see just outside the enclosure.

I assure you that all America will be extremely ratified by your action, not only because of their nterest in ancient arts, and in modern art, but ecause of their understanding that this gift comes rom the affection and the sense of relationship n the part of the Italian people to our own. As ou know, we have many millions of citizens of talian derivation. They will be, I think, ex- remely proud that you brought this gift to our eople, and all the rest of us will take a tremendous atisfaction that it has been handed over in the ands of one who is a militant leader for democ- acy and human values in this world of today.

Thank you very much.

ADDRESS TO THE CONGRESS, FEBRUARY 29[1]

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, honorable Members of Congress, I am very grateful for your cordial welcome and I thank you for the opportunity you have given to me of extending here to the American people, to Congress, and to the United States Government the message of greetings and good wishes from the Italian people which I have already conveyed to President Eisenhower.

This message is an expression of the deep friendship which exists between our two peoples, and which has its roots, over and beyond all treaties and diplomatic agreements, in the bonds of a common civilization and of common democratic ideals, and in the kinship of a not inconsiderable segment of your great Nation for the large number of Italians who made their new home here.

My greeting is also a sincere expression of the gratitude of the Italian people for the striking proofs of solidarity which you gave us, at considerable sacrifice for all sections of your people, when, after the war, Italy had to rebuild from the ashes of a painful past her political, economic, and social life. This bond of gratitude cannot be forgotten, and my visit is meant as a reaffirmation of it.

Mutual Knowledge and Cooperation

But a friendship between two nations, as that between two persons, cannot be nurtured with sentiments and remembrances only. To keep it alive and vital, such friendship must draw nourishment from an intimate mutual knowledge and a steady cooperation of purpose and action.

Consequently, I shall attempt to focus your attention, albeit briefly, on the present position of Italy, her major problems, and on the evaluation that we in Italy make of current international developments. If I shall succeed in this task, the purpose of my visit will be, in my opinion, fully accomplished.

It should be recognized that, despite hopes and patient and generous endeavors, the world is not more secure today than it was 1 or 2 years ago. In fact, we are going through a disquieting phase of confusion in ideas and political orientations, and consequently of greater potential danger. It is sufficient in this context to look at North Africa

[1] Made in Italian before a joint session; interpreted by A. José DeSeabra of the Department of State; reprinted from *Cong. Rec.* of Feb. 29, p. 3154.

and the Middle East, and to listen perceptively to the rumblings which come from the remainder of Asia.

It is true that, it would appear, we have moved from a war, a cold war but still a war, to a more peaceful competition, which impinges strongly upon the specific interests of each people, such as the development of national independence and the adjustment of the social structure. By becoming tinged with these features, such competition encompasses wider horizons and acquires every day a deeper meaning. Two basic conceptions face each other throughout the greatest part of the world. Will it be the principle of government for the people, or of the people subject to the government? Will it be the Western brand of democracy—democracy through freedom—or the so-called people's democracy, that is Marxist-Leninist? The latter ideology, while organically repugnant to our own, also as a moral and social conception, has in itself a great power of expansion, since it has the appearance of a political and social system capable of bringing freedom from poverty and from their sense of inferiority to the underprivileged classes.

But this power of expansion must be viewed with alarm by people, such as us, of different traditions and background, and make coexistence difficult since that ideology is embodied in a watertight political and economic system, and consequently sustained by all the powers of a government, which include not only the weapons of propaganda and of the media of mass communication, but also more powerful and frightful weapons, conventional and nuclear.

History knows only one example of peaceful ideological expansion, the expansion of Christianity against the pagan world. It was a peaceful one since it taught to men not to kill but to die for their faith.

The North Atlantic Treaty

Against this ferment which is spreading among the people of all continents, we can safeguard our ancient civilization only through an effort that will unfold and display its fuller meaning. We have to make our democratic system more and more capable of accomplishing an effective reconciliation between the authority of the state and individual freedom. We have to reinforce the solidarity of the people who share those ideals and are striving to fulfill their ends. This solidarit exists, since the day of the signature of the Atlanti Pact among many Western nations, including th United States and Canada.

The Atlantic Pact, as conceived and operate thus far, was appropriate and sufficient so long a there was the fear of imminent armed aggressio intensified by an imbalance of strength betwee the two sides. It is a historical truth that the pac removed that danger and created the possibility c experimenting with attempts at solutions very dif ferent from those of the past. However, it shoul be brought into line with today's realities, whe the military imbalance has been reduced and ther have been so many changes of situation in man parts of the world.

Military cooperation continues to be very im portant today, but it should be supplemented wit new and imaginative forms of cooperation. Thi is necessary not only to move away from a climat of emergency measures and to enter into a phas characterized by more complex and permanen arrangements, but chiefly because we all realiz that no person, nation, or group of nations ca consider without anxiety and anguish the pros pects of a world where peace is based solely o military strength or on limited political aline ments. Today especially when nuclear weapon have reached such fearful developments, whic will be intensified in the future, it is essential tha while an efficient military strength is maintained every effort be made to reduce the danger of wa so that gradually the employment of force may b no longer required.

It has been said authoritatively, and truthfully that even an adequate collective defense systen does not constitute a final solution, but can onl serve as a stage to go beyond the dangers of a balance-of-power approach, and to give a bette foundation to peace.

In this brief survey which is made possible b my address to you, I do not wish to outline o discuss specific proposals. It would not be m task, anyhow.

One might consider a better coordination of th existing organizations—Organization for Euro pean Economic Cooperation, European Coal an Steel Community, Western European Union, th Council of Europe—because the new methods of a more organic cooperation should range from th political to the social and economic areas.

One might consider with more attention a better ıtegrated functioning of NATO, involving a wider ıd more frequent use of the [North] Atlantic 'ouncil.

In this way we would accomplish the purpose of ıaking more fruitful and timely the exchanges f views between the various members, giving to ıem a fuller sense of responsibility and at the ıme time a recognition of the value of their con-ribution to the common cause.

Within the framework of the NATO pact one ıight consider, dispassionately, the possibility of ringing at last life into the spirit of article 2, hich right from the beginning was meant to give the military pact the wider and deeper connota-ion of a community of peoples.

I cannot fail in my duty of emphasizing that the eorganization of the Western World is the central roblem of the day, which should be faced without elay.

It is clear that the solution of these problems is ot only an American responsibility.

The European nations of Strasbourg must con-ribute their share, by setting into motion the rocess of integration.

Our old and restless Europe must find the way o her spiritual and political unity and must pool ogether her resources if she wants to take up again er mission of civilization, which is true to her raditions and her history.

The United Nations, with their great organiza-ion, ought to give a more effective, continuous, mpartial, and harmonious content to their task, hich is charged with so great political and human ignificance.

I am convinced that in the new competition of leologies and economic assistance we cannot hope or the success of our democratic conception unless ıis gives concrete and factual evidence of its su-eriority by bringing to bear the willpower and ıe means which, through appropriate action, can emove injustice and positions of inferiority ithin each national structure and internationally.

alian Contribution

Italy wants to participate—within the limita-ons set by her resources and to the full extent f her commitments—to this work of redemption. Italy has already contributed with full loyalty the common cause. Italy asks that her contri-ıtion should not be appraised only with reference to her participation in the Atlantic Pact and to the financial effort accomplished, with the friendly help of the American administration and Congress, in order to discharge faithfully the commitments deriving from NATO.

I know that our financial effort has appeared to some observers as insufficient or lukewarm, or imperfectly planned at the technical level.

Permit me, however, to point out that in this subject one relies too frequently on hasty reactions. Actually there is little justification for some of the comments which are made occasionally and which would seem to throw an adverse light upon our determination to maintain our armed forces at the highest level of strength and efficiency consistent with our resources. For instance, there is little meaning in a mere comparison of the percentages of gross national income allocated to defense in the various countries: 11 percent in the United States, 10 percent in the United Kingdom, 8 percent in France, against 5 percent in Italy.

Such comparison does not take into account the differences in total and per capita national income in each country, and actually distorts the facts, as it can be seen when one considers that the income of an American family, in real, actual terms, represents the income of 5 or perhaps 6 Italian families. Because of their low level of income, our people have to cut deeply into their resources, foregoing essential needs, in order to bear the financial burden of defense.

But the most significant and substantive Italian contribution to the common cause is that of having strengthened its internal structure, having restored democratic institutions and, with them, the authority of the state, having overcome the disruptive economic and social effects that are typical of all postwar periods, having increased all-round production, and having improved the living conditions of the working classes, especially in southern Italy. Owing to the depressed conditions of many areas of the Italian economy, this effort has been, as it had to be, much more considerable than the one accomplished in order to strengthen our defensive military posture within NATO. Your administration and you, gentlemen of the Congress, have given us invaluable help in this reconstruction, with wisdom, imagination, and great generosity, despite the great sacrifices entailed for the American taxpayer. No one in Italy will ever

377377—56——4

forget this solidarity, which we appreciated also for its idealistic significance.

I know that from certain quarters there has been some criticism because of alleged waste or faulty utilization of the aid received. There may have been mistakes. But is there any responsible person in this country, so imbued with practical sense and experience, who can say that there is anywhere in the world a government or agency whose management is free from error?

In the overall picture of a national economy the important thing is not whether an individual item of accounting closes in the black or in the red, but whether the whole operation closes with a surplus or a deficit.

The 10-year period which has just ended for the Italian economy closed with a large plus balance. Consequently this Congress can tell the American people with satisfaction that the aid given to Italy was not an unproductive expenditure.

It is not my intention to bother you with figures; yet a few of them may be quoted to substantiate my statements.

(a) Industrial production increased five times since 1945, while agricultural production doubled.

(b) Per capita income and consumption increased by more than 50 percent with respect to 1947.

(c) The productive capacity of Italian industry doubled since 1947. Defense production is now very close to the levels required by NATO.

Therefore my country has made great strides, and if one looks back this is not to indulge in pride and self-satisfaction for what has been accomplished but to survey the long road which is still ahead of us, and what remains to be accomplished.

Problems Yet To Be Solved

All of us in Italy, government, the major parties and all responsible persons know, as you know, that we have still a large pool of chronic unemployment, as it transpires from the statistics. We know that much has been done for southern Italy but that there is still an unfair and excessive gap in individual income between north and south. We know that we must complete the land reform undertaken with notable success, and which has also a function of moral, social, and consequently political rehabilitation.

We are aware of the fact that our housing problem, while of varying dimensions in different regions and cities, is still serious, also because o its human and political implications.

I am not telling you this to ask your help or suggest that you continue a policy of aid which w consider rightly closed by you.

Italy can be compared to a working concern, we under way, which, however, has inadequate capit resources, falling short of what would be require to expand its physical plant and to improve i organization and its equipment.

Consequently, Italy does not hope and does n ask sacrifices from others and free advantages f her. On the contrary, she is anxious to be co sidered in the same light as a customer of goo moral and financial standing who gets in touc with a bank, applying for loans at favorable term or approaching a financial institution in order enlist its interest in profitable and secure joi ventures or other participations. In many cou tries and probably also in yours, there are peop who have a conventional picture of the Italia economy, based on stereotypes such as the hopele lack of natural resources, the inability of the Go ernment to collect taxes from its citizens and manage its financial affairs competently, the a leged deficiencies of its vocational education. Th picture is either inaccurate or obsolete. This ma be due to the fact that many people, well meanin and well disposed, but with only a few days o their hands, are attempting to do in 2 or 3 da what, even for the study of a single firm or plan would require weeks of work by an expert Amer can auditor interested in scratching below th surface of things.

Our natural resources are growing. The di covery of large amounts of natural gas has pe mitted extensive practical applications to industr and science. Pretty soon oil will become one of ou most important productive resources.

Taxes absorb a very high percentage of ou national income, especially if one considers th the average income is very low.

Vocational schools, which are being expand and better organized, are increasing and improvin the productivity of our labor. You can dra yourselves a picture of this change by comparin the skills of earlier Italian immigrants with tho of the more recent ones, who are better qualifi and prepared.

In conclusion we have in Italy the essential pr requisites for a steady and balanced developme of our economy. The program outlined by the la

mented Minister Ezio Vanoni aimed at that pur-
ose, and it remains valid also today, with some
rrections suggested by experience. Italy's great
ed is that, through mutual agreements at the
ternational level, closer economic cooperation be
moved from the stratosphere of science and high
inciples, and brought down to earth.

Economic cooperation, in an age like ours, is not
burden or a mere act of generosity from one
untry to another. It is policy consonant with
e interest of each and all concerned.

A poor country or a country beset with difficul-
s and uncertainties is a danger to all others, on
th counts, that is, domestic weakness and in-
ility to protect itself against external dangers.
can say that no people, even the richest in re-
urces and creative power, can be durably pros-
rous if there are many nations which are
happy and restless because of the hardships of
verty and starvation, of the burden of injustice,
d because of the uncertainty of their immediate
ture.

The wonderful development of the United
ates, at which the world looks with admiration
d astonishment, has become even greater since
is country discarded its isolationist state of
nd. From that point on, you have placed your-
ves in the very heart of world events, and have
come the determining factor of world history.

It is therefore in the name of a mutual interest
at I appeal here to you for closer and uninter-
pted cooperation, carried on in a spirit of mutual
ust and faith.

ed for Faith

Faith is the basic element which I would like
mention in closing these words of mine. With-
t faith, there could be no meetings of the mind
d no true cooperation.

Italy can be trusted, because of the capacity
d willingness to work of her managers, tech-
ians, and labor, and also because of her faithful-
ss to democratic ideals and firm determination
defend and expand their accomplishments.

Our destiny as individuals, in our family, social,
political life, is safe and free only in a democ-
cy which draws its principles from the Christian
dition.

After the historical experiences of Eastern Eu-
pe, what would be our anxiety if this type of
mocracy should disappear or even should yield
to some degree. We all are firmly convinced of this fact, and I am the first to believe it.

In spite of uncertainties which are natural, given also certain dispositions of a Latin people, democratic stability in Italy is not in danger, and the democratic political parties together with the great majority of public opinion are fully conscious of their responsibility for maintaining and strengthening the institutions which the Italian people freely accepted through their constitution.

My people know that freedom becomes a sham and a privilege for those who are already strong, unless it means to every man and woman freedom from the hardships of poverty and starvation.

My people want to succeed, through an action based on progress and justice, in bringing about a friendly disposition toward the authority of the state on the part of certain large segments of our people who are still diffident or hostile to it. In this way the authority of the state will be strengthened through the self-discipline of the people.

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, gentlemen of the Congress, this is the Italy which today is before you, as a member in good standing of the great family of the Western democracies.

ADDRESS TO THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB, MARCH 1[2]

I am very happy of the opportunity afforded to me by your National Press Club of meeting with you gentlemen of the press. This is the more so, since because of your professional skill and tradition for objectivity you gentlemen are a most effective channel for clarifying and welding together in a single constructive effort the hopes and purposes of the free world.

Only a month ago, for the first time since the end of the war, there was once more, from the Capital of this great Nation and as a result of the meeting between the President of the United States and the British Prime Minister, a restatement of the very principles dear to most people which helped to win the dreadful ordeal of the last war and enabled many nations oppressed by dictatorship to live once more in freedom and democracy.[3] The restatement of those principles

[2] Delivered in Italian.

[3] BULLETIN of Feb. 13, 1956, p. 231.

after 10 years acquires a fresh significance because, now that their wartime appeal has faded out, it brings to the foreground the problem of how we shall go about in spreading those principles and defending them, so that the greatest part of human society may identify itself with their intent and may cooperate in their fulfillment and preservation.

As I mentioned before the joint session of Congress which I had the honor of addressing yesterday, two fundamental conceptions of life are facing each other throughout the world, with far-reaching implications on the organization and the orientation of modern nations. This, in my opinion, is the basic new fact that we must consider, a fact which is pregnant with developments going far beyond the area of such problems as military defense and the balance of power.

The fact is that we might witness a process of political conquest, through the conquest of the mind and of the heart of people, without the need for a single gun being fired. There is already some such symptom, especially in Asia, and it is not an overstatement to say that, together with the terrifying developments of nuclear weapons, the awakening of the feeling of independence and the hopes for freedom which are multiplying, from North Africa to Indonesia, are foreshadowing the entrance of new nations as free and influential factors in world history, as well as new situations and the new configurations in the balance of world power.

Weapons of Self-Defense

The type of democracy in which we believe, that is, the one which places itself at the service of the individual to help him to express his full personality and to enhance human dignity, calls for additional weapons of self-defense. It was a great step forward to have reached the point when war is less probable in the near future than it was in the past. We must be glad of this development, because nowadays war would be equivalent to total destruction. However, this in itself is not a sufficient safeguard for that spiritual Christian conception and for those political and social systems which are identified with our faith in freedom and justice—in turn, the only forces which can free humanity from slavery in every shape or form.

This, I suggest, is the big problem which we have now to face. It does not eliminate the last-ing need for a posture of armed defense, painf as this may be, nor the need for the cooperati military, and political arrangements related to Every free country must be on its guard again the temptation of denying or even whittling dov their importance. However, we can realize ready now the inadequacies of the so-called b ance of power, and with it the danger, inherent the balance-of-power conception, of bringing abo a vicious spiral of causes and effects, set in motion by mutual diffidence and fear and resul ing in a dangerous and ruinous race for power.

These considerations are not original, and I not claim any special gift of insight. I thi however that it is useful to bring them to the atte tion of you gentlemen of the press who are respo sible to such a great extent for the enlightenme of public opinion in our democratic countries. may well be that these truths, which have be already voiced by statesmen of great standin have a stronger appeal in the nations which a less wealthy and consequently are unable to con pete with the wealthier ones in strength. It is fact that to become prepared for war, with a those frightful modern weapons, is a tragic luxu far beyond the means of nations less endowed wit wealth. However, it would be mistaken to thin that such an attitude implies discouragement weakness, stemming either from unreasonable f talism or from irresponsible optimism.

People such as the Italians, who have felt i their own flesh the unmitigated horrors of wa have been warned through experience. They kno that, if they want to preserve their independenc their security, and their free existence—in oth words, if they want to survive—they must see through mutual cooperation with other natio the strength which they cannot have alone. Co sequently, we are faithful to our alliances becaus we are convinced that they are consonant with ou fundamental interests. This is the position o Italy, and we have done and are doing all that i necessary to fulfill our commitments, regardle of sacrifices.

Above all, Italy and other like-minded nation are appealing to their friends so that the Wester World may become a close community, and tha cooperation within that community may help t solve problems of survival and development of th less strong units, and may also help to free othe nations from the enslavement to injustice an poverty.

'he problem is to demonstrate in fact, and in a ctical way, the superiority of our democratic nciples of progress and civilization, in the face he solutions advocated by the Marxist and the litarian ideology.

am talking about this to you because, as a ristian and as a believer in democracy, I am er to bring nearer the attainment of a just, able, and secure peace, capable of safeguarding human rights. I talk of this because it seems to essential that this eagerness be shared by all us, particularly among the leaders of opinion he free world. For ultimately the great issues ollective interest are not settled through official eements and diplomatic arrangements but only a result of convictions which in turn awaken sense of responsibility.

o-Fold Action in Italy

As far as Italy is concerned, we have developed wo-fold action: a domestic action for the defense our free institutions, and an international action ing as its objective a clarification of requirements and a fresh appraisal of our entialities, within the framework of the exist- alliances.

Our domestic action is based upon the assump- n of the full implementation of the clauses and nciples of our Constitution, accepted by the e will of our people, which has entrusted their lication and defense to our constitutional au- rities. This is supplemented, however, by a scious and far-reaching action, having as its ective an improvement in the conditions of the rer segments of our population. In Europe attitude of a mere conservatism would be inevi- ly left behind by the pressures of our social lities, which make themselves felt not only when overall economic situation deteriorates but also even more, as it is the case with Italy, when etter economic situation brings about new re- rements and enables new and wider segments he population to enter the market as consumers. 'he post-war Italian governments have endeav- d with success to restore the technical efficiency he public administration, which had been dis- ted by dictatorship and war. They have also eavored even more, and will continue to do to eradicate to the greatest possible extent the tors which may lead to disturbance of social ce. The results of this conscious effort are already apparent. We Italians have traveled a long road toward reconstruction and much has been done to change the economic fabric of the country, to cut down vigorously and, possibly, to wipe out the gaps existing between different classes and different regions. As an example I might quote our land reform, and as another the work of the Cassa del Mezzogiorno. A long-range development plan for the elimination of unemployment, along the lines first conceived by the lamented Minister of the Budget, Ezio Vanoni, is now under active consideration. It will help to give specific shape and continuity to our programs for the future.

During a first phase of this effort for the improvement of living conditions in Italy, we have benefited from the friendly assistance of the United States of America. I wish to repeat also to you gentlemen that this cooperation has created strong, secure, and lasting bonds between the Italian and the American people.

But even in your country there are people who entertain doubts as to the wisdom and effectiveness of our principles and methods of political and social life. I do not wish to disregard this fact, while of course, because of the responsibilities inherent to my office, it would not be proper for me to engage in political or other controversies.

Let me say, however, first of all, and this not because of pride or insufferance of criticism, that it might be prudent to recall an old saying which has been quoted in the past few days by an authoritative newspaperman. The saying goes, "A fool in his home knows more than a wise man abroad." I would like to add in this context that Italy has leaders, democratic parties, Parliament, and a Government which are perfectly conscious of their responsibilities for the defense of freedom and democracy. In every democratic country, and consequently also in Italy, political stability can be secured chiefly by enlisting the confidence in and allegiance to the state on the part of the largest number of the population. Outside of this method there are only the authoritarian practices of more or less disguised dictatorships, which are repellent to you and to us because they deny the fundamental freedoms of man. It would be damaging to attempt to enlist that allegiance through spurious compromises at the expense of our principles. No lover of democracy in Italy can be suspected of that. What we want is to give to the authority of the state the noble imprint of justice

and to free the less privileged classes from the pressures of poverty through a more equitable distribution of our national income. This is the ground on which we envisage the reconciliation of the Italian people with the authority of the state, which is our dream and the idea for which we work.

Therefore Italy deserves confidence, full confidence in the light of her democratic traditions and of the sense of responsibility of her leaders.

In the international sphere Italy is motivated by a sense of active responsibility which translates itself in an ever-increasing degree of participation in the negotiations for the solution of common problems. Italy cannot overlook in particular the pressures which are developing above all in the Near and Middle East, that is, in an area which has always been an outpost of her defense. It is essential that the stabilizing function of Italy in that area be considered in our efforts for common defense, lest the existing equilibrium become dangerously shaken and the cooperation which exists with the countries of the Mediterranean region become seriously jeopardized.

We are convinced that the energies of all members of the Atlantic community, reappraised and coordinated in a program of active common action, will give us the domestic and external security which will answer the earnest expectations of our peoples.

This reference to the necessity for a degree of political and economic evolution in the association of the free nations is not meant as a negative criticism of the present organizational arrangements of the West. It is meant with reference to the future and to the necessity of taking into due consideration the position of each member, to prevent friction or dispersions of energy, and to strengthen the weak points which might appear from time to time.

These are the thoughts which I wanted to express in this place, before you who, as representatives of a press of outstanding liberal and democratic traditions, are especially sensitive to problems of relationship between the two big forces which are alined in the defense of freedom, namely the United States and Western Europe.

I could not conclude, however, without saying that this frank discussion of problems in an atmosphere of sincere cooperation, and among equals, which are typical features of the relations among the nations of the free world, and of which my own visit to the United States is a symbol, are a ready by themselves a tangible evidence of tl harmony which exists among us, and of our dete mination to make our cooperation ever more int mate and consequently more effective, in the servi of peace and of human progress, which are o loftiest common aims.

U.S. Restates Position on Weather Balloons

TEXT OF NOTE TO U. S. S. R.[1]

Press release 109 dated March 1

The United States Government acknowledg receipt of the Soviet Government's further no of February 18 objecting to the flight of meteo ological balloons by the United States and propo ing an exhibit of the material in the Soviet Go ernment's possession.

The facts in this matter were conveyed to tl Soviet Government in the United States Gover ment's note of February 8.[2] With that note w enclosed a copy of the press release issued Washington January 8 describing the project detail at the time of its initiation. The Unit States Government observes that the Soviet Go ernment deliberately withheld publication in i own press of the information material in th release which it erroneously referred to mere as a United States domestic regulation.

As previously stated, free-floating United Stat balloons have long been employed for the a vancement of meteorological study. The Sovi allegations concerning the danger of such balloo to aerial navigation are as misleading as Sovi assertions concerning the purpose of the proje Thousands of meteorological balloons have be launched in the Northern and Southern Hem spheres without interference with air traffic danger to lives and property on the ground. T Soviet Government and certain Eastern Europe Governments have been the only nations to obje It is noted that the Soviet Government has n taken advantage of the offer put forth in t United States Government's note of February 8 discuss with the United States authorities t

[1] Delivered by the American Embassy at Moscow to t Soviet Foreign Ministry on Mar. 1.

[2] BULLETIN of Feb. 20, 1956, p. 293.

ature of the safety devices incorporated in these alloons.

At the time that the Soviet Government ob-ected to the transit of United States meteoro-ogical balloons over the U. S. S. R., its own bal-oons were passing over and landing on the terri-ory of other countries. It is noteworthy that oviet balloons have flown over United States erritory and that authenticated reports have been eceived of the recovery of Soviet balloons on the erritory of several countries including Japan, urkey, Iran, Finland, and Germany. It is il-ogical that the Soviet Government should desire ne rule for itself and another for the rest of the orld.

The Soviet Government has not returned the cientific property which rightfully belongs to the nited States and which the Soviet Government as endeavored to convert to propaganda uses of ts own. In renewing its request for the return f the equipment in question, the United States overnment states its willingness to return the oviet equipment which has come into its ossession.

It is the firm belief of the United States Gov-rnment that any legitimate concern of the Soviet overnment regarding the United States balloon peration has been satisfied by the United States overnment's decision conveyed in its note of ebruary 8, provisionally to suspend the release f balloons which could transit Soviet territory. hus in view of the cognizance taken by the United tates Government of Soviet objections, there ould appear to be no scientific or other reasonable urpose which would be served by exhibits of the ature proposed by the Soviet Government. The nited States Government can only assume that ursuit of this matter through exhibits or other eans would be for propaganda ends apparently ntended to exacerbate the international atmos-here.

While perceiving no constructive purpose in the ype of exhibit proposed by the Soviet Govern-ent, the United States Government, in order to romote progress in an area of interest to all Gov-rnments, is willing to work out internationally rough cooperative arrangements with the Soviet overnment and other interested Governments, a oint program for the utilization of techniques and quipment, including the type of balloons referred in the Soviet note, which it has developed in eteorological research. It is the tentative view of the United States Government that the facilities of the World Meteorological Organization might appropriately be utilized in giving effect to this proposal.

TEXT OF SOVIET NOTE OF FEBRUARY 18

[Unofficial translation]

In connection with the note of the United States Government of February 8, which is an answer to the note of the Soviet Government of February 4 concerning the question of the release of American balloons in the air space of the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Government considers it necessary to state the following:

In its note of February 4 the Soviet Government directed the attention of the United States Government to the fact that a great quantity of American balloons with apparatus suspended from them, which included automatic operating cameras for aerial photography of terrain, radio transmitters, radio receivers, and other things, had been captured in the Soviet Union. By this note the Soviet Government demanded that the United States take measures to cease release of such balloons in the air space of the Soviet Union.

In its answering note the United States Government does not deny that American balloons were released in the air space of the Soviet Union. But, at the same time, an argument not justifying the violation of air space is advanced, namely that flights of air balloons are not dangerous for aerial communications.

In view of this, the Soviet Government again points out that the release of such balloons in the air space of the U.S.S.R. is a gross violation of the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union and generally accepted norms of international law, and lodges its protest against it.

In addition, numerous data at the disposition of the Soviet Government and also statements by the governments of a number of other European countries in this regard bear witness to the fact that flights of American balloons are a serious threat both for air transport and for the population of the districts above which these balloons fly. It is clear to all that a collision of an airplane with a balloon bearing a cargo weighing up to 650 kilograms threatens unavoidable catastrophe. It is obvious also that two boxes, suspended to a large metal beam, with ballast with overall weights of 200 to 300 kilograms freely falling from great height due to so-called automatic destruction of balloon, can damage buildings, telephones, electricity wires, and various equipment, and cause human injuries. From the facts set forth, it follows that the statement of the United States Government to the effect that American balloons released in the air space of the U.S.S.R. are no danger to air transport contradicts accurately established factual data relating to balloons and their equipment.

In the note of the United States Government there is also included a further assertion to the effect that balloons outfitted with the apparatus indicated above in general are intended only for meteorological research. An examination of the equipment suspended to air balloons

carried out by Soviet experts shows that the release of these balloons in the air space of the U.S.S.R. has nothing in common with meteorological research but pursues a completely different aim. Suffice it to say that not one of the numerous balloons captured in the Soviet Union has any kind of apparatus intended for measurement of basic meteorological elements—atmospheric pressure, temperature, humidity of air, and others.

Film with pictures of the territory of the Soviet Union revealed in the cameras of balloons caught in the U.S.S.R. bears witness to the fact that the real purpose of these balloons sent into the air space of the Soviet Union by American military organs is aerial photography of the territory of the Soviet Union.

Representatives of the foreign press and diplomatic corps in Moscow had an opportunity personally to convince themselves of this by examining the equipment of the American balloons which were displayed at a special exhibition in Moscow.

Inasmuch as in the note of the United States Government there is expressed a point of view differing from the conclusions based on indisputable data in the possession of the Soviet authorities, the Government of the U.S.S.R. proposes to organize in New York, Washington, London, or Paris, if agreement to this will be forthcoming from the governments of the states in question, exhibitions of the air balloons and apparatus suspended from them captured in the U.S.S.R. Inasmuch as the Soviet Union has at its disposal a large quantity of captured air balloons, the Soviet Government expresses its willingness to organize similar exhibits also in other countries, in the event of the agreement of the governments of these states, if there is need to be convinced of the soundness of the assertions made by the Soviet Government.

If the United States Government considers this proposal acceptable, the Soviet Government is ready to send to these exhibits Soviet experts who could give the necessary explanations concerning the equipment displayed and furnish other information concerning the flight of these balloons over the territory of the U.S.S.R.

The Soviet Government considers familiarization by specialists and public opinion with exhibitions of this type will make it possible for them to be clearly convinced as to the purpose for which these air balloons captured in the U.S.S.R. were intended and whether or not they constitute a danger for air transport and population.

The Soviet Government takes note of the declaration of the United States Government that it will for its part take the necessary measures to prevent the further release of air balloons which might fly over the territory of the U.S.S.R.

Balloon Flights in Eastern Europe

U.S./U.N. press release 2353 dated February 10

The following communication was transmitted on February 11 to the Secretary-General by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. Representative to the United Nations.

I have the honor to refer to communications a dressed to the Secretary-General by the gover ments of several states in Eastern Europe[1] co cerning reported flights of balloons over their te ritories.

These communications resemble a note prev ously received by the U.S. Government from tl Soviet Union. All of them are based on a mi construction of facts. The U.S. Government February 8 explained its position and set for the true facts in this matter in a reply to the Sovi Union which has been made public.

Therefore, and in view of the relationship b tween the actions taken by the Governments of tl Soviet Union and the aforementioned countries Eastern Europe, further statements by the Go ernment of the United States do not appear to l required at this time.

I request that this letter be circulated to all stat members of the United Nations.

Color Television Demonstrations for Foreign Visitors

Press release 103 dated February 29

A program of color television demonstration organized jointly by Government and industi for the benefit of visiting engineers from abroa will open in New York City on March 5, 1956.

This event has been arranged at the request representatives of countries holding membershi in the television study group of the Internation Radio Consultative Committee of the Intern tional Telecommunication Union, a specializ agency of the United Nations with headquarte at Geneva. The purpose of the demonstratio is to afford radio and television engineers fro other countries an opportunity to collect info mation on different color systems being studied in service in countries which have made the grea est technological advances, to facilitate the d velopment of systems in their own countrie Similar demonstrations for the same group engineers will be staged at Paris, London, an The Hague immediately following the U. demonstrations.

The Department of State, which is primari responsible for this Government's participation i

[1] Albania, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia. The text the Bulgarian communication was released by the Unit Nations on Feb. 9.

e International Telecommunication Union, has cured the cooperation of industry's top execu-ves and outstanding television and electronics gineers in arranging a full program of demon-rations, lectures, and discussion for the approxi-ately 100 experts expected to attend from about countries. The Federal Communications ommission and the U.N. Secretariat are also nding their support to the occasion.

Site of the opening day's proceedings on March 5 will be the U.N. Headquarters, after which come several days of visits to company installations in and around New York. Delegates will return to the United Nations on March 13 for a final day devoted to technical discussion and spend the remainder of that week in further plant visits at the invitation of participating companies.

.S. Trade Policy and Problems

by Robert D. Coe
Ambassador to Denmark [1]

I know very few countries which are so trade-nded as Denmark. I have traveled now in See-nd and Fyn and Jutland—and on several of your aller islands. In every town I have visited I ve discovered that employers and employees ke, in industry, agriculture, and commerce, are enly interested in world trade and very well formed about world trade developments. I ve also discovered that, when you Danes think trade, you think in terms of expanding trade, lowering trade barriers, of buying as well as ling. You believe that the ship which sails into rhus Bay loaded with a foreign cargo can be t as profitable to you as the ship which sails ay, carrying good Danish hams—and, of course, e cheese.

I have felt very much at home in this atmos-ere. My own country, in the last three decades, s become one of the world's great trading na-ns. In that time we have also become firmly nmitted to the belief that trade is most profita- when it flows freely—in both directions.

The production of the free world's goods and vices has shown a remarkable expansion in the t 5 years. In the same period there has been de great progress in raising the level of trade l lowering the barriers to trade. We believe t free-world production will continue to rise—t each year more and better goods and services will be produced. We believe that the free nations can best share in this increased production—and contribute to further increases—if these goods and services can be traded as freely as possible. Those beliefs are at the basis of our trade policy.

I have no doubt you remember the Marshall plan, which the United States sponsored in the postwar period. It has been mentioned many times and I shall not name it again, but that plan was an effort by the United States to assist in expanding free-world production. We helped to rebuild industries, to restore transportation and power facilities. We sent American technicians abroad. We invited foreign technicians to visit the United States. Were we foolish to do all this—to help raise production in other countries? After all, Denmark and the other nations of the world are our competitors. You compete with us in world markets. We believe that we were not foolish. We believe that in an expanding world economy there is room for all of us, that, as each nation prospers and increases its production and raises its purchasing power, we and the other nations of the free world will also prosper. We believe that competition in world markets is healthy.

Reducing Barriers to World Trade

We have done and are doing all we can to help create conditions of healthy competition in world markets. The United States is active in the

[1] Address delivered before the Provincial Chamber of nmerce at Aarhus, Denmark, on Feb. 1.

several international agencies and agreements which are working to reduce the barriers to world trade and to facilitate the multilateral flow of goods and capital. One of these is the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], and at this moment Denmark and the United States and some 30 other nations are negotiating at Geneva, trying by mutual concessions further to eliminate trade barriers. In his 1956 economic message to the Congress President Eisenhower recommended early passage of legislation authorizing United States membership in the proposed new international agency—the Organization for Trade Cooperation.[2]

One of the most important trade barriers, of course, is a nation's tariff structure. Now, one's opinion about a tariff, as I learned last week from the Copenhagen papers, depends very much on one's point of view. It seems that any tariff is a bad thing if another country is putting it up against one's own country; on the other hand, it seems that a tariff may sometimes be a very good thing if one's own country is putting it up against other countries. Viewed from the point of view of world trade, however, a prohibitively high tariff is a bad thing. The United States recognizes this and, by its own direct actions and by multilateral negotiations, it has made great progress in lowering its own tariffs. We have been engaged in this progress for quite a few years.

It was in 1934 that the American Congress first enacted a Trade Agreements Act. In the 22 years since that act we have reduced by 50 percent the average rate on all our dutiable imports. We have steadily lowered duties until the average duty on all United States imports is now less than 6 percent. The United States has in fact become one of the low-tariff countries of the world. This statement may surprise many of you. I think it is not generally known that in this period the United States has actually cut its tariffs in half. These cuts, I may add, have not always been easy. We also have a textile industry, and we have thousands of other industries, and these industries sometimes objected strongly to tariff cuts. Our Congress persisted, however, and, in fact, has gone steadily on to make further tariff reductions possible.

There was enacted last year legislation authorizing the President to reduce tariff rates, by negotiations, by 5 percent per year over a period 3 years. We are negotiating these reductions the GATT meeting now in progress at Geneva.

[2] BULLETIN of Feb. 13, 1956, p. 254.

Simplifying Customs Procedures

The United States has also taken far-reach steps of its own to open up the American marl to make it easier for our merchants to buy as w as sell. Complicated customs procedures sometimes obstruct trade; and so we have tal steps to simplify and clarify our customs p cedures, and we expect to go further in that rection. The amount of foreign goods which e American tourist can bring home free of duty been increased from $300 to $500, and Presid Eisenhower has recommended that it be increa further to $1,000. We have liberalized, in fa of foreign suppliers, the terms of the regulati which permit these foreign suppliers to bid United States Government purchases and c tracts. We have sought, under our offshore p curement program, to place in foreign count orders for military equipment destined for common defense. We have encouraged the f of American private investment capital abroa

Have these measures been effective? Have in fact made it easier for you and other nati to sell to the United States? I think the tr figures themselves are the best answer. In 1 merchandise imports into the United States estimated at about $11 billion. This is just un 80 billion kroner. It is nearly 10 percent m than our imports in 1954, and it is nearly 4 ti the average of United States imports of the p war period.

We are buying more and, most important to y we are buying more from Denmark. In 1955, D ish exports to the United States, including armed forces in Europe, are estimated at 530 lion kroner. This compares to 490 million in 19 to 119 million in 1950, and to an annual aver of only 17 million in the years 1935–38. These ures are not in terms of constant prices, but ne theless you are now selling to the United St approximately 10 times as much as you sold be the war. The United States has now become D mark's third best customer.

These are impressive figures. They are equ impressive evidence of the aims and the direct of American trade policy. I suspect, howe that at this point some of you may be think

his is all very fine, but what about blue cheese, fifty-fifty clause, the surplus butter sales?"

In my country we have a very popular form of stry which is called a doughnut. It is a cir-lar piece of pastry with a round hole in the ddle. We often define a pessimist as a man o sees only the hole in the doughnut and not doughnut itself. I believe you in Denmark fine a pessimist as a man who sees only the les in a cheese. In any case, speaking candidly, sometimes seems to me that critics of American nmercial policy ignore the great strides we have en to break down trade barriers and concen-te instead upon the relatively few measures we ve found it necessary to take to protect Ameri-n industry, agriculture, and shipping. Such asures exist, of course. They exist in every ntry. But they are not typical. To concen-te upon them means missing the much more ical and positive aspects of our overall trade licy. It means seeing only the hole and not doughnut—or the cheese.

Unfortunately, some of our measures do have, wever, a special importance for Danish-Ameri-n trade relations. I'd like, therefore, to be a ssimist myself for a few minutes; I'd like to nore the doughnut and to examine closely one two of the holes.

In any discussion of American trade policy, a w words and phrases constantly recur. One of favorites is "escape clause," and it is usually ntioned along with Swiss watches and British cycles. There sometimes exists much misinfor-ation about this escape clause. It is a clause hich permits the President, upon recommenda-n from the Tariff Commission, to restore the ts made in certain tariffs if a domestic American dustry can establish that, as a result of the low-ed tariff, imports have increased to a point where ey are causing serious injury to the industry. other words, the escape clause operates only ter tariff cuts have already been made. This use has been on our statute books for 7 years. that time, from all the thousands of industries the United States there have been only about applications for restoration of tariff cuts. The riff Commission has recommended restoration tariff cuts in only 16 of these cases. The Presi-nt has acted to restore the cuts in only 6 cases.

One of these cases was the famous bicycle case. that case the United States tariff in question d been cut from 30 percent to 7½ percent. Imports of bicycles rose from 2 percent of U.S. consumption in 1949 to over 58 percent in 1955. The domestic industry was seriously injured, and, upon recommendation from the Tariff Commission, the President restored a part, but only a part, of the tariff cut. He restored it to 11¼ percent on lightweight bicycles, which constituted the bulk of the imports. After the dust had settled it was realized that this new tariff of 11 percent is still a considerable drop from the earlier tariff of 30 percent and that it is one of the lowest bicycle tariffs maintained by a bicycle-producing country.

Taken all together, the commodities affected by this and the other escape-clause actions represented only a very small fraction of our trade, and yet they were given much publicity. Such cases are bound to happen again, and it is fair to expect foreign producers to protest again. When these cases occur, however, it ought to be remembered that they occur only because of the far more important fact that sizeable reductions in tariffs have occurred first. With that in mind you will appreciate that the escape clause is a necessary safety valve to prevent us going too far and too fast in any given tariff cut. Without such a safety valve it would be impossible for us to proceed with our general policy of tariff reduction.

Disposal of Agricultural Surpluses

One aspect of our trade policy which I know is of particular interest to you people of Aarhus concerns our program for the disposal of agricultural surpluses.

We have in the United States, as you know very well, great surpluses of certain agricultural products, including dairy products. These came about because of the tremendous and worldwide demand for food and fiber which existed in the war years and the years immediately following. The need was very great and, providentially, the United States was in a position to supply this need. We urged our farmers on, using all kinds of incentives, and we expanded our agricultural production greatly. Our ability to produce the food the world needed was a factor in the final victory, in limiting much of the postwar starvation, and in bolstering the free world in its painful task of reconstruction.

The result of this tremendous effort, however, has been that we now have production in excess of effective demand and we have surpluses. I

know and appreciate your anxieties about our dairy surpluses. I have discussed them with leaders of Danish agriculture on previous visits to Jutland. I was impressed then with the understanding which these men have of our problem.

What are we going to do with these surpluses? Well, one thing we are not going to do is to undermine world markets. In fact, it is exactly because of our refusal to throw these goods on the world market at cutthroat prices that our problem of disposal exists.

We are attacking the problem in several ways. We have introduced flexible price supports, reducing the incentive to the farmer so that he diverts his acreage to other uses. In a special message to Congress last month,[3] President Eisenhower recommended a bold new plan under which an area of 16 million hectares would be retired from crop and livestock production and used in connection with soil conservation programs. This area is 6 times the area of all of Denmark's cultivated land. By such means as these we expect to hold down the accumulation of surpluses.

But what about the dairy surpluses already on hand? Our cheese surpluses are down from 436 million pounds to 250 million; our stocks of butter are now down from 466 million pounds to 45 millions; our dried skim milk stocks have gone from 600 million pounds to almost nothing. Much of these stocks were disposed of in the American market, but we have also disposed of considerable quantities in world markets. Throughout the period we have been doing so, the traditional exporters of dairy products have been enjoying capacity exports and, in fact, have frequently been unable to meet foreign demand. It seems fair to conclude that we have disposed of these surpluses without unduly disrupting world markets.

Where commercial sales have taken place in foreign markets, they have been made at competitive world prices. Following a recent sale of United States surplus butter to Germany, there were charges that we were undermining the Danish market in that country. I am informed that the wholesale price of this butter in the German market is now 5.90 to 6.00 D. marks per kilo as against 6.15 to 6.20 D. marks for Danish butter in the same market. This is a price difference of only 4½ percent. I believe that this can hardly be called unfair competition. I am also informed that the demand in Germany which this butter is intend to satisfy is in part a newly arisen demand, a d mand which has now appeared as a result increases in the German standard of living. this is the case, it seems inaccurate to suggest th the United States sale has forced traditional su pliers out of the German market. As a matter fact, I am told by our Embassy in Bonn that, spite of a slight delay, Germany expects to proce with its planned butter purchases from tradition suppliers in the first quarter of 1956.

This German sale illustrates the principl which have guided our agricultural export p icy. Our sales have been competitive, in pri and in quality. Our sales have been made at time or in a place where the circumstances we such that our sales would not cause loss of marke to traditional suppliers.

I appreciate that nevertheless you may ha apprehensions. I assure you that we are rea always to talk facts in Copenhagen or in Was ington. We will not engage in any cutthroat ra for markets. We will not break or unduly d rupt markets. We are interested in fair play.

Import Quotas

We have in the United States import quotas a few and only a few commodities. One of the is a Danish product well known to you, a produ which I may have the pleasure of eating lat tonight. In connection with this blue-chee quota, I would like to point out a fact which often overlooked, namely, that our price suppo program, which led to our surpluses and, in tu to our import quotas, is also the very thing whi has made the American market so attractive to e porters of these products. In other words, if did not have the price supports which have ma us establish the import quota on blue cheese a which keep American prices high, you might n have been impelled to enter the market. We ha in a very real sense, created the market. I wou like to remind you, too, of a much more importa fact. In spite of quotas, exports of all kinds Danish cheese to the United States and our arm forces totaled 17.5 million kroner in 1955. This the highest figure on record. It is a tribute Danish export enterprise and an indication American willingness to buy a fine product—wit out regard to its foreign origin.

You may recall the famous joke about the e

[3] H. Doc. 285, 84th Cong., 2d sess.

ınt. A German was asked to write about the phant and he wrote a treatise about the philo-hical importance of the elephant. A French-n wrote about the elephant's love life. The tisher described an elephant hunt. I sometimes nk, after almost 3 years in Denmark, that if I e asked to write about the elephant I would duce a paper entitled, "The Elephant and the 50 Shipping Clause."

am sure you know that the 50–50 clause is a troversial subject in my own country and that tain groups there are very much interested in repeal. Because of this controversy it would be proper for me to comment upon the merits he clause. The clause should be seen, however, much larger context.

know how important shipping is to Denmark, I know how fine your ships are. I came here night on one of them. I also know that you not subsidize your merchant marine. If we are ave a merchant marine, however, it is necessary us, because of our high labor and other costs, to sidize it heavily. In the light of the experience he last war, we consider a moderate merchant rine absolutely essential to our defense. We sider also that it is absolutely essential to the ense of our friends in the free world.

Our subsidies are aimed at maintaining this derate merchant marine. We are not expand-it. On the contrary, we have laid away many ps in costly "mothballs," as we call them, again the defense of the free world. All this costs American taxpayer a great deal of money, and 50–50 clause was devised by the Congress as a d of subsidy which was considered to be least densome to the American taxpayer. The clause plied at first only to those shipments made as t of United States direct aid programs—and y to 50 percent of those. Surely this was not easonable. It has since been extended, but it l applies only to 50 percent of those shipments ich, in one way or another, are sponsored or nced by the Government. The clause has no plication to normal commercial shipments and, pite its existence, the percentage of total United tes foreign trade which is carried in foreign ps continues to rise. I am informed that this centage is now up to 75 percent.

would like to go on speaking frankly. I en't even mentioned some things, such as the port licensing and exchange control systems, ich many countries, including Denmark, main-tain. To do that, perhaps, would again be to look at holes—this time in the cheese! We believe that import licensing systems are, in most cases, more restrictive than tariffs. An importer knows what a tariff is, and he can plan accordingly. So can the foreign producer. An import licensing system can defeat trade completely and, unfortunately, most import licensing systems usually succeed in defeating to the greatest extent the trade which comes from my country. Denmark, for example, has liberalized 78 percent of its imports from the OEEC area but only 55 percent of its imports from the dollar area. Have you ever tried to buy an American orange or prune, an American cigarette, or an American shirt in Denmark? You can't. Your import licensing system keeps them out completely. This same situation often exists in other countries with import licensing systems. We regret this, and sometimes we do not understand it, particularly in view of the steady increase in dollar holdings in Denmark and other countries of the free world.

Now, however, I am looking at the holes. I would much prefer to look at the cheese. I appreciate the special circumstances which made import licensing systems necessary in many countries, and I recognize that, in some degree at least, they may still be necessary nuisances. It is heartening to see that these systems are gradually being relaxed in most countries. It was particularly encouraging for me to see that Denmark in the past year relaxed its own licensing system to allow more and more goods to enter freely from all parts of the free world, including the dollar area. United States exports to Denmark in 1955 reached almost 640 million kroner as compared with 400 million kroner in 1954. We are hopeful that this trend toward freer dollar trade in Denmark can continue.

Our trade policy, based on the belief that the common prosperity can best be achieved by a higher level of trade in an expanding and free world economy, is also based on the belief that progress toward those ends must be the concern of all the free nations. Each nation, on a reciprocal basis, must do its part. Each nation must have a share in the general effort to raise world standards of living and to free world trade. I can assure you that so far as the United States is concerned we will continue to do our part. We are unalterably convinced that our well-being and prosperity depend upon the common well-being and prosperity.

United Efforts To Meet the World Agricultural Situation

EIGHTH CONFERENCE OF THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, ROME, NOVEMBER 4–25, 1955

by Earl L. Butz

Some 400 delegates representing 71 member nations of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations met at Rome from November 4 to 25, 1955, for the 8th Conference of the Organization. The United States delegation was composed of Members of Congress, representatives of farm, forestry, and fisheries organizations, and officials of the executive branch of the Government. The congressional representatives were Victor L. Anfuso and Clifford R. Hope.

Unlike previous Conferences, this session faced an appraisal of FAO's activities not only for the 2 years that had elapsed since the 7th Conference in November 1953, but also for the 10 years since the Organization came into being in October 1945. The Conference's principal job, then, was to evaluate the work that had been done by FAO during the past decade and to project its activities to fit the agricultural situation that faces the world today and that is likely to face it in the future.

The delegates had as a basis for their deliberations the Organization's 1955 10-year review and outlook report, *The State of Food and Agriculture.* The report pointed out the remarkable progress that has been made in technical methods of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries and in their utilization; the developments in member countries in social and economic fields; the increasing awar ness of the problems of nutrition and nutrition requirements; the progress that has been made many countries toward the coordinated prograr ing and development of agricultural resources. showed how widespread schemes of land refor and especially measures of price support, ha given to farmers in many countries a high degree of security and economic stability.

The report pointed out that, as a result of the and other developments, world per capita agı cultural production had regained its prewar lev despite a drop of from 10 to 15 percent at the er of the war and an increase of nearly 25 perce in world population. But it also showed th production has increased more rapidly in advanc countries than in underdeveloped countries, so th per capita production in Asia and Latin Ameri is still below prewar, while surpluses have bui up in the more advanced countries.

Thus, the situation the delegates had to de with in 1955 was basically the same as in 195 with surpluses in some countries and continuir undernourishment in others. This situation, tl Conference decided, was evidence of a failure expand effective demand for farm products rapidly as technical developments made it po sible to expand production.

Based on the report and their own assessmen of the situation, the delegates concluded, therefo that it was important to give much greater atte tion to raising consumption levels. They adopt a resolution calling on governments to exami their policies affecting consumption levels and n

• *Mr. Butz, author of the above article, is Assistant Secretary of Agriculture. He was chairman of the U.S. delegation to the 8th FAO Conference.*

ional needs. The resolution also asked the rector-General of FAO to examine the structure distribution costs and ways of reducing them, l to aid member governments in strengthening sumer education and in increasing the efficiency marketing food and agricultural products.

blem of Surpluses

Along with greater attention to expanding conption in order to improve nutrition and utilize ndant production, the Conference recomnded action aimed at preventing development additional surpluses. It recognized that furr expansion of production was essential, in view the rapid growth of population and rising ndards of living, but stressed, as it had at the nference in 1953, that any further expansion uld be selective, taking into account both exted market demand and nutritional needs.

The Conference also flagged the problem of tching production and demand. Member governments were reminded of their responsibility help farmers adjust their output, particularly removing such obstacles as restrictive trade ctices and by modifying price policies when se policies favor expansion in directions where s no longer required. And it concluded that: n expansion of production, particularly for ext, which had developed primarily under the lter of high support prices in other countries likely to be precarious."

This conclusion reflected a warning by U.S. retary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson when, message to the Conference,[1] he said:

> some nations today many of us fear that present ds are leading toward "quick return" attitudes, tod single-crop rather than balanced agricultural econes. We see new agricultural production springing up ome countries, not because it is economically justified only because it can creep under the umbrella-like ection of the United States price support program. I must assure you that any production based on such of short-term benefits may sooner or later find its ecting umbrella withdrawn.

Recognizing that flexibility of production was erned in some cases by various systems of supting agricultural prices, the delegates agreed to the Director-General to bring together a group experts nominated by their governments to ly various methods of maintaining farm ines, their effectiveness, and their effect on flexibility of production, consumption levels, and levels of international trade.

Turning from considering how to expand consumption to use surpluses and adjust production to prevent them, the delegates discussed immediate problems of surplus disposal. The Conference approved the development of principles of surplus disposal by the Organization's Committee on Commodity Problems. These principles had been formally accepted by 37 FAO member governments. It also approved the work of the Consultative Subcommittee on Surplus Disposal, which meets at Washington as a forum for airing any problems that member nations want to bring up on surpluses.

Delegates expressed keen interest in the use of surpluses for aiding economic development. In the discussion, based on a pilot study FAO had made in India, the United States made the point that existing U.S. legislation, Public Law 480, provided for using our surpluses for this purpose. The Conference called the attention of other governments to this possible use of surpluses.

The Conference drew conclusions on a number of other parts of the total world food and agriculture situation, such as farm income, agricultural credit, and a number of specific commodity situations. And it increased the membership of the Committee on Commodity Problems from 20 to 24.

The Budget

Another major job of the Conference was to approve the Organization's program of work and budget for the next 2 years. As agreed in advance, the Conference undertook early in the session to establish the level of the budget before dividing into commissions and committees for determining the Organization's future activities. The Director-General had presented the Conference a proposed program of work calling for a budget level of $7,020,000 for 1956, and $7,187,000 for 1957.

The problem of establishing the budget turned out to be the most controversial issue of the Conference. A number of delegations wanted to accept the level as proposed by the Director-General. Others, particularly those whose contributions form the larger proportion of the total budget, favored lower amounts.

After considerable debate on the question a figure of $6,600,000 was voted for 1956, and $6,800,000 for 1957. More than half of the reductions came out of administrative services. One proposed new

[1] BULLETIN of Dec. 5, 1955, p. 934.

project (on international fisheries regulations) was eliminated, and initiation of several new activities was postponed.

Thus, the budget established will enable the Organization to carry out its program substantially as the Director-General had proposed. This program, in addition to an expansion of programs already under way, includes a number of new activities: The Organization will engage in the collection and distribution of information on the peaceful uses of atomic energy in agriculture and food production as a part of the collective endeavor of the U.N. and the specialized agencies; increase its emphasis on milk and child nutrition in cooperation with the United Nations Children's Fund; expand its participation in certain joint activities with other international organizations; institute a program of research fellowships; and begin a survey and appraisal of world agricultural, forestry, and fisheries resources in relation to nutrition.

The United States agreed to increase its contribution from 30 percent to 31½ percent for 1956 and 1957 and to 33⅓ percent beginning in 1958 at a meeting of a working party on the FAO scale of contributions, which met at Rome in March 1955. The agreement was made with two provisos, however—one, that if other countries join FAO the United States would expect to share the benefits of additional contributions of new members; the other, that the ceiling of $2 million established by Congress on the U.S. contribution to FAO would not be exceeded. The Conference approved the scale of contributions on essentially the basis recommended by the working party.

While the U.S. assessment for each of the next 2 years will be 31½ percent, this does not mean that the United States will contribute 31½ percent of the total FAO budget. Miscellaneous income that FAO gets from sources such as investment of funds in the Working Capital Fund is deducted from the total before the assessments are applied to member governments. The estimated miscellaneous income for 1956 and 1957 is $140,000 per year. In addition, the United States has an excess credit of $212,396 from funds remaining in the Working Capital Fund at the end of December 1954. Thus, the U.S. contribution for both years will be less than the current legislative ceiling.

FAO will have about $8 million available for technical assistance work in 1956—the largest amount since the program began 5 years ago. This fund is allocated from the U.N. Special Account for the Expanded Technical Assistance Program and is in addition to the $6,600,000 budget for the regular program.

The Director-General proposed, and the Conference agreed, that there should be closer integration between the activities financed from FAO's regular budget and those financed from the Expanded Technical Assistance Program. The Conference also agreed that the Council and the Conference should be given greater opportunity to consider the planning, development, and execution of FAO technical assistance activities, even though the ultimate approval of the program lay in the hands of the U.N. Economic and Social Council and the U.N. General Assembly.

The Conference also laid emphasis upon the value that may be derived from regional technical assistance programs and requested the Director-General to press the Technical Assistance Board to raise the proportion of ETAP funds permitted to be used by FAO for regional projects.

SUNFED

The Conference adopted a resolution urging the establishment of a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development within the U.N. a plan for providing grants and low-interest loans to promote the economic development of underdeveloped countries. This has been under discussion in the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly for the past 5 years. The resolution was passed over the opposition of the United States and a number of other countries, including the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand; in the final voting, the United States as well as the above group of countries abstained.

United States opposition to the resolution was based on two factors: first, that this Conference was not the appropriate place for such a resolution; second, that the United States felt that adoption of the resolution could and probably would be misinterpreted—that it would raise hopes in some countries of early availability of aid or credit which is likely not to be immediately forthcoming. Oris V. Wells, speaking for the United States delegation, warned that—

> . . . we think the adoption of this resolution could well turn out to be a cruel deception. It will also focus attention upon the possible use of outside aid rather than concentrating major attention upon what member nations

l their own nationals may themselves do . . . we think t this is where the major problem and the major hope successful economic development center.

ison With the U.N.

The Conference adopted a resolution, which was roduced jointly by the United States and Can-a, indicating that the Director-General might ly utilize the services of the North American gional Office in maintaining and strengthening ison with the United Nations. In so doing the rector-General could prescribe procedures which uld allow an appropriate officer stationed at N. headquarters to maintain direct communica-ns with FAO headquarters at Rome, and at the ne time also prescribe procedures to assure effec-e working relationships between such an officer l the North American Regional Office.

mmittee To Examine Work of Council and nding Committees

Another resolution—also introduced by the ited States jointly with other countries—for pointing an *ad hoc* committee to look into the ctions of the various policymaking bodies of o was approved. The committee will seek ways achieve economies and greater efficiency in the erations of the Council, the Coordinating Com-ttee, the Committee on Financial Control, and Committee on Commodity Problems. The ited States will be a member of this committee ng with five other countries and an independent irman, Sir Donald Vandepeer, former Per-nent Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture l Fisheries of the United Kingdom.

uncil Elections

S. A. Hasnic, Secretary of the Ministry of Food l Agriculture of Pakistan, was unanimously cted as independent chairman of the FAO Coun-for the next 2 years. He succeeded Josue de stro of Brazil, who had held the office since 51. The Council is the governing body of FAO ween biennial sessions of the Conference.

Sixteen vacancies on the 24-member FAO Council re also filled by elections—8 to take office im-diately after the Conference, and 8 on January 1957. The United States, whose membership uld expire at the end of 1956, was reelected ng with Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Italy, pan, the Philippines, and Spain. Belgium, Brazil, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Syria, Turkey, and the Union of South Africa replace other members on the Council. The remaining 8 countries, whose terms do not expire until the next Conference in November 1957, are Australia, Costa Rica, Egypt, France, India, Sweden, Switzerland, and Thailand.

The United Kingdom, whose term expired at this session of the Conference, was not reelected. This is the first time since the Council's beginning in September 1947 that the U.K. has not been elected to a seat on the Council. Following the announcement of the results of the elections, Francis Deak, spokesman for the United States delegation, led off with a statement of profound regret that the United Kingdom was eliminated from the Council. A large number of other delegates followed with similar statements of regret.

Associate Membership

The Conference approved amendments to the constitution to provide for admission as associate members of FAO territories or groups of territories that are not responsible for the conduct of their international relations. The constitutional amendments on this delicate question had been painstakingly developed and considered by the FAO Council during the 2 years intervening since the last Conference. Even so, the Conference, through its Committee on Constitutional and Legal Questions, devoted long hours to debate on many of the same points that had been labored so heavily in the Council.

As finally approved, the amendments provide that associate members will participate with member nations in the activities of the Organization, except that they will not have the right to vote or hold office in the Conference or its commissions and committees and will not be eligible for election to the Council or to the committees whose members are chosen by election.

New Member

Tunisia became the 72d member of FAO at this Conference. Full membership for the North African state was proposed by France when that country decided that the associate membership provisions were too restricted for Tunisia. The Conference admitted the new member by a vote of 33 to 4, with 26 countries abstaining.

Tenth Anniversary Observance

On November 4, the opening day of the Conference, a special plenary session was devoted to a commemoration of FAO's 10th anniversary. Representative Clifford R. Hope of Kansas, who has been associated with FAO's activities since its beginning in October 1945, was chosen as the spokesman for North America. Mr. Hope spoke on "The Economic Aspects of FAO in a Changing World." Other speakers were Emilio Colombo, the Italian Minister of Agriculture, Joaquin M. Elizalde of the Philippines, and André Mayer of France. Dr. Antonio Segni, Prime Minister of Italy, attended the commemoration observance.

Opening of 12-Nation Talks on Atomic Energy Agency

The following was released to the press on February 27 by the Working Level Meeting on the draft statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The first session of the Working Level Meeting to consider the text of the statute for an International Atomic Energy Agency convened on February 27 at the Department of State. Ambassador James J. Wadsworth, chairman of the United States delegation, took the chair and welcomed the representatives of the 11 other nations on behalf of the United States as host. The other chairmen of delegations are: Sir Percy Spender, Australian Ambassador; Pierre Ryckmans, Belgian Commissioner of Atomic Energy; João Carlos Muniz, Brazilian Ambassador; A. D. P. Heeney, Canadian Ambassador; Ambassador Pavel Winkler, Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Maurice Couve de Murville, French Ambassador; Dr. H. J. Bhabha, Secretary to the Government of India, Department of Atomic Energy; Luis Esteves Fernandes, Portuguese Ambassador; J. E. Holloway, South African Ambassador; Georgi N. Zaroubin, Soviet Ambassador; and Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador.

The purpose of the meeting is to produce for submission to a future international conference a text for the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency first proposed by President Eisenhower in a speech made before the United Nations General Assembly on December 8, 1953. Consideration is being given at this meeting to o servations made during discussions at the Ten General Assembly of the United Nations in D cember 1955 and to comments received from stat not represented in the meeting which have r viewed the draft statute circulated on August 2 1955.[1] The discussions are being held in priva in order to facilitate a full and frank exchange views and rapid progress toward the goal of agreed statute.

Political and Economic Developments in Ruanda-Urundi

Statement by Benjamin Gerig[2]

After examining the annual report of the Go ernment of Belgium on its administration of t Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi[3] and the su plementary explanations presented by the Speci Representative, my delegation considers that pro ress generally is being made. However, in certa aspects of political development—and also in t field of educational development—certain que tions remain in our mind.

Though we appreciate that the administrati accepts the principle of closer union between t two *pays* of Ruanda and Urundi, we wond whether sufficiently concrete plans are being d veloped to bring about such union. We fully re ognize that efforts to unite peoples who have be ethnically, historically, and traditionally distin for so many years is no easy job. In developi the two *pays* toward the objectives of self-gover ment—either as a unitary state or within t framework of a federal union—we would ur that continued and diligent efforts be made to a custom the inhabitants to more democratic met ods, with a constantly broadening electoral ba and that continued efforts be made to show the a vantages of closer union of these two *pays*.

We believe that political development should given due emphasis in the plans of all administe ing authorities. We wonder whether in Ruand Urundi political development is in fact keepi

[1] For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 24, 1955, p. 666.

[2] Made in the Trusteeship Council on Feb. 16 (U.S./U press release 2355). Mr. Gerig is deputy U.S. represe ative to the Council; Mason Sears, the U.S. representati is currently President of the Council.

[3] U.N. doc. T/1201.

e with the steps being taken in economic and ial development.

Ve are convinced that continued expansion of powers and functions of the various councils oughout the territory will be an important step vard political advancement. It is worthy of e that the native councils set up in 1952 have tinued to function and that the two High Coun- s of Ruanda and Urundi have been active and erested in the administration of local affairs. e fact that the Mwami are no longer exerting rights of individual decision in the High uncils is a development of importance. My egation hopes that the councils will continue develop in a more representative manner and t the aims of the administration will be to es- lish as soon as possible a direct electorate ipted to local conditions on the basis of adult frage.

Ly delegation wishes to commend the admin- ration on its continued efforts to abolish the ouhake" system [4]—a project requiring great ience and effort. As the system progressively ninishes, we hope that it will be possible to ablish a meat industry within the territory.

In noting the various economic programs, my egation would like to commend the administra- n on its efforts to improve the standard of liv- for inhabitants of the trust territory—par- ularly its efforts to tackle the soil erosion and orestation problem and to provide adequate inage and water supply. We agree that the roduction of manioc as a food product, which be stored in the ground for 2½ years, will be pful in avoiding possible future famines. We re glad to learn of the pilot projects initiated both *pays* to study the biological balance be- en man, earth, vegetation, water, and cattle l will await their findings with great interest.

Ly delegation hopes that the imminent estab- ment of the Ruzizi hydroelectric plant will a decided help in initiating secondary indus- es and that efforts will be made to train the in- enous inhabitants for increasingly responsible itions in such enterprises.

Ve were glad to see that the number of gain- ly employed has been increasing each year. feel that the rate of industrialization neces- y for dealing with the population problem is not yet satisfactory. But we think that, as the 10-year plan for economic and social development gets more fully under way, more opportunities for gainful employment will open up and a rapidly increasing number of the inhabitants will be able to make a living outside of agriculture.

The Administering Authority should be commended for carrying out the recommendation of the Trusteeship Council to abolish penal sanctions for breach of labor contracts—a measure which becomes effective in 1955.

While we appreciate that relations between management and employees can often be worked out through company unions, we feel nevertheless that, with growing industrialization taking place in the territory, unions on a wider industrial basis should be developed, and we have no doubt that the Administering Authority is fully aware of this problem and will give such unions all appropriate assistance.

Mr. President, my Government believes the Council should commend the Administering Authority for its fine achievements in the educational field. It seems to me that anyone who reads the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization's latest observations on the annual reports before us, contained in document T/1223 of February 1, 1956, would agree with our opinion on this point. These observations show that steadily rising appropriations are devoted to education (paragraph 4), that a remarkably high percentage of education funds are devoted to capital works (paragraph 6), that the total number of children at school has risen constantly and has more than doubled between 1950 and 1954 (paragraph 12), that the number of girls in school has steadily expanded to 27 percent of the total (paragraph 13), and that the expansion of vocational education is noted with satisfaction by UNESCO (paragraph 22). My delegation was also pleased to hear the Special Representative say that a second university is soon to be opened in the Congo, which will give Ruanda-Urundi students additional opportunities for higher education. These are all achievements of which Belgium may well be proud.

My delegation hopes that the day will not be too far distant when Ruanda-Urundi will have its own university to meet the growing needs of its dense population and expanding educational system. We also wish to commend the Administering Authority for its steady expansion of teacher

[4] The practice of holding cattle as a form of wealth her than for consumption.

training facilities and to express the hope that it will continue to give increasing attention to the need for more and more qualified teachers. Finally, Mr. Chairman, my delegation shares the view of the last two Visiting Missions that the advantages of higher education in Europe and the Americas far outweigh the disadvantages, and we hope that the Administering Authority will grant further scholarships for study abroad.

Mr. Bowman To Represent U.S. on ECOSOC Statistical Commission

The Department of State announced on February 28 (press release 99) that Raymond T. Bowman had been sworn in that day as representative of the United States on the Statistical Commission of the United Nations. Mr. Bowman's nomination was confirmed on February 9, 1956, and, in accordance with the requirement of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, will be submitted also for confirmation by the Council at its 21st session.

The Statistical Commission is one of eight functional commissions of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. The ninth session is scheduled to be held at Headquarters, New York, April 16 to May 4, 1956. Among the items on the agenda for this session are the following: general survey of developments in international statistics; statistics of capital formation; classification of government financial accounts; balance-of-payments statistics; external trade statistics; minimum program of economic and social statistics; and national accounts.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Economic and Social Council

Slavery. Comments received on the Draft Convention on the Abolition of Slavery and Servitude submitted by the Government of the United Kingdom. Belgium. E/2679/Add.5, January 6, 1956. 1 p. mimeo.

Action taken upon decisions reached by the Ninth Session of the Commission on the Status of Women, 14 March–1 April 1955. (Report prepared by the Secretary-General.) E/CN.6/278, January 18, 1956. 10 pp. mimeo.

Commission on the Status of Women. Information Concerning the Status of Women in Non-Self-Governing Territories. (Report by the Secretary-General). E/CN.6/279, January 20, 1956. 10 pp. mimeo.

Trusteeship Council

Provisional Agenda of the Seventeenth Session of the Trusteeship Council, to be convened at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 7 February 1956 at 11 a. m. T/1216, January 3, 1956. 33 pp. mimeo.

Social Conditions in Non-Self-Governing Territories. Note by the Secretary-General. T/1219, January 6, 1956. 1 p. mimeo.

Examination of the Annual Report on the Administration of Tanganyika, 1954. Note by the Secretary-General. T/1221, January 16, 1956. 4 pp. mimeo.

Examination of the Annual Report on the Administration of the Cameroons under British Administration, 1954. Note by the Secretary-General. T/1222, January 6, 1956. 7 pp. mimeo.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. Done at New York, June 4, 1954.[1]
Accession deposited: Viet-Nam, January 31, 1956.

Customs convention on temporary importation of private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954.[1]
Accession deposited: Viet-Nam January 31, 1956.

Cultural Property

Convention for protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict, and regulations of execution. Done at The Hague May 14, 1954.[1]
Ratification deposited: Yugoslovia, February 15, 1956.

Protocol for the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict. Done at The Hague May 14, 1954.[1]
Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, February 15, 1956.

Property

Convention for the protection of industrial property. Signed at London June 2, 1934. Entered into force August 1, 1938. 53 Stat. 1748.
Adherence effective: Spain, March 2, 1956.

Trade and Commerce

International convention to facilitate the importation of commercial samples and advertising material. Done at Geneva November 7, 1952. Entered into force November 20, 1955.[2]
Notification by Australia of extension to: Territory of Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea, February 12, 1956.
Senate advice and consent to ratification given: February 22, 1956.

[1] Not in force.
[2] Not in force for the United States.

otocol of organizational amendments to the General greement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva, larch 10, 1955.[4]
ignature: Belgium, February 16, 1956.[3]
reement on Organization for Trade Cooperation. Done t Geneva March 10, 1955.[4]
ignature: Belgium, February 16, 1956.[3]
otocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX f the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done t Geneva March 10, 1955.[4]
ignature: Belgium, February 16, 1956.[3]
otocol amending preamble and parts II and III of the eneral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at eneva March 10, 1955.[4]
ignature: Belgium, February 16, 1956.[3]
otocol of rectification to French text of the General greement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva une 15, 1955.[4]
ignatures: Belgium, February 16, 1956;[3] Australia, February 17, 1956.

BILATERAL

minican Republic

reement for a cooperative agriculture program pur- uant to the general agreement for technical coopera- ion of February 20, 1951 (TIAS 2226). Effected by xchange of notes at Ciudad Trujillo June 22 and 30. Entered into force June 30, 1955. TIAS 3420.
otice of intention to terminate given by the Dominican Republic: January 27, 1956 (in accordance with article XIV, para. 1, the agreement will terminate February 26, 1956).

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ricultural commodities agreement under title I of the gricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, s amended (68 Stat. 454; 69 Stat. 44, 721). Signed t Tehran February 20, 1956. Entered into force ebruary 20, 1956.

rkey

reement relating to passport visas and visa fees. Ef- ected by exchange of notes signed at Washington une 27, August 8, September 27, and October 11, 1955. Entered into force October 11, 1955.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

S. Mission to Coal and Steel Community

The Department of State announced on February 20 establishment of a U.S. mission to the European Coal l Steel Community at Luxembourg City, Luxembourg, ctive February 26, 1956.[1] Ambassador W. Walton tterworth has been designated U.S. Representative in rge of the U.S. mission.

[3] Signed "subject to ratification."
[4] Not in force.
[1] For an earlier announcement, see BULLETIN of Oct. 24, 5, p. 643.

Resignations

Avra M. Warren as Ambassador to Turkey, effective March 30.

PUBLICATIONS

Foreign Relations Volume

Press release 88 dated February 17

The Department of State on February 25 released *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1939, Volume I, General.* This volume is comprised entirely of the Department's documentary record of the events leading to the outbreak of World War II and the various aspects of that war. The great majority of the documents in this volume have not previously been published and tell graphically the events of that tragic year as seen by American diplomats.

The story of the coming of World War II is presented in 401 pages divided into eight chapters which cover speculation as to Axis designs, the occupation of Czechoslovakia by Germany, tension following that occupation, President Roosevelt's peace messages of April 14 to Germany and Italy, increasing German pressure on Poland, unsuccessful Anglo-French negotiations with the Soviet Union for an agreement on support against aggression, German-Soviet relations culminating in the Treaty of Nonaggression signed at Moscow on August 23, and final appeals for peace by President Roosevelt.

Of particular interest are the documents on the failure of British and French efforts to reach an acceptable understanding with the Soviet Government and the turning of the latter to a deal with Hitler. Stumbling blocks to an Anglo-French-Soviet agreement were reported to be: (1) the distrust by Poland and Rumania of the Soviet Union, which led them to refuse to agree to the entry of Soviet troops for their defense; (2) the terms of the Soviet nonaggression proposal, which was interpreted as giving the Soviet Union a free hand to occupy the Baltic States and perhaps other countries at its own discretion; (3) and the insistence by the Soviet Union upon delaying a

political agreement until other military agreements were negotiated.

The beginning of the European war is covered by 10 chapters including the start of the war, the intervention of the Soviet Union in Poland, the Boundary and Friendship Treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union, peace movements, appeals of President Roosevelt against aerial bombardment of civilian populations, and minor subjects. Other sections cover the impact of the war upon the United States giving rise to problems of repatriation of Americans, neutrality policy, control of commerce by belligerent governments, and measures to secure adequate supplies of raw materials. The final chapter of this volume deals with the concern of the United States over Soviet demands on Finland and the subsequent invasion of Finland by Soviet forces.

Two other *Foreign Relations* volumes for 1939 have already been published: *Volume III, The Far East;* and *Volume IV, The Far East, The Near East and Africa.* The series of five volumes for 1939 will be completed by *Volume II, General, The British Commonwealth of Nations, and Europe;* and *Volume V, The American Republics.*

Copies of *Volume I* (viii, 1059 pp.) may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., for $4.50 each.

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

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Tax Relief Techniques on Defense Expenditures. TIAS 3120. Pub. 5809. 6 pp. 5¢.

Arrangement between the United States and the Netherlands. Exchange of notes—Dated at The Hague May 29 and June 22, 1953. Entered into force June 22, 1953.

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Agreement between the United States and El Salvado- Signed at San Salvador May 14, 1953. Entered into fo May 14, 1953.

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Relief Supplies and Equipment—Duty-Free Entry a Exemption From Internal Taxation. TIAS 3128. P 5784. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Peru. change of notes—Signed at Lima October 21 and 25, 19 Entered into force October 29, 1954.

Technical Cooperation—Joint Commission for Econo Development. TIAS 3129. Pub. 5785. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Paragua Terminating agreement of November 9, 22, and 27, 19 Exchange of notes—Signed at Asunción February 13 a 24, 1954. Entered into force February 24, 1954.

Naval Mission to Brazil. TIAS 3130. Pub. 5786. 4 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Brazil—I tending and amending agreement of May 7, 1942. I change of notes—Signed at Rio de Janeiro June 29 a October 9, 1954. Entered into force October 9, 1954; erative retroactively May 7, 1954.

Pacific Ocean Weather Stations. TIAS 3132. Pub. 57 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Canada. I change of notes—Signed at Ottawa June 4 and 28, 19 Entered into force June 28, 1954.

Civil Aviation Mission to Peru. TIAS 3134. Pub. 58 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Peru—Exte ing agreement of December 27, 1946, as amended. I change of notes—Dated at Lima December 27, 1949, a February 8, 1950. Entered into force February 8, 19

Relief Supplies and Packages. TIAS 3135. Pub. 59 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Federal I public of Germany. Exchange of letters—Signed Frankfurt am Main, Bonn, and Bonn-Petersberg April May 25, and June 7, 1951. Entered into force May 1951; operative retroactively December 29, 1949.

Mutual Defense Assistance—Disposition of Surp Equipment and Material. TIAS 3136. Pub. 5973. pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Italy. I change of notes—Dated at Rome November 20 and Dec ber 14, 1951. Entered into force December 14, 1951.

Relief Supplies and Packages. TIAS 3137. Pub. 59 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Federal I public of Germany—Amending agreement of April 10, M 25, and June 7, 1951. Exchange of letters—Signed at B Godesberg and Bonn July 8 and September 6, 1952. I tered into force September 6, 1952; operative retroactiv July 1, 1952.

rica. Political and Economic Developments in Ruanda-Urundi (Gerig) 438
riculture. United Efforts To Meet the World Agricultural Situation (Butz) 434
ia
rst Annual Report of the Council Representatives of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 403
anscript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference 409
S. Delegation Leaves for SEATO Council Meeting (Dulles) 408
omic Energy. Opening of 12-Nation Talks on Atomic Energy Agency 438
lgium. Political and Economic Developments in Ruanda-Urundi (Gerig) 438
ngress, The. The Problem of Disarmament (Dulles) 415
nmark. U.S. Trade Policy and Problems (Coe) 429
sarmament. The Problem of Disarmament (Dulles) 415
onomic Affairs
. Bowman To Represent U.S. on ECOSOC Statistical Commission 440
anscript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference 409
S. Mission to Coal and Steel Community . . 441
S. Trade Policy and Problems (Coe) . . . 429
rope
lloon Flights in Eastern Europe (Lodge) . . 428
S. Mission to Coal and Steel Community . . 441
reign Service
signations (Warren) 441
S. Mission to Coal and Steel Community . . 441
lia. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference 409
ternational Organizations and Meetings
rst Annual Report of the Council Representatives of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 403
ening of 12-Nation Talks on Atomic Energy Agency 438
S. Delegation Leaves for SEATO Council Meeting (Dulles) 408
ly. Visit of Italian President Gronchi (statements and addresses) 417
tual Security. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference 409
ar East. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference 409
n-Self-Governing Territories. Political and Economic Developments in Ruanda-Urundi (Gerig) 438
blications
reign Relations Volume 441
cent Releases 442
ence
lor Television Demonstrations for Foreign Visitors 428
S. Restates Position on Weather Balloons (texts of notes) 426
Treaty Information. Current Actions 440
Turkey. Resignations (Warren) 441
U.S.S.R.
Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference 409
U.S. Restates Position on Weather Balloons (texts of notes) 426
United Nations
Balloon Flights in Eastern Europe (Lodge) . . 428
Mr. Bowman To Represent U.S. on ECOSOC Statistical Commission 440
Color Television Demonstrations for Foreign Visitors 428
Current U.N. Documents 440
Political and Economic Developments in Ruanda-Urundi (Gerig) 438
United Efforts To Meet the World Agricultural Situation (Butz) 434

Name Index

Bowman, Raymond T 440
Butz, Earl L 434
Coe, Robert D. 429
Dulles, Secretary 408, 409, 415
Eisenhower, President 417
Gronchi, Giovanni 417, 418
Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr 428
Nixon, Richard M 417
Warren, Avra M 441

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: February 27-March 4

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Press release issued prior to February 27 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 88 of February 17.

No.	Date	Subject
97	2/27	Nixon and Gronchi arrival statements.
*98	2/27	Fletcher Warren nominated ambassador to Turkey.
99	2/28	Bowman sworn in as U.S. representative on U.N. Statistical Commission (rewrite).
100	2/28	Dulles: news conference.
101	2/29	Dulles: testimony on disarmament.
102	2/29	SEATO delegation.
103	2/29	ITU color TV demonstrations.
*104	2/29	Program for President Gronchi.
*105	2/29	Robert C. Hill nominated Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.
*106	2/29	Nominations for career ambassador.
†107	3/1	Dulles: testimony on OTC.
108	3/1	SEATO Council report.
109	3/1	Reply to U.S.S.R. on weather balloons.
*110	3/1	Educational exchange.
†111	3/2	Surplus commodity agreement with Indonesia.
112	3/2	Dulles: departure for SEATO meeting.

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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VOL. XXXIV, No. 873

March 19, 1956

SECOND MEETING OF SEATO COUNCIL • *Final Communique and Statements by Secretary Dulles* 447

PURPOSES OF PROPOSED ORGANIZATION FOR TRADE COOPERATION
Statement by Secretary Dulles 472
Statement by Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks 476

IMPORTANCE OF THE U.N. SPECIALIZED AGENCIES TO THE UNITED NATIONS • *Statement by Assistant Secretary Wilcox* 480

THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE NEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA DURING 1955: PART I • *Article by Harry N. Howard* . . 452

For index see inside back cover

The Department of State bulletin

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March 19, 1956

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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cond Meeting of SEATO Council

IMUNIQUE OF MARCH 8

release 130 dated March 9

ıe Council of the Southeast Asia Treaty Or-zation today concluded its second meeting, in Karachi from March 6 to March 8 ır the chairmanship of Mr. Hamidul Haq wdhury, Foreign Minister of Pakistan. The ing was attended by the Foreign Ministers of tralia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the ippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and United States.

he Council members reaffirmed their govern-ts' support for the United Nations and their inued intention to conduct their policies in rdance with the purpose and principles of the ed Nations Charter.

he Council also reaffirmed the dedication of member governments to the objectives of the ıty and of the Pacific Charter: To strengthen fabric of peace and freedom; to coordinate ts for collective defense for the preservation eace and security; to uphold the principle of l rights and self-determination of peoples in rdance with the Charter of the United Na-s; to promote self-government and to secure independence of all countries whose peoples re it and are able to undertake its responsibili-to promote higher living standards, economic gress, and social well-being; and to prevent any ıter attempts to subvert freedom or to destroy reignty or territorial integrity. The Council ewed progress made toward these objectives in 18 months since the Treaty was signed in ıila [1] and especially in the year since the Coun-ıeld its first meeting at Bangkok.[2]

he Council agreed that the Treaty and the gress of the Treaty organization have made a notable contribution to the maintenance of peace in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific and have helped to deter armed aggression in the Treaty area. The Council hoped that the use of force would continue to be avoided in the settlement of international disputes and that particular disputes would be resolved amicably if peace was maintained. It recognized the necessity, however, of creating and maintaining powerful deterrents against aggression lest potential aggressors come to believe that aggression would not be effectively and immediately resisted. The Council members severally affirmed that their countries will never commit aggression and that their cooperation under this treaty is directed toward mutual defense and the maintenance of peace.

The members of the Council noted with satisfaction the healthy political developments of the past year within the Treaty area. They noted that talks with the delegation from Singapore were to take place in London in April and expressed their deep interest in the outcome of discussions of such importance to the SEATO area. They welcomed reports of the steps taken toward establishing full self-government and independence for Malaya within the Commonwealth. They noted the further progress in development of free political institutions in the region and particularly the further development of representative governments in the countries referred to in the Protocol to the Treaty, Cambodia, Laos and the Republic of Vietnam.

The Council agreed that steady economic progress had been achieved among the members and in Cambodia, Laos and the Republic of Vietnam. It was noted that assistance from the members had contributed markedly to this desirable development.

The Council agreed that there had been useful progress in cooperation among member governments in assisting each other to combat subversive activities. They observed that communist tactics

---

ULLETIN of Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393.

bid., Mar. 7, 1955, p. 371. For the text of the first al report of the Council Representatives, released on 1, 1956, see *ibid.*, Mar. 12, 1956, p. 403.

were placing increasing reliance on methods of political and economic infiltration. They noted, however, that this shift in tactics was unaccompanied by any convincing evidence of intent to abandon efforts to subvert, weaken and overthrow the political, economic and social systems which have been freely chosen by the peoples of the area. The Council attributed in large measure this seeming shift in tactics away from violence in some parts of the world to the collective security arrangements of the free nations.

They particularly deplored statements and interventions by Soviet leaders in recent months designed to increase tension and promote division in the Asian communities and among other nations of the free world. Insofar as these statements referred to "Pushtunistan" the members of the Council severally declared that their governments recognized that the sovereignty of Pakistan extends up to the Durand Line, the international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and it was consequently affirmed that the Treaty area referred to in Articles IV and VIII of the Treaty includes the area up to that line.

Insofar as these statements concerned Kashmir, the members of the Council noting that the United Nations resolutions remain in force, affirmed the need for an early settlement of the Kashmir question through the United Nations or by direct negotiations.

Assisted by reports from the Council Representatives in Bangkok, from the various committees under the Council Representatives, and from the Military Advisers, the Council reviewed in detail the steps taken by member governments individually and collectively to carry out the Articles of the Treaty.

The Council reviewed steps taken by member governments under Article II to "maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent any counter subversive activities directed from without". They found that the defense forces of the member nations in Asia have been appreciably improved since the signing of the Treaty and are better equipped and deployed to act in an emergency. Member governments have assisted one another on an increasing scale in the training and equipping of these forces. Through its Military Advisers, SEATO has made a good beginning in planning for the coordinated use of these forces in collective self-defense. During the year a number of jo military exercises by some of the SEATO pow were held, including the "Firm Link" combi land, sea and air exercises held in and aro Bangkok on February 15 to 18. These exerc pointed the way to further cooperative efforts the common defense.

The Council welcomed the progress recor in the past year in reducing the dangers pose the territorial integrity and political stability the area by subversive activities directed f without. In considering the continuing threat Council noted that the members concerned h significantly improved the quality of their s rity forces, and have developed other measure reduce threats to democratic government and cial progress. The SEATO Governments have itiated a number of mutual assistance program this field, and the Organization's Committee Security Experts has provided an increasin useful forum for cooperation in defense aga such subversive activities.

The Council reviewed steps taken under Art III to cooperate "in the further developmen economic measures . . . to promote econo progress and social well-being". They conside this a most important objective of the Treaty c ognizing that economic and social welfare is sential to healthy political life. They w gratified to note the steady progress already m in promoting the economic development of Treaty area and emphasized the urgency of problem. They noted the measures of econo assistance to countries of the area undertake member governments in addition to the very considerable expenditures under aid programs increasing the defensive capacity of the reg

They particularly welcomed the fact that US allocations for economic aid to Asian SEATO members have increased in total almost four-fold the two fiscal years since the Treaty was sig The Council members, while convinced of the cessity of adequate defense programs and c eration to preserve the national independence cultural traditions of their countries, are equ determined to press forward with national international programs to raise standards of li in the Treaty area which they consider basi national security.

The Council approved measures to streng the Organization and facilitate the Council

ntatives' plan of work for the coming year. 'hey approved the plans of the Committee of nomic Experts, working under the Council resentatives, to continue their studies of the nomic problems involved in Treaty commit- ts and to undertake new studies. They in- d the Council Representatives to pursue the ly of the concrete problems resulting from the nse effort of member states as well as those ting in areas particularly susceptible to sub- ive activities.

hey noted and approved the intention of the ncil Representatives, within the terms of their ting directives, to give a high priority in the ing year to regional cooperation and, where ropriate, joint action by the member govern- ts in the field of countering subversive activi-

he Council considered the work of the Military isers which would result in further develop- the effectiveness of the machinery for defense eration. The members considered the con- ions of the Military Advisers as to the defen- forces that would be required to meet aggres- , and agreed on the desirability of maintaining ain of their military forces at levels of mobility combat effectiveness which would be an effec- deterrent to aggression.

he following organizational decisions were n:

A) To assist the Council Representatives and rovide a stronger central SEATO organization angkok, the Council authorized the establish- t of a permanent working group composed of fficer from the staff of each Council Repre- ative, and the establishment of a full-time cutive Secretariat to replace the provisional etariat generously provided hitherto by the ernment of Thailand.

B) A research service center will be estab- d in Bangkok under the Council Represent- es to produce, for the benefit of member gov- nents and of bodies set up within the SEATO nework, reports on current developments in munist activities.

C) The public relations office in Bangkok will xpanded and a cultural relations office estab- d to carry out new programs in these fields.

D) An economic officer will be appointed to litate the important work in the economic field will work closely with and under the direction ne Council Representatives.

(E) Organizational costs will be met from a common budget.

The Council was convinced that the work accomplished at this meeting would give a new and strong impetus to the promotion of the security and welfare of the treaty area. All the Foreign Ministers expressed the firm determination of their governments to press forward with their individual and collective efforts to safeguard the peace and well-being of the region as a whole.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY DULLES AT OPENING SESSION, MARCH 6

In 1954 we met at Manila to write our treaty of collective defense for Southeast Asia. In 1955, when the treaty came into force, we met at Bangkok to breathe life into the treaty words.

Now in 1956 we meet in Karachi to develop still further our partnership.

It is appropriate that we should now be in the capital of Pakistan. It is one of the newly independent nations of Asia which, even as we meet here, perfects its independence by adoption of its first constitution.

The United States values its membership in this organization because its purpose responds to our national dedication to advancement of liberty, peace, and happiness within the society of nations.

Since World War II, fifteen nations of Asia and Africa have gained political independence. This evolution has consistently had the moral and political support of the United States, and we have provided large military and economic assistance in terms of both men and money to enable independent nations of Asia and Africa better to sustain their independence and to enjoy more fully the blessings of liberty.

Today in Asia this United States policy continues to find expression in our active participation in SEATO, in other mutual security pacts, in our bilateral arrangements for economic aid, technical assistance, cultural exchange, in our membership in the Colombo Plan for economic development in Asia and in the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, and in our bilateral agreements for sharing knowledge and materials to advance peaceful uses of atomic energy. In this latter connection I recall that only a few days ago President Eisenhower announced 20,000 kilograms of our fissionable material would be avail-

able for future peaceful use in other countries including those of Asia.[3]

In contrast stands the policy of the Soviet-Chinese Communists. Whenever they could they have swallowed up their neighbors or subjugated them. They have annexed territory comprising all or part of 10 states and also made 10 states into virtual colonies ruled by international communism.

That aggressive policy explains why free nations have developed collective security arrangements such as that which brings us here today.

Communist propaganda now attacks these collective security organizations. But it was not always so. When the Soviet Union felt itself endangered, it argued for adoption of a policy of collective security. Thus on March 10, 1939, prior to the outbreak of World War II, the leader of the Soviet Government spoke of aggressive intentions of Fascist states.

He said, "Combined nonaggressive democratic states are unquestionably stronger." But he complained, "A majority of nonaggressive countries, particularly England and France, have rejected a policy of collective security, a policy of collective resistance to aggressors, and have taken up a position of nonintervention and a position of neutrality." This, he said, "means conniving at aggression."

Today Soviet rulers sing a different tune. They denounce collective security. Aggressive states always prefer that independent states should not help each other to preserve their independence. That is their preference, but it is not ours. In fact collective security has now been so widely adopted that it powerfully deters armed aggression.

So Soviet and Communist leaders are now emphasizing economic and political measures. Their economic measures are superficially like economic aid measures which have long been pursued by the United States. Of course, honest imitation would be as welcome as the sincerest flattery. But economic measures adopted by the United States and the other free nations have demonstrably aided other nations to preserve their political independence and their distinctive social and cultural institutions. On the other hand the Soviet and Chinese Communist purpose, as their history demonstrates, is to extend the sway of international communism, which, as Lenin said, involves "amalgamation of all nations." Soviet rulers have long held that among the first to be "amalgamat would be "colonial and dependent peoples." A Soviet purpose has not been changed by the that many of these people now enjoy independe

Khrushchev, head of the Soviet Commu Party, speaking to the Supreme Soviet as rece as last December 29, said in relation to the called "spirit of Geneva": "We never renoun and we will never renounce our ideas, our strug for victory of communism."

That is why it is important for us here to velop not only those aspects of our organizat which deter open armed aggression but also th aspects of SEATO which help members to com subversion and to develop wholesome societies mune from Communist infection.

As we review the record of SEATO for the p year, there is ground for much satisfaction. T report of our Council Representatives shows t SEATO has made an important contribution to p ervation of peace in the area. Under SEATO p tection member states have registered apprecia progress in their economic development and their capacity to resist armed aggression a subversion.

SEATO has encouraged stability, indispensa to social and cultural as well as economic progr

We can take satisfaction from the fact t SEATO benefits other than its members. It l aided in the development and stabilization f newly independent countries in the treaty are Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam—whose futu seemed so precarious a year or more ago. Oth free nations of Asia have also benefited both rectly and indirectly from increased security f the treaty area.

For this gain we thank particularly the lead of our Asian members. They are men of gr political wisdom and experience. They are t patriots who can distinguish liberty from tyran even though tyranny attempts to disguise itself the cloak of liberty.

Significant achievements of the past year shou inspire us to even greater efforts in days, mont and years ahead in order that we may furt promote peace and independence and serve to large human opportunities for all. These goals to which we are pledged by our treaty, our Pacific Charter, and by the charter of t United Nations. May we here go forward in t future further honoring of these noble comm ments.

[3] See p. 469.

TATEMENT BY SECRETARY DULLES AT FINAL ESSION, MARCH 8

ess release 125 dated March 8

Those who study the record of our meeting will nd that much has been accomplished. I hope at they will also find evidence of the spirit which ade that accomplishment possible. We were rawn together, and we hold together, by the oblest and most enlightened of human senti-ents—that is the desire to help one another.

To that sentiment is added another—that is the uality of courage which impels us to face danger gether and not to seek immunity in the hope at someone else will suffer first from aggression.

So long as those two sentiments animate our untries, this organization will be strong and pro-uctive of much good. A deep debt of gratitude is wed to our host, the Government of Pakistan, for e excellent preparations and splendid facilities at have contributed so much to the success of is conference. The hospitality of the Govern-ent of Pakistan and its people has charmed and elighted us all. They have surrounded the seri-us business of the conference with pleasant asso-ations that will never be forgotten. Our sin-rest compliments are also due to His Excellency amidul Huq Choudhury, Foreign Minister of akistan. His guidance of our conference as its airman contributed in no small measure to its ery substantial accomplishments.

We owe great thanks to the Council Represent-ives that prepared for this meeting. Without eir labors, it would not have been possible to ake so many significant decisions during the 3 ys of our session.

Now, we go our separate ways. But, wherever e go, we shall carry with us a sense of fellowship rn of this gathering.

.S. Views on March 4 Statement y Chinese Communists

Following is a statement released by the Depart-ent of State on March 6 (press release 115) com-enting on a Chinese Communist statement of arch 4 regarding the Geneva discussions which ve been taking place between U.S. Ambassador . Alexis Johnson and Chinese Communist Am-ssador Wang Ping-nan.

The Chinese Communist statement of March 4 contains nothing new. Its failure, however, even to mention that the Chinese Communists still hold 13 Americans in prison, despite their agreement of last September—6 months ago—that these Americans would be permitted "expeditiously" to exercise their right to return to the United States, cannot be overlooked. This only reemphasizes that these Americans are being held as political hostages.

The reply which the United States made on January 21[1] to a similar Chinese Communist statement of January 18 is equally applicable to the Communist statement of March 4. The concluding paragraphs of that reply read as follows:

"1. Four months after the Communists announced that they would adopt measures to permit Americans in China to return to the United States, 13 Americans are still held in Communist prisons.

"2. The United States proposed that the parties renounce the use of force without prejudice to the right of individual and collective self-defense against armed attack, in order that the discussions might take place free from the threat of war.

"3. The United States made clear that this renunciation would not prejudice either side in the pursuit of its objectives and policies by peaceful means.

"4. The Communists, while stating that they accept the principle of the renunciation of force, have deprived such acceptance of its value by refusing to agree that it is without prejudice to the right of individual and collective self-defense against armed attack and that it is applicable to the Taiwan area.

"In short, the Communists so far seem willing to renounce force only if they are first conceded the goals for which they would use force.

"The United States, for its part, intends to persist in the way of peace. We seek the now overdue fulfillment by the Chinese Communists of their undertaking that the Americans now in China should be allowed expeditiously to return. We seek this not only for humanitarian reasons but because respect for international undertakings lies at the foundation of a stable international order. We shall also seek with perseverance a meaningful renunciation of force, particularly in the Taiwan area."

---

[1] BULLETIN of Jan. 30, 1956, p. 164.

The Development of United States Policy in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa During 1955: Part I [1]

by Harry N. Howard

The year 1955 witnessed no lessening of American interest in the countries and peoples of the Near East, South Asia, and Africa, and it brought no end to the difficult and complicated problems which have come to the United Nations from this vital part of the world. On the contrary, the old, basic issues, involving the resurgent and often strident nationalism of the peoples of the area, the problem of self-determination or "colonialism," and questions of the economic development of underdeveloped countries still persisted 10 years after the end of the Second World War. In addition, important individual problems such as the Arab-Israel controversy, Cyprus, and French North Africa have also remained as a matter of American concern, whether directly or otherwise, because of the position of the United States as one of the leaders of the free world.

In addition, toward the end of the year, the United States, together with other nations, was faced with a renewed and dynamic manifestation of Soviet interest in the general area of the Near East, South Asia, and Africa. In line with an old imperial Russian tradition and in accord with Leninist-Stalinist Communist doctrine, the Soviet Union sought to take advantage of the "relaxation of tensions" in Europe and pressed toward the achievement of its secular interests. The Soviets exploited every weakness and every problem a employed every art, artifice, and instrument their disposal, including their satellites and the i ternational Communist apparatus. There seem little doubt that they were seeking a dominant i fluence in the so-called uncommitted areas of Sou Asia and the Middle East.[2] Because of the se ousness of the situation, the members of the Nor Atlantic Treaty Organization, meeting at Paris December 15–16, 1955, reviewed the "provocati moves and declarations by the Soviet Union r garding the Middle East and Asia" and recogniz that Soviet tactics, "coupled with a continued i crease in Soviet military capability, created ne problems and a new challenge to the Free World."

• *Mr. Howard is United Nations adviser for the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs. Part II of his article, dealing with problems of regional security, and Part III, on mutual security and U.S. assistance programs, will appear in subsequent issues of the* BULLETIN.

[1] For background, see Harry N. Howard, "The Develo ment of United States Policy in the Near East, 194 1951," BULLETIN of Nov. 19, 1951, p. 809, and Nov. 2 1951, p. 839; "The Development of United States Poli in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa, 1951–1952 *ibid.*, Dec. 8, 1952, p. 891, and Dec. 15, 1952, p. 936 (al available as Department of State publication 4851) "The Development of United States Policy in the Ne East, South Asia, and Africa During 1953," *ibid.*, Fe 22, 1954, p. 274, Mar. 1, 1954, p. 328, and Mar. 8, 1954, 365; and "The Development of United States Policy i the Near East, South Asia, and Africa During 1954," *ibi* Feb. 14, 1955, p. 256, Feb. 21, 1955, p. 301, and Feb. 2 1955, p. 338 (also available as Department of Sta publication 5801).

[2] Recent Soviet actions called to mind the position of th Soviet Union in November 1940 that "the area south Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persia Gulf" be "recognized as the center of the aspirations the Soviet Union." See *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–194* (Department of State publication 3023), pp. 217–258 also, H. N. Howard, "Germany, the Soviet Union an Turkey During World War II," BULLETIN of July 18, 194 pp. 63–78.

[3] *Ibid.*, Dec. 26, 1955, p. 1047.

As in years past, in his report on the work of the Nited Nations for 1954–1955 [4] Secretary-General)ag Hammarskjold touched on a number of basic roblems involving the Near East, South Asia, nd Africa. Among other things, he referred to he Bandung conference (April 18–24, 1955), in hich the nations of this area played a prominent art, and noted the great upheaval in the relations f nations and peoples which was under way, the irection of which, at least in some respects, emed "clear enough." He noted that:

he peoples of Asia today, of Africa tomorrow, are mov- g towards a new relationship with what history calls e West. The world organization is the place where is emerging new relationship in world affairs can most eatively be forged.

he Secretary-General also dealt at some length ith the troublesome issue of Palestine. He ought that too little attention had been given to eet "the emerging problems of the continent of frica in a spirit consonant with the aims of the harter," although the United Nations had been oncerned with these problems "on a piece-meal asis." The issues, he said, were partly social and onomic, partly political, and partly they be- nged to the realm of trusteeship arrangements. the Secretary-General's considered view:

The great changes that are under way in Africa present challenge to the rest of the world—a challenge to give d in guiding the course of events in orderly and con- ructive channels. It is apparent that in the next ten ars the peace and stability of the world will be strongly fected by the evolution in Africa, by the national awak- ing of its people, by the course of race relations and the manner in which the economic and social ad- ncement of the African peoples is assisted by the rest the world.

The Tenth Session of the U.N. General Assem- y devoted considerable attention to problems of e Near East, South Asia, and Africa and espe- ally to the type of problems outlined above. epresentatives of the nations of this area par- cularly emphasized the political, social, and eco- omic problems confronting their peoples, but they ere not alone in discussing them. Secretary ulles laid special stress on the Arab-Israel con- ct in his address of September 22,[5] and both ritish Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan and French Foreign Minister Antoine Pinay pointed toward the Middle East as an area of tension and controversy. In line with recent Soviet policy, in his address of September 23 Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov gave the distinct impression that the Soviet Union, now more than ever, was engaged in an attempt to win over the states of Asia and Africa to the side of the Soviet Union.[6] Molotov reiterated Soviet opposition to "aggressive military blocs and coalitions" in general, and to such arrangements in the Middle East in particular.

SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL ISSUES

As already noted, the United States was confronted during 1955 with a number of difficult political issues, some of which came to it through the United Nations and some more directly. Of special, although by no means exclusive, interest were those of French North Africa, Cyprus, and Palestine. Some of these problems became even more intense during the course of the year, although others appeared to be on the road toward possible solution as the year drew to a close.

French North Africa

The United States had an interest in the issues involving Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria not merely because of certain bases in Morocco or because of its politico-strategic interest in the entire Mediterranean region but also because it was interested in the stability of France as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and in the development and welfare of the peoples of this area. The problems of French North Africa had been discussed, it may be noted, at the Bandung conference in April 1955, and the 29 Asian-African nations represented there adopted a resolution supporting the "rights of the people of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to self-determination and independence" and urged the French Government "to bring about a peaceful solution without delay." [7]

Morocco—The problem of Morocco, which proved very troublesome during the first part of 1955, appeared on the road to solution by the year's end. Fifteen Arab, Asian, and African

[4] U.N. doc. A/2911, *Annual Report of the Secretary-neral on the Work of the Organization, 1 July 1954–June 1955*, pp. xi–xvi.

[5] BULLETIN of Oct. 3, 1955, p. 523.

[6] U.N. doc. A/PV. 520, pp. 44–52.

[7] For text, see Embassy of Indonesia, Washington, D. C., *Report on Indonesia*, Vol. VI, No. 9 (June 1955), p. 30.

states on July 26 requested the inclusion of the problems of both Morocco and Algeria on the agenda of the Tenth General Assembly, charging that the situation in Morocco had suddenly deteriorated.[8] Although the item was inscribed on the agenda of the General Assembly, there was no immediate discussion. On November 5, 1955, the former Sultan of Morocco, Mohammed Ben Yousef, once more was formally recognized as the Sultan, and the country's political and constitutional problems appeared to be moving toward solution. On his return to Rabat on November 18 as Sultan Mohammed V, the new ruler proclaimed the end of the French protectorate and looked toward a "new era of freedom and independence," although this was not to mean the end of all Franco-Moroccan ties. President Eisenhower sent a special message to the Sultan, recalling the relations which had existed between the United States and Morocco since the earliest days of the United States and expressing the hope that the reign would "open new vistas for that community of purposes which has contributed so much to the greatness of Morocco, and restore the peace and prosperity which the United States so deeply desires" for the people of Morocco. At the same time the United States indicated that the return of Mohammed V marked a significant step in the development of Franco-Moroccan cooperation, and it was felt that the already demonstrated friendly spirit augured well "for success in working out the mutually satisfactory arrangements" which, it was hoped, would "lead to the peace and prosperity of the Moroccan community." [9]

Thanks to these favorable developments, virtually no discussion of the Moroccan issue took place at the General Assembly. Instead, on December 3, 1955, the Assembly agreed unanimously to postpone further consideration of the item. There was, indeed, much commendation of France for the statesmanlike way in which the problem had been handled. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., the United States Representative, declared in the Political Committee that the constructive developments which had taken place since 1954 had given great satisfaction to the United States. He extended the American people's "best wishes" to Sultan Mohammed V and the Moroccan people. In view of the Franco-Moroccan agreement Ambassador Lodge felt it incumbent on the Gene Assembly to do everything possible "to contrib to an atmosphere in which the parties direct concerned can work out the outstanding proble between them," the solution of which would quire "the utmost good will, patience, and straint on both sides." Ambassador Lod expressed the hope that the pending negotiatic would "strengthen the links of friendship betwe the people of France and Morocco." [10]

Algeria—In distinction to Morocco, Algeria i part of metropolitan France, and a crisis develop in the United Nations with regard to inscription the Algerian item. The United States opposed scription because of the constitutional position Algeria. The question was inscribed on Septe ber 30 by a vote of 28–27–5, despite the threat the French delegation to boycott the General sembly. French Foreign Minister Pinay advis the General Assembly to "weigh the consequenc all the consequences" of such a decision; the "wh future of our organization" was at stake, warned. Mr. Pinay's basic argument was that geria had been an integral part of France for ov a century, and he declared that the Algerians we citizens of France, with far more rights than t citizens of some states whose representatives we voting for inscription.[11] Because of the action the General Assembly, the French delegation wit drew entirely from the General Assembly on Se tember 30 and did not return until November when, by unanimous action, the Assembly remov the Algerian item from its agenda.[12]

[8] U.N. docs. A/2923/Add. 1, A/2924/Add. 1, and S/3414.

[9] Bulletin of Nov. 28, 1955, p. 894.

[10] *Ibid.*, Dec. 19, 1955, p. 1040.

On Jan. 26, 1956, the Department of State announc its intention to request congressional action to end U extraterritorial jurisdiction in Morocco. The rights h been accorded in 1787 and renewed in 1836. In the lig of progress being made by France and Morocco "in wo ing out their future relationships," the United States c sidered it appropriate to modernize its own tre relationship with Morocco with regard to extraterritor rights (Bulletin of Feb. 6, 1956, p. 204).

On Mar. 2, 1956, France and Morocco signed an agr ment virtually ending the 1912 protectorate, and Fra confirmed its recognition of Moroccan independence; p. 466.

[11] U.N. doc. A/PV. 530, pp. 193–6. For "Basic Fact on Algeria," see *Ambassade de France, Service de Pre et d'Information*, No. 24 (November 1955). For Amb sador Lodge's statement of Sept. 22 in the General Co mittee, see Bulletin of Oct. 3, 1955, p. 546.

[12] *Ibid.*, Dec. 19, 1955, p. 992.

unisia—The problem of Tunisia was not placed n the agenda of the Tenth General Assembly the primary reason that on June 3, 1955, the nch Government and the Tunisian leaders had hed an agreement whereby Tunisia was ıted internal autonomy. The agreement pro- d for a monetary and customs union, with nce retaining control over defense, internal rity, and finance and the exclusive right to nd technical and financial assistance. A nch High Commissioner was to exercise all ers remaining to France and to be responsible the protection of French interests; the French manding general was to be responsible, as ister of Defense, for the naval and air bases Bizerte and other military installations.

ollowing approval of the agreement, Secretary les on August 10 expressed U.S. satisfaction a new framework for close Franco-Tunisian peration had been established.[13] He consid- it significant that agreement had been hed "through negotiations on a basis of equal- between the parties directly concerned" and ared that France and Tunisia could "take real sfaction and pride in the achievement of this ement." The negotiations, in his view, dem- rated that "mutually satisfactory progress can nade on such difficult problems if they are t with in time by the parties concerned with rmination, realism, and good will." On Au- 27, the Bey of Tunis, Sidi Mohammed Amin, ratified and sealed the convention re- ing internal autonomy to Tunisia, and the ıments were exchanged and deposited in Paris August 31.

Problem of Cyprus

troublesome issue of special concern to the ted Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey, involving problem of self-determination, was that of rus. It had been before the General Assem- during 1954, but, after 2 days of discussion, body decided against further consideration he time.[14] During 1955, however, the prob- became more intense, with growing violence he Island of Cyprus. On May 9, the Greek ernment advised the Secretary-General of the United Nations that developments in Cyprus were "unfortunately assuming a particularly alarming character" and reserved "the right to consider such action" as might be necessary.

With a view to a possible solution, the United Kingdom on June 30 announced invitations to the Greek and Turkish Governments to a conference at London for discussion of "political and defense questions which affect the eastern Mediterranean, including Cyprus."[15] Both Greece and Turkey accepted the invitation early in July; the former, on July 23, requested inscription of the problem of self-determination for Cyprus on the agenda of the Tenth Session of the General Assembly.

When the London conference convened on August 29, three essential elements appeared to be involved: (1) the Greek position concerning self-determination, (2) the Turkish position regarding the protection of the rights of the Turkish minority and Turkish security, and (3) the British position that common security interests in the eastern Mediterranean should be considered. The conference ended on September 7, without having achieved substantial result.[16] Foreign Minister Stephanos Stephanopoulos, who presented the Greek case on August 31, called for self-determination within a reasonable time, pledging that Greece would give the United Kingdom unlimited use of military bases on Cyprus and offering other base rights on the Greek mainland, but indicating that Greece would regard the discussions as a failure unless the right of self-determination were recognized.[17] Essentially the Turkish view was that the agitation concerning self-determination was largely artificial, that the right of the large Turkish minority must be protected, and that, for reasons of Turkish security, the island should remain in British hands.[18] The United Kingdom, which had stressed the security aspects of the

bid., Aug. 22, 1955, p. 301.

For brief background, see H. N. Howard, *The Devel- ent of United States Policy in the Near East, South , and Africa During 1954.*

[15] See British Information Services, *Eastern Mediterranean: Proposed Conference*, T. 23 (July 1, 1955); *Cyprus—A New British Initiative* (August 1955), pp. 8–10.

[16] See the United Kingdom, *The Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus held by the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Greece and Turkey, London, August 29–September 7, 1955.* Cmd. 9596.

[17] For certain aspects of the Greek case, see Royal Greek Embassy Information Services (Washington), *Cyprus Demands Self-Determination* (1954) and *British Views on Cyprus* (1955).

[18] Turkish Information Office (New York), *Turkish Views on Cyprus* (1955).

problem, on September 6 offered Cyprus a new constitution giving island residents more self-rule and a prospect of ultimate self-determination. But it was obvious by September 7 that no agreement was possible, and the final communique of the conference indicated that Foreign Secretary Macmillan would study the Greek and Turkish statements.

The failure of the London conference to achieve anything more substantial, and the subsequent intensification of the problem, appeared not only to weaken the Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav treaty which had been signed on February 28, 1953, but also to sap the strength of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the vital eastern Mediterranean—matters in which the United States was very much concerned. Moreover, it now seemed clear that Greece would make every effort to have the problem inscribed on the agenda of the Tenth Session of the General Assembly.

The riots in Istanbul and Izmir on September 6–7, and the vast damage which they wrought, were also most disturbing to the United States, although it did not comment publicly at once. On September 18, the Department of State announced that Secretary Dulles had sent personal messages to the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers.[19] The announcement characterized

> as most regrettable recent evidences of tension between the Governments of Greece and Turkey. Present differences between these two countries resulted in widespread violence in the cities of Istanbul and Izmir. We have expressed to the Turkish Government our deep concern over these disorders, which have not only caused extensive physical damage but have also exerted an adverse influence on Turkish-Greek friendship at a time when these two allies are in great need of mutual understanding.

In his identical communications to Prime Minister Papagos and Prime Minister Menderes, Secretary Dulles stressed the importance which the United States attached to "continued close cooperation between Greece and Turkey." He could not believe that, in the light of their record of common achievement, any problem would "long disrupt the course of Greek-Turkish friendship," nor that "the unhappy events of the past two weeks" would reverse policies of cooperation initiated under the leadership of Eleftherios Venizelos and Kemal Atatürk. Mr. Dulles recalled the assistance which the United States had rendered to Greece and Turkey since 1947 because of belief that the Greco-Turkish partnership constituted "a strong bulwark of the free world a critical area." But if the bulwark were "terially weakened, the consequences could be gr indeed," and he urged that every effort be m that the partnership not be impaired "by pre disagreements." He was confident, however, the spirit of cooperation which the two count had so often demonstrated as members of United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty ganization, and the Balkan Alliance would en them "to transcend immediate differences in interests of free world unity."

The Greek and Turkish replies to the Du communication were made public on Septembe Premier Papagos expressed appreciation of message and noted the necessity of NATO unity, he felt that it did not take account of the fact Greece was an injured party, and he complai concerning Turkish "hostility against Gree He said that he expected moral and mate reparation from Turkey and held that the la should take the initiative in the renewal of mu confidence. On the other hand, Prime Mini Menderes of Turkey warmly thanked Secre Dulles for his message; he expressed regret for events of September 6–7 and concern for contin Greek-Turkish friendship, within the framew of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza and the Balkan Alliance.

On September 29, President Eisenhower sured King Paul that he remained convince "the paramount importance of the ties of str friendship which unite Greece and the Un States." Even if there were "differences of o ion over how the Cyprus question should be dled," that one issue would not be permitte "trouble our deep friendship and sympathy Greece."[20]

Meanwhile, on September 21 the Greek req for inscription of the Cyprus issue on the age of the Tenth General Assembly was considere the General Committee. At the outset, Anth Nutting, the United Kingdom representative, pressed regret that the London conference produced no solution. He declared that the Un Kingdom devoutly hoped that consultations w be renewed and was ready to consider "am ments or counterproposals" to its recent "

[19] BULLETIN of Sept. 26, 1955, p. 496.

[20] *Ibid.*, Oct. 10, 1955, p. 560.

uctive and far-reaching" suggestions concern- Cyprus, which were "designed to lead to the llest measure of internal self-government com- tible with the strategic requirements of the esent international situation." But he felt that tended discussion in the United Nations would t prove helpful. He observed that the Greek rpose was to acquire sovereignty over Cyprus d warned that debate might generate heat which uld "light flames elsewhere." [21]

On the other hand, Ambassador George V. Melas t only maintained that Greece was sponsoring legitimate petition of a distinct national entity t rejected "with contempt" the charge that eece was a "troublemaker." He asserted that e British proposals concerning Cyprus were a enial of democracy." He presented the case r self-determination, pointing out that the prin- le was enshrined both in the Atlantic Charter d in the United Nations Charter, and recalled e "very sad and depressing things" which had ppened in Turkey. In turn, Ambassador Selim rper of Turkey took exception to the remarks the Greek representative, to whom he had lis- ed with a feeling of "almost physical pain." nbassador Sarper declared that Turkey still at- hed "importance to friendship and alliance with eece," which was a necessity for the mainte- nce of stability in the eastern Mediterranean, t he warned against the effects of the self-de- mination argument for Cyprus and noted that eece itself was a "mosaic" of minorities.[22]

Ambassador Lodge, who did not enter into the bstance of the issue, expressed the view that ch problems should be included if there were son to suppose that discussion would "promote e purposes of the charter." [23] The U.S. decision oppose inscription was a "painful" one because was contrary to Greek desires, especially in the ht of the "tragic events" which had just oc- rred in Turkey. Nevertheless, the United States k what seemed "the course of true friendship" an effort to avoid what might prove in reality be "a disservice to our charter goals, both those ating to non-self-governing territories and se relating to the development of friendly re- ions among nations."

In the end, by a vote of 4–7–4, the General Committee recommended against inscription. The General Assembly upheld the recommendation on September 23 by a vote of 28–22–10.

During the Assembly's discussion on inscription, Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos contended that, under the charter, the United Nations had both the right and the duty to offer an opportunity for self-determination to the Cyprian people, and he repeated that Greece had turned to the United Nations because of the failure of diplomatic negotiations. Mr. Nutting, however, declared that the "real aim" of the Greek Government was "acquisition of Cyprus and not constitutional self-government in the island." He closed with a solemn pledge on behalf of the United Kingdom, through an unremitting endeavor "to work out a solution to this tangled, difficult and delicate issue." Ambassador Sarper declared that discussion would serve no useful purpose but would inflame relations, and he challenged the competence of the United Nations to deal with the status of Cyprus, which, he contended, had been settled in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.

Ambassador Lodge reiterated the position which he had taken in the General Committee, noting that a decision against inscription "would not mean that nothing will happen." Rather it meant that the matter could and would be dealt with "under different and more auspicious conditions," in which "quiet diplomacy" might prove more effective, and he pledged that the United States would "continue an active interest in the Cyprus situation." V. K. Krishna Menon of India, who abstained, favored independence for Cyprus; he remarked:

> But we do not think in the present circumstances, when negotiations have been proceeding, and when there is violence in the area, and when this undertaking has been given to carry on negotiations and bring about a settlement in a peaceful manner, that the purposes of the Charter and the prospects of a settlement would be advanced by public debate in this Assembly.[24]

At the close of the discussion, Mr. Nutting issued a statement expressing British satisfaction with the "clear-cut decision by the Assembly that inscription and discussion" of the Cyprus question would be unwise. He was glad that the General Assembly had "heeded our warning about the consequences of a debate which could only be bitter and further arouse passions between

[21] U. N. doc. A/BUR/SR. 102, pp. 2–3.

[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 3–4.

[23] BULLETIN of Oct. 3, 1955, p. 545.

[24] For the discussion as a whole, see U.N. doc. A/PV. 521, pp. 53–65.

friends" and repeated that the United Kingdom would "now make unremitting endeavors to find an acceptable solution to this problem," which affected "three friendly countries." [25]

Problems in the Arab-Israel Controversy

As in years past, both the United States and the United Nations faced many troublesome problems in connection with the Israel-Arab controversy. The U.N. Secretary-General, in his annual report, declared "with great regret" that the "lack of any improvement in the political situation in the Middle East has continued to prevent the United Nations from assisting countries in that region in the way in which it should do so." The Secretary-General pointed out that economic and social problems in this area were accumulating and that, under existing conditions, some of the means of economic and social development which had "proved most effective in other regions" were denied to the Middle East. The catalog of problems included the broad, perennial issue of attempting to bring about some peaceful settlement of the specific problems involved; the question of armed incidents along the demarcation lines; restrictions on shipping within the Suez Canal and Gulf of Aqaba; the need for equitable distribution of the waters of the Jordan River for irrigation and hydroelectric purposes; and the problem of the Arab refugees from Palestine. The additional nuance of the Czechoslovak-Egyptian arms arrangement further complicated the picture during the latter part of 1955.

THE U.S. PROGRAM

Secretary Dulles expressed the basic concern of the United States for peace and security in the Middle East in an address before the Council on Foreign Relations at New York on August 26, when he outlined American policy with regard to Palestine issues and Arab-Israel relations.[26] e pointed to the progress which had been made ward settling such Middle Eastern issues as t of the Suez Base since May 1953, when he visi the area, but drew attention to outstanding issu He noted that Ambassador Eric Johnston was t on his fourth visit to the Middle East in connect with the Jordan River project. According Secretary Dulles, there were three basic proble which had been left unsolved by the Armist Agreements of 1949: (1) the tragic plight 900,000 refugees who formerly lived on the te tory now occupied by Israel; (2) the pall of f hanging alike over Arabs and Israelis; and the lack of fixed permanent boundaries betw Israel and its neighbors.

Solution of the refugee problem, in the Sec tary's view, required that these "uprooted peop be enabled to resume a life of dignity and se respect through resettlement and, where feasi repatriation. The need for more arable la could be met by practical projects for water velopment. Compensation to the refugees v due from Israel; if necessary, an international lo might be made "to enable Israel to pay the co pensation which would enable many of the re gees to find for themselves a better way of lif President Eisenhower would recommend subst tial American participation in such a loan, as w as an American contribution "to the realization f water development and irrigation projects wh would, directly or indirectly, facilitate the settlement of the refugees."

Projects to aid refugee resettlement would more than enable people to enjoy a better li they would also assist in eliminating the probl of "recurrent incidents" which had plagued a embittered life on both sides of the armistice lin But security could be assured "only by collect measures which commit decisive power to the terring of aggression." President Eisenhov had authorized Secretary Dulles to state that

> given a solution of the other related problems, he [President] would recommend that the United States j in formal treaty engagements to prevent or thwart effort by either side to alter by force the boundar between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

Secretary Dulles hoped that other countr would be willing to support such a secur guaranty and that the United Nations wo

[25] See also the statements of Foreign Secretary Macmillan on Dec. 5, 1955, and of Field Marshal Sir John Harding, the Governor of Cyprus, Jan. 1, 1956, in British Information Services, T. 53 (Dec. 6, 1955) and T. 1 (Jan. 10, 1956).

After 5 months of direct negotiation with the Cyprians, the British Government announced on Mar. 3, 1956, that it had failed to reach agreement on the character of an amnesty, the responsibility for public security, and the composition of an elected majority in the Assembly; the principle of self-determination had not been under discussion.

[26] BULLETIN of Sept. 5, 1955, p. 378.

onsor it. Under such collective security meas-
es the fears could be resolved and political lead-
ship in the Middle East could "devote itself to
nstructive tasks."

Since the Armistice Agreements of 1949 had not
termined permanent frontiers, agreement con-
rning borders should precede a boundary
aranty. The overall advantages to be gained
such a guaranty were well worth the adjust-
nts required to convert "armistice lines of dan-
r into boundary lines of safety," and Secretary
lles believed it "possible to find a way of
onciling the vital interests of all the parties."
e United States was willing to assist in finding
solution to this problem, and, if agreement
ld be reached on the basic problems of refugees,
urity, and boundaries, it was thought possible
solve other issues, largely economic, and also
reach an agreement concerning the status of
rusalem. The United States was ready to sup-
rt a review of the latter problem by the United
tions.

Secretary Dulles said that the purpose of his
tement was to demonstrate the possibility for
provement and make clear that the United
ates was disposed to encourage that possibility
contributions of its own, if desired. He
ncluded:

> At a time when a great effort is being made to ease the
> sion which has long prevailed between the Soviet and
> stern worlds, can we not hope that a similar spirit
> uld prevail in the Middle East? That is our plea.
> e spirit of conciliation and of the good neighbor brings
> h rewards to the people and to the nations. If doing
> t involves some burdens, they are burdens which the
> ited States would share, just as we would share the
> isfaction which would result to all peoples if happi-
> s, contentment, and good will could drive hatred and
> sery away from peoples whom we hold in high respect
> l honor.

U.N. Secretary-General Hammarskjold imme-
tely welcomed the Secretary's address and de-
red that American willingness to participate
bstantially in an international loan to assist
e Arab refugees "might well prove to be an
proach to this humanitarian problem which
uld mark the beginning of a general stabiliza-
n of conditions in the area." Similarly the
ited Kingdom, on August 27, endorsed the pro-
sals as "an important contribution toward the
lution of the most critical problem in the Middle
st." The United Kingdom was ready to play
its full part "in an effort to bring about more settled relations" and declared, as had already been stated on April 4, that it was ready to guarantee "by treaty or treaties with the parties concerned any territorial settlement so agreed." The United Kingdom welcomed American willingness to participate both in security guaranties and in an international loan and hoped that the governments concerned might be disposed to examine the possibilities of settlement. The French Government also substantially endorsed the proposals. Sir John Kotelewala, Prime Minister of Ceylon, declared on August 28 that the suggested program would "provide a useful starting point" for a "further sincere and determined effort" to settle outstanding Israel-Arab differences; Ceylon, too, was ready to assist "in the search for a peaceful solution."

At his news conference on August 30, Secretary Dulles declared that his address had been "a very carefully considered statement" and he did not desire to elaborate on it "in terms of substance" until there had been responsible comment from Middle Eastern Governments.

Although there was no official Arab comment concerning the Dulles suggestions, unofficial comment was critical. The Israel Government, on the other hand, appeared rather favorably impressed but desired more information with regard both to frontier guaranties and to frontier adjustments. In an address on September 11, Abba Eban, Israel's Ambassador to the United States, declared that, while Israel was "ready in the proper context for mutual adjustments of the boundary lines," it would "accept no unilateral territorial concessions."

Secretary Dulles again discussed the problem of peace in the Near East in his address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 22.[27] He noted that the situation in that area remained troubled, repeated his proposals, indicated that the United Kingdom and a number of other governments had expressed their support, and added that, if there was a favorable response from the Near East, "many aspects of this problem would eventually come to the United Nations for its action at some future session."

[27] *Ibid.*, Oct. 3, 1955, p. 523. See also the remarks of Ambassador Eban in the General Assembly on Oct. 3 in U.N. doc. A/PV. 532, pp. 215–19.

PROBLEM OF ARMS SHIPMENTS

Closely related to the maintenance of peace in the Middle East was the problem of arms shipments to that area. Secretary Dulles indicated on August 30 that, although he had no direct proof as yet, the Department of State had received unofficial reports that the Soviet Union had offered to supply arms to some Arab States. Premier Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt announced an Egyptian-Czechoslovak arms arrangement on September 27.

On the same date Secretary Dulles and Foreign Secretary Macmillan discussed the problem in New York.[28] They declared that the policies of the United States and the United Kingdom were based on the desire, on the one hand, to enable the countries of the Middle East to provide for internal security and defense and, on the other, "to avoid an arms race which would inevitably increase the tensions in the area." They hoped that other governments would also be guided by these principles. The Department of State sent Assistant Secretary of State George V. Allen to Cairo on September 28 to look into the problem.

The Israel Government indicated that it would have to study the implications of the report that Egypt was making arrangements for the purchase of arms. Meanwhile, the Egyptian Government insisted on its sovereign rights in the matter and declared that it had sought unsuccessfully to purchase arms from the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. The French Government alined itself with the Anglo-American position, but the Soviet Government, as was to have been expected, held that each state had the right to look after its defenses and to purchase weapons for defense requirements on the "usual commercial terms," a position which was echoed by the Czechoslovak Government on October 3. Meanwhile, the Council of the Arab League supported the Egyptian position, and Saudi Arabia and Syria indicated their willingness to make similar arrangements.

Secretary Dulles commented on the Egyptian-Czechoslovak arrangement on October 4,[29] noting that as a result of Assistant Secretary Allen's visit to Cairo there was a better understanding of the problem, although he had no reason to believe that the arrangement would not be implemented. Recalling his statement of August 30 that the A countries were independent governments and to do whatever they wished in the matter, Dulles declared that, from the standpoint Soviet-American relations, "such deliveries arms would not contribute to relaxing tensio and he added:

> It is difficult to be critical of countries which, fee themselves endangered, seek the arms which they since believe they need for defense. On the other han doubt very much that, under the conditions which vail in the area, it is possible for any country to get secu through an arms race. Also it is not easy or pleasan speculate on the probable motives of the Soviet- leaders.

The Secretary of State referred to his add of August 26 and repeated his proposal for a curity guaranty under the United Nations, wh he believed, "would relieve the acute fears wh both sides now profess." Since he did not kn the precise character or extent of the Czechoslov Egyptian arrangement, or whether it might riously upset the balance of power" in the Mid East, Mr. Dulles could not say whether the Uni States might ship arms to Israel. In the main, pointed out, it had been American policy "to av participating in what might become an arms ra and he still hoped that it would be possible avoid getting into that situation."

Prime Minister Eden expressed similar vie in an address at Bournemouth on October 8, n ing the "grave risks" of the "crudest form of a race" and declaring that, if an outside great pow stepped in to supply arms "on an infinitely lar scale," the risks inevitably would be intensifi

The problem soon was complicated further Soviet promises of extended economic and te nical assistance, and the situation became m tense. Secretary Dulles touched upon the mat again on October 18,[30] indicating that there mi be some informal discussion of it with Soviet F eign Minister Molotov at the Geneva conferen He did not consider that "very certain conclusio could be drawn from the Tripartite Declarat of May 25, 1950, which was based on the br concept of avoiding both a serious imbalance power and an armaments race in the Middle E Nor could he yet judge the military significa of the Czechoslovak-Egyptian arrangement, si

[28] BULLETIN of Oct. 10, 1955, p. 560.

[29] *Ibid.*, Oct. 17, 1955, p. 604.

[30] *Ibid.*, Oct. 31, 1955, p. 688. See also the address Assistant Secretary Allen before the New York *Her Tribune* Forum on Oct. 17, 1955, *ibid.*, p. 683.

ıe "business of secondhand arms" was "very diffi-ılt to appraise accurately" and the value of the iscards was not always easy to judge.

Israel Prime Minister Moshe Sharett also spoke : length on the possible arms race in an address efore the Israel Knesset on October 18, accusing gypt of misdeeds along the Israel demarcation nes and expressing approval of Mr. Dulles' ad-ress of August 26, although he declared there ould be "no unilateral territorial concessions on ıe part of Israel." Mr. Sharett considered the zechoslovak-Egyptian arms arrangement a dan-r to Israel, along with the British shipment of ms to Iraq and other Arab States. But because ms were a "prime necessity" for its defense, rael would "not refuse arms from any possible urce." At the same time, Mr. Sharett contended ıat no power was justified in withholding a se-ırity pact from Israel and attached "particular ıportance" to one with the United States, to hich Israel had considered itself "entitled" for long time.[31]

Prime Minister Sharett later journeyed to Paris ıd Geneva in order to present Israel's position the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the nited Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union. e visited the United States during November–ecember in the interest of arms and a security ıaranty.

IE PRESIDENT'S POSITION

Meanwhile, from Denver, Colo., President isenhower issued a statement concerning peace the Middle East on November 9.[32] He said he lt that nothing which had happened since 1954 ıd invalidated "our fundamental policies . . . sed on friendship for all of the peoples of that ea." In the President's view, true security "must based upon a just and reasonable settlement," d he recalled the U.S. offer of August 26 to in in "formal treaty engagements to prevent or wart any effort by either side to alter by force e boundaries between Israel and its Arab neigh-rs." Recent developments had made a settle-ent all the more imperative, and the President clared that the United States would continue to ay its full part and would "support firmly the United Nations," which had "already contributed so markedly to minimize violence in the area." He hoped that other nations of the world would cooperate in this endeavor, "thereby contributing significantly to world peace."

Prime Minister Eden also discussed Middle Eastern problems on November 9, referring both to the U.S. proposals of August 26 and to the "new element of danger" brought into the picture through the Czechoslovak-Egyptian arms arrangement.[33] He paid tribute to the work of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), regretted that the Jordan River Valley project had not yet been approved, and said that the powers "must somehow attempt to deal with the root causes of the trouble." Because of its "long tradition of friendship with the Middle East," the United Kingdom had "a special responsibility" in the area. The United Kingdom was aware of the respective Israel and Arab positions concerning terms of peace, the resolutions of the United Nations in 1947 and afterward, and the Armistice Agreements of 1949, and he felt that the only solution was some kind of compromise on territorial claims, in the interest of which the good offices of the United Kingdom would be available. If there could be some accepted agreement about boundaries, the Prime Minister believed the United Kingdom, the United States, and perhaps other powers would be prepared to give a formal guaranty to both sides. This might, at last, bring "real confidence and security," and there would also be financial and other assistance "over this tragic problem of the refugees."

On November 15, in a message read at a rally in New York City, President Eisenhower repeated the American willingness to sign a Middle Eastern security guaranty, provided agreement was reached between Israel and the Arab States concerning boundaries, and stressed the view that current problems were capable of pacific settlement.[34] He considered a threat to Middle Eastern peace as a threat to world peace and indicated that the United States would continue to be guided by the policies of the 1950 Tripartite Declaration, which, he thought, best promoted "the interest and security of the peoples of the area." In the President's view:

[1] On Oct. 24 the Knesset approved a resolution express-i; its anxiety concerning the arms shipment to Egypt d the continued arming of Iraq and other Arab States.

[2] BULLETIN of Nov. 21, 1955, p. 845.

[33] For text of this address, made at the Lord Mayor's banquet, see British Information Services, T. 48 (Nov. 10, 1955).

[34] BULLETIN of Nov. 28, 1955, p. 894.

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The need for a peaceful settlement becomes daily more imperative. The United States will play its full part in working toward such a settlement and will support firmly the United Nations in its efforts to prevent violence in the area. By firm friendship towards Israel and all other Nations in the Near East, we shall continue to contribute to the peace of the world.

The Department of State indicated on November 16, following visits of the Israel and Egyptian Ambassadors, that the United States "would view with grave disapproval anything which would lead to hostilities in the Middle East." [35] Two days later, the Department declared that the United States and the United Kingdom were "working closely together in their common interest in the settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute." The two governments saw "eye to eye" on the imperative necessity of an early settlement, as had been clearly indicated by the President on November 9 and by the Secretary of State on August 26.

Toward the end of November, Prime Minister Eden clarified the British position before the House of Commons. On November 22, he reaffirmed the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, and on November 24 he declared that (1) there was nothing in his address of November 9 involving "very substantial" concessions of territory by Israel, (2) Israel should cooperate in solving the problem of the 900,000 Arab refugees, and (3) there could be no real settlement without Arab recognition of the right of Israel to exist. He had not attempted to specify any details concerning a compromise but was convinced that a settlement would be so valuable that both sides would find concessions "more than worthwhile." The Prime Minister added that, although he did not want to bind his American friends to every word he had spoken, it was a fact that the United Kingdom and the United States were in "close agreement in this difficult business."

On December 6 Secretary Dulles, who had had a discussion with the Israel Foreign Minister on the previous day, declared that the United States continued "to feel very strongly that there should be a solution" of the Israel-Arab problem.[36] He held the need for a solution to be imperative and hoped that both sides would see the advantages of a settlement, but he would not say that there were any "concrete developments which could be adduced as proof that they have been so convinced as yet"; the possibilities, in his view, still existed.

TENSION ALONG BORDERS

But despite these efforts 1955 did not bring a settlement in the Arab-Israel controversy. Tension along the demarcation lines [37] continued unabated, with the Israel-Egyptian and Israel-Syrian demarcation lines the major center of conflict, rather than the Israel-Jordan boundary as in years past.[38]

Israel-Egyptian relations worsened during 1955 with the continuance of Egyptian restrictions against Israel shipping in the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba [39] and numerous infiltrating raids across the demarcation lines in the Gaza region. The first serious incident of the year was Israel's "retaliatory" raid in the Gaza strip on February 28, in which 39 Egyptians and 8 Israelis were killed and 30 Egyptians and 13 Israelis wounded, an act for which the United Nations Security Council censured Israel on March 29, 1955.[40]

In line with the suggestions of Maj. Gen. E. L. M. Burns, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, the Security Council on March 30 called upon the parties to cooperate in (1) establishment of joint patrols along sensitive portions of the demarcation line, (2) negotiation of a local commanders' agreement, (3) erection of a barbed-wire obstacle along sections of the line, and (4) manning of all outposts and patrols by regular forces.[41] The difficulty continued, however, and on April 13 General Burns declared that the significant element in the increased tension had been the mining of tracks used by Israel army trucks—an action which might have been in retaliation for the Gaza incident.

[35] On Nov. 10 the Department announced that it had "let it be known that we would be strongly opposed to the side which starts a war and would be very favorably disposed to the side which convinces us that it desires to maintain peace."

[36] BULLETIN of Dec. 19, 1955, p. 1009. Foreign Secretary Macmillan told the House of Commons on Dec. 12 that the Soviet Union was doing everything possible to make the problems of the Middle East "utterly insoluble."

[37] For a map of Israel showing boundary and demarcation lines, see *ibid.*, Feb. 21, 1955, p. 303.

[38] One serious incident occurred on the Israel-Lebanon demarcation line on Sept. 22; an armed gang attacked a bus, killing three persons and wounding nine, one of whom was an American citizen.

[39] See, for example, the Israel complaint of Sept. 1955 (U.N. doc. S/3442).

[40] For U.S. statement and text of resolution, see BULLETIN of Apr. 18, 1955, p. 659 and p. 661.

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 662; U.N. docs. S/3373 and S/PV. 693.

[42] U.N. doc. S/3990.

he increasing seriousness of the situation rompted Ambassador Lodge, as President of the ecurity Council, to express his concern to Coun- l members on June 7; his letter (copies of which ere sent to the Egyptian and Israel representa- ves to the U.N.) noted that, if General Burns d not receive the necessary cooperation of the rties, another meeting of the Security Council ight be necessary.[43]

Nevertheless, incidents continued, and the dis- ssions under General Burns did not go well. cidents which resulted in heavy casualties and ndry claims and counterclaims had seriously in- med the situation by the end of August. A ase-fire was accepted by September 4, but Gen- al Burns was convinced that a repetition could avoided only if the opposing forces were sep- ated by a physical barrier and kept 500 meters each side of the line.[44] The Security Council et on September 8 and unanimously adopted a solution (1) noting the cease-fire, (2) calling on rael and Egypt to bring about peace and order the Gaza region and particularly "to desist from rther acts of violence and to continue the cease- e in full force and effect," (3) endorsing the urns proposals concerning separation of the posing forces, (4) calling for freedom of move- ent of United Nations observers (some of whom d been detained in Israel), (5) calling for full operation with General Burns, and (6) request- g the latter to report to the Security Council implementation of the resolution.[45]

Although both Egypt and Israel conditionally reed on September 27 to the UNTSO request to ithdraw from the demilitarized zone, the situa- on did not improve and shooting incidents con- ued, with provocations on both sides. On No- mber 2, following a statement of Prime Minister n-Gurion that Israel was ready for peace with gypt, Israel forces struck at Egyptian positions hich were beyond the old border in the demili- rized zone, with the result that 50 Egyptians ere killed and 40 wounded, and 4 Israelis lled. United Nations observers were not per- tted to go to the scene. On November 3, the N. Secretary-General proposed a peace plan lling for clear delineation of the demarcation lines and the withdrawal of armed forces. At the same time he protested the detention of United Nations observers and expressed "grave concern" over the incident in a protest to the Israel representative at the United Nations.[46] Two days later the Department of State also issued a statement[47] following a conference of Assistant Secretary Allen with Ambassador Eban and Egyptian Ambassador Ahmed Hussein; it noted with concern the "increasing tempo" of Israel-Egyptian hostilities and violations of the Armistice Agreement by both sides. It strongly supported the efforts of the United Nations to achieve a settlement by peaceful methods, particularly those proposed by General Burns, and declared that United Nations observers should have "full liberty to perform their peaceful functions."[48]

In contrast to the situation on the Egyptian-Israel demarcation lines and to that which had generally obtained in the period of 1949–54, the Israel-Jordan line was relatively quiet. On April 18, a local commanders' agreement, designed to minimize incidents and other hostile acts in the Jerusalem area, was accepted on an informal basis.[49] But the situation along the Israel-Syrian line, always tense, flared into open conflict. There were occasional Syrian forays across the Israel line and numerous charges and countercharges, with mutual recriminations. On October 22 an Israel force killed 3 Syrian soldiers, wounded 6, and took at least 5 prisoners, in what the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization termed a "well-planned" operation.[50] On December 11 a much more serious incident developed when Israel forces, estimated at some 600 men, attacked Syrian outposts overlooking

[3] BULLETIN of June 20, 1955, p. 1016.

[4] See U.N. docs. S/3425, 3426, 3427, 3428, 3430, 3431, 3.

[5] For U.S. statement and text of resolution, see BUL- IN of Sept. 19, 1955, p. 458.

[46] See also Israel protests of Nov. 1 and 8, 1955, and Mar. 13, 1956 (U.N. docs. S/3454, 3456, 3559).

[47] BULLETIN of Nov. 14, 1955, p. 786.

[48] Of the disturbances during the first 10 months of 1955 for which responsibility has so far been determined, Egypt was held responsible by the UNTSO for some 30 incidents, in which 4 Egyptians and 16 Israelis were killed and 4 Egyptians and 59 Israelis were wounded, while Israel was held responsible for 21 incidents, in which 47 Egyptians and 9 Israelis were killed and 45 Egyptians and 13 Israelis wounded.

[49] During the first 10 months of 1955 there appear to have been 12 incidents for which Israel was held responsible, in which 4 Jordanians and 3 Israelis were wounded. Jordan was held responsible for 18 incidents, in which 8 Jordanians and 6 Israelis were killed and 1 Jordanian and 13 Israelis wounded.

[50] See also U.N. docs. S/3448 and 3451.

Lake Tiberias (the Sea of Galilee), killing 56 Syrians and taking 29 prisoners, with at least 6 Israelis among the dead. The Israel Government charged that Syrian troops had fired at Israel fishermen on the Sea of Galilee, but the UNTSO held that there had been violations of the Armistice Agreement by both sides, pointed to the increase in tension, and noted Syria's resentment at the denial of fishing rights. There was, moreover, mutual embitterment because of failure to return prisoners. But the report of the UNTSO held:

> The Israeli action on the night of 11/12 December was a deliberate violation of the provisions of the general armistice agreement, including those relating to the demilitarized zone, which was crossed by the Israel forces which entered Syria.
>
> Like the Kibya and Gaza incidents with which the Security Council has had to deal, the Tiberias incident has been explained by Israel as a retaliatory action on a large scale. In these three cases, Israel forces have acted by surprise and after striking a heavy blow, they have returned to their base. There is, however, a risk in such retaliatory action, viz that the attacker may not be able to limit the extent of the operation to that planned. Such actions may well produce a violent reaction by the forces of the attacked country and what had been conceived as a limited raid develops into full-scale hostilities. In the present atmosphere of tensions and military activity, this possibility must be faced.[51]

ACTION IN U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL

There was some justification for the fears expressed by the UNTSO. On December 15, the eve of the discussion of the problem by the Security Council, the Egyptian Government advised the Secretary-General that, in view of the Egyptian-Syrian Mutual Defense Treaty of October 20, 1955, Egypt considered the attack against Syrian forces "an aggression against Egypt" and felt compelled "to treat force with force." [52]

During the discussions in the Security Council, Israel was unanimously condemned for the action against Syria.[53] The resolution of January 19, 1956,[54] held that interference by Syrian authorities with Israeli activities on Lake Tiberias in no way justified the Israel action. It reminded Israel that the Security Council had already condemned the raid against the Jordanian village of Kibya (October 14–15, 1953) and the retaliatory attack in the Gaza region (February 28, 1955).[55]

The attack of December 11–12, 1955, was condemned as a "flagrant violation" of the cease-fire provisions in the Security Council resolution of July 15, 1948, and of the Syrian-Israel Armistice Agreement of 1949. The Security Council also expressed "its grave concern at the failure of the

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[51] U.N. doc. S/3516 and Add. 1, Corr. 1. According to official Israel estimates, during the first 6 months of 1954 Israel casualties in clashes on the Sea of Galilee totaled 2 killed and 7 wounded. At least 25 incidents were reported in the first 10 months of 1955 "causing loss of life and property," but without specification. Most of the clashes occurred when Syrian military outposts dominating the corner of the sea opened fire to defend Arab fishermen threatened by Israel police patrols or to interfere with Israel shipping. On the other hand, according to the UNTSO, Israel complaints concerning incidents in 1954 reached 14, involving 2 killed and 8 wounded, while there were 24 complaints in 1955, with no casualties. Again according to UNTSO, there were 14 Syrian complaints during 1954, involving 5 killed and 6 wounded; in 1955 there were 26 complaints involving two wounded.

On Mar. 4 there was an incident on the Sea of Galilee involving Syrian forces and Israel police; 4 of the latter were killed (U.N. docs. S/3554, 3555, and 3558).

[52] U.N. doc. S/3514.

[53] Ambassador Eban made a spirited defense of Israel on Jan. 17, among other things charging that, as a result of "acts of aggression organized on the responsibility of Arab Governments," some 884 Israelis had been killed or maimed since 1951 (U.N. doc. S/PV. 713, p. 36).

[54] BULLETIN of Jan. 30, 1956, p. 183.

[55] For the discussions, see U.N. docs. S/PV. 707–715; for various drafts of the resolution, see U.N. docs. S/3519, 3528, 3530 and Revs. 1–2, S/3532, S/3536, and S/3537. See also the Israel memoranda of Dec. 21 and 29, 1955 (U.N. docs. S/3518, 3524). Although the Council recognized some provocation, all members felt that Israel's action was out of all proportion to the provocation; as Ambassador Lodge declared on Jan. 12, 1956, it could not "be accurately described as a retaliatory raid." Ambassador Lodge added, "The Security Council must do more than condemn. It must warn the Government of Israel that another transgression will compel it to consider what further measures under the charter are required to maintain or restore the peace" (BULLETIN of Jan. 30, 1956, p. 182).

Meanwhile, it may be noted that the UNTSO did not accept the Israel charges that Egypt had sabotaged General Burns' attempt to ease the situation in the Gaza region. The primary difficulty continued to lie in the fact that the Egyptians desired to demarcate all three sides of the demilitarized zone triangle, whereas the Secretary-General had proposed demarcation of only the side which constituted the old Palestinian-Sinai frontier. Despite Israel's charge that Egypt had rejected the proposals, the UNTSO for the third time denied the Israel charge and stated that "disturbance of public opinion in Arab countries," following Israel's retaliatory action in the Sea of Galilee, had made further progress in negotiations impossible. There had been no serious clashes in the El Auja area since Nov. 2. It may be noted that the UNTSO denied a similar Israel charge on Nov. 18.

Government of Israel to comply with its obligations" and called upon Israel to do so in the future; otherwise the Council would have to consider "what further measures under the Charter are required to maintain or restore the peace." The resolution called upon the parties to comply with their obligations under the General Armistice Agreement to respect the demarcation line and the demilitarized zone and requested the Chief of Staff of the UNTSO to pursue his suggestions for improving the situation in the area of Lake Tiberias "without prejudice to the rights, claims and positions of the parties and to report to the Council as appropriate on the success of his efforts." Both parties were called upon to arrange with the Chief of Staff to implement the provisions of the Armistice Agreement in good faith, and especially "to make full use of the Mixed Armistice Commission's machinery in the interpretation and application of its provisions."

On January 24, 1956, during his visit to the Middle East, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold announced that Egypt had accepted the proposals with regard to the easing of tensions in the vicinity of the demilitarized zone at El Auja (Nitsana), which had been originally set forth on November 4 and which Israel had accepted on January 4. These proposals dealt with border markings and withdrawal of troops from the demilitarized zone. At the end of his visit the Secretary-General indicated that he was somewhat hopeful concerning the possibility of peace, although he did not minimize the difficulties.[56] Both Arab and Israel leaders, he indicated, had reaffirmed their faith in the principles and purposes of the United Nations, had expressed their determination, "in accordance with their obligations under the Charter and under the General Armistice Agreement, to abstain from any acts of hostility or aggression and above all to settle conflicts, when they may arise, by peaceful means." The Secretary-General was convinced that such an attitude was essential for a lessening of tensions and the development of that calm in which alone it would "be possible to make a constructive approach toward the solution of outstanding problems."[57]

[56] U.N. press release SG/464, Jan. 30, 1956.

[57] See also U.N. doc. S/3539 (Jan. 24, 1956) for Israel memorandum.

Other Issues

There were many other issues, not always of direct concern to the United States, but nevertheless matters of interest which bore promise of one sort or another for the future. Thus, for example, the Sudanese Parliament, on December 19, 1955, adopted a unanimous resolution for independence, which was duly proclaimed on January 1, 1956.[58] The United States extended recognition on the same date, and on January 2 President Eisenhower sent a message declaring that the United States looked forward to friendly relations with the Government of the Sudan and wished it "every success in establishing a stable, prosperous and happy nation."[59] The United States also endorsed the application of the Sudan for U.N. membership, which the Security Council unanimously recommended to the General Assembly on February 6.[60]

Another long-smoldering issue was that between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia over Buraimi. Attempts at arbitration had failed by the fall of 1955, and forces of Abu Dhabi and the Sultan of Muscat, supported by the Trucial Oman levies, entered the area on October 26. The Saudi Government informed the Security Council in October that it reserved the right to bring the matter before the Council; no further action has been taken, however, and the possibility exists that Saudi Arabia will discuss the matter directly with the British.[61]

Still a third problem was that of Goa, involving India and Portugal, which had broken relations concerning the question. Secretary Dulles on August 2 stated that the United States was concerned with tension in that area as in any other. He noted that it had

> always been our policy to favor the settlement of disputes by peaceful means. That is, of course, a principle which is expressed in the charter of the United Nations. That applies to Goa as well as to any other place in the world. We are pleased to note that, as I recall, Prime Minister Nehru affirmed that principle for his own Government,

[58] The Anglo-Egyptian controversy concerning the Sudan, in the settlement of which the United States was much interested, ended formally with the agreement of Feb. 12, 1953.

[59] BULLETIN of Jan. 16, 1956, p. 85.

[60] *Ibid.*, Feb. 27, 1956, p. 354.

[61] For the British and Saudi positions concerning the matter, see U.N. docs. S/3450, 3452, 3465.

and I am confident that that is also the view that will be taken by the Government of Portugal.[62]

Subsequently, during the visit of the Portuguese Foreign Minister to the United States on December 2, a joint communique referred among other things to allegations concerning "the Portuguese provinces in the Far East," in view of various statements made during the Bulganin-Khrushchev visit to India.[63] In a statement of December 6, Secretary Dulles pointed to the context of the statement, which had been directed against the introduction of hate and prejudice into a situation calling for calmness but which had not taken "any position on the merits of the matter." The United States believed that such problems should not be settled by force—a general approach which, he felt, Prime Minister Nehru shared.[64] On December 29 the United States sent a note to the Indian Government to this effect.

French-Moroccan Declaration

Department Announcement

Press release 117 dated March 7

On March 2, 1956, the Foreign Minister of France and the Prime Minister of Morocco signed a Joint Declaration which recognized the independence of Morocco and affirmed the will of the two nations to define, as equal and sovereign partners, the new conditions which will govern their future relationships.

It is fitting that on this occasion the United States should pay tribute to the farsighted and generous statesmanship which has opened a new chapter in the history of collaboration between the two nations.

Our representatives in France and Morocco have been instructed to convey our congratulations on this occasion.

Message to Acting Foreign Minister of France [1]

Press release 118 dated March 7

My Government has instructed me to convey warmest congratulations to your Government on the farsighted statesmanship which has culminated in the Joint Declaration of March 2, 195 by the French and Moroccan Governments. M Government is particularly gratified that the De laration, which recognizes the independence c Morocco, should also reaffirm the will of both n tions to work out their destinies together and th to assure the continued contribution of France t the future of Morocco.

Message to Sultan of Morocco [2]

Press release 119 dated March 7

I have been instructed by my Government to co vey to Your Majesty and His Government an to the Moroccan people warmest congratulatio on the recognition of Morocco's independence, a embodied in the Franco-Moroccan Declaration c March 2, 1956.

My Government renews its wishes for the peac and prosperity of Morocco, and has asked me t express its gratification that Morocco has freel chosen, as a sovereign nation, to continue in th path of its traditional friendships.

Text of Declaration [3]

[Unofficial translation]

The Government of the French Republic and Hi Majesty Mohammed V, Sultan of Morocco, affirm thei desire to put into full operation the declaration of L Celle Saint-Cloud of November 6, 1955.

They note that, following the evolution achieved b Morocco on the road of progress, the Treaty of Fez c March 30, 1912, no longer corresponds henceforth to th necessities of modern life and can no longer gover Franco-Moroccan relations.

Consequently the Government of the French Republi solemnly confirms the recognition of the independence o Morocco, which specifically implies a diplomacy and a army, as well as its desire to respect and have respecte the Moroccan territorial integrity guaranteed by inte national treaties.

The Government of the French Republic and Hi Majesty Mohammed V, Sultan of Morocco, declare tha the negotiations which have just opened at Paris betwee Morocco and France, sovereign and equal states, have a their object to conclude new accords which will define th interdependence of the two countries in the domains wher their interests are common, which will thus establish thei cooperation on the basis of liberty and equality, notabl in matters of defense, of external relations, of economy

[62] BULLETIN of Aug. 15, 1955, p. 263.

[63] *Ibid.*, Dec. 12, 1955, p. 966.

[64] *Ibid.*, Dec. 19, 1955, p. 1007.

[1] Delivered by Ambassador C. Douglas Dillon on Mar. 7.

[2] Delivered to His Cherifian Majesty Mohammed V on Mar. 7 by Julius C. Holmes, Diplomatic Agent of th United States in Morocco.

[3] Signed at Paris on Mar. 2 by Foreign Minister Chris tian Pineau of France and Premier Embarek Bekkai o Morocco.

l of culture, and which will guarantee the rights and rties of the French established in Morocco and of the roccans established in France respecting the sovereignty both states.

The Government of the French Republic and His jesty Mohammed V, Sultan of Morocco, agree that, ding the application of these agreements, the new reonships between France and Morocco will be founded the terms of the protocol annexed to the present laration.

PROTOCOL

. The legislative power is exercised sovereignly by His jesty the Sultan. The representative of France is nizant of projects of Dahirs and of decrees: he will mit observations when the texts refer to the interests France, of Frenchmen, or of foreigners during the lod of transition.

I. His Majesty Mohammed V, Sultan of Morocco, will ablish a national army. France will lend its assistance Morocco for the constitution of this army. The present us of the French Army in Morocco remains unchanged ing the transition period.

II. Administrative powers reserved until now will be subject of a transfer whose modalities will be decided er common agreement.

he Moroccan Government will be represented with the t to speak and vote in the committee of the franc zone, central directing organ of monetary policy for the re franc zone.

n the other hand, guaranties enjoyed by French offis and French agents serving in Morocco are mained.

V. The representative of the French Republic in Moco will carry the title of High Commissioner of France.

tters of Credence

James C. Hagerty, press secretary to the Presit, announced on March 2 that the President l that day received the credentials of the newly pointed Ambassador of Japan, Masayuki Tani.

sit of Prime Minister Ireland

The Department of State announced on March press release 122) the members of the party for visit to the United States of John A. Costello, ime Minister of Ireland, who will arrive in ashington on March 14:

ohn A. Costello, Prime Minister of Ireland
ohn Joseph Hearne, Ambassador of Ireland
lexis Fitzgerald, special personal assistant to the Prime Minister
harles Murray, Principal Officer, Prime Minister's Department
William Howard Taft, 3d, American Ambassador to Ireland
John F. Simmons, Chief of Protocol, Department of State
John P. Meagher, Press Officer, Department of State

The Prime Minister will spend 3 days in Washington and a week in and near New York City. He will remain in the United States until March 29.

Educational Exchange Agreement With Denmark Extended

In an exchange of notes on February 17 the United States and Denmark extended the agreement between the two countries dated August 23, 1951, to provide for a program of educational exchange under the Fulbright Act for an additional 5-year period. The notes were exchanged in a brief ceremony at Copenhagen by the United States Ambassador to Denmark, Robert D. Coe, and the Danish Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, H. C. Hansen, representing their respective governments.

The exchange of notes provides for the continuance of the program at its present level ($180,000 annually). The funds made available will be used to finance travel of Danish nationals to the United States for study, teaching, lecturing, or advanced research and to pay travel and maintenance costs for Americans to engage in similar activities in Denmark.

Nearly 600 exchanges have or will have taken place between Denmark and the United States during the first 5 years of the program's operation.

In presenting the American note, Ambassador Coe said it was a matter of particular gratification to him that, when the end of the program was threatened by the expiration of supporting funds, great initiative was shown in Denmark to find ways and means for its continuation. He paid particular tribute to the interest shown and the efforts made by the Danish press as well as leaders in the academic world to have the program extended.

He concluded his remarks by saying:

> This exchange has not only had its effects on the individuals concerned but has enriched many institutions in both our countries. I am pleased therefore that the Danish Government fully cooperated with my Government, which has made funds available to continue this program for an additional five years. International

cooperation through cultural exchange is the basic idea of the Fulbright program, and it was a Danish poet who said that ". . . good ideas cannot die until even better ideas have grown from their seed." The renewal of the Fulbright Agreement between our two countries testifies to the strength of a good idea.

The Prime Minister expressed sincere gratitude on behalf of the Danish Government for continuation of the program, and stated:

Apart from their scientific and technical value such cultural exchanges have resulted in a substantial contribution to our knowledge of cultural and social life in the United States. Similarly, we hope that these visits may also have extended American knowledge of the cultural, social and economic conditions of our country.

He added that the program "has proved an important link in the chain of Danish-American friendship."

Report on Refugee Relief Act Transmitted to Congress

Press release 113 dated March 6

Forty-nine percent of all visas that have been issued under the Refugee Relief Act were issued in the 6-month period from July 1, 1955, to December 31, 1955. Total visas issued as of December 31 were 73,331; an additional 13,000 visas have been issued since January 1, 1956.

Pierce J. Gerety, Deputy Administrator of the Refugee Relief Program, announced the figures for the last half of 1955 in the fifth semiannual report, transmitted to Congress on March 5. The Refugee Relief Act of 1953 allocated 209,000 visas to bring in refugees, escapees, expellees, relatives, and orphans. The act expires December 31, 1956.

Complete success is already assured for the program in Greece and Italy. For these two countries "cutoff" dates for applicants and sponsors were announced near the end of 1955.[1]

Considering the number of visas issued, cases now in process, and the rate new cases are being received, it is expected that goals will be reached by the end of 1956 for the following categories: the Italian allocation of 60,000 visas; Greece, 17,000; escapees in NATO countries, 10,000; Palestine refugees in the Near East, 2,000; and Asians indigenous to the Far East, 5,000.

Reporting that the program is moving forward in all areas and prospects are encouraging, Mr. Gerety cautioned that, despite an accelerated r e of processing cases, the program may need citi n assurances to cover as many as 55,000 persons, c sidering maximum visas allowable. He poin d out that one of the greatest single elements versely affecting the Refugee Relief Program c tinues to be the lack of an adequate flow f assurances from American citizens for cert n countries and categories of refugees.

Sponsors are needed for refugees and escap s in Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands; n Asians stranded in the Far East; and orpha Ninety thousand visas were allocated for escap s and expellees (largely from behind the Iron C tain) now residing in Germany and Austria. C sidering visas issued, cases in process, and the r assurances are being received, the German-A trian allocation may need assurances to cover many as 39,500 persons. Improved economic c ditions in Germany have lessened the demand visas under the act. Nevertheless, there are la numbers of eligible refugees, expellees, and capees still waiting to come to America, and ass ances are needed to provide visas for those w seek them under the act.

Further sponsorships from American citiz may also be needed to cover, in approximate nu bers, 13,000 visa possibilities for relatives a refugees in the Netherlands; 1,700 non-Asi who were stranded in the Far East; and orphans worldwide. The total visa allocati made by the Refugee Act to those areas are: Netherlands, 17,000; Far East, non-Asians, 2,0 orphans, 4,000. An assurance (or sponsorshi may cover more than one person, in the case families; a visa covers only one person.

Persons in many employment categories among those waiting to come to the United Stat Thirty-three voluntary agencies, 41 Governo Committees for the Refugee Program, and ma local and national organizations are available aid citizens in sponsoring refugees.

Transportation to the United States for ma of the refugees during the past 6 months w provided by chartered air flights and special sa ings of the *General Langfitt*, a converted Na transport under charter by the Intergovernmen Committee for European Migration. The *La fitt* made seven trips from July 12 to Decem 16, with 8,257 passengers.

The tabulation by states of verified refug assurances shows the following 10 (in ord

[1] BULLETIN of Dec. 5, 1955, p. 917, and Jan. 2, 1956, p. 16.

sted) to be leading in number of assurances ırnished: New York, Illinois, California, New ersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Michgan, Connecticut, and Wisconsin.

ron Lungs Rushed to Argentina or Polio Epidemic

ess release 114 dated March 6

The U.S. Government through the Department State, the International Cooperation Administation, and the U.S. Air Force, and with the coperation of the Pan American Sanitary Bureau nd the National Foundation for Infantile Paralys, is rushing a shipment of 21 iron lungs to Arntina, where a serious epidemic of poliomyelitis ıs broken out. Since January 1, upward of 800 ses have been reported, most of them in the area the capital city of Buenos Aires; and the disease spreading at the rate of approximately 60 cases day. U.S. Ambassador Albert F. Nufer inrmed the Department of State of the urgent need r iron lungs and other equipment.

The American Red Cross is in touch with the rgentine Red Cross to ascertain the nature and tent of assistance needed and will coordinate s own activities with those of the U.S. Governent agencies cooperating. Acting on behalf of e U.S. Government, the National Foundation r Infantile Paralysis is flying two of its experts Buenos Aires to confer with Argentine authoris and to determine what further equipment, ugs, and other assistance are needed. The oundation is preparing to send two or more ams, each consisting of a doctor, a nurse, and a erapist.

The iron lungs, obtained through auspices of the n American Sanitary Bureau, and other equipnt are being flown to Buenos Aires by the U.S. ir Force.

ırplus Commodity Agreement gned With Indonesia

ss release 111 dated March 2

On March 2 Anak Agung Gde Agung, Minister Foreign Affairs, representing the Republic of donesia and Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., American mbassador, representing the United States gned in Djakarta an agreement for the sale of U.S. surplus commodities valued at approximately $96,700,000. This agreement was concluded pursuant to the provisions of title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (Public Law 480, 83d Congress, as amended)[1] and will be implemented over a 2-year period.

Payment for the commodities will be made in Indonesian rupiahs. A major part of the funds generated by the agreement will be loaned to the Indonesian Government for development purposes, with eventual repayment to the United States. The remainder will be used for U.S. Government expenses in Indonesia, agricultural marketing development in Indonesia, and the carrying out of an educational exchange program between Indonesia and the United States.[2]

Distribution of Additional Quantities of Uranium 235

White House press release dated February 22

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT EISENHOWER

Mankind's hopes and aspirations for peace and greater well-being are closely linked to the world's progress in developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The program to further this development has advanced steadily in the past two years.

I am announcing today further steps by the United States toward the production of peaceful power from the atom.

At the recommendation of Chairman Lewis L. Strauss of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, in which the Departments of State and Defense concur, I have determined, under Section 41b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, that substantial quantities of the special nuclear material uranium 235 may now be designated for research and development purposes and for fueling nuclear power reactors at home and abroad. This material will be available for either sale or lease under conditions prescribed by the United States Govern-

[1] For the third progress report on P. L. 480, see BULLETIN of Jan. 23, 1956, p. 130.

[2] The Department of Agriculture announced on Mar. 2 that the agreement covers about 550 million pounds of rice, valued at $35.8 million; about 206 thousand bales of cotton, valued at $36 million; 23 million pounds of leaf tobacco, valued at $15 million; and about 1,270,000 bags of wheat flour, valued at $5 million. About $4.9 million is included for ocean transportation.

ment. The Commission's recommendations are based on extensive studies that have been in progress since enactment of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

The quantities of uranium 235 which will be made available for distribution over a period of years under this determination are:

a. In the United States, through lease for all licensed civilian purposes, principally for power reactors—20,000 kilograms.

b. Outside the United States, through sale or lease for peaceful purposes, principally power and research reactors—20,000 kilograms. This is in addition to the 200 kilograms already made available for research reactors abroad.

It is not intended that nations which are presently producing uranium 235, or the Soviet Union and its satellites, shall share in this distribution.

Distribution of special nuclear material will be subject to prudent safeguards against diversion of the materials to non-peaceful purposes.

The quantities of uranium 235 to be made available as a result of this determination will permit us to carry out our responsibilities in the development of atomic energy for the common defense and security of the United States and for contributing to the peace and general welfare of the world.

Significant actions are under way to create an international agency and an integrated community for Western Europe to develop peaceful uses of atomic energy. The United States welcomes this progress and will cooperate with such agencies when they come into existence.

The special nuclear material to be made available will support the start of nuclear power programs with a generating capacity of several millions of electrical kilowatts. With this assurance, such programs may be undertaken in the next several years, in this country and abroad.

As additional projects are undertaken by our industry and by other nations, more nuclear fuel will be required. The Atomic Energy Commission has informed me that it will recommend that additional supplies be made available as become necessary in the future.

This action demonstrates the confidence of the United States in the possibilities of developing nuclear power for civilian uses. It is an earnest of our faith that the atom can be made a powerful instrument for the promotion of world peace.

STATEMENT BY LEWIS L. STRAUSS CHAIRMAN, ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSIO

The President's action in authorizing Atomic Energy Commission to make avail 40,000 kilograms of uranium 235 for use here abroad in the development of nuclear power is most important step toward peaceful uses atomic energy since the passage of the Ato Energy Act of 1954.

The President's action has two major aspect

a. It authorizes the Atomic Energy Comm sion to provide sufficient U–235 to meet estimated requirements of the private and pu power groups in the United States which, in role of pioneers, have announced plans for construction and operation of nuclear po plants.

b. It enables the Commission to respond to top-priority question concerning the availabil of nuclear fuel being asked by our friends abr who wish to negotiate agreements with the Uni States for assistance in developing their respect nuclear power programs.

We are now embarking on programs of aid nuclear power development, extending beyond previous programs of support of atomic ene research in the United States and abroad. Un these new programs we will provide U–235 to s port nuclear power development during the life the licenses issued under our civilian applicati program at home and the expected life of agr power reactor projects abroad using our fu The 40,000 kilograms of U–235 available to dom tic and foreign users will not all be distributed the coming year or in any other single year. will be distributed over a period of years as need with smaller amounts in the early years.

Prior to the President's action today, the Unit States offered to make available, within prude security considerations, to friendly nations p pared to invest their own funds in nuclear p grams both access to and training in the new tec nology of theory, design, construction and op ation of power reactors.

We have carried out that promise in seve ways. At the International Conference on t Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy held in Gene in August 1955, the United States presented, alo with the valued contributions of other natio much data useful in nuclear power research a development. We also have encouraged friend

ons to seek, under mutually acceptable stand- of necessary security, more precise data and tance in the power reactor field.

ie research type of bilateral agreements for eration now in effect with 26 nations contain words:

is the hope and expectation . . . that this initial ement . . . will lead to consideration of further co- tion extending to the design, construction, and oper- of power producing reactors.

ral nations are presently negotiating with us he type of agreement envisioned in the bilat- research agreements.

for training representatives of friendly ons in the new technology of power reactors, ave organized a special school at the Commis- s Argonne National Laboratory from which ientists and engineers already have been grad- d and 30 more are now attending classes. e 70 men come from 29 nations. It is planned tend this training. Among other means will proposed educational and research institution e Far East.

the present state of the nuclear art, countries available water power or supplies of coal and ill, for some time to come, find it more eco- c to build and operate conventional power ts.

ie authorization of 20,000 kilograms of ura- 235 to be made available for lease to civilian in the United States was based on estimates irrent and future needs. These include the s of existing licenses and pending applica- for licenses as well as proposals received by Commission—including proposals under the er Demonstration Reactor Program—which likely to lead to the filing of license applica- during the current fiscal year ending June 956.

ly part of the special nuclear material will istributed in any one year. Licenses may be d for a varying period extending up to 40 s, and delivery of U–235 to licensees will be id over the life of the licenses, to permit start- f reactors and replacement of fuel as required er years.

ie U–235 will be distributed under provisions ection 53 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 will be allocated to specific licensees only on basis of a Commission determination of the see's need for the material.

e procedures which will govern the distribution of the 20,000 kilograms of U–235 to be made available to other countries, as well as charges for sale or lease, will be announced in the near future. However, based on the value of $25 per gram of contained U–235 for enriched uranium leased for research reactors, as announced by the United States Atomic Energy Commission at the International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, the 40,000 kilograms of U–235 now made available for such sale or lease would have a value of one billion dollars.

Current Legislation on Foreign Policy: 84th Congress, 2d Session

Report on Audit of Commodity Credit Corporation for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1954. H. Doc. 279, December 12, 1955. 90 pp.

Distinguished Civilian Awards and Cultural Interchange and Development. Hearings before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Education and Labor on various bills relating to awards of medal for distinguished civilian achievement and cultural interchange and development. July 5, 6, 1955; January 20, 26, 27, 1956. 436 pp.

Nineteenth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission. S. Doc. 91, January 1956. 200 pp.

Report on Audit of Export-Import Bank of Washington for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1955. H. Doc. 314, January 16, 1956. 11 pp.

Control and Reduction of Armaments. Hearing before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations pursuant to S. Res. 93, 84th Congress. Part 1, January 25, 1956. 45 pp.

Nomination of Robert R. Bowie. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the nomination of Robert R. Bowie to be Assistant Secretary of State. February 7, 1956. 26 pp.

Fifteenth Semiannual Report on Educational Exchange Activities. Letter from chairman, United States Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange, Department of State, transmitting the Fifteenth Semiannual Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange for the period July 1 to December 31, 1955, pursuant to section 603 of Public Law 402, 80th Congress. H. Doc. 335, February 10, 1956. 21 pp.

International Convention to Facilitate the Importation of Commercial Samples and Advertising Material. Report to accompany Executive Q, 83d Congress, 1st Session. S. Exec. Rept. 3, February 14, 1956. 6 pp.

United States Contributions to International Organizations. Letter from the Secretary of State transmitting the fourth report on the extent and disposition of United States contributions to international organizations for the fiscal year 1955 pursuant to section 2 of Public Law 806, 81st Congress. H. Doc. 337, February 14, 1956. 78 pp.

Extending Greetings to the Sudan. Report to accompany S. Con. Res. 70. S. Rept. 1485, February 16, 1956. 2 pp.

Importation of Certain Handwoven Fabrics for Use in Making Religious Vestments. Report to accompany H. R. 4376. S. Rept. 1487, February 20, 1956. 2 pp.

Transfer of Amorphous Graphite from Dutiable List to Free List. Report to accompany H. R. 3653. S. Rept. 1488, February 20, 1956. 3 pp.

Authorizing Participation by the United States in Parliamentary Conferences of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Report to accompany H. J. Res. 501. H. Rept. 1808, February 23, 1956. 3 pp.

Purposes of Proposed Organization for Trade Cooperation

Following are texts of statements made before the Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives by Secretary Dulles on March 1 and by Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks on March 2.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY DULLES

Press release 107 dated March 1

I come here today to support the President's proposal that the United States join with other nations in establishing an Organization for Trade Cooperation. United States membership in the Organization would be authorized by H. R. 5550, introduced by the chairman of this committee [Representative Jere Cooper] at the last session.

The project of an Organization for Trade Cooperation was undertaken on American initiative, proposed by the present administration after careful study. Successful international negotiations leading to the agreement on the Organization for Trade Cooperation were completed among 35 governments in the spring of 1955. It is our conviction that this Organization is needed in order that American agriculture, industry, and labor may obtain maximum benefits from our reciprocal trade program. It is also our conviction that the Organization will enhance the collective economic strength of the free nations.

The Organization for Trade Cooperation has a simple basic purpose: to provide formal machinery to administer more effectively the multilateral trade agreement known as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Along with this, the Organization would generally facilitate international cooperation in trade matters.

In order to make this statement as clear as possible, I invite your attention to a matter of terminology. Whenever I refer to the "general agreement," I mean the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. It is necessary to distinguish cle between this long-established multilateral t agreement and the new agreement on the Or ization for Trade Cooperation, or OTC, whic now before you for consideration.

The United States has participated in the eral agreement for 8 years under the Trade Ag ments Act, which authorizes the President "enter into foreign trade agreements." In time the list of countries which are parties to general agreement has grown from 23 to 35 now embraces most of the important trading tions of the free world.

When this administration took office, we r amined the question of continued American ticipation in the General Agreement on Tariffs Trade. We found that American participa was serving the national interest of the Un States by strengthening economic ties with partners and allies. We found, too, that a 8 years of experience some improvement in trade practice rules of the general agreement required. And we found serious defects in arrangements for administering the general ag ment. Its so-called "organizational provisi hardly amounted to more than an awkw improvisation.

The President has already acted to revise trade-agreement rules in the general agreem Within the limits of the authority granted to Executive by the Trade Agreements Act, United States has negotiated and accepted a se of amendments to the general agreement desig to clarify and simplify its provisions to the ex practicable in this complex field.

In our approach to the organizational pr sions of the General Agreement on Tariffs Trade, however, the President has felt it to proceed in another way. After careful st we concluded in 1954 that a formal internati organization was needed if the general agreem

o be fully effective on a continuing basis. ve also determined that the matter of our ership in such an organization should be tted to the Congress.

is our purpose is to create better machinery ninister the General Agreement on Tariffs rade and to do it with the explicit approval Congress.

s my conviction that this is essential if our policy is to be stable, if it is to be responsible, f it is to be genuinely effective in further- ir national objectives.

v, I know from my appearance before the e Finance Committee last year,[1] when the on of the Organization for Trade Coopera- was touched upon in connection with the al of the Trade Agreements Act, that a num- things have been said or may be said which give rise to certain fears about the OTC and pingement upon United States sovereignty. judgment much of this apprehension results misunderstanding. It might be helpful to mmittee, therefore, if I were to try to clear these fears at this time.

OTC agreement contains nothing which or can alter United States tariff rates or trade measures. It is essentially admin- ive. It does not add to the President's au- y to enter into trade-agreement commitments ant to the Trade Agreements Act. Any sub- ve undertakings by the United States with t to its trade regulations must either be d into by the President under the Trade ments Act or be specifically approved by ress. No substantive undertakings of any are authorized by H. R. 5550.

Organization for Trade Cooperation will ooperative organization of sovereign nations; l not be a so-called supranational institution. ll not involve a loss of sovereignty on the f the United States or any other government.

Organization for Trade Cooperation does volve a delegation by the United States to ernational organization of authority or con- ver its own tariff and trade regulations. The could not impose any new obligation upon member.

OTC would help promote competition and te enterprise. The basic idea behind both eneral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the OTC is to allow the fullest possible competition in the market, rather than government controls, to determine the movement of international trade, for that is the way trade best performs its beneficial functions. Thus the OTC is quite the opposite of any sort of global planning agency.

Functions of the OTC

The functions of the OTC are briefly these:

Administering the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Making it easier for governments to consult and negotiate with one another on trade questions.

Studying questions of trade policy and, where appropriate, making recommendations thereon to the member nations.

And, finally, collecting, analyzing, and publishing facts and figures on international trade and commercial policy.

Thus, the functions of the OTC would be strictly limited to matters of trade and trade policy. It does not share the elaborate ambitions of the International Trade Organization, or ITO, which was proposed some years ago and later abandoned. The ITO, if it had come into being, would have had responsibilities in the fields of full-employment policy, of fair-labor standards, of technical and financial aid to underdeveloped countries, of investment, of commodity agreements, and of international cartels. The OTC will not have responsibilities in any of those fields. It could not administer any international agreement other than the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. It would, in short, keep firmly within the bounds of our trade-agreements program.

Let me say that in negotiating the agreement on the Organization for Trade Cooperation we deliberately avoided giving the Organization any undertakings in the related fields that I have just listed in connection with the ITO.

The Organization for Trade Cooperation is not a "self-amending" organism. It does not contain the seed of its own automatic enlargement. No amendment to the agreement on the Organization for Trade Cooperation could bind the United States without its consent, and, if the executive branch felt that an amendment were in the interest of the United States and should be accepted, it would be submitted to the Congress for approval.

The text of the agreement on the OTC [2]—some 21

[1] LLETIN of Jan. 31, 1955, p. 171.

[2] *Ibid.*, Apr. 4, 1955, p. 579.

brief articles in all—has been reproduced for the information of the committee in the committee document entitled "The Agreement on the Organization for Trade Cooperation." It will be seen that the Organization would be relatively simple in structure. The members of the OTC would be those governments which belong to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. There would be an Assembly, consisting of all of the members, which would have full responsibility for the Organization's activities. Then there would be an Executive Committee, a smaller group of 17 members which would carry out assignments given to it by the Assembly. The OTC agreement requires that the Executive Committee shall always include the five members of chief economic importance, thus giving assurance that the United States will always be represented on this Committee.

I might add parenthetically that the economic importance of the United States is such that the Organization could not really work without our pervasive participation and support. This is freely recognized by other governments. In 8 years of experience with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade the United States has been represented on every committee, subcommittee, and working group in which it has expressed an interest. Any fear that American influence may not be fully exercised, or adequately felt, is groundless.

The Organization for Trade Cooperation would also have a secretarial staff, supervised by a Director-General who would be appointed by the members. This staff of experts would assist the Assembly and the Executive Committee in their work; it would have no independent powers or responsibilities.

As for the budget of the Organization and the American contribution to it, both would be small—in fact, very small. For the first year we anticipate that the total budget would not exceed $600,000, and the United States share would not exceed $120,000 or about 20 percent. It should be noted that this share is below the percentage of 33⅓ percent established under other laws of the United States relating to American contributions to international organizations in general.

Key Responsibilities of the OTC

The main task of the OTC would be to help its members obtain more promptly than at present the full benefits of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. And in administering the trade provisions of the general agreement, the OTC wo perform a number of necessary tasks of admi tration—for example, reviewing the trade rest tions which now are applied by certain for governments for balance-of-payments reas The two key responsibilities of the OTC in rela to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Tr are explicitly set out in the OTC agreement be you, and I wish to describe them briefly at point.

The first of these responsibilities, describe article 13, is that of enabling individual mem governments to obtain a curtailment of their t obligations under the General Agreement on T iffs and Trade whenever such obligations p severely burdensome or inequitable in the fac exceptional developments. Experience has sh that flexibility of this kind is needed. Very cently the United States itself has had occasio seek, and obtain, a similar waiver from the ot countries which participate in the General Ag ment on Tariffs and Trade. These count agreed that certain obligations we had assur under the general agreement could be set a whenever they were in conflict with agricult import restrictions which we find necessary un section 22 of our Agricultural Adjustment Ac

The second of the organizational responsibili explicitly described in the agreement before is that of arranging for the settlement of dispu This point is covered by article 14. The Orga zation is not given a hunting license to prob will into the affairs of members. It is not international policeman. But if one governm has reason to complain about the trade actions another and cannot obtain satisfaction in bilate discussions, it may then bring the matter to Organization for discussion. For example, if Organization discovers that a country breached its commitments under the Gene Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and if that co try is unwilling or unable to do anything about the Organization may authorize complaining g ernments to withdraw some of the trade conc sions which they originally made to that count In this way a balance of mutual advantage maintained in line with the principle of recipr ity, trade wars are averted, and a fair method reaching solutions in international trade c troversies is provided.

These two important organizational function that of waiving particular trade obligations a

of settling trade disputes—have been removed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade placed in the agreement on the Organization Trade Cooperation in order that their nature d be entirely clear to the Congress. I should o emphasize once more that neither these nor other functions of the OTC could have the of placing new trade obligations on any ber going beyond those which they have vol- rily assumed in negotiating the General ement on Tariffs and Trade.

t me be very clear on what the Congress will proving if it enacts H. R. 5550.

e Congress will be authorizing the President cept membership for the United States in rganization for Trade Cooperation.

e General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade not been submitted to the Congress for ap- l because, as I have indicated, the authority ter into trade agreements without referring back to the Congress is found in the Trade ements Act. The general agreement, there- is in the same status as any of the many trade agreements which have been entered by the President.

e Congress is being asked to approve mem- ip in an organization which, under the terms e organizational agreement now before it, is established in order to further the objectives e general agreement by providing more ef- e administration. Congress is not being to approve the detailed provisions of the al agreement—to endorse the detailed actions h the President has taken in exercising the rity which Congress granted to him in the e Agreements Act.

ficance of OTC in International Relations

e OTC, then, is a modest proposal to place the national aspects of our trade-agreements pro- on a more stable footing and a more business- basis. I am convinced that it would serve rican economic interests. The President de- ed some of the economic advantages in his message of last April 14,[3] which you also in the committee document. But I shall not ss the commercial aspects in detail. Other esses who will follow me here will refer more to the economic benefits we may expect to e from membership in the OTC. It is my special responsibility, rather, to point out the significance of the OTC for our international relations in general.

That significance, in my judgment, is very great. I have often said that the strategy of the international Communist movement is to divide the free nations, so that they can be taken over piecemeal. We have seen no deviation in this strategy over many years. We have seen shifts in tactics, but the purpose has remained fixed. We must hope that it will change. There are some signs that it may change. But it has not changed yet.

We are now being treated to a display of this strategy on the economic front. The current offers of the Soviet Union to extend economic help in loans to, and trade with, less economically developed countries in the free world are a matter of everyday newspaper comment. I would be the last to give credence at this time to the existence of a genuine Soviet desire to help independent countries to nourish their economic growth in conditions of freedom. But there is the danger that some may unwittingly risk their freedom, so intense is their desire to improve the material lot of their people.

It is not a part of our design to allow our own actions to be determined by Soviet gestures. Quite apart from Soviet tactics, we seek solid and permanent programs to help economic progress in other countries and to raise the living standards of their peoples along with our own. Our programs began many years before the Soviet Union gave the appearance of entering the economic field. What we offer is partnership in building with others a safe, free, and productive civilization. This requires not only collective security against military menace; it also requires economic health and growth, hand-in-hand with political independence and mutual respect among nations.

It is hard to see how this kind of system can work without mutually advantageous international trade arrangements. Perhaps because of the immediate importance of trade to the daily living of people in many countries, trade problems have been historically a fruitful source of political controversy between the independent sovereign states. The Communist leaders have been aware of this and have tried to show that the struggle for markets is such a divisive force in the relations between non-Communist nations that it will inevitably lead to economic and social crises. This is a part of the standard Communist appeal to peoples in doubt.

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[3] *id.*, Apr. 25, 1955, p. 678.

Cooperation Among Free Nations

The answer to the Communist contention does not lie in reducing healthy competition among free countries in the international market. We want more of this healthy competition and more private enterprise, not less. Nor does it call for obliterating sovereign rights over trade, or establishing free trade. What is needed is a willingness of the free nations, first, to moderate unjustifiable trade barriers in cooperative agreements with one another and, second, to agree to handle in an orderly and equitable way the trade problems and controversies which inevitably arise between them.

We have made heartening progress in clearing away unwarranted barriers to trade through our trade-agreements program, most notably through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. But our machinery for applying the general agreement to day-to-day problems and for the settlement of trade controversies is weak and precariously based. The Organization for Trade Cooperation is needed in order to strengthen this second vital aspect of our trade relationships with other countries of the free world. There is great advantage in arrangements which will take international trade disputes out of the realm of political diplomacy and into a technical forum.

Not long ago the United States delegation to the Tenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly sent to me a rather forceful statement, approved by all 10 members of the delegation.[4] As you know, our delegation is made up of distinguished Americans, including two Members of this House. The delegation said that there appears to have been a shift in the cold war, "in which economic and social problems have moved to the forefront." It warned that we could lose the economic contest unless the country as a whole "wakes up to all its implications."

I read this statement to a news conference on January 11. It was generally taken to be an important pronouncement. Some people, assessing the implications of the "economic contest," seem to have judged them largely in terms of our foreign aid programs. I should like to emphasize that the role of economics in international affairs has much greater significance than grants of aid. Our cooperation with other free nations goes far beyond that. It must include other economic relations as well, and at the heart of these relatio lies trade cooperation.

If the Congress approves H. R. 5550, the O will undoubtedly come into existence. If Co gress fails to approve the bill, it will not. This a measure of decisive importance in world tra matters.

The consequences for our international relatio of rejecting OTC would be grave. For what ultimately at stake here is not whether a piece technical machinery shall be established; it whether, in the crucial area of trade relatio the unity of the free nations will be preserved a strengthened. It is for these reasons that I ho the Congress by a decisive majority will author United States participation in the OTC.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY WEEKS

I have come before you this morning to supp H.R. 5550. This bill would authorize the Pre dent to accept United States membership in t Organization for Trade Cooperation (OTC).

The committee has already heard the Secreta of State discuss the advantages of the propo from the standpoint of our overall foreign poli These broad national-interest reasons weigh hea ily in favor of United States membership in O But I believe there are also direct foreign-tra benefits to be gained from membership. My p pose today is to outline these advantages for t committee.

The main function of the OTC would be to a minister the General Agreement on Tariffs a Trade, commonly known as the GATT. In ad tion to this main function, it would provide forum for discussion of other trade problems, ea government remaining entirely free to adopt reject recommendations growing out of such d cussion. It would also assemble and publish d on world trade.

The United States has adhered to the GATT si 1947. Under its auspices we have exchanged ta concessions with over 30 other countries. The f practical effect of many of the tariff reducti granted by other countries has been delayed a result of the postwar financial disruption wh caused many of these countries to limit their i ports. However, during the last few years, as ternational financial conditions improved, num ous countries have abolished or enlarged quo

[4] *Ibid.*, Jan. 23, 1956, p. 117.

ɔeralized their licensing policies on a substan- number of import commodities. This, of se, has had the effect of bringing the lower granted us in these tariff negotiations more into play. As a result our exporters are now asingly feeling the beneficial results of the GATT negotiations.

am convinced that the creation of the OTC d enable American industry and trade to de- additional and increased benefits from the r and the tariff concessions we have received. agreement for the OTC has been so drafted United States interests are fully safeguarded. would not be supranational. It could not im- new obligations on the U.S. without our ent.

inistrative Machinery for GATT

his whole proposition is essentially very sim- The OTC would provide machinery to enable GATT nations to do better those things which GATT already provides for. It would not ex- the GATT provisions to any additional aspects ade, nor would the OTC take any new kinds of on on the aspects already covered by GATT. new machinery to administer GATT is de- ed solely to enable the member nations to take e promptly and more effectively those joint ons already provided for in GATT, with respect hose tariff and trade matters already covered GATT.

t present, with no formal administrative ma- ery those problems which require joint action he GATT nations can be acted on only at long rvals, when the annual meetings are in session. ts present form the GATT might be likened to a in which each member has important rights benefits to which it is entitled, but which has officers, standing committees, or staff empow- l to carry on its business between annual mem- ship meetings. It being the stated policy of country to enter into reciprocal trade agree- ts, it is only common sense to provide ma- nery to administer agreements which are sup- ed to assure that each member actually receives al benefits.

The countries whose interests are most fre- ntly involved in the kinds of joint action which OTC is designed to make more effective are urally the ones which stand to gain the greatest efits from better administration of the agreement by OTC. I believe that the United States, by the nature of our position in foreign trade, stands to benefit as much as or more than any other single country from better administration of the GATT. For this reason the United States, above all, should welcome and encourage the creation of OTC.

U.S. Stakes in the Export Market

Let me spell this out by first reminding you that the United States has a very substantial stake in the export market. Last year, without considering at all the impact of foreign aid, United States manufacturers alone sold abroad a wide range of products, in the total amount of approximately $10 billion. This, of course, reflects the fact that we can and do compete successfully in markets throughout the world. But despite this fact many U.S. industries are confronted in many foreign markets with restrictions which continually limit the opportunities for the sale of U.S. products. In the absence of such restrictions, which include amongst other things quotas, special taxes, and exchange restrictions—in other words, under conditions of normal commercial competition—American manufacturers would have sold abroad even more than the $10 billion figure just referred to. Our industries do not seek special governmental advantages in selling their products in foreign markets; they seek only to be allowed to compete fairly in foreign markets on the commercial merits of their products.

Now, by comparison, what does the GATT stand for? The GATT—the largest and most comprehensive trade agreement in history—is an agreement among 35 nations reflecting principles which have for good reason been cardinal points of U.S. trade policy. First of all, it contains for each member country an item-by-item list of tariff rates which that country agrees not to exceed in charging duties on imports from the remaining GATT countries. Collectively, these lists cover almost 60,000 items, embracing a large share of world trade. The remainder of the agreement consists of a set of "general provisions" which each country agrees to observe in international trade. An important purpose of these general rules—which restrain the use of such things as taxes, quotas, subsidies, and administrative procedures—is to insure that these devices will not be used to nullify the intended value for members of the tariff-rate agreements.

Objectives of GATT

Under the GATT the 35 nations agree to seek four major objectives:

(1) Elimination of quota restrictions which arbitrarily limit the physical amount of goods which can be imported;

(2) Reliance on tariffs for the protection of domestic producers and avoidance of use of nontariff measures for protective purposes;

(3) Avoidance of unjustified discrimination between outside nations in the administration of trade regulations; and

(4) Gradual reduction of unreasonable obstacles to the flow of trade.

So, in the last analysis, the objectives of the GATT closely correspond to established principles of American commercial policy—principles such as most-favored-nation treatment, for example, which the United States in its own interest has long urged upon other nations.

This is the long-run reason for my statement a moment ago that the United States stands to benefit as much or more than any other single country from better administration of the GATT. Furthermore, in the short run, large exporting countries with convertible currencies are the ones whose trade is most apt to be affected by special limitations adopted by countries having financial difficulties. Such large exporting countries, most importantly the United States, therefore have the greatest stake in any increase in the effectiveness with which their rights under GATT can be sustained.

The OTC would increase GATT's effectiveness by enabling the GATT countries to take joint action more promptly on problems arising under the agreement. From the standpoint of the United States, important matters which may require such action by GATT countries are cases of import restrictions and discriminatory quotas. The most important forms of this action are:

(1) Consulting with member governments to verify the justification for their action when they propose to restrict imports on the grounds that their balance of payments requires such limitations;

(2) Reviewing with such governments periodically the progress they are making to carry out their obligation to eliminate restrictive and discriminatory quotas as rapidly as their finances permit; and

(3) Handling complaints made by individu countries or groups of countries which belie that other members are not according their tra the treatment they have a right to. Wh American trade is directly affected in such cas as it so frequently is, the promptness with whi such matters can be taken up, the thoroughn with which they can be explored, and the d patch with which remedies can be developed ul mately determine the degree of benefit c businessmen receive out of the GATT.

Cumbersome Administrative Procedures

Now, with no OTC, such problems can be tak up only under cumbersome administrative p cedures. When a country having financial di culty decides that it is necessary to impose tighten restrictions on dollar imports, no f review of its justification for such action can had until the next GATT meeting. This may months away. The pressure of time in such meeting, with a large agenda, makes thorou exploration of the justification for the acti difficult, while the restrictions will in the inter have taken root and justifiable modification m be correspondingly more difficult.

Under the GATT, countries resorting to restr tions for financial reasons are called upon eliminate these restrictions as rapidly as th finances permit. Effective procedures to insu this are of primary importance to the U Periodic consultations are scheduled during whi the membership collectively examines the curre situation of each country still using such restr tions, and whether it is doing its best to aboli the remaining restrictions. Obviously, the issu in each case are very complex and to be rea useful such examinations require thorough p paratory analyses and adequate time for the fa to-face consultation. For maximum resul adequate staff and organization facilities a necessary.

The same points broadly apply to the handli of complaints raised by countries which feel th their trade is not receiving the treatment to whi it is entitled under the GATT. Remedial acti which complaining countries should recei promptly is often postponed, while delay in e ploring the merits of a complaint may imp the chances for constructive solution.

Naturally, we are not dependent in these m ters solely on the formal GATT procedures. V

and do pursue such matters bilaterally ›ugh regular diplomatic channels. Further-'e, we would expect to continue doing so even ›r the more effective machinery of the Organi-on for Trade Cooperation becomes available. ; such bilateral negotiation frequently results ı stalemate. In many cases a divergence of nion on the exact interpretation of rights un-the agreement can be resolved only by con-ing the judgment of all the parties to it. ›TC would improve this situation in a very ple way. It does not entail any complicated · procedures but it does make these procedures ilable on a continuous basis as problems arise. › Executive Committee would be available at · time to receive problems of this kind and to on them without delay. Beyond that, OTC's ſ would be able to provide more expeditious and rough service in preparing technical material the exploration of these cases.

æst I be charged with claiming too much for ; proposal, let me make it clear that I am not ›rting the OTC is or could ever be the answer ıll our trade problems. Such a test of per-tion would seem to me an unfair basis on which 'udge its value to the U.S. No one device can ›ly be expected to solve all problems in a field complex as international trade. However, I convinced that the improvement which OTC ıld make in GATT's effectiveness would very ›stantially increase its value to the U.S.

am aware that there has been disappointment American circles with the results so far ›ieved by the GATT itself. For my own part I tainly agree that we have not to date accom-›hed as much as we should have liked to.

t does seem to me, however, that a mere demon-ıtion that the GATT, with or without the OTC, ls short of a complete solution to all trade prob-ıs and that there are unfavorable situations ich it has not completely cured, fails fully to ›t the question which faces us. To me the sig-:cant question is not whether the GATT and the c can solve all of our problems. The question is her whether, other things being equal, we are ter off with them or without them. Our choice ›s not lie between the GATT and the OTC on the › hand and a world without problems on the ›er. The choice is rather between a world with ny problems in which we have this useful device ›elp us solve them, and a world in which we face these very same problems, but without their assistance.

The United States has benefited from those positive results which the general agreement has so far been able to achieve. The problems which the GATT has not fully solved would have been just as difficult if we had had no GATT at all. These problems were not created by GATT. The problems are there, GATT or no GATT.

A Cooperative International Approach

In my own mind, I have no doubt about the relative advantage to the United States of a cooperative international approach to trade problems versus unlimited national rivalry which could lead to international trade warfare. It seems clear to me that our net advantage lies in having such an agreement and working constantly to improve its operation. That is precisely what the OTC is designed to do.

The OTC would be essentially administrative and entail no abridgement of our rights in conducting our own affairs.

It could not add to our obligations under the GATT and could not limit the powers of the Congress with respect to our tariffs.

It could not make tariff concessions or in any way modify the United States tariff structure.

It could not impose new obligations on the United States without our consent.

We are assured a permanent seat on the Executive Committee.

Its major function would be to administer more effectively an agreement to which the United States has for 9 years been a party.

That agreement, in turn, projects in the international arena trade-policy objectives with which the United States has long been associated.

In conclusion, I assert that we cannot lose by cooperating with our friends in the trade area of our foreign relations, just as we cooperate with them in a variety of other directions.

We cannot stand at arm's length from them in this field and hope to meet the unanimity of action produced by the Soviet bloc.

The reciprocal-trade-agreements program is an established part of our national policy. Under it, our participation in a 35-nation agreement offers us an opportunity to obtain the maximum tariff benefits from the countries concerned.

Having this policy, it is clearly in our interest to provide the machinery—OTC—which is needed to make these agreements as effective as possible.

The proposal to establish the OTC involves no issues as to our tariff level. This issue is settl by our own domestic trade-agreements legislatic our escape-clause and peril-point provisions, a the other limits and safeguards it provides.

Importance of the U.N. Specialized Agencies to the United Nations

Statement by Francis O. Wilcox
Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs [1]

I welcome this opportunity to assist your committee in exploring United States participation in the 10 specialized agencies of the United Nations. You have chosen for your inquiry one of the significant elements in the international scene today. The cooperative activity represented by these international agencies must be taken into account in any assessment of world political affairs as well as any overall survey of world economic and social growth.

In fact, relatively few people realize the importance of the specialized agencies. They lack the glamour and the drama of the General Assembly or the Security Council. While the political debates in New York make headlines, the specialized agencies are engaged in the relatively humdrum job of solving fundamental problems in economic, technical, and social fields.

Actually, the specialized agencies have achieved the greatest degree of international cooperation the world has seen, largely because they deal with immediate human problems—problems which technicians can solve if they are given the opportunity. And most people these days are inclined to give their technicians greater freedom than they permit their statesmen.

One has only to look at the fields of activity covered by the specialized agencies to realize their importance—food, aviation, health, to name only a few. And that importance grows when one takes account of the many services they provide, services which it would be difficult and costly to obtain through any other means. But final and from the point of view of our national inter and our own foreign policy, the specialized ag cies assume great significance as channels throu which we can meet the Soviet challenge. T channels are, in effect, of our own choosing a ones in which we can, so to speak, put our b foot forward. I will have more to say on t point later in my statement.

It seemed to us that we could be most help to the committee at the outset by focusing t general statement on an overall look at the speci ized agencies from the point of view of our f eign policy. With that as the general approa I will restrict my remarks to three main are first, the historical background or perspecti second, the facts regarding the place the agenc hold in the total international picture; and thi an evaluation as to the importance of the agenc in international politics and as one of the mea through which we express our foreign policy.

Historical Perspective

Our judgments today may need the benefit some historical perspective. How and why we arrive at this present stage of development international organizations? Two facts are w known but need reemphasis. Organized discussi and cooperation between sovereign nations h a long history. Events since the Second Wo War have simply elaborated the structu Secondly, the agencies with which we are c cerned here are *not* "johnny-come-lately's," wh owe their form and existence merely to the spec circumstances of the recent war and to the em

[1] Made on Feb. 20 before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives.

nce of this Nation and the Soviet Union as minant world powers.

The fact is, rather, as the subcommittee knows, at the present United Nations system was not eated overnight as a result of enthusiasm gen-ated by the Second World War. On the con-ary, the United Nations and the 10 specialized encies have their roots in the past. The charter the United Nations was developed in part out the experience of the League of Nations, the orld Court, and other international institutions previous decades. Several of the specialized encies have their origins back in the 19th cen-ry. In 1865, for example, the International legraphic Union was established; today, this ganization is known as the International Tele-mmunication Union. In 1874 the Universal stal Union was formed to bring order out of the aos that then existed among the postal services individual governments. And chaos it was, for ere were no uniform postal rates in force in the rld at that time. Foreign rates were very high d the sending of mail through different coun-es was an exceedingly complicated matter. An lividual in the United States mailing a letter to stralia found he must pay either 5 cents, 33 nts, 45 cents, 60 cents, or $1.02 per half ounce, pending on the route by which it was sent. In 78 there was established the International teorological Organization, which today is own as the World Meteorological Organization. Several of the other specialized agencies have eir origins in the early part of the 20th century. e Food and Agriculture Organization of the ited Nations developed out of the International stitute of Agriculture, founded at Rome in 1905. e World Health Organization grew out of the ternational Office of Public Health, which was ablished at Paris in 1909. Later, in 1919, came e International Labor Organization. Only four the present specialized agencies were new crea-ns during or after the Second World War: the ternational Civil Aviation Organization, the ternational Bank, the International Monetary nd, and the United Nations Educational, Scien-c and Cultural Organization.

At the San Francisco conference in 1945, special ention was paid to the problem of what to do th this complex network of international agen-s, old and new. There were two different schools thought. One school argued in favor of com-ete centralization in order to provide for a maximum degree of coordination. This school of thought maintained that, if all activities—political, security, economic, social, and the rest—could be placed under one roof, there would be relatively little waste of money and manpower. They favored a single institution which, like a national government, would consist of a number of functional departments and be financed out of a single budget. The other school of thought argued in favor of decentralization, insisting that the United Nations should be limited primarily to political and security matters and that the specialized agencies, as autonomous bodies, should deal with all the other activities. They contended that no single institution could cope effectively with the whole range of international problems and that, in any case, the success of these humanitarian activities should not be jeopardized by being tied in to political issues.

Facts About the United Nations Today

The present system, which includes the United Nations and the 10 specialized agencies, combines the advantages of both of these schools of thought. Each organization has its own constitution, its own secretariat, its own rules of procedure, its own membership, and its own budget. All of these organizations, however, are bound together in a common effort by agreements between the United Nations and each agency as well as agreements between the agencies themselves. The General Assembly of the United Nations reviews the administrative budgets of the 10 specialized agencies, and the Economic and Social Council makes recommendations for coordination of their programs. The Council has accomplished much in the past 10 years in suggesting priorities for activities, in urging a concentration of effort, and in eliminating duplication among the various agencies. Furthermore, the heads of the several organizations meet together regularly in the Administrative Coordination Committee, which is under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General of the U.N. Here they discuss their common problems, plan joint programs, and strive to eliminate overlapping and duplication.

Country membership in these agencies varies from 54 to 96; seven of the organizations have more than 70 members. The central servicing staffs, employed under the authority of the member nations, total approximately 5,000 persons.

The budgets of the agencies for this calendar

year vary from around $400,000 for the World Meteorological Organization to about $12 million for the World Health Organization, figures which I consider modest in relation to the problems with which the agencies deal. We and other member nations are constantly alert to the budget question and have exerted every effort to keep the totals reasonable in the light of what governments can contribute and of what it is practicable for the organization to undertake. Let me illustrate this. The first 5 years after the war was a formative period. The total expenditures of specialized agencies which resulted in assessments on members ranged from $18.7 million in 1947 to about $30 million in 1951, the first year in which all were in existence in their present form and fully operative. In 1955, 4 years later, the comparable total was only approximately $38 million. A significant part of that increase was necessary merely to meet price changes and other increased operating costs.

Sovereignty

From time to time, Mr. Chairman, charges are made that the United Nations is a kind of superstate that concludes treaties that are binding upon the United States and are gradually undermining our national sovereignty. These charges, of course, are totally false.

Let me emphasize that no one of these organizations, nor the whole system taken together, constitutes any kind of a "world government." Nor do they represent, in any way, a threat to our sovereignty. None of these organizations can enact legislation, levy taxes, raise armies, or enforce laws. To be sure, each conference or assembly of an agency can take decisions about the structure and functioning of its secretariat and can assess member governments for annual dues. On the other hand, any member government that has serious objections to these arrangements can always, as a last resort, withdraw.

Likewise, each agency can draft and *approve* treaties and conventions on particular subjects, if the member states want to do so, but these are *binding* only upon those governments which subsequently take their own constitutional steps to accept them. In our case, this means approval by the United States Senate. The ILO, for example, has concluded 104 conventions, although the United States is a party to only 5 actually in force. The WHO can issue quarantine regulations—a highly useful function—but these are not binding on any government that specifically rejects them. Thus, what we are considering here is a group of voluntary associations in which sovereign governments pool a little of their money and their energy to attain common goals.

Importance of the Agencies in International Affairs

When the United Nations held its commemorative ceremony at San Francisco last June to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the signing of the charter, the representatives of all its members reviewed the achievements of the past and looked forward to the future. To me, the most impressive aspect of this 10th anniversary was the fact that practically everybody now takes the United Nations for granted. Our Government, the Soviet Government, and dozens of other governments today take for granted that they will submit many of their most important problems to the United Nations for debate and that they will work together within the United Nations toward a solution of these problems. In the same way, the members of the 10 specialized agencies have long since come to take for granted their responsibility to deal with common problems, in their respective fields, to better the lot of man.

Nonetheless, of course, we in the Department of State, as well as the staffs of other Government agencies, look critically at all proposals for action by the specialized agencies, proposals which we as a sovereign government, are called upon to discuss with the other members of these agencies. As a result of this critical review, we have come to recognize three basic reasons for the very important role which these agencies are playing in international affairs today.

First, handling the complex matters which arise in diplomatic relations today solely on a bilateral basis is much too expensive and much too slow—both for the powerful and for the weak.

Second, meeting the rising expectations and demands of the rapidly developing peoples—and, in fact, the demands of our own expanding economy—requires the practical techniques of multilateral negotiation and agreement afforded by the specialized agencies.

Finally, as the President said in his recent state of the Union message,[2] we must wage the peace with all the tools and ideas and means at hand. The specialized agencies offer very effective machinery for this effort.

[2] BULLETIN of Jan. 16, 1956, p. 79.

hese basic factors serve to underline the im- ance of three traditional types of work of rnational organizations, particularly the spe- zed agencies. Even if there were no great blems of poverty in some parts of the world, if e were no problems of restrictions on the move- ts of goods, ideas, and people, we would still l convenient international forums (a) for con- ition, (b) for provision of services, and (c) the exchange of information. The complex blems of the modern world seldom involve only nations. As I mentioned previously, the fact at *all* countries, the comparatively advanced ell as the rapidly developing, frequently find sier to deal with each other at a multilateral l.

et me illustrate these points with practical ex- les from the work of the specialized agencies— show at the same time how our national in- st is served.

irst, one group of these agencies is engaged arily in establishing common standards and viding common services for their members. UPU helps get our letters and packages across onal boundaries at reasonable rates. The ITU s keep the air waves free for our radio broad- s and in several practical ways facilitates rnational communications. The WMO helps to ect worldwide information of great value to own Weather Bureau. The ICAO safeguards erican air traffic by developing uniform stand- and procedures throughout the world. The rnational Monetary Fund, by seeking to sta- e currencies, facilitates our foreign invest- ts and trade. These essential activities are ously of very direct advantage to the United es.

econd, other agencies devote special attention romoting economic and social development. ILO, by promoting higher standards of labor ywhere, helps to protect the American worker nst cheap or even slave labor in other coun- s. The WHO, by determining which drugs on international market produce addiction, pro- s protection against the traffic in narcotics. FAO, by developing a Convention on Plant tection [3] and carrying on related activities, helped to safeguard American agriculture against pests and diseases from other lands. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, by developing an International Copyright Convention, protects in foreign countries the interests of American writers, artists, and musicians. And the International Bank, by financing sound developments in underdeveloped countries, creates new opportunities for private American capital. These are only a few of the examples I could mention which are of direct benefit to the American people.

Third, most of these agencies are engaged in collecting, analyzing, and publishing information. This activity is of inestimable value not only to governments but also to businessmen and other private citizens throughout the world. It is an activity that no one government could possibly do by itself, even if it wished to spend the necessary money and manpower. The handbooks, the yearbooks, the periodicals of the specialized agencies contain facts and figures and analyses of those facts and figures that are among the major contributions of these organizations. This activity does not make the front pages of our newspapers, but it is one that is familiar to technicians in many different fields throughout our country.

More recently there has emerged a fourth basic and important program to make the work of these agencies more effective. This is the expanded technical assistance program. As the committee knows, the United Nations and the specialized agencies found that they could not provide sufficiently, out of their regular budgets, the technical assistance and advisory services required by their member governments. The needs of the underdeveloped countries were so urgent and their governments were so insistent on speedier progress that a special program, financed out of voluntary contributions, was established. This expanded technical assistance program has injected new life into the work of many of these agencies and has contributed notably to the economic and social advancement of many countries in Latin America, the Near East, and Asia.

This is the essentially new element in international organization activity since the Second World War. It has enabled the international agencies to provide help rapidly where it is needed. These agencies have in a sense gotten to the grassroots. They are showing how things can be done better with available resources. They are teaching the ordinary man on farms and in villages and

[3] For text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 20, 1956, p. 311.

in the factories. They are thus bringing the meaning of the United Nations close to the people.

The best test of the success of the whole United Nations system is this: Over the past decade, with only a few exceptions, the original members have not withdrawn or threatened to withdraw from the United Nations or the specialized agencies. On the contrary, many other governments have applied for memberships in these organizations. Almost the first thing the government of a new state does after the achievement of its independence is to join a number of these organizations.

Later in these hearings, expert witnesses from the State Department and other departments will provide you with detailed information about the work programs and accomplishments of each of the specialized agencies. They will be much better qualified than I to answer your questions about labor productivity, fundamental education, currency stabilization, forest conservation, and other technical matters. They will give proof, if any be needed, that these specialized agencies are not mere debating societies; that they are, on the contrary, well-tested machines for getting things done; that the people behind them are practical and get practical results.

A summary of these functions demonstrates, I believe, that the dynamics of the world today, even were there no threat to a peaceful future, call for voluntary, cooperative effort through the specialized agencies.

The U.S. Stake in the Specialized Agencies

I do not need to go into details with this subcommittee, I am sure, to demonstrate that poor countries are poor customers of the United States. People whose average daily food consumption level is only 1,800 calories (in contrast to about 3,300 for North America) and whose annual income is less than $100 or $200 are not in a position to buy many United States farm products such as rice, cotton, and wheat. Conversely, prosperous countries are likely to be our best customers. Two of the most highly developed countries in the world, the United Kingdom and Canada, both of which produce many of the same products we do, lead all other countries as markets for United States exports. On the other hand, many other countries, equally large in territory and larger in populations but far below the United Kingdom and Canada in per capita income, rank far below them in purchase of United States exports, except as they a enabled to pay for these goods through Unite States assistance. It stands to reason, therefor that if the per capita income of those countri could be raised even a little, they might becom much better permanent customers for the outp of American farms, factories, and mines, and th might eventually require less United States assis ance. Raising the standard of living of these cou tries is one of the major objectives of t specialized agencies.

And now, given the increasingly aggressive ec nomic threat of the Soviet Union, participation i these international agencies becomes important t us for still other reasons. These reasons strike m as worth emphasis.

First of all, the United States finds in t specialized agencies an opportunity to exercise i leadership, to develop a sense of unity among t nations of the free world, to demonstrate America ingenuity in putting knowledge to the service c mankind, and, by all these means, to gain good wi and prestige. Second, to the extent that the agencies contribute to relieve tensions, to redu poverty, disease, and illiteracy, and to raise stan ards of living, to this extent their work contribut measurably to the efforts of our Government t combat the threat of communism throughout th world. And finally, to the extent that these age cies help their member governments to develop th habit of cooperation and the routine of workin together toward our common goals, to this exte these agencies are helping to lay foundations fo a peaceful world.

Our vigorous participation in the United Na tions agencies is particularly helpful in a worl where the underdeveloped countries are strivin for recognition, for freedom from any sort o domination, and for mastery over their own mate rials and human resources. It is evidence to thes countries that we are ready to take our part as on of many in the working out of common problem without fear or reservation in the free exchang of ideas, and in laying a share of our great re sources on the table for the common good.

These reasons would be compelling even if th Soviet Union withdrew from all the specialize agencies.

But the Soviet Union now appears determine to bring its aggressive challenge into these forum At the end of the last session of the United Nation

ral Assembly, the United States delegation o Secretary Dulles a statement[4] that read, in as follows:

present period in history may one day be recog- as a major turning point in the struggle between unism and freedom. It appears to be clearly a shift cold war, in which economic and social problems noved to the forefront.

roughout the Near East and Asia, even in America, we see this new shift under way. only is the Soviet Union now offering eco- aid and technical assistance but it is also nly becoming the self-announced champion nomic and social development in the United ns and the specialized agencies. All this sents no change whatever in the basic strat- f the Soviet leaders, but it does represent a atic shift in tactics. Moreover, this indicates he Soviet leaders have come to recognize the icance of these organizations and the value eir work.

is means that our form of society and govern- meets that of the Soviets in open and observ- competition in the forums of the specialized ies—where all the world can see. The peo- f the world are watching our reaction to this challenge.

m sure that members of the subcommittee are ially interested in precisely what the partici- n of the Soviet Union and its satellites in various organizations means for the United s. Some Members of the Congress may feel y concerned about this development, and they even wonder whether it is worth while for the d States to continue membership in interna- l organizations where the Soviets promote propaganda and do their utmost to weaken ree world.

t me mention, at the outset, that there is no rm pattern of participation by the Soviet The Soviet Union itself belongs to some of pecialized agencies, and the various satellites g to one or another of them. The Soviet n has never belonged to FAO, ICAO, the Bank, he Fund, but it has recently joined the ILO UNESCO and has announced its return to the . However, the maximum number of votes ntire Soviet bloc can muster in any interna- l organization is only nine, a relatively small rity.

d., Jan. 23, 1956, p. 117.

The harmful effects of Soviet propaganda in the United Nations and the specialized agencies have often been discussed in Congress, in the press, and elsewhere. I must say that this aspect of the problem worries me least of all. In fact, I feel strongly that it is greatly to our advantage to be able to meet Soviet propaganda head-on in the United Nations and in these other agencies. Our spokesmen, whether from the Government or from private life, whether Democrats or Republicans, can hold their own against any propaganda agents of the Soviet Union. Our representatives can expose the falseness of the Soviet propaganda and can show, by facts and figures, what is happening behind the Iron Curtain. At the same time they can explain the American way of life and show the rest of the world what can be accomplished under our tradition of democracy and free enterprise.

Indeed, one of the most important contributions of the United Nations lies precisely here; for in the debates that have taken place in the United Nations and in the specialized agencies, the diabolical nature of international communism has been clearly revealed. As a result, the free-world countries, by consistently overwhelming margins, have been able to outvote the Soviet bloc on all important issues.

The return of the Soviet Union to the International Labor Organization has created a special problem, with which members of the subcommittee may already be familiar. The International Labor Organization has a unique structure in that each member is represented by separate delegates for its government, its employers, and its workers. This system is a useful one so far as democratic countries are concerned, but it raises serious questions where totalitarian governments are involved. To what extent, in other words, are the Soviet employers and the Soviet workers represented by independent delegates free from government domination and control?

In fact, of course, we know that the so-called worker and management delegates speak for the Soviet Government. What this means for the ILO and what can be done about the situation is now under study by a small group within the ILO framework. Many will be impatient about the slow process of developing a solution and of securing agreement from other governments on a proper course of action. Meanwhile, we have even heard

proposals that the United States withdraw from the organization.

It is my firm conviction that it serves our national interest to remain and to continue our full participation. In the first place, there are important economic considerations. ILO efforts to encourage and actually to assist in the introduction of improved labor standards help to reduce the gap between our high standards and those that exist elsewhere.

But even more important, perhaps, is the fact that the ILO can and does play a significant part in our efforts to keep the free world free. We have already demonstrated that by our success in encouraging the ILO to produce a report on forced labor in the Soviet Union and its satellite states.[5] Furthermore, with direct employer and worker participation in the ILO, particularly from the developing and uncommitted countries, U. S. business and labor representatives have an unusual opportunity to come into direct contact with their counterparts from other lands. Through this contact, they can contribute to a wider and more sympathetic understanding of our form of capitalism, of our economic and social institutions which are so misrepresented by the Communists, and of the benefits of a system where free men work together for an expanding economy.

We cannot afford to renounce our leadership by retreating before this challenge. It would be nothing short of folly to encourage, by default, the Soviet Union's desperate efforts to win the minds of men to their cause.

Need for Continued U.S. Participation

From the point of view of our foreign policy and our national interest, then, we find most of the nations of the world engaged in this impressive structure of international organizations to consider and act upon important economic, technical, and social problems of today. The cost is infinitesimal in comparison with the magnitude of the problems.

The organizations involved have impressive accomplishments to their credit.

There is no move to withdraw on the part of the other participants.

Even without the challenge and new tactics of the Soviets, therefore, it seems to us only a logical and essential exercise of our sovereignty and leadership to continue and strengthen our participati in the specialized agencies.

In praising the work of the specialized agenci I would not want to leave the impression that th are perfect. No human institution is perfect, a the specialized agencies have their share of i perfections. Some secretariats are not as efficie as we might wish. Sometimes there is duplicati of effort or an element of friction between two the agencies, or between one of them and t United Nations itself. On occasion, an agen may try to carry on too many different activiti at the same time, to hold too many meetings, a to publish too many documents, thus tending scatter its efforts and diffuse its resources.

On balance, however, despite some of these i evitable imperfections, our Government can e dorse the work of the specialized agencies and c commend the devotion and diligence of the secretariats.

In closing, I would like to quote a statement Laird Bell, distinguished lawyer and chairma of the Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. Mr. Bell was o of our delegates at the last General Assembl Speaking of U.N. technical and agricultural assis ance to Africa, Southeast Asia, and South Ame ica, he said: "I doubt that any dollars we spen are better spent than on that assistance. My ow feeling is that it is justification enough for t United Nations."

[5] *Ibid.*, Aug. 10, 1953, p. 167.

Mr. Stassen To Represent U.S. at London Disarmament Meetings

Press release 121 dated March 8

Harold E. Stassen, Special Assistant to th President, will represent the United States a the forthcoming meetings of the subcommitte of the United Nations Disarmament Commissio It is expected that these meetings will commenc in London on March 19, 1956.

The United Nations Disarmament Commissio was established by the General Assembly in 195 and is concerned with preparing proposals on a aspects of the regulation of armed forces an armaments, including nuclear weapons. Th Commission is composed of the 11 members of th United Nations Security Council, and Canad In 1953, on recommendation of the General Assem bly, the Disarmament Commission set up a Sub committee of Five—Canada, France, the Unite Kingdom, the United States, and the Union o

iet Socialist Republics—to seek in private an ›ptable solution of the disarmament problem. s subcommittee met in London early in 1955 again in New York later that year. It has been reconvened to continue its efforts.

5. Delegations to ernational Conferences

ference on Conservation of Natural Resources

he Department of State announced on March press release 132) that Assistant Secretary land will be chairman of the U.S. delegation he Inter-American Specialized Conference on servation of Natural Resources: The Conti- al Shelf and Marine Waters, which opens in lad Trujillo, Dominican Republic, on March Ambassador John C. Dreier, U.S. Repre- ative on the Council of the Organization of erican States, will be vice chairman of the gation.

he full delegation is as follows:

rman

y F. Holland, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- American Affairs

Chairman

C. Dreier, U.S. Representative on the Council of the Organization of American States

ates

am C. Herrington, Special Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife, Department of State

h L. Miller, Chief of the Fuels Division, U. S. Geo- ogical Survey, Department of the Interior

am Sanders, U.S. Representative on the Inter- American Council of Jurists

ers

s E. Barr, Executive Secretary, Shrimp Association of America

ley L. Back, Lt. (jg.), Office of the Judge Advocate General, Department of the Navy

ert McL. Chapman, Director of Research, American Tuna Boat Association

rt E. Hardwicke, American Petroleum Institute

Admiral Harold A. Houser, USN, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Department of the Navy

n J. Lindner, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior, México, D.F.

Lyman, Chief, Division of Oceanography, Hydro- graphic Office, Department of the Navy

r E. Sette, Office of Oceanic Research, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior

Arnie J. Suomela, Assistant Director, Fish and Wild- life Service, Department of the Interior

Fred E. Taylor, Office of Special Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife, Department of State

Edwin Thomasson, Geological Survey, Department of the Interior

Marjorie M. Whiteman, Assistant Legal Adviser for Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

Secretary of Delegation

Henry Allen, Office of International Conferences, De- partment of State

Technical Secretary

William G. Bowdler, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

The meeting was called pursuant to a resolution of the Tenth Inter-American Conference at Caracas in March 1954, for the purpose of studying various juridical, economic, and scientific prob- lems related to the continental shelf and ocean waters of the Western Hemisphere.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Customs Tariff

Protocol modifying the convention signed at Brussels July 5, 1890 (26 Stat. 1518), creating an international union for the publication of customs tariffs. Done at Brussels December 16, 1949. Entered into force May 5, 1950.[1]

Accession deposited: Iceland, February 17, 1956.

BILATERAL

Denmark

Agreement amending the agreement of August 23, 1951 (TIAS 2324), to finance certain educational exchange programs, by establishing a United States Educational Foundation in Denmark and providing additional funds for the program. Effected by exchange of notes at Copenhagen February 13 and 17, 1956. Entered into force February 17, 1956.

Indonesia

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of

[1] Not in force for the United States.

1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 69 Stat. 44, 721). Signed at Djakarta March 2, 1956. Entered into force March 2, 1956.

Japan

Agreement on agricultural commodities, agreed official minutes, and exchange of notes. Signed at Tokyo February 10, 1956. Enters into force on the date of receipt of a note from the Government of Japan stating that Japan has approved the agreement in accordance with its legal procedures.

Protocol to amend article III of the agreement on agricultural commodities signed May 31, 1955 (TIAS 3284). Signed at Tokyo February 10, 1956. Enters into force on the date of receipt of a note from the Government of Japan stating that Japan has approved the protocol in accordance with its legal procedures.

Agreement relating to grants to Japan, under title II of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454), to expand school children's welfare programs in Japan. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo February 10, 1956. Entered into force February 10, 1956.

Agreement relating to grants of agricultural commodities to Japan for an expanded school lunch program in accordance with the agreement on agricultural commodities of May 31, 1955 (TIAS 3284), as amended. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo February 10, 1956. Will enter into force on the date of receipt of a note from the Government of Japan stating that the implementation of the present agreement can be initiated on the part of Japan.

Pakistan

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 69 Stat. 44, 721). Signed at Karachi March 2, 1956. Entered into force March 2, 1956.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Staff Corps Review Panels

The Department of State announced on March 6 (press release 116) that the Seventh Staff Corps Review Panels had been convened that day by Raymond A. Hare, Director General of the Foreign Service, in the presence of other high officials of the Department. These five panels of four members each will sit for about 2 months to review the records of some 2,500 members of the Foreign Service Staff Corps in order to recommend certain personnel for promotion and to make other recommendations such as naming those who should be given special training.

The Staff Corps furnishes the personnel to provide administrative and technical support to our diplomatic and consular establishments throughout the world. Its members are promoted on a basis of a review of their performance records as built up in Washington. Panels to make this competitive review are chosen from among outstanding members of the Staff Corps itself, other officers of the Foreign Service, and officials of the Departments of Commerce and of Labor, which are represented abroad by the Foreign Service.

Confirmations

The Senate on March 7 confirmed Fletcher Warren to be Ambassador to Turkey.

THE DEPARTMENT

Confirmations

The Senate on March 7 confirmed Robert C. Hill to be an Assistant Secretary of State.

Designations

Robert G. Barnes as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for Mutual Security Affairs, effective March 12.

Fisher Howe as Director of the Executive Secretariat, effective March 12.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Economic Cooperation. TIAS 3139. Pub. 5817. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Greece. Exchange of notes—Signed at Athens October 14, 1952, and December 2, 1953. Entered into force December 2, 1953.

[1] For a list of the members of the panels, see press release 116.

rmy Mission to Liberia. TIAS 3140. Pub. 5794. 2 pp. .

greement between the United States and Liberia—Ex-nding agreement of January 11, 1951. Exchange of otes—Signed at Washington August 7 and October 23, 953. Entered into force October 23, 1953.

xchange of Official Publications. TIAS 3141. Pub. 5998. pp. 5¢.

greement between the United States and Pakistan—mending agreement of April 25 and May 23, 1951. Ex-hange of notes—Dated at Karachi April 22 and Decem-er 29, 1953. Entered into force December 29, 1953.

conomic Cooperation—Release of Counterpart Funds. IAS 3142. Pub. 5930. 12 pp. 10¢.

greement, with annex, between the United States and ugoslavia—Signed at Belgrade April 16, 1954. Entered nto force April 16, 1954.

rmy Mission to El Salvador. TIAS 3144. Pub. 5795. 5 pp. 15¢.

greement between the United States and El Salvador—igned at San Salvador September 23, 1954. Entered into orce November 17, 1954.

aval, Army, and Air Force Missions to Colombia. TIAS 146. Pub. 5803. 3 pp. 5¢.

greement between the United States and Colombia—Ex-nding agreements of October 14, 1946, and February 21, 949. Exchange of notes—Signed at Bogotá October 6 nd November 4, 1954. Entered into force November 4, 954.

lutual Defense Assistance. TIAS 3147. Pub. 5897. 4 p. 5¢.

greement between the United States and Lebanon. Ex-hange of notes—Signed at Beirut March 6 and 23, 1953. ntered into force March 23, 1953.

merican Commission for Cultural Exchange With aly—Educational Exchange Programs. TIAS 3148. ub. 5819. 4 pp. 5¢.

greement between the United States and Italy—Interim mendment of agreement of December 18, 1948. Ex-hange of notes—Dated at Rome April 28, June 14 and 30, 954. Entered into force June 30, 1954.

echnical Cooperation Program for Trust Territory of omaliland Under Italian Administration. TIAS 3150. ub. 5821. 7 pp. 10¢.

greement between the United States and Italy—Signed t Rome June 28, 1954 Entered into force June 28, 1954.

echnical Cooperation—Program in British Guiana. IAS 3152. Pub. 5823. 4 pp. 5¢.

greement between the United States and the United ingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Ex-hange of notes—Signed at Washington June 29 and uly 12, 1954. Entered into force July 12, 1954.

ertificates of Airworthiness for Imported Aircraft. IAS 3158. Pub. 5837. 7 pp. 10¢.

greement between the United States and Denmark. xchange of notes—Signed at Copenhagen December 15, 954. Entered into force December 15, 1954.

ertificates of Airworthiness for Imported Aircraft. IAS 3159. Pub. 5838. 6 pp. 5¢.

greement between the United States and Sweden. Ex-hange of notes—Signed at Stockholm December 22, 1954. ntered into force December 22, 1954.

Exchange of Commodities and Sale of Grain. TIAS 3179. Pub. 5863. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement, with annex, between the United States and Turkey—Signed at Washington November 15, 1954. Entered into force November 15, 1954.

Austrian State Treaty. TIAS 3298. Pub. 6016. 167 pp. 60¢.

Between the United States and other governments—Signed at Vienna May 15, 1955. Entered into force July 27, 1955.

Copyright. TIAS 3324. Pub. 6004. 98 pp. 30¢.

Convention and protocols between the United States and other governments—Dated at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force December 6, 1954 and September 16, 1955.

Trade. TIAS 3348. Pub. 6093. 49 pp. 20¢.

Agreement and protocol, with annexes and exchange of notes, between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines—Revising agreement of July 4, 1946—Signed at Washington September 6, 1955. Entered into force January 1, 1956.

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. TIAS 3359. Pub. 6115. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland amending agreement of June 15, 1955. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington October 20 and November 3, 1955.

Relief From Taxation on Defense Expenditures. TIAS 3360. Pub. 6128. 27 pp. 15¢.

Agreement, with annex and exchange of notes, between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany—Signed at Bonn October 15, 1954. Entered into force November 8, 1955.

Education—Administration of Schools in Naval Reservation, Subic Bay. TIAS 3361. Pub. 6129. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines. Exchange of notes—Signed at Manila October 28, 1955.

Double Taxation—Taxes on Income, Facilitating Extension to the Netherlands Antilles. TIAS 3366. Pub. 6133. 7 pp. 10¢.

Protocol between the United States and the Netherlands—Supplementing convention of April 29, 1948—Signed at Washington June 15, 1955. Entered into force November 10, 1955.

Double Taxation—Taxes on Income, Extension to Netherlands Antilles of Operation of Convention of April 29, 1948, as Supplemented. TIAS 3367. Pub. 6139. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Netherlands. Exchange of notes—Dated at Washington June 24 and August 7, 1952, September 15 and November 4 and 10, 1955. Entered into force November 10, 1955; operative retroactively January 1, 1955.

Military Assistance Advisory Group. TIAS 3377. Pub. 6152. 9 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Peru. Exchange of notes—Signed at Lima June 28, July 18, October 20 and 28, 1955. Entered into force October 26, 1955.

Weather Stations—Betio Island. TIAS 3389. Pub. 6155. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington November 15, 1955. Entered into force November 15, 1955.

Guaranty of Private Investments. TIAS 3400. Pub. 6176. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Colombia. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington July 14 and 18, and November 18, 1955. Entered into force November 18, 1955.

Economic Cooperation—Informational Media Guaranty Program. TIAS 3402. Pub. 6182. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Viet-Nam. Exchange of notes—Signed at Saïgon October 11 and November 3, 1955. Entered into force November 3, 1955.

Sale and Purchase of Tin Concentrates. TIAS 3413. Pub. 6013. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Thailand—Signed at Bangkok November 14, 1955. Entered into force November 14, 1955; operative retroactively November 1, 1955.

Exchange of Commodities and Sale of Grain. TIAS 3414. Pub. 6184. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Turkey—Modifying agreement of April 28, 1955. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington July 6 and November 18, 1955. Entered into force November 18, 1955.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3422. Pub. 6203. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and France—Amending agreement of August 11, 1955. Exchange of letters—Signed at Paris November 18, 1955. Entered into force November 18, 1955.

Fisheries Mission to El Salvador. TIAS 3423. Pub. 6207. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and El Salvador—Extending agreement of July 19, 1951, as extended. Exchange of notes—Signed at San Salvador September 13, 1954, and July 25, 1955. Entered into force July 25, 1955; operative retroactively August 19, 1954.

Fisheries Mission to El Salvador. TIAS 3424. Pub. 6208. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and El Salvador—Extending agreement of July 19, 1951, as extended. Exchange of notes—Signed at San Salvador July 25 and October 24, 1955. Entered into force October 25, 1955; operative retroactively August 19, 1955.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3429. Pub. 6212. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Israel—Signed at Washington November 10, 1955. Entered into force November 10, 1955.

The Declaration of Washington. Pub. 6288. General Foreign Policy Series 108. 6 pp. 10¢.

A pamphlet containing the Joint Declaration of the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, issued at the conclusion of their recent conference at Washington, D.C., January 30 to February 1, 1956.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Analysis of Renegotiation of Certain Tariff Concessions: Austria, Ceylon, Cuba, the Netherlands and Sweden. Pub. 6291. Commercial Policy Series 156. 34 pp. 15¢.

A report of the negotiations for modification or withdrawal of individual concessions undertaken by Austria, Ceylon, Cuba, the Netherlands and Sweden.

Introducing OTC—Organization for Trade Cooperation. Pub. 6268. Commercial Policy Series 155. 23 pp. 15¢.

A pamphlet giving a simple explanation of the OTC—its aims, structure, and responsibilities.

Renunciation of Force. Pub. 6280. General Foreign Policy Series 107. 15 pp. 15¢.

A booklet containing a Department of State statement on the U.S.-Chinese Communist talks which began in August 1955 at Geneva; also certain documents issued by the United States and the Chinese Communists.

When You Go Abroad—Information for Bearers of Passports. Pub. 6177. Department and Foreign Service Series 50. 105 pp. 35¢.

A booklet containing valuable general information; also sections regarding the laws of the United States governing the loss of American nationality and the status of American citizens in certain foreign countries.

Technical Cooperation, Rural Education Program. TIAS 3153. Pub. 5832. 25 pp. 15¢.

Agreement between the United States and Brazil giving effect to administrative clauses of program agreement of June 27, 1952, between Brazil and the Institute of Inter-American Affairs. Exchange of notes—Signed at Rio de Janeiro June 14 and 30, 1954. Entered into force June 30, 1954.

Lend Lease Settlement, Return of Certain United States Naval Vessels. TIAS 3168. Pub. 5843. 10 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—Signed at Washington December 22, 1954. Entered into force December 22, 1954.

Technical Cooperation, Employment Service Program. TIAS 3169. Pub. 5844 20 pp. 15¢.

Agreement between the United States and Peru—Signed at Lima December 31, 1954. Entered into force December 31, 1954.

Passport Visa Fees. TIAS 3172. Pub. 5845. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Switzerland and the Principality of Liechtenstein. Exchanges of notes—Dated at Washington October 22 and 31 and November 4 and 13, 1947. Entered into force November 13, 1947.

Defense, Offshore Procurement Program. TIAS 3173. Pub. 5846. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Greece. Exchange of notes—Dated at Athens October 14 and November 12, 1954. Entered into force November 12, 1954.

North Atlantic Treaty, Stationing of United States Armed Forces in the Netherlands. TIAS 3174. Pub. 5847. 10 pp. 10¢.

Agreement, with annex, between the United States and the Netherlands. Exchange of notes—Signed at The Hague August 13, 1954. Entered into force November 16, 1954.

Mutual Security, Defense Support Assistance. TIAS 3183. Pub. 5864. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Pakistan—Signed at Karachi January 11, 1955. Entered into force January 11, 1955.

ica. The Development of United States Policy the Near East, South Asia, and Africa During 955: Part I (Howard) 452
entina. Iron Lungs Rushed to Argentina for olio Epidemic 469
Development of United States Policy in the ear East, South Asia, and Africa During 1955: art I (Howard) 452
ond Meeting of SEATO Council (text of com- unique, Dulles) 447
mic Energy. Distribution of Additional Quan- ties of Uranium 235 (Eisenhower, Strauss) . . 469
na, Communist. U.S. Views on March 4 State- ent by Chinese Communists 451
gress, The
rent Legislation 471
ortance of the U.N. Specialized Agencies to e United Nations (Wilcox) 480
poses of Proposed Organization for Trade Co- eration (Dulles, Weeks) 472
mark. Educational Exchange Agreement With enmark Extended 467
armament. Mr. Stassen To Represent U.S. at ondon Disarmament Meetings 486
nomic Affairs
poses of Proposed Organization for Trade Co- eration (Dulles, Weeks) 472
plus Commodity Agreement Signed With Indo- esia 469
cational Exchange. Educational Exchange greement With Denmark Extended 467
eign Service
firmations (Warren) 488
f Corps Review Panels 488
nce. French-Moroccan Declaration 466
lth, Education, and Welfare. Iron Lungs ushed to Argentina for Polio Epidemic . . . 469
onesia. Surplus Commodity Agreement Signed ith Indonesia 469
rnational Organizations and Meetings
servation of Natural Resources 487
ond Meeting of SEATO Council (text of com- unique, Dulles) 447
and. Visit of Prime Minister of Ireland . . . 467
an. Letters of Credence (Tani) 467
rocco. French-Moroccan Declaration 466
r East. The Development of United States olicy in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa uring 1955: Part I (Howard) 452
tection of Nationals and Property. U. S. Views March 4 Statement by Chinese Communists . 451
lications. Recent Releases 489
ugees and Displaced Persons. Report on Refu- e Relief Act Transmitted to Congress 468
te, Department of
firmations (Hill) 488
gnations (Barnes, Howe) 488
f Corps Review Panels 488
Treaty Information
Current Actions 487
Educational Exchange Agreement With Denmark Extended 467
Surplus Commodity Agreement Signed With Indonesia 469
Turkey. Confirmations (Warren) 488
United Nations
Importance of the U.N. Specialized Agencies to the United Nations (Wilcox) 480
Mr. Stassen To Represent U.S. at London Disarmament Meetings 486

Name Index

Barnes, Robert G. 488
Coe, Robert D. 467
Costello, John A. 467
Dulles, Secretary 449, 472
Eisenhower, President 469
Hill, Robert C. 488
Howard, Harry N. 452
Howe, Fisher 488
Stassen, Harold E. 486
Strauss, Lewis L. 470
Tani, Masayuki 467
Warren, Fletcher 488
Weeks, Sinclair 476
Wilcox, Francis O. 480

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: March 5–11

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Press releases issued prior to March 5 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 107 of March 1 and 111 of March 2.

No.	Date	Subject
113	3/6	Highlights of refugee relief report.
114	3/6	Iron lungs sent to Argentina.
115	3/6	Comment on Chinese Communist statement of March 4.
116	3/6	Staff corps review panels (rewrite).
117	3/7	French-Moroccan declaration.
118	3/7	Message to French on French-Moroccan declaration.
119	3/7	Message to Sultan of Morocco.
*120	3/8	Mrs. Houghton appointed to UNESCO Commission.
121	3/8	Meetings of U.N. Disarmament Subcommittee.
122	3/8	Program for Costello visit (rewrite).
123	3/8	Barnes appointment (rewrite).
124	3/8	Howe appointment (rewrite).
125	3/8	Dulles: statement at final SEATO session.
†127	3/9	Wilcox: "The Soviet Challenge and the U.N."
*128	3/9	Patterson nominated Ambassador to Uruguay.
130	3/9	SEATO Council communique.
*131	3/9	McIntosh nominated Ambassador to Venezuela.
132	3/9	Delegation to continental shelf conference.

*Not printed.
†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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XXXV, No. 874

ch 26, 1956

THE SOVIET CHALLENGE AND THE UNITED NATIONS • *by Assistant Secretary Wilcox* 495

CORRESPONDENCE OF PRESIDENT EISENHOWER AND PREMIER BULGANIN ON DISARMAMENT AND U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS 514

THE ESSENTIALS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH • *by Deputy Under Secretary Prochnow* 529

RECENT ADVANCES IN THE PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY • *by Ambassador C. Douglas Dillon* . 518

PALESTINE: FOCAL POINT OF TENSION • *by Donald C. Bergus* 502

ELEMENTS OF HOPE IN THE MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC PICTURE • *by Cedric H. Seager* 506

THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE NEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA DURING 1955: PART II • *Article by Harry N. Howard* . 510

THE UNITED STATES BALANCE OF PAYMENTS WITH LATIN AMERICA • *Article by Walther Lederer and Nancy F. Culbertson* 521

For index see inside back cover

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he Soviet Challenge and the United Nations

by Francis O. Wilcox
Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs [1]

We live in a time charged with dramatic de-
lopments. In such times it is especially hard to
asp the thread of history. It is even more diffi-
lt to determine which developments are transi-
y, which more permanent.

We have witnessed in recent days an event of un-
ual significance. We have seen another zigzag
Soviet tactics. The Soviet 20th Congress has
written some of the Stalinist dogma. The full
port of the decisions taken by the Congress will
come clearer as Soviet policy evolves in the days
ead.

The change in Soviet tactics is, when you think
out it, a logical development. The old line of
lence and threatened violence became un-
ofitable and unworkable, largely because Soviet
litary might has been neutralized by the free
rld's defensive buildup. So the Kremlin has
ned a new face to the world. No longer is war
ween the two systems considered "inevitable."
e "frightful collisions" Lenin predicted between
two systems do not have to take place, Khrush-
v has told us, because the victory of communism
be achieved without violence—unless, he was
eful to add, the "exploiters" are unwise enough
resist their own extinction.

But in general the termite is to take the place of
battering ram. There will be more emphasis
smiles and promises and less emphasis on brute
ce. The goal remains the same: the collapse of
foundations of non-Communist society. Thus
Kremlin has undertaken a new Soviet offensive.
litical cooperation is being sought with leftwing
cialists, formerly the target of Soviet abuse.

Great stress is being placed on trade and economic assistance. This "new look" is being directed by the leaders of the Soviet monolithic state, who control with an iron hand the people and the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. It poses a sharp threat to the United States and to the entire free world inside and outside the United Nations. It is a challenge which must be understood and met.

The new look in Soviet tactics became manifest at the Geneva summit conference last July. There Soviet leaders spoke in a spirit of accommodation toward the West. They spoke of an era of peaceful and competitive coexistence between the free and the Communist world. They expressed a desire to reduce tensions.

The more hopeful atmosphere engendered at Geneva was reinforced by a series of Soviet actions taken both prior to and after the Geneva conference. In May 1955, after 10 years of painful negotiations, the Soviets finally signed the treaty with Austria. This was followed by the remarkable visit of Soviet leaders to Yugoslavia to make amends for past deeds. The Kremlin established diplomatic relations with the German Federal Republic. It evacuated its military base in Finland.

The new look also became apparent within the United Nations. In the General Assembly last fall the Soviet tone was, for the most part, more moderate, less contentious. They partially lifted their barrier to the admission of new members—for a price, of course. In their speeches they stressed the need for economic aid to underdeveloped countries. They made clear their intention to play a stronger role in the United Nations specialized agencies, some of which they had joined or rejoined only a short time before.

[1] Address made before the American Association of
ior Colleges at New York, N. Y., on Mar. 9 (press re-
se 127).

This does not mean that international communism has given up its ultimate ambitions or that it is not still the enemy of free governments. As Secretary Dulles said recently, the Soviets "have subordinated those elements of their old creed in the hope that, in a new garb, they could still pursue conquest."

Witness the words of Mr. Khrushchev, speaking to the Supreme Soviet on December 29, 1955:

> If certain people think that our confidence in the victory of socialism, the teaching of Marxist-Leninism, is a violation of the Geneva spirit, they obviously have an incorrect notion of the Geneva spirit. They ought to remember once and for all that we never renounced and we will never renounce our ideas, our struggle for the victory of communism.

Witness the Soviet refusal to permit the unification of a democratic Germany, and the renewed Soviet efforts to destroy NATO and other Western defensive alliances.

Witness also the arms shipments from Czechoslovakia to Egypt. This cannot be explained away as a simple business deal. In Communist countries the state controls *all* such transactions, and they are a part of foreign-policy strategy.

Witness, finally, the Soviet "good will" mission to India, Burma, and Afghanistan. On the one hand the Western powers were subjected to vitriolic verbal attacks; on the other there were Soviet proffers of trade and aid to the Asian countries.

It is important to note that this offensive was being pursued in Asia simultaneously with conciliatory tactics toward certain strategically important countries in the West. A pattern clearly emerges: First, the U.S.S.R. is conducting a holding operation against Western Europe while seeking to destroy NATO; second, it is seeking to expand its economic influence in the Near East, Africa, and Asia; third, it is attempting to utilize the United Nations and the specialized agencies in support of these objectives and in order to create the image of a peaceable, cooperative Soviet Union.

Why Soviet Tactics Have Changed

Why have Soviet tactics changed? Has the strength of the free world made them necessary? Have past Soviet foreign economic policies been a failure?

I would answer both questions in the affirmative.

First, free-world strength. After the Second World War a new threat of Communist expansion developed. It was turned back in Iran, Gre Turkey, and Korea only by prompt and det mined free-world action. To deter further viet threats of aggression, nations of the f world joined together to exercise what the Uni Nations Charter calls "the inherent right of lective self-defense." Last year, in the face of strongest Soviet threats and political maneuv the German Federal Republic became a full p ner in the North Atlantic Treaty Organizati The change in Soviet tactics stemmed from ab this time. Soviet rulers concluded that their proach to the non-Communist world must changed. A new route to the old destination needed.

Second, past failure of Soviet foreign econo policies. After the war the United States sh dered a major share of the task of rehabilitat war-torn countries. In the United Nations championed the establishment of the speciali agencies and have consistently given them str support. We took the lead in formulating p grams of technical assistance to speed the econo development of underdeveloped countries.

By contrast, the Soviet Union stripped the v quished and provided assistance only to its sa lites on its own onerous terms. In the Uni Nations, until recently, the U.S.S.R. gave lit if any, support to the specialized agencies or technical assistance program. Instead it attac them as tools of Western imperialism.[2]

This negative attitude did not go unnoticed did not help the U.S.S.R. in its efforts to penet the underdeveloped countries.

The failure of old policies is not the only son for the Soviet new look. For one, there new leadership since the death of Stalin w may be convinced that new tactics are require reach the old goal of a communized world.

For another, the hydrogen bomb means t virtual disaster rather than possible victory be the price of aggression.

For a third, the Soviet economy may now, the first time, be in a position to provide go and technical services for export. In many c this will mean withholding consumer goods f their own people.

Whatever the reasons for the changed So

[2] For a U.S. statement replying to Soviet charge this type during the recent meeting of the U.N. Econ Commission for Asia and the Far East, see BULLETI Mar. 5, 1956, p. 395.

actics they constitute, in effect, a shift in foreign policy. A recent Communist publication describes them as "prolonged coexistence and economic competition between the two systems."

This new strategy is the challenge. We must take it seriously. It is not sufficient to say that the Soviets may have seen the errors of their ways. We must look ahead and be prepared to meet this and other Soviet challenges in the foreseeable future.

What the Soviet Challenge Means to the U.N.

I am particularly concerned with how we meet this challenge in the United Nations.

There are 16 new members in the United Nations. Many of them are newly independent, proud of their sovereignty, and anxious not to become committed to any great power. They have swelled the ranks of the underdeveloped nations which constitute a majority of the United Nations. They want to acquire rapidly the material attributes of developed countries. "Industrialization" has become a magic word. People of Asia, Africa, and Latin America hope to find in quick industrialization a cure for many of their domestic economic and political problems.

In Asia and Africa, the new Soviet campaign has taken on various forms. It includes the barter of surplus arms in areas where tensions were already high. It includes the purchase of agricultural surpluses. The Soviets have given great publicity to these purchases. They have not made known, however, that some of these commodities have been reexported to markets which would normally have been supplied by the original sellers. The Soviets have also made low-cost loans in increasing numbers to countries important to them strategically. They are flooding the underdeveloped areas with offers of experts, equipment or training centers, invitations and fellowships for travel and study in the Soviet Union.

In the expanded United Nations, the U.S.S.R. can be expected to champion the demands of the underdeveloped countries for a substantial United Nations Fund for Economic Development, although it remains to be seen whether they would be prepared to contribute much to it. Indeed, the world may find, in time, that they are long on promises and short on deliveries.

In certain of the specialized agencies the Soviets have also made an about-face. In the past the Soviets ignored, opposed, or sought to frustrate the economic and social activities of the United Nations. They ignored membership in the International Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Labor Organization, and UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization]. For a short while they did belong to the World Health Organization, but they withdrew in 1949.

During this period the U.S.S.R. was not content with merely boycotting the specialized agencies. They were the targets of Soviet attacks. The Soviets rarely missed an opportunity to describe the International Labor Organization as "an instrument of capitalist employers to enslave the workers of the world." UNESCO they described as an instrument of "American cultural imperialism."

Now this is changed. Since the death of Stalin the U.S.S.R. has joined UNESCO and rejoined the ILO. They are renewing their membership in the WHO. They have contributed 4 million rubles a year or the equivalent of $1 million a year for the past 3 years to the United Nations technical assistance program.

What does this mean for the United States? I remind you that there is nothing new about the United States engaging in economic assistance to the less developed areas. We have provided billions of dollars over many years. In doing so we have strengthened the foundations of the free world, which is clearly in our national interest. We have no imperialist designs. We are simply helping other countries maintain their independence and strengthen their free institutions. It is a compliment to our programs that the U.S.S.R. is now trying to copy them. Current Soviet activities in the Middle East and Asia merely underline the importance of what we have been doing.

To meet the Soviet economic challenge two things are essential: greater flexibility and greater assurance of continuity in dealing with economic aid problems. Without these two elements we run serious risks of a rigid policy which will not be able to cope with the variety and shifts of Soviet attempts at economic penetration.

We can continue and possibly expand our support for both the United States bilateral aid and the multilateral economic programs of the United Nations. From a dollars-and-cents point of view, economic and technical aid through the United Nations is less costly to us in many instances since

it spreads the burden over many countries. Moreover, the multilateral approach is more acceptable for political reasons to some of the underdeveloped countries.

Much is being done in the field of international financing through the International Bank and the Export-Import Bank. Now that Congress has approved our membership in the International Finance Corporation, we look forward to increased efforts to encourage the flow of capital to underdeveloped countries. The early approval of this agency by the Congress has gone a long way toward stimulating other countries to ratify. We hope this new instrument of international cooperation will begin to function late this summer. Meanwhile we must continue to review our economic programs, both within and without the United Nations, to make them as sound and effective as possible.

We must maintain our leadership in the specialized agencies. This is especially important in view of the new Soviet interest in these agencies. I do not agree with those who are apprehensive that Soviet membership will mean Communist domination or corruption of the specialized agencies. There are those, for instance, who think we should quit the International Labor Organization because the Russian employer delegates are in reality government officials and not employers as we use that term. Nothing could be more injurious to our national interest than for us to walk out and leave such organizations as the ILO to the Russians. The overwhelming majority of both the employers and the workers represented in the ILO are on the side of freedom.

Soviet participation in such organizations as ILO and UNESCO serves to bring into the open the fundamental differences which separate the free world and the Soviet world. We need not fear such comparison. I would be the last to claim that these organizations, or any other human institutions, are perfect. But they serve our interests, and we are constantly alert to improve their programs.

What Colleges and Universities Can Do

Of course this new Soviet challenge cannot be met by government action alone. It is a long-range problem. It must have the continued attention and understanding of our people. In developing such understanding, the colleges and universities have a vital role to play.

I believe the colleges should encourage by e means possible an interest in and understandin world affairs. I do not mean merely the traditi study of ancient and European history but als history of the newly independent and resur areas of the world. They are on the march to political and economic equality with the most vanced countries. Your students were born a world in which Western concepts were domir They will exercise their responsibilities as citi in a world in which Western concepts mus reconciled and harmonized with those of Asia the Middle East. This will require new fami ity with comparative economic, social, and p cal concepts and customs.

Our college and university students mus made fully aware of the developments of the few decades to understand the demands of the position of leadership into which we have thrust since the war. They must understand limits as well as the possibilities of leadershi coalitions of free states and in parliamen organizations such as the United Nations. in this context can they comprehend the new f at play in the world. Such education is esse to understand what we can do to meet the S bid for leadership of newly independent states those peoples still seeking self-government independence.

I would advocate that *all* colleges teach t students the cold facts about communism. should know the origin of the Communist ideol its evolution into an absolute dictatorship u the Soviets, its methods of subversion, its w nesses and its strength, its spurious appeal i era of vast social change.

I believe the junior colleges have a special sponsibility in this regard. A great man your students will complete their formal ed tion with you. They will then go directly business, industry, and trade. Others will tinue preparation for their life's work. W you have them they should be exposed to a ge course on world affairs. If this is done they be far better equipped to discharge their resp bilities of citizenship, cognizant of the stre of democracy and vigilant to the challeng communism.

This responsibility of the colleges and univ ties becomes greater as the Soviet threat bec more long-range. It is not only a threat of r tary aggression to be met by military prepa

ness on the part of the free world. It is a threat for years to come. Continuing deterrent power is essential in the nuclear age. But this must be backed by an increasingly informed American public opinion in the field of foreign affairs.

Many of your graduates will be called upon to go abroad to represent the United States in one capacity or another. In the military or diplomatic services, as technical specialists, as recipients of study or travel grants, they will have the opportunity to speak and act for the American people. They should be equipped to discharge this responsibility in meaningful terms to the people of other lands.

Statistics, I realize, are sometimes misleading. But statistics show that the Soviet Union is training and graduating far more scientists and technicians than we are. The Soviet Union is determined to outproduce us in the scientific and industrial fields. They are not doing so now, but we have no grounds for complacency. The junior colleges, I believe, should provide the best in scientific and technical training for their students and encourage and stimulate them to go on to the university for higher training. American leadership and training is not self-perpetuating. It must be cherished and inculcated at every level of education.

I would venture to direct a word to the administrators of the great American junior college system. The teachers whom you employ are the caretakers of tomorrow's civilization. It is to them that we entrust education for leadership and understanding in this complex world. Only *good* teachers can do this. It takes good salaries to attract and keep good teachers. They should have at least the incentive and security which we provide for labor, for our armed services, and for the public service. Arnold Toynbee has written that societies have often been spurred to self-improvement in the face of external challenges. If the threat our society now faces teaches us to place a higher premium on our intellectual and educational human resources, it will have served at least one useful purpose. There is no doubt that a free society can meet and surpass any challenge posed by a society under dictatorship. But to do so, it must both recognize and accept the challenge.

Of great importance in the teaching of international affairs is a study of the United Nations. This is not an ephemeral organization. It is a going concern affecting the security and well-being of nations on a day-by-day basis. We must know how it was created, what it has done, what it can and cannot do.

Facts and Fallacies About the U.N.

The United Nations has had strong bipartisan support from the Congress. But this support cannot be taken for granted. It must be based on an informed and sound public opinion. It is, after all, the responsibility of the Congress to reflect public attitudes on important matters of foreign policy. The public, therefore, has a heavy responsibility to keep itself accurately informed. With regard to the United Nations, this means that we must sift fact from fiction. Here a little misunderstanding goes a long way. Let us consider, for a few moments, some of the common fallacies about the United Nations.

It is said that the United Nations is a superstate with treaty making powers. This, of course, is not the case. The United Nations is a voluntary association of sovereign states. It has no power to legislate, to levy taxes, or to make treaties. The members may propose conventions and treaties, but these are only binding on countries which subsequently approve them through their constitutional processes. In our case, this means approval by the United States Senate.

It is said by a few critics that UNESCO interferes in and dictates to our American educational system. This likewise is untrue. UNESCO, which is also a free association of nations, does make recommendations to member countries regarding teaching about the United Nations and teaching to foster international understanding. It is entirely up to the member countries whether they want to follow these recommendations or not. And yet there is a small but vocal minority in this country which continues to regard UNESCO as some sort of threat to our educational system and to American youth.

Shortly after the inauguration of President Eisenhower this administration undertook an independent appraisal of UNESCO to determine whether the charges against it were valid. The President appointed three distinguished citizens to study UNESCO activities. Let me summarize the principal findings of this group:

1. UNESCO does not advocate world government or world citizenship in the political sense.

2. UNESCO does not attempt, directly or indirectly, to undermine national loyalties or to

encourage the substitution of loyalty to a supranational authority for loyalty to one's own country.

3. The official bodies and the personnel of UNESCO observe the provision of the UNESCO Constitution which prohibits UNESCO from interfering in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of member states. UNESCO does not attempt to interfere in the American school system.

4. There was no evidence of atheism or antireligious bias in any of UNESCO's work.

It seems to me that these findings should more than counteract the negative criticisms that have been made with respect to UNESCO.

But we must not be content with merely laying bare fallacies about the United Nations. We must understand why the United Nations deserves our support.

Since its foundation, the United Nations has been the most effective mechanism available for settling international disputes. It has facilitated peaceful change where violence might otherwise have been the only course. We have the examples of the peaceful settlement of the Indonesian-Dutch conflict, the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, and the removal of the aggressive Communist threat to Iran and Greece.

We have the important example of the resistance to aggression in Korea, in which the United States called for and got the material or moral support of the overwhelming majority of the United Nations members. This may well have prevented World War III.

The United Nations at President Eisenhower's initiative has promoted the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The historic peaceful uses conference held at Geneva last summer opened up vast potential benefits which the atom has made possible for mankind.

The work of the technical assistance program and the specialized agencies has raised standards of living and has brought prospects of economic and social well-being closer for millions of people everywhere.

These are some of the reasons why the United Nations deserves our continuing support. President Eisenhower has called the United Nations man's best hope to substitute the conference table for the battlefield. He has said, and I certainly agree, that if we did not have a United Nations we would have to create one to cope with the common problems of the world. In the United Nations we get a great deal for very little cost. It will prosper and serve our purposes and the purposes of the free world if we give it our continuing and enlightened support.

U.N. Cannot Solve All Our Problems

Understanding and support for the United Nations does not mean unthinking approval of everything it does. Nor should we look upon it as a cure-all or panacea for all the world's ills. The United Nations can only be a "center for harmonizing the actions of nations" to the extent which each sovereign state is willing to cooperate for the common good. There are many issues which it has been unable to solve. For example, once again we are faced with mounting tension between Israel and the Arab States in the Middle East. The United Nations could resolve that issue if the parties concerned were more willing to cooperate.

This is no place to assess blame for what is happening in the Near East.

Neither the Israelis nor the Arabs are guiltless in the tense situation which prevails there. If the two sides would fulfill their obligations under the Security Council resolutions and would carry out the recommendations of General Burns, the U.N. Truce Supervisor, they could do much to lessen tensions in the area. However, aside from the responsibility of the Arab States and Israel for preventing hostilities, the other members of the United Nations have a serious responsibility—indeed, an obligation—to keep the peace there. This cannot be done by irresponsible shipments of arms to the countries in that area, or by trying to maintain a precarious "balance of arms" between Israel and the Arab States. An arms race will magnify suspicions and tend to create the impression—if not the fact—of power alinements which can only lead to hostilities disastrous for the Near East and possibly the world.

We are vitally interested in the peace and welfare of the Near East as a nation and as a member of the Security Council. We are convinced that early action in the United Nations is necessary on the problems that confront us all in the Near East.

The United Nations, through its members is the logical focal point for remedying the dangerous developments which confront us. What the United Nations can and must do is something

which, I can assure you, the United States is earnestly and prayerfully considering.

Similarly in the field of disarmament. Despite 0 years of negotiation, no safeguarded system of disarmament has yet been agreed upon. The threat of atomic disaster still hangs over man's ead. From the very start, in 1946, the United States has been squarely on record for a genuine program of safeguarded disarmament. The Soviet Union has consistently blocked progress, but he quest continues, for we cannot afford to lacken our efforts.

President Eisenhower has given world leadership in the search for ways to put the atom to the ervice of mankind. In his letter to Premier Bulganin last week [3] the President suggested concrete measures which, as he wrote, "if carried out dequately, would reverse the present trend toward a constant increase in nuclear weapons overanging the world. My ultimate hope," the President said, "is that all production of fissionble materials anywhere in the world will be deoted exclusively to peaceful purposes." This ionth the disarmament subcommittee of the United Nations will try again in London. The United Nations provides a forum where this probm can be solved, and solved it must be.

Let us remember this. Many important and ifficult international problems are solved outde the United Nations. But the really tough nes, the well-nigh insoluble ones, come to the United Nations. It is, in a way, the court of last ppeal. I don't believe the United Nations should y to shelve or dodge such problems. But let us emember that the United Nations doesn't *create* iem. The organization mirrors the realities of ie world. If the image is ugly it is not the irror that is at fault.

hallenge of New Soviet Offensive

In conclusion, the challenge of the new Soviet ffensive faces all of us. It is not a short-run roposition. The Communists are not handipped by any timetable. The cold war—with l its trickery and fraud, its subversion and sabage, and perhaps even its peripheral outbreaks violence—may run for 10, 20, 30, or 40 years.

This will call for firmness and determination and patience on the part of the American people, together with a willingness to sacrifice over a long period of time. It will call for flexibility and understanding.

Let us not waver in our determination to preserve our heritage of freedom and to create those conditions in the world in which the cause of free men can flourish.

To sum up—

We must understand the long-range nature of the Soviet threat and meet it with courage and imagination;

We must continue to support the United Nations and the high purposes and principles for which it stands;

We must work closely with our allies and not try to go it alone;

We must demonstrate to the uncommitted nations of the world the enduring values of democracy.

If, as a nation, we follow this course, then we can face the future with confidence that freedom will prevail.

Sultan of Morocco Responds to U.S. Message

Press release 139 dated March 16

On March 14, Si Embarek Bekkai, Prime Minister of Morocco, delivered to Julius C. Holmes, diplomatic agent of the United States in Morocco, the following message in response to congratulations from the U.S. Government to Sultan Mohammed V presented on March 7, following signature of the joint Franco-Moroccan Declaration of March 2.[1]

His Majesty was very touched by the felicitations and the wishes that you kindly addressed to him in the name of the Government of the United States of America on the occasion of the recognition of the independence of Morocco. His Majesty charges me to request you to transmit his warm thanks to your honorable government. He hopes that fruitful relations in the interest of all will develop between independent unified Morocco and its traditional friends.

[3] See p. 514.

[1] Bulletin of Mar. 19, 1956, p. 466.

Palestine: Focal Point of Tension

by Donald C. Bergus
Officer-in-Charge, Israel-Jordan Affairs [1]

I was gratified to see that the key word used in the program of this conference of the Middle East Institute is the word "tensions." Mr. Webster may not bear me out, but I have always assumed that, in international relations, at least, "tensions" are phenomena of relatively short duration. "Problems" or "questions" on the other hand relate to international situations which have become institutionalized. The "Eastern question" titillated historians and political thinkers throughout the civilized world for at least 2 centuries.

Perhaps one of the most significant contributions which we as Americans have made to international polity has been our pragmatic refusal to accept historic issues or traditional feelings of hostility as unavoidable features of the landscape defying solution by human or practical means. Perhaps our first task, therefore, is to keep the world aware of the fact that the disturbing situation which exists between Israel and the Arab States is a state of tension, a collection of issues which can and must be peacefully and equitably resolved. Neither we nor the peoples directly concerned can afford the luxury of dismissing Arab-Israel hostility as an infernal machine set in motion by historic forces beyond our control and ticking inexorably to a climax of bloodshed and disaster.

Discouragingly enough, there are trends in the area which could indicate a resignation, indeed even a wish, to let present issues relapse into permanent ills. There are those in the region who see advantage, or at least lack of disadvantage, in today's situation. The continuing hostility has not been without economic effect, but it would be f ish to pretend that the economic developmen the area has been stifled. The most superfi comparison of the Near East at the end of W War II and the Near East today cannot but press the observer with the tremendous str which all the countries of the area have m Even Jordan, the country which has taken brunt of the impact of the events of 1948, has its capital develop from a quiet backwater in throbbing and active Arab center.

Arab reaction to the emergence of Israel been perhaps the major factor in crystallizing A discontent with the *status quo* in their own c tries, in making effective efforts to achieve sovereignty and political independence, in crediting regimes unable to respond to the pop will, and in giving voice to growing aspirati for an objective as yet not completely define Arab unity. It can hardly be said that intra-A rivalries have been thrust aside, but the appea unity seems to be the slogan of the day.

In Israel, also, the present tension has serve a uniting force. A people struggling to for nation of many diverse elements shares the c mon experience of common fears and ho While the burden of armament has been heav has been the defense forces of Israel perhaps m than any other factor which have contribute instilling in the new generation knowledge of pride in Hebrew language and culture and Israel institutions. The picture of a beleagu state which emerges from Israel's present posi readily evokes sympathy and support from m than a few of the free peoples of the world. T is ample justification for Israel to defer decisi on hard questions which must in time be answe

[1] Address made before the Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs of the Middle East Institute at Washington, D. C., on Mar. 9.

ch as the definition of a Zionist, the relationship tween Israel and Jews residing outside the state, d the role of religion and state in Israel.

These advantages, if in truth they are ad-ntages, are decisively outweighed by the grim ssibilities engendered by the continuance of the esent situation. Rather than attempt to in-ntory each of the unresolved issues and the nger it presents, I would like to discuss briefly e impact of Arab-Israel tension on political life d behavior in the area. As a case in point, let take the problem of the Arab refugees.

e Arab Refugees

As a result of the Palestine hostilities of 1948, er 800,000 people are displaced from their rner homes and living largely through the istance of the United Nations financed almost tirely by the United States and the United ngdom. Even the number of refugees is a tter of controversy. Arab spokesmen like to e figures well in excess of a million. Israel tisticians get out their slide rules and with mingly little effort succeed in almost halving e total number of bona fide refugees.

The circumstances of the departure of these un-rtunate people from their former homes are also matter of argument. The Israel view is that— Arabs left Palestine voluntarily and at the tigation of their leaders so as to leave the field e for Arab military operations. The Arabs intain that the refugees fled in terror as a result Israel actions—such as the Deir Yassin mas-re—or were systematically pushed out by the ael Army. The history of the days of fighting still too tangled to permit a definite conclusion to the reasons why the Arabs left their homes. ather suspect that time and research will bring light facts indicating that both the Israel and Arab versions of the circumstances contain ments of truth when applied to one or another the waves of movement outward which took ce. I submit, however, that the question of the cumstances of the refugees' departure may not too relevant to the situation as it now exists— fact that hundreds of thousands of people who l homes and livelihoods no longer have them. nited Nations actions and recommendations cerning the refugees form a comprehensive tern, the important elements of which include:

. The 1948 General Assembly resolution that e refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return. . . ."

2. The establishment of appropriate U.N. machinery to provide temporary relief for the refugees and assistance in promoting the economic development and the public works essential to the implementation of the above resolution.

3. The fact that the parties to the Arab-Israel dispute are internationally recognized as sovereign states, and are themselves members of the United Nations and parties to its charter and have undertaken the obligations and responsibilities of the charter.

Within this framework and with the substantial funds which have been pledged to carry out these objectives, it would seem that an early solution to the problem of the refugees was eminently feasible. That this has not proved true is due largely to the fact that leaders of both sides will not accept all of the elements of the proposed solution, preferring to pick and choose those parts which add up to what they think are devastatingly convincing public positions.

Arab Position

Arab leaders demand that the refugees be returned to their former homes, in accordance with the United Nations resolution. This demand is made without thorough acknowledgment of the full implications of the clause reading "and live at peace with their neighbours." Indeed, some Arab spokesmen even go so far as to paint a picture of the returning refugees as the vanguard of successive waves of Arab conquest. The clear implication that refugees who will return will become citizens of the sovereign state of Israel with all the duties and obligations of that citizenship is also often elided for purposes of oratorical appeal. Arabs maintain that, short of repatriation, no other solution to the refugee problem will be acceptable.

A curious practical result emerges from such thinking. The wealthy or gifted refugee who was able to leave Palestine with some capital or some special skill is enabled to reestablish himself by dint of his own efforts and to make a new life without risking popular condemnation. For some reason, however, the poor refugee who fled with little and left little behind him must be prevented from accepting outside assistance in resuming a

position of dignity of self-support—even when this assistance is offered in the context of the U.N. determinations of the political rights accruing to the refugees. It is evidently believed that, by keeping these unfortunate people in camps in idleness and living on a subsistence ration, some tremendous political advantage is gained.

Israel Position

Israel spokesmen also prefer to formulate their position out of preferred elements of the context of U.N. action. The principle of repatriation is repudiated despite the clear implication of the U.N. resolution. A nation which waited millennia to return to the soil of Palestine seems unable to recognize a similar desire on the part of others now in their 8th year of exile and often camped within sight of their former homes. Public undertakings are made for the payment of compensation under a number of conditions, among them being the willingness of outside interests to make the necessary funds available. Frozen bank accounts have been released. The lands and properties of the refugees have been taken over by an absentee property authority. They represent a substantial asset to the Israel economy and in most cases have been transferred to new users who are enjoying their benefits. These assets represent capital, and capital earns income. Still, nothing is heard of efforts to set aside this income in transferable liquid assets against the day when compensation must be paid. Official tables of Israel's balance of payments or foreign indebtedness make no mention, even by footnote, of the standing obligation by Israel to make future payment for property which she has taken over and from which she is deriving present benefit. Israel spokesmen not only minimize their own responsibility for assisting the Arab refugees but use the issue to belabor the neighboring Arab States for lack of willingness to assume complete responsibility for the refugees' rehabilitation.

While neither side remains prepared to make the substantial effort necessary to bring about a solution to this problem, what is happening to the refugees themselves? The years of idleness, the lengthening period of loss of livelihood and dignity, the growing feeling among refugees that they are unwanted—all are taking their toll. The refugees, particularly the youth among them, are prone to adopt more and more a philosophy of nihilism and to assume that the very foundations of the society in which they live must be destr before new hopes can appear. They are enc aged to dream of a distant day of vengeanc though further bloodshed and cataclysm c bring about any real benefit for anyone. T hatred for Israel is played upon and exploite elements who for reasons of unwillingness to reality or for ulterior motives seek to preve peaceful resolution of the issue. Those car along the borders of Israel constitute a contin risk of border violations which culminate in bl incidents. As an outside, unaccepted eleme the host countries the refugees can be a contin threat to the internal security and stability o Arab States concerned. The countries of world whose gifts keep the refugees alive tired of continuing expenditure which b opprobrium and accusation down upon the of the giver while the countries directly conce show little willingness to make the effort n sary to bring about a solution of the probler

On August 26, 1955, the Secretary of S speaking with the authority of the Presiden dicated the contributions which the United S was prepared to make toward a solution of problem.[2] He stated that the United S would be willing to participate in an inte tional loan if such a loan is necessary to e Israel to fund her obligations to the refu Assistance in the financing of the works of nomic development necessary for refugee reh tation either through resettlement in the States or by repatriation, to such extent as m feasible, was also pledged.

It seems to us that no real solution to the p lem can be found unless it contains these elem and that it is up to the countries directly conce to take up this offer. Without a willingnes the part of all concerned to take their full sha the responsibility the present situation can continue to deteriorate and the common t which engulfs the area can only grow. Reso war cannot solve a problem which requires b based economic development for its solution.

Desire for Conciliation Needed

It is our view that the other unresolved issu the Palestine conflict can likewise be res given a willingness to bring a spirit of states ship and a desire for conciliation to bear. D

[2] BULLETIN of Sept. 5, 1955, p. 378.

ations of intention to seek a solution to these problems by force, and ritual restatement of positions of intransigence, may have passing public value in the countries where they are made, but the unfulfilled desires and needs of the people who are suffering build up to crisis proportions.

I do not think that it is in the interest of the Arab States that a generation is growing up convinced that they must seek by war a solution to problems which were created by war. I do not think that it is in the interest of Israel that a generation is growing up in isolation from the peoples and cultures of the area where Israel must live and convinced that for the indefinite future they must stand on the ramparts of a garrison state.

As late as little more than 10 years ago, the majority of the peoples of the area had yet to achieve full independence and control of their own affairs. In this relatively brief period full political sovereignty has emerged for country after country in the Near East. With mastery of one's own destiny must come a sense of responsibility and a desire to build a lasting foundation for the efforts of future generations.

I wish I had been able this afternoon to outline some new gimmick, some easy way, some royal road to the permanent lessening of tensions and the resolution of the Palestine issues. But there is no solution which can succeed without a common will for peace and a readiness to make the contributions necessary to achieve that peace. The United States will continue efforts to bring the parties concerned to a process of working out their difficulties through peaceful means. To this end we are pledged to act with the United Kingdom and France, both within and outside the United Nations, to resist or thwart attempts to exacerbate the situation through pointless resort to aggressive force.

I would like to conclude by reading from the final paragraphs of the Secretary of State's speech of August 26, 1955:

"Both sides in this strife have a noble past, a heritage of rich contributions to civilization; both have fostered progress in science and the arts. Each side is predominantly representative of one of the world's great religions. Both sides desire to achieve a good life for their people and to share, and contribute to, the advancements of this century.

". . . The spirit of conciliation and of the good neighbor brings rich rewards to the people and to the nations. If doing that involves some burdens, they are burdens which the United States would share, just as we would share the satisfaction which would result to all peoples if happiness, contentment, and good will could drive hatred and misery away from peoples whom we hold in high respect and honor."

U.S. Position on Cyprus Issue

Following are texts of statements made to correspondents on March 12 and 13 by Lincoln White, acting chief of the News Division.

STATEMENT OF MARCH 12

The United States Government is not a party to the negotiations which have been in progress regarding Cyprus and had no advance information on certain moves of the last few days affecting Cyprus.

The United States had been encouraged by the steady progress made during the last few months regarding Cyprus. It had earnestly hoped that basic agreements might be reached which would enable the people of Cyprus to achieve their legitimate desire of cooperating in the establishment of a government truly representative of the people of the island. We are confident that a solution may be reached which will take into account and safeguard the legitimate interests of all parties concerned. We earnestly hope that, despite the present reverses, no one will lose sight of the overriding objective, which is the reestablishment of an atmosphere in which negotiations can be resumed and carried to a successful conclusion.

STATEMENT OF MARCH 13

The Cyprus issue involves the direct interests of close friends and allies of the United States. It is, therefore, a matter which the United States views with attentive interest.

The United States has not itself been a party to the Cyprus issue. Our sole effort has been to encourage those directly concerned to find a fair and just solution.

We were greatly disappointed that the substantial progress made toward such a solution through

private discussion did not result in final agreement. We are convinced, however, that further progress can be made once an atmosphere conducive to negotiations can be reestablished.

The United States is ready to assist its friends in the achievement of a just solution to the Cyprus problem. We view present problems with sympathetic concern but are confident that a solution can be found which will strengthen overall Western interests.

Elements of Hope in the Middle East Economic Picture

by Cedric H. Seager[1]

I am particularly honored to be invited to raise your spirits during the closing hours of this interesting conference. Some of my friends have smiled cynically when I have mentioned the subject of my talk. They appear to discern little of hope under the present darkness of sky. I share their anxiety and trepidation. If I took the short-term view, as they do, I would hesitate to address you today on this topic. But hope is a matter of wider perspective, reaching to far horizons, justifying its calculation upon known experience, and in that context I find enough to promise a brighter future for an area so close to my heart.

You will forgive this touch of sentimentality. I was born and raised in the area. I have lived in the midst of its wars and revolutions and have been marked by them. I have seen it humbled, and I have seen it rise from its knees to greatness. I have known its strength and its weakness, seen it move mountains by faith and spiritual determination. Who can say there is no hope here? Ask him who saw the Greek stand steadfast against Italian, German, and Communist domination. Ask him who watched the Turk rise from the ashes of defeat and dare, first, the Western Powers and, later, Russia to deny her her destiny. Ask any witness of Arab accomplishments in the short period between colonial domination and present independence. Ask anyone who has lived in Cairo these past few years. Yes, ask anyone who suffered a sense of personal outrage by the treatment meted out to the Jews in this enlightened 20th century in those years that preceded the agony of Palestine. You will be told that there are men and women in this area, regardless of their race or religion, who are of the stuff of which all human hope is fashioned.

That is my conviction and my faith.

As to the matter of my hope, my faith, my talk this morning must be based largely upon a review of recent events and accomplishments which appear to me to give sure promise of future strength and stability.

My time is too short for a full review, and the area is as wide as it has been eventful. But I will do what I can in the time allotted.

Greece

It is only a decade since Greece lay in ruins, her population starving. It is less than that since the Communists were storming the outposts of Athens. In the interim, a remarkable recovery has taken place. Her economy has been placed on a stable basis, her transportation system restored, electricity has been carried across the country to the most distant hamlets, and a small but powerful modern military force has joined in partnership with the NATO alliance. The immediate outlook in Cyprus is discouraging, and Greco-Turkish relations have been seriously strained. But more critical issues than Cyprus have been surmounted, and both Greece and Turkey, in our lifetime, have displayed statesmanship in patching up more

[1] Address made before the Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs of the Middle East Institute at Washington, D.C., on Mar. 10. Mr. Seager is Director of the Near East, South Asia, and Africa Division of the International Cooperation Administration.

rievous wounds. It would be unreasonable to uppose that they will allow present rancor to estroy future promise.

urkey

Short-term difficulties in Turkey do not mar the rospect of a great future. To appreciate the full otential of this remarkable country, one must ave lived through the years between the two Vorld Wars, and since. There are present inernal dislocations. The Government's financial ifficulties are serious. Economic readjustment nd belt tightening are necessary; but it is these ery present difficulties that pave the way for urther modernization and a continuation of the rogress that has revolutionized the country in 35 ears.

It is true that, with respect to the country's econmy, the Government has tried to go too far too ast. This has resulted in mounting inflation, eavy debt, and increasing deficits in external rade balances, all of which must be brought under ontrol. The newly constituted government of 'remier Menderes has undertaken to adopt the ecessary measures to bring about stabilization, hich will necessitate slower, but more orderly, rowth.

The economic foundation of Turkey, which rge-scale investment has buttressed and exanded, is sure. Ever-increasing benefits will deive from the new factories and mills, the power nd the cement plants, the improved highway and arbor facilities which have transformed the face f the country. There has been an increase of 25 ercent in real per capita income and consumption uring the past 5 years and an average 6 percent ncrease in gross national product for each year nce 1949. Agricultural production has increased ne-third since 1949, industry and mining by aproximately 50 percent, construction by 50 percent, hile transportation and communications facilies have almost doubled. The effort, which has een notable, will pay increasing dividends.

On the military side, the country has placed itelf in a strong defensive position, joining with ATO and the Baghdad Pact countries to deter agression, while in the U.N. Councils she has connued to exercise wise leadership.

an

The outlook for Iran is brighter than at any me during recent years. By 1951 the economic situation had deteriorated to the point where loss of oil revenues had reduced the country to bankruptcy, created large-scale unemployment, and brought all developmental projects to a standstill. The U.S. had already established a technical assistance mission in Tehran, with regional offices in 10 provinces. At the height of the crisis, and while negotiations over the oil nationalization issue were proceeding, substantial additional U.S. aid was provided, amounting to some $60 million in the first year. Statesmanship resolved the oil issue, a stable government took office, internal security was restored, and a climate for improved economic and administrative reform was created.

Today, a country-wide development program, supported by substantial oil revenues, has been launched under strong administrative direction. Improved tax collections are expected to provide new income for normal budget requirements. The country's creditworthiness has been greatly improved. The outlook, once so dismal, is full of promise.

Iraq

It is clear that a particularly bright future is opening up in Iraq. Wise planning has made good use of substantial oil revenues in the form of dams, roads, irrigation works, land reclamation, and land settlement programs, accompanied by simultaneous broad-scale educational and social-welfare advancement. There has been recourse to U.S. technical assistance in most of these areas of activity. As the full benefits of such large-scale investment in major fields of production accrue, a broad vista of opportunity will open up in this historic area. Industrial opportunities will multiply, and there will be demand for greater skilled manpower than Iraq alone will be able to supply.

Jordan

I was heartened by what I saw of economic progress in Jordan when I visited that country a few months ago. Everybody in this room is fully aware of the great difficulties created by the refugee problem, which, until a solution is found and stability restored, will handicap Jordan's potential for economic growth. This is one area where the short-term view offers nothing but discouragement. But it is impossible for me to believe that negotiations for settlement of the Jordan Valley waters problem, which last year came so near to success, will ultimately fail. With virtually full

agreement already reached on the technical side, one must hold to the conviction that political consent of all parties concerned is only a matter of time. Land reclamation, resettlement, power development, and other means of raising the living standards of many thousands of people will then materially advance the welfare of Jordan, as of other adjacent countries, and present hope will be justified by future fulfillment.

Meanwhile, progress is not at a standstill in that country. There has been substantial improvement in agricultural production and successful exploitation of ground water resources. A good program of highway construction is well under way. Tourist revenues last year were the highest in Jordan's history. The potential from this source is, of course, enormous when settlement of political issues is happily reached. The outlook for mineral resources development is also encouraging.

Lebanon

The ambitious Litani River development project in Lebanon offers promise for that country to meet all its needs for irrigation and power facilities. Highway development, already well advanced, will facilitate domestic and international trade.

Israel

The accomplishments of Israel, in the few years of that country's turbulent history, have been remarkable. It has skillfully welded a diverse mixture of people from various cultures into a single constructive force, making the utmost of its own meager resources and not inconsiderable external assistance to create an economy and an industrial machine that could very profitably serve, to the advantage of all concerned, all the nations of the area under conditions of peace and friendly commercial intercourse.

Egypt

The economic problem of Egypt is one of the most difficult to resolve in the area. Western support of the High Aswan Dam construction has been offered. It is, of course, an economic "must" for Egypt, with its potential for power and industrial development, together with the irrigation of 2 million acres of land.

But the problem of Egypt extends far beyond the area of influence of High Aswan. Prom made to the Egyptian people by its leaders broad-scale economic and social improvement quire fulfillment. The magnitude of the undertaking is one of the greatest of our time. solution calls for steady nerves, wisdom, and cooperation of all sincerely concerned for Egy welfare. The outbreak of hostilities, or even constant shadow of war, would hideously imp progress. Our aid already extended to Eg and proffered in connection with High Aswa substantial. It is extended in association with genuine admiration for the reform policies ac cated by the Nasser government and pursuan our desire to promote stability in the area. Fo that would seriously exacerbate animosities t have handicapped economic progress in the Mi East have lately entered the area, motivated policies that are inimical to the growth of a p perous free-world society. With such help as be extended by the West, from her own resour and from considerable additional resources t could be made available out of the Middle East self under more stabilized conditions, the solut to the problem can be found. To succumb to blandishments of Soviet Russia, the greatest ruptive force in history, would endanger, not vance, the welfare of Egypt and all the area.

Optimism for Future Development of Middle East

The foregoing examples of specific progress certain countries of the area in recent times l me to a few generalizations that justify, in y opinion, a large measure of optimism for future development of the Middle East. This timism is based upon my knowledge and exp ence of those underlying conditions that stimul indeed compel, economic advancement. calamity that would crumble such advancemen war. One must work and pray, in this tense h to see that the clock shall not be set back by such calamity.

There is no gainsaying the fact that the upw surge of vast populations in underdeveloped a is among the most vital forces of our times. crying need of people is for better health co tions and a reasonable measure of progress. T is a movement fraught with an infinite potent for good or for evil. It was the late, much lo Dr. Bennett, the first point 4 administrator, said that a billion people had been vouchsafe

window onto the 20th century and that it was up to us to provide them a door.

The Middle East is crowded with these people—restless, dynamic, intelligent. The compulsion placed upon their leaders is to make visible economic progress while preserving independence that has been won out of so much trial and tribulation. We, for our part, have recognized that economic development is the most important key to political stability in underdeveloped countries and to the security of the Western World itself. The technical and economic assistance that we have rendered already, the measure of aid we are willing to continue to render, is token of our recognition of this fact. This cooperative effort can continue to gather momentum as the resources of the area, human as well as material, are mobilized to attain a common objective.

These human and material resources of the Middle East are immense. Waters are available for increasing production of food and power. The fact that the Jordan water development plan has not yet been fully agreed does not diminish the fact that the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers do exist, providing substantial hope for the future. Unplumbed possibilities still exist, from Iran to Egypt, across Tigris, Euphrates, Litani, Nile, and other bodies of water, for limitless additional productive effort. New subterranean water resources are constantly being discovered; more mineral deposits, and more oil. Plenty of work remains to be done in the exploratory stages, but, once such explorations reveal the availability of important resources, I am convinced that private capital will find it profitable to develop them for the general welfare of the people of this area.

I have hope in the proven adaptability, in a phenomenally short space of time, of the people themselves to modern techniques. Bedouin tribesmen have become skilled mechanics in a short period of time. Forsaking their traditional nomadic cultural pattern, they are digging wells, repairing machines and vehicles, taking their place in factories.

Improvements in education and health and vocational training will result in a revolution in the way of life of these people. It will become increasingly less necessary to import skilled technicians from outside the area to carry forward the task of economic development and industrial expansion. As the people themselves acquire an ever more important share in their own material growth, as their restlessness is channeled into gainful effort, the goal of stability and prosperity will come nearer to attainment.

Thus I conclude that the major element of hope in the future of the Middle East derives from the people of the Middle East themselves; from their resources, their ancient cultures, the enlightened attitudes of their governments, and the willingness of freedom lovers everywhere to help them attain a better life and a more peaceful future.

U.S. Atomic Experts To Visit Thailand, Pakistan, Turkey

The Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State (press release 144) announced on March 16 that Louis Roddis, deputy director of the Atomic Energy Commission's Division of Reactor Development, and Dr. John Lawrence, director of the Donner Laboratory, University of California, Berkeley, will visit Thailand and Pakistan and that Mr. Roddis will visit Turkey within the next 3 weeks to consult with appropriate officials and scientists in connection with these countries' desire to develop atomic energy programs utilizing the peaceful applications of atomic energy. The three countries are among those with which the United States has signed agreements for cooperation pursuant to President Eisenhower's atoms-for-peace program. Mr. Roddis and Dr. Lawrence will arrive at Bangkok on March 19 and at Karachi on March 28, and Mr. Roddis will arrive at Ankara on April 3.

Physicist To Lecture in Japan on Peaceful Uses of Atom

The Department of State announced on March 16 (press release 143) that Clark D. Goodman, assistant director for research and development, Reactor Development Division, Atomic Energy Commission, has accepted an invitation to participate in the International Educational Exchange Program of the Department of State and will leave on March 19 for Japan. He expects to open the atoms-for-peace exhibit at Osaka and will also deliver lectures at cultural centers and universities in other parts of the country. Dr. Goodman's visit is part of the overall program to assist friendly foreign countries in developing peaceful uses of atomic energy.

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The Development of U.S. Policy in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa During 1955

PART II: PROBLEMS OF REGIONAL SECURITY[1]

by Harry N. Howard

The United States and Middle East Defense

Since the end of World War II the United States has been very much interested in the defense of the Middle East and has expressed that interest in a wide variety of ways, including assistance to Greece and Turkey (1947) and support for the entry of those countries into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1952). Together with France, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, the United States during 1951–1952 sought the establishment of a Middle East Command or Middle East Defense Organization; this concept failed to materialize, however, largely because of the Middle Eastern preoccupation with local quarrels and with disputes with the Western states.

Following his visit to the area in May 1953, Secretary Dulles concluded that any sound regional defense arrangement would have to rest on the desires of the peoples and governments in the Middle East. Mr. Dulles found that the states of the Northern Tier, more exposed to external danger, were more likely than the others to find a solution of the problem and also were so situated as to provide the greatest measure of protection to the area. He therefore concluded that it should be the policy of the United States to assist in strengthening the defenses of those countries which desired such assistance in order to resist the common threat. It was hoped that the stat directly concerned would recognize the comm danger and would cooperate for collective r gional defense. The United States could encou age efforts which were consistent with its ov security goals and could help to fill gaps in t evolving defense arrangement. But the countri of the area should take the lead in establishing th arrangement; they should also determine wheth it should take the form of a single structure or separate but related units and whether the a rangement should be restricted to states in t area or should include Western states interest in the defense of the area.[2]

The Turco-Iraqi Pact, February 24, 1955

It was within the framework of this gene policy and of article 51 of the United Natio Charter that the United States looked with a proval upon the Turco-Pakistani treaty of Ap 2, 1954, and signed mutual defense assistan agreements with Iraq (April 21, 1954) and Pal stan (May 19, 1954).[3] Pakistan, which thus b came linked by treaty in a Middle Eastern arrang ment, was in addition a signatory of the Sout east Asia Collective Defense Treaty on Septemb 8, 1954, together with the United States, t United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealan the Philippines, and Thailand.

The United States also looked with approv

[1] For Part I of this article, dealing with political issues, see BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1956, p. 452. Part III, dealing with mutual security and U.S. assistance programs, will appear in a subsequent issue. Mr. Howard is United Nations adviser for the Bureau of Near East, South Asian, and African Affairs.

[2] See John D. Jernegan, "Middle East Defense," B LETIN of Apr. 4, 1955, p. 564.

[3] For a brief background, see Harry N. Howard, *U. Policy in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa—19* (Department of State publication 5801), pp. 36–42.

n the Pact of Mutual Cooperation which Iraq nd Turkey signed at Baghdad on February 24, 955, despite the misgivings of certain other Arab tates, notably Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, nd despite Soviet strictures concerning the pact.[4] he Turco-Iraqi treaty, in its preamble, referred the treaty signed by the two countries on March 1946, which had recognized that the peace and curity of Turkey and Iraq were an integral part f the peace and security of the Middle East as a hole. It also noted that article 2 of the Arab ollective Security Treaty had specified that that eaty did not affect rights and obligations under e United Nations. Under article 1, "consistent ith Article 51 of the United Nations Charter," urkey and Iraq were to "cooperate for their curity and defense" and the specific measures to taken in this connection were to be the subject "special agreements." The parties agreed not interfere in each other's domestic affairs and to ttle disputes by peaceful means, in accordance ith the United Nations Charter. The new treaty as not in contradiction with any of their inter- tional obligations, and the parties undertook assume no incompatible obligations. It was en to accession to any member of the Arab ague [5] and to any other state actively concerned ith the "peace and security" of the Middle East, ully recognized by both the High Contracting rties." A permanent council of ministerial nk was to be established under the treaty. The ct would remain in force for a 5-year period, bject to denunciation within 6 months prior to piry. Attached to the treaty was an exchange notes in which the parties placed on record their derstanding that it would enable Turkey and aq

cooperate in resisting any aggression directed against her of them and that in order to ensure the mainte- nce of peace and security in the region, we have agreed work in close cooperation for effecting the carrying t of the United Nations resolutions concerning Palestine.

Despite certain gaps in both the Turco-Paki- ni and the Turco-Iraqi treaties, the United ates held that the association of Middle Eastern states under such defense arrangements, directed against potential external aggression, was a safeguard also against their involvement in possible aggression within the area. The willingness of states to enter into such regional arrangements was an earnest that their attention was directed toward the common threat.

Soviet Opposition

The Soviet Government bitterly denounced the Turco-Iraqi Pact and, during the discussions of the Gaza incident in the Security Council in March 1955, held the policy of "forming military blocs" responsible for the tension in the Middle East. In turn, U.S. Representative Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., and others pointed to the purely defensive character of the arrangement. Turkish Ambassador Selim Sarper noted that the Soviet–Communist Chinese treaty of 1950 had led to aggression in Korea, while NATO and similar instruments looked only toward security.[6]

On April 15, 1955, the Soviet Union published a statement, which was subsequently repeated on February 13, 1956, warning against the development of a Middle East defense system and denying any threat of aggression on its part—this, despite the fact that the Soviet Union itself since 1943 had built a formidable bloc of states dominated by the Communist system. (The bloc was formally consolidated in the Treaty of Warsaw on May 14, 1955.) The Soviet Government said it thoroughly approved of the "neutralist" stand of Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia and of those countries' opposition to the Turco-Iraqi treaty and declared it could not be "indifferent to the situation" in the Middle East, since the creation of "military blocs" and the establishment of "foreign military bases" in the area were "directly related to the security of the U.S.S.R."

Expansion of Pact

Despite the Soviet position, however, on April 4 the United Kingdom had adhered to the treaty. By a special agreement the U.K. at the same time terminated the Anglo-Iraqi alliance of June 30, 1930, and gave up its bases at Habbaniya, Shaiba, and Margil; Iraq hereafter was to assume full responsibility for its own defense. When Pakistan adhered to the Baghdad Pact on September 23, the United States expressed "sympathy with the desire

[4] For partial text and exchange of notes, see *Embassy Iraq* (Washington, D.C.), *Bulletin*, vol. II, No. 3 (March 55).

[5] At the time of the signing of the Baghdad Pact the ague included Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, udi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen; the Sudan joined on n. 19, 1956.

[6] See especially U.N. docs. S/PV. 693, 695, and 696.

of these nations to provide for their legitimate self-defense through a collective arrangement within the framework of the United Nations."[7] Such an arrangement, especially between "the 'Northern Tier' nations of the Middle East," contained "the elements needed for an effective area defense structure." The United States, therefore, welcomed Pakistan's adherence to the Baghdad Pact, since it would "facilitate the cooperation of these nations for their mutual benefit and common defense."

When Iran announced its intention to adhere to the Baghdad Pact on October 11, the Soviet Foreign Minister summoned the Iranian Chargé d'Affaires, once more denounced the treaty, declared it to be an instrument of Western colonialism and aggression, and charged that the action was inconsistent with the Soviet-Iranian treaties of February 26, 1921, and October 1, 1927. In contrast, the United States welcomed Iran's adherence; a statement issued on October 12 declared that Iran's decision was "further evidence of the desire and ability of nations of the Middle East to develop regional arrangements for collective self-defense within the framework of the charter of the United Nations."[8] Moreover, the drawing together of the Northern Tier nations "should promote peace, stability, and well-being in the area." In no respect could "this natural association be deemed hostile or threatening or directed against any other nation." The statement continued:

> The United States has had a longstanding interest in the territorial integrity and sovereign independence of Iran. That has been amply demonstrated in the past. That interest remains a cardinal feature of U.S. policy and assures that the United States will not waver in its demonstrated purpose to assist Iran and other free nations which are making their own determined efforts to achieve defensive strength and economic and social progress.

Ratification by the Shah was completed on October 26, 1955.

Partly as a counterweight to the pact, Syria and Egypt, on October 20, and Egypt and Saudi Arabia, on October 27, 1955, signed defense pacts. On November 29, Syria and Egypt established a joint command; Egypt and Saudi Arabia took a similar step on December 26.

On November 21 and 22, an organizational meeting of the Council of the Baghdad Pact was held at Baghdad. The United States was represented by Ambassador Waldemar Gallman and Adm. John H. Cassady in the capacity of observers. During the session on November 21, Ambassador Gallman reiterated U.S. approval of the treaty indicating that the presence of observers and the intention to establish permanent political and military liaison constituted "still further evidence of the continuing interest of the U.S. in the pact and its objectives."[9]

Baghdad Pact Communique

The Council welcomed the intention of the United States to establish liaison with it and to have an observer present at the organizational meeting of the economic committee. Its final communique also expressed appreciation of the "generous and valuable help" which the United States had extended to its members "in the provision of arms and other military equipment to enable them to strengthen their defence against aggression, and of the support and encouragement" of the United States "in their efforts to cooperate for peace." Appreciation was also expressed "for the extensive economic assistance" which had been "freely accorded by the Government of the United States." The five members of the Council reaffirmed their intention, under the Baghdad Pact and in consonance with article 51 of the United Nations Charter, "to work in full partnership with unity of purpose for peace and security in the Middle East, to defend their territories against aggression or subversion, and to promote the welfare and prosperity of the peoples in that region." Provision was made for a permanent organization at Baghdad.[10] The members agreed to appoint deputy representatives, with ambassadorial rank, to the Council, which would be in continuous session; the Foreign Ministers would meet at least once a year. A special session of the Council would be held at Tehran during April 1956.

The Council set up an economic committee to develop and strengthen the economic and financial resources of the region." The committee would consider the sharing of experience in the field of development and discuss problems on a regional basis with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World Health Organization, UNICEF, and other specialized agencies. The Council noted a British statement that the United Kingdom was ready to use its experience

[7] BULLETIN of Oct. 3, 1955, p. 534.

[8] *Ibid.*, Oct. 24, 1955, p. 653.

[9] *Ibid.*, Dec. 5, 1955, p. 926.

[10] Awni Khalidy of Iraq became Secretary General.

the atomic energy field to assist other signatories ith their projects for the peaceful application of omic energy.[11]

The members of the Baghdad Pact appear to laying a solid foundation for the development f a new regional security arrangement in the iddle East, based not merely upon military and olitical considerations but also upon broad eco-mic cooperation. Shortly after their first ses-on, Secretary Dulles noted the achievement as nong the collective security arrangements form-g a "worldwide political warning system," and, his state of the Union message, President Eisen-wer included the Baghdad Pact as one of the najor gains for the system of collective security" ored by the free world during 1955.[12]

CJ Action on Cases involving U.S. Claims

ess release 140 dated March 16

The International Court of Justice announced March 15, 1956, that it has directed that the o applications filed by the United States against zechoslovakia and the Soviet Union respectively removed from the General List of the Court. e application against Czechoslovakia was filed March 29, 1955,[1] and the application against e Soviet Union was filed on June 2, 1955.[2] The urt gave as the sole reason for this direction e refusal of the Czechoslovak Government and e Soviet Government to agree to take the neces-ry actions to submit themselves to the Court's risdiction for the purposes of those cases.

The U.S. Government, in its application against echoslovakia, charged the Czechoslovak Gov-nment with liability to pay damages in the ount of $271,384.16 arising out of the destruc-tion of a U.S. Air Force F–84 type aircraft over Germany on March 10, 1953. It charged that without any provocation the Government of Czechoslovakia had caused MIG-type military aircraft to overfly the Czechoslovak-German border and to pursue and attack U.S. Air Force F–84 aircraft which were engaged in peaceable routine patrol in the U.S. Zone of Germany, and that these actions constituted serious violations of international law. It pointed out that the Czechoslovak Government had asserted an entirely contrary version of the facts of the incident, including an assertion that the incident had taken place 18 kilometers south-southwest of Pilsen within Czechoslovakia, and that the F–84 had been damaged as a result of an engagement which occurred when the F–84 did not comply with a direction to land in Czechoslovakia given by the MIG aircraft. These and other allegations of fact by the Czechoslovak Government the U.S. Government denied, and in its application it pointed out that the Czechoslovak Government had failed to reply, although twice requested, to the U.S. Government's invitation to take this dispute to the International Court of Justice.

In its application against the Soviet Union, the U.S. Government charged the Soviet Government with liability to pay damages of $1,620,295.01 on account of the destruction on October 7, 1952, off Hokkaido, Japan, of a U.S. Air Force B–29 aircraft and the loss of its crew. In addition to the dispute as to the circumstances of the incident, serious questions of international law were also involved. These included the validity of the Soviet Government's claim to sovereignty over the Habomai Islands situated off Hokkaido, Japan. The U.S. Government supported the Japanese Government's denial of the legal right of the Soviet Government to hold the Habomai Islands.

In filing these applications with the International Court of Justice, the U.S. Government has exhausted all diplomatic channels; it took these actions in each case in the hope that the respondent government might, if it truly believed that its version of the facts was the true one, permit the International Court of Justice to hear the evidence and the legal contentions of both sides. However, on May 6, 1955, the Czechoslovak Government informed the Court that it regarded the U.S. Government's application "as unacceptable" because "totally unfounded," the incident of

[1] For text of communique, see BULLETIN of Jan. 2, 1956, 16.

[2] *Ibid.*, Dec. 19, 1955, p. 1003, and Jan. 16, 1956, p. 81. iots occurred in Jordan during December 1955 and uary 1956 in connection with the possibility that Jor-n might adhere to the Baghdad Pact. Secretary Dulles Jan. 8 expressed to the Jordanian Chargé d'Affaires deep concern at reports of mob violence at Amman on n. 7 and in the Jordan-occupied sector of Jerusalem, ere American property was damaged and American s endangered (*ibid.*, Jan. 16, 1956, p. 85).

BULLETIN of Apr. 18, 1955, p. 648.

Ibid., July 11, 1955, p. 65.

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March 10, 1953, having, it said, occurred over Czechoslovakia. On August 26, 1955, the Soviet Government informed the Court that it regarded "as unacceptable the proposal of the Government of the United States of America that the International Court of Justice should examine the case concerning the American bomber"; it gave as its reason that the case asserted against it "is totally unfounded" and "no question arises in this case which calls for a decision of the International Court of Justice and it sees no reason why the question should be dealt with by the International Court of Justice."

These refusals by the Czechoslovak Government and the Soviet Government to permit these disputes to be passed on by judicial authority are to be regretted. The notion that a court, and p ticularly the International Court of Just should have jurisdiction only over cases wh the parties are in agreement as to the facts, wh is implied in the Czechoslovak Government's ter of May 6, 1955, and the Soviet Governme letter of August 26, 1955, will come as an unf tunate frustration of the attempts of peace-lov governments to settle serious international p putes by the processes of law and order. For part, the U.S. Government hopes that all gove ments will not only continue to profess their herence to principles of international law peace but will cooperate to permit these princip to be applied to their own conduct in justicia disputes.

Correspondence of President Eisenhower and Premier Bulganin on Disarmament and U.S.-Soviet Relations

THE PRESIDENT TO PREMIER BULGANIN[1]

White House press release dated March 6

March 1, 1956

Dear Mr. Chairman: In accordance with my message to you of October eleventh, I have now thoroughly reviewed your letter of September nineteenth,[2] regarding the objective of an acceptable system of disarmament which we discussed at Geneva.

I have noted with satisfaction that you have expressed agreement with the importance of providing mutual safeguards against surprise attack and with the desirability of reciprocal reductions in armaments. You have credited me with a sincere desire to find a way to settle the important problem of international control and inspection.

It would appear, however, that you raise the following questions with regard to my Geneva proposal. You ask whether the adoption of my offer would lead to the reduction of armaments, and express doubt. You suggest the need of extending the inspection to other countries. You raise other points regarding nuclear weapo s.

I am confident that the adoption of my Gen a proposal combined with ground inspection tea s which you proposed, thus reducing the danger f surprise attack, will in fact lead to a reduction f armaments, the lessening of tensions, and e brightening of the prospects of a durable pe e. Certainly the United States is fully resolved o achieve those ends. My representative on e Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarm ment Commission will be prepared to help deve p a program to carry out that resolve, through p propriate action by our Governments.

In my judgment, our efforts must be direc d especially to bringing under control the nuc r threat. As an important step for this purp e and assuming the satisfactory operation of r air and ground inspection system, the Uni d States would be prepared to work out, with ot r nations, suitable and safeguarded arrangeme s so that future production of fissionable mater ls anywhere in the world would no longer be u d to increase the stockpiles of explosive weapo s. With this could be combined my proposal of D cember 8, 1953, "to begin now and continue o

[1] President Eisenhower's letter was delivered by Ambassador Bohlen at Moscow on Mar. 5.

[2] Bulletin of Oct. 24, 1955, p. 643.

ake joint contributions" from existing stockpiles f normal uranium and fissionable materials to an ternational atomic agency.[3] These measures, if rried out adequately, would reverse the present end toward a constant increase in nuclear weapns overhanging the world. My ultimate hope that all production of fissionable materials anyhere in the world will be devoted exclusively to aceful purposes.

I am mindful of the difficulties in this regard, inted out in your Government's proposals of lay 10, 1955,[4] arising from the possibilities for ding international control and organizing the andestine manufacture of atomic and hydrogen eapons. The risks inherent in failing to achieve ntrol, however, make it imperative to overcome e difficulties involved and to devise and imple-ent an effective system of safeguards. With nuine efforts on both sides, I feel confident we n succeed in this endeavor.

In general, my feeling is that disarmament ould be sought primarily, though not exclu-vely, in terms of limitations on armaments rather an on men. The former are more subject to pervision, regulation and control than the tter. In the present state of international affairs d especially in the absence of real peace in the ar East, I foresee that it may be difficult to agree reductions in the general level of armed forces this time. It should, however, be possible now agree on measures having a stabilizing effect, aling with the control and limitation, under oper safeguards, of major types of armaments. hese measures will be an essential part of the mprehensive system required to provide security participating states.

If the United States and U.S.S.R. and our asso-ites on the Subcommittee—the United Kingdom, rance and Canada—can reach a basic agreement, am confident that other nations would want to in in what they would regard as a favorable velopment for world peace. With the agree-ent of other nations concerned, the United States ould expect the agreed system of supervision apply, in an appropriate and effective manner, forces and facilities which we both have outside r borders.

During the early phases of such a program, th the U.S.S.R. and the United States would have very extensive military strength, including stocks of nuclear weapons. I wish to make it clear that, so far as the United States is concerned, we would continue to hold such strength, not for aggression, nor for narrow national purposes, but as a contribution toward world stability in this transitional period.

I welcome the indication that you are giving major attention to this subject which has such extraordinary significance to the peoples of our two countries and of the other nations of the world. May I assure you and the people of your country that the objective of the United States continues to be the attainment of a just and durable peace.

I hope that the coming meeting of the Disarmament Subcommittee will succeed in making real progress toward that goal.

I also wish to take this opportunity to acknowledge receipt of your letter of February first which replied to mine of January twenty-eighth.[5] My view remains generally as expressed in that letter. But I shall continue to study the problem with a view to seeing whether it seems that any useful new steps can be taken as between us. I may communicate again with you later on this matter.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

His Excellency
Marshal NIKOLAI A. BULGANIN
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

PREMIER BULGANIN TO THE PRESIDENT[6]

Press release 56 dated February 2

THE KREMLIN, MOSCOW
February 1, 1956

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Your message of January 27 [28], which was written in so friendly a tone, could not fail to awaken in me recollections of those sincere and frank conversations which we had with Your Excellency and our other colleagues at Geneva six months ago. We may hold different positions, we may defend different views, but if we also have good will and a desire to understand each other, then such discussions contribute to the strengthening of trust and the promotion of friendly relations.

[3] *Ibid.*, Dec. 21, 1953, p. 847.
[4] *Ibid.*, May 30, 1955, p. 900.

[5] *Ibid.*, Feb. 6, 1956, p. 191.
[6] Premier Bulganin's letter was delivered to Secretary Dulles by Soviet Ambassador Zaroubin on Feb. 2.

I was gratified by your agreement that the present international situation makes it imperative for all states, especially the Great Powers, which bear special responsibility for ensuring the peace and security of nations, to adopt measures which can contribute to a further easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust and cooperation between states.

I was also gratified by your agreement that the historic friendship between our nations gives us a basis on which better political relations between our countries might be established.

It is precisely because such a basis exists that my colleagues and I decided, soon after our nations had welcomed the New Year, to address to Your Excellency a proposal to consider jointly concrete steps that would permit a substantial improvement in the relations between our two countries. In this connection we felt that the future peace of the world depended to a great extent on the status of our relations.

We believed, and still believe, that the time has come for concluding a treaty of friendship and cooperation between our countries. This would be an important contribution to the development of Soviet-American relations and, at the same time, would contribute to the improvement of relations between your friends and ours in the international field. We can only regret that our proposal did not have a more favorable reception on the part of Your Excellency.

As far as I was able to judge, Your Excellency is preoccupied by the fact that the draft treaty proposed by us repeats to a certain degree some provisions of the U.N. Charter, which our countries have signed. But this fact, it seems to us, not only does not hinder but, on the contrary, favors the conclusion of the treaty. The existence of the U.N. Charter by no means excludes the possibility of concluding any bilateral agreements between members of that organization that are based on its principles. It expressly states in the U.N. Charter that members of the United Nations are to "establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained."

The United States of America, like many other states, after the creation of the U.N. became a party to a large number of both bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements. In this connection there has never been nor can there be any doubt as to the incontestable right of sovereign states, in the interest of peace, to conclude any treaties and agreements that regulate their relations with other countries.

Nor can we fail to take into account that the U.N. Charter itself cannot be sufficiently effective if the two greatest powers in the world—the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.—do not harmonize their relations. It can become more effective if our two countries cooperate in fulfilling the aims of the U.N. I think that Your Excellency will agree with this.

As far as I am able to judge, certain doubts arise in your mind because of the fact that we propose to Your Excellency the conclusion of a treaty "on a bilateral basis," whereas the U.N. Charter is a "treaty between many states." But you will agree that the conclusion of a treaty of friendship and cooperation between the two strongest powers in the world would contribute enormously to a healthier international situation. On the other han w are willing to conclude similar treaties with other s as well, including the United Kingdom and Fr Lastly, the proposal to conclude a treaty between th groups of states—those parties to NATO and those p to the Warsaw Treaty—is still open.

In your message you rightly observe that it is deed not words that count in the establishment of throughout the world. The conclusion of a trea friendship and cooperation between the U.S.S.R. an U.S.A. would be one of the most important concrete in this respect, in as much as our two countries, once had the very important obligations provided for i draft treaty, would strengthen confidence and would tranquillity to the entire international situation. would mean that our countries do not confine thems to verbal assurances of their desire to be friends bu into actual practice the obligations which they assumed.

Incidentally, it may be noted that after the Geneva ference important steps had already been taken in h direction, contributing to a relaxation of internat tension, and it is therefore difficult to agree with th sertion that the post-Geneva period has not justifie hopes of nations.

For its part the Soviet Government has already tal series of steps designed to relax international tensio strengthen confidence among states. In this connect should like to call to your attention the reduction i Soviet Union's armed forces in 1955 by 640,000 men reduction in the appropriations for military needs o U.S.S.R. for 1956 by 9.6 billion rubles as compared to the Soviet Union's withdrawal from its last military in the territory of other states, namely, the military in Finland-Porkkala-Udd; and the initiative of the S Union toward concluding a state treaty with Au which led to the withdrawal of all foreign troops o Austrian territory and the assumption by Austria o obligation to pursue a policy of permanent neutr Other steps taken by the Soviet Union toward e international tension and improving relations among s are also well known.

In the Soviet Union it is thought that other s might also back up their declarations with specific d Meanwhile, to be frank, Mr. President, it must be that not only have certain great powers failed to similar action, but on the contrary much is being to increase international tension.

In spite of the positive results of our Geneva me the military appropriations of certain Western po including the U.S.A., not only fail to be reduced bu even being increased. The number of American mil bases in foreign territories is also being increased; r over, these bases are located mainly in areas adjo the borders of the Soviet Union. You will agree this cannot fail to create fully understandable appre sion among the Soviet people concerning the inten of the U.S.A.

We cannot but call attention also to the fact that, trary to our mutual assurances of peace at the ti the Geneva Conference, Mr. President, certain le personages of the U.S.A. continue to make staten which can in no way be said to conform to the "s

Geneva." It is a well-known fact, for example, that ry recently a statement was made in the U.S.A. in vor of a policy that would keep the country "on the ink of war." We must also call attention to the lligerent statements of a number of military leaders NATO, who openly advocate a continuation of the arma-ents race and the accumulation of stocks of atomic eapons in the NATO forces and do not feel any qualms out threatening to use them.

In proposing the conclusion of a treaty of friendship d cooperation between our countries, we follow the asoning that the conclusion of such a treaty and the provement of relations between our countries would ake it easier to accomplish substantial reductions of maments and armed forces. We could, for instance, ek a reduction in the armed forces of five powers to these vels, which have been duly agreed to by both the United ates and the Soviet Union. An agreement on the prob-n of atomic weapons, the prohibition of which is de-anded by the nations, would also contribute to it. solution of the problem of establishing an appropriate ternational control would also become easier.

In your message you again called attention to your pen skies" proposal, which provides for mutual flights er the territories of the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. spectively by American and Soviet airplanes for the rpose of aerophotography, as well as for an exchange military information. My colleagues and I have al-ady had the opportunity to express their attitude on s proposal. It seems to us that in the present inter-tional situation and, moreover, under conditions of a npletely unrestricted armaments race, the carrying out such flights would not only fail to free the peoples from fear of a new war, but on the contrary would intensify it fear and mutual suspicion. Judge for yourself, Mr. esident: what would the military leaders of your ntry do if it were reported to them that the aerpho-raphy showed that your neighbor had more airfields? be sure, they would order an immediate increase in number of their own airfields. Naturally, our military lders would do the same in a similar case. It is not ficult to understand that the result would be a further ensification of the armaments race.

t would be a different matter, if we could agree on a uction of armaments and armed forces. Then, the rying out of an appropriate control, the methods of ich could be agreed upon, would be justified and essary.

One cannot fail to note also that the obligation of the S.R. and the U.S.A. to solve all questions in dispute ween them by peaceful means alone, which signifies a usal to use force or the threat of force in their mutual tions, including atomic and hydrogen weapons, would eed have a calm effect on the international situation would create more favorable conditions for reaching agreement on other unsettled international problems.

Thus, the conclusion of a treaty of friendship and co-ration between the United States and the Soviet Union uld mean that we could actually do something, as you in your message, "to convince the world that we had ggressive purposes against each other."

s far as the concrete international problems touched upon in your message are concerned, I am convinced, as before, that, along with the problem of disarmament, the most important is the problem of guaranteeing European security. At the Geneva Meeting of the Foreign Ministers in the fall of 1955[7] the Government of the Soviet Union introduced a number of concrete proposals for the solution of this problem. As before, the Soviet Government considers that the problem of an effective guarantee of security in Europe may best be solved on the basis of establishing a single all-European system of collective security.

In our proposals we also tried to meet halfway the wishes of the three Western powers on many important questions, and we also took into consideration concrete ideas in that field which were brought forward by the representatives of the Western powers during our meeting at Geneva. The proposals of the Soviet Government to guarantee European security also take full account of the important role which the United States of America plays in the solution of European affairs.

However, the governments of the three powers did not agree to our proposals and opposed them with a plan that would tend to reestablish militarism in all Germany and in addition provide for the inclusion of a united Germany in a closed military bloc created by the Western powers. It is not difficult to understand that such a plan cannot serve as a basis for solving the question of guaranteeing genuine security in Europe and for settling the German problem.

Inasmuch as in the postwar period in Europe there arose and were consolidated two German states having different social and economic systems and developing in different ways, the problem of establishing a unified Germany as a peace-loving and democratic state cannot, of course, be solved without an appropriate agreement between the Germans themselves—between the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic.

At the same time, I am convinced that the normalization of Soviet-American relations and, in particular, such a step as the conclusion of a treaty of friendship and co-operation between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., would be of great positive significance also in establishing the necessary prerequisites for the solution of the German problem.

With regard to your remark concerning the right of the nations to choose the form of government under which they wish to live, it is necessary to say that the Soviet Union has always maintained, and maintains at the present time, the principle that the internal system in any state is the domestic concern of its own people. We expect that other powers will also be guided by it in their international relations.

In your communication you also touch upon the important problem of the development of contacts between the East and the West. We are entirely in accord with you on the importance of these contacts. It was for this very reason that the Soviet Union submitted at the Foreign Ministers' Meeting in the fall of last year a proposal designed to remove the barriers hindering the development of normal commercial and economic relations and broaden contacts in the field of culture, science, art, sport, tour-

[7] *Ibid.*, Nov. 7, 1955, p. 727; Nov. 14, 1955, p. 775; Nov. 21, 1955, p. 819; and Nov. 28, 1955, p. 872.

ism, etc. We were all pleased to note that definite agreement was noticeable at the meeting on this question. At the last moment, however, certain demands were advanced by the delegations of the United States of America and other Western powers which were contradictory to the directives given by you and me, and by Mr. Eden and M. Faure to our Foreign Ministers. The Soviet Government could not accept these new demands, since they envisaged direct interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states.

Unfortunately, the practical measures of the Soviet Union for the development of contacts between our countries, in particular by means of an exchange of delegations, are encountering serious obstacles on the American side.

I believe that by joint effort we shall succeed in liquidating the so-called Iron Curtain and in creating conditions for a wide development of personal contacts between the citizens of our countries.

I permit myself to express the hope that you on your part share this opinion.

On this question, the conclusion of a treaty of friendship and cooperation between our countries would without doubt also have a great positive significance.

These are some of the ideas which I wanted to express to you, my dear Mr. President, in connection with the remarks which you made in your message. I should be very glad if they would help to clarify the significance which my colleagues and I attach to the conclusion of a treaty of friendship and cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America.

For our part we are ready to give the greatest attention to any of your thoughts on the provisions of the future treaty which you may deem fit to express.

I await your further ideas on this subject.

Respectfully,

N. Bulganin

His Excellency
Dwight D. Eisenhower
President of the United States
Washington

Recent Advances in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

by C. Douglas Dillon
Ambassador to France[1]

I have recently returned from the United States where, among other things, I spent some time looking into the details of one of the most fascinating developments in the world today. I have in mind what is taking place in the field of atomic energy and in particular the impressive advances of the past few years.

The world is indebted to France for a long string of profound and important contributions to the advancement of science. Among the most important have been her contributions to the development of nuclear science. It can truthfully be said that the earliest studies on atomic radiation were due to French initiative; it is from such bases that the United States has been able to bring to fruition the state of the art as we know it today.

Atoms are very peculiar things and, when treated in manners which today are well understood and which are becoming technically and commercially feasible, they turn out to be tools of the greatest importance—tools which will affect almost every aspect of our daily life. When atoms are cooked in reactors, they are changed into other kinds of atoms. The properties of many of these new materials are so startling that it can reasonably be said that for the first time in human history we are on the threshold of being able to carry out almost any project which the human mind can conceive.

One of the properties which atoms pick up during the course of their cooking is the property of radioactivity. Twenty years ago only a very few radioactive elements were known, but today we can produce artificially almost any known element with at least some degree of radioactivity. One of the interesting properties of this radioactivity is the fact that it can be determined and measured in unbelievably small amounts or in unbelievably large dilutions. For those of you who like your dry Martinis, may I mention the fact that it would be possible to detect one drop of slightly

[1] Address made before the American Club of Paris on Feb. 22 (U.S. Embassy, Paris, press release dated Feb. 21).

dioactive vermouth in three carloads of gin. An merican oil company, forced to use an old slate arry for the storage of heating oil, wanted to be le to tag this oil so that if leakage occurred it uld be identified. One half a cubic centimeter tritium, the radioactive hydrogen isotope, comned with the 210,000 barrels of oil in the quarry, s enough to do the job.

One of the problems which have faced the Amerin rubber industry for years is that of accurately easuring the wearing qualities of automobile es. Today this can be done with great accuracy nply by making a tire slightly radioactive and easuring the amount of radioactive rubber left the road during a 15-foot skid. The same ing applies to wear tests on machine tools, which n now be completed in 30 seconds instead of the ys or weeks that used to be required.

Radioisotopes are also changing manufacturing chniques. Already many American industries e using such things as radioactive thickness ges for maintaining constant thickness on sheets ing produced. These sheets can be paper or el or linoleum, or glass window plate, or anying which is made in sheet form. In the linoim industry alone, where variations in thickss have always led to substantial financial sses throughout the year, the savings can be unlievably great.

Radioactive materials are also being used to easure and record the height of liquids in inacssible tanks, their flow in underground pipees, and for many other practical matters.

Through a multitude of uses such as these the om has already taken its place as a priceless dustrial tool which is leading to ever greater nplification and saving.

dioisotopes in Agriculture

Important as are these industrial uses, it seems me that the greatest revolution which radioive isotopes are going to bring about lies in the ld of agriculture. The problem of feeding the rld has become the most important and difficult ced by man. The earth's population is increasig at such a rate that, as we sat down to dinner ight, 35,000 more people had to be fed than were esent in the world at breakfast time this mornig. There are vast areas of the earth's surface ere hunger is a daily and permanent part of n's life.

Controlled radiations can induce genetic changes in plants which lead to new traits, permanent in succeeding generations. For example, by using these methods, the United States has developed a strain of oats resistant to one of the most damaging rusts prevalent in the American Midwest. It is estimated that this disease has reduced our national production of oats every year by some 10 percent. At present rates of production the control of this rust alone will increase our oat crop by 125 million bushels yearly, which means an annual saving of some $100 million.

Radioisotopes are also of great use in developing newer and better insecticides and fungicides. Take the small but interesting case of a species of worm fly which is estimated to cause a loss of approximately $20 million a year to the livestock industry in the Southwestern United States. Entomologists who studied the life cycle of these flies found that, unlike the male, the female mates only once in her life history. In a most interesting experiment, large numbers of male flies were irradiated sufficiently to render them sterile. These male flies were recently released in a limited area in one of the Caribbean islands. The females, in accomplishing their single mating with a sterile male, did not reproduce, and today this area is completely free of these flies. It is not too much to hope that a similar effort will eradicate this pest throughout the United States.

Finally, radiation has proved itself able to reduce to practically zero the losses during bulk storage of grain which have heretofore been accepted as inevitable.

Through all these various means—better strains of crops, better control of pests, and better storage—it appears that the United States may realize savings approaching the stupendous figure of $5 billion a year.

The importance of this coming revolution in agriculture is stressed in the recent report of the McKinney Panel on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.[2] This report was prepared by a group of eminent civilians chosen by the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy to survey the whole field of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The report recommends that the Government make

[2] *Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy: Vol. I, Report of the Panel on the Importance of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy; Vol. II, Background Material.* Joint Committee Print, Jan. 1956. Available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C.; vol. I, 45 cents; vol. II, $2.00.

maximum use of atomic research in the attempt to increase the food supplies of underdeveloped countries. At the same time it pointedly warns those responsible for our agricultural policies to plan for the added surpluses that the atom will bring at home.

This same McKinney report also points out that propulsion of ships, aircraft, and locomotives by atomic energy should soon be technically feasible. It recommends a prompt exploration of the economics involved in the atomic propulsion of merchant ships with a view to the possible large-scale use of atomic marine engines within the next 10 years. The economics of the atomic propulsion of aircraft are far less clear as yet. What is clear is that the larger the plane the more likely it would be that atomic power could become commercially attractive. The large-scale movement of heavy freight by air has not yet become practical. It may be that atomic power can bring it to reality.

Atomic Production of Power

I now come to a subject of great importance which has recently been featured in the press—the use of the atom for the production of energy. The United States is heavily engaged, partially through the use of Government installations and funds and partially through private industrial investment, in building a series of reactors specially designed for the production of power. It will be 1960 before most of these plants are in full operation, and we will have to wait until then to know just what this sort of power is going to cost. It is quite clear, however, that reactors which are large enough to provide power of the order of 100,000 kw. or more will be much more economic than those producing smaller amounts.

Seven private industrial groups in the United States are undertaking to build six different types of reactors in order that the problem may be studied. Three of these reactors will cost more than $45 million apiece. While the Government is providing a small part of the necessary funds, by far the larger share is being provided by private industry, which has shown itself sufficiently convinced of the ultimate success of atomic power to invest well over $200 million in these study projects. And this in the full knowledge that most if not all of the plants now being constructed will almost certainly become obsolete within a very short period.

It is estimated that within 25 years the ov a national investment in generating, transmis on and electrical distribution facilities helped o t the development of atomic power should rise f its present $40 billion to between $125 and billion. With this sort of expansion so clos at hand it is clear why American industry is wi n to spend several hundred million dollars toda t map out the most economical paths for the fu r.

The situation in the rest of the world is nearly so advanced. Outside of the United St es Great Britain, and the Soviet Union—the t nations most advanced in harnessing the atom power—France is almost the only country in h world that is already sufficiently advanced to e this race by itself. The first large French rea has already started operation, and two others ill follow next year. It is of interest that Fr ch engineers have designed new and unusual met ds of cooling these reactors using compressed as Also Electricité de France has announced p n for the first French reactor to be built prima ly for the production of commercial power. 'is plant will go up in the Loire Valley and sh ld start production in 1959 at approximately the s ne time as our own large commercial power proj ts.

The people of France have a right to be pr d of the remarkable success of their scientists in o r-coming the gap in the atomic field caused by he war years.

Medical Uses of the Atom

No talk on the peaceful uses of the atom w ld be complete without mention of the medical es of radioactive atoms. The human body has he property of absorbing certain types of atoms li-rectly into various parts or organs of the b y. In this way several thousand patients have alre ly undergone treatment in hospitals by drin g atomic cocktails of radioactive iodine. The o-dine lodges in the thyroid gland and the ra o-isotopes then act to diminish the overactivit of this organ. New and promising treatments r certain types of tumors and for some blood s-eases are also becoming available thanks to ra o-isotopes.

There have also been fascinating develop ts in the field of X-ray photography. Small p t-able cameras no larger than a Brownie can w be had. These cameras operate with small bit of radioactive material which give off gamma ys which have the same effect as X-rays for ph o-

-aphic purposes. With these cameras it will -en be possible for skiers of the future to find out st how bad their fractures are before they leave e slopes.

It seems clear from the things that we have been scussing this evening that there are many ıanges in store for us and for our families in e years to come. It looks as if, thanks to the om, these changes will be greater in scope and ill come more quickly than at any previous time in human history. As all of you know, the atom has been by no means an unmixed blessing. It is imperative now as never before that ways be found for mankind to develop and enjoy all the benefits that peaceful use of the atom can bring. We cannot allow ourselves to be halted or delayed by the difficulties involved. Never in human history can it be more truly said that man's discoveries must become his servants; we dare not allow ourselves to become their slaves.

'he United States Balance of Payments With Latin America

by Walther Lederer and Nancy F. Culbertson

This article is the first of a series on the balance of payments between the United States and the Latin American Republics. Mr. Lederer and Mrs. Culbertson, who expect to prepare these studies for the BULLETIN *semiannually, are members of the Balance of Payments Division, Office of Business Economics, U.S. Department of Commerce. The data on which the articles will be based are prepared by the Office of Business Economics and published quarterly in the* Survey of Current Business, *the monthly periodical of that office.*

An analysis of current developments in the balance-of-payments situation between the United States and the Latin American Republics should help us to understand some of the fundamental problems in our economic relations with our southern neighbors. Current and prospective changes in our supply and demand relationships have a direct effect upon the development of the economies of all the Latin American countries. They are also an important factor in our own economic pattern.

First, a word about the data on which our analysis is based. Estimates are made for the United States balance of payments with Latin America as a whole, not with individual countries. The lack of country data represents a greater impediment to the analysis of balance-of-payments developments for Latin America than it does, for instance, for Europe. The economic interdependence of the Latin American Republics is relatively small: In 1954 only 10 percent of Latin American exports consisted of intraarea trade, as compared with about 50 percent of Western European exports. Consequently, major changes in trade and the economies of individual countries in Latin America generally have little effect on the other countries in the area, whereas in Europe the impact of such developments is much more likely to spread. Although the Latin American countries have great similarities in their economic structure and particularly in their development problems, they cannot be considered an integrated economic area.

Furthermore, transactions of the United States vary greatly from country to country, and different factors may have to be considered in analyzing changes in the United States balance of payments with each of them. Most of the countries are highly specialized in their exports, and only few of our more important imports are obtained from

more than two or three countries in important quantities. Similarly, about three-fourths of United States tourist expenditures in the area as a whole are made in Mexico, and remittances by migratory workers go primarily to that country. Transactions with Panama are dominated by purchases made by United States Government agencies in the Canal Zone and their personnel. There is also a considerable specialization by country in United States investments, particularly in raw-material producing industries. When, nevertheless, United States transactions with Latin America as a whole are discussed, it is assumed that basic changes in the United States economy have similar effects on United States international transactions regardless of the countries involved. It is inevitable, however, that we give consideration to special circumstances which cause transactions with the various countries to develop in different directions.

Latin American Dollar Receipts Understated

The figures shown in the accompanying table for the transactions between the Latin American Republics and the United States do not reflect the total of Latin American dollar receipts or dollar expenditures. Both are understated—receipts by a considerably larger amount than expenditures. The data, of course, do not show Latin American dollar receipts from, or payments to, other countries. Neither do the data on United States transactions with Latin America include the value of crude oil shipped from Venezuela to the Netherlands West Indies for refining and ultimate shipment to the United States and elsewhere. United States imports from the Netherlands Antilles were valued at about $160 million in 1954 and about $200 million in 1955. Transactions of Latin American countries with the International Bank and the International Monetary Fund are likewise not included in United States transactions with Latin America, since these institutions are treated as independent entities in the United States balance of payments. To a minor extent the understatement of the Latin American dollar receipts from those sources is offset by the treatment of the fleets registered in Panama or Honduras as Latin American enterprises. This involves the inclusion of freight payments to, and charter fees for, such ships as payments to Latin America and their expenditures in United States ports and the profits obtained from these shipping corporations as United States receipts from that area. The net amount of these transactions is relatively small, but investments in such shipping companies included in the capital outflow to Latin America were about $300 million during the postwar period.

Fivefold Expansion in U.S. Payments Since 1940

One of the significant aspects of the transactions of the United States with the Latin American Republics is their expansion during and after World War II. Payments by the United States, including imports of goods and services, remittances, Government grants, and net transfers of United States capital, rose from $900 million in 1940, the first year for which such data have been computed, to $4.7 billion in 1954. This more than fivefold expansion equals the rate of increase of United States payments (excluding military and transfers) to all other countries during this period.

The rise in payments to Latin America was achieved essentially through private transactions, while United States payments to the other countries include large military expenditures and Government grants. If these Government expenditures are excluded, it is evident that United States payments to Latin America increased considerably faster than those to other countries. This faster growth would be even more evident if the years 1936–38 could be used as a basis for comparison, because of the relative rise since these years in imports, which constitute the major portion of United States expenditures abroad.

The percentage rise in United States expenditures in Latin America was also greater than the rise in United States domestic expenditures, which in 1954 were 3.6 times as high as in 1940. Thus, the portion of total United States expenditures going to Latin America increased during the same period from 1.1 percent to 1.6 percent.

It may be argued that payments as measured here overstate the amount of dollars actually transferred to Latin America, since the import values include the profits by United States companies on their investments in that area. Although this argument applies—at most—only to income from investments in raw-material producing facilities and although not all of the output of these facilities is exported to the United States, a netting of income on all direct investments against United States payments would indicate a rise in Latin American receipts from $750 million in 1940 to

United States Balance of Payments With the Latin American Republics

Yearly Average or Year

(*Millions of dollars*)

	1940	1941–1945	1946–1952	1953	1954	1955
nited States payments						
Merchandise	670	1, 437	2, 782	3, 570	3, 434	3, 468
Services, including investment income	221	310	498	668	644	715
Remittances	−1	40	40	53	47	42
Government grants and other transfers [1]	2	77	28	30	44	73
Direct investments, net	1	−7	240	117	102	119
Other private U. S. capital, net	−9	−3	29	−256	399	172
Government capital, net	18	27	52	345	34	49
Total payments	902	1, 881	3, 669	4, 527	4, 704	4, 638
nited States receipts						
Merchandise [1]	682	968	3, 117	3, 039	3, 312	3, 274
Income on investments	170	219	506	611	683	819
Services [1]	165	294	534	667	653	695
Total receipts	1, 017	1, 481	4, 157	4, 317	4, 648	4, 788
Balance	115	−400	488	−210	−56	150
crease in Latin American dollar assets, and gold purchases in the United States [decrease in assets and gold sales (−)]	−20	496	21	248	167	146
nrecorded transactions including Latin American transactions with other areas [net receipts by Latin America (−)]	−95	−96	−509	−38	−111	−296

[1] Transfers of military supplies and services under grant-aid programs are excluded.

Source: U. S. Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics.

early $4.1 billion in 1954, or by an even larger atio than without this adjustment.

ices Main Factor in U.S. Import Rise

About 70 percent of the rise in payments to the atin American Republics from $900 million in 940 to $4.7 billion in 1954 resulted from the gher value of merchandise imports. The quan- ty of imports increased during this period only about 30 percent, while prices, which rose by ore than 300 percent, were responsible for the mainder of the rise in import values. The ange in import prices thus accounted for about lf of the total rise in United States payments Latin America between 1940 and 1954. Even 1954 data are disregarded because of the un- ually high prices and the low volume of coffee d cocoa imports, and 1953 data are substituted, appears that import prices for Latin American oducts have risen nearly twice as fast since 40 as import prices from other countries or do- estic prices in the United States. Prices of ods bought from Latin America also rose twice much as prices of goods sold to Latin America. In quantity, imports from other countries have en slightly more than those from Latin Amer- a. The faster rise in the volume of imports from the other countries reflects the more than proportional increase in United States trade with Canada. Imports from Latin America consist primarily of foodstuffs and industrial raw materials. The volume of foodstuffs imports rises approximately in proportion to the size of the United States population and is relatively insensitive to changes in United States business activity or the growth in per capita incomes. While countries producing such goods have a more stable market for their products, their exports to the United States do not expand as fast as United States production and incomes. Nor is it likely that their exports to the United States can provide the basis for an increase in their own per capita income, unless the prices of their export goods rise continuously relative to the prices they pay for imports. This problem is accentuated by the fact that relative prices for such goods seemed to have reached a peak in 1954.

On the other hand, those countries which export mainly petroleum and metals benefit not only from the relatively fast rise in demand for these products but also from the gradual exhaustion of the best resources in the United States. Without these commodities, the production of which has been facilitated largely by United States private investments, the import volume from Latin Amer-

ica would have lagged even farther behind that from other countries.

Most Service Payments Go to Nearby Countries

Payments to Latin America for services amounted in 1954 to about $640 million and for remittances, mainly by migratory workers, to nearly $50 million. In 1940 the total of these transactions yielded about $220 million. Of the $690 million in 1954, Mexico received from United States tourist expenditures and remittances alone about $230 million. Tourist expenditures in the Central American and Caribbean Republics were $45 million and in the rest of Latin America $22 million. The concentration of tourist expenditures in the nearby countries points out that in the rest of Latin America tourist trade has hardly been developed as a source of dollar income. Transportation expenditures were approximately $240 million, consisting of $80 million for freight carried on Latin American ships, about the same amount for charter fees, and the remainder principally for United States vessel expenditures in Latin American ports. These estimates include payments to operators of ships registered in Panama and Honduras. Other United States payments for services cover expenditures of United States Government agencies and their personnel—a large part of which is in the Republic of Panama—miscellaneous private transactions, and interests and dividends on Latin American investments in the United States.

Postwar Capital Outflow Exceeded $3 Billion

The net outflow of capital from the United States to Latin America during the years 1946 through 1954 amounted to about $3 billion. This amount includes $1.9 billion invested by American corporations in their branches and subsidiaries and a net outflow of Government capital, mainly long-term loans, of nearly $750 million. The remainder consisted mainly of changes in outstanding short- and medium-term trade credits and new issues or repayments of dollar bonds. In addition to these capital outflows, about $1.5 billion was invested by American subsidiaries out of their undistributed earnings, and $300 million was disbursed by the International Bank on loans (net of repayments).

The outflow of direct investment capital was especially large during the years 1947 to 1949, when petroleum enterprises expanded rapidly and other industries carried out investments delayed by the war. Beginning in 1950 large amounts of capital were required by mining and manufacturing enterprises, and a second wave of petroleum investments began in 1952. As the new enterprises are growing, a larger portion of the required capital is obtained from undistributed earnings or depreciation allowances. The smaller net outflow of capital in the more recent years, therefore, does not indicate a reduced rate of expansion of the productive facilities.

The importance of these investments for the balance-of-payments and economic development of Latin America cannot be judged from the size of the capital flows alone. Even when the flow of new capital slows down, the current operations of the existing enterprises are instrumental in creating a continuing foreign exchange income from Latin American exports as well as foreign exchange savings by domestic production within Latin America of goods which otherwise would have to be imported from the United States or other countries. In 1954, United States imports of goods the production of which can be attributed to American investments in Latin America were valued at well over $1 billion.[1]

The movement of other private United States capital showed a small net inflow during the war years and the postwar period through 1953. During both periods, redemptions of long-term bonds issued prior to the war exceeded the increase in outstanding short- and medium-term credits. Although for all these years the rise in the net amount outstanding was small, there were large fluctuations, which frequently reflected the accumulation of unpaid bills by countries in balance-of-payments difficulties. The credits were paid back usually by downward adjustments of imports and in several cases by United States Government credits.

Incomes From Investments

Income on United States investments in Latin America rose from about $170 million in 1940 and $300 million in 1946 to nearly $700 million in 1954. The latter amount included $630 millions income from dividends, interests, and branch

[1] A new study to be carried out by the Office of Business Economics, Department of Commerce, will provide data to show the extent to which American enterprises operating in Latin America contribute to local incomes and foreign exchange resources.

rofits obtained on direct investments by United tates corporations, $21 million on other private nited States investments, and $32 million on overnment loans. More than half of the in-mes on direct investments in 1954 were derived om Venezuela. The remainder was widely scat-red, and the largest amount of income from any her country was $50 million received from exico. Incomes from countries other than Ven-uela reached a peak of nearly $400 million in 50, from which they declined to about $270 mil-n in 1953. In 1954 they increased again to arly $300 million.

Total earnings on direct investments in 1954 ere about $750 million and thus exceeded the comes from dividends, interests, and branch ofits by about $120 million. The latter amount as ploughed back by subsidiaries of American mpanies and, together with the net outflow of pital from the United States of about $100 mil-n, accounted for the rise in United States in-stments in Latin America during that year. e reinvestment of earnings by subsidiaries was ost important in manufacturing industries, ere they absorbed more than half of the total rnings and financed two-thirds of the expansion such enterprises. Earnings from investments the mining and petroleum industries approxi-ately equaled the income distributed, or accrued the parent companies as branch profits.

Dividends, interests, and branch profits from in-stments in the extractive industries and associ-d facilities rose from $135 million in 1946 to 40 million in 1954, when they accounted for out 70 percent of the $630 million received by ited States corporations from all of their di-t investments in Latin America. Such incomes m petroleum investments alone increased dur-g that period from about $90 million to $350 llion. The rise in incomes was facilitated by e expansion in production and exports result-g from these investments. The rise in produc-n also contributed to higher incomes and change resources in Latin America through in-ased expenditures in these countries, particu-ly for wages and taxes. Thus incomes to ited States investors and incomes to the Latin nerican countries in which the investments are ated are closely linked and tend to move in the ne direction.

ncomes from investments in manufacturing en-prises in 1954 were $56 million, or 50 percent higher than in 1946. During the same period the value of such investments increased by about 200 percent. The slower rise in incomes was due in part to a larger amount of earnings having been reinvested, but even total earnings failed to rise as fast as the value of the investments. Income from other industries, such as agriculture, public utilities, trade, and finance, was about 24 percent higher in 1954 than in 1946, although the value of investments in these industries had expanded over that period by about 50 percent. Manufacturing, trading, and public utility enterprises generally produce for the local market and in many instances provide goods which otherwise would have to be imported. Since the foreign exchange costs of such imports would be substantially higher than the remittances of investment incomes and the value of imported raw materials, such investments result in savings of foreign exchange, which may be used by these countries to pay for other imports. The substitutions of domestic production for imports and the subsequent shifts in the composition of imports are the major avenue by which countries which export mainly foodstuffs can increase their per capita incomes, particularly when the prices of their exports do not increase relative to the prices they pay for their imports.

Postwar Exports Rise Less Than Payments

During the war years United States exports were limited by supply stringencies with the result that Latin American countries increased their gold and dollar reserves by nearly $3 billion. In 1946 and 1947, Latin American purchases increased sharply and were financed not only by drawings on the previously accumulated reserves but also by dollar receipts from other countries with which Latin America had a balance-of-payments surplus. During the following 2 years purchases in the United States declined again, as Latin American reserves as well as net dollar receipts from other countries shrank. A similar cycle was started with the outbreak of hostilities in Korea and was completed by 1953. Since 1945, Latin American countries, in general, have added only a very small part of their current dollar receipts to their reserves and have shown a tendency to keep their imports as high as available exchange resources permit. This policy results from their desire to increase investments to speed up the growth of their economies and, in some countries, is accompanied by inflationary developments

which tend to raise the import demands above current exchange receipts.

Exports by the United States, however, depend not only upon United States payments (including the outflow of capital) to Latin America, less the amounts returned to the United States as investment income, but also upon Latin American receipts of dollars from, and payments to, other countries. In recent years the ability of other industrial countries to export has greatly improved and their share in Latin American imports increased. Consequently, net dollar receipts from these sources have declined, and at times some Latin American countries have had to use dollars to settle their accounts with other countries. As these industrial countries expand their economies and exports, such cases may become more frequent. For the United States it may not be too important whether dollars paid to a Latin American country are returned through exports to the same country or through exports to some country in another area.

Payments Decline in 1955

During 1955, according to preliminary estimates, United States payments to Latin America were about $70 million smaller than in 1954. This decline is in sharp contrast to the expansion in United States international payments to the world as a whole, which amounted to $1.7 billion for the same period.

Several factors account for this difference. First, payments to Latin America during 1954 were about $500 million higher than during the previous year, while those to the rest of the world as a whole had dropped by about $700 million. Latin America was, therefore, not adversely affected by the decline of domestic business activity in 1954 and should not necessarily be expected to gain by a rise. Nevertheless, special circumstances in our transactions with Latin America prevented the rise in payments in 1955 which otherwise could have been expected.

The return of coffee prices from the extraordinary high in 1954 to the level prevailing in the previous years reduced coffee imports from Latin America from 1954 to 1955 by more than $100 million, although the volume of imports, particularly toward the end of the year, rose substantially. Payments for cocoa also dropped as a result of price declines. Imports of copper from Chile were held down by interruptions f production and by diversion of supplies to Euro where higher prices were obtained.

Except for these developments which were n connected with basic changes in United Sta demand, imports from Latin America would ha risen from 1954 to 1955, although the rise wou possibly have been relatively smaller than that f total United States imports. In fact, impo from countries other than Brazil and Colomb increased by more than 10 percent from the p vious year.

The other major factor reducing Latin Ame can dollar receipts from the United States in 19 was the decline in the outflow of United Sta capital. The principal change was in net n short- and medium-term credits, the total of whi dropped from about $400 million during 1954 less than $200 million in 1955.

In 1954 large short-term credits to Brazil fac itated a continuation of Brazil's imports at high rates than the decline in foreign exchange receip from exports would have permitted. In 19 Brazil obtained medium-term bank credits to co vert these short-term debts, which alleviated t immediate financial burden. At the same tim short-term credits were extended to Colombia (f similar reasons as to Brazil a year earlier) a to Mexico and Venezuela, and longer-term loa to Cuba. The credits to Mexico and Venezu reflected the higher business activity and t larger volume of external trade in these countr and coincided with a general strengthening f their financial position. The loans to Cuba we made principally for internal financial purpo and are fully secured by United States Gover ment securities.

An Export-Import Bank loan to Brazil ear in 1955, of which $45 million was disbursed du ing the first half of the year, made it possible f that country to obtain urgently needed impo which could not be financed from the lower expo proceeds or from a further extension of priva credits. Other disbursements by the Governme on long-term loans to Latin America were smal than in 1954. However, the Government retain some Latin American currencies from the sale f agricultural commodities, which in effect cons tutes another form of credit by the United Stat.

The net outflow of capital through direct vestments was about the same in 1955 as in 19

though the completion of some large mining vestments and the rise in shipments of their oducts raised the accumulations of depreciation nds. The inflow of funds for such purposes as offset by an increased outflow to finance new vestments. The higher output of American-wned enterprises in the mining and petroleum dustries was also the principal reason for the crease in incomes from direct investments from 30 million in 1954 to about $750 million in 1955.

Downward Adjustments in U.S. Exports

Although United States payments to Latin merica were slightly smaller than in the preced-g year, and larger amounts were retained as come on investments, Brazil was the only untry to which United States exports during 55 were substantially lower than in 1954. Ex-rts to Colombia dropped during the first three arters of 1955 from the peak reached in the urth quarter of 1954 but recovered again during e fourth quarter of last year and for 1955 were arly as high as in 1954. Most of the major tin American countries increased their pur-ases from the United States.

Changes in gold and dollar holdings of the indi-dual Latin American countries reflect the diver-nt developments with the United States and in rt also with other countries. For the area as a ole, however, these assets increased by over $100 llion during 1955, while during the previous ar Latin American gold and dollar holdings e by less than half that amount.

The major increase in gold and dollar holdings curred in countries exporting petroleum and er mineral products, particularly Mexico, nezuela, and to a lesser extent Chile and Peru. the case of both Mexico and Venezuela, how-er, the rise in these assets was in part offset by her short-term debts to the United States.

Major declines occurred in Colombia, Argen-a, and Uruguay. However, Colombia ceased draw on reserves after the end of the first arter. This improvement was facilitated by rise in short-term debts, mentioned earlier, ich lasted until the middle of the year, and by gradual downward adjustment in imports to current rate of foreign-exchange receipts.

Brazil's reserves began rising after the end of the first quarter of 1955 following the adjustments in imports.

The balance of payments of the United States with the Latin American Republics, and the changes in their aggregate gold and dollar reserves, indicate that the Latin American countries succeeded, by the end of 1955, in limiting their currently incurred dollar obligations to the amount of dollars available to meet them, although in many countries the demand for dollar exchange continued to exceed the available supply. The major adjustments in 1955 were necessitated by the decline in export incomes of the principal coffee-producing countries, a decline which resulted from the return of coffee prices to the level prevailing before the extraordinary rise that culminated in 1954, and from the liquidation of inventories in the United States, which reached their lowest point around the middle of the year. The balance in the transactions between Latin America and the United States indicate, therefore, that the temporary disturbances caused by extraordinary price fluctuations in 1953 and 1954 have largely been overcome.

U.S. Doctors To Help Combat Polio Epidemic in Argentina

Press release 138 dated March 15

The Department of State announced on March 15 that Dr. James Whittenberger, professor of physiology at the Harvard School of Public Health, and Dr. Benjamin G. Ferris, assistant professor of physiology at the Harvard School of Public Health and director of the Respirator Laboratory of the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis Boston Respirator Center, were leaving that day from New York for Buenos Aires.

The two doctors flew to Argentina at the request of the Argentine Government for a 4-week period to work with and advise Argentine medical authorities. They are being sent by the National Foundation on behalf of the U.S. Government, the funds being provided by the International Cooperation Administration.[1]

[1] For an announcement of Mar. 6 regarding the shipment of iron lungs to Argentina, see BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1956, p. 469.

Designation of Foreign Students at U.S. Service Academies

White House press release dated February 27

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

The President on February 27 signed an Executive order by which he delegated the authority of the President to designate persons from American Republics, other than the United States, who may be permitted to receive instruction as now authorized by law at U.S. service academies.

Under this order the Secretary of Defense may designate the persons who may attend the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, and the U.S. Air Force Academy in Colorado. Similarly, the Secretary of Commerce may designate persons who may attend the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point, N. Y., and receive instruction in the U. S. Merchant Marine Corps. Such designations are to be made after consultation with the Secretary of State.

EXECUTIVE ORDER 10661[1]

DELEGATING TO CERTAIN OFFICERS OF THE GOVERNMENT THE AUTHORITY VESTED IN THE PRESIDENT TO DESIGNATE PERSONS FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES WHO MAY BE PERMITTED TO RECEIVE INSTRUCTION AT THE MILITARY, NAVAL, AIR FORCE, AND MERCHANT MARINE ACADEMIES

By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code, and as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. The Secretary of Defense, and, when designated by the Secretary of Defense for such purpose, the Secretary of the Army are hereby designated and empowered to exercise, without the approval, ratification, or other action of the President, the authority vested in the President by the first section of the act of June 26, 1946, ch. 493, 60 Stat. 311, as amended (10 U.S.C. 1093c) to designate persons from the American Republics (other than the United States) and Canada who may be permitted to receive instruction at the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York.

SEC. 2. The Secretary of Defense, and, when designated by the Secretary of Defense for such purpose, the Secretary of the Navy are hereby designated and empowered to exercise, without the approval, ratification, or other action of the President, the following-described authority to designate persons who may be permitted to receive instruction at the United States Naval Acad y at Annapolis, Maryland:

(a) The authority vested in the President by the ac of July 14, 1941, ch. 292, 55 Stat. 589, as amended (34 U. S. 1036–1), with respect to persons from the American e publics (other than the United States) and Canada.

(b) The authority vested in the President by the ct of June 24, 1948, ch. 616, 62 Stat. 583 (34 U. S. C. 1036), with respect to Filipinos.

SEC. 3. The Secretary of Defense, and, when design d by the Secretary of Defense for such purpose, the Se e- tary of the Air Force are hereby designated and n- powered to exercise, without the approval, ratificatio r other action of the President, the authority vested in e President by the first section of the said act of June 1926, as made applicable to the United States Air F e Academy by section 5 of the act of April 1, 1954, ch. 68 Stat. 48 (10 U. S. C. 1854), to designate persons f m the American Republics (other than the United Sta) and Canada who may be permitted to receive instruc n at the United States Air Force Academy.

SEC. 4. The Secretary of Commerce is hereby design d and empowered to exercise, without the approval, rati n- tion, or other action of the President, the authority ve d in the President by the act of August 9, 1946, ch. 928 Stat. 961 (46 U. S. C. 1126b), to designate persons f m the American Republics (other than the United Sta) who may be permitted to receive instruction in the Un d States Merchant Marine Cadet Corps and at the Un d States Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point, w York.

SEC. 5. No person shall be designated under the aut r- ity of this order to receive instruction except after n- sultation by the designating officer with the Secre y of State.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
February 27, 1956.

[1] 21 *Fed. Reg.* 1315.

U.S. and U.K. Conclude Civil Aviation Talks

Press release 145 dated March 16

Talks on civil aviation matters between U.S. d U.K. delegations which began in London on Ma h 5 were concluded on March 16. The U.S. dele- tion was led by Livingston Satterthwaite of e Department of State, with former Senator Cl n Gurney, member of the Civil Aeronautics Boa l, as vice chairman. The U.K. delegation was d by Sir George Cribbett, Deputy Secretary (A) of the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviati n.

These talks were a resumption of discussions hich were begun in Washington last May [1] and ere mainly devoted to an examination of the ute patterns which the airlines of the two coun- ies operate. The discussions covered a large mber of areas including the North Atlantic, the aribbean, the Far East, and the Pacific.

Both delegations looked forward to a period progressive expansion of air traffic and the need r adjustment of air transport capacity to meet the demand. The United Kingdom accepted the U.S. designation of Seaboard and Western Airlines, Inc. to operate an all-freight service on the North Atlantic, and agreement was reached on the reciprocal extension of certain routes in the Caribbean area.

It was agreed that discussions on route patterns in other areas should be continued later in the year in accordance with the provisions of the Bermuda agreement [2] for such reviews.

[1] ULLETIN of June 20, 1955, p. 997.

[2] I.e. the U.S.–U.K. Bilateral Air Transport Agreement of February 1946; for text, see *ibid.*, Apr. 7, 1946, p. 586.

he Essentials of Economic Growth

by Herbert V. Prochnow
Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs [3]

Only in the last century has man gained sufficient edom and knowledge to make possible large- le economic development. Today production d distribution are highly efficient, mechanized, d on a massive base, affecting whole populations. Scientific and technological discoveries tumble r one another with increasing swiftness. Eco- nic changes of great magnitude are taking ce over the world in our lifetime.

Technical and economic progress has proceeded st rapidly in the United States. And this cir- stance has already laid a powerful hand upon rld history. For example, the American econ- y, when injected into the First World War, et all European calculations. A quarter of a tury later our highly developed economy was ecisive force in World War II. Then our ex- tionally productive economy helped to put stern Europe back on its feet.

he high standard of living in the United tes is another major effect of our economic de- pment. This effect, too, is of worldwide ificance.

he measure of American economic progress is e found not only in our military potential. It ot found merely in impressive national totals ollars, tons, and bushels. It is found in the -being of our people.

The American economic system, based on vigorous competition for expanding markets, has diffused its benefits more and more widely through the population. It has come to be characterized by a large volume of goods and services and small profit margins (rather than small volume and large margins) and by high savings, high investment, high productivity, high wages, and high purchasing power.

To put it briefly, we are fortunate enough to have had a real *people's* economic development, a dynamic capitalism in which the people generally, not merely a privileged few, have received the benefits.

But millions of men and women in the world have had no such experience in the past. Now, for the first time in all history, large numbers of people in all continents of the world are beginning to see that new and challenging economic opportunities may be opened to them which will raise their standards of living.

Men and women in many nations are determined to move forward economically. But what route they will follow and how long it will take to march to a well-advanced economic position are

[3] Excerpt from an address made at the Foreign Trade Transportation Institute at San Francisco, Calif., on Mar. 12 (press release 126).

very big questions indeed. Their leaders speak the language of economic urgency, and in many nations they are trying impatiently to crowd the economic progress of a century into a decade.

Economic Conditions in Underdeveloped Areas

Consider the economic conditions of vast numbers of men and women in some of the underdeveloped nations. There is widespread poverty, malnutrition, illiteracy, and disease. How may people struggling under these conditions gradually come to realize the benefits of economic development?

Before we attempt to suggest how economic development can perhaps best be achieved, a few things need to be said plainly.

As men and women over the world achieve higher standards of living, not only they but the world will be better off. The chances of mankind to achieve the economic, social, and spiritual blessings of a free society will be increased to the extent that the economic well-being of individual men and women is improved. For this reason the United States has consistently sought to be helpful in the attainment of this broad objective.

With all our help, however, and all our good will, we cannot accomplish the economic development of all men and all women everywhere. They must do it largely themselves, and they unquestionably wish to do it themselves.

Still another preliminary observation is that we cannot expect all peoples to imitate in detail our own development. Among countries there are sharp differences—differences, for example, in physical resources, geographical location, density of population, birthrate, traditions, experience, and education. It would be presumptuous to suggest that all sovereign nations could or should conform in detail to our pattern of economic progress.

First Essential Is Freedom

Nevertheless, human beings everywhere have certain characteristics in common. There are certain essentials that must be present before any people, anywhere, can make rapid and genuine progress toward the kind of economic development that will bring higher living standards widely diffused throughout the population.

With a full realization that one can hardly avoid oversimplification, may I suggest three essentials for the economic growth of a people which reflects itself in all segments of the life of a nation.

First, there must be freedom so that men and women willingly give their energies to the productive efforts of a nation.

By freedom, we mean both political and economic. It is impossible to separate the two. Freedom implies a regard for the human individual—his essential worth; his right to think for himself, to speak, to create, and to experiment; his right to improve his status by work and enterprise; his right to save and to risk his savings. In short he must have the right to develop his individual capacities to the greatest extent possible.

Most Americans would consider individual freedom the most precious gift of all, not merely because it encourages economic growth but because in a larger sense—spiritually, morally, and intellectually—it gives meaning to human life itself.

It is of course possible to sacrifice the liberties and lives of whole generations of people, or whole classes of the population, in order to accelerate national economic development. Capital is thus formed through compulsory labor, forced savings, and even outright starvation of noncooperators. The Soviet Communist state has done this. Whatever sheerly physical gains in output may accrue to the state from this process, such gains are far less than those achieved in the free societies and they do not result in standards of living comparable to those attained by individuals in a free society. The judgment of history is that freedom is both the most potent generator of sustained economic growth and the only assurance that the benefits of that growth will be enjoyed by the individual man, regardless of race, religion, or political creed.

The second essential for the economic growth of a people is a climate conducive to the creation of capital—that is, the physical means to increase production and improve distribution. Whether a country calls itself capitalistic or not, it must have capital if it expects to grow economically.

The more capital a country creates through the productive efforts and savings of its people, acting as individuals for their own gain, the faster and healthier the economic development will be.

Private foreign investment has also had an important part in the economic development of a number of countries, including the United States, and with the proper investment climate it can make important contributions in many countries

day. Not the least of these contributions is industrial know-how, for a company opening a branch plant abroad not only installs physical equipment but also trains local technicians and workers in advanced technology.

Integrity and Intelligence in Government

The third essential for the economic growth of people is that there must be integrity and intelligence in government.

There are a number of aspects of government policy that deserve special mention. In order to stimulate healthy and steady economic development for the widespread benefit of the people, a government must strive conscientiously to keep its internal finances on a sound basis. It must courageously take the necessary measures to prevent disastrous inflation that destroys the savings of its people. It must avoid promoting developmental projects faster than the country's capacities can handle them, and the people's savings pay for them, or it will be faced by inflation and unmanageable debts. It must be certain the tax system is fair and conducive to economic growth and that the taxes are collected. It should mercilessly root out corruption. I have already emphasized that it should take steps to stimulate the investment of private capital, both domestic and foreign, and that it should protect the liberties of the individual citizen.

America is great because individual men have freedom and equality, because individual men have been given the incentive to create, to produce, and to save, because every man is rewarded for his labor with a generous share of the goods he helps to produce. America has taken its place among the great civilizations of history because the cornerstone upon which the Republic rests is the social, economic, and spiritual betterment of individual man.

The Issue of the Organization for Trade Cooperation

Excerpt from an Address by Deputy Under Secretary Prochnow [1]

Early this month Congress began public hearings on an important aspect of our international trade relations—the Organization for Trade Cooperation, or OTC.[2]

OTC has captured few headlines in the newspaper competition for the reader's attention. International news is big news, it is true; but the headlines that leap at us from the morning paper are very likely to be about what the Russians may do next, and not about the solid achievements of ourselves and our allies.

The creation of an Organization for Trade Cooperation among the main trading nations of the free world would be one of these solid achievements which President Eisenhower strongly hopes will be made possible by favorable congressional action. The story of OTC begins with the reciprocal trade agreements program of the United States. Through this program, which has been authorized by Congress in the Trade Agreements Act, we and other friendly governments reach agreement on the reduction of tariffs and other barriers to world trade, thus making it possible for private enterprise in each country to sell more goods and buy more goods on world markets. The most important of our trade agreements, and the largest single trade agreement ever concluded in the history of world commerce, is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade no less than 35 governments, including our own, have reached agreement on tariff concessions covering some 60,000 items of commerce and $40 billion worth of trade a year. The general agreement also records the agreement of the participating countries to reduce barriers to trade other than tariffs—barriers such as import quotas, discriminatory taxation, restrictive state trading, and excessive or discriminatory customs regulations.

We have been participating in the general agreement for the last 8 years with considerable success. Partly because of the general agreement our exports have found improved markets abroad; and our increased imports have provided foreign countries with the money to buy larger amounts of American goods.

Yet the general agreement has been seriously lacking in one important aspect: It has not had adequate organizational machinery to help the countries which participate in it to realize its full benefits.

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[1] Made at a meeting cosponsored by the World Affairs Council of Seattle and the University of Washington at Seattle, Wash., on Mar. 13 (press release 129).

[2] For text of OTC agreement, see BULLETIN of Apr. 4, 1955, p. 579; for a Presidential message on OTC, see *ibid.*, Apr. 25, 1955, p. 678.

The Organization for Trade Cooperation is designed to remedy this defect. For the main purpose of OTC would be to administer the general agreement and thereby to make its provisions more meaningful to producers and traders in terms of larger world markets. We in the United States have special reason to expect benefits from the OTC because better machinery to administer the general agreement will hasten the day when the foreign restrictions which still remain against American exports will be lifted.

President Eisenhower has placed the OTC at the forefront of his foreign economic program.[3] When Congress began its public hearings on OTC, six members of the President's Cabinet—representing those departments which share the responsibility for the trade agreements program—testified in its favor.[4]

The case for OTC is a simple one. We already have a trade program which brings economic benefits to our country as well as unity to the free world. Why not make it fully effective?

As I have said, the trade agreements program of our Government is authorized by Congress in the Trade Agreements Act. Last year this law was extended for another 3 years when Congress approved a bill that had become widely known as H. R. 1. There was a long debate on H. R. 1, and it was finally adopted and became the law of the land.

The OTC issue is a different question. *It is not the battle of H. R. 1 all over again.* The question now is not whether we are going to have a trade agreements program but whether our trade agreements program will operate more efficiently in the national interest of the United States. As Secretary of State John Foster Dulles told the Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives 2 weeks ago, the OTC proposal is a measure which provides for the more efficient administration of a program that Congress has already authorized. Secretary Dulles added:

"I do not think it necessarily follows that a person who voted against H. R. 1 should therefore automatically vote against this bill, because I believe since it has been passed and has become the law of the land, even the opponents of it should be willing to give it a decent chance to work as efficiently and competently as possible."

[3] For excerpts from the President's economic report, see *ibid.*, Feb. 13, 1956, p. 253.

[4] For statements by Secretary Dulles and Secretary of Commerce Weeks, see *ibid.*, Mar. 19, 1956, p. 472.

Surplus Commodity Agreements

AGREEMENT WITH CHILE

Press release 133 dated March 13

The United States and Chile on March 13 sig an agreement authorizing the sale to Ch through private U.S. traders, of wheat, ed oils, edible tallow, lard, nonfat dry-milk sol forage seeds, cotton, tobacco, and frozen beef t total value of $34,600,000.00. These sales being made under title I of the Agricult Trade Development and Assistance Act of 19 as amended. The agreement was signed at S tiago by the Foreign Minister of Chile, Enri O. Barbosa Baeza, and the American Ambassac Willard L. Beaulac.

As in the first agricultural sales agreement c cluded with Chile last year, this agreement p vides that payments under the sales program be made in Chilean pesos. A substantial part all pesos accruing will be earmarked for lo designed to contribute to Chile's economic velopment and will be payable in dollars or pe under the terms of a supplemental loan agreem which is to be concluded at a later date. T balance will be reserved for the use of the Uni States in Chile.

AGREEMENT WITH KOREA

Press release 134 dated March 13

Representatives of the Republic of Korea d the United States signed an agreement in Se on March 13 for the sale to Korea of agricultu commodities under title I of the Agricultu Trade Development and Assistance Act of 19 as amended.

Commodities included in the agreement barley, wheat, raw cotton, tobacco, canned pc edible fats and oils, and dairy products, wit total value of $43,800,000 including certain tra portation costs to be financed by the United Sta The grain component, totaling 359,000 met tons, is expected to have an important stabiliz effect on the Korean economy.

A major portion of the hwan proceeds of sales will be used to procure military equipm materials, facilities, and services for the Kor

d'ense forces for common defense. The re-
n inder will be used in payment of U.S. Govern-
nnt expenses in Korea.

UN. Committee To Study Effects of Atomic Radiation

Press release 135 dated March 13

Dr. Shields Warren, scientific director of the Cancer Research Institute of the New England Deaconess Hospital in Boston, will represent the United States on the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, which will convene for its first meeting on March 1 1956, in New York.

This committee was established by the General Assembly's resolution of December 3, 1955,[1] and will be composed of representatives from Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, France, India, Japan, Mexico, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The committee's task, in general terms, is to receive and assemble radiological information furnished by member states of the United Nations or members of specialized agencies; to recommend uniform standards for sample collection, instrumentation, and radiation counting; to compile and assemble various reports; and, after review, to refer such information to the Secretary-General for publication.

Dr. Warren will be assisted by two alternates, Dr. Austin Moore Brues of the Argonne National Laboratory and Merril Eisenbud of the Atomic Energy Commission, and by several consultants.

Current Treaty Actions

MULTILATERAL

North Atlantic Ice Patrol

Agreement regarding financial support of the North Atlantic Ice Patrol. Opened for signature at Washington January 4, 1956.[2]
Signatures: Belgium, March 5, 1956; Italy, March 16, 1956.

Slave Trade

Protocol amending the slavery convention signed at Geneva September 25, 1926 (46 Stat. 2183), and annex. Done at New York December 7, 1953. Protocol entered into force December 7, 1953. Annex entered into force July 7, 1955.
Ratified by the President: February 13, 1956.
Ratification deposited: United States, March 7, 1956 (entered into force for the United States March 7, 1956).

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention. Signed at Buenos Aires December 22, 1952. Entered into force January 1, 1954. TIAS 3266.
Ratification deposited: Viet-Nam, January 26, 1956.

Final protocol to the international telecommunication convention. Signed at Buenos Aires December 22, 1952. Entered into force January 1, 1954. TIAS 3266.
Ratification deposited: Viet-Nam, January 26, 1956.

Additional protocols to the international telecommunication convention. Signed at Buenos Aires December 22, 1952. Entered into force December 22, 1952.
Ratification deposited: Viet-Nam, January 26, 1956.

Trade and Commerce

Agreement on Organization for Trade Cooperation. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.[2]
Signature: United Kingdom, February 29, 1956.

BILATERAL

Chile

Surplus commodity agreement pursuant to title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454, 455; 69 Stat. 44, 721). Signed at Santiago March 13, 1956. Will enter into force on date the United States is notified by Chile that it has approved agreement in accordance with its constitutional procedures.

Greece

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of June 24, 1955 (TIAS 3449) by providing for the purchase of lard, cottonseed oil, and soybean oil. Effected by exchange of notes at Athens February 13 and at Corfu February 17, 1956. Entered into force February 17, 1956.

Iran

Agreement extending to March 20, 1958, the agreement of October 6, 1947 (TIAS 1666), providing for a military mission to Iran, as amended and extended. Effected by exchange of notes at Tehran February 13, 1956. Entered into force February 13, 1956.

Agreement extending to March 20, 1958, the agreement of November 27, 1943 (57 Stat. 1262), providing for a United States military mission with the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie, as extended and amended. Effected by exchange of notes at Tehran February 13, 1956. Entered into force February 13, 1956.

Korea

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, as amended (68 Stat. 454, 455; 69 Stat. 44, 721). Signed at Seoul March 13, 1956. Entered into force March 13, 1956.

Spain

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, as amended (68 Stat. 454, 455; 69 Stat. 44, 721). Signed at Madrid March 5, 1956. Entered into force March 5, 1956.

[1] For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 21, 1955, p. 855.

[2] Not in force.

Thailand

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Bangkok March 13, 1955. Entered into force March 13, 1955.

Turkey

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, as amended (68 Stat. 454, 455; 69 Stat. 44, 721). Signed at Ankara March 12, 1956. Entered into force March 12, 1956.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3184. Pub. 5865. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Pakistan—Signed at Karachi January 18, 1955. Entered into force January 18, 1955.

Technical Cooperation. TIAS 3185. Pub. 5866. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Pakistan supplementing agreement of February 9, 1951, as supplemented—Signed at Karachi January 18, 1955. Entered into force January 18, 1955.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3246. Pub. 6070. 11 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Spain. Exchange of notes—Signed at Madrid April 20, 1955. Entered into force April 20, 1955.

Mutual Defense Assistance, Disposition of Surplus Equipment and Materials. TIAS 3263. Pub. 6050. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Dominican Republic. Exchange of notes—Dated at Ciudad Trujillo March 23 and April 22, 1955. Entered into force April 22, 1955.

Reciprocal Trade. TIAS 3328. Pub. 6099. 31 pp. 15¢.

Agreement between the United States and Switzerland, supplementing agreement of January 9, 1936—Signed at Geneva June 8, 1955. And proclamation by the President of the United States, carrying out supplementary agreement with Switzerland—issued June 25, 1955. Effective July 11, 1955.

Protection of War Victims, Armed Forces in the Field. TIAS 3362. Pub. 6137. 104 pp. 35¢.

Convention, with annexes, between the United States and other governments—Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Date of entry into force with respect to the United States: February 2, 1956.

Protection of War Victims, Armed Forces at Sea. TIAS 3363. Pub. 6138. 99 pp. 30¢.

Convention, with annexes, between the United States and other governments—Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Date of entry into force with respect to the United States: February 2, 1956.

Protection of War Victims, Prisoners of War. TIAS 3364. Pub. 6140. 201 pp. 60¢.

Convention, with annexes—Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Date of entry into force with respect to the United States: February 2, 1956.

Presence of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany. TIAS 3426. Pub. 6222. 13 pp. 10¢.

Convention between the United States and other governments—Signed at Paris October 23, 1954. Entered into force May 5, 1955.

Exercise of Retained Rights in the Federal Republic of Germany. TIAS 3427. Pub. 6221. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and France—Signed at Paris October 23, 1954. Entered into force May 5, 1955.

North Atlantic Treaty, Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany. TIAS 3428. Pub. 6218. 7 pp. 10¢.

Protocol between the United States and other governments—Signed at Paris October 23, 1954. Entered into force May 5, 1955.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. TIAS 3[illegible]. Pub. 6226. 133 pp. 55¢.

Protocol of terms of accession of Japan between the United States and other governments—Dated at Geneva June [illegible], 1955. Entered into force September 10, 1955.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: March 12–18

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

Press releases issued prior to March 12 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 56 of February 2 and 127 of March 9.

No.	Date	Subject
126	3/12	Prochnow: "The Essentials of Economic Growth."
129	3/13	Prochnow: "The Issue of the OTC."
133	3/13	Surplus commodity agreement with Chile.
134	3/13	Surplus commodity agreement with Korea.
135	3/13	Committee on atomic radiation effects.
†136	3/14	Arrival of Prime Minister Costello.
†137	3/15	Asian Nuclear Center in Philippines.
138	3/15	Doctors to advise Argentine medical authorities.
139	3/16	Message from Sultan of Morocco.
140	3/16	Removal of U.S. applications from ICJ list.
†141	3/16	Atomic agreement with Ireland.
*142	3/16	Educational exchange.
143	3/16	Atoms-for-peace lecturer to Japan (rewrite).
144	3/16	Atomic experts to visit Thailand, Pakistan, and Turkey.
145	3/16	U.S.–U.K. civil aviation discussions.

*Not printed.
†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

ica
Development of U.S. Policy in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa During 1955: Part II (Howard) 510
estine: Focal Point of Tension (Bergus) . . . 502

iculture. Surplus Commodity Agreements . . 532

erican Republics
ignation of Foreign Students at U.S. Service Academies (text of Executive order) . . . 528
United States Balance of Payments With Latin America (Lederer, Culbertson) 521

entina. U.S. Doctors To Help Combat Polio Epidemic in Argentina 527

a
Development of U.S. Policy in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa During 1955: Part II (Howard) 510

mic Energy
sicist To Lecture in Japan on Peaceful Uses of Atom 509
ent Advances in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy (Dillon) 518
. Committee To Study Effects of Atomic Radiation 533
. Atomic Experts To Visit Thailand, Pakistan, Turkey 509

le. Surplus Commodity Agreements 532

ms and Property. ICJ Action on Cases Involving U.S. Claims 513

choslovakia. ICJ Action on Cases Involving U.S. Claims 513

armament. Correspondence of President Eisenhower and Premier Bulganin on Disarmament and U.S.-Soviet Relations 514

nomic Affairs
Essentials of Economic Growth (Prochnow) . 529
Issue of the Organization for Trade Cooperation (Prochnow) 531
United States Balance of Payments With Latin America (Lederer, Culbertson) 521
and U.K. Conclude Civil Aviation Talks . . 528

nce. Recent Advances in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy (Dillon) 518

lth, Education, and Welfare. U.S. Doctors To Help Combat Polio Epidemic in Argentina . 527

rnational Organizations and Meetings. U.S. and U.K. Conclude Civil Aviation Talks . . 528

el. Palestine: Focal Point of Tension (Bergus) 502

an. Physicist To Lecture in Japan on Peaceful Uses of Atom 509

ea. Surplus Commodity Agreements . . . 532

tary Affairs
ignation of Foreign Students at U.S. Service Academies (text of Executive order) . . . 528
ICJ Action on Cases Involving U.S. Claims . . . 513

Morocco. Sultan of Morocco Responds to U.S. Message 501

Mutual Security. The Development of U.S. Policy in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa During 1955: Part II (Howard) 510

Near East
The Development of U.S. Policy in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa During 1955: Part II (Howard) 510
Elements of Hope in the Middle East Economic Picture (Seager) 506
Palestine: Focal Point of Tension (Bergus) . . . 502
U.S. Position on Cyprus Issue (White) 505

Pakistan. U.S. Atomic Experts To Visit Thailand, Pakistan, Turkey 509

Presidential Documents
Correspondence of President Eisenhower and Premier Bulganin on Disarmament and U.S.-Soviet Relations 514
Designation of Foreign Students at U.S. Service Academies 528

Publications. Recent Releases 534

Thailand. U.S. Atomic Experts To Visit Thailand, Pakistan, Turkey 509

Treaty Information
Current Actions 533
Surplus Commodity Agreements 532

Turkey. U.S. Atomic Experts To Visit Thailand, Pakistan, Turkey 509

U.S.S.R.
Correspondence of President Eisenhower and Premier Bulganin on Disarmament and U.S.-Soviet Relations 514
ICJ Action on Cases Involving U.S. Claims . . . 513
The Soviet Challenge and the United Nations (Wilcox) 495

United Kingdom. U.S. and U.K. Conclude Civil Aviation Talks 528

United Nations
The Soviet Challenge and the United Nations (Wilcox) 495
U.N. Committee To Study Effects of Atomic Radiation 533

Name Index

Bekkai, Si Embarek 501
Bergus, Donald C. 502
Bulganin, Nikolai A. 515
Culbertson, Nancy F. 521
Dillon, C. Douglas 518
Eisenhower, President 514, 528
Howard, Harry N. 510
Lederer, Walther 521
Prochnow, Herbert V. 529, 531
Saeger, Cedric H. 506
White, Lincoln 505
Wilcox, Francis O. 495

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The Department of State

bulletin

XXXIV, No. 875

April 2, 1956

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 1957 MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM
Message of President Eisenhower to the Congress 545
Statement by Under Secretary Hoover 550

A REPORT ON ASIA • *Address by Secretary Dulles* 539

A CRUCIAL CONTEST WITH THE COMMUNIST WORLD • *by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy* 556

VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER COSTELLO OF IRELAND • *Statements and Addresses by the Prime Minister* 560

CLARIFICATION OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD NORTH AFRICA • *by Ambassador C. Douglas Dillon* 553

For index see inside back cover

The Department of State bulletin

VOL. XXXIV, No. 875 • PUBLICATION 6313

April 2, 1956

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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Report on Asia

Address by Secretary Dulles [1]

have just returned from a 19-day trip which me to 10 countries of Asia. It gave me the ce to talk intimately with the leaders of each ese 10 countries. That is a great aid to good national relations. We can, of course, write other notes. But talking face to face is the way yet invented for enabling men to under- l each other.

also took part in the annual meeting, held year at Tokyo, of the heads of our 14 United es missions in the Far East area.[2] I discussed policies with them and answered their ques- and received their suggestions.

e particular reason why I took this trip at time was that the Council of the Southeast Treaty Organization—SEATO, for short—was ing in Pakistan. That treaty, you may re- was made at Manila in 1954 [3] to deter Com- ist aggression which was then threatening ously in Southeast Asia. We have a Coun- eeting each year, attended by the Foreign sters of the eight member countries. Last our Ministerial Council met at Bangkok.[4] year we met in Pakistan.

e had a good meeting which further devel- the organization and gave it increased stat- We feel confident that our combined gth and vigilance will safeguard the treaty against open armed aggression. We also be- lieve that this shield will make it more possible for the member countries to develop, individually and collectively, their economic and social welfare.[5]

After 4 days in Pakistan, I went on to visit India, Ceylon, Indonesia, Thailand, Viet-Nam, the Philippines, Formosa (Taiwan), Korea, and Japan. These 10 countries I visited have a total population of over 700 million people, or almost one-third of the total population of the earth. More than 600 million of these people were colonial people until as recently as the close of World War II. Now they are independent nations.

Several of them are only now completing their new political institutions. For example, while we were in Pakistan that country adopted its first constitution. In Indonesia the first government based on national elections was in process of formation. On the day I left Viet-Nam, a popularly elected Constituent Assembly was meeting to frame a constitution.

This building and testing of new political processes is the outstanding and exciting characteristic of the area I visited.

Another characteristic is the determination to develop the economic potentials of the area. So far, productivity is low. The average income amounts to about $100 a year. The people expect their new governments to improve their living conditions.

There are some who doubt the determination or ability of these free Asian nations to preserve and develop their political independence and also

[1] de to the Nation over radio and television on ar 3 (press release 159).

[2] r text of communique issued at close of Tokyo eg, see p. 543.

[3] r text of treaty, see BULLETIN of Sept. 20, 1954, 3

[4] *d.*, Mar. 7, 1955, p. 371.

[5] For text of communique issued at Karachi, see *ibid.*, Mar. 19, 1956, p. 447. For the First Annual Report of the Council Representatives, see *ibid.*, Mar. 12, 1956, p. 403.

to make that independence serve to improve social and economic conditions. I do not share that doubt. But I do come back with the strengthened conviction that the United States can help the Asian countries to achieve both of these goals. Also, I feel sure that it is in our own interest to provide that help.

I should like to give you a country-by-country report. But there is hardly time for that. So I shall give some general conclusions.

Political Independence

Let me speak first of the problem of political independence in Asia. We need to be aware of how proud the peoples of Asia are to be free of foreign domination and how sensitive they are to any hint of encroachments from without. Also, let us remember that, while *we* think first of the danger that stems from international communism, many of *them* think first of possible encroachments from the West, for that is the rule they have actually known at firsthand.

But I found that the leaders are quite aware of the danger of penetration by international communism and of the fact that Soviet and Chinese Communist economic lures generally go with a hook and line that leads to Moscow or Peiping. Some take more effective precautions than others to avoid being caught. But none of the leaders is blind to this danger.

They all desire help which will in fact preserve their independence and develop their free institutions. But they want to be very sure that that help does not subtract from their sovereignty or retard their development by involving them in controversies that do not directly concern them.

The United States is able sympathetically to understand that attitude. We ourselves were once a colony. Our struggle for independence is the first chapter of history that is learned by every American boy and girl. Also, in our early days we too saw our first task as that of internal development, and only changed conditions have made it apparent that international security is best assured by collective efforts.

That story of America is well known in Asia. George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and Abraham Lincoln are honored names, and it is significant that the President of Indonesia, in his opening address to the Bandung conference, invoked the memory of Paul Revere and the principles of the American Revolution.

All of this creates a bond of sympathy helps to make possible a good understanding tween us and them. Our historical experien an asset of priceless value in Asia.

Many of the countries of Asia feel that independence is better assured if they partici with us in arrangements for mutual secu Then we help them develop their national f and they share the deterrent of our mobile mili power. There are such arrangements—bila or multilateral—with 7 of the 10 countri visited—Pakistan, Thailand, Viet-Nam, the ippines, free China, Japan, and Korea. Thr the countries I visited—India, Ceylon, and I nesia—have preferred not to join regional sec arrangements. That choice also we respect. United States does not seek ties of mutual de with any country whatsoever unless that cou believes that this application of the principl collective security will better assure its i pendence.

Economic and Social Development

Let me turn now from the problem of poli independence to the problem of economic social development. Here, too, the conduct example of the United States provide an ins tion and a responsibility.

The United States has itself realized an nomic miracle. Our population of about 165 lion produces nearly half of all the goods tha produced in the world.

When contrasted with our example, the pro tion of forced labor pales into relative insig cance.

There is, of course, no magic formula for re ducing elsewhere economic productivity like It is not to be had merely for the wanting merely by the installation of machines. It product of widespread education, of an ingra spirit of enterprise, and of savings which pro more efficient tools for labor.

I did not find that the Asian leaders expect either they, or we, or all of us in combination be able to change their economies overnight. I did find in Asia a natural and powerful to get on a path which surely, even though slo leads upward to better economic and s conditions.

If we wish to see the free world preserved enlarged, we must help, or forces of despo will take control. The day is past when

ples of Asia will tolerate leadership which ɔs them on a dead center economically and so- ly, and when each generation merely ekes out are subsistence, with a brief life expectancy, passes on to the next generation only the same k prospect.

Mutual Security Programs

he United States has already come to see that own self-interest is served by helping others rove their economic condition. Our Nation vides this help in many ways, public and pri-, throughout the free world. For 10 years we have had mutual security programs, and the last 3 years, following the completion of Marshall plan for Europe, much attention has n given to Asia.

ne component of our mutual security program chnical assistance. It helps others to develop techniques. This is a good program manned oyal and competent persons. But it is a pro- n which could be enlarged and improved.

or example, I found a widespread desire in to learn the English language. This knowl- e is eagerly sought for as opening the door to lued literature in both cultural and technical s.

he Soviet Union has been specializing for many s on training technicians. These technicians at the same time thoroughly indoctrinated in munism so that they can serve also as political its. All of these technicians are at the com- d of the Soviet Government, which can direct n to go wherever it wills. It is trying to in- ate them into key posts in lands which they e to dominate.

n the case of the United States the Government appeal, but it cannot command. Also it can- match the financial rewards of private busi- . The answer, it seems to me, must be found greater recognition on the part of our people he inner or spiritual satisfactions to be gained ublic service and aiding in the cause of human fare.

n the past, missionaries, doctors, and educators arge numbers carried our faith and our knowl- e to other people under conditions involving t hardship and sacrifice. There are many ericans today who are doing that very thing. the 38 countries which I have visited since ming Secretary of State I have almost always ed with gatherings of the Americans of our Foreign Service and related services. I have often found them serving under conditions of hardship. But also I have found that they derive satisfactions which are not readily to be found under conditions of greater ease and material prosperity at home.

It is my earnest hope that more of our young men and women who are specially qualified to help others to help themselves will engage in this great adventure.

In addition to technical assistance we have economic programs of other sorts. We have programs which help our allies to bear the cost of their defense establishments, which vitally supplement our own.

Then we have surplus commodity programs which under proper conditions can do much good. It is necessary to avoid unfair competition with countries which historically depend upon the sales abroad of their own agricultural surplus. But I was impressed with the fact that, subject to this qualification, our surpluses can do much to bring a better life to Asian people. For example, we have just concluded an agreement with Indonesia for delivery of surplus commodities of a value of some $95 million,[6] and we are just beginning a milk program for the children of Ceylon.

These programs involving military support, technical assistance, and surplus commodities are of great importance and contribute to preserving and developing the Asian economies. But by themselves they are not sufficient to enable the free Asian countries to make their economies more diversified or lessen their dependence on others for manufactured goods. The present lack of diversification and industrialization is the weakness which Asian leaders above all want to cure. That aspect of the matter requires more emphasis. Japan should be able to help in this respect as one Asian nation, indeed the only Asian nation, which has found the way to industrialization.

President Eisenhower has just sent to the Congress his message on the mutual security program, including economic assistance.[7] On the basis of my trip I am more than ever convinced of the vital importance of this program. It can be improved in ways the President has suggested. There is need for greater flexibility in the use of the funds appropriated. In addition, the United States

[6] *Ibid.*, Mar. 19, 1956, p. 469.

[7] See p. 545.

should be able to back long-range projects requiring several years for completion. This will importantly strengthen our program.

To meet defense costs and dietary needs is important. The one preserves independence; the other preserves life. But also there is need for more water, more fuel and electric power, more development of mineral resources, and more industrial plants so that, hereafter, the people can, by their own efforts, raise their own living standards.

To share with others our own blessings accords with the best and most deeply rooted of American traditions. George Washington, in his Farewell Address, said,

> It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and, at no distant period a great nation to give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence. Who can doubt that in the course of time and things the fruits of such a plan would richly repay any temporary advantages which might be lost by a steady adherence to it?

Our mutual security plan conforms to Washington's prescription. Even though, to use Washington's phrases, it loses us some temporary advantages, the fruits of that plan will, in the course of time, richly repay us. That plan provides the margin of difference between a world environment which is friendly and healthy and one which is corroded by massive discontents dangerous both to us and to the discontented.

Profound Desire for Peace

Throughout most of the countries I visited there is a profound desire for peace. In the case of the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China the leaders and the people would be willing to make almost any sacrifice to restore freedom to their countries as a whole. However, even there the will to sacrifice is tempered by knowledge that modern war creates such widespread devastation and so many evils that it provides no clear solution to any problem.

Communist propaganda has sought diligently to create the impression that the United States seeks war and that its collective security arrangements are aggressive in purpose. I had no opportunity to judge the impact of that propaganda upon the people generally. But so far as concerns the leaders with whom I talked I found no evidence whatsoever that they believe that the United States wants war.

The spot in the Far East where, at the mo conflict most threatens is the Taiwan (Form area. I reported to our Asian friends how, a Geneva talks with the Chinese Communist were patiently but persistently striving for ciprocal renunciation of force with particul lation to this Taiwan area.

I found in India some fear lest our arms plied to Pakistan, which feels endangered the north, might be turned against India. ceived the most categorical and convincin surances from the highest authorities of Pak that they have no belligerent intentions wh ever as against India. In India I publicly c attention to the fact that the Southeast Asi curity pact expressly prohibits any use of except in defense against aggression. Als agreements under which we are supplying to Pakistan explicitly provide that these shall not be used for any aggressive purpos expressed my conviction that Pakistan w scrupulously observe these solemn engagem

I found uniformly that the Asian leaders whom I talked desire the United States t strong and that that strength should contin be a sort of protective umbrella over other nations. That was the clearest single impre that I received. Repeatedly I was asked wh it was our purpose to maintain that prote cover, affording new freedoms the opportuni sink deep their roots and grow strong. Each my reply was emphatically affirmative. And reply was received with profound satisfactio

There is of course a great desire for disa ment, particularly since it is felt that arma limitation would release funds which, in would inure to the benefit of the less economi developed countries of the world. Presi Eisenhower's letter to Chairman Bulgani March 1,[8] discussing disarmament, was r public while I was on my trip. It gave n satisfaction as evidence of our purpose to limitation of armament which could be ver and controlled. I found no one who wanted lateral disarmament by the United States or armament which might in fact turn out to be lateral because of evasions by others.

I believe that there is general realization of ardent dedication to peace as well as respect our determination to have the strength to in

[8] *Ibid.*, Mar. 26, 1956, p. 514.

at no one need feel that peace has to be bought surrendering freedom to despotism.

ian Culture

There is throughout the Asian peoples a desire r Western recognition of their dignity.

We need to remember that although we have veloped more rapidly than Asians in some di-ctions, notably in industrialization, they have eceded us in finding many of the ways to make e richer. Their culture and art long antedate r own and in many respects have not yet been ualed by our own. Their handicraft is out-anding. They have an exceptional love and preciation of beauty. They possess in full easure those human qualities which all admire—votion to family and to country, courage, and llingness to sacrifice. They possess unusual alities of patience, reflection, and repose.

Therefore, let us not forget that, while we have aterial and technical things to give, they also ve things to give. And if we are wise enough perceive and to take what Asia has to offer, the lance struck between us will not be one-sided any true measure of values.

I come back from this trip encouraged. Of urse, Soviet and Chinese economic tactics are a nger. Of even greater danger are their tactics stirring up hatred as between free nations. But feel that conditions which we wish for will pre-il in the area I visited, if only we play worthily r part.

e Goal We Seek

What is it that we seek? It is not conquest or mination. If that were our goal, I would have conclude that it is doomed to failure. Our de-e is a world in which peoples who want political dependence shall possess it whenever they are pable of sustaining it and discharging its re-onsibilities in accordance with the accepted ndards of civilized nations. That condition independence is developing throughout non-mmunist Asia, and I believe that it will con-ue to develop as against assault from any quar-r.

But we also realize that political independence not enough. It is a means to certain ends. One these ends is the infusing of men with reason-le hope that, if they strive, they can build a tter world for their children and their children's children. That reasonable hope we can help to provide without any encroachment whatsoever on the political independence of others. Under those conditions help will be welcome. Under reverse conditions, it would, I am glad to say, be rejected.

Also, there is need for a new attitude toward the diversity that Asians provide. Differences of race and of culture are not measures of superiority or inferiority. Indeed, uniformity and conformity are conditions to be abhorred. The great richness of our universe is due above all to its diversity. We may take honorable pride in our own distinctive accomplishments. But we should equally be aware that the accomplishments of others are a proper subject for their pride and our appreciation.

The future belongs to independence, not domination; to freedom, not servitude; to diversity, not conformity. Acceptance of that fact will create between the Asians and ourselves a solid basis for fellowship. It will enable us, as mutual friends and helpers, to pursue hopefully the destiny that we share in common.

Chiefs of Mission in Far East Meet at Tokyo

Following is the text of a communique issued at Tokyo on March 21 after the final session of the 3-day conference of U.S. Chiefs of Mission in the Far East.[1]

United States Chiefs of Mission in the Far East met under the chairmanship of Assistant Secretary of State Walter S. Robertson from March 19 to 21 in Tokyo. They reviewed the present situation in Asia, the progress made over the past year, and the prospects for the future. Secretary Dulles presided over the first session, summarizing developments in connection with his recent trip through Asia.

The meeting revealed a general feeling of confidence based on the political, social and economic advances made during the past year in the free countries of Asia, the growing strength and vigor of collective security efforts against the still powerful threat of Communist aggression, and the developing sense of partnership in free Asia.

[1] For an announcement of the meeting, see BULLETIN of Feb. 20, 1956, p. 278.

Among the significant developments during the past year in East Asia have been the series of free elections and the increasing association and practical cooperation among free Asian nations.

The Chiefs of Missions expressed their confident belief that the free Asian nations will continue to consolidate their independence and make progress in their national programs to their mutual advantage and the greater security of the free world.

Philippines Chosen as Site for Asian Nuclear Center

Press release 137 dated March 15

The United States Embassy at Manila announced on March 15 that Secretary Dulles has informed President Magsaysay that the Republic of the Philippines has been chosen as the site for the new Asian Nuclear Center. This center was proposed by the United States at the Colombo Plan meeting held at Singapore last October.[1] The United States is now preparing to move rapidly with initial plans for the establishment of this center as a means of putting atomic energy to work for the economic and social progress of Asia. This action will represent an important step toward the further advancement of President Eisenhower's atoms-for-peace program.[2]

[1] BULLETIN of Nov. 7, 1955, p. 747.

[2] The International Cooperation Administration announced on March 15 that the U.S. Government, with financing provided from the President's Fund for Asian Economic Development, is now arranging for the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission's Brookhaven National Laboratory to develop preliminary technical proposals as to how the center can best serve the needs of the region and as to what facilities would be required. The Brookhaven Laboratory, an institution with unique competence in the field of nuclear science, is a cooperative regional center uniting the facilities of nine American universities. In developing its proposals, the Brookhaven Laboratory shortly will send survey teams of experts to consult with scientists and government officials in Asia. The Brookhaven group is expected to assemble in Washington within the next month for a brief period of orientation. The survey team will then proceed to Manila to inspect possible sites and facilities before visiting the various participating countries to discuss with them their principal fields of interest and plans for using the center. It is expected that detailed plans for the center will be presented at the Colombo Plan meeting in Wellington, New Zealand, next October.

Pan American Day and Pan American Week, 1956

A PROCLAMATION[1]

WHEREAS the sixty-sixth anniversary of the fou of the Pan American Union, nucleus of the inter-Ame system of mutual co-operation and good will, now k as the Organization of American States, will be obs by the twenty-one American Republics on Saturday, 14, 1956; and

WHEREAS the observances commemorating this a cious event in the history of the Western Hemis will be held throughout the week of April 8 to Apri 1956; and

WHEREAS the American Republics stand together in thering the maintenance of peace and the defense of dom through the Organization of American States, w they have built together and together uphold; and

WHEREAS the Government and the people of the U States of America are steadfast in adhering to the fr ship uniting them with the other American Republic

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, P dent of the United States of America, do hereby proc Saturday, April 14, 1956, as Pan American Day, and period from April 8 through April 14, 1956, as Pan A can Week; and I urge that the people of this Natio that day and throughout that week give expressio their cordial good will toward the peoples of the o American Republics and of their intention to main the principles of freedom and equality fundamental t

I also invite the Governors of the States, Territo and possessions of the United States of America and Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to i similar proclamations; and I call upon all our citizens all interested organizations to join in appropriate servance of Pan American Day and Pan American W in testimony of the steadfast friendship which unites people of the United States with the people of the o American Republics.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand caused the Seal of the United States of America t affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this fifteenth da March in the year of our Lord nineteen hun [SEAL] and fifty-six, and of the Independence of United States of America the one hundred eightieth.



By the President:
HERBERT HOOVER, Jr.
Acting Secretary of State

[1] No. 3126; 21 *Fed. Reg.* 1763.

ecommendations for 1957 Mutual Security Program

SSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE CON-ESS [1]

the Congress of the United States:

For almost a decade the United States has ved, year by year, with growing success, to p fortify the economies and military strength nations of the free world. Over the years this ort has changed in size and character in keep- with changing world affairs. Today it re- ins as indispensable to the security of every nerican citizen and to the building of an endur- peace as on the day it began 9 years ago.

Today this great Nation, at the peak of its peace- ne military and economic strength, must not itate or retreat in this vital undertaking. Nor n we subordinate this program to local concerns collateral issues, on the unsound premise that ady progress through this program for 9 years kes it no longer necessary.

We cannot now falter in our quest for peace.

The need for a mutual security program is gent because there are still nations that are eager strive with us for peace and freedom but, with- our help, lack the means of doing so.

The need is urgent because there are still forces stile to freedom that compel the free world to intain adequate and coordinated military wer to deter aggression.

The need is urgent because there are still peo- s who aspire to sustain their freedom but con- nt economic obstacles that are beyond their abilities of surmounting alone.

These facts are as fundamental to our own se- rity and well-being as the maintenance of our n armed forces.

Our goal is clear—an enduring peace with justice. To achieve it will continue to require effort, skill, patience, and sacrifice. Toward it we must and will strive constantly by every means available to us.

We must continue to work with other countries to insure that each free nation remains free, secure from external aggression and subversion, and able to develop a society marked by human welfare, individual liberty, and a rising standard of living. We must continue to maintain our economic and military strength at home. We must continue to stimulate expansion of trade and investment in the free world. We must continue helping to build the productive capacities of free nations through public loans and guarantees of private investment. We must continue to provide technical knowledge and essential materials to speed the advance of other nations in peaceful uses of the atom. We must continue our cultural and educational exchanges to expand mutual knowledge and understanding. We must continue and intensify our information programs so that the peoples of the world may know our peaceful purposes and our love of human liberty. And through our mutual security programs we must continue helping to create in the free world conditions in which freedom can survive and develop, and free nations can maintain the defensive strength necessary to deter aggression.

Peace with justice remains the sole objective of our mutual security programs. We have no other interest to advance. We have no desire or intent to subjugate or subvert other peoples—no purpose to change their chosen political, economic, or cultural patterns—no wish to make any of them our satellites. We seek only to further the cause of freedom and independence and to develop the military strength necessary to protect and defend it, in the interest of peace.

To help a free country to maintain forces necessary for the protection of its freedom and inde-

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H. Doc. 358, 84th Cong., 2d sess., transmitted on Mar. For the section on the mutual security program in sident Eisenhower's budget message for the fiscal year 7, see BULLETIN of Jan. 30, 1956, p. 150.

pendence but beyond those which it can alone support may mean foregoing some domestic expenditure. To help a less developed nation in its initial steps toward an economy that can sustain freedom and independence and provide opportunity for higher living standards may mean postponement of desirable projects here in this country. We must continue willing to make these sacrifices, for the benefits we gain in the interests of peace are well worth the price. The mutual security program is a demand of the highest priority upon our resources.

Because our people and the peoples of other nations in the free world have been willing to make the necessary sacrifices, the past mutual security programs have achieved a real measure of success. By combined effort the free world has advanced toward stability and toward economic strength. It has achieved the power and the will to resist aggression. Collective security arrangements have brought into existence free world defense forces and facilities far greater than those which we, by our unaided efforts, could have raised and maintained from our own resources without a crushing burden of taxation on our people. In their economic aspects, our programs have made significant advances toward the solution of many problems of the free world. Without this assistance many other nations, beyond doubt, if existing at all, would exist today only in the grip of chaos. Moreover, we ourselves are more secure, more prosperous, better fitted to go forward in the common enterprise of freedom than ever before.

Significant testimony to the success of our mutual security programs appears in the new turns and developments of Soviet policy. Aggression through force appears to have been put aside, at least temporarily, and the Communists are now making trade approaches to many nations of the free world.

The Soviet maneuver, which is still developing, includes offers of bilateral trade arrangements which may involve provision of arms and capital goods as well as technical assistance. Had we any reason to believe that the Soviet leaders had abandoned their sinister objectives, and now shared our own high purpose of helping other nations to develop freedom and independence, we would welcome the new Soviet program, for it appears to have aspects of normal trade expansion and business competition. Its danger for us and other free nations, however, lies in the traditio Soviet objectives and in the entanglements which acceptance of their offers may lead.

Even while we welcome respite from the So policy of threat and violence, we must take ca ful stock of what still remains of it. The v Soviet military establishment has not b scrapped. On the contrary, the Soviets and th Communist allies are increasing the strength a effectiveness of their armed forces and are p viding them with equipment of the most mod design. The threat implicit in this huge agg gation of military power still casts an omin shadow over the world. There is nothing h to warrant a slackening of our efforts to strength the common defense of the free world.

In its new departures in foreign policy, we that the Soviet Union continues in its famil pattern of ceaseless probing for opportunities exploit political and economic weaknesses. cannot view otherwise the arms traffic in ar where tensions are high and the peace is in dang We cannot view otherwise the extension of cred hand in hand with exploitation of ancient a mosities and new hatreds in a world already ov burdened with them.

We must therefore assume that Soviet pansionism has merely taken on a somewhat d ferent guise and that its fundamental objective still to disrupt and in the end to dominate the f nations. With Soviet leaders openly proclaimi their world aim, it would be folly for us and c friends to relax our collective efforts toward s bility and security.

Needless to say, we do not intend to perm specific Soviet moves to control our activiti Our mutual security program, conceived in t common interests of the free nations, must ahead affirmatively along tested lines to meet t common need. Where changes now give prom of making the program more responsive to t need and more effective, I am recommendi changes.

The authorizations and appropriations I a recommending for fiscal year 1957 are design to carry forward the program toward the goal seek.

I recommend that the Congress authorize a propriations of $4,672,475,000 in accordance wi the schedule attached. In a separate letter to t

aker of the House of Representatives,[2] I am iesting the appropriation of $4,859,975,000 for same fiscal year to cover these recommended iorizations together with authorizations nted but not fully used in prior years. Certain ects of this program require special attention.

tinuity and Flexibility

'e should be able to assure the nations of the world that we will continue to participate in icular nonmilitary projects and enterprises ch will take a number of years to complete. h assurance from us will help these nations to ilize their own funds for projects which will ribute to an important degree to their eco- ic strength, to enlist public and private loans investment, and to plan ahead intelligently. ill be difficult for these nations to organize projects unless mutual security program sup- can be relied on for more than a single year. request authority of the Congress to make mitments up to ten years in length to assist developed countries in long term projects im- ant to their development. Funds to fulfill commitments would come from appropria- s for nonmilitary mutual security, and would exceed an aggregate of $100 million in any

ie mutual security program, in a world in h events move with great rapidity, requires flexible authority exist for the use of funds e available by the Congress. Section 401 of Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, ides such flexibility with respect to the funds opriated, or transferred, for use pursuant to section. It provides a valuable means of ing numerous unforeseeable requirements for tance without the necessity for postponing or cing other urgently needed programs.

year ago the Congress appropriated a special idential fund of $100 million to be used under on 401. For fiscal year 1957, I request the orization of an appropriation of a further million for this special fund. I also ask the authority of the President to transfer mutual security funds for use under the isions of section 401 be increased. With re- to at least $100 million in this special fund, e that the maximum degree of flexibility be orized for its expenditure whenever the President determines that the use of sums in this manner is important to the security of the United States.

The Middle East and Africa are areas in which it is especially important to build new strength friendly to us. There is need for an adequate fund which can be used to assist in meeting special economic problems that may arise in those regions. The United States must be in a position to act promptly to help the governments in this area in their efforts to find solutions for economic and social problems. I therefore recommend creation of a special fund of $100 million to be available for use in any part of the Middle East or Africa for nonmilitary mutual security programs which will advance the cause of free world security and economic strength.

In 1955, the President's fund for Asian economic development was established. The sum of $100 million was then appropriated for it and authorization was given for the appropriation of a further $100 million. It is now desirable that the whole of the funds authorized be made available, and I shall request the appropriation of the remaining $100 million.

Advanced Weapons Systems

I recommend that about $530 million be made available to enable the Department of Defense to begin a program of aiding our allies in developing an even more effective defense based on an improved and better coordinated early warning and communications system and utilizing advanced weapons systems, including missiles, now being procured for our troops.

These advanced weapons, which are purely defensive in character, pose no threat to any nation which does not initiate aggression. They are designed to give warning of, and repel, such aggression—and by their potential effectiveness to deter it.

The sum of $195 million has been included initially for NATO countries in the fiscal year 1957 program. The eventual distribution of the balance of the advanced weapons included in the 1957 program will be made on the basis of later judgment as to their most effective employment worldwide.

Our defense methods cannot be static in view of the constant growth of the military potential of the Communists. We and our allies must keep our defenses adequate to meet new methods of

[2] Doc. 360, 84th Cong., 2d sess.

attack. Because of the rapidity of scientific advances, it is likely that the content of this advanced weapons program will be modified from time to time.

Europe

The program for the NATO countries of Europe (excluding Greece and Turkey) is primarily one of military assistance. This includes the advanced weapons I have mentioned. Although our allies have made great progress in building up their defense forces, military grant assistance is still necessary in most countries to assist them in maintaining equipment and replacing materiel lost by attrition. No economic assistance is proposed for any European country in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A small amount of technical exchange assistance is proposed.

Continued economic support is required for Berlin, and military and economic support for Spain and Yugoslavia.

Middle East, Africa, and Asia

In Asia and the Middle East, serious risk of aggression still exists. The program recommends aggregate military assistance of approximately $1,640 million for countries in these regions which must maintain substantial forces in the field to resist possible attacks. The military assistance which we propose will support the objectives of various mutual defense pacts, including SEATO, to which the United States is a party.

In these areas, the problems of building security are economic as well as military. Many of the nations in the area do not now have the resources required for a minimum rate of economic growth. They are striving to create the standards of living under which their economies can develop. This is a long-term process, in which their own efforts will play the major part, but in which our help can be crucial.

The program, accordingly, proposes economic help to those of our allies whose own resources cannot support their essential defense effort. This help is designed, as in former years, in part to assist projects of a nonmilitary character which further defense activities, in part to help build internal resources and economic stability, and in part to contribute to the recipient's programs of economic development.

Provision is also made for economic assistance to nations in the Middle East, Africa, and A which receive no military assistance, where economic assistance will contribute to their nomic strength and thus to their ability to re their independence. This program is of the most importance to the security of the free wo

The program for fiscal year 1957 also prov for continuing our technical cooperation and sistance in less-developed countries.

Latin America

We propose to strengthen further the frie relationships which exist with our sister Repu to the south. I recommend that we continu encourage by technical assistance the progr initiated by Latin American nations, to m better use of their own resources. We should continue our participation in the technical as ance activities of the Organization of Amer States.

In special circumstances, when loans from Export-Import Bank and the World Bank are available to countries facing critical situati the mutual security program has assisted in m ing temporary economic problems, as in the of two countries where it is proposed that assistance be continued in the next fiscal year.

Military assistance in Latin America shoul continued where needed in order to provide sta ardized equipment, maintenance of equipment ready furnished, and training in the use of equipment.

United Nations and Other Special Programs

The United States should continue its sup of the United Nations Expanded Technical sistance Program, the United Nations Childr Fund, and the United Nations Relief and W Agency, which provides relief and rehabilita of the Arab refugees from Palestine.

Provision is also made for continuing our port of the program of the United Nations H Commissioner for Refugees and the work of Intergovernmental Committee for European gration. Authorizations for continuing our Government's program for care and resettlen of escapees from communism, and our prog of paying the ocean freight costs of shipment of relief supplies donated to our voluntary r agencies and of surplus agricultural commodi are also recommended.

of the Program

ıe request for military assistance authoriza- in fiscal year 1957 is substantially larger than requests and appropriations for this purpose the past 2 years. The lower level of appro- tions for fiscal years 1955 and 1956 will, by end of the current fiscal year, have brought t reduction in unexpended balances over the ır period by approximately $2½ billion to $3 on. Now, however, in order to maintain the of military assistance in 1958 and 1959 an in- e in the appropriation for fiscal year 1957 is ired.

substantial period of "lead" time is required anslate appropriated funds into actual pay- t for, and deliveries of, nearly all items of ary equipment. This year, for the first time, than $500 million are included in the mili- assistance program for advanced weapons. e weapons, because of their complexity, have longer lead times.

ı the economic side of the program, appro- ions for the last 2 years have been approxi- ly at the same rate as expenditures. The ınts requested this year for economic assist- are larger principally because of the new proposed for the Middle East and Africa because of heavier emphasis on programs in .

r Aspects of the Program

he mutual security program for fiscal year proposes continued procurement within the ed States of surplus agricultural commodities use abroad. In addition, large amounts of commodities are moving abroad under the cultural Trade Development and Assistance for the mutual benefit of this and other coun- . This latter effort has been considered in levelopment of the 1957 mutual security pro- ı requirements, and every effort is being made ordinate the two programs.

the request for appropriations to carry out fiscal year 1957 program, I am urging that gress permit greater flexibility in the obliga- of appropriations, in order that there may ıore thorough planning of expenditures and time allowed for necessary negotiation of racts with suppliers and of arrangements with r nations.

FY 1957 MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM

Authorization and Appropriation Request [a]

Title and Section	*FY 1957 Autharization Request*	*FY 1957 Appropriation Request*
Title I—Mutual Defense Assistance:		
Chapter 1—Military Assistance		
Sec. 103 (a) (3)—General Authorization	$2,925,000,000	$2,925,000,000
Sec. 104—Infrastructure	[b] (75,000,000)	[b] 75,000,000
Total—Chapter 1	2,925,000,000	[c] 3,000,000,000
Chapter 3—Defense Support		
Sec. 131 (c):		
(1) Europe	78,700,000	78,700,000
(2) Near East and Africa	170,000,000	170,000,000
(3) Asia	882,000,000	882,000,000
	1,130,700,000	1,130,700,000
TOTAL—TITLE I	4,055,700,000	4,130,700,000
Title II—Development Assistance:		
Sec. 201 (c)		
(1) Near East and Africa	63,000,000	63,000,000
(2) Asia	80,000,000	80,000,000
(3) Latin America	27,000,000	27,000,000
TOTAL—TITLE II	170,000,000	170,000,000
Title III—Technical Cooperation:		
Sec. 304 (h)—General Authorization	140,500,000	140,500,000
Sec. 306—Multilateral Technical Cooperation:		
(a) United Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance	15,500,000	15,500,000
(b) Organization of American States	1,500,000	1,500,000
TOTAL—TITLE III	157,500,000	157,500,000
Title IV—Other Programs:		
Sec. 401 (h)—Special Presidential Fund	$100,000,000	$100,000,000
Sec. 403 (h)—Special Assistance in Joint Control Areas	12,200,000	12,200,000
Sec. 405—Migrants, Refugees and Escapees:		
(a) Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration	[d] (12,500,000)	12,500,000
(c) United Nations Refugee Fund	2,300,000	2,300,000
(d) Escapee Program	7,000,000	7,000,000
Sec. 406 (h)—Children's Welfare	10,000,000	10,000,000
Sec. 407 (h)—Palestine Refugees in the Near East	[e] (45,300,000)	[e] (45,300,000)
Sec. 408—North Atlantic Treaty Organization		
Sec. 409—Ocean Freight Charges:		
(c) Voluntary Relief Shipments	1,400,000	1,400,000
(d) Surplus Agricultural Commodities	14,000,000	14,000,000
Sec. 410—Control Act Expenses	1,175,000	1,175,000
Sec. 411 (b)—Administrative and Other Expenses (Other than Chapter 1 of Title I, and Sec. 124)	35,250,000	35,250,000
Sec. 418 (b)—President's Fund for Asian Economic Development	(100,000,000)	100,000,000
Sec. 420—Special Authorization for the Middle East and Africa	100,000,000	100,000,000
Sec. 10—Foreign Reactor Projects	5,950,000	5,950,000
TOTAL—TITLE IV	259,275,000	401,775,000
GRAND TOTAL—ALL TITLES	$4,672,475,000	$4,859,975,000

[a] Title and section references are, with one exception, to the Mutual Security Act of 1954 as it would be cumulatively amended by the proposed Mutual Security Act of 1956. The exception is the section reference for "Foreign Reactor Projects", which is to the proposed Mutual Security Act of 1956.

[b] 1957 authorization not being requested as Sec. 104 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 authorized the appropriation of $321 million in installments prior to June 30, 1958. In FY 1955 $100 million was appropriated. An additional $122 million was appropriated in FY 1956 leaving an unappropriated authorization of $99 million. The 1957 appropriation request will leave an unappropriated authorization balance of $24 million.

[c] For FY 1957 Direct Forces Support has been consolidated with "Military Assistance".

[d] Continuing authorization provided under Sec. 405 (a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954.

[e] Estimated unobligated balance of FY 1956 funds for which carry-over authority is requested.

Conclusion

The mutual security program is vitally important to our people. Its cost is not disproportionate to our Nation's resources and to our national income. That cost is a low price to pay for the security and vastly greater chances for world peace which the program provides.

The mutual security program is an indispensable part of our national effort to meet affirmatively the challenge of all the forces which threaten the independence of the free world and to overcome the conditions which make peace insecure and progress difficult.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

THE WHITE HOUSE,
March 19, 1956.

STATEMENT BY UNDER SECRETARY HOOVER[3]

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I come before your Committee this morning in support of the President's program for mutual security. I do not intend to go into any great detail. The Secretary of State, who is returning to Washington tomorrow, plans to appear before you shortly to report on the SEATO meeting in Karachi and his trip through 10 of the countries in the Near and Far East. He will undoubtedly touch upon the importance of this program in the areas he has visited. Mr. Hollister, the Director of ICA, who is with me this morning, will discuss the details of the proposed program which is before your Committee. I do, however, wish to take this opportunity to express my conviction that the mutual security program is a fundamental and essential aspect of the conduct of our foreign policy today.

Importance of the Mutual Security Program

Many of the members of this Committee have recently visited the areas whose problems and needs will be considered in connection with this program, and I am sure that no one on the Committee is unaware of the tremendous importance of the program. It is vital to the security of the United States and of the whole of the free world. We are looked upon for leadership in the free world, and the consequences of what we do or fail to do with respect to the mutual security prog reach far beyond our own national frontier

The world today is one in which we and friends cannot relax our collective efforts for bility and security. There is no basis for hope that the long-range objectives of inte tional communism for world domination have abandoned. We must, therefore, place conti reliance on the mutual security program an provisions for continued economic and mil assistance.

We seek, on the one hand, to make outrigh gression unprofitable, and thus unlikely. To end, we have supported mutual defense a ments throughout the world and have sup arms, materiel, and training to assist in th fense of friendly nations.

Without abandoning defensive efforts, we at the same time, to help the constructio healthy economies and free institutions and to promote stability and minimize the thre subversion.

The Soviet New Look

The Soviet Government continues to pursu overall aim of Communist domination. The mittee will recall that Mr. Khrushchev st frankly to the Supreme Soviet 2 months ago "we never renounced and we will never reno our ideas, our struggle for the victory of munism." But we need to keep in mind in consideration of the program this year that emphasis on Soviet tactics has shifted from mary reliance on force to a campaign of poli and economic blandishment.

In this campaign the Soviet Union and its s lites have expanded their trade relations wit free world, they have offered their technical advisory services to the less industrialized c tries, and they have provided long-term interest loans for economic development. themselves these activities are more or less le mate, but they are being carried on in combina with efforts to stir up local controversies and s and with pressures to disrupt and destroy security arrangements that have been constru in the free world. The immediate Soviet go quite clearly one of isolating the countries o free world from the U.S. This much ac plished, the goal of outright conquest or subve would be greatly advanced.

[3] Made before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on Mar. 20 (press release 150).

We must view the new Soviet campaign with ncern for it is aimed at the welfare and free-n of all the independent countries. We are presenting the mutual security program as an swer to the Soviet activities, but we do need to ke our own program, which is of long standing, effective an instrument for aiding the cause of lependence and freedom as is possible.

New Provisions

Our own security depends upon the security of free world. This security, in turn, depends ectly upon the ability of the free nations to intain their independence and to strengthen ir free institutions. These continue to be our ns. From the founding of our country we have n deeply devoted to the cause of freedom. In s new phase of our struggle to achieve an en-onment of freedom, when many nations of the e world desperately need assistance in their orts to achieve security and healthy economic velopment, it is vital that we have in the mutual urity program a larger measure of flexibility. Changes occur in the world at a very rapid pace. cannot forecast them in advance, but it is al to our national security that we have the lity to adapt the mutual security program to lect changes. That presents a major dilemma. cause of the long lead time necessary to the ective administration of this program, the pro-sals we are making today for fiscal year '57 l not be implemented before early 1958. That period of almost 2 years. It is obvious that, meet the conditions existing then, there be a gree of flexibility in the legislation now.

The President has accordingly requested a ater flexibility in his authority to use funds de available for this program by the Congress. me measure of flexibility is provided in the sent legislation. But we consider it of the ut-st importance to the efficient and economic ac-nplishment of our objectives that the President given even wider discretion for future years. The President has also asked the Congress for hority to make certain commitments of a ger-term nature in assisting countries to carry a restricted number of important projects. ese commitments would be met from nonmili-y mutual security appropriations. We are not ing for additional appropriations. It is con-nplated that this kind of assistance will be fur-nished in special cases where the recipient country cannot carry out a major project with its own resources. I have in mind such projects as river development, improvement of ports, highways, railroads, or other means of communication, and important large industrial projects. Works of this kind generally require a number of years for completion. Where we provide aid for these purposes, it is essential that the recipient country be given reasonable assurance that our aid may be continued for the period of time necessary for completion of the projects and so long as the purposes of the free world are served thereby. Only with assurances of this type of support will these countries be able to develop additional financing from other sources.

Rate of Expenditure

The purpose of the proposed program is to carry on at approximately the same rate of expenditure as last year and the year before. In view of the increased threat of Communist economic penetration in the free world, we cannot afford to reduce our efforts at this time.

The requested increase in appropriation from $2.7 billion in fiscal year 1956 to $4.9 billion in fiscal year 1957 does not imply a corresponding increase in expenditures. The details of this situation will be brought out later in the hearings. But I wish to make the basic facts clear at this time.

The $4.9 billion figure is made up of two parts: First is the defense-support and economic program amounting to $1.9 billion. This compares to a fiscal 1956 request of $1.8 billion and a final appropriation of $1.7 billion. The second part is the military and direct-forces support program of $3 billion. This compares to a fiscal 1956 request of $1.7 billion, and a final appropriation of $1 billion, which was less than half of the annual rate of expenditure.

To recapitulate, the increased request this year of $4.9 billion, as compared to the appropriation last year of $2.7 billion, or a difference of $2.2 billion, is made up as follows:

(a) increase in defense support and economic aid—$200 million;

(b) increase in military and direct-forces support—$2.0 billion.

The increase of $200 million in defense support

and economic aid is requested to cover a prudent and moderate increase in the program for the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, and the Far East. This represents an increase of approximately 12 percent in the size of the program for this year. One-half of this increase, or $100 million, is requested for use as a special fund in the Middle East and Africa, with emphasis on the Baghdad Pact countries, while the other half is needed in Asia and the Far East.

The increase of $2 billion in military and direct-forces support will bring to $3 billion the amount requested for these purposes for fiscal year '57. This sum is designed to provide for one extra year's military expenditures at the average annual rate at which the Department of Defense is now expending funds for military assistance. In addition, there is requested authorization of $530 million for advanced weapons, for most of which there have been no prior appropriations.

A detailed explanation of the various programs will be given, of course, in the hearings that are to follow. My purpose in presenting the basic figures at this time is to place the major aspects of the program in their proper perspective.

Again, I would like to reiterate that the purpose of the proposed program is to maintain approximately the same rate of expenditure during fiscal year 1957 as in the years 1955 and 1956. The fact that increased authorizations are required in order to maintain the same expenditures, particularly in the military program, will be brought out later by Mr. Gray and other witnesses from the Department of Defense.

Conclusion

Mr. Hollister plans to discuss with you the detailed legislative provisions which we are requesting for this 1957 program. Altogether we believe that these appropriations, subject to the approval of Congress, will:

(1) provide adequate means to continue to strengthen our allies;

(2) continue soundly and affirmatively our economic program, which in itself is the best answer to new Soviet activities;

(3) achieve a greater measure of flexibility so urgently needed;

(4) supply a limited element of continuity in our aid program.

I have presented in very brief outline the problem we face and the proposal of the execu branch for the solution of that problem. I our earnest hope the Committee will approve t program.

Visit of Deputy Prime Minister of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

The Department of State announced on Ma 24 (press release 160) that Sir Roy Welens Deputy Prime Minister of the Federation of R desia and Nyasaland, will visit Washington Ma 25–30, under the auspices of the International l change of Persons Program. Principal purp of the tour is to familiarize Sir Roy with United States and particularly with its transp tation and manufacturing industries as well as afford him the opportunity to confer with U Government transportation, labor, and busin leaders.

Deputy Prime Minister Welensky arrived New York March 17 and has just completed vis to Pittsburgh and Chicago. While in Washing he will confer with officials of the Departments State, Commerce, and Labor, Members of C gress, and labor and transportation officials. F lowing his stay here, the Deputy Prime Minis will fly to California via Denver, Colo., and v also visit the Grand Canyon, Texas, and the T nessee Valley. After another visit in New Yo from April 12–21, he will fly to Canada.

Congratulatory Messages on Signing of French-Tunisian Protocol

Message From U.S. Consul General to Bey of Tu

Press release 154 dated March 22

My Government wishes to convey to His Hi ness the Bey, to the members of the Tunis Government, and to the people of Tunisia its c gratulations on the signature of the Protocol Agreement of March 20 between the Governme of Tunisia and France, and on the recognition Tunisian independence as embodied therein.

My Government desires to express its particu

[1] Delivered on Mar. 22 by Morris N. Hughes, Co General of the United States in Tunis, to Sidi Moham Lamine Pasha, Bey of Tunis.

iration for the courage and realism of those once again have proven steadfast in adhering ie principle of peaceful negotiation. In fol- ng the paths of friendship which have led to signature of this solemn act, the leaders of isia give proof to the world of their devotion he real welfare of the inhabitants of their ıtry.

ellvered on Mar. 22 by the American Embassy at s.

Message From U.S. Ambassador to French Foreign Office [2]

Press release 155 dated March 22

My Government desires to pay new homage to the realism and magnanimity of those who have made possible the Franco-Tunisian Protocol of Agreement, signed on March 20, and to the role of France, which has proven once again her dedication to the progress of North Africa and to the aspirations of its people.

rification of U.S. Policy Toward North Africa

by C. Douglas Dillon
Ambassador to France [1]

am glad to have the opportunity to speak ou today. Recently I have noticed in France ncreasing misunderstanding of United States cy toward North Africa. Such misunder- ding is a matter of serious concern to us all should not be allowed to continue. In an at- pt to clarify this situation I am going to de- be briefly the basic views of my Government rding the problems which France is facing in area.

think you will all agree that there are today mber of people in France who seem to feel the United States has not been adequately porting France in North Africa or, worse still, we have even contemplated the possibility eplacing her in that area. Nothing could be her from the truth. Ever since I have been in Paris my Government has loyally sup- ed the French Government in its search for tions to North African problems—solutions will make possible long-term, close coopera- between France and the Moslem communi- of Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria. The United es has consistently supported France when th African subjects have been discussed in United Nations. The most recent instance our strong support last fall of the position Algeria is an internal French problem and efore not appropriate for discussion by the N.[2] In addition, when last year the important question of helicopters was brought to our attention, we responded promptly and favorably to the requests of the French Government. Never once since I have been in Paris have I had a specific complaint from any member of any French government or, for that matter, from any informed Frenchman regarding any action taken by the United States Government in North Africa.

I say "United States Government" advisedly, because I do not mean to say that Frenchmen have not occasionally spoken to me about the actions of a few private American citizens in the North African area. But I have two observations to make on this score: First, if one looks at the overall picture, any actions taken by the few private American citizens who have had anything to do with North Africa are clearly of very minor importance in the drama of the past few years; second, and even more important, I am sure that you will all agree with me that in free countries such as France and the United States, where there is no governmental control over the thoughts and words of our citizens, it is most important to distinguish clearly and sharply between the action of the nation as such taken by its government and the actions or words of private individuals. There has been a tendency in France to confuse the two when talking of American policy in North Africa, and I ask you to help in guarding against this error.

Translation of address delivered in French before the omatic Press Association at Paris, France, on Mar. 20.

[2] BULLETIN of Oct. 3, 1955, p. 546.

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With this background, how is it possible that so much misunderstanding should have arisen? Misunderstanding between peoples almost inevitably means that there must be some fault on both sides. I have looked hard at the American position in this matter, and I think that I may have found one of the causes. That is that, until now, there have been very few public expressions of United States policy in this area. On the one hand we have felt that Algeria was primarily a French affair and on the other that the relationships between France and Morocco and Tunisia were matters to be settled between the French Government on the one hand and the Moroccan and Tunisian Governments on the other. We thought that public expression of our views would be considered to be undue interference in other people's affairs, and accordingly we have kept silent. While we have repeatedly given assurance in private to the French Government that we supported their efforts to reach liberal and mutually acceptable solutions in the area, our policy of avoiding public expression of our views may have contributed to a misunderstanding of our position.

I hope today that I can do something to rectify this situation. May I suggest, on the other hand, that we Americans, when judged by the record of our longtime friendship and cooperation as well as our sacrifices on the fields of France during the last two wars, may deserve a greater degree of confidence than has been shown us by certain circles of public opinion.

Tunisia and Morocco

Now let me elaborate a little on our policies. First, let us look at Tunisia and Morocco. With these two countries the French Government, animated by the liberal traditions for which France is justly famous, has concluded agreements. In the first agreement—that with Tunisia—a long step was taken toward independence. There followed the recent agreement according full independence to Morocco.[3] And we have just learned that new negotiations perfecting the independence of Tunisia have been successfully completed. These agreements should usher in a new era of close interdependence between those two countries and France. They have been greeted with applause and thanksgiving throughout the free world.

[3] *Ibid.*, Mar. 19, 1956, p. 466.

What does this newly acquired status of i pendence mean? It simply means that hencef the relationships between France on the one h and Morocco and Tunisia on the other wil freely negotiated as between sovereign equals. certainly hope that these new relationships not weaken but rather will strengthen the c ties that have bound France and these two la together in a common destiny. I am certain the Tunisian and Moroccan people must rea that they owe their remarkable economic and cial development of recent years to French in tive and to French investment.

My Government was particularly happy learn that the recent negotiations with Tur and Morocco opened up the prospect of a tinued close relationship between the Gov ments and people of France and these two co tries. The United States wholeheartedly supp such a relationship of freely negotiated inte pendence. We believe it is a necessity in the w of today, when it has become difficult if not im sible for any country to stand alone.

You have all heard that the people of the Un States are anticolonialist by tradition. Tha true, and we are proud of it. But what does mean? It means that we believe, as I am the people and Government of France believe, the less-favored peoples of the world shoul brought forward as rapidly as possible to a s of freedom in which they can freely and ration choose their own destiny. Such freedom of ch can take many forms. It by no means requir rupture between the peoples that have newly quired their freedom and those that have led t along the path to this freedom. May I point, example, to the decisions of the peoples of P stan, India, and Ceylon to stay on as member the British Commonwealth in their capacity sovereign nations? May I point to the free cision of the people of Puerto Rico to maintai even closer relationship with the United State

Therefore, it should come as no surprise wh say that the United States hopes for and fa the continuation of the closest possible inte pendence between France and Morocco Tunisia. May I also say, once and for all, with the greatest clarity and force, that the Un States has no desire to interfere in any way the close relationship between France and t

countries—a relationship which we look upon ne of the bulwarks of the free world.

eria

ow let me turn for a moment to Algeria. Here problem is quite different and the solution st undoubtedly be different. The four departts of Algeria are French territory. There are 00,000 Frenchmen living in Algeria alongside 00,000 Moslems, and this coexistence in itself es a most complex and difficult problem.

While my Government has been, and is, well re of this problem, it is fair to say that public nion in the United States has not been adetely informed regarding the French commu- in Algeria. The size of this community, the ent of its participation in all phases of Algerian , and the length of its history in Algeria are becoming better known to the American ple, and with this knowledge is coming greater lerstanding and sympathy for the problems you e in Algeria. I can assure you that France our profound sympathy and support in its mpt to work out a liberal solution to this diffit problem of coexistence.

The French contribution in North Africa, the at advances in hygiene and public health, the lding of roads and hospitals, the multitude of tly and ingenious programs that have made ren areas fruitful—these are all elements of a matic story that is not well enough known oad. The soaring population increases in geria and throughout North Africa over the t decades are in themselves testimony to these ievements. France can and should be proud her efforts in North Africa. It would be help- if she were to make a greater effort to spread knowledge of these good works throughout the rld.

Now, to return again to Algeria, there the nch Government has proposed a liberal pro- m, the basic element of which is a search for arrangements for the continued coexistence the French and Moslem communities—new argements to be freely arrived at by discussion ween the chosen leaders of the Moslem comnity and the representatives of France and the nch community in Algeria. The French Govment has solemnly promised free elections for purpose of choosing these leaders. Such elecns are wholly consistent with the ideals of liberty and justice which are held so dear by both the French and American people. But we all know that elections cannot take place while disorder reigns. Hence, we in the United States fervently hope that peace and order will come soon to the Algerian countryside so that progress can be made toward the liberal solution sought by the French Government.

U.S. Support for France

My countrymen have always been shocked by blind acts of terrorism, and those who take part in such activity should not for a moment imagine that they have the support of my Government or of any segment of our public opinion. May I repeat so that there can be no possible misunderstanding: The United States stands solidly behind France in her search for a liberal and equitable solution of the problems in Algeria.

We recognize that there have been external influences at work trying to undermine the French position throughout North Africa. I hope that what I have just said will be of help in enabling the people of France to differentiate sharply between her friends and her foes, between the friends and allies who support her in her search for liberal and fair solutions, and those who have sought to destroy every possibility of a continuing relationship between France and the Moslem communities throughout North Africa.

Finally, I would like to ask your help in one concrete matter, which I feel is in the best interests of France as well as of my own country. It is undeniable that the terrorists and those who seek simply to drive France from North Africa are encouraged by any indication that there may be differences between France and her allies, in particular the United States, regarding North African policy. There have been articles in the press stressing that differences of opinion exist in this matter between France and the United States. Such articles can only serve to encourage the enemies of France. I hope that after the explanation which I have just given of United States policy in North Africa you will feel able to join with me in an effort to dissipate the misunderstandings of the past and to let everyone realize that France, in its search for liberal solutions that will insure the continuance of its presence in North Africa, has the wholehearted support of the United States Government.

A Crucial Contest With the Communist World

by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy[1]

The part George Washington University plays in this community more than bears out the wisdom of the first President of our country in sponsoring the idea of a university located in the Capital of the Nation. Of course, George Washington's wish was not for a university devoted exclusively to the training of civil servants, important as that is. His desire also was for a university providing "education in all branches of polite literature: in arts and sciences. . . ."

The 14 colleges, schools, and divisions of the University, including medicine, law, engineering, education, pharmacy, and government, as well as the 4-year course in liberal arts, have fulfilled his wish more completely than he might have dreamed. The graduates of these schools and disciplines, whether or not they go into the Government, contribute richly to the life and wealth of our area and Nation.

We sometimes fail to appreciate the contribution made by our system of higher education, not only to the internal needs and culture of our country but to our understanding of foreign affairs. The strength of our society depends in large part on the intelligence and training of our people, on the mixing of technical and professional skills, and on the ability of all our people to analyze and comprehend the economic, political, and social forces at work in the world today.

We not only rely on technical training and on scientific skills for the enrichment of our society. The liberal arts, the inquiring mind, the well-rounded individual are perhaps of more fundamental significance in our kind of country. The Founding Fathers who drew up the charter our Nation reflected in high degree this attit of inquiry, this wide variety of skills, intellige and experience. Our higher education today is voted to the idea of the well-rounded man.

By comparison we note that the Soviet sys does not have this breadth of purpose. It is ducing technicians, engineers, and men of sci in growing, if not disturbing, abundance. broad intellectual needs of a developed and w balanced society are seemingly neglected and e repressed in the Soviet Union. In this way it complishes the purpose of the state to prog rapidly in technical and economic fields. onesidedness in Soviet education and training resents a certain danger to the free world. It sults in almost complete acceptance of dogmas of opinions handed down from above usually w out question and without understanding.

Recent Communist Party Congress

We have witnessed a further startling exam of this onesidedness at the recent 20th Congres the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at M cow. This relates to the Stalin story, about wh we are still lacking factual information. news of this apparent development has leaked the outside world in a peculiar fashion. We s do not possess the text of the speech said to h been made by Khrushchev at the Party Cong meeting in February, but it is reported that Kh shchev delivered a lengthy denunciation of former master. As a result of that speech Jos Stalin apparently has now become an outcast pariah, where but a very few short years ago was the demigod, the physical and spiritual ru of all the Russians. If reports are accurate, t

[1] Address made before the George Washington University Alumni Luncheon at Washington, D. C., on Mar. 24 (press release 157 dated Mar. 23).

writing of history, which the 200 million people the Soviet Union may be reluctantly forced to ept, is a spectacle we have seen before and one it makes us cherish more dearly than ever our tem of free inquiry and broad education.

The 20th Congress of the Communist Party was many respects a valuable performance for us to tch, even though we do not as yet know the en- e story or understand its implications. During e 3 years and 4 months since the 19th Communist rty Congress, many changes had occurred on Soviet scene. The most important, of course, s the death of Stalin in 1953, ending a 29-year le and paving the way for a new phase in Soviet tory. In this same period collective leadership top party organs, or perhaps more accurately lective dictatorship, a form of oligarchy, be- ne the guiding principle of the Government. the same time, Khrushchev succeeded in mov- to the forefront of the ruling group.

The purge of Beria brought the police under ner party control. The armed forces received reater share of prestige and recognition. Agri- ture remained a weak point and became the get for sustained special attention. A new ss on consumers' goods was short-lived as the ime reaffirmed the priority of heavy industry. The first Soviet thermonuclear test explosion, appearance of new long-range bombers and ersonic fighters, the development of guided siles, the modernization and reequipment of ound forces, the continued emphasis on new val construction—all testified to the further rease of Soviet military power since 1952.

n foreign affairs, the Soviets moved toward v international relationships which gave them re flexibility, whether or not they reflected any damental change in Communist strategy. is new posture was most dramatically expressed the "summit" meeting last summer in Geneva. e Soviets sought to create an image of the S.S.R. as a peace-loving power by a number of lomatic gestures and by offering to remove ew barriers to communication with the non- mmunist world. The wars in Korea and Indo- na were ended, an Austrian treaty was signed, ations with West Germany were established. e U.S.S.R. warmed up its approach to Yugo- via and to a number of non-Communist coun- s stretching from the Arctic to the Indian an. They employed new means—arms, cred- t machines, and technicians—in a new political offensive against less-developed non-Communist countries.

Against this background, more than 1,400 delegates to the 20th Communist Party Congress, as well as delegates from 55 foreign Communist Parties, assembled in the Great Hall of the Kremlin in February.

The highlight and main innovation of the 20th Congress was the first formal public criticism of Stalin by his successors. In the nearly 3 years since his death, Stalin's stature had been progressively reduced by withholding adulation from him and concentrating it on Lenin, but previous to the Congress there had been no official public criticism.

The criticism of Stalin centered on methods of rule, but it also involved policy decisions. Caustic references were made to one-man decision-making, leader-worship, overcentralization, mistakes in economic policies, ossified conduct of foreign relations, distortions of ideology, propaganda in Soviet history, unhealthy developments in Soviet law, and arbitrariness in law enforcement.

A second important result of the conference was to put the official stamp of approval on the present organization of rule as well as on recent policies. The emphasis on collectivity in leadership plus the criticism of one-man rule may have been designed to make it more difficult for any Soviet leader to set himself apart from the other members of the ruling clique. Nevertheless, it may be significant that the new Central Committee expanded the party presidium to include members with ties to Khrushchev. In addition, it enlarged the party secretariat, which is directed by Khrushchev, and tied that body and the presidium even more closely together through overlapping of membership.

"Peaceful Coexistence"

In the field of foreign affairs, the Soviet rulers claimed success for their new policies and promised that they would be pursued even more vigorously. Their basic premise they defined as peaceful coexistence as the only alternative to "the most destructive war in history."

Their apparent plan is to cultivate friendly relations with most countries, including the major Western Powers, but not at the cost of concessions. They apparently will make special efforts in less-developed areas and among foreign socialist groups.

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Their immediate aim was made clear: to undermine Western defense efforts and further to extend Soviet influence. Their ultimate goal was expressed by speaker after speaker with even greater optimism than in the past: "The ideas of communism will triumph without war."

The Soviet rulers gave a number of reasons for their confidence. They cited growing Soviet military power as a deterrent to Western aggression. They depicted increasing Soviet economic strength as a symbol of the success of communism. They lumped into a "zone of peace" the neutral countries, which together with the Sino-Soviet bloc they consider as proof that a majority of mankind is moving toward "peace" and socialism.

The speeches at the Communist Congress showed awareness of the contradiction between coexistence and continuing Communist-capitalist conflict. Unwilling to discard either, the Soviet leaders sought to appear both respectable and revolutionary by adjusting their ideological garb. The doctrine of the inevitability of war was modified to stress the preventability of war. The doctrine of the necessity of the violent overthrow of capitalism was shaded to sanction a "nonviolent" parliamentary seizure of power. These adjustments were intended to reassure non-Communists of the seriousness of Soviet ideas on coexistence and to make clear to Communists that coexistence means neither relaxation nor reformism. Coexistence, it was stressed, is a state-to-state concept, which involves no reconciliation with "bourgeois" ideas.

Within the U.S.S.R. the priority of heavy industry and the maintenance of a high level of armaments continue to demand sacrifices from the population, since the threat of war is assumed still to exist. Outside the U.S.S.R., the Soviet speakers declared, Soviet efforts to improve relations with foreign governments are not to be interpreted by local Communists as undercutting their efforts to come to power. A period of coexistence, they maintain, will still provide chances for revolution.

As we see it, these were the highlights of the Soviet Congress. These are the features which the Communist leaders themselves thought most significant about the Soviet Union. Now we might try to look at the world scene more objectively.

Several important elements in combination have been instrumental in bringing about the changes in Soviet policy and strategy dramatized by the 20th Communist Congress. The death of Stalin opened the door for new leaders to try out n ideas and to get out from under Stalin's d weight. Very real increases in Soviet indust capacity have given them both greater confide in their power of control and the ability to exp their economic operations. The development testing of thermonuclear weapons in the hands both sides perhaps has persuaded some that prospect of another world war is more rem Finally—and this is most significant—we m bear in mind that, if the Soviets have in f shifted to new methods and new points of atta it is because the strength and firmness of the f nations frustrated their old methods of intimi tion and aggression.

Challenge in Western Europe

The primary aim of the Soviets from 1945 ur rather recently was to take over Western Eur through dividing and weakening it by subversi and threats. Europe is the site of the world's m highly developed industrial plant outside t United States. The combined industrial capac of Western Europe and the United States greater by a ratio of seven to two than the capaci of the Communist empire. Control of Weste Europe, however, would give the Communists lead of five to four. In population, in geograp in military power, and in political, economic, a cultural leadership, Western Europe was and the most valuable prize in the world for the Co munist imperialists.

To meet their challenge, we and our allies Europe built our military capacity to a poi where it was sufficient to deter an attack. O foreign aid at first prevented economic collap and has now produced record prosperity. T North Atlantic Treaty provided a warning syste against any Communist attempt to move again the European nations one by one.

The joining of a rearmed and prosperous Ge many with a unified and strong NATO was t signal that the 10-year Soviet effort to weake divide, and conquer the richest prize in the wor had failed. The problem now is to retain th unity and strength.

In addition to their efforts at conquest in E rope, the Communists also attempted, by violenc threats, and subversion, to forward their aggre sive aims in the Far East.

In Korea 3 years ago the Communists we made to understand that, if they failed to reac

agreement for an early cease-fire, they would n the risk of retaliation massive enough to cost em far more than war could gain. Today Korea at peace.

In the Formosa Strait a year ago, the Chinese ommunists were aggressively pressing their ims to the offshore islands of Quemoy and atsu and to Formosa. The President sought and tained from Congress the overwhelming assurce that the might of this country would be used necessary to guard the peace. War has not oken out in the Formosa Strait.

peal to Colonial Peoples

It is said that a good general forces his opponent meet him on ground that is favorable to him. e Soviets are now appealing to colonial and rmer colonial peoples who are searching for onomic strength and political prestige. As a rmer colony which won its own freedom and s helped other nations to achieve theirs, the ited States can make a strong case for our sysn against the "new colonialism" of the Comnist empire. We are challenged, in effect, to e up to our own heritage. I believe we are eting that challenge.

The Soviets are now imitating our efforts to lp other countries build economic strength. ir efforts in this field have enjoyed much sucs during the past 10 years. There is no ground on which we are better equipped by experience l productive capacity to place our efforts up inst theirs. Our 160 million people, working freedom, produce over three times as much as the 220 million of the Soviet Union, working servitude. Again we are meeting the challenge, l I am confident we will succeed. It is an exsive and trying experience for our Nation bese our competitor's tactics involve deceptive ctices. The Stalinist open military aggression supplanted by political and economic subversion liked in language of peace and friendly cooperon. We have known how to deal with military gression. We are even better equipped to deal h the present form of competition.

Ve are on the high ground in this crucial cone with the Communist world. Our reserves—nitary, economic, and political—are vast. Our n hods have been tested and proven through 10 rs of post-war competition. As President Eenhower has said,

e sum of our international effort should be this: the waging of peace, with as much resourcefulness, with as great a sense of dedication and urgency as we have ever mustered in defense of our country in time of war. In this effort, our weapon is not force. Our weapons are the principles and ideas embodied in our historic traditions, applied with the same vigor that in the past made America a living promise of freedom for all mankind.[2]

Those party bosses who oppose us, by contrast, are on the low ground, on the quicksands and broken terrain of Soviet colonialism in all its brutality, bad faith, and oppression. Neither materially nor morally can they match our potential. We enjoy the support of our people in our efforts. I should doubt that the Communist leadership is entirely confident of support of the masses. We do not intend that they shall outwit or outdistance us in this crucial test.

We will hope and work for the day when conflict of any kind may cease, when all may join in peaceful efforts toward peaceful ends, when Russia itself will be governed by men who put the welfare of the Russian people above world conquest. But as long as there is to be conflict, we are on the high ground, and if we have faith in ourselves and our system, if we are brave, resourceful, and patient, we will win through. I know that we here today, as graduates of a university with a proud record in our Nation's history, will play a vital part in this epic struggle.

Soviet Payment of Damages for U.S. Navy Plane

Press release 148 dated March 19

The following is the text of a note delivered by the Soviet Embassy in Washington to the Department of State on March 16, 1956, in reply to the United States note of January 6, 1956,[1] requesting payment of damages for the destruction of a United States Navy Neptune plane on June 22, 1955.

[Translation]

The Embassy of the U.S.S.R. presents its compliments to the Department of State of the U.S.A. and, referring to the State Department's note of January 6 of this year, has the honor to state the following.

The State Department's note asserts that the

[2] BULLETIN of Jan. 16, 1956, p. 79.

[1] BULLETIN of Jan. 16, 1956, p. 94.

American military aircraft of the "Neptune" type referred to in the note did not violate the state frontier of the U.S.S.R.

In this connection, the Embassy considers it necessary to recall that on June 25, 1955, in the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., V. M. Molotov, to the Secretary of State of the U.S.A., Mr. Dulles,[2] factual data were communicated regarding the violation of the U.S.S.R. state frontier by an American military aircraft of the "Neptune" type.

The present note reaffirms the above-mentio statement concerning the circumstances of the lation of the U.S.S.R. state frontier by an Am can military aircraft.

In accordance with the agreement which been reached and with the request contained the State Department's note of January 6 of year, there is enclosed a check in the amount $724,947.68 in reimbursement for 50 percent the total amount of the damages borne by American side.

Visit of Prime Minister Costello of Ireland

Following are texts of statements and addresses made during the visit to Washington of John A. Costello, Prime Minister of Ireland, from March 14 to 17.

WELCOME AT NATIONAL AIRPORT

Press release 136 dated March 14

Statement by Vice President Nixon

Mr. Prime Minister, it is a very great privilege and honor for me to welcome you to Washington, D.C., and the United States on behalf of President Eisenhower and on behalf of all the American people.

It seems to me rather symbolic that you are arriving in this season of the year, because, as you will note, in just a few days you will find virtually all Americans blossoming out in the green, and not only those of Irish persuasion and descent but others who have great affection for those who are Irish. Consequently, perhaps, it is not too inappropriate that you are arriving on a day on which the rain is falling very heavily in Washington, because that means that we will have rain today and a very green and happy St. Patrick's Day on Saturday of this week.

In any event, may I say that, as you know, we have many bonds of friendship between our two countries and our peoples. Those of Irish descent have contributed tremendously to the United States in many fields and particularly, as you will note in Washington, in the fields of statesmans and politics.

So welcome, and we trust that your visit, thou it is brief here, will be one of warmhearted frie ship every place you go.

Response by Prime Minister Costello

Mr. Vice President, when I was listening to y very kind words of welcome, I felt that you sho have been in my position as having kissed Blarney stone. I appreciate the warmth of welcome that has been extended to me this mo ing and appreciate that that welcome is gi from the American people to the Irish nation a the Irish people.

Of course, even the great American Nat which has achieved so much can as yet not cont the weather. We have a saying in Ireland, goi back for many centuries—I will give you the E lish and not the Irish expression—that St. Patr took the cold stone out of the water. The legend was that the water was heated by hot ston and of course they grew cold and the water gr cold. But St. Patrick took it out and, acco ingly, after St. Patrick's Day the weather w get fine.

I regret I can't promise you the weather w get fine before St. Patrick's Day.

The reason that I have come here to the Unit States once again, where I have so many frie and where there are so many people friendly my country, is one not as coming to a foreign co try but as coming to a country in which we h

[2] *Ibid.*, July 18, 1955, p. 100.

uch in common and in which we are really part the American race. We always remember the lcome that was given to our people in bad times, d we hope that they gave, as your Vice President s said, good and substantial and ample return r the warmth and welcome and the shelter they t here in bad times in building up this great merican Nation.

You have given me a welcome as representative the Irish Government and the Irish people. n their behalf and as their representative, I ank you for the warmth of your welcome and ing you their affectionate greetings and the rmest admiration for this great United States America.

DRESS BY THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE NATE, MARCH 15[1]

I wish to express my appreciation of the honor u have done me by inviting me to appear here d address you today. Your invitation is but other of the many friendly gestures which your eat country has extended to mine, gestures which ing from, and go far to perpetuate, those close d intimate ties which bind our countries. It is earnest desire—and my firm intention, insofar any effort of mine can bring it about—that my rt stay amongst you will help to nourish and ter those ties, so that in the future, as in the t, there may exist between our two countries l community of sympathy and interest notwithnding the 3,000 miles of ocean that separate paradoxically unite us.

The ties which unite our countries spring from ommon outlook and from common ideals, based a Christian, democratic, and free way of life. is is not surprising, as Ireland's spiritual em- e, consisting of many millions of persons of sh birth or descent scattered in every corner the globe, is nowhere so powerful as in your ntry. It is this sense of basic community of l spirit between our two countries which serves keep alive today the older historical ties which centuries past have constituted a bond between

n the United States of America, we see the ghtiest upholder of the traditional values of the st. In the veins of this great people flows the blood of many European races, and the Irish have contributed a more than proportionate share. It is not long, in historical time, since America was created as a new Nation, "conceived in liberty," but even then predestined to greatness. In her growth and in the achievements of her people, she has, however, far outstripped the older nations from which she drew her origins. She has become a giant among the nations of the world, splendid in her youth and majestic in her strength.

I bring to you the greetings of a very old nation, though one not long emerged into the light of freedom from centuries of darkness and near despair. We are proud to claim our place as a people who contributed not a little to the creation and development of your great country, and we gladly acknowledge that our contribution has been abundantly repaid in the sympathy and support which we have always received from you in time of need.

At a time when freedom seemed for us, at home, a dissolving dream, Ireland's sons played a significant part in the attainment of liberty in this land of yours. It is, I think, pardonable for us to feel some of the pride that gladdens a parent whose son has grown to manhood in strength and fame and good repute.

Ours is a small country, yours a mighty one. But we have much in common. We, like you, have a tradition of devotion to those principles of freedom, Christian justice and humanity which are facing, in the world of today, a challenge more powerful and menacing than any that has opposed them in the past. It can scarcely be doubted that the almost miraculous development of your country is a manifestation of God's providence, which never leaves His people without a defender strong enough to meet the evil forces of the time. We see in you a Nation, magnificent in its youthful vigor, well fitted to bear the tremendous burden which, in the course of history, has fallen upon its shoulders. Yours is the power and yours, therefore, the responsibility to insure that, in these days of great danger, freedom "shall not perish from the earth."

Ireland may claim to be qualified, better perhaps than any other nation, to serve as a link between the Old World and the New. She is herself an ancient European nation, and her people are steeped in the Christian traditions of European culture. Once situated at the edge of

[1] Reprinted from *Cong. Rec.* of Mar. 15, p. 4307.

the known world, she now finds herself rather at its center, between Europe and America. Such influence as she possesses cannot, in view of her size, be founded in material strength. Rather is it a spiritual influence, which, though without the support of big battalions, has an importance which the Christian democracies of the world will not ignore. How fortunate these democracies are that in your great country they have found a happy alliance of the big battalions with that same spiritual strength.

Millions of our people have found here a second home. In the recent as well as in the more distant past, many of her sons have fought and died for America. I want, however, to mention an Irishman who, nominally, at least, fought against your country. His name was Richard Fitzpatrick.

I seek through you the permission of Congress to present to the Library of Congress five unpublished letters which Fitzpatrick wrote to his brother, the Second Earl of Upper Ossory, during your War of Independence. These letters are a small Irish contribution to the study of the history of the United States, but they have a wider significance, which is my excuse for bringing them to your attention today.

The outbreak of the War of Independence found Richard Fitzpatrick a captain in the British Army. As an intimate friend of Charles James Fox, the great Whig leader, his whole inclinations were against the attempt to subdue the American people, but when ordered abroad to war his sense of duty forbade him to resign his commission.

His letters do not concern themselves much with the incidents of the campaign. They are for the most part a series of reflections on the merits, conduct, and probable issue of the war.

Fitzpatrick, as a member of Parliament, must have many times listened to the rolling periods of his fellow Irishman Edmund Burke, the greatest mind of the age, and one of the greatest political thinkers of all time. Burke had not yet declared the age of chivalry to be gone, and it is not surprising that a man of feeling and intelligence who lived and moved in such an environment as did Fitzpatrick should detest a situation which made him the instrument of an ignoble cause, "a situation," says Fitzpatrick, "where I am obliged to be constantly acting in direct opposition to all my feelings, principles and opinions."

"I grow every day," he cries, "more and mo disgusted with the folly and iniquity of the ca in which I am condemned to serve."

Neither is it surprising that Fitzpatrick's e perience of the American character and temp should lead him to the conclusion that the w could have only one outcome.

Shrewd though many of his judgments we they pale into insignificance beside a remark whi he made when Congress struck a medal in co memoration of the Convention of Saratoga. (that occasion, he said:

> There is a greatness and a dignity in all the proce ings of this people that makes us contemptible indeed. am well convinced they will be the first and great people there ever was an example of in the history mankind.

I doubt if history holds a comparable instar of such prescience. It was this near prophecy the part of a private and comparatively obscu observer of the scene 180 years ago that fi prompted the trustees of the National Libra of Ireland and myself to feel that the proper cu todian of these historic manuscripts should not the National Library of Ireland, whence I a their bearer, but the Library of Congress.

Gentlemen, today the world looks to you "the first and greatest people there ever was example of in the history of mankind." May yo actions always be worthy of the responsibility th thrust upon you, and may there always be a "gre ness and dignity in your proceedings" that w match those shown by your stouthearted fo fathers in their critical hour.

That is my wish for you in presenting you wi this gift from a small nation which is deeply your debt but, you will permit me to say, wh sons and daughters have played their part in ma ing you what you are—the greatest Nation in t world.

ADDRESS TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE MARCH 15 [2]

I am deeply honored by the invitation to addr your assembly. I am sensible that you are ho oring not me but the Irish Government and t whole Irish people, whose spokesman I am tod

I bring a message of good will from a you

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 4236.

public, which is an old nation, to your young ation, the oldest republic on earth.

At the outset of my remarks, and before I ad- ess you on the topics I wish to cover in my ad- ess today, I seek your permission to present to e Library of Congress five unpublished letters ich Richard Fitzpatrick wrote to his brother, e Second Earl of Upper Ossory during your ar of Independence. These letters were pur- ased by the trustees of our National Library of eland and were lodged in the National Library. e originals of these letters go back to 1777. chard Fitzpatrick, who wrote those letters, the iginals of which are in this small case, was an ishman fighting with the British Army against e army of the forthcoming United States of nerica. He did not like this task, but as a soldier felt bound to obey the orders to fight in a cause which he did not approve. During the course his campaigning against the soldiers of the nerican Republic, he wrote some letters to his other in which he expressed the opinion that the itish people were fighting a battle in which they ould not be engaged. He also indicated what s view would be of the outcome of the struggle.

I ask you to permit me to present the originals these letters to the Library of Congress. They e remarkable for the fact they are so old, still re remarkable for the fact they are the candid d self-critical expressions of a soldier who was hting against an army who were themselves uggling for independence, but they are really narkable, outstandingly remarkable, for one rticular passage which I ask your permission to d to you and which in itself furnishes me with a excuse, if an excuse were needed, and certainly h a justification, for asking that your Library ll have custody of these historic documents her than our National Library of Ireland.

n one of his letters, giving expression to his ws after Congress had struck a medal in com- moration of the Convention of Saratoga, he sl:

here is a greatness and a dignity in all the proceedings of his people that makes us contemptible indeed. I am w l convinced they will be the first and greatest people th e ever was an example of in the history of mankind.

am presenting you with this small gift as the resentative of a small nation to this Nation ich has fulfilled the prophecy Fitzpatrick made 1 years ago.

take leave to express the conviction that your actions will always be worthy of the responsibility which has been thrust upon you and that there will always be in the proceedings of this great Nation a "greatness and dignity in your proceedings" that will continue to keep you "the first and greatest people there ever was an example of in the history of mankind."

Your countrymen are well aware that they occupy a very special place in the hearts of all Irishmen, a position due as much to Irish admiration of the achievements and attainments of the United States as to the many associations our two countries have in common.

You have been the world's exemplar of liberty and the course you have so brilliantly traveled many in the rest of the world have been content but to follow. Your magnificent political institutions, the creation of your youthful genius, have been the model not less for us in Dublin than for the other centers of the civilized world. Yours has been the idea of a fundamental document protecting, with a carefully balanced arrangement of political power, the fundamental human rights. What a noble conception of man has inspired your Constitution, yet how well founded it is on the earth. The idealism has not vanished like a dream but has remained the angelic part of a truly human institution.

For your Founding Fathers, to whose broodings political philosophers of every age return for inspiration, were not merely thinkers but men of action, too: If theoretical, practical also. They knew the nature of man, so wittily disclosed by G. K. Chesterton, who said:

There is one little defect about man, the image of God, the wonder of the world and the paragon of animals, he is not to be trusted.

This fine distrust, a lawyer's shrewdness, is writ large over your Constitution. The men who made it built well on sound foundations: and what they built has endured.

It has been said that growth is the only evidence of life. What amazing, unexampled growth has not your history shown. What abounding life does not your country display. May your future repeat the miracles of your past and well will humanity be served. Your present hospitality is but another happy instance of those many friendly gestures toward Ireland which the United States has made in the past. It is not very many years ago since it was my pleasant duty to ex-

press our thanks for the generous help which we received under Marshall aid. But the help which America gave Ireland did not start with Marshall aid. Long before Marshall aid was thought of, American support sustained the Irish people.

Ages ago, long before America was discovered by Europe, it was imagined by Irish seers as I-Breasail—The Island of Great Desire—a fertile land of alluring loveliness; in the terrible centuries of Ireland's misfortune when "Hope had grown gray hairs, Hope had mourning on," this memory remained. Then out into the miraculous sunsets of the west coast of Ireland went many an Irish family to reach this Island of Great Desire, and truly were they not mistaken in their journeys, for abounding hospitality and consolation in plenty awaited them and a fine future of noble living. And it is our boast that our emigrants have contributed not insignificantly to the building up of America. We allow ourselves, therefore, to feel that we, too, may to an extent share your greatness.

All small nations owe a special debt of gratitude to the United States for its strong and unceasing efforts for world peace. Through your efforts we have been spared the unlimited horrors of modern war and have thereby been able to maintain unscathed our Christian, democratic, and free way of life.

It has been your honor to have exercised the greatest power on earth in accordance with the high principles of justice. It has, indeed, been well said that you are apt for power. If you do but maintain your power as the servant of your rectitude, the world's future will be in good hands. I pray that it may be so. You will not need encouragement from me to ignore the misunderstandings and misrepresentations with which your foreign policy has been met in certain lands, for ingratitude is the first of the sins of man. But I can assure you that the free critical intelligence of my countrymen has not faulted your intention.

History has inextricably intertwined the fortunes of our two countries, and it is an easy task to come on such a mission as mine. I have the sense of having traveled far only to find myself at home. It was the Irish statesman, Henry Grattan, who said that the ocean unites, and in the west of my country we say that the next parish is America.

Time has not fulfilled nor realized the optimist's dream. Its passage has not exclusively brought improvement to the human situation. Inde some of the developments we have witnessed ha confronted mankind with the ultimate decisic about life. Nevertheless, it was your great Am ican judge, Oliver Wendell Holmes, who said

> I think it not improbable that man, like the grub t prepares a chamber for the winged thing it never seen but is to be—that man may have cosmic destin that he does not understand.

This has been the heart of the Christian messa imparted to all of us, that man has such cosr destinies; and it is good that the people of Amer and of Ireland can share together the Christ hope.

Atoms-for-Peace Agreement Signed by Ireland and U.S.

On March 16 the Atomic Energy Commiss and the Department of State (press release 1 announced that representatives of Ireland a the United States had on that day signed a p posed agreement for cooperation in research in peaceful uses of atomic energy.[1] The agreem was negotiated within the framework of Pr dent Eisenhower's atoms-for-peace program.

The agreement was signed for Ireland by A bassador John J. Hearne. The Deputy Assist Secretary of State for European Affairs, C. Bu Elbrick, and Lewis Strauss, Chairman of Atomic Energy Commission, signed for the Uni States.

Under the proposed agreement, the Governm of Ireland will receive information as to the sign, construction, and operation of research actors and their use as research, development, engineering tools. It is contemplated that vate American citizens and organizations woul authorized to supply to the Irish Government to authorized private persons under its juris tion, appropriate equipment and services.

The proposed agreement further provides ta the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission will leas the Irish Government for use in research reac up to 6 kilograms (13.2 pounds) of contai U–235 in uranium enriched up to a maximun 20 percent U–235. Ireland assumes responsibi for using and safeguarding the fissionable m rial in accordance with the terms of the prope

[1] For text of a similar agreement with Turkey, tialed on May 3, 1955, see BULLETIN of July 11, 1955, p

eement. The agreement provides for the exnge of unclassified information in the research ctor field, related health and safety problems, l on the use of radioactive isotopes in physical l biological research, medical therapy, agriture, and industry.

Looking to the future, the agreement expresses hope and expectation of the parties that this tial agreement for cooperation will lead to coneration of further cooperation in the peaceful s of atomic energy.

This proposed cooperative agreement will ene the Irish to enhance their own country's train- and experience in nuclear science and engiring for the development of peaceful uses of mic energy, including civilian nuclear power hin the framework of the atoms-for-peace gram.

Under the provisions of the U.S. Atomic Energy t of 1954, certain procedural steps must be en by the executive and legislative branches of United States Government before the agreent signed may enter into force.

rthquake Disaster in Lebanon

ollowing are the texts of messages sent to sident Camille Chamoun of Lebanon by Presit Eisenhower on March 19 (White House press ase dated March 20) and by Acting Secretary ver on March 17 (press release 149).

sage From President Eisenhower

ews of the tragic consequences of the earthkes in Lebanon has been received with sorrow concern throughout the United States. On lf of the American people I send deepest symy to Your Excellency and to all those who suffering in this disaster.

sage From Acting Secretary Hoover

he news of Lebanon's earthquake disaster has widely reported in the U.S. On behalf of Government and the American people, I en to send Your Excellency heartfelt condoes on the loss of lives that has resulted and est sympathy to the bereaved families and rs in distress, particularly in Chauf and the ges of Mt. Lebanon and South Lebanon.

Prime Minister of India To Visit United States

White House press release dated March 20

The Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, has accepted the President's invitation to visit the United States. It has now been found that a visit immediately following the conclusion of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in London would be mutually agreeable.

It is expected that Mr. Nehru will arrive in the United States on July 6 or 7 and will depart on July 10 or 11. The visit will be an informal one, and discussions between the President and Prime Minister Nehru will cover matters of mutual interest between the two countries.

The President has offered to have the Presidential plane bring the Prime Minister from London and return him there upon completion of his visit.

Congratulatory Messages to Pakistan on Republic Day

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT EISENHOWER

White House press release dated March 22

The President sent the following letter on March 21 to General Iskander Mirza, President of Pakistan, on the occasion of the celebration of Republic Day, Pakistan's new national holiday, March 23, 1956.

Dear Mr. President: On the occasion of Pakistan's establishment as a Republic within the Commonwealth, I send my greetings and best wishes, as well as those of the people of the United States, to you and through you to the people of Pakistan. The United States will be represented at the attendant ceremonies by the United States Ambassador to Pakistan [Horace A. Hildreth] and by a Special Representative, the Honorable Jefferson Caffery, one of our most distinguished citizens.

The inauguration of Pakistan's constitution represents an important milestone in Pakistan's development as a modern, democratic state, responsive to the needs and aspirations of its people. The long efforts of Pakistan's leaders in drafting a

constitution based on democratic principles have culminated in well-deserved success. Because of the close ties of friendship between our countries, the people of the United States are particularly happy to send expressions of good will on this memorable day in Pakistan's history.

I am confident that under your inspiring leadership Pakistan will continue to make progress in advancing the welfare of its people.

May I express my good wishes for success in these worthy endeavors.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

MESSAGES FROM SECRETARY DULLES

Press release 156 dated March 22

Secretary Dulles on March 21 addressed the following congratulatory messages to Prime Minister Chaudhri Mohamad Ali and Foreign Minister Hamidul Huq Choudhury of Pakistan.

Secretary Dulles to the Prime Minister

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: I want to extend to you my warmest congratulations on the coming into effect of Pakistan's constitution and the establishment of Pakistan as a Republic within the Commonwealth. Despite formidable difficulties Pakistan has established an impressive record of achievement in many fields since its independence but a few years ago. The adoption of a constitution represents another important stride in Pakistan's advance. It is our belief that the establishment of a Republic in Pakistan marks the beginning of a new era of progress and growth for your country.

I greatly enjoyed my recent visit to Pakistan on the occasion of our successful SEATO meeting. I shall long cherish the kindness and hospitality extended to me by the people of Pakistan.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

Secretary Dulles to the Foreign Minister

DEAR MR. MINISTER: On the occasion of Pakistan's establishment as a Republic within the Commonwealth I offer my best wishes to you and to the people of Pakistan. The adoption of a constitution guaranteeing the preservation of fundamental human rights is evidence of your country's deep attachment to democratic principles and is an event of which all the people of Pakistan may truly proud.

The United States looks forward to a contin tion of the close cooperation which has char terized our common exertions for safeguarding peace. Pakistan's contribution to the collect defense efforts of the free world is a reassura to its friends and I am sure it is also a source pride to Pakistan's own leaders and people.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLE

Note to Japanese Government on Pacific Nuclear Tests

Press release 158 dated March 23

Following is the text of a note concerning forthcoming nuclear tests in the Pacific which delivered by the Department of State to the E bassy of Japan on March 19.

The Acting Secretary of State presents his cc pliments to His Excellency the Ambassador Japan and has the honor to refer to the note fr the Embassy of Japan dated January 25, 195 requesting assurances of compensation in the ev of damage or economic loss arising from the for coming nuclear tests in the Pacific, and the E bassy's note dated February 14, 1956,[1] transm ting the resolutions of the Japanese Diet urgi suspension of nuclear tests and expressing strong wish of the Government of Japan th earnest consideration be given to the realizati of the desire of the people of Japan as express in these resolutions.

The United States is second to none in its des for the safeguarded control and reduction armaments, including nuclear weapons. Pre dent Eisenhower has led the way toward wor cooperation to achieve this goal. In his addr to the United Nations General Assembly on I cember 8, 1953,[2] he stated,

> . . . the United States pledges before you—and theref before the world—its determination to help solve the fe ful atomic dilemma—to devote its entire heart and mi to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecra to his life.

At the Summit Conference in Geneva last su

[1] Not printed.

[2] BULLETIN of Dec. 21, 1953, p. 847.

, President Eisenhower proposed an exchange blueprints and a system of aerial inspection.[3] st recently, in his letter of March 1, 1956, to mier Bulganin of the Union of Soviet Socialist ublics,[4] the President stated that:

> n my judgment, our efforts must be directed especially ringing under control the nuclear threat. As an im- ant step for this purpose and assuming the satisfactory ation of our air and ground inspection system, the ted States would be prepared to work out, with other ons, suitable and safeguarded arrangements so that re production of fissionable materials anywhere in world would no longer be used to increase the stock- s of explosive weapons. With this could be combined proposal of December 8, 1953, "to begin now and con- e to make joint contributions" from existing stockpiles ormal uranium and fissionable materials to an inter- onal atomic agency. These measures, if carried out quately, would reverse the present trend toward a stant increase in nuclear weapons overhanging the ld. My ultimate hope is that all production of fission- materials anywhere in the world will be devoted ex- ively to peaceful purposes.

The United States recognizes and strongly sym- hizes with the humane motivations which in- red the resolutions of the Japanese Diet, but is strained to point out that the problem of sus- nding nuclear weapons tests cannot be treated arately from the establishment of a safe- arded and controlled disarmament program.

The United States Government is convinced t the proposed nuclear tests are vital to its own ense and the defense of the free world because possession and competence in the use of nuclear apons by leading nations of the free world are chief deterrent to aggression and to war. In- national agreement to abandon tests without ective safeguards against the clandestine de- opment of new weapons would involve a reli- e by the United States upon the good intentions certain nations not justified by the record of ir actions in the past.

The United States Government is convinced t no world-wide health hazard exists from the t or planned tests. In this connection the ited States proposed a resolution [5] unanimously pted by the United Nations Tenth General sembly establishing a scientific committee on iation, of which Japan is a member, to facili- tate pooling and distribution of all available scientific data on the effects of radiation upon man and his environment. During the forthcoming tests the United States will make every effort to eliminate any danger and to minimize any inconvenience to maritime commerce and fishing.

It cannot be regarded as established on the basis of present information that substantial economic losses will result from the establishment of the danger area. Military exercises are a traditional use of the high seas, and the Government of the United States considers that inconvenience for other traditional uses which may result therefrom is not compensable as a matter of right.

In view of precautions which will attend the tests and the widespread dissemination of information with respect to maximum permissible levels of radiation, the United States Government anticipates no economic losses from radioactive contamination of marine life.

The United States Government is prepared, however, in the interest of the fullest understanding and cooperation between the two countries:

1. To examine with the Japanese Government the consequences for Japanese maritime activities resulting from establishment of the danger area, to which end consultations have already begun;

2. To make its experts available for any further consultations which the Japanese Government may desire upon radiation standards and maximum permissible levels of radiation, and to consider arrangements for maximum feasible exchange of information on the effects of radiation on marine life; and

3. If after the test series has ended, any evidence is officially presented that substantial economic losses for Japan or Japanese nationals have been incurred as a result of establishment of the danger area and the tests, to give further consideration to the question of compensation in the light of any such evidence.

In conclusion the Acting Secretary wishes to give the assurance that the United States continues only such tests as are essential to the strength of the free world defense and security. It has sought and will continue to seek with renewed efforts a system for a safe-guarded and controlled disarmament program which ultimately may lead to the type of action envisaged by the resolutions of the Japanese Diet.

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[3] *Ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1955, p. 173.
[4] *Ibid.*, Mar. 26, 1956, p. 514.
[5] For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 21, 1955, p. 855.

Visa Applications Cut Off for Refugees Indigenous to Far East

Press release 147 dated March 19

Because of the heavy oversubscription for the 3,000 visas allotted by the Refugee Relief Act to refugees who are indigenous to the Far East, the Department of State announced on March 19 that it will accept no new applications for such visas after midnight March 26, 1956.

As of March 9, 1956, 1,863 of the 3,000 visas had been issued and the number of applications on hand greatly exceeds the number of visas remaining to be issued.

In instructions to the consulates, Pierce J. Gerety, Deputy Administrator of the act, emphasized that:

1. The cutoff would not apply to orphan applicants residing in the Far East who are processed under another section of the act.

2. The cutoff would not apply to nonindigenous refugees residing in the Far East or to refugees of Chinese ethnic origin who have passports endorsed by the Chinese Government. These cases are processed under other sections of the Refugee Relief Act.

3. Since assurances for refugees indigenous to the Far East received after the cutoff date will not be processed under the Refugee Relief Act, such assurances will be sent to the appropriate consular authorities to permit the applicant to establish a priority registration date under the normal annual quota of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

Similar cutoffs have been announced by the Department of State for Greece and Italy,[1] where sufficient cases are on hand to cover the 17,000 visas allocated to Greece and the 60,000 visas allocated to Italy under the Refugee Relief Act.

As of March 9, 1956, the total worldwide issuance of visas under the Refugee Relief Act was 89,742. Despite the assured success of the program in Greece, Italy, and in the indigenous refugee category in the Far East, sponsors continue to be needed for refugees in Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria, as well as for refugees in Italy and Greece who have been processed but are still lacking sponsors.

[1] BULLETIN of Dec. 5, 1955, p. 917, and Jan. 2, 1956, p. 16.

Eximbank Credit to Philippines for Industrial Growth

A credit of $65 million for development of tl economy of the Republic of the Philippines w announced on March 8 by Samuel C. Waug president of the Export-Import Bank of Was ington, at a joint press conference with Migu Cuaderno, governor of the Central Bank of tl Philippines.

The credit was authorized by the Board of D rectors of the Export-Import Bank for the pu pose of contributing to the industrial growth ar financial progress of the Philippines through series of loans for expansion and diversification the economy of the Republic. The Board also e pressed its particular pleasure, in view of tl close friendship which exists between the Phili pines and the United States, in being able to mal this financial assistance available as an expressi of confidence of the U.S. Government in the futu prospects of the Philippines.

The loans will be made to either public agenci or private concerns and will provide for purcha in the United States, for export, of machiner equipment, material, and services required f various projects.

Fifty million dollars will be made available d rectly in favor of public and private entities assist them in financing large-scale projects th may be approved on a case-by-case basis by tl Eximbank.

Fifteen million dollars will relate primarily small private industrial-expansion projects ar will be made available either directly in favor the Central Bank of the Philippines or upon re ommendation of the Central Bank and approv of the Export-Import Bank, to the Rehabilitatic Finance Corporation, Philippine National Ban and commercial banks in the Philippines. The credits are for the purpose of enabling the Centr Bank to assist Philippine enterprises in meetir dollar requirements of appropriate transactio and for the purpose of enabling the Central Ba and public and private Philippine lending instit tions to assist Philippine enterprises in connecti with purchases in the United States.

The Export-Import Bank indicated it is pr pared to consider the following general types developments for financing under the cred authorization:

1. Projects designed to reduce Philippine de-
ndence on imported raw materials and find out-
s for its growing labor surplus;
2. Development of timber and mineral resources
order to reduce the country's dependence on a
w agricultural products as the chief source of
reign exchange;
3. Expansion of basic service industries, such
power and transportation, to service a growing
nomy; and
4. Reduction of future foreign-exchange re-
irements through development of industries
nsuming domestic materials or imported mate-
ls at an earlier processing stage.

Terms of the loans will vary, depending upon
nature of each. Smaller loans, coming under
$15 million aspect of the program, will run in
neral for 5 years, while loans in the $50 million
rt of the program, for larger projects, will be
longer duration. Interest rates also will vary
ghtly, case by case.

Mr. Waugh advised Governor Cuaderno that,
establishing the $65 million credit, it is the
ximbank's hope that the Philippine Govern-
nt and private enterprises in the Philippines
ll be able to make use of credit through specific
ns in the immediate future to the mutual ad-
ntage of both nations.

Under the administration of President Magsay-
the Philippine Government has encouraged
industrial development program which will
atly strengthen the economic stability of the
public. Under this program the hydroelectric
ential of the Agno River in northern Luzon is
ler development and the proposed Binga Dam
now under consideration.

The new $65 million credit is in addition to $5
lion Eximbank credit extended in 1954 to
ding institutions in the Philippines, upon rec-
mendation of the Central Bank.

5. Proposal to Burma Exchange Technicians for Rice

The U.S. Government has proposed to the Gov-
ment of the Union of Burma an agreement
ler which the United States would exchange
h services of American technicians for about
000 tons of rice, the International Cooperation Administration announced on March 12. The new technicians-for-rice agreement proposed by the United States would enable Burma to pay for the services of needed technicians which, because of a shortage of dollar reserves, it could not otherwise obtain.

Upon conclusion of such an agreement, the United States would immediately make $1 million available to Burma to enable its Government to hire U.S. technicians. Burma would then repay the United States in local currency. It is anticipated that this local currency would then be used to provide up to 10,000 tons of rice for shipment to Pakistan to help avert a severe food shortage in East Pakistan. The United States has already agreed to provide about 165,000 tons of U.S. surplus rice to Pakistan under titles I and II of Public Law 480 to meet the food shortage.

Recently Burma concluded an agreement with the United States under which it will buy about $21 million worth of U.S. surplus cotton, dairy products, tobacco, and fruit.[1] Payments for these commodities, too, will be in Burmese currency. This agreement, under title I of Public Law 480, will permit Burma to increase consumer imports without drawing on its limited dollar foreign-exchange reserves.

There is no U.S. aid program in Burma at present. From 1950 to 1953, however, about $19 million was spent by the United States in technical cooperation programs there. Since that time the Burmese Government has continued to employ the services of several groups of U.S. technicians originally sent to Burma through the U.S. technical cooperation program.

Escape-Clause Relief on Acid-Grade Fluorspar Held Unnecessary

White House press release dated March 20

White House Announcement

The President on March 20 announced that he has acted on the United States Tariff Commission's report of its escape-clause investigation relating to acid-grade fluorspar by accepting as the findings of the Tariff Commission the findings of the three Commissioners who concluded that the

[1] BULLETIN of Feb. 20, 1956, p. 308.

domestic industry is not presently experiencing serious injury, that it is not faced with a threat of serious injury, and that escape-clause relief is not warranted. The other three Commissioners found no present serious injury but did find a threat of such injury and recommended that the 1951 concession on acid-grade fluorspar, reducing the tariff from $5.60 per long ton to $2.10 per long ton, be withdrawn in full.

Under present law, in escape-clause cases where the Tariff Commission is equally divided, the President is authorized to accept the findings of either half of the Commission as the findings of the Commission.

The President's decision was taken only after he had consulted with interested departments and agencies in the executive branch of the Government.

This application for escape-clause relief is separate and distinct from the domestic industry's application under last year's so-called national security amendment to the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951. The latter application is still pending before the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization.

The Tariff Commission's report was submitted to the President on January 18, 1956.[1]

The text of the President's letters to the Chairmen of the Senate Finance and the House Ways and Means Committees [Senator Harry F. Byrd and Representative Jere Cooper] is as follows:

Text of President's Letter to Chairmen of Congressional Committees

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The United States Tariff Commission on January 18, 1956 submitted to me a report of its escape clause investigation relating to acid grade fluorspar. The Commission's investigation was made pursuant to Section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, as amended.

The members of the Commission are equally divided on the question of whether relief is warranted. Under present law, I am authorized to consider the findings of either group of Commissioners as the findings of the Commission.

The three Commissioners who concluded that escape clause relief is warranted found no existing serious injury to the domestic acid grade fluorspar industry but did find a threat of such injur These three Commissioners recommend that tl tariff on imports of acid grade fluorspar, whic was reduced in 1951 from $5.60 per long ton t $2.10 per long ton, be restored in full.

The other three Commissioners do not find th the domestic industry is currently exper encing serious injury, nor do they find it threa ened with serious injury. They report that the do not detect any strong probability that the co ditions of the industry in the immediate futu will be less favorable than at present. They co clude that no basis exists for granting esca clause relief.

After full consultation with interested depar ments and agencies of the Executive Branch, have decided to accept, as the findings of tl Commission, the findings of the three Commi sioners who held no escape clause relief to be nece sary at this time.

This application for escape clause relief is se arate and distinct from the domestic industry application under last year's so-called national s curity amendment to the Trade Agreements E tension Act of 1951. The latter application pending before the Director of the Office of D fense Mobilization.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

[1] Copies may be obtained from the U.S. Tariff Commission, Washington 25, D.C.

Current Legislation on Foreign Policy 84th Congress, 2d Session

Japanese-American Evacuation Claims Act. Report accompany H. R. 7763. H. Rept. 1809, February 2 1956. 15 pp.

Situation in the Middle East. Hearing before the Sena Committee on Foreign Relations. February 24, 195 73 pp.

Further Amending Section 20 of the Trading with tl Enemy Act, Relating to Fees of Agents, Attorneys, ar Representatives. Report to accompany S. 1146. Rept. 1603, February 27, 1956. 4 pp.

Cargo Preference and Its Relation to the Farm Surpl Disposal Program. Report pursuant to section 136 the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Public La 601, 79th Congress. H. Rept. 1818, February 27, 195 30 pp.

Reorganization of the Passport Office. Report of tl Senate Committee on Government Operations. S. Rep 1604, March 1, 1956. 25 pp.

Reorganization of the Passport Office. Report to accor pany S. 3340. S. Rept. 1605, March 1, 1956. 8 pp.

Exemption of Certain Foreign Travel from Tax on Tran portation of Persons. Report to accompany H. R. 526 S. Rept. 1607, March 1, 1956. 12 pp.

Amending the United States Information and Exchan Act of 1948, as Amended. Report to accompany S. 256 S. Rept. 1608, March 1, 1956. 5 pp.

lendar of Meetings [1]

ourned During March 1956

. Trusteeship Council: Standing Committee on Petitions	New York	Jan. 3–Mar. 31*
O Special North Atlantic Regional Air Navigation Meeting	Paris	Feb. 20–Mar. 3
. Trusteeship Council: Standing Committee on Administrative Unions.	New York	Feb. 21–Mar. 31*
r-American Travel Congresses: 2d Meeting of Permanent Executive Committee.	Lima	Feb. 27–Mar. 3
rnational Telecommunication Union: Meeting of Chairmen of ven CCIT and CCIF Study Groups.	Geneva	Feb. 29–Mar. 8
International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR): Study roup XI, Color Television Demonstrations.	New York	Mar. 5–18
. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights: 12th Session	New York	Mar. 5–29
TO Council	Karachi	Mar. 6–8
Governing Body: 131st Session	Geneva	Mar. 6–10
. ECAFE Subcommittee on Electric Power	Bangalore	Mar. 7–12
r-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences: 1st Meeting of Technical Advisory Council.	Turrialba (Costa Rica)	Mar. 8–10
CEF Executive Board and Program Committee	New York	Mar. 12–23
O Regional Association VI (Europe): 2d Session	Dubrovnik (Yugoslavia)	Mar. 12–24
ECOSOC Commission on Status of Women: 10th Session	Geneva	Mar. 12–28
. Scientific Committee on Effects of Atomic Radiation: 1st ssion.	New York	Mar. 14–24
-American Specialized Conference on the Conservation of the Natural Resources of the Continental Shelf and Marine Waters.	Ciudad Trujillo (Dominican Republic).	Mar. 15–28
ECE Coal Committee	Geneva	Mar. 21–22
ECAFE Railway Subcommittee: 4th Session	New Delhi	Mar. 25–31
ting of Canadian–Mexican–United States Heads of Government	White Sulphur Springs (W. Va.).	Mar. 26–28
ECE Timber Committee	Geneva	Mar. 26–28

ession as of March 31, 1956

h Pacific Fur Seal Conference	Washington	Nov. 28–
national Fair for Peace and Progress	Ciudad Trujillo (Dominican Republic).	Dec. 20–
T Contracting Parties: 1956 Tariff Negotiations	Geneva	Jan. 18–
Trusteeship Council: 17th Session	New York	Feb. 7–
International Wheat Conference: 2d Session	Geneva	Feb. 20–
national Atomic Energy Agency: Working Level Meeting on Draft Statute.	Washington	Feb. 27–
Disarmament Commission: Subcommittee of Five (reconvened).	London	Mar. 19–
nternational Congress of the Vineyard and Wines	Santiago	Mar. 21–
nternational Exhibition of Drawings and Engravings	Lugano (Switzerland)	Mar. 29–
ECAFE: 4th Regional Conference of Statisticians	Bangkok	Mar. 29–

duled April 1-June 30, 1956

O: 3d Caribbean Regional Air Navigation Meeting	Ciudad Trujillo (Dominican Republic).	Apr. 3–

[1] Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Mar. 23, 1956. Asterisks indicate tentative dates and places. lowing is a list of abbreviations: U.N., United Nations; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; CCIT, ternational Telegraphic Consultative Committee (Comité consultatif international télégraphique); CCIF, International lephone Consultative Committee (Comité consultatif international téléphonique); ITU, International Telecommuni- tion Union; CCIR, International Radio Consultative Committee (Comité consultatif international des radiocommuni- tions); ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; ILO, International Labor ganization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; MO, World Meteorological Organization; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; GATT, General Agreement on ffs and Trade; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; FAO, Food and Agri- lture Organization; UPU, Universal Postal Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; SUNFED, Special ited Nations Fund for Economic Development; ECLA, Economic Commission for Latin America; UNREF, United ations Refugee Fund; WHO, World Health Organization; CIGRE, Conference internationale des grands reseaux elec- ques; PASO, Pan American Sanitary Organization.

Calendar of Meetings—*Continued*

Scheduled April 1–June 30, 1956—*Continued*

ITU International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR): Study Group XI, Color Television Demonstrations.	London	Apr. 3–
ILO Petroleum Committee: 5th Session (reconvened)	Geneva	Apr. 4–
U.N. Economic Commission for Europe: 11th Session	Geneva	Apr. 5–
International Exhibition on Instrumentation-Automation	Oslo	Apr. 9–
UNESCO Executive Board: 43d Session	Madrid	Apr. 9–
ITU International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR): Study Group XI, Color Television Demonstrations.	The Hague	Apr. 10–
6th Inter-American Travel Congress	San José (Costa Rica)	Apr. 12–
FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: Working Party of Consultative Subcommittee on Rice.	Rome	Apr. 16–
U.N. ECOSOC Statistical Commission: 9th Session	New York	Apr. 16–
WMO Executive Committee: 8th Session	Geneva	Apr. 17–
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 21st Session	New York	Apr. 17–
ITU International Telegraphic Consultative Committee (CCIT): Study Group IV, Phototelegraphy and Facsimile.	London	Apr. 17–
UNESCO Conference on Asian-U. S. Cultural Relations	United States	Apr. 19–
ITU Administrative Council: 11th Session	Geneva	Apr. 21–
9th International Film Festival	Cannes	Apr. 23–
South Pacific Conference: 3d Session	Suva (Fiji)	Apr. 23–
ITU International Telegraphic Consultative Committee: Study Group V, Joint CCIT/CCIR Committee on Phototelegraphy.	London	Apr. 23–
U.N. International Law Commission: 8th Session	Geneva	Apr. 23–
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 11th Session	Geneva	Apr. 23–
UNESCO Regional Conference on Free and Compulsory Education in Latin America.	Lima	Apr. 23–
Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference	San José (Costa Rica)	Apr. 25–
WMO Eastern Caribbean Hurricane Committee: 4th Session	Ciudad Trujillo (Dominican Republic).	Apr. 25–
U. N. Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories: 7th Session.	New York	Apr. 27–
5th International Philatelic Exhibition	New York	Apr. 28–
ILO Coal Mines Committee: 6th Session	Istanbul	Apr. 30–
UPU Executive and Liaison Committee	Bern	Apr. 30–
International Sugar Council: 8th Session	London	April
2d International Congress of Tribunals of Accounts	Brussels*	May 1*–
Inter-American Cultural Council: 2d Meeting	Lima	May 3–
Inter-American Ministers of Education: 2d Meeting	Lima	May 3–
NATO: Ministerial Meeting of the Council	Paris	May 4–
South Pacific Commission: 15th Session	Suva (Fiji)	May 4–
UNESCO Intergovernmental Meeting on International Principles Governing Archeological Excavations.	Palermo (Italy)	May 4–
U. N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade: 3d Session.	New York	May 7–
U. N. *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Establishment of SUNFED: 1st Meeting.	New York	May 7–
U. N. Trusteeship Council: Standing Committee on Petitions	New York	May 7–
International Cotton Advisory Committee: 15th Plenary Meeting	Washington	May 8–
9th World Health Assembly	Geneva	May 8–
UNESCO Regional Seminar on Curriculum for Latin America	Lima	May 9–
ILO Building, Civil Engineering, and Public Works Committee: 5th Session.	Geneva	May 14–
U. N. ECE Housing Committee and Working Parties	Geneva	May 14–
U. N. ECLA Committee of the Whole: 5th Meeting	Santiago	May 19–
Inter-American Technical Cacao Committee: 6th Meeting	Salvador (Brazil)	May 20*–
UNESCO Conference on Cultural Integration of Immigrants	Caracas	May 20–
4th International Congress of Mediterranean Citrus Growers	Israel	May 20–
U. N. International Sugar Conference	New York	May 21–
Caribbean Commission: 22d Meeting	Cayenne (French Guiana)	May 21*–
U. N. ECAFE Working Party of Senior Geologists on the Preparation of a Regional Geological Map for Asia and the Far East: 2d Meeting.	Tokyo	May 22–
WMO Working Group on International Radiosonde Comparisons	Payerne (Switzerland)	May 23–
FAO Technical Advisory Committee on Desert Locust Control: 6th Session.	Rome	May 23–
UNREF Standing Program Subcommittee: 3d Session	Geneva	May 23–
UNESCO Meeting of Experts on Radioisotopes	Paris	May 25–
WHO Executive Board: 18th Session	Geneva	May 28–
ILO Governing Body: 132d Session (and Committees)	Geneva	May 28–
UNREF Executive Committee: 3d Session	Geneva	May 28–
34th Padua International Fair	Padua (Italy)	May 29–
16th International Conference on Large Electric High Tension Systems (CIGRE).	Paris	May 30–

lendar of Meetings—*Continued*

eduled April 1–June 30, 1956—*Continued*

. ECAFE Subcommittee on Minerals Resources Development: 2d Session.	Tokyo	May 30–
. ECE Steel Committee	(Undetermined)	May
r-American Commission of Women: 11th General Assembly	Ciudad Trujillo (Dominican Republic).	June 1–
rnational Seed Testing Association: 11th Congress (Executive Committee Meetings June 1 and 10).	Paris	June 4–
. Trusteeship Council: 18th Session	New York	June 4–
O Executive Committee: 28th Meeting	Washington	June 5–
rnational Labor Conference (ILO): 39th Session	Geneva	June 6–
rnational Commission for Criminal Police: 25th General Meeting.	Vienna	June 7–
rnational Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: 6th Annual Meeting.	Halifax	June 11–
ld Power Conference: 5th Plenary Session	Vienna	June 17–
) Committee on Commodity Problems: 27th Session	Rome	June 18–
O Assembly: 10th Session	Caracas[1]	June 19–
International Congress on Bridge and Structural Engineering	Lisbon	June 25–
. ECE Coal Trade Subcommittee	Geneva	June 25–
. ECE Conference of European Statisticians	Geneva	June 25–
ESCO Intergovernmental Copyright Committee	Paris	June 25–
. ECE Coal Classification Working Party	Geneva	June 26–
rnational Meeting of Tonnage Measurement Experts	Copenhagen	June

ogress in the Territory French Togoland

tement by Benjamin Gerig[1]

he most important single development in the of the Togolese people under French adminis- ion is the imminent, fateful, and far-reaching ce which they will soon make concerning their tical future.

'e were aware, of course, that following upon events in the Gold Coast and British Togo nilar development in French Togo would nec- rily take place. But until we heard the state- t of the distinguished representative of France w days ago we were still thinking in terms of 's rather than months.

ow, however, we are confronted with a situa- which in the very near future will require Trusteeship Council and the General Assem- o cooperate with the Administering Authority resenting to the people of French Togo the lom to choose their destiny.

e cannot but pause a moment to reflect what his means to the people of Togo, to the Ad- stering Authority, to the United Nations, and e world. Freedom to choose one's destiny is a tremendous opportunity. It is an opportunity which in the past has sometimes been too long delayed, or perhaps denied altogether. Indeed, there are vast multitudes of people today who still hope to be able to make such a choice—and, I may add, they are not all in Africa.

But to those who are given the opportunity it is also a tremendous responsibility. For a decision of this kind once made cannot easily be undone, and, indeed, it has elements of finality which will affect a people for all time to come. We feel, therefore, that as far as the Trusteeship Council is concerned in the matter we at least will want to exercise our part with the greatest care, conscious that we are dealing with destiny.

New Technique of International Cooperation

There will be many practical details to be worked out as experience in the case of British Togo has shown. We are undoubtedly developing a new technique of international cooperation, or, if you like, a kind of jurisprudence which, as our experience accumulates, will enable us to smooth the way for other people who, in their turn, will emerge to take their places among the free peoples of the world.

Mr. President, as we listened to the thoughtful remarks of the two distinguished representatives of France, we were impressed with the way in

ade in the U.N. Trusteeship Council on Feb. 28 (U.S./ press release 2360). Mr. Gerig is Deputy U.S. Rep- tative on the Trusteeship Council.

which the Administering Authority is laying the groundwork for the people of this territory. No one knows, of course, what the people of French Togo will choose as to their future: association with France, with neighboring territories in Africa, or with some other state. We ourselves were not altogether clear as to what the status of a trust territory is, or would be, with respect to the French Union. We therefore appreciated the clear-cut answer of the distinguished representative of France to our question on this point when he said that an act of association between trust territories and the French Union would provide for the right of withdrawal. Thus, one of the choices which the Togolese people will have to make will permit them to exercise a relationship which is not only freely chosen but which will give them the basic attribute of independence. Indeed, Mr. President, my delegation considers that at the moment freedom of choice is offered to a people in a trust territory it is in fact as well as in theory exercising for that moment an act of independence. We know, of course, of a number of territories whose people have considered that complete independence is less desirable than some form of association with another state or group of states—an association in which they may voluntarily transfer certain powers to another state to be exercised on their behalf. But whether this choice or any of the five outlined by the distinguished representative of France is made, the occasion will be a momentous one for the people of Togoland.

On the question of the time and method of granting freedom of choice, my delegation has only one comment. We consider that, when a people has shown itself to have the capacity to determine its future, the choice should be offered even before such people have all the institutions and attributes of a fully self-governing nation. We believe that in most cases self-determination should precede full self-government or independence and that self-government or independence, or even the rejection of these goals, is a matter which people should freely be given the opportunity to choose. Thus, we believe that the experience which the United Nations has already gained in this matter tends to support the thesis put forward so logically and forcefully by the French delegation.

And now I wish to comment, but only briefly, on several matters in the political, economic, social, and educational field.

Political Reforms

The efforts of the Administering Authority introduce political reforms throughout the Ter tory of French Togoland during 1955 have be noted by my delegation with approval, and would urge the progressive extension and expa sion of the powers of the Territorial Assembl as rapidly as possible, so that it may become truly effective legislative organ representing t indigenous population. Likewise, we look fo ward to an extension of the powers of the Gover ment Council—which is at present considered the Government of France as a forerunner of Cabinet—so that the Council may soon acquire t status of an executive body responsible to t Assembly.

It is urged, moreover, that continued efforts made to expand the powers of the District a Municipal Councils and to make them more re resentative of the indigenous inhabitants by t application of universal suffrage in the very ne future.

Economic Development

As a supplement to the important developme in the political field which have occurred duri the past year, the United States wishes to co mend the Administration generally on its co tinued efforts to improve the economy of the t ritory. It is a well recognized fact that, witho economic progress, developments in the politic social, and educational fields would have lit meaning since it is only with an adequate sta ard of living that the population will have t desire or capacity to progress in other fields.

We were encouraged during the debate on e nomic conditions to learn that recent discover in the territory of deposits of phosphate, bauxi iron, and other minerals may be an import factor in the territory's more rapid economic vancement. We shall await with interest furtl details of these developments as well as efforts the Administration to provide a port for the t ritory. Recognition by the Administering A thority that industries should be increased and panded has likewise been noted by my delegat as an encouraging sign. In this connection, would suggest that attention be given in the n future to the establishment of a meat indus which would be of benefit to the inhabita Further efforts worthy of mention and commen

on are the introduction of more protein into the ıdigenous diet by the development of a fish-farm-ıg industry, measures taken to increase the de-ɔlopment of crops, to protect plants, and to ıprove generally the yield and methods of ıltivation.

Moreover, the increase of indigenous participa-on in the economic life of the territory through nall rural development schemes—including orks in the field of agriculture, irrigation, drain-ge, soil conservation, and markets—have been ɔted with approval. We should like to suggest ıat, in addition to the measures already taken improve the road network, attention should given by the Administering Authority particu-rly to improving and developing secondary and eder roads which will be extremely important to e overall progress and development of the rritory.

Lastly, my delegation would urge that the Ad-inistration continue to give serious considera-ɔn to the possibility of following up the Ten-ear Plan, which will end in 1957, by another plan the same line so that there will be no stoppage progress in the field of economic development.

alth and Medical Services

Steps taken in the field of health and medical rvices have been noted with approval by my legation—and especially the measures taken to mbat various diseases throughout the territory. ıe adoption of a family allowance plan during 55 pursuant to the labor code of 1952—as an aid helping to reorganize the family structure and improve the status of women—is also considered a constructive measure. My delegation would e to suggest in the field of social progress that rther attention be devoted by the Administering ıthority to the suggestion of the Visiting Mis-n to improve the conditions in the penal institu-ns throughout the territory.

On the unduly protracted discussion as to what meant by the term "elite," it is our opinion that differences of view which are expressed reflect lifference in semantics rather than of substance. ench and English usages of the term "elite" markedly different. But we believe that in ry society leaders in every walk of life will erge. And this leadership will become en-sted with the political, economic, and social of the people. It cannot be otherwise in ench Togoland.

In conclusion, my delegation believes that the rapid political progress now under way in the territory reemphasizes the urgent need for better facilities for higher education. We were pleased to note that 69 scholarships for study in France were awarded to pupils from secondary schools in 1954. In view of the territory's growing need for qualified African personnel, however, we hope that ways and means will be found to provide additional higher educational facilities for Togolanders, both in France and in Africa.

On the whole, we consider, therefore, that the outlook for the Territory of French Togoland is one of hopeful progress in all major fields; and while we realize that much remains to be done, we consider that the Administering Authority merits the sympathetic support and commendation of the Trusteeship Council for the constructive guidance which it is giving to the peoples of this territory.

Attainment by Trust Territories of Self-Government or Independence

Statements by Benjamin Gerig [1]

U.S. VIEWS ON COLONIALISM

U.S./U.N. press release 2361 dated February 29

The trend of the present-day aspects of colonialism was clearly brought out at the Bandung conference, to which the representatives of the Soviet Union just referred. There it was pointed out by a number of speakers, and rightly, that, while colonialism was receding in other parts of the world, a new and worse form of colonialistic imperialism was developing in Eastern Europe and elsewhere.

We agree with the Soviet representative that we cannot overlook the problem of colonialism. As to one type of colonialism, the Trusteeship Council is doing constructive work—not always, I am sorry to say, with the amount of disinterestedness which would be desirable. But on the whole I believe our work has been effective.

Now as to the proposal of the Soviet delegate on attainment of self-government, we adopted a resolution at our previous session on this question, the main paragraph of which instructs the Draft-

[1] Made in the U.N. Trusteeship Council on Feb. 29 and Mar. 1.

ing Committee to prepare appropriate conclusions and recommendations on this subject.[2]

Mr. President, the General Assembly in its later resolution[3] requested the Council to insure that the procedure devised by it should be fully complied with and called on the Council to implement our own resolution. We have certainly begun to do that, but our new method has not yet even had the time to prove itself in one session, while the Soviet representative is now proposing that it be set aside for something else.

The U.S. delegation thinks that the present resolution now on the books should be given time to work out, and we believe that the method proposed will work effectively. Therefore, my delegation proposes that the Council take note of the General Assembly resolution.[4]

With respect to the reference which the Soviet delegate made on the question of nuclear testing, I don't know whether the Council considers that that subject has any relevance to the item now under discussion. We feel that there is no relation, but the Council may wish to decide on this matter and we will have an opportunity to discuss it at that time.

NUCLEAR TESTS IN TRUST TERRITORIES

U.S./U.N. press release 2363 dated March 1

Everyone, of course, understands the propaganda motives which lie behind the proposal of the Soviet representative regarding the holding of nuclear tests in trust territories. When the proposal was made yesterday, I said that we could not see what relevance a proposal concerning nuclear testing could have with the item of attainment of self-government or independence, which was then under consideration. We believe his proposal was, and still is, out of order. However, we will waive this point, reserving our position on the procedure, and we are fully prepared to de with the subject forthwith.

Let me state first of all that we of this Counc must continue to hope that those organs of tl United Nations which are working to bring abo an effective plan of armaments control will reac a basis of agreement so that the testing of suc weapons now being carried on by the United Kin dom and the U.S.A., and which were conducte within the last 4 months by the Soviet Union, wi become unnecessary.

Mr. President, let me repeat what everyo knows, that in the absence of effective intern tional agreement, safeguarded by adequate inspe tion to limit or control armaments, preparatio must still be made to develop methods of defen against nuclear attack, and for the maintenan of international peace and security.

It is not my purpose—and we think the Truste ship Council would in any case not be the place to debate the broad issues involved in the questic of nuclear tests as they are being carried on b various countries. Other organs of the Unite Nations are dealing with the disarmament prol lem, of which this question is a part, and tl United States will contribute everything withi its power in these bodies to achieve an effecti solution.

Indeed, since 1946, when the general questic first came before the United Nations, my Gover ment has urged the adoption of an effective an dependably controlled program of disarmamen The day this program becomes a reality, nucle testing will become unnecessary.

Mr. President, certain aspects of this questic were before the Trusteeship Council in July 19 in connection with nuclear testing at the Paci Proving Grounds. At that time this Council re ommended that "if the Administering Authori considers it necessary in the interests of wor peace and security to conduct further nuclear e periments in the Territory, it take such preca tions as will ensure that no inhabitants of tl Territory are again endangered. . . ."[5]

With respect to the forthcoming tests, my Go ernment, in conformity with the resolution whi the United States unreservedly supported, wi see to it that all feasible precautions are taken avoid endangering any inhabitants of the ter tory or any other peoples and will notify air a

[2] U.N. doc. T/Res/1254(xvi).

[3] U.N. doc. A/Res/946(x).

[4] A U.S.-sponsored resolution (T/L.640/Rev. 1) was adopted by the Council on Mar. 16 by a vote of 10–2–2. It takes note of General Assembly resolution 946(X), instructs the drafting committees on the annual reports of Trust Territories to prepare "appropriate draft conclusions and recommendations concerning the question of the attainment by the Trust Territories of self-government or independence," and requests the Secretary-General to prepare a separate section of the Council's report to the General Assembly "containing the information indicated in the General Assembly resolutions referred to above, and the conclusions and recommendations of the Council thereon."

[5] BULLETIN of July 26, 1954, p. 139.

traffic of the details of the warning area well advance of the commencement of the operations. For these reasons my delegation considers that proposal of the Soviet Union should be re-ted. As far as the trust territory under U.S. ministration is concerned, the question is en-ely covered by the previous resolution to which ave referred. My delegation will consequently e against the Soviet draft resolution.[6]

TREATY INFORMATION

chnology Agreement With Japan

s release 153 dated March 22

The Department of State announced on March the signing of an agreement with Japan to ilitate the exchange of patent rights and tech-al information for defense purposes. The eement was signed in Tokyo, March 22, 1956, Mamoru Shigemitsu, Japanese Minister of reign Affairs, and by John M. Allison, United tes Ambassador. It will enter into force upon eipt by the United States of notification that an has approved the agreement in accordance h its legal procedures.

The agreement is expected to foster the ex-nge of technology for defense purposes be-en the two Governments and between the pri-e industries of the two countries. Thus it uld be of reciprocal benefit in providing for ional defense and in contributing to mutual ense.

The agreement is the latest to be signed of a es being negotiated with the NATO countries l with Japan. Other agreements of this nature e been signed with Italy,[1] the United Kingdom,[2] Belgium,[3] Norway,[4] the Netherlands,[4] Greece,[4] and the Federal Republic of Germany.[5]

These agreements recognize that privately owned technology should, to the greatest extent practicable, be exchanged through commercial agreements between owners and users. They also stipulate that rights of private owners of patents and technical information should be fully recognized and protected in accordance with laws applicable to such rights. Other provisions are intended to assure fair treatment of private owners when they deal directly with a foreign government and also in cases in which private information communicated through government channels might be used or disclosed without authorization. The agreements also provide for the establishment of arrangements by which owners of patentable inventions placed under secrecy by one government may obtain comparable protection in the other country.

The agreements also provide that, as a general rule, government-owned inventions shall be interchanged for defense purposes on a royalty-free basis.

Each of the agreements provides for the establishment of a Technical Property Committee to be composed of a representative of each Government. The Technical Property Committee is charged with general responsibility for making recommendations to the two Governments on any matters relating to the agreement which are brought before the committee by either Government, either on its own behalf or on behalf of its nationals. One of the specific functions of the committee is to make recommendations to the Governments, either in particular cases or in general, concerning disparities in their laws affecting the compensation of owners of patents and technical information.

Policy guidance for the United States representatives on the Technical Property Committees is provided by the Interagency Technical Property Committee for Defense, which is chaired by the Department of Defense and includes representatives of the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the International Cooperation Administration, and the Government Patents Board. This committee is assisted by an industry advisory group representing major sectors of American industry concerned with defense production.

On Mar. 2 the Soviet representative withdrew his pro-al (U.N. doc. T/L. 642 dated Feb. 29).

Oct. 3, 1952; provisionally in force.

Jan. 19, 1953. For text see Treaties and Other Inter-onal Acts Series 2773.

BULLETIN of Nov. 8, 1954, p. 712.

Ibid., July 11, 1955, p. 84.

Ibid., Jan. 16, 1956, p. 104.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

White Slave Traffic

Agreement for the repression of the trade in white women. Signed at Paris May 18, 1904. Entered into force July 18, 1905. 35 Stat. 1979.
Adherence deposited: Mexico, February 21, 1956.

BILATERAL

Bolivia

Agreement providing for an informational media guaranty program pursuant to section 1011 of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, as amended (62 Stat. 6; 68 Stat. 862). Effected by exchange of notes at La Paz February 27 and March 10, 1956. Entered into force March 10, 1956.

Germany

Arrangement concerning the exchange of information relating to the illicit traffic in narcotics. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington January 17 and August 24, 1955, and March 7, 1956. Entered into force March 7, 1956.

Iceland

Agreement relating to the addition of tuna to the types of fish excepted from item 718 (b) of schedule II of the trade agreement of August 27, 1943 (57 Stat. 1075). Effected by exchange of notes at Reykjavik March 5 and 6, 1956. Enters into force April 14, 1956.

Ireland

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington March 16, 1956. Enters into force on the day on which each Government shall receive from the other Government written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements.

Japan

Agreement to facilitate interchange of patent rights and technical information for defense purposes. Signed at Tokyo March 22, 1956. Enters into force upon receipt by the United States of notification that Japan has approved the agreement in accordance with its legal procedures.

Pakistan

Agreement amending article II of the surplus agricultural commodities agreement of January 18, 1955 (TIAS 3184). Signed at Karachi February 9 and 25, 1956. Entered into force February 25, 1956.

Peru

Agreement extending for a period of 4 years from July 31, 1956, the naval mission agreement of July 31, 1940 (54 Stat. 2344), as extended. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington January 27 and March 14, 1956. Entered into force March 14, 1956.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Go crnment Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Addre requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, e cept in the case of free publications, which may be o tained from the Department of State.

Mutual Defense Assistance, Disposition of Equipme and Materiel. TIAS 3447. Pub. 6244. 3 pp. 5¢.

Understanding between the United States and Iraq. E change of notes—Signed at Baghdad December 3, 195 Entered into force December 3, 1955.

Technical Cooperation, Program for Economic Develo ment in the Departments of Caldas, Cauca, and Valle d Cauca. TIAS 3451. Pub. 6249. 10 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Colombia. E change of notes—Signed at Bogotá July 29 and Novemb 15 and 28, 1955. Entered into force November 28, 195

Mexican Agricultural Workers. TIAS 3454. Pub. 625 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Mexico, e tending agreement of August 11, 1951, as amended an extended. Exchange of notes—Dated at México Decemb 23, 1955. Entered into force December 23, 1955.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3455. Pu 6253. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Spain, amen ing agreement of April 20, 1955—Signed at Madrid Oct ber 20, 1955. Entered into force October 20, 1955.

Air Transport Services. TIAS 3456. Pub. 6254. 2 pp. 5

Agreement between the United States and Canada, amen ing schedule 2 of agreement of June 4, 1949. Exchange notes—Dated at Ottawa November 22 and December 2 1955. Entered into force December 20, 1955.

Technical Cooperation, Additional Assistance for Artib nite Valley Project. TIAS 3457. Pub. 6255. 5 pp. 5

Agreement between the United States and Haiti. E change of notes—Signed at Washington December 2 and 28, 1955. Entered into force December 28, 1955.

Defense, Use of Practice Bombing Range Near Cuxhave (Germany) by United States Air Force. TIAS 3458. Pu 6258. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Feder Republic of Germany, supplementing agreement of Augus 6 and 28, 1954, as amended. Exchange of notes—Date at Bonn/Bad Godesberg and Bonn November 7, 14, an 29, 1955. Entered into force November 29, 1955.

cation of U.S. Policy Toward North Africa
llion) 553
of Deputy Prime Minister of Rhodesia and Nyasa-
d 552
lture. U.S. Proposal to Burma To Exchange Tech-
ans for Rice 569
can Republics. Pan American Day and Pan Ameri-
Week, 1956 (text of proclamation) 544

of Mission in Far East Meet at Tokyo 543
ort on Asia (Dulles) 539
Applications Cut Off for Refugees Indigenous to
East 568

: Energy
-for-Peace Agreement Signed by Ireland and U. S. . 564
o Japanese Government on Pacific Nuclear Tests . 566
pines Chosen as Site for Asian Nuclear Center . . 544

. U.S. Proposal to Burma To Exchange Technicians
Rice 569

and Property. Soviet Payment of Damages for
Navy Plane (text of Soviet note) 559

ss, The
nt Legislation 570
-Clause Relief on Acid-Grade Fluorspar Held Un-
essary (Eisenhower) 569
mendations for 1957 Mutual Security Program
enhower, Hoover) 545

nic Affairs
-Clause Relief on Acid-Grade Fluorspar Held Un-
essary (Eisenhower) 569
ank Credit to Philippines for Industrial Growth . 568

cation of U.S. Policy Toward North Africa
llion) 553
atulatory Messages on Signing of French-Tunisian
tocol (Hughes, Dillon) 552
ss in the Territory of French Togoland (Gerig) . . 573

Prime Minister of India To Visit United States . 565

ational Organizations and Meetings. Calendar of
etings 571

l
-for-Peace Agreement Signed by Ireland and U.S. . 564
of Prime Minister Costello of Ireland (Nixon,
tello) 560

o Japanese Government on Pacific Nuclear Tests . 566
ology Agreement With Japan 577

on. Earthquake Disaster in Lebanon (Eisenhower,
ver) 565

y Affairs. Soviet Payment of Damages for U.S.
y Plane (text of Soviet note) 559

l Security
mendations for 1957 Mutual Security Program
enhower, Hoover) 545
ort on Asia (Dulles) 539
ology Agreement With Japan 577

elf-Governing Territories
ment by Trust Territories of Self-Government or
ependence (Gerig) 575
ss in the Territory of French Togoland (Gerig) . 573

an. Congratulatory Messages to Pakistan on Re-
lic Day (Eisenhower, Dulles) 565

pines
ank Credit to Philippines for Industrial Growth . 568
pines Chosen as Site for Asian Nuclear Center . . 544

ential Documents
atulatory Messages to Pakistan on Republic Day . 565
quake Disaster in Lebanon 565
e-Clause Relief on Acid-Grade Fluorspar Held Un-
essary 569
American Day and Pan American Week, 1956 . . . 544
mendations for 1957 Mutual Security Program . . 545

ations. Recent Releases 578

Refugees and Displaced Persons. Visa Applications Cut Off for Refugees Indigenous to Far East 568

Treaty Information
Atoms-for-Peace Agreement Signed by Ireland and U.S. . 564
Current Actions 578
Technology Agreement With Japan 577

Tunisia. Congratulatory Messages on Signing of French-Tunisian Protocol (Hughes, Dillon) 552

United Nations
Attainment by Trust Territories of Self-Government or Independence (Gerig) 575
Progress in the Territory of French Togoland (Gerig) . 573

U.S.S.R.
A Crucial Contest With the Communist World (Murphy) . 556
Soviet Payment of Damages for U.S. Navy Plane (text of Soviet note) 559

Name Index

Costello, John A. 560
Dillon, C. Douglas 553
Dulles, Secretary 539, 566
Eisenhower, President 544, 545, 565, 570
Gerig, Benjamin 573, 575
Hoover, Herbert, Jr. 550, 565
Hughes, Morris N. 552
Murphy, Robert 556
Nehru, Jawaharlal 565
Nixon, Richard M. 560
Welensky, Roy 552

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: March 19–25

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

Press releases issued prior to March 19 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 136 of March 14, 137 of March 15, and 141 of March 16.

No.	Date	Subject
†146	3/19	Conant: "Freedom and Slavery in a Divided Germany."
147	3/19	Cutoff of visa applications in Far East.
148	3/19	Soviet payment in Neptune case.
149	3/17	Hoover message on Lebanon earthquake disaster.
150	3/20	Hoover testimony on mutual security program.
*151	3/20	Mills nominated Ambassador to Afghanistan.
*152	3/21	Assignments of economic officers in Europe.
153	3/22	Technology agreement with Japan.
154	3/22	Message to Bey of Tunis.
155	3/22	Message to France on Tunisia.
156	3/22	Dulles messages on Pakistan Republic Day.
157	3/23	Murphy: "A Crucial Contest With the Communist World."
158	3/23	Note to Japan on Pacific nuclear tests.
159	3/23	Dulles: "A Report on Asia."
160	3/24	Visit of Deputy Premier of Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (rewrite).

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XXXIV, No. 876

April 9, 1956

FREEDOM AND SLAVERY IN A DIVIDED GERMANY ● *by Ambassador James B. Conant* 583

TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE ● *Remarks by Secretary Dulles* 588

EAST-WEST TRADE ● *Statement by Under Secretary Hoover* 619

AN OUTLINE OF THE MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM FOR 1957 ● *Statement by John B. Hollister* . . . 605

THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE NEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA DURING 1955: PART III ● *Article by Harry N. Howard* 593

For index see inside back cover

The Department of State bulletin

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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reedom and Slavery in a Divided Germany

by James B. Conant
Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany[1]

When I last had the honor of being the Charter y speaker 16 years ago, I spoke as a college sident and I spoke about education. Having erted the ranks of university administrators 3 rs ago, I now find myself speaking as the ited States Ambassador to the Federal Re- lic of Germany on the topic "Freedom and very in a Divided Germany."

f anybody had predicted in March 1940 that ould once again be invited to be a Charter Day aker, I would have been highly flattered by the gestion. But if anyone had predicted that I uld be speaking as ambassador to a sovereign man nation with which we were bound in a itary alliance, I would certainly have pro- med the would-be prophet an utter idiot! For 1940 Adolf Hitler's grip on Germany seemed hakable; he had already invaded Poland after ing overrun Austria and Czechoslovakia; rld War II was in its first stages. I was among many Americans who had long detested and hed everything that Hitler and his cohorts d for in Germany, and I was among those who e fearful that Germany under his control ld soon conquer and enslave all Western ope. Therefore, in those days any suggestion ny being an ambassador to Germany would e seemed not only ridiculous but highly gnant.

ow, I must confess that my knowledge of many in 1940 was incomplete. I did not ize that there existed at that very moment a inconsiderable number of important Germans felt exactly as I did about Adolf Hitler, his ods and his goals. But even if I had been better informed about the internal situation in Germany, I could not have foreseen that, within two decades, from the ranks of the then dissenters from national socialism would come the leaders of a free Germany and that these leaders would determine the mood of a large proportion of the German people.

In 1940 few Americans had ever heard of one Konrad Adenauer, who had bravely defied Adolf Hitler shortly before the Nazis seized the government and, as a consequence of his stand, had been driven out of office as Mayor of Cologne. Today everyone knows and honors the name of Chancellor Adenauer; but I suggest that it is important to remember that he, the present Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as the President of the Federal Republic of Germany, Theodor Heuss, and not a few of the political leaders in the separate states and in the Federal Republic, were during the entire Nazi period literally in danger of their lives. To me it is the first prerequisite for understanding Germany today to realize that these facts have had enormous influence on the history of that country since 1945.

The Spirit of Germany Today

The spirit of Germany today is the spirit of a people who have repudiated the tyranny and brutality of the period of the Nazi rule. Perhaps some of my audience, still thinking in terms of 1945, may question this generalization. If so, I suggest you have failed to understand how Hitler and his followers completely discredited themselves by their actions during the last few years of the total war.

The barbarous revenge which Hitler took after the attempt to destroy him by a bomb on July 20, 1944, his senseless last-ditch resistance in Berlin

[1] harter Day address made at the University of Cali- ornia, Berkeley, Calif., on Mar. 23 (press release 146 ated Mar. 19).

when the war was clearly lost, his repeated statements that he would bring all Germany down in ruins about him, his orders to flood the mines and destroy the industry (orders which were never carried out), all of these things are well known in Germany and have left their mark. So too have the revelations of the horrors of the concentration camps and the slaughter of the Jews. Therefore, speaking as a reporter of the German scene, I think it correct to state that the legend of Hitler and the Nazis is completely dead. If there should be another significant right radical movement in Germany, such a movement, I feel sure, will not employ the symbols of the Nazis or claim any connection with their history, their slogans, or their goals.

I have dipped back into the history of the terrible years between 1933 and 1945 because I believe that in order to understand Germany today one must first of all understand the mood in which most articulate Germans regard their immediate past. The second prerequisite for understanding our new ally, the Federal Republic of Germany, is to realize what has happened and is now happening in the Soviet Zone. In other words, one must realize that, while some 50 million Germans are enjoying freedom, another 17 million are suffering under the slavery of an imposed communistic system. Not only does the Iron Curtain run right through Germany, but the city of Berlin itself is split between a free Berlin protected by American, British, and French troops and an Eastern Sector ruled as is the zone by a puppet regime subservient to the Soviet masters.

Contrasting Political Systems

If one wants to study the contrast between a free society and the modern form of tyranny which finds its prototype in Soviet Russia, one cannot do better than to examine Germany today. Indeed if one wants to examine the situation in miniature, the city of Berlin provides the best example, for here the Iron Curtain is transparent; one can see for oneself in the Soviet Sector what communism in action is really like. Whether one is interested in political science, economics, education, or the arts and letters, the contrast between the Soviet Zone of Germany and the Soviet Sector of Berlin on the one hand, and the Federal Republic of Germany and free Berlin on the other, is the contrast of night and day.

Take, for example, the two political systems In the Federal Republic freely elected state legis lative assemblies and a freely elected national as sembly, the Bundestag, successfully govern a dem ocratic society; rival political parties wage elec tion campaigns much as they do here in the Unite States. In the Soviet Zone the government is i theory based on an elected assembly and, in addi tion to the Communist Party, in theory there ar parties with other labels. Actually all politica activity is but a puppet show with the control in Soviet hands; there is neither freedom of as sembly, of speech, nor of the press.

The regime in the Soviet Zone carries the nam "The German Democratic Republic," but what travesty of democracy is actually in operation i evident from the election of a year ago. Like a elections in Soviet Russia and the satellite state this election was a farce. A single ballot with single list of candidates was handed to each vote as he entered the election booth; he or she was ex pected to deposit it forthwith in a ballot box; th only opportunity the voter had for registering dissent was to go over to a special corner and as for a piece of paper and pencil to indicate dis approval of the list. It is hardly necessary t point out that the officials in the booth were cer tain to report any voter who acted as if he wer living in a free land. Everyone in a police stat is under duress; it is not surprising that a vas majority of the population of the Soviet Zon went to the polls and cast the required ballo Whether, as reported, 99.9 percent of the voter voted yes, no one can say, but, when one consider the penalties of failure to toe the line, the figu may be factually correct.

If there were free elections in the zone, there little doubt that the communistic regime would l repudiated by an overwhelming vote. You wi recall that on June 17, 2 years ago, a spontaneou uprising in East Berlin could only be put dow by the Soviets' bringing in troops and tanks. Tl spirit of freedom which was symbolized by tho young men who threw stones at the Soviet tanl still burns strongly, not only in East Berlin b throughout the zone—of that fact there can l no doubt.

Over the last 3 or 4 years more than a millic Germans have left the Soviet Zone—the refuge still swarm through Berlin at the rate of near a thousand a day. In an attempt to diminish th flood the government of the so-called "Germ

ıocratic Republic" recently condemned to th two of its citizens because they were alleged ıave advised their compatriots to migrate to Federal Republic of Germany. This barous sentence was denounced by a unanimous ılution of the Bundestag, the elected assembly he Federal Republic of Germany. As a conıence of this protest and the incensed public ıion in the free world, the sentences have been ımuted to life imprisonment, but they still rern an example of the ruthlessness and brutality government of Soviet agents.

f time permitted, I would like to tell you of way the schools and the universities in the iet Zone have been remodeled to fit the Comıist pattern, how all publications must conn to the official line, how the industries have ı nationalized and agriculture reshaped to form to Communist ideology. Nationalizaof industry, for example, has proceeded ahead ılan, and 85 percent of industrial output now es from nationalized plants. In heavy industhe percentage is even higher—94 percent. ıly wish that those who in some free nations ear still to harbor illusions about the nature ommunism would go to Berlin and visit there a few days and talk to the refugees who have e from what the Communists declare to be ırkers' paradise but which, in fact, is a terrorsociety of slaves.

perity in Western Germany

ı terms not only of freedom but also in terms aterial prosperity there is a striking contrast een the Soviet Zone and the Federal Republic Germany. What private initiative can do r a stable political system with a stable curv has been demonstrated once again by the ilding of Western Germany. Recovery has eeded at a most astonishing pace. Today is little if any unemployment in Western nany, the factories are running full blast, the rt markets are expanding. Prosperity is to en at every turn.

l the Soviet Zone, on the other hand, there ecurrent crises and food shortages: Despite Five-Year-Plan promise to discontinue food ning by 1953, rationing of meat, fats, sugar, l, and potatoes continues, and shortages of and many other food items are chronic, times so severe that even the basic ration rements cannot be covered for certain products. This is partly due, of course, to the use of Communist methods in agriculture, whose failure is reflected by the fact that crop yields in the zone are an average of 20 percent lower per hectare than in West Germany. Luxury goods are high priced and scarce; automobiles, in comparison to Western Germany, are rarely to be seen.

When one realizes that these contrasts are before the eyes of the German voters, one is not surprised that the Communist vote in West Berlin and in the Federal Republic of Germany has been almost negligible. The Soviet model of so-called "democracy" has no appeal to the Germans who can freely express their view.

The Bundestag election of 1953 was highly significant in this regard. Neither the Communist Party nor the right radical parties polled enough votes to place a single member in the national legislative assembly (the Bundestag). The election in free Berlin of the State Assembly in December 1954 was equally decisive as showing a repudiation of radicalism of the right and left. There can be no doubt about the fact that a vast majority of the citizens of Germany who are free to vote have repeatedly demonstrated their commitment to a political system based on the dignity of the individual, private ownership of property, and parliamentary democracy which insures freedom of speech, religion, and the press.

Many Americans who have reported on Germany in the last few years have emphasized the remarkable prosperity of the Federal Republic. Indeed those who last saw the ruined German cities in 1946 can hardly believe their eyes when they revisit the same spots today. How was the amazing recovery accomplished, many ask. The answer is that several factors were involved. The currency reform of 1948—an act of the three Western occupying powers—was the first essential; closely related was the creation of a government with a banking system that issued a stable currency. Indeed, if anyone ever needed evidence as to the importance of sound money, the recent history of Germany provides the material. From the close of the war until the summer of 1948 very little progress was made in rebuilding the cities and industrial plants, trade was largely on a barter basis, the stores were almost empty. But as soon as the new currency was introduced into the three Western zones, conditions changed almost overnight; people began to work, trade to function, recovery began.

A year after the currency reform the first elections under a new constitution were held, and shortly thereafter Adenauer was elected Chancellor by the Bundestag. The economic policy of his government—the policy of his Minister for Economics, Professor Erhard—proved admirably suited for the tasks which lay ahead. Private initiative and competition were encouraged, socialization of industry was rejected, tax laws were passed which enabled industry to put back its profits into plant reconstruction. And it has been largely by plowing back profits that the industrial recovery has taken place.

Of course, the impetus given by American aid through the Marshall plan was of the greatest importance, and that this is so is freely acknowledged by Germans in all walks of life. All told, the American taxpayer has contributed some $3.5 billion to the reconstruction of Germany. But I might note that no new aid has been given for the last 4 years except for the city of Berlin, whose situation as an outpost of freedom presents us with special problems.

To the factors I have mentioned should be added three others in explaining German recovery. First, the attitude of the labor leaders who during the critical years refrained from pushing demands for increased wages. Second, the esprit de corps of the technical staff and working force in many factories which enabled these plants to start functioning again as soon as equipment could be put in order and raw materials obtained. Third, the well-known desire of the German people to work hard and effectively once a sound basis is at hand.

Political Developments

To describe the material reconstruction and economic recovery of Western Germany without mentioning the political developments of the critical years, 1946 to 1951, would be to present a distorted picture. For unless there had been a rapid and satisfactory building of representative government, there would be no sovereign Germany today. The process started in the Western zones with the election of state legislative assemblies, which elections gave an opportunity for rival political parties to present programs to the voters. Early in 1948 the three Western occupying powers authorized the governments of the separate states (then 10 in number) to convene an assembly charged with the task of drafting a constitution, or Basic Law, for a federated republic. A later such a Basic Law was submitted to the arate states and ratified by a majority of the semblies. Then followed in the summer of a national election of representatives of the lo house, the Bundestag, which in turn elected F rad Adenauer as Chancellor that fall. The B Law provides for a national election every 4 ye and the second election took place in 1953, ret ing Chancellor Adenauer and his coalition gov ment to power with a large majority.

It would take too long to describe in detail federal structure of the German Governm But there are one or two points of special inte The upper house, the Bundesrat, is compose delegates from the state governments, who as the state governments direct, each state ing a certain number of votes allocated to it w are always cast as a unit. But not all laws pa by the lower house require the concurrence of upper house—only those which affect the indi ual states. A supreme court has the power of claring unconstitutional laws which in the opi of the majority of the judges are contrary to provisions of the Basic Law. Thus, this feder governmental structure is somewhat analogou our own.

At the same time, the Basic Laws provide a parliamentary government, not a governmen divided powers as in the United States. Bu order to avoid that plague of rapidly chang governments which has disturbed other Europ countries, the Basic Law contains a unique vision. It is provided that a vote of no confid in the Chancellor can only be presented as of a motion which names his successor, and motion must be adopted by a majority of Bundestag by secret ballot. There is little d that this provision gave stability to the first ernment of Chancellor Adenauer, which came power by only a one-vote margin.

The political history as well as the econo history of the last 10 years in West Germa thus the story of the successful efforts of a people. But even more striking is the recor the assimilation of more than 11 million expe and refugees. When the war ended, about 40 i lion Germans were living within the area under the jurisdiction of the Federal Repu Into this portion of Germany came within a months nearly 8 million Germans from the l The job of finding living quarters and work

this influx can be imagined. In addition, more than 2 million Germans have fled from the Soviet Zone, many literally in danger of their lives.

The danger that all these displaced families and individuals would form an unassimilated and hence dissatisfied fifth of the population was great. If this occurred, a breeding ground for radicalism of the right or left would clearly be at hand. Recognizing what was involved, the problem of the refugees was given high priority by the Federal Government and the separate states, each of which took its quota. Just as a sort of "social engineering," if I may use the term, the work of the officials involved in the gigantic task of resettlement deserves the highest praise. Today it is estimated that well over three-fourths of the refugees are fairly well integrated into new communities and have found suitable employment.

Our New Ally

Earlier in my remarks I spoke of the Federal Republic of Germany as our new ally. I referred, of course, to the fact that last May Germany became sovereign and entered the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The process of building up a German armed force as part of this organization is now under way. And I may remark in passing that all the political parties are endeavoring to see to it that this army will not be a "state within a state." There is much concern with how a free democratic nation can have a large armed force which is both effective, completely loyal, and under civilian control. If concern with a problem will produce the right solution, this difficult question will be correctly answered by free Germany today.

Though our formal partnership with Germany as fellow members of NATO only began last May, we have been in fact allied with the free Germans in resisting Soviet aggression since the days of the Berlin blockade in 1948 and 1949. The success of the airlift and the brave stand of the inhabitants of Berlin made possible a significant victory for the free world. Furthermore, the struggle transformed the relationship of the American Armed Forces to the population. Legally our status continued to be that of an occupying power. Actually, it was clear to all, we were in Berlin as a defending power. A partnership between Germans and Americans developed in the beleaguered city, and after the blockade was lifted the new relationship continued and gradually spread to cities and towns in the American Zone.

After the invasion of Korea more than one high ranking official begged us to increase our military strength in Germany. We did so early in 1951, and this fact in itself was evidence that, while the legal status remained unchanged, our soldiers henceforth could only be regarded as defenders. Discussion soon started as to how the Germans themselves could participate in the defense of Europe by once again organizing military forces. In the meantime the formal relation remained unchanged, but the spirit was altered; the German Government agreed to continue to pay what was known as occupation costs but which were recognized as in fact the Federal Republic's contribution to the defense of Europe.

I am told by those who were then in Europe that the winter of 1950–51 was a period of great fear. The possibility the Soviets might overrun an almost defenseless Germany and France was evident for all to see. Then came the strengthening of our forces, the appointment of General Eisenhower as Commander in Chief of NATO; anxiety gradually diminished. But it has taken far longer than anyone then imagined to end formally the occupation of the territory of the Federal Republic and provide a legal basis for a German armed contribution.

At the moment it is only in the Soviet Zone that any large number of Germans are in uniform and carrying arms. The puppet government has armed and trained some 100,000 of its youth. One may well doubt whether these soldiers are either honored or respected by the population. Yet because the power of the police state in the Soviet Zone is backed by the presence of Russian troops, there can be no question but that the regime has *physical* domination of the unfortunate inhabitants of the enslaved part of Germany.

The Future of Germany

What of the future, you may ask. We are allied to the free peoples of Germany today in defense of Europe. The only government entitled to speak for them, the freely elected Government of the Federal Republic, is by its own declaration a provisional government, for it has been elected by only the inhabitants of what were once the American, British, and French Zones. While praising its accomplishments and welcoming it as

a partner, we must at the same time hope for its replacement by an all-German government freely elected by the inhabitants of the Soviet Zone as well as by those of the Federal Republic. This is the paradox of the present, a result of the tragic split of Germany today.

As the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France have repeatedly declared, there can be no hope of lasting peace and security in the world until German reunification is achieved, until an all-German government is established in Berlin. When that day comes, the history of the Federal Republic will have been concluded.

I have tried to tell you something of its present achievements, material, political, and spiritual. It has restored the German people to a position of respect among free nations; it is now our ally in the gigantic struggle of our times; its problems are our problems. To cooperate effectively the United States and the Federal Republic must seek to understand each other.

Tasks and Responsibilities of the Foreign Service

Remarks by Secretary Dulles [1]

I am happy by my presence here to testify to the tremendous importance which I attach to the Foreign Service of the United States and my gratification that so many persons, some for the first time and others in midcareer, are going out into it with the special qualifications that you get from the Institute.

As perhaps many of you know, my family has been identified with the Foreign Service of the United States for a long time, going back several generations. But when I recall some of those earlier days, I think how different the tasks and responsibilities were then from what they are today. They are just totally incomparable.

I have traveled about a good bit, as you may have heard. I have been to a total, I believe, of 38 foreign countries, and in each of those countries I have made it a practice to ask the Ambassador to bring together the members of the Foreign Service and of the related United States services in that country. I have tried to take vantage of my presence to have a little talk w them and to tell them what I think about Foreign Service and its responsibilities today.

To a greater extent than ever before in history, the fate of our own national future—a I think one can fairly say of the future of m of the free world—rests upon the group of peo who make up the Foreign Service of the Uni States. In time of war that responsibility re upon the military services primarily. In time assured peace the task of the diplomat—of Foreign Service officer—may be an amiable c reflecting what it was in the earlier days to wh I referred. But in times like these the respon bilities of representing the United States abr have become immense. There is today what called a "cold" war. There is a struggle go on which is worldwide in scope. The danger c stantly exists that that struggle could break fr the so-called cold war into a hot war. We m realize that in every post the loss of the so-cal cold war could have grave consequences not o in that country but in adjoining countries.

As I was just saying to Secretary Henderson we were coming down here from my office—th is no single post today that is not of great i portance. I think there are about 80. The nu ber is increasing as new countries come into bei We have a few new countries every year now. every one of these posts the problems are ma and important, and a loss there—a breakthrou there—could have serious consequences, just as time of war a breakthrough by the enemy at a point could have serious consequences all alo the line. So it is today.

Now, it used to be said that the practice diplomacy for the people in the field is not co plicated—that all they need to do is to deli notes and to receive notes. But nothing could further from the truth today. I believe that perhaps went through a period when that was case. But as things are now, on the basis of observation, the personal qualities of the memb of our Foreign Service are often the decisive e ment. It is particularly important that they velop the ability to make decisions, to report th observations and opinions in an understanda way, and to understand the point of view of th own Government or that of the Government which they are accredited, as the case may be.

I find that on my trips abroad it is most help

[1] Made on Mar. 29 at graduation exercises for Foreign Service officers graduating from the Foreign Service Institute (press release 167).

talk face to face with the Foreign Ministers of ıer countries. After such talks I am able to derstand better their point of view and to ob- n a better understanding of the despatches and ɔles that come to me. I can do that kind of ng in a certain number of countries once in a ile. But the big task of helping me to such an derstanding, of assisting me in obtaining the ɔper background, rests upon our Foreign Serv- officers. They have the task not only of under- nding and interpreting accurately the point of w of the country to which they are accredited equally the task of understanding the United ıtes point of view and transmitting that in an eptable way.

It is sometimes easy for a Foreign Service offi- to get to feel that his job is to please the coun- to which he is accredited. It is of course his to keep on good relations with the peoples of country to which he is accredited. But he ıst never forget that he is serving the United ıtes. And it is vital that he have the capacity to derstand United States foreign policy and to lize that that foreign policy is, as far as we ı make it so, a coherent one. We don't make r foreign policy just to please the people of ıntry "X," or country "Y," or country "Z." It y please country "X" and it may not please ıntry "Y." Well, that is tough on the Foreign rvice people that live in country "Y." But it is part of their job sometimes to face a tough uation.

We receive reports—reports of the kind that ne of you people who are graduating here today ll be making from different posts. We put se reports together with similar reports that ne in from other posts and use them in formu- ing our policy. When our policy decision goes , it may not be the thing that you recommended. u may feel disappointed about it. It may make ır job harder. But remember that the over- strategies and policies are made by giving con- eration to many factors. If something comes you that you don't like, it's because we in the partment have received information from other ırces which has led us to believe that the policy ɔn which we have decided is the best policy in interest of the United States. Your job is to lerstand and make that policy understandable he leaders of the governments to which you are redited. That is a task which cannot be per- med merely by delivering written notes or by receiving written notes. A personal element has reappeared today in these relationships to a very marked degree indeed.

An illustration of the importance of personal relationships is the meeting which I attended the last 2 or 3 days at White Sulphur Springs, where for the first time in history the President of the United States has met with the Heads of Government of the two countries to the north and south of us. What was our purpose? It was not to solve any problems. We had no concrete problems on our agenda. It was to create conditions which would make problems which may arise more solvable. You who are in foreign posts will find that your task is not just to solve some concrete problem, although there will be plenty of problems, but that you may also have the task of creating relationships, creating understanding, so that when particular problems arise the atmosphere will be such as to make those problems more solvable. This will be a tremendously exciting job.

Those of you who are in the midcareer group already know the fascination, the burdens, the tasks, the responsibilities of the Service and are better qualifying yourselves to solve them as you go into senior positions. Some of you are just completing your beginning course and will be assuming these tasks and responsibilities for the first time.

I congratulate both groups. I congratulate you not only on what you have accomplished to date but upon the future that lies ahead of you, the future which will not always be easy.

In the talk I made last Friday night, after I came back from Asia,[2] I emphasized that we must have more people who are willing to take on tasks of this sort, recognizing that the sacrifices are considerable, recognizing that they cannot be rewarded in material things since they are not selling themselves in a market place to the highest bidder. We must have more people who recognize that it is the great American tradition to carry the American message, the knowledge of the American way of life and our ideals, to the four corners of the globe. That is what our Nation was founded for, really.

The opening paragraphs of *The Federalist* papers point out that it seems to be reserved for the American people by their example to show the other peoples of the world how a free form of so-

[2] BULLETIN of Apr. 2, 1956, p. 539.

ciety can be organized and that upon the success or failure of our experiment will depend the welfare of all humanity. That has been the concept of our Nation since its earliest days. It is the task of those of you who are graduating today to carry out that great American tradition. In this Institute you have been qualifying better to perform this task. I am sure that in carrying it out you will have satisfactions which can be gained in no other way.

Canadian-Mexican-U.S. Meeting at White Sulphur Springs

At the meeting of the Canadian-Mexican-United States Heads of Government at White Sulphur Springs, W. Va., March 26 to 28, the three countries were represented by the following delegations:

Canada

Louis S. St. Laurent, Prime Minister of Canada
Lester B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada
Arnold D. P. Heeney, Ambassador of Canada to the United States
John W. Holmes, Assistant Under Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada

Mexico

Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, President of the United Mexican States
Luis Padilla Nervo, Minister of Foreign Relations of Mexico
Manuel Tello, Ambassador of Mexico to the United States

United States

Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States
John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State of the United States
Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State
Henry F. Holland, Assistant Secretary of State
Francis White, Ambassador of the United States to Mexico
R. Douglas Stuart, Ambassador of the United States to Canada

U. S. Makes Final Payment to U. N. Refugee Fund

U.S./U.N. press release 2377 dated March 27

Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. Representative to the United Nations, on March 27 transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a check for $261,000 representing the final payment by the United States on its 1955 pledge the U.N. Refugee Fund. This brings to $1,006, this country's 1955 contribution to the progr which is designed to find permanent solution the problem of the European refugees made ho less by war and the political upheavals which lowed.

The U.S. pledge was for $1,200,000 for the endar year 1955, but this was made on the unc standing that the U.S. contribution should not ceed one-third of all governmental contributi to the fund.

The President has recently asked Congress an appropriation of $1,500,000 for the progr for 1956 on a similar basis and has also reques that the unexpended balance for 1955 be carr over for use in 1956. In addition, the Presid has requested $800,000 for the first 6 months 1957; if appropriated, these funds would fac tate advance planning for the program.

Atoms-for-Peace Agreement With Thailand Signed

Following are the texts of statements made Bangkok on March 13 by Secretary Dulles Prince Wan Waithayakon, Foreign Minister Thailand, on the occasion of the signing of a Th U.S. agreement on the civil uses of atomic ener

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY DULLES

Today, with the signing of this agreement the civil uses of atomic energy, Thailand and United States have forged yet another link in th partnership for peace and human well-being. we all know, this partnership goes back ove century. I am proud that American doctors, ed cators, and experts in many fields have worl with Thai doctors, nurses, teachers, and te nicians to put to use the scientific advances medicine and other fields. These Thai a American pioneers built the Thai–American pa nership on the solid foundations of mutual h and mutual respect as they labored together. W the inception of the Thai–U.S. economic coope tion program, this Thai–American joint effort v expanded and accelerated as new scientific c coveries and new skills were brought to bear Thailand in the fields of agriculture, public heal

ducation, and transportation. Thai and Ameri-
an experts, working side by side, have evolved
proved breeds of rice, rid wide areas of malaria
nd other diseases, expanded water supplies and
ommunications, and made higher education avail-
ble to many. In turn, Thailand has shared its
kills in many of these fields with its neighbors
nd fellow members of the United Nations while
turn receiving aid in certain fields from inter-
ational organizations as well as the United
tates. We can look with deep satisfaction upon
ur joint achievements while pushing forward
ith the task of continuing to improve the con-
tions under which men live.

Now science has put a wonderful new force
thin our grasp—the untold energy of the atom.
he President of the United States, by his per-
nal sponsorship of the atoms-for-peace pro-
ram, has shown the United States desire to share
is knowledge and help provide equipment to its
iends so that by pooling efforts the benefits of
omic science may be sooner and more effectively
alized. To this end the United States has
orked earnestly with the other nations prin-
pally involved toward the establishment of an
ternational atomic energy agency. Represent-
ives both of Thailand and the United States
ve attended and contributed to a very successful
ternational conference on peaceful uses of
omic energy held under the auspices of the
nited Nations in Geneva last summer. The
nited States has concluded a series of bilateral
reements with other nations of the free world
oviding for cooperative efforts in this vast new
ld. In signing this agreement here today,
hailand joins in this program designed to ad-
nce the frontiers of science for the benefit of
ankind. This program is imaginative, excit-
g, and realistic. The agreement lays a basis
r further cooperation between Thailand and the
nited States in this important field, including
e establishment of an experimental reactor in
hailand. Radioisotopes to fight the ravages of
sease can thus be made available to Thai hos-
als and medical schools. A major source of
aining in this important technology would thus
set up in Thailand; eight Thai scientists have
ready gone to the United States for training in
e fundamentals of atomic science.

We must not expect atomic science to work any
lden far-reaching miracles. We must carefully
ild up common knowledge, work out common
problems, develop and share skills. Progress may well be slow in the beginning as we explore the complexities of atomic science. Here or anywhere it is a long path from the scientific laboratory to the engineering drawing board and to the completion of any project in this field. Yet explorations in this field of atomic energy to date give stirring indications of the potential benefits to all men which we may some day realize. As we strive forward, we must display those characteristics of resourcefulness, devotion to duty, industry, and mutual assistance and cooperation which characterized the work of those Thai and Americans who pioneered in the fields of medicine and applied sciences here in Thailand.

STATEMENT BY PRINCE WAN

It was indeed a great day in history, pregnant with unlimited possibilities of benefit to mankind, when President Eisenhower announced to the world through the United Nations his atoms-for-peace program. It stands as a landmark in history because it marks the determination of man to harness this new potential source of energy for peaceful uses. It opens up a wide vista of untold benefits that will accrue to mankind. With the lofty spirit that inspires the American people your Government now offers to let the world share in the knowledge and experience you have gained in this new field of science.

In this spirit your Government has already opened up your institutes to provide training for scientists from other countries. As you mentioned, eight Thai scientists have already gone to the United States for this purpose and more will follow. An atomic research library is also being made available free to Thailand. I understand that the materials are already here and will shortly be presented by your Ambassador to His Majesty's Government.

And now comes this agreement for cooperation between our two Governments in the establishment of an experimental reactor in Thailand and in making available to Thailand the requisite materials for experiments in research in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to the end that diseases may be fought and other uses in agriculture and industry might follow later on.

We recognize that, in your offer to let the world share in the program for peaceful uses of nuclear

energy, your Government is moved purely by the noble desire to promote the happiness of mankind. As you aptly put it, Mr. Secretary, the program initiated by the agreement which we have just signed is designed to advance the frontier of science for the benefit of mankind. It is indeed imaginative, exciting, realistic, and, I might add, also extremely generous. We are deeply grateful for this assistance and gladly accept it in the spirit in which it is offered, for we know that no sinister motive lies behind it. It is offered to us in the same selfless spirit that moved American missionaries and other humanitarian workers, men and women, to devote their untiring efforts, for well over a century now, to help our people in the promotion of their health and welfare.

Mr. Secretary, this agreement is yet another testimony of the unshakable resolve of your Government to promote the progress of mankind so that men can live in freedom and have the necessary conditions to develop their freedom. It is also another landmark in the history of Thai–American relationships which have grown and are growing ever closer and firmer every day. I am indeed proud and highly honored to be able to participate with you, Mr. Secretary of State, in this historical event.

Sale of 129 Tons of Heavy Water in Atoms-for-Peace Program

The Atomic Energy Commission on March 13 announced approval of the sale of 129 tons of heavy water to six nations for assistance in their peacetime applications of atomic energy. Sixteen tons of the material have been shipped abroad.

The initial consignments of 11 tons to Great Britain and 5 to France were manufactured at the Commission's plant at Dana, Ind. Heavy water also is produced at its facilities in S Carolina. All sales are at the price of $28 pound announced August 8, 1955.

Included in the 129-ton total was an additi 11 tons for the Government of India. An orig order of 10 tons for India, announced Febr 12, 1955,[1] was the first to be approved for special reactor material under the Presid atoms-for-peace program. The 21 tons wil used by the Government of India in a rese reactor which the Government of Canada has nounced it plans to give India under the Colc Plan.

The total amounts approved for sale ar follows: United Kingdom, 50 tons; France, India, 21; Australia, 11; Italy, 10; and Swi land, up to 7, with 2 tons to be delivered by gust 1957.

Britain will use the material in several o civilian research reactors. The Swiss order go to Reactor, Ltd., the private group which ries on nuclear research in Switzerland and erates the pool-type research reactor purch from the United States at the close of the at for-peace conference in Geneva last August.

Heavy water is used as a moderator in sev types of reactors to slow down the speed of trons emitted in the splitting of atoms of fissionable uranium–235.

Mr. Allyn To Be U.S. Representati to Eleventh Session of ECE

The Senate on March 28 confirmed Stanle Allyn to be a representative of the United St to the 11th session of the Economic Commis for Europe.

[1] BULLETIN of Mar. 7, 1955, p. 396.

'he Development of United States Policy in the Near East, outh Asia, and Africa During 1955: Part III [1]

by Harry N. Howard

IUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAMS AND U.S. ECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

road Character of United States Programs

There was continued recognition, during the urse of 1955, of the positive necessity of techni- l and economic assistance, especially in such iderdeveloped areas as those of the Near East, uth Asia, and Africa. Although the Soviet overnment spoke much of technical and economic sistance, particularly during 1955, it had not rticipated in the United Nations Technical As- tance Program, hitherto condemned as a de- m for colonial exploitation, until 1953 and then ider restrictions and with a very small con- ibution.[2] On the contrary, the United States s long engaged, both directly and through the ited Nations, its specialized agencies, and re- nal organizations, in constructive programs of sistance. U.S. participation is based on the alization that the maintenance of international ace and security, the preservation of the politi- independence and territorial integrity of states, promotion of political stability, and the ocesses of orderly change are all interconnected. The record of the United States in this field is an pressive one. Between July 1, 1945, and Sep- tnber 30, 1955, the total of United States grants d credits to other nations reached $52,287,000,- 0, of which no less than $41,340,000,000 was in grants. Some $17,248,000,000 went for economic and technical assistance, famine relief, and other urgent relief. Of these amounts, grants and credits in the Near East and Africa totaled $4,466,000,000, the net grants reaching $3,934,000,000 and credits $532,000,000. In South Asia, grants and credits totaled $548,000,000, with the net grants standing at $280,000,000. A more detailed picture of the situation in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa as a whole may be seen from the accompanying table.[3]

Summary of Net U.S. Grants and Credits in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa (1945–1955) [4]

	Net Grants	Net Credits	Net Total
Greece	$1,208,000,000	$81,100,000	$1,289,000,000
Turkey	226,000,000	94,000,000	320,000,000
Iran	147,000,000	54,000,000	201,000,000
Egypt	26,000,000	4,000,000	30,000,000
Israel	233,000,000	137,000,000	370,000,000
Jordan	25,000,000	.....	25,000,000
Liberia	6,000,000	19,000,000	25,000,000
Unspecified (Near East and Africa)	189,000,000	−7,000,000	182,000,000
Afghanistan	3,000,000	26,000,000	29,000,000
India	116,000,000	228,000,000	344,000,000
Pakistan	142,000,000	15,000,000	157,000,000
Unspecified (South Asia)	19,000,000	.....	19,000,000
Totals by Area			
Near East and Africa	$1,967,000,000	$532,000,000	$2,499,000,000
South Asia	280,000,000	268,000,000	548,000,000
Near East, South Asia and Africa	$2,247,000,000	$800,000,000	$3,047,000,000

For Part I of this article, dealing with political issues, BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1956, p. 452; for Part II, on prob- s of regional security, see *ibid.*, Mar. 26, 1956, p. 510.

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For a U.S. statement on Soviet participation, see BULLETIN of Mar. 5, 1956, p. 395.

[3] This article does not cover the contribution of the Department of State International Educational Exchange Service in this area. For a brief account of activities under this program, see *The International Exchange Program, 15th Semiannual Report to Congress* (Department of State publication 6293, 1956).

[4] Department of Commerce, *Foreign Grants and Credits by the United States Government*, September 1955 quarter, tables 1 and 2. Net figures cited here differ from certain of the individual country figures cited below because they are computed on another basis.

A potentially important phase of the broad U.S. program was the initialing of a series of atoms-for-peace agreements with Turkey (May 3), Lebanon (June 2), Israel (June 3), Pakistan (June 15), and Greece (June 22). Under these agreements, the governments concerned were to receive information concerning the design, construction, and operation of research reactors and their use as research, development, and engineering tools; the United States Atomic Energy Commission was to lease up to 6 kilograms (13.2 pounds) of contained U–235 in uranium enriched up to a maximum of 20 percent U–235. The agreements also provided for exchange of unclassified information in the research reactor field, and on the use of radioactive isotopes in physical and biological research, medical therapy, agriculture, and industry. The agreements would enable the countries involved to acquire valuable training and experience in nuclear science and engineering for the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy, including civilian nuclear power.[5]

Assistance Programs During 1955

The programs of economic and technical assistance during 1955 were within the broad framework which had been elaborated over the years. As President Eisenhower explained in his foreign economic policy message to the Congress on January 10, the self-interest of the United States required "economic strength among our allies" and "economic growth in underdeveloped areas" in order to "lessen international instability growing out of the vulnerability of such areas to Communist penetration and subversion."[6]

President Eisenhower's theme was carried forward in his recommendations for the 1956 mutual security program, transmitted to the Congress on April 20, in which there was considerable stress on the problems of the Near East, South Asia, and Africa.[7] All told, the President recommended that Congress approve funds totaling $3,530,000,000 for the mutual security program, of which $712,500,000 was for economic programs, including $172,000,000 for a continuation of technical cooperation programs, $175,500,000 for spec programs, and $165,000,000 for development sistance; $179,000,000 was to be allocated to Middle East. In all, about $812,500,000, or ab 25 percent, was requested for nonmilitary p grams. In a statement of May 5 before the Sen Committee on Foreign Relations, Secret Dulles declared:

> International communism is pressing hard to extend influence in Asian countries which lack the econo strength to support an adequate defense establishm and to provide the necessary foundation of political bility and steadily improving living standards.[8]

Mr. Dulles was convinced that a continuation this "investment of strength" under the mut security program could meet the Soviet challe

In the end, the Congress appropriated so $2,700,000,000 for fiscal year 1956, includ $1,700,000,000 for defense support, developm assistance, technical assistance, and other p grams. It may be observed that, of these fu some $113,700,000 was designed for defense s port in the Near East and Africa, $73,000,000 to go for development assistance in that area, the general authorization for technical coop tion amounted to $127,500,000. Other items interest were the appropriations of $14,500 for the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF), s $62,000,000 for the U.N. Relief and Works Age for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRW and $100,000,000 for the President's Fund Asian Economic Development. For all purp except direct military assistance, approxima $317,000,000 was allocated to the Near East, Sou Asia, and Africa during 1955.[9]

Assistance to Greece, Turkey, and Iran

Greece and Turkey had been the subject of cial American assistance, designed to strengt

[5] For text of the agreement with Turkey, which entered into force on June 10, see BULLETIN of July 11, 1955, p. 55. The agreement with Lebanon entered into force on July 18; that with Israel on July 12; Pakistan on Aug. 11; and Greece on Aug. 4, 1955.

[6] BULLETIN of Jan. 24, 1955, p. 119.

[7] *Ibid.*, May 2, 1955, p. 711.

[8] *Ibid.*, May 23, 1955, p. 855. See also the Secret statement of May 25 before the House Committe Foreign Affairs, *ibid.*, June 6, 1955, p. 911, and th Harold E. Stassen before the House Committee on 8, 1955, *ibid.*, July 4, 1955, p. 29.

[9] For a summary of the uses to which mutual sec funds were put in individual countries during the half of 1955, see *Report to Congress on the Mutual rity Program for the Six Months Ended June 30,* H. Doc. 266, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 20 (Pakistan), (India), p. 22 (Afghanistan and Nepal), p. 25 (G and Turkey), p. 26 (Iran), p. 27 (Arab States and Is and p. 32 (Africa).

eir defensive positions and to preserve their po-
ical independence and territorial integrity. De-
ite serious difficulties between Greece and Tur-
y concerning Cyprus, Greek and Turkish armed
rces continued to constitute an essential ele-
nt in the Western defense system. Both were
mbers of NATO and the Balkan Alliance, and
rkey was a signatory of the Baghdad Pact
955).

Among the noteworthy undertakings for
engthening the Greek economy was an electric
wer project, which provided Greece for the first
e with a unified electric power generating and
d system, more than doubling the prewar out-
t.[10] It was announced on June 24 that new aid
aling $19,200,000, partly in the form of a loan,
d been made available to Greece to help meet
economic pressures arising from earthquake
mage.[11]

The United States also continued to assist Tur-
y during 1955. Under an agreement of Novem-
r 1954, supplemented on April 28, 1955,[12] $29
llion worth of American surplus agricultural
oducts was to be shipped to Turkey, in view of
rop failure and diminished foreign exchange,
effects of which were felt during 1955. In
der not to jeopardize either Turkey's military
sition or its achievements under the program
ce 1950, the United States agreed in June to
rease the defense-support program in fiscal
55 from $70 million to $100 million, the addi-
nal $30 million to assist Turkey during the
ergency period and to provide for imports of
w materials, basic commodities, and spare parts
r its industrial establishment.

t was announced on January 17, 1956, that, at
l request of the United States and the Republic
Turkey, Clarence B. Randall, the eminent in-
trialist and special consultant to President
enhower on foreign economic policy, had
eed to visit Turkey late in January to discuss
nomic problems of interest to both countries.
was expected that Mr. Randall's visit would
atly contribute to the further development of
erican-Turkish economic relations and to the
advancement of mutual understanding in this
realm.[13]

Although the oil settlement of October 1954 had started the flow of substantial oil revenues to Iran by 1955, financial assistance was still necessary to meet urgent needs. The Foreign Operations Administration (now the International Cooperation Administration), for example, made a loan of $32 million for defense purposes, government employee payrolls, and other expenses. There was increasing evidence of the success of technical assistance in Iran during 1955. A program for the control of malaria had been launched 4 years before by U.S. health technicians; by 1955, the Iranians themselves were carrying on most of the work. Similarly, U.S. technicians had taught the techniques of livestock crossbreeding to Ministry of Agriculture employees, who in turn were spreading the knowledge to rural areas. A teacher-training program was now being carried out by the Ministry of Education, involving some 12,000 teachers, or about 40 percent of the Iranian teaching staff. There was also progress in the field of public administration, and an Institute of Administrative Affairs was opened at the University of Tehran in January 1955.[14]

Assistance to the Middle East

The United States has also engaged in significant development projects in the Middle East. In the case of Egypt, which had initiated a comprehensive 10-year economic development program, for example, the United States made available a total of $40 million in development assistance during fiscal year 1955, and, in addition, $2 million was allocated for technical cooperation. The American program stressed, among other things, railway and highway improvement. A loan agreement provided for repayment of $7 million of the

Direct American participation in the project ended on
15, 1955. On June 10 Greece signed an agreement
the United States for defense use of technology, de-
ed to foster the exchange of technology for defense
oses (BULLETIN of July 11, 1955, p. 84).

BULLETIN of July 18, 1955, p. 100.

Ibid., May 16, 1955, p. 814.

[13] *Ibid.*, Jan. 30, 1956, p. 171. Since the beginning of 1948 Turkey has received $463 million in economic assistance from the United States for development assistance related to the upkeep of its armed forces and for technical assistance. During the same period, Turkey has borrowed some $25 million from the Export-Import Bank and about $63 million from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, while short-term government and commercial debts in Europe were estimated at about $150 million.

[14] For text of a U.S.–Iranian agreement signed on Feb. 20, 1956, on surplus agricultural commodities, see Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3506. On Feb. 26, 1956, the Export-Import Bank signed a $14 million credit agreement with Iran for railroad improvement.

$40 million, and, as its share of the cost of the projects, Egypt was to spend the equivalent of $43 million from its resources.

In addition, the United States, together with the United Kingdom and other countries, was much interested in the project for the construction of the High Aswan Dam on the Nile River, both for hydroelectric and for irrigation purposes, the total cost of which, over a 20-year period, was estimated at some $1 billion. During a visit to the United States by the Egyptian Minister of Finance, Abdel Moneim El Kaissouni, the problem of the dam was discussed, and on December 17, 1955, it was announced that the United States and the United Kingdom had assured the Egyptian Government of their support of the project, "which would be of inestimable importance in the development of the Egyptian economy and in the improvement of the welfare of the Egyptian people." The assistance was to take the form of grants toward defraying foreign exchange costs of the initial stages of the construction, involving the coffer dam, the foundations for the primary dam, and auxiliary work. Assurance was also given, subject to legislative authority, that the United States and the United Kingdom were prepared "to consider sympathetically in the light of then existing circumstances further support toward financing the later stages to supplement World Bank financing." [15]

The problem of assistance to Iraq differed from that of aid to Egypt both because of the former's signature of the Baghdad Pact and because of its oil revenues of about $140 million a year. However, the United States has assisted in developing Iraqi military potential under the mutual defense agreement of 1954.

The primary key to Iraqi development lies in harnessing the waters of the Tigris-Euphrates river system; construction is now under way on a series of dams. Iraq initiated its second Five-Year Plan on April 1, 1955, and the Iraqi Development Board proposed that the equivalent of some $800 million be made available from petroleum to finance the program, much of the emphasis of which was on projects to raise living standards. Under the technical cooperation program in Iraq an agricultural college was established at Abu Ghraib with the assistance of nicians from the University of Arizona, whil Technical Institute at Baghdad was establ with similar assistance from the Bradley Inst of Technology.

With its limited resources and the presen some 450,000 Arab refugees from Palestine, dan continued to be confronted with serious nomic problems. During 1955 the United S made $5 million available to the Jordania velopment program, $3.6 million of it in the of local currency purchased with pounds ste generated from the sale of American coal t United Kingdom. The assistance took the of road construction, afforestation, and w spreading activities; some 50 miles of roads completed, about 5,000 acres of formerly u ductive land were brought under cultivation many thousands of new trees were planted. $2,200,000 was provided for technical coopera with projects in agriculture, natural reso health, and education. Nineteen agricultura ters serving 300 villages are now in operati Jordan. Sound beginnings have been ma education, and about 100 Jordanian trainees i field of education have been sent abroad.[16]

During 1955, a large part of the progra Lebanon was designed to assist in improvin Lebanese road system, in view of its impor to the country's economic development. An a ment in June 1955 provided for $5,700,000 to finance construction of a modern highway Beirut to the Syrian border, connecting wit road to Damascus, one of the important high in the Middle East. While the Lebanese Go ment was to pay the major cost, $5 millio American assistance was to be in the form 15-year loan at 3 percent, which the Lebanese ernment has not yet taken up. The rema $700,000 was to be used to purchase Ame road-building equipment and to finance an neering survey by an American firm. Other f of assistance included provision of $1.4 mi for improved agricultural equipment, the e lishment of 30 agricultural extension offices

[15] BULLETIN of Dec. 26, 1955, p. 1050. For the agricultural commodities agreement with Egypt signed Dec. 14, 1955, see Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3439.

[16] On Oct. 30, 1955, the Jordanian Parliament app an agreement permitting Edwin W. Pauley, an inde ent American petroleum producer, to explore Jord oil. It provided for 50 percent sharing after paym exploration expenditures and for cancellation a months if oil was not found; all oil wells were to b the exclusive property of Jordan after 55 years.

ie guidance of American extension specialists, ie establishment of the Lebanon Industry Institute, and the setting up of the National Litani Board for the development of the Litani River.[17]

The United States also continued to support the rogram of assistance to Arab refugees under 'NRWA. Some 900,000 refugees were involved, bout 300,000 of whom were completely supported y UNRWA in camps, while the rest received both ood rations and basic medical services, at an verage cost of $28 per annum.[18] It is partly connection with the refugee problem that the 'nited States has sought to promote the development of the Jordan River Valley, which would rmit the irrigation of some 225,000 acres of nd in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Israel and ake possible eventual settlement of some 200,000 fugees.

At the same time, the United States continued s assistance to Israel, with special attention to rograms for orderly industrial development. he program for 1955 centered on projects degned to make maximum use of local raw marials, without neglecting agriculture.[19] On pril 29 an agreement was signed with Israel roviding for the sale of $8.3 million worth of surlus commodities, including 50,000 metric tons wheat and 40,000 metric tons of feed grains. he Israeli pounds derived from the purchase of ese commodities were to be used for various irposes, including American expenditures in Isel; some were to be loaned for the purpose of onomic development in Israel.[20]

Neither Yemen nor Saudi Arabia received ecomic or technical assistance during 1955 from the nited States. By 1954, however, Saudi Arabia as receiving royalties from the Arabian Ameri-n Oil Company at the rate of about $260 million nnually. As President Eisenhower declared on ugust 11, 1955, when receiving the credentials Saudi Arabian Ambassador Sheikh Abdullah -Khayall, "from the earliest years of our country, traders, doctors, and educators have gone [to the Middle East] to contribute, through their careers, to the growth and development of the area." [21]

On November 22, it was announced that Yemen had granted a concession to the Yemen Development Corporation, the first oil and mineral concession in the history of the country. The 30-year agreement provided for exclusive exploration and development rights over 40,000 square miles, or the northern two-thirds of the country, with the exception of the narrow coastal strip (Tihana). All net profits were to be divided equally, but the agreement could be voided if commercial quantities either of petroleum or minerals were not found within 6 years.

Assistance in Africa

Among the projects of economic and technical assistance in Africa, examples may be cited from Liberia, Ethiopia, and Libya. Classes began in the new Booker T. Washington Institute in Liberia during August 1955. The project was launched under a contract with Prairie View (Texas) Agricultural and Mechanical College, which provided assistance in improving teaching methods and planning an educational curriculum. A project for demonstrating the techniques of growing swamp rice was completed in 1955, with the results disseminated in many parts of Liberia through an agricultural extension system organized with American assistance.

A joint Ethiopian-American educational commission made a thorough examination of Ethiopian educational needs, through the technical assistance program. The educational program in agriculture and the mechanical arts was already showing results in Ethiopia. The 3-year-old Jimma Agricultural Secondary School and the Handicraft School at Addis Ababa, were financed entirely by the Ethiopian Government, except for the cost of American technicians. In addition, an apprentice trade school was established at Addis Ababa by technicians from the Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College, as part of a program for developing agricultural and mechanical training. On October 3 the Export-Import Bank announced that it would establish a $24 million credit in Ethiopia's favor for the develop-

[17] It was announced on Mar. 2, 1956, that an Export-Import Bank loan of $105,000 to Syria would assure the beginning of a program to bring a dependable supply of drinking water to various parts of Syria.

[18] See also U.N. docs. A/2978 and Add. 1, A/2989, A/3057.

[19] Israel also receives large-scale assistance from unofficial sources in the United States. During 1955, for example, some $42,318,500 was subscribed in Israel bonds, bringing the total sold since 1951 to $216,594,450.

[20] BULLETIN of May 16, 1955, p. 815.

[21] Department of State press release 486, Aug. 11, 1955 (not printed).

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ment of commercial airfields and aviation facilities throughout the country.[22]

On presenting his credentials as Ambassador, Sayyid Saddiq Muntasser, on May 6, 1955, noted that the Libyan people had placed much trust in the friendship of the United States and recalled the role which the United States had played during the consideration of the future of Libya in the United Nations. Ambassador Muntasser also noted that the decision to recognize the legitimate right of self-determination had been made on American soil. But independence had not solved all problems, and Libya still counted on the assistance of the United States to overcome some of its difficulties to insure its complete independence in all fields. President Eisenhower replied that he was aware of the complex problems facing Libya and indicated that the United States was "deeply sympathetic" with the efforts which were being made to raise Libyan standards of living.[23]

The Libyan-American Reconstruction Commission, with an American as executive director, was established to help supervise American economic assistance. Under a revised technical assistance agreement, projects were being integrated within Libyan government departments to pave the way for Libya to assume greater responsibility for project activities. Preventive and other public health services were introduced by the Libyan-American Joint Service in Public Health.

The International Cooperation Administration announced on August 1 that it would ship 6,800 tons of surplus American wheat to Libya in an emergency move to relieve distress occasioned by a poor grain harvest, and on September 2 a further agreement was signed covering an additional grant of 6,000 tons and bringing to 45,000 tons the total of wheat shipments authorized over a period of some 20 months.[24]

Assistance in South Asia

In South Asia, where the Soviet Union made considerable propaganda with large offers of assistance during the fall of 1955, the United States had long been active under the United Nat and its own bilateral programs.

Both military and economic assistance has b rendered to Pakistan, which has taken a firm p tion on the side of the free world, within framework both of the Southeast Asia Collec Defense Treaty and the Baghdad Pact. In th years ending on June 30, 1955, the United St provided Pakistan with some $361,850,000 in nomic assistance. Because of its urgent need assistance, some $71.8 million—$20 million o loan basis—was provided during fiscal year 1 of which $40 million was for commodity impo The program also included $20 million for def support, $5.5 million for flood relief, $5.3 mil for technical assistance projects, and $1 million freight costs in ocean transport of surplus a cultural commodities.

The technical assistance program in Paki during 1955 included projects directed toward provement of transportation and indus Among other things, Pakistan International A lines and Pan American World Airways sig an agreement in May providing for Ameri technical assistance in expanding Pakistan's transportation system, and a group of Ameri technicians assisted in this work. American te nicians also cooperated in agricultural prod tion, land reclamation, public health, vocatio education, and the community development p gram. The United States assisted in designin multipurpose hydroelectric dam to be construc on the Karnafuli River in East Pakistan, elec power from which will stimulate industrial de opment and also contribute to flood control irrigation. In May the United States and Pa stan signed an agreement making possible gu anties for private investments in Pakistan, signed to encourage private industry.[25]

During the latter part of 1955, India was visi by Premier Nikolai Bulganin and Party Sec tary Nikita Khrushchev and also received tan lizing offers of Soviet economic and technical

[22] Bulletin of Oct. 17, 1955, p. 617.

[23] Department of State press release 244, May 6, 1955 (not printed).

[24] Bulletin of Aug. 15, 1955, p. 263, and Sept. 12, 1955, p. 427. For a U. S.-Libyan agreement on relief supplies and equipment, see Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3480.

[25] Bulletin of Jan. 24, 1955, p. 157, and June 20, 1 p. 1018. Greece, Israel, and Turkey have signed sim agreements with respect to the protection of priv investments.

For a U.S.-Pakistan agreement on mutual secu signed Jan. 11, 1955, see Treaties and Other Internati Acts Series 3183; for an agreement on surplus agri tural commodities signed Jan. 18, 1955, see TIAS 31 for a technical cooperation agreement signed Jan. 1955, see TIAS 3185.

tance.[26] The United States, for its part, had g engaged in programs of economic and tech- al assistance in India. Indeed, since 1951, the ited States had provided India with gross as- tance totaling more than $500 million, divided nost equally between grants and loans. In all re were more than 50 joint projects, toward the npletion of which India was contributing about 0 million. In addition, American foundations l voluntary agencies have contributed some $48 llion to various projects in India.

While the problems with regard to India were uplicated, results were already evident in a mber of fields, involving both agriculture and lustry. During fiscal year 1955, the United ites allocated $84.3 million to Indian projects, which $45 million was on a loan basis. Of .1 million in development assistance funds de available during 1955, $30 million was pro- imed for cotton and wheat purchases in the ited States; the rupees acquired by the United ites from these purchases were part of the $45 llion loan and were to be utilized for the de- opment of power, river valley projects, and er joint projects.

Technical assistance projects continued to stress nmunity development and increased agricul- al production. Contracts were negotiated h five American universities and colleges for hnical support to several Indian states and ag- ultural institutions. A village water supply l sanitation system was inaugurated and at- tion given to small irrigation projects, soil con- vation, and farm management. The Univer- of Tennessee was to assist Indian women's leges in home economics; the University of xas was to cooperate in the establishment of cher-training institutions in the field of sec- lary education.

There were also other forms of assistance. Up June 1955, for example, some $38,875,000 had n earmarked for the purchase of railway roll- stock and locomotives, and early in September freight cars were received under the American program. On October 4 the United States l India announced an exchange of notes cover- the extension of emergency assistance totaling 7 million in the form of 10,000 tons of wheat and 10,000 tons of rice from the stocks of the Commodity Credit Corporation to help relieve victims of flood disaster in northeast India.[27] On January 5, 1956, the fourth anniversary of the assistance program in India, a new agreement was signed, providing $10 million for importation of 100,000 tons of steel and 6,000 tons of DDT for malaria control.[28]

During the Bulganin–Khrushchev visit to Afghanistan in December 1955, much was made of the announcement of a $100-million Soviet loan to Afghanistan and of the reaffirmation of Afghanistan's "neutral" policy.[29] On the other hand, the United States has endeavored over the years, although on a relatively small scale, to assist Afghanistan in a variety of ways. Through the Export-Import Bank, loans totaling $39,500,000 were made for the multipurpose Helmand Valley project for irrigation, flood control, and power development. In addition, some $4 million had been granted in the form of technical assistance.

During 1955 stress continued to be placed on the Helmand River project, and a group of American experts assisted in such technical projects as engineering, agriculture, health and sanitation, community development, and public administration. Moreover, under contract with the Foreign Operations Administration, Columbia University Teachers College sent a group of four specialists to Kabul to assist the Ministry of Education in teacher training and general education. The University of Wyoming sent 23 specialists to assist in technical education and agriculture; helped in the establishment of the Afghanistan Institute of Applied Science, with two subsidiary schools, the Afghan Institute of Technology and the Vocational Agricultural School; and aided the Ministry of Agriculture in research and demonstration. The Near East Foundation, long experienced in such matters, assisted in a project for community development in Afghan villages.

Work in Nepal during 1955 looked primarily

India and the Soviet Union had signed a loan agree- nt on Feb. 2, 1955, for the construction of a 1-million- steel plant in central India at a cost of some $91 mil- to be completed by 1960.

[27] BULLETIN of Oct. 17, 1955, p. 617.

[28] The steel import brought to 700,000 tons the total which India had obtained from the United States. The first 4 of 100 locomotives arrived at Bombay on Jan. 3, 1956; for an address by Ambassador John Sherman Cooper on that occasion, see BULLETIN of Feb. 6, 1956, p. 205. For text of air transport agreement signed with India on Feb. 3, see *ibid.*, Feb. 13, 1956, p. 264.

[29] Since 1954 the Soviet Union had loaned some $14 million to Afghanistan for road construction, storage tanks, flour mills, etc.

toward reparation of flood devastation, and a project for reclamation in the Rapti Valley, where an area of some 130,000 acres was to be opened for resettlement, was undertaken. The village improvement program involved six development centers, which have trained more than 175 Nepalese to demonstrate more effective use of insecticides, fertilizers, and farm implements. Assistance was also given in the field of public health. The University of Oregon assisted in an educational project, under which more than 100 villagers were trained as teachers to work in schools throughout Nepal. Since 1951 approximately $6 million in U.S. aid has gone to Nepal, including $1.5 mil in flood relief.

Export-Import Bank Loans

Even before the inauguration of the Ameri program for technical and economic assista the Export-Import Bank of Washington had thorized a number of loans in the Near East, Sc Asia, and Africa for the economic developmen countries in that area. By July 1, 1955, tl loans were substantially as shown in the accom nying table.

Export-Import Bank Loans, 1945–1955 [30]

Country	Date	Authorized Credit	Purpose
Egypt			
Fertilizer and Chemical Industries of Egypt.	7/16/47	$7, 250, 000	Construction of fertilizer plant
Egyptian Spinners (Barclays Bank D. C. O.).	5/6/55	60, 000	Textile equipment (Whitin Machine Wor
United Spinning and Weaving Co., S. A. E.	6/13/55	25, 000	Textile equipment (Whitin Machine Wor
Total		$7, 335, 000	
Greece			
Kingdom of Greece	1/9/46	$25, 000, 000	U. S. products and services. Some $10,4 687.39 cancelled
Kingdom of Greece	6/13/55	300, 000	Crawler tractors with angle-dozers motor graders
Piraiki-Patraiki Industrie de Coton, S. A.	12/16/54	625, 000	Textile machinery
Total		$25, 925, 000	
Iran			
Government of Iran	11/11/54	$53, 000, 000	Economic development
Israel			
State of Israel	1/19/49	$70, 000, 000	Agricultural production
State of Israel	3/9/49	9, 535, 243	Transportation. Some $544.52 cancelle
State of Israel	3/16/49	25, 000, 000	Housing materials
State of Israel	3/23/49	5, 000, 000	Telecommunications equipment. S $1,256.10 cancelled
State of Israel	9/7/49	5, 464, 757	Development of ports
State of Israel	10/26/49	20, 000, 000	
Total		$135, 000, 000	
Saudi Arabia			
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	1/3/46	$25, 000, 000	Raw materials and equipment. S $15,000,000 cancelled
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	7/20/50	15, 000, 000	Public works and development proj Some $10,232,483.60 cancelled
Total		$40, 000, 000	
Turkey			
Sumer Bank (Republic of Turkey)	10/13/48	$417, 584. 33	(International General Electric Co.)
Republic of Turkey	1/26/46	431, 263. 64	State seaways and harbors
Etibank (Republic of Turkey)	3/16/49	104, 000	Ingersoll Rand Co.
Republic of Turkey	5/25/49	3, 750, 000	State railways. Some $37,155.58 cancell

[30] Export-Import Bank of Washington, *Twentieth Semiannual Report to Congress for the Period January–June 1* appendix C. Loans in Africa as a whole totaled $198,669,661.60 and in Asia $632,676,462.89.

Export-Import Bank Loans, 1945–1955—Continued

Country	Date	Authorized Credit	Purpose
ırkey—Continued			
Republic of Turkey	5/25/49	$4, 250, 000	State seaways and harbors
Republic of Turkey	11/19/54	500, 000	State seaways and harbors
Republic of Turkey	8/31/49	999, 524. 92	U.S. rails and accessories
Etibank (Republic of Turkey)	9/28/49	500, 000	Earth-moving equipment
Etibank (Republic of Turkey)	3/17/55	785, 000	Materials, equipment and service for coal washing plant (McNally Pittsburg Mfg. Corp.)
Republic of Turkey	11/26/47	8, 000, 000	Reconversion of vessels. Some $819.74 cancelled
Republic of Turkey	11/4/54	4, 235, 000	Equipment, storage and handling of grain (Colombian Steel Tank Co.)
Cukurova Itholat ve Ithracat, T. A. O.	1/6/55	1, 020, 000	Spare parts for tractors (Caterpillar Tractor Co.). Some $1,020,000 cancelled
Total		$24, 992, 372. 89	
ghanistan			
Royal Government of Afghanistan	11/23/49	$21, 000, 000	Construction of dam and canal
Royal Government of Afghanistan	4/29/54	18, 500, 000	Helmand River Valley Development
Total		$39, 500, 000	
hiopia			
Ethiopian Empire	6/22/50	$1, 000, 000	Aircraft and spare parts. Some $27,731.82 cancelled
Ethiopian Empire	7/10/46	2, 000, 000	Communication equipment and industrial machinery. Some $250,027.57 cancelled
Total		$3, 000, 000	
beria			
Republic of Liberia	1/11/51	$5, 000, 000	Highway improvement and construction
Republic of Liberia	6/14/51	1, 350, 000	Water supply and sewerage system
Republic of Liberia	1/20/55	15, 000, 000	Highway construction projects
Total		$21, 350, 000	

S. Support for U.N. Assistance Programs

The United States continued during 1955 to ntribute in major degree to United Nations pro-ams of technical assistance, many of which were ncentrated in the Near East, South Asia, and frica.[31] It also maintained its contributions to ırious United Nations agencies such as the Food ıd Agriculture Organization (FAO), World ealth Organization (WHO), United Nations ducational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-on (UNESCO), and UNICEF which have given ısic assistance to underdeveloped areas in a wide ıriety of ways.[32]

The United States on December 5, 1955, com-eted the action required for membership in the ıternational Finance Corporation, established under Resolution 823 (IX) of the General Assembly.[33] This country, as in the past, made a large contribution to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which assisted

[31] See *U.S. Participation in the U.N.: Report by the Presi-nt to the Congress for the Year 1954* (Department of ate publication 5769), pp. 235–39, for tables of contribu-ons.

[32] In general see U.N. docs. A/2943: *Report of the Economic and Social Council covering the period from 7 August 1954 to 5 August 1955, passim;* E/2740 (ST/ECA/32): *Economic Developments in the Middle East, 1945–1954, passim;* ST/TAA/SER.C/21: *Fourth United Nations Social Welfare Seminar for Arab States in the Middle East* (Baghdad, 6–21 March 1954); ST/TAA/K/Israel/4: United Nations Technical Assistance Programme, *Revenue Administration and Policy in Israel* (Second Report); *Seeds of Progress: Stories of Technical Assistance* (1955); E/CN.5/303/Rev. 1/ST/SOA/26: *Social Progress Through Community Development* (1955).

[33] BULLETIN of Jan. 9, 1956, p. 54. The charter of the International Finance Corporation requires a subscription of $75,000,000 before the corporation can come into being; by Jan. 10, 1956, $56,761,000 had been subscribed. Egypt was the first Middle Eastern country to complete action for membership (Dec. 16, 1955).

in a number of development programs in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa. By June 30, 1955, out of an authorized capital of $10,000,000,000, some $9,028,000,000 had been subscribed.[34] The United States had subscribed $635,000,000, with 31,750 shares in the amount of $3,175,000,000. By September 30, 1955, effective loans reached $1,8[illegible],262,494, of which $317,310,000, as illustrated in the table below, were for development purposes in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa. A development survey was completed in Syria during 1955 and one was organized in Jordan.[35]

[34] Afghanistan and Israel became members of the IBRD during 1955.

[35] See also U.N. docs. A/2906 and A/3065 for material on the proposed Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development.

Loans of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1949–1955 [36]

Country	Date	Original Amount	Purpose
Ceylon	7/9/54	$19, 110, 000	Electrical power development
India	8/18/49	34, 000, 000	Railway rehabilitation. Some $1,200,000 cancelled or refunded
	9/29/49	10, 000, 000	Agricultural development. Some $2,796,637 cancelled or refunded
	4/18/50	18, 500, 000	Electric power development. Some $690,000 cancelled or refunded
	1/23/53	19, 500, 000	Electric power development, flood control and irrigation. Some $9,000,000 cancelled or refunded
India (Guarantor)			
Indian Iron & Steel Company	12/18/52	31, 500, 000	Expansion of iron and steel production facilities
Tata Hydro, Andhra and Tata Power Companies	11/19/54	16, 200, 000	Electric power development
India (Guarantor)			
Industrial Credit and Investment Corp. of India	3/14/55	10, 000, 000	Foreign exchange for development of private industry
Iraq	6/15/50	12, 800, 000	Construction of a flood control project. Some $6, 506, 054 cancelled or refunded
Lebanon (Guarantor)			
Litani River Authority	8/25/55	27, 000, 000	Electric power development and irrigation
Pakistan (Guarantor)			
Sui Gas Transmission Co	6/2/54	14, 000, 000	Construction of natural gas transmission line
Karachi Electric Supply Corporation, Ltd	6/20/55	13, 800, 000	Electric power development
Karnaphuli Paper Mills, Ltd	8/4/55	4, 200, 000	Construction of paper and pulp mill
Trustees of the Port of Karachi	8/4/55	14, 800, 000	Port construction and development
Turkey	7/7/50	3, 900, 000	Construction of grain storage facilities
First Tranche	7/7/50	12, 500, 000	Port construction and development
Second Tranche	2/26/54	3, 800, 000	Port construction and development
	6/18/52	25, 200, 000	Electric power development, irrigation and flood control. Some $2,356,000 cancelled or refunded
Turkey (Guarantor)			
Industrial Development Bank of Turkey	10/19/50	9, 000, 000	Foreign exchange for development of private industry
Industrial Development Bank of Turkey	9/10/53	9, 000, 000	Foreign exchange for development of private industry
Ethiopia	9/13/50	5, 000, 000	Highway rehabilitation
	9/13/50	2, 000, 000	Foreign exchange for Development Bank
	2/19/51	1, 500, 000	Rehabilitation and extension of telephone and telegraph systems
Total	.....	$317, 310, 000	

[36] International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Tenth Annual Report 1954–1955*, appendix F. See also International Bank for Reconstruction and Development press release 427 (Nov. 3, 1955), Financial Statements for 1st Quarter ending September 30, 1955. In addition to the above, the IBRD on Aug. 26, 1955, made a loan of $10 million for electric power in Algeria and on Mar. 5, 1956, announced that it was sending a survey mission to the Trust Territory of Somaliland.

That the United States continued to look upon e problems of stability and security in the Near ast, South Asia, and Africa from a broadly lsed point of view, and that it was prepared to et the new challenges which had arisen, was ilicated by a number of developments toward e end of 1955 and the beginning of 1956. The nerican attitude was reflected in the unanimous w of the United States delegation to the Tenth ssion of the General Assembly of the United ations that economic and social questions were ssuming increasing importance on the internatnal scene" and had moved to the forefront in e struggle between Communism and freedom," rticularly since the Soviet Union was using onomic and social collaboration as a means for uping military as well as political barriers," as India, Egypt, and Burma, for example. The legation believed that the United States should unter the Soviet efforts, not by outbidding it sheer amounts of economic assistance but "by aking newly independent and newly articulate oples feel that they can best satisfy their wants becoming and remaining part of the community free nations." The delegation warned that the ited States was "in a contest in the field of onomic development of underdeveloped countes which is bitterly competitive" and that deit in this contest "could be as disastrous as deit in an armaments race." [37]

President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles enrsed these views. Mr. Dulles had already dered, on December 20, that the United States ught no monopoly in the field of economic astance and welcomed "any grant of economic l" which invigorated less developed countries d made them more independent, as had been the n of American policy since the Second World ar. Not one country had "lost any particle of edom or independence" as a result of American sistance. Mr. Dulles hoped that Soviet assistce was "not offered as a Trojan horse to penete, and then take over, independent countries"; felt that the experienced statesmen of the areas ncerned were well aware of the dangers.[38]

President Eisenhower sounded a similar note in s state of the Union message on January 5, 1956, clarring that the mutual security program must sustained and fortified and noting that "because e conditions of poverty and unrest in less developed areas make their people a special target of international communism, there is a need to help them achieve the economic growth and stability necessary to preserve their independence against Communist threats and enticements." [39]

THE OUTLOOK IN UNITED STATES POLICY

Such were the major developments in United States policy during 1955. As the year drew to a close and another dawned, it was clear that the problems were as manifold, complex, and persistent as they had been in the past and that there were no simple or easy solutions to any of them. There was a recognition of the basic elements in the situation in the discussions between Prime Minister Eden and President Eisenhower, January 30 to February 1, 1956, in which the problems of the Near East, South Asia, and Africa were both broadly and specifically discussed.

It was agreed that every effort should be made to reduce the sources of misunderstanding between the Middle Eastern nations, whose peoples should be helped to achieve "their legitimate aspirations." Similarly, an Arab-Israel settlement was considered urgent, but possible only if both sides were "willing to reconcile the positions" hitherto taken. The United States and the United Kingdom reiterated their willingness to contribute to a settlement through financial assistance on the Arab refugee problem and guaranties of "agreed frontiers," reaffirmed the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950, and announced arrangements for discussions, with French participation, as to "the nature of the action" to be taken in the event of violence. It was also clear that security in the Middle East could not rest upon arms alone but must be based on the establishment of good neighborly relations. Soviet policy in arms supplies to Middle Eastern countries was viewed as adding to

[37] BULLETIN of Jan. 23, 1956, p. 117.

[38] For transcripts of the Secretary's news conferences of Dec. 20, 1955, and Jan. 11, 1956, see *ibid.*, Jan. 2, 1956, p. 8, and Jan. 23, 1956, p. 118. Mr. Dulles indicated that mutual security requests for the next fiscal year would total about $4,900,000,000, of which about $1,900,000,000 would be for the economic part of the program. See also the transcript of the Secretary's press conference of Jan. 17, 1956, *ibid.*, Jan. 30, 1956, p. 155.

[39] *Ibid.*, Jan. 16, 1956, p. 79. See also excerpts from the President's budget message, *ibid.*, Jan. 30, 1956, p. 147, and his message transmitting the 1957 mutual security program, *ibid.*, Apr. 2, 1956, p. 545.

the tensions and increasing the risk of war—a risk which the United States and the United Kingdom desired to mitigate. In that interest they fully supported the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization and were ready favorably to consider "recommendations for any necessary enlargement . . . and improvement of its capabilities." They were also agreed concerning the significance of the Baghdad Pact, and the United States indicated that it would "continue to give solid support to the purposes . . . of the Pact" and that its observers would "play a constructive part in the work of its committees." The belief was expressed that difficulties in Arabia and the region of the Persian Gulf could be solved through "friendly discussions."

The Declaration of Washington, which emanated from these discussions, reaffirmed the goal of self-government and independence of "all countries whose people desire and are capable of sustaining an independent existence" and noted that, in striking contrast to the Soviet record in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 600 million people "in nearly a score of lands" had attained nationhood since World War II with American and British assistance and that many more millions were "being helped surely and steadily toward self-government." Since political independence alone was insufficient, the need for technical and economic assistance was recognized, and it was stressed, again in contrast to Soviet aggrandizement, that the United Kingdom and the United States had "not sought nor desired extension of either economic or political power." It was also pointed out that Soviet aims had not changed, that "military and political force" had been used in the past, and that now "economic inducements" had been added to the "methods of penetration." There were a warning lest underdeveloped nations lose their independence through "threat, promise or enticement" and a notice that some 50 nations which cherished their freedom had "drawn together in voluntary associations for their collective security." [40]

[40] For texts of communique and Declaration, see *ibid.*, Feb. 13, 1956, p. 231.

The policy of the United States was reconfir e both generally and specifically on a number o x casions in the period immediately following h Anglo-American discussions, whether with re r to North Africa, Middle East security and shipment of arms, South Asia, the Soviet c lenge in the area, or the problems of econ development. Secretary Dulles suggested to h Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Febr r 24, 1956, that Israel's security could be bette sured, in the long run, through measures—inc ing reliance on the United Nations—other t the acquisition of additional arms in circ stances which might "exacerbate the situati He did not exclude the possibility, however arms shipments, either to Israel or to the A States, at a time when it would "preserve peace." [41]

President Eisenhower reiterated this positio his news conferences on March 7 and 15, em sizing that the United States was trying to a the initiation of an arms race in the Middle E stressing the need for action under the Un Nations and for the avoidance of incidents, noting continued adherence to the Tripartite D laration of May 1950. At the same time, the P ident indicated that the conflict between the C munist and the free worlds was now undergoi "very great broadening" into the economic political fields, a very serious development w demanded "flexibility" in the American fore assistance program.[42]

[41] *Ibid.*, Mar. 5, 1956, p. 368. See also the Secret statements of Feb. 7, *ibid.*, Feb. 20, 1956, p. 279, and of 28, *ibid.*, Mar. 12, 1956, p. 409. See also the corresp ence of Secretary Dulles with certain members of gress, *ibid.*, Feb. 20, 1956, p. 285. For the Departm statement of Feb. 18, concerning the shipment of 18 t to Saudi Arabia under the Mutual Defense Assist Act of 1949 and the Mutual Security Act of 1954, see *i* Feb. 27, 1956, p. 325.

[42] See also Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, "I Annual Report of the Council Representatives, M 1956," *ibid.*, Mar. 12, 1956, p. 403, and the final commun of the SEATO Council meeting at Karachi, Mar. 8, 1 *ibid.*, Mar. 19, 1956, p. 447.

ı Outline of the Mutual Security Program for 1957

Statement by John B. Hollister
Director, International Cooperation Administration[1]

I am glad, Mr. Chairman, to have the opportunity to appear before you in support of the esident's request for authority for funds to ry out the mutual security program in fiscal ır 1957. This request, as the President has inated in his message,[2] is for the national defense d for a program which is a vital part of the eign policy of the United States.

As you know, I became Director of the Interional Cooperation Administration in June 5. Full realization of the scope of the mutual urity program in all its aspects has come only 8 months' experience in day-to-day operations d by visiting each of the principal regions in ich the program is carried out in cooperation th our foreign allies and friends. I have held ional meetings with the chiefs of our missions Europe, the Near East and Africa, and in Latin erica. I have personally visited each Far stern country in which we carry on a mission d have seen some of the work being conducted representative nations in other parts of the rld. Altogether, I have visited personally 17 the 50 countries where the ICA has missions.

These meetings and visits were essential to a pper understanding of what this Government s trying to do in various parts of the world, d it has given me a basis for appreciating the ny problems which confront us. I am glad ıt a number of members of this committee, since Congress adjourned last summer and in prior ırs, have been able to see some of the mutual urity programs in actual operation, for I am e that such firsthand observation is a great lp to understanding the need of the assistance d the problems that beset us in furnishing it.

The mutual security program is a large global operation. No industrial company in the United States spends anywhere near as much to deliver as many varied items and services in as many different places abroad.

Administrative Setup

The program, as this committee well knows, is both military and nonmilitary. In this program, the Director of ICA performs two distinct roles. One of these is as head of a semiautonomous *operating* agency within the State Department. This agency is charged with the development and execution of most of the nonmilitary aspects of the program. With respect to the nonmilitary phases of the mutual security program, ICA administers the operations through a planning and administrative staff in Washington and through several thousand representatives in the field.

The other role of the Director is that of coordinator of the whole program. This is not by virtue of his position as head of ICA but by special delegation of the Secretary of State. Under this delegation it is the duty of the Director of ICA to coordinate all elements of the mutual security program. In all foreign policy matters, I take guidance from the Secretary of State.

The Director in his coordinating activities must see that the whole problem in each country is examined and is taken into account and that the program in all of its aspects—policy, economic, and military—is properly designed to accomplish the objectives of the program. Accordingly, in presenting our requests for funds for your consideration, we will try to describe fully to you the problems of each region and country as a whole, in all its aspects. We will plan to have here at all times (1) a representative of the State Depart-

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[1] Made before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Mar. 20.

[2] BULLETIN of Apr. 2, 1956, p. 545.

ment for the region under discussion who can answer your questions on foreign policy; (2) a representative of the Department of Defense who can inform you about the military situation and program; and (3) a regional representative of ICA to explain the economic and nonmilitary programs.

Program To Meet All Aspects of Problem

We feel that the program should be viewed as a whole, as a balanced effort to meet the Communist challenge for world domination which today threatens the peace and security of the United States and the rest of the free world. This challenge has existed since World War II and now for nearly a decade has been the major problem confronting the United States, to which many other problems of our Government are related in one way or another.

In meeting the Communist threat affirmatively, we must recognize that the threat itself will continue to have many different aspects despite the Soviet tactics of shifting from time to time the emphasis from one form of offensive to another. In the period 1947 to 1953 the Soviets aroused well-founded fears of armed aggression through all the free world. Today, although their primary effort appears to be economic, there is no indication that the war preparations have ceased. There can, therefore, be no relaxation in our own military effort, nor in those of our allies, nor in our support of those allies. At the same time we must go forward with our own foreign economic aid program, the success of which will be the best answer to the new Soviet economic activities.

The total program (to be met out of new appropriated funds) presented for fiscal year 1957 is $4.86 billion. Of this, $3 billion is for military assistance. The balance of $1,860 million is nonmilitary, although much of it directly supports military effort.

I refer you to a chart which shows the approximate distribution of the fiscal year 1957 program by function. The military assistance funds ($3 billion) will go for administration and expenditure to the Department of Defense. The items for defense support, development assistance, and technical cooperation will be allotted for administration and expenditure by the International Cooperation Administration.

Military assistance now includes what was formerly called direct-forces support—that is furnishing of consumable supplies, services, modities, etc., to allies' military forces, as we the provision of equipment, weapons, and trai

Defense support is furnished to certain coun eligible for military assistance. It is the which, as a result of previous congressional tory, is applied to all forms of nonmilitar sistance (except technical cooperation) in tries where there is a substantial military a ance program. It includes aid for civilian projects and activities which directly suppor military program of the country (for exa highways, ports, communications) and also general assistance which makes it possible country to maintain agreed force levels wit seriously adverse economic or political c quences. At the same time, defense suppo designed to contribute to building up the reci country's internal strength, making possible ress toward improved living standards.

Development assistance is the term gene used to define all forms of aid, except tech cooperation, which are furnished in coun where we have no substantial military aid gram. It is furnished to certain countries which we have no military agreements to pro their economic development.

Technical cooperation consists of program sharing technical knowledge and skills with developed countries. These programs are ca on through direct arrangements between United States Government and individual ernments usually referred to as "host" go ments, as well as through the United Nations through the Organization of American St Under the technical cooperation programs, nicians and experts are sent from the United S to work overseas with host government offi and to help host governments develop their technical resources for economic and social velopment. Our technicians are supported, necessary, by supplies and equipment sent fron United States for demonstration purposes. eign nationals are also brought to the U States (or other countries) for training or vanced study in technical specialties. This t nical exchange program is operative equall countries which are eligible for military aid those which are not. Much of it is carrie through contracts with American univers

MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAMS BY FUNCTION

FY 1956 APPROPRIATIONS



$2,703 MILLION

FY '57 APPROPRIATION REQUEST



$4,860 MILLION

NOTE: The figure of $4,860 million for the 1957 appropriation request excludes programs of $105 million to be nced from reappropriations or funds remaining available in 1957.

der which technicians and specialists are sup-ed. All of it is on a joint basis.

There are some further circumstances which uld be mentioned in this connection, as failure understand them may lead to confusion about total of the figures just mentioned. In addi-to the new funds requested for appropriation, expect to have on hand on June 30, 1956, an bligated balance of $45 million in the Pales-Refugee Fund, which we ask be carried over. estimate that there will be an unobligated bal-e in the Asian fund of about $60 million, ch is available for 2 more years. We expect t this sum will be programed and wholly ob-ted in fiscal year 1957.

Military Program

or the description and details of the purely itary part of the program, you will hear from resentatives of the Department of Defense. wever, as coordinator of the mutual security gram, there are some aspects of that program which I wish to comment.

The military program has been developed country by country, with careful consideration of the entire situation in each region and country.

(a) In determining the military assistance to be furnished to a country, we have tried to consider all aspects of that country's status, including the nature of the risks and dangers to the country itself and the relationship of such risks and dangers to the security position of the free world.

(b) We have considered what nonmilitary projects are necessary to give direct support to the military effort.

(c) We have considered the capacity of the country to produce internally or to procure elsewhere and pay for equipment which it needs.

(d) Equally, if a country cannot, without either injury to its economy or outside aid, maintain agreed forces and adequate political stability important to the security of the United States and the free world, we must frame our nonmilitary programs in a way which helps to make possible the maintenance of the desired defense strength.

(e) We must give attention to the very practical consideration which exists in many coun-

tries—What is the maximum defense expenditure which the country can make without endangering the economic health and progress of the country? In countries with low per capita incomes, this is important because the peoples of the less developed countries have reasonable aspirations for better conditions which should be satisfied as fully as practicable if the countries are to remain stable components of the free world.

(f) The military-assistance program in each country, and action in carrying out the programs of prior years, must be related closely to the current U.S. foreign policy with reference to that country and to developments in the general world situation.

We have met with great cooperation from all the agencies involved in trying to tie all aspects of the program together.

2. The military program has a new aspect this year—the commencement of a major effort to equip the forces of our allies with very advanced weapons. This will involve the provision of about $530 million worth of advanced weapons for those countries receiving military assistance who can use them effectively in defense of the free world.

A portion of the funds for these advanced weapons has already been earmarked for NATO countries in the illustrative fiscal year 1957 program. The balance has not been distributed in such specific fashion but will be allocated after further study of their most useful and effective employment.

While the problems of each country are different, it is more convenient to discuss them in regional categories, which is the historical method of treatment.

Europe: NATO

Our earliest mutual security problems in the period following World War II were encountered in Europe. The Marshall plan, inaugurated in 1947, helped put Europe on the road to economic recovery, and that recovery continues. At the same time the military forces of the NATO countries have been strengthened rapidly.

The aid request for NATO countries (excluding Greece and Turkey) in fiscal year 1957 is almost entirely military. For the second successive year no defense support or related aid, with the exception of a small amount for technical exchange, is being requested for any of these countries.

The need for military assistance is based marily on two main considerations.

The first consideration is *strategic.* The rity of Western Europe is vital to the securi the United States. Western Europe is a firs of our defense, and our divisions stationed are testimony to this fact. Western Europ the largest reserve of skilled manpower and, to the United States, the greatest industria tential in the world. It has a large pool of tr forces under arms. Its air and naval base vital to the defense of this country.

The second consideration is *economic.* withstanding Western Europe's economic provement, the heavy expense of creating maintaining an adequate defense in the are poses a severe strain on the resources of ma the NATO countries. The high cost of adva weapons, coupled with the annual recurring of maintaining the defense establishment al built up, therefore, make the continuation of United States military assistance to them de ble. Without this assistance, the effectivene their forces would not be maintained. E ment would deteriorate and fall into disrepai lack of spare parts, or become obsolescent.

In their own defense expenditures NATO c tries have continued at a high level despite fact United States economic aid to these coun has ceased.

The expenditures which the European coun are now undertaking for their own defense very substantial indeed. The total outlay European defense establishments from 194 1955 amounts to about $72 billion. Of this t about $10 billion is represented by United S aid. In other words, the NATO countries footing the bill for about 85 percent of t total defense expenditures. Moreover, since t pay in Europe is very much lower than in United States, the human and material reso actually devoted to defense by the Europeans substantially larger than these figures would dicate, by our yardstick. Likewise, the force tually maintained through this expenditure significantly larger than those that we could m tain for the same expenditure.

In the coming fiscal year, of the military sistance proposed for Western Europe, the gre part will go to the NATO countries. This wil increased by the amount of any of the unalloc reserve of advanced weapons which may be

ned for use by NATO forces. In the light of all circumstances, including the advantage to the e world of maintaining force strength and ality of equipment, the help proposed to the ropean nations in NATO is not disproportionate the benefit to us as a nation, nor does the ropean effort as a whole represent less than a sonable share of the common defense effort.

Although no defense support or economic aid such is proposed for these countries in fiscal r 1957, we are requesting $1½ million for sup- rt of the European Productivity Agency, an of the OEEC [Organization for European onomic Cooperation]. Through this agency, OEEC countries are working together to adapt d apply the best American and European tech- al experience to the development of more dy- nic economies in Europe, thereby strengthen- the economic base for Western defense.

st Berlin, Spain, Yugoslavia

The second group of European countries with ich we are concerned comprises West Berlin, ain, and Yugoslavia. All three of these lie, litically and geographically speaking, on the riphery of Western Europe. They are not mbers of NATO and OEEC although Spain and goslavia are observers in the latter organiza- n. Spain and Yugoslavia have not benefited fully from the European recovery as the other ntries, and their standards of living are appre- bly below those of other European areas. Yet h of these countries is making a substantial tribution to the military, political, or psycho- ical defense of the West, and each is joined h us in strong mutual security interest.

Spain is cooperating with us in the construction important air and naval bases;

Yugoslavia, despite a common frontier with r Iron Curtain countries, continues to set an portant example by guarding its independence m Soviet domination, and is a member of the lkan Pact with Greece and Turkey—both NATO mbers, though generally considered "Near st" countries;

West Berlin stands as an outpost of the free rld—a symbol of freedom far behind the Iron rtain.

These are the three special situations for which ense support and related assistance is proposed. ng with the $1½ million for the European ductivity Agency, the nonmilitary aid proposed comes to $90 million. This is a slight reduction from funds available for similar programs for fiscal year 1956 and a reduction of more than 50 percent from similar programs for fiscal year 1955.

Middle East, Africa, and Asia

Turning from Europe to the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, the situation becomes much more complex and much more varied. In these areas we have a large number of new nations, some of them recently emerged from colonial status. In most of these countries the levels of living standards, annual gross national product, industrial capacity, and per capita income are low in comparison to the more prosperous parts of the free world.

Some of these nations, such as Korea, Laos, Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and Taiwan, have recently suffered from the effects of war or are faced by large Communist forces at their borders, or both. There is great need for many of them to maintain substantial defense forces. This poses an economic problem of substantial proportions, for the military expenditure in many cases is totally beyond their resources. Nevertheless, they and the free world need this military effort so that they can remain free of external aggression and can put down armed internal subversion.

Many of these allies of ours, and also other nations of the free world not receiving military assistance, are faced with internal economic problems which would confront them even if they made no military effort. Their peoples, with unsatisfactory living conditions, are aspiring to a level above an austere subsistence standard. They look to their leaders for a degree of economic progress which is beyond their powers to achieve unassisted. We thus must face the problem of nonmilitary assistance of an economic character:

(a) To maintain the defense efforts of our less prosperous allies at desired levels, and

(b) To assist some of our allies, and also various less developed, uncommitted free nations, to strike at those conditions of poverty, disease, and low living standards which tend to create unrest and instability and which, if not improved, can lead to disorder or collapse which would threaten world peace.

Our allies want to be strong. If they are to be strong, we cannot see them bowed by an unbearable defense burden beyond their capacities and

unable to meet the reasonable aspirations of their peoples for progress.

In the case of uncommitted nations, we achieve an important objective in the interests of the security of the United States and the free world if we can succeed in helping them to make the progress which will keep alive their desire for independence as responsible and developing members of the free world. We have no desire to impose our way of life upon them. Our sole purpose is to help them to develop the internal economic conditions in which free institutions can prosper. We hope to keep them from throwing their weight into the balance against the free world and on the side of communism.

The problem has been greatly complicated by the increased economic activities of the Soviet bloc in relation to the free nations. Communist offers of economic, military, and technical help have a strong appeal for nations which need assistance badly, and we, therefore, must expect many of these offers, where they are sufficiently attractive, to be accepted. Such acceptance involves dangers as well as material benefits. It increases the opportunities for Communist penetration; it quently places the Soviet Union in a falsely f able light; it may tie the recipient unduly t Communist bloc; it will be capitalized upo the Communists to proclaim their unselfish i est in the economic welfare of others.

We must take this danger with the utmo seriousness. Some of the peoples throughou Middle East and Asia are all too likely to a the Communist propaganda line, which put blame on free-world nations for the existen obstacles between present hard economic rea and their own economic aspirations. For r leaders in the region, the first direct contact the Soviet Government itself has been wit new 1956 model of Soviet "traveling sales diplomat who smilingly and seductively offe easy terms the capital and technical and mil help they desire. These Soviet offers hav cluded arms to Egypt, Afghanistan, and countries and machinery, food, industrial p and technicians to many other countries ar the world. While we have no intention of peting with the U.S.S.R., offer by offer—f

TOTAL MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM BY REGION

(MILITARY AND NON-MILITARY COMBINED)



NOTE: The figure of $2,943 million for fiscal 1956 includes programs of $240 million financed from reappropr of funds. The figure of $4,965 for fiscal 1957 includes programs of $105 million to be financed from reappropria or funds remaining available in 1957.

so would be to abandon independence and dgment—yet we must take account of the new proach which Soviet tyranny has adopted to rt the Moslem, Asiatic, and African worlds.

Our policy, I believe, should be to continue to pport projects and programs which, in the light our best judgment and experience, contribute freedom and sound development in these areas. e should not be stampeded into proposing projts beyond the capacity and energies of any tion—for, unlike the Soviets, we care about their ture and will not deliberately entice a nation to the quicksands of overexpansion or inflation. e must recognize that pressing human misery s made many a nation nearsighted to the huan tragedy of the concentration camps, slave bor, and brutal rigidity that lies back of the viet offers of arms and aid and Soviet methods obtaining industrial advances. We must underand that responsible leaders in the newly develing region, no matter how moderate or how proee-world they may be themselves, must make subntial deliveries on programs of development in der to continue as leaders in their nations. Our ogram must recognize such circumstances. It fact does so by helping to provide the kind of d needed to carry forward sound development rograms at a rate and in a volume adapted to e capacity of countries to maintain effectively, d in terms of the economic and political circumances that these countries, their peoples, and their aders face.

Before discussing the various countries of the iddle East, Africa, and Asia in more detail, I ant to make two points which affect our programs these areas.

1. *Great flexibility of action* on the part of the ited States is needed to meet situations as they ise.

These areas are in a volatile stage of developent and change. New problems are arising ily, and old problems are constantly taking on w aspects. We should be in a position to take mpt action to deal with those situations where sistance is wise, before others, hostile to freeorld objectives, exploit them dangerously.

2. Some of these problems are *long-range*. To most effective, we should be in a position to ake reasonable nonmilitary commitments exnding beyond the span of a single fiscal year. e President mentioned this problem in his mesge, and I shall discuss it later.

MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA

I turn now to the situation in the Middle East and Africa in greater detail. As examples of some of our problems, let me mention a few individual situations.

Turkey's assumption of an extraordinarily large military burden—she is presently contributing a substantial part of the ground forces of NATO—merits our continued support. The combination of the demands of the defense establishment and the costs of accelerated development has brought about serious economic strain. The Government of Turkey has recently announced a stabilization program containing those elements of economic reform which can contribute to financial balance if properly carried out.

The oil of *Iran* is beginning to add substantially to that country's capital development, but in the next year or so Iran will still need help in meeting the heavy costs of government that are occasioned by large military expenditures and the needs for development.

We support the *Egyptian* Government's determination to build a better life for her people. To bring fruition to their strivings for the common decencies of life, Egyptians need aid to provide long-range buildup of their resources, such as the High Aswan Dam will accomplish. At the same time, Egypt must satisfy immediate needs so that there will be a "long-range" future with which we can cooperate. Our relationship with this great Moslem state depends on our understanding of both future and present economic requirements in connection with which Egypt needs external help.

In the *Arab States* and in *Israel*, we hope that our programs, which are designed to accelerate desperately needed economic development and to provide a partial answer to the pitiful plight of the refugees from Israel, will also help in the solution of the bitter controversies that now plague the whole Near East. We are prepared to support any programs or projects that hold real promise of constructive progress on these problems, including broad support for regional projects that will harness the energy and equitably distribute the waters of the Jordan River or facilitate the resettlement of refugees.

MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA FUND

Three factors in particular create a special need for the capacity for flexible action on the economic

front in the Middle East and Africa. The *first* is the increased Soviet activity in the area. The *second* factor is a past pattern, which there is every likelihood will continue to repeat itself in the future, of frequent and sudden economic crises in certain countries of the region. The *third* consideration is the fact that many of the major problems of the region with which our aid programs must deal are of a kind which concern two or more countries. This means, when given the sensitive political issues involved in the relationships among some of these countries, that the exact timing and character of the eventual solutions to these problems cannot be accurately forecast, nor the precise manner in which our aid can contribute.

We need to have available a fund which is not programed in detail, far in advance and country by country. This should be available during the coming fiscal year for carrying out major country and regional projects which seem of particular importance in solving economic problems and in maintaining peace and stability. Such a fund would place the United States in a position to give highly desirable economic assistance, without having to divert funds earmarked for some other specific purpose. Such a fund would avoid the necessity of transferring funds to high-priority projects suddenly developing, at the expense of soundly conceived country programs which have been carefully presented for your approval as illustrative programs.

The President suggests a fund of $100 million. We would expect to have it obligated in the course of the coming fiscal year. Some of it would doubtless be applied in aid of projects which we are already considering but which have not at the moment developed to a point where we are able to present them as part of our specific illustrative programs. Some of the fund would doubtless be applied to meet emergency situations.

SOUTH ASIA

In the light of *Pakistan's* commitment to the free world both in the SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization] and the Baghdad Pact, her efforts to maintain adequate defenses and to build economic strength deserve our strong support, for Pakistan's strength and freedom are a center link to a chain that guards free Asia.

Consistent with our policy of helping to strengthen free nations which are striving to m tain their independence and which require l in achieving a rate of economic growth adequ for the minimum needs of their people, we p to assist *India* in carrying out its second 5-y development program, which is to be initiated i year. It is important for the United State give continued assistance as evidence of our terest in and friendship for the Indian people, t helping a great nation, devoted to the princi of freedom, to make the economic advances wl are essential to its welfare.

FAR EAST

The mutual security program in the Far E currently includes programs for Korea, Taiw Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, Viet-N Cambodia, Laos, and Indonesia. In general, reasons which I have already advanced for sistance to the less developed countries of Middle East, Africa, and South Asia apply v equal force to all our Far Eastern friends allies, except, in part, in the case of Japan, wh is the only highly industrialized country in Far East.

The major part of the total aid proposed the Far East would go to Korea, Taiwan, V Nam, Cambodia, and Laos. Each of these co tries is now maintaining large military fo which it requires for its self-defense. These fo are larger, in some cases many times larger, t those which these countries can raise and supp with their own resources alone. Over the p several years we have helped them to develop maintain these forces through the provision all types of aid. As a result, the strength effectiveness of these forces has increased v greatly, but this strength and effectiveness can be sustained without continuing aid of consid ble magnitude. Modern forces are far more pensive to maintain than primitive ones. M over, expanded forces require new facilities s as airfields, naval bases, and barracks. T countries, with their very limited resources, c not meet the high costs involved out of their c revenues.

Some of these same nations, like Korea Viet-Nam, have also faced the problem of rec ering from the effects of war and of caring and absorbing a great influx of refugees. T lack the foreign exchange to import consu goods, industrial raw materials, machinery

are parts which their present economies need. hey also face the necessity of increasing their vn capacity for self-support and of making a ginning at the long task of economic develop- ent to raise living standards.

These countries will necessarily receive substan- l military assistance under the 1957 program. he threat of further Communist aggression is not any means removed, and it is unfortunate that, countries with so much need for economic ogress, it is necessary for the free world to spend ch large amounts for military purposes. In the esent state of the world this cannot be avoided.

The aid program for Korea continues to be the rgest single aid program currently being con- cted by the United States. This is true of both military and nonmilitary components. This partly because Korea has the largest single my in the Far East and one which is well beyond e capacity of Korea to support unaided. This my is largely composed of battle-trained vet- ns, and it has been created, and then main- ned, at its present effective strength only by ge volumes of continuing military aid and fense support.

ESIDENT'S FUND FOR ASIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

A year ago, the Congress authorized appropria- ns of $200 million for Asian economic develop- nt, but only $100 million was appropriated. is year the President has requested appropria- n of the remaining $100 million. This commit- is not called upon for any action now upon this uest since the appropriation has been author- d.

The Congress knew that planning the expendi- e of this money would take some time, and the ds appropriated were therefore made available a 3-year period.

The first major expenditure from this fund will bably be for a regional nuclear research and ining center to be located in the Philippines the benefit of Asians. This was announced y last week.[3] The Brookhaven National Lab- tory will start off a comprehensive survey of next month. Other projects under study in- ve communications, mineral-resources develop- nt, production improvement, rail and water nsportation, and various regional technical ning centers.

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bid., p. 544.

Latin America

The fiscal year 1957 program recommends continuance of our technical cooperation programs in Latin America. These are effective in assisting the self-reliant governments and peoples of Latin American countries in their own development activities. These governments are striving to achieve higher health, social, and economic standards, and the technical assistance we have been able to furnish has been warmly received and generously acknowledged.

The programs are designed to assist the peoples in each country to develop and utilize more effectively their tremendous human and natural resources. The programs are cooperative in that our representatives and those of the host government work side by side and are supported by the pooled contributions of both countries.

In a recent trip to several Latin American countries I gained the impression that the broad objectives of the mutual security program are being achieved in generous measure. In each country, whether it was in the palace or the foreign office or in some jungle area of the interior, the answer to the question "Who is carrying out this program?" was invariably—"we"—"your people and our people." This is the partnership spirit with which our people are carrying out the program, and it is gratifying to me to find that it is shared by those with whom we work. I think you can feel assured that these technical assistance programs are a source of genuine good will between the United States and Latin America.

Other Activities

We assist, as you know, various projects handled through U.N. agencies. In dollar amount our contributions to these agencies are included in the fiscal year program for a total of $27,800,000.

Witnesses directly concerned with supervising and operating these programs will testify about them. They are in general comparable in size to the programs of earlier years.

It has been the policy of the United States to participate in these efforts of the United Nations as well as those of other international organizations to deal with certain problems of economic development and to meet the serious difficulties of certain especially needy people whose problems are best handled through multilateral action. We propose support of (a) our own program for

FREE ASIA'S IMPORTANCE









escapees from communism, (b) the work of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM), and (c) the program of paying ocean freight costs on donated relief supplies. These humanitarian programs are part of this Government's general support of collective action in the solution of important world social and economic problems, some arising out of World War II.

The Need of Flexibility

I have already referred to the need of flexibility to deal with the problems which confront us. This need will be apparent if I review for you briefly our planning and program cycle.

Ordinarily we come before your committee in the late spring. Incidentally, we are here before you earlier this year than in any year since 1952. Hearings before this committee, the Senate F-eign Relations Committee, and the two Appropr-tions Committees are thorough and complete, a l we develop for your benefit illustrative progra s which indicate the purpose for which we are a-ing very large sums of money.

These illustrative programs, when they re h you, have gone through a long process. Alre y the country teams in the countries involved e working on the early stages of the planning r the fiscal year 1958. Much of the planning t the country level for the 1957 fiscal year progr n was done a year ago. These country progra s, both military and economic, then receive a v y thorough screening in the field and in Washi-ton. Priorities among the projects are then e-termined. Those least useful and with le t promise are eliminated, and the program requi-ments are reconciled with fiscal needs. The h-

n of the Budget thereafter participates in ex-
ded hearings on the programs as developed, and
y are again further refined. Thus, funds ac-
lly appropriated in the late spring or early
mer of 1956 for the fiscal year 1957 program
l be based on planning which started in the
ng of 1955.

Appropriation of funds does not end our plan-
g process. The Congress frequently makes
nges in the program. This necessitates an
nded further program review to adjust the
strative programs to congressional action and
hanges in the general world or country situa-
. It takes time to make allocations of funds to
ticular programs and situations. Usually we
not get the funds in form to be used until No-
ber or December of the calendar year in which
appropriations are made. After that, we
t begin the long process of negotiation, first
other governments and later with contrac-
, designed to insure that we spend the money
have granted to us with wisdom and frugality.
negotiation cannot be started (particularly
foreign governments) until we know we have
ey to spend. This is particularly true with
ect to country programs, including the sale
gricultural commodities or the use of loans as
of the program, for, in general, the agreement
such a country is on a "package" basis. Both
he Defense Department and for ICA, this puts
a very tight time schedule—and forces active
tiation work by a busy staff just at the time
n it is preparing to present the program of
next succeeding fiscal year to you.

his presentation is a very intricate task indeed.
l large presentation documents which come to
each year do not write themselves. They in-
e a vast amount of careful writing, checking
igures, interdepartmental coordination and
ances, and editing. The Defense and ICA
ram and operating staffs have been working
lily on the documents which you have before
for over 2 months and at the same time have
pressing to carry out the obligating of fiscal
1956 funds. The same people must work
oth tasks, for they are the only people who
the detailed knowledge to do this. The sit-
n is particularly difficult because section 106
e appropriation act provides that not more
20 percent of the funds made available under
ct may be obligated or reserved during the
months of the fiscal year.

I wish to make two principal points on the basis of this description of the cycle.

First, a period of 1½ years to 2 years thus elapses between (a) initial planning and (b) obligation of funds. This means a substantial time lag between ascertainment of requirements and obligation of funds. New and substantial requirements can develop rapidly in the interim. We can meet these new requirements under present legislation in two ways.

1. We can transfer funds from other carefully prepared programs. This is undesirable because it means abandonment or postponement of carefully planned programs of assistance which are badly needed.

2. We can use the $100-million President's contingency fund under section 401. This is our most valuable flexible asset in carrying out mutual security objectives, and we should save this for the most serious emergencies and unprogramed calls on our funds. The proposal of an additional Middle East and Africa fund, which I have already mentioned, in essence would give us a further available source of emergency funds for use in this region. Although this fund would be earmarked for use in a particular area of the world, it is a region in which unexpected need for funds is especially likely to arise.

Second, the planning and program cycle which I have described shows that the time available for obligation of mutual security funds is very short indeed, especially when 80 percent of them must, under the provisions of the present appropriation law, be obligated during the first 10 months of the fiscal year. I believe the taxpayers would get better value for their money and the conduct of the mutual security program would be improved if the Congress were to adopt the following recommendations:

(a) Make military assistance funds available on a "no year" basis as in the case of most other military procurement funds expended by the Department of Defense;

(b) Provide that at least 25 percent of nonmilitary Mutual Security Act funds shall remain available until September 30 following the end of the fiscal year (i. e. be 15-month funds).

I feel sure that the present provision limiting obligations in May and June to 20 percent of appropriations for the year exerts undue and unnecessary pressures for early obligation of funds which inevitably lead to hasty action. In essence,

the present provision moves the pressure for last-minute obligation of funds forward from June 30 to April 30, thus worsening the situation instead of improving it. I hope that the appropriations committees will see fit to relieve us of this requirement.

Further flexibility is needed in another wholly different direction. At the present time, the President is authorized to use under the provisions of section 401 of the Mutual Security Act (President's Special Fund), without regard to the provisions of the act itself or of any other statute for which funds are appropriated under the act:

(a) $100 million specifically appropriated under the act for fiscal year 1956; and

(b) $50 million of any other mutual security funds appropriated for fiscal year 1956.

This provision has enabled us to move promptly to carry out the purposes of the act in a number of critical situations where these purposes could not otherwise be accomplished within one or more of the normal restrictions of the Mutual Security Act and of certain other statutes.

We believe that the ability to act rapidly in an unrestricted fashion will prove to be even more necessary in the year which lies ahead. Accordingly, the President has recommended the broadening of the valuable authority provided by section 401 in three respects.

First, he has requested that the amount which is subject to the provisions of section 401 should be increased from $150 million (composed of a specific appropriation for fiscal year 1956 under section 401 of $100 million and any other $50 million of fiscal year 1956 mutual security funds) to $300 million (composed of a new specific appropriation of $100 million for fiscal year 1957 under section 401 and any other $200 million of fiscal year 1957 mutual security funds). This would mean that $300 million, or about 6 percent, of the total mutual security funds requested for fiscal year 1957 would be subject to the high degree of flexibility now afforded by section 401.

Second, the President has requested that he be given authority to use not in excess of $100 million of the funds available under section 401 without regard to the requirements of any act, if the President determines that such use would be important to the security of the United States. This provision would be similar to the broad exemption already furnished by section 404 of the act with respect to the funds provided under that section.

Third, he has requested that the amount of fu which may be allocated under section 401 to one nation in any one fiscal year be increased f $20 million to $40 million.

These three changes would be an important dition to the authority of the Department of fense and of ICA to move rapidly and flexibl take necessary action in cases which may aris

Long-Term Commitments

The President has recommended that, for military projects of significance or importa the President be authorized to make commitm for not over 10 years. The funds to fulfill commitments would come from appropriations nonmilitary purposes and would not exceed million in any one year.

The significant feature of the requested aut ity would be that the President would be abl give to other nations assurance, backed by gressional approval, that annually an ag United States contribution to the projects in q tion will be made within and subject to the li of the funds made available annually.

The Aswan Dam has frequently been cited a example of the type of project in contemplat Although in the initial stages of this project of the requested new commitment authority not be involved, it does serve to illustrate the sible use of the requested authority.

This project is a large river development volving many facets (irrigation, power, trans tation, flood control, related agricultural er prises, and service activities) all of which in aggregate constitute a long-range developm project, partly to be financed by the country t benefited and partly by assistance programs international loans. All these elements of an enterprise must be pulled together into a sc arrangement for its financing. To obtain one of the financing there must be assurance of availability of the balance. The governmen the country concerned must know that the pro is financially feasible before it can safely go ward or even plan on a firm basis.

Other types of projects for which such a p would be useful involve harbor development, systems, inland waterways, power systems, c munications systems, industrial and educati centers, with their respective related and sub ary schemes. If these are to be carried out a period of years, there is no need of actual p

opriations until the year in which the funds are tually to be obligated approaches. However, we request the authority, at an earlier date, to ıke commitments *not* amounting to binding *con-ıct authority* but backed by the assurance of the ngress that these are undertakings for which expect later to make appropriations. This thority may prove to be a very powerful and ·ful mutual-security instrument in the difficult ırs lying immediately ahead.

From personal experience in the House of Rep-entatives, I know and understand the congres-nal reluctance to permit long-term arrange-nts. The Congress likes to review proposed propriations on an annual basis and to check on expenditure of previously granted funds be-e granting new authority. This opportunity review will not be completely lost under the posal, for annual appropriations must be de.

n the face of greatly increased Communist ac-ity in the economic field, those charged with execution of our mutual security programs are going to need every reasonable tool to accomplish their objectives. The Communist leaders can act on dictatorial fiat without accountability to anyone. They need not give thought to any wishes of their own people or to their crying need for consumer goods. We seek no such autocratic power.

Agricultural Commodities

Under section 402 of the 1954 act, as amended, $300 million is to be used in the current fiscal year to finance the export and sale for foreign currencies of surplus agricultural commodities produced in the United States. If we fail to arrange for such exports in the full amount, to the extent of our failure we cannot use our appropriations. To that extent the mutual security program of the United States and its allies is curtailed, and carefully planned projects must be scrapped or postponed.

In fiscal year 1956 we hope to reach the $300-million mark, but may fall short. Whatever figure we reach will be only after much effort and

PROGRAM BY REGION



in the face of many difficulties. In these situations, we must always try to avoid hurting normal export markets for United States agricultural products or for the products of our allies and friends. If we did cause such injury, we would do damage to the very cause of free-world security and stability we are trying to serve. This limits our opportunities. The 50–50 shipping provision also sometimes makes the problem difficult, particularly our efforts to work out triangular arrangements. The shift of the mutual security economic program toward less developed countries, which are predominantly agricultural and therefore need our surpluses less, also accentuates the problem.

I therefore ask that the requirement of section 402 for the coming fiscal year be set at $250 million. We shall do our utmost to carry out the purposes of section 402, but we do not want to see useful projects abandoned for lack of funds, merely because under current world conditions we find it impossible to reach some arbitrary goal.

Loans

In the administration of the mutual security program it has been this Government's policy to encourage the financing of nonmilitary projects and activities by private investment or through public lending institutions such as the Export-Import Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. This policy has been considered and applied in formulating the program for fiscal year 1957. Unfortunately, loan financing of this character has not been available in adequate amounts to meet the requirements for capital even in many countries whose economies are sufficiently stable to indicate capacity for repayment.

Under the mutual security program, we have provided our assistance in the form of loans rather than grants, so far as this was consistent with the attainment of mutual security objectives. We have tried to make sure that loans did not supplant those which might be available from the public lending institutions or replace potential private capital investment, if that possibility exists. Consequently, we have restricted the use of mutual security loans to situations in which the transaction would not take place at all unless on terms substantially more liberal than those available from the public lending institutions. The efforts this year to increase the volume of loans acti made under the mutual security program been disappointing. It has been found tha attempted substitution of a loan for a gra frequently, either for political or economic sons, inconsistent with the attainment of m security objectives, unless the terms of such l are so liberal as in effect to constitute pa grants.

Unexpended Balances

At a later stage of these hearings, the ap priate accounting officers of the Defense De ment and of ICA will discuss in detail the s of past appropriations and the unexpended ances of prior appropriations which we a pate at the end of fiscal year 1956.

My present estimate, on the basis of inform furnished by the Department of Defense, is the balance of unexpended military assistanc propriations on June 30, 1956, will be about 4 billion. This balance will represent a decli the 2-year period since June 30, 1954, of about 2 billion. It will be equal to about 2 years of tary assistance expenditures at the average for the fiscal years 1955 and 1956.

On the nonmilitary side, on June 30, 1956, will probably be a slight decline in unexpe balances from the levels prevailing at the en June 1955 and June 1954. This balance wi equal to about 1 year's expenditure at the ave rate now prevailing.

The new military assistance authorizatio quested is equal to about 1 year of expendit ($2.4 billion) at the present rate plus the million requested for advanced weapons of a for which, in general, no previous appropria have been made. The nonmilitary authoriz requested is equal to about 1 year of expendit at the current rate.

This, ladies and gentlemen, is a summary o views on this vast program. The needs for a program were never greater. The usefulne it seems to me to be borne out by the new read in each day's newspapers. We shall t give you in the days to come a full picture of e aspect of the program. We think that the which you will hear in testimony and will fi written form in the presentation books wi more convincing than any expression of opi anyone can give you.

ast-West Trade

Statement by Under Secretary Hoover[1]

You have asked me to appear today to give in-rmation on the matter of East–West trade.

At the outset there should be a clear understand-g of the type of East–West trade with which we e here concerned. We do not refer to trade tween the United States and the Communist oc, for controls on our trade with the Commu-sts are not in question. What we are dealing th here is trade between our allies and the Com-unist countries. The only effective way in ich we can control that trade is through the wer of persuasion.

We have offered to give your subcommittee—d we repeat our offer—all necessary and appro-iate information about such trade. The issue ween us seems to be that the subcommittee in-sts that all of this information be given in pub-l session. We, on the contrary, feel that certain rtions should only be given to the Congress on lassified basis. To make this information pub-l would violate our agreements with our allies d would be prejudicial to our national security erests.

In any consideration of our system of interna-nal controls it is essential to remember that se controls depend entirely upon a system of luntary cooperation among the free nations of West. Thus, the 1954 revision of the Interna-nal Control List had to be negotiated and agree-nt reached with all 14 of our allies.[2]

In those negotiations neither the United States r any of the other participants got everything y wanted. The State Department, as well as other interested Departments, was not happy to see many items deleted from the control list. By the same token, some of our allies were not happy to see some items retained. We did succeed in retaining on the list highly strategic items which could not be controlled successfully without international agreement. We also succeeded in achieving our other major objective, the setting up of a more effective enforcement system. Without agreement among all 15 nations it would not have been possible to have any International Control List at all.

Thus all the responsible agencies are in full support of Governor Stassen's statement that the 1954 negotiations achieved a net security advantage for the United States, under all the circumstances then prevailing, and that the results were in the best interests of the United States.

Some criticism has been directed, during the course of these hearings, at our allies for the position taken by them with regard to East–West trade controls. They, as well as we, were seeking to achieve a balance between the beneficial effects of peaceful trade and the dangers of unrestricted trade in strategic items. Sometimes we disagreed, as free nations often do, as to where to strike that balance. Our negotiations in 1954 were on the whole a successful effort to resolve this problem.

It has been suggested that we might have been more successful if we had used more than the power of persuasion. President Eisenhower answered that contention on December 2, 1953,[3] as follows:

> The easiest thing to do with great power is to abuse it, to use it to excess. This most powerful of the free nations must not permit itself to grow weary of the processes of negotiation and adjustment that are funda-

[1] Made on Mar. 26 before the Senate Permanent Sub-mittee on Investigations (press release 161).

[2] For a Foreign Operations Administration announce-nt on the 1954 revisions, see BULLETIN of Sept. 13, 1954, p. 72.

[3] *Ibid.*, Dec. 14, 1953, p. 811.

mental to freedom. If it should turn impatiently to coercion of other free nations, our brand of coercion, so far as our friends are concerned, would be a mark of the imperialist rather than of the leader.

During the course of this investigation, complaints have been made that the executive branch has withheld information about the 1954 negotiations which the Congress has a right to know. I do not think the record will sustain that point.

On February 14 I appeared before your subcommittee in executive session. I offered full cooperation to the subcommittee and explained that much of the information sought could only be given in executive session in order to protect our national security. The subcommittee did not respond to that offer but instead proceeded with open hearings.

Therefore, on February 20 a letter was sent to the chairman on behalf of the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce and the International Cooperation Administration.[4] That letter is in the record of these hearings. It pointed out that most of the documents involved in these international negotiations were classified and highly sensitive and that they involved our relations with other governments. It was further stated that in many instances we had given a specific commitment to keep the participation of a particular nation in this program secret. The letter concluded that, for these reasons, the International List could not be made public but full information as to items on the List could be offered to the subcommittee in executive session and on a classified basis.

In a further effort to clarify our position a letter was addressed to the chairman on March 23,[4] pointing out that the information already offered would give the subcommittee, on a classified basis, every item on the International List. I would like to enter that letter into the record at this time. It stated we were ready to give the subcommittee the List itself on a classified basis and to discuss the 1954 revisions of that List with the subcommittee in executive session.

Our request is not unusual. We are only asking to follow the same procedure followed by the other committees of the Congress. In matters involving foreign relations, officials from the responsible Departments meet in executive session on frequent occasions with the appropriate congressional committees to testify on classified mat-

[4] Not printed here.

ters that affect the national interest. That that is being requested in this instance.

We believe that this position is essential system of international trade controls is maintained. That system rests on a volu agreement among ourselves and 14 of our When the agreement was negotiated in 19 was decided by the 15 negotiating countries the International List and the negotiations established it were to be classified. Some o allies would only consent to participate i negotiations on the basis of a specific commit to that effect. Pursuant to that agreemen under security regulations issued by the S tary of State, the International List and the ments on which that List was based were c fied.

I have personally examined the documen volved, and it is my considered judgment t declassify the material would not only be a b of faith which would be prejudicial to ou eign relations but that it could seriously ris stroying the entire agreement upon whic system of controls now rests. Furthermo would jeopardize our ability to conduct fu negotiations on this or any other subject i future. For these reasons the executive b must respectfully decline to declassify the I national List. It is, however, as stated p ously, available to the subcommittee on a clas basis.

In arriving at this conclusion a number of factors had to be considered. Our allies that they must trade if they are going to su Many of them have had a substantial trade tern with countries now within the Comm bloc, extending back over a period of a ce or more. They are under constant pressure their parliaments, trade unions, and indu interests to expand their trade. They r trade-control lists as an obstacle to such expa That attitude is reflected in their negoti with us. We have done our best to resist pressures. Our task would be made far difficult if the International List were publ at this time.

Another factor has to do with Communist p ganda. East–West trade controls are a target area today for Red propaganda. The munists are seeking every opportunity to d the free nations on this issue. Were the I

ional List to be published, it would become a get for attack by Communists and left-wing ups within the participating countries. The bination of parliamentary, trade union, and siness pressures, spurred on by subversive ups directed by the Communists, could, in our gment, jeopardize the entire international sys- of controls.

t has been claimed that the International List lready public and known to the Soviets. What known to the Soviets is, of course, a matter of culation. No doubt they do have some infor- tion as to items which are controlled. That s not seem to be a valid reason why they should given all the information.

t has also been contended that the British ard of Trade List is identical to the Interna- nal List. That contention is not correct. The ns on the British list vary in significant details m those on the International List. The Brit- list does not include the surveillance list nor amounts of the quantitative control list. Na- nal lists are published by a number of other ntries—among them the Italians, the Cana- ns, and ourselves. None of these lists are the e, and none of them are the International List.

There is one other aspect of this problem that uld be mentioned. It is referred to in our er of March 23. The working papers of the nt Operating Committee are internal commu- ations and working papers of an advisory na- e which are historically retained within the cutive branch. These files and working papers are not in a position to make available to the committee. The Secretary of Commerce is pared to discuss this aspect of the matter later he hearing.

We regret that the balance of the information being requested by your subcommittee can y be furnished on a classified basis. To de- sify it would jeopardize our foreign relations be prejudicial to the national interest. There o effort on our part to withhold from the Con- ss any information which it should rightfully e. Our only interest is to see to it that the in- mation is made available in such a way as to tect the best interests of the United States.

n conclusion, Mr. Chairman, may we repeat t we desire to cooperate with your committee he fullest extent possible in your consideration his important subject.

TREATY INFORMATION

Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaty With Netherlands

Press release 164 dated March 27

A treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation between the United States and the Kingdom of the Netherlands was signed at The Hague on March 27. The American Ambassador, H. Freeman Matthews, signed on behalf of the United States. The Netherlands signers were Dr. J. W. Beyen, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Dr. J. M. A. H. Luns, Minister Without Portfolio.

The new treaty affirms the friendly and cooperative spirit prevailing between the two countries and reflects the important business and commercial interests which have developed in their economic relations. The broad and liberal provisions embodied in the treaty represent a set of principles designed to promote the continued growth of those relations along mutually beneficial lines.

The new treaty contains 27 articles, together with a protocol and exchange of notes, and covers a wide range of subject matter. In brief, each of the two countries:

(1) agrees to accord within its territories, to citizens and corporations of the other, treatment no less favorable than it accords to its own citizens and corporations with respect to engaging in commercial, industrial, and financial activities;

(2) formally endorses standards regarding the protection of persons, their property and interests, that reflect the most enlightened legal and constitutional principles;

(3) recognizes the need for special attention to stimulate the international movement of investment capital; and

(4) reasserts its adherence to the principles of nondiscriminatory treatment of trade and shipping.

This treaty is the sixth of its type to have been concluded between the United States and European countries since World War II. It represents another step in a program pursued by this Gov-

ernment for the modernization of its commercial treaty structure and the establishment of legal conditions favorable to foreign investment.

Similarly, the treaty is responsive to the important interest which the Netherlands has in international commerce and investment, both as receiver and as supplier of goods and capital, and reflects the policies which that country has developed to attract American capital. A large number of American firms have established branches or factories in the Netherlands in recent years, and Netherlands firms likewise have substantial and expanding investments in the United States.

The treaty will be transmitted as soon as possible to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification and, when the ratification processes of both countries have been completed, will enter into force one month after exchange of ratifications. Provision is made regarding the extension of the treaty to Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles upon the election of those territories communicated through the Netherlands Government.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Genocide

Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. Done at Paris December 9, 1948.[1]
Accession deposited: Afghanistan, March 22, 1956.

Labor

Convention (No. 80) for the partial revision of the conventions adopted by the General Conference of the International Labor Organization at its first 28 sessions. Done at Montreal October 9, 1946. Entered into force May 28, 1947 (TIAS 1810).
Ratification deposited: Bulgaria, November 7, 1955.

North Atlantic Treaty

Agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for cooperation regarding atomic information. Signed at Paris June 22, 1955.
Notification of being bound by terms of the agreement: Turkey, March 29, 1956.
Entered into force: March 29, 1956.

Safety at Sea

Convention on safety of life at sea. Signed at London June 10, 1948. Entered into force November 19, 1952. TIAS 2495.
Acceptances deposited: Brazil, January 17, 1956; Venezuela, February 8, 1956.

Regulations for preventing collisions at sea. Done at L don June 10, 1948. Entered into force January 1, 1 TIAS 2899.
Acceptance deposited: Uruguay, August 18, 1955.

Slave Trade

Protocol amending the slavery convention signed Geneva September 25, 1926 (46 Stat. 2183), and am Done at New York December 7, 1953. Entered i force for the United States March 7, 1956.
Proclaimed by the President: March 16, 1956.

Trade and Commerce

Fifth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of the schedules to the General Agreement Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3, 1 Will enter into force on the day it has been signed all the contracting parties to the general agreemen
Signatures: Haiti, Indonesia, Italy, Netherlands, N Zealand, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasal United States of America,[2] December 3, 1955; Ur of South Africa, December 5, 1955; Finland, Janu 4, 1956; Belgium, February 16, 1956.

BILATERAL

Italy

Agreement amending the surplus agricultural comm ties agreement of May 23, 1955 (TIAS 3249) by pro ing that funds may also be used for the purchase of c and feed grains. Effected by exchange of notes Rome August 30 and September 2, 1955. Entered i force September 2, 1955.

Netherlands

Treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation, w protocol and exchange of notes. Signed at The Ha March 27, 1956. Enters into force one month after day of exchange of ratifications.

Philippines

Agreement providing for disposition of equipment and terial furnished by the United States under the n tary assistance agreement of March 21, 1947 (T 1662). Effected by exchange of notes at Manila J 27, 1953, and March 3, 1956. Entered into force Ma 3, 1956.

Spain

Agreement supplementing the surplus agricultural c modities agreement of March 5, 1956 (TIAS 3510) providing for the exchange and use of funds acqui from the purchase of fertilizer by Spain from Aust Effected by exchange of notes at Madrid March 6 and 17, 1956. Entered into force March 17, 1956.
Agreement supplementing the surplus agricultural c modities agreement of March 5, 1956 (TIAS 3510) providing for the resale of wheat to Switzerla Signed at Madrid March 20, 1956. Entered into fo March 20, 1956.

Thailand

Agreement for the sale and purchase of tin concentra Signed at Bangkok March 12, 1956. Entered into fo March 12, 1956.
Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of ato energy. Signed at Bangkok March 13, 1956. Ente into force March 13, 1956.

[1] Not in force for the United States.

[2] With a reservation.

a. The Development of United States Policy the Near East, South Asia, and Africa During 55: Part III (Howard) 593
The Development of United States Policy the Near East, South Asia, and Africa During 55: Part III (Howard) 593
ic Energy
s-for-Peace Agreement With Thailand Signed ulles, Waithayakon) 590
of 129 Tons of Heavy Water in Atoms-for-ace Program 592
da. Canadian-Mexican-U.S. Meeting at White lphur Springs 590
ress, The
West Trade (Hoover) 619
utline of the Mutual Security Program for 57 (Hollister) 605
omic Affairs
West Trade (Hoover) 619
dship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaty With therlands 621
llyn To Be U.S. Representative to Eleventh sion of ECE 592
gn Service. Tasks and Responsibilities of the reign Service (Dulles) 588
any. Freedom and Slavery in a Divided Ger-ny (Conant) 583
national Organizations and Meetings
dian-Mexican-U.S. Meeting at White Sulphur ings 590
llyn To Be U.S. Representative to Eleventh sion of ECE 592
co. Canadian-Mexican-U.S. Meeting at White phur Springs 590
al Security
utline of the Mutual Security Program for 1957 ollister) 605
Development of United States Policy in the r East, South Asia, and Africa During 1955: t III (Howard) 593
East. The Development of United States icy in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa ring 1955: Part III (Howard) 593
Netherlands. Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaty With Netherlands 621
Refugees and Displaced Persons. U.S. Makes Final Payment to U.N. Refugee Fund 590
Thailand. Atoms-for-Peace Agreement With Thailand Signed (Dulles, Waithayakon) . . . 590
Treaty Information
Atoms-for-Peace Agreement With Thailand Signed (Dulles, Waithayakon) 590
Current Treaty Actions 622
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaty With Netherlands 621
United Nations. U.S. Makes Final Payment to U.N. Refugee Fund 590

Name Index

Allyn, Stanley C. 592
Conant, James B. 583
Dulles, Secretary 588, 590
Hollister, John B. 605
Hoover, Herbert, Jr. 619
Howard, Harry N. 593
Waithayakon, Prince Wan 591

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: March 26–April 1

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Press release issued prior to March 26 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 146 of March 19.

No.	Date	Subject
161	3/26	Hoover: East-West trade.
*162	3/27	Educational exchange.
*163	3/27	Educational exchange.
164	3/27	Commercial treaty with Netherlands.
*165	3/29	Foreign Service training courses.
*166	3/29	Pinkerton nominated Ambassador to the Sudan.
167	3/29	Dulles: remarks at FSO graduation.

* Not printed.

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HIST

The Department of State bulletin

XXIV, No. 877

April 16, 1956

THE MESSAGE OF AMERICA • *Remarks by President Eisenhower* 633

SIGNIFICANCE OF NEW SOVIET LINE CONCERNING STALIN ERA • *News Conference Statement by Secretary Dulles* 637

THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION • *by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy* 644

SECURITY COUNCIL AGREES UNANIMOUSLY ON U.S. PROPOSAL TO SEND SECRETARY-GENERAL HAMMARSKJOLD TO MIDDLE EAST • *Statements by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., and Text of Resolution* 627

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For index see inside back cover

The Department of State bulletin

VOL. XXXIV, No. 877 • PUBLICATION 6317

April 16, 1956

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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curity Council Agrees Unanimously on U.S. Proposal To Send cretary-General Hammarskjold to Middle East

ollowing is the text of a letter of March 20 n Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. resentative to the United Nations, to the Pres- lt of the Security Council, Sir Pierson Dixon, esting a meeting of the Council to consider Palestine question, together with a series of ements by Ambassador Lodge during the Se- ity Council debate. On April 4 the Council pted unanimously a U.S.-sponsored resolution his agenda item (see box).

TER TO PRESIDENT OF SECURITY COUNCIL

U.N. press release 2372 dated March 20

have the honor on behalf of the Government he United States to request you to convene a ting of the Security Council as soon as possible onsider the following agenda item:

e Palestine Question: Status of Compliance Given e General Armistice Agreements and the Resolutions e Security Council adopted During the Past Year.

he Government of the United States has be- e increasingly concerned over recent develop- ts in the Palestine area which may well endan- e the maintenance of international peace and rity. Information relating to the build-up of ed forces on either side of the Armistice De- cation Lines leads the United States to believe the parties may not be fully complying with provisions of their Armistice Agreements ch stipulate limitations upon armed forces in ear the Demilitarized Zones and the Demarca- Lines.

he instances of firing across and otherwise ating the Demarcation Lines are recurring at ngerous rate. Despite the earnest efforts of Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Or- ization the parties have not agreed to proposals which he has put forward to them on his own initiative or as a result of the Security Council's resolutions of 30 March 1955,[1] 8 September 1955,[2] and 19 January 1956.[3] These three resolutions had the unanimous support of the Security Council and it should therefore be a matter of genuine concern to each of its Members to ascertain the extent of compliance being given to them. It is a matter of deep concern to the Government of the United States and it, therefore, requests urgent and early action by the Security Council to consider the situation now prevailing in the Palestine area.

STATEMENT OF MARCH 26

U.S./U.N. press release 2376 dated March 26

The United Nations has been dealing with the Palestine question almost continuously since April 2, 1947.

Since August 11, 1949, when the last of the armistice agreements between Israel and the Arab States had been signed and all had been approved, the Security Council has met on the Palestine question 90 different times. No other question has so occupied the attention of the Council. No other question has so persistently challenged United Nations efforts.

Today, the 26th of March, 1956, 7 years since the armistice agreements were signed, the Palestine question is still unsolved. In fact, during recent months the situation has deteriorated and the world is alarmed at the prospects which it sees in the Near East.

---

[1] BULLETIN of Apr. 18, 1955, p. 662.
[2] *Ibid.*, Sept. 19, 1955, p. 459.
[3] *Ibid.*, Jan. 30, 1956, p. 183.

Resolution on Palestine Question[1]

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions of 30 March 1955, 8 September 1955, and 19 January 1956,

Recalling that in each of these resolutions the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization and the parties to the General Armistice Agreements concerned were requested by the Council to undertake certain specific steps for the purpose of ensuring that the tensions along the Armistice lines should be reduced,

Noting with grave concern that despite the efforts of the Chief of Staff the proposed steps have not been carried out,

1. *Considers* that the situation now prevailing between the parties concerning the enforcement of the Armistice Agreements and the compliance given to the above-mentioned resolutions of the Council is such that its continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security,

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to undertake, as a matter of urgent concern, a survey of the various aspects of enforcement of and compliance with the four General Armistice Agreements and the Council's resolutions under reference;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to arrange with the parties for the adoption of any measures which after discussion with the parties and with the Chief of Staff he considers would reduce existing tensions along the Armistice Demarcation Lines, including the following points:

(a) Withdrawal of their forces from the Armistice Demarcation Lines;

(b) Full freedom of movement for observers along the Armistice Demarcation Lines and in the Demilitarized Zones and in the Defensive Areas;

(c) Establishment of local arrangements for the prevention of incidents and the prompt detection of any violations of the Armistice Agreements;

4. *Calls upon* the parties to the General Armistice Agreements to co-operate with the Secretary-General in the implementation of this resolution;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council in his discretion but not later than one month from this date on the implementation given to this resolution in order to assist the Council in considering what further action may be required.

[1] U.N. doc. S/3575; adopted unanimously by the Security Council on Apr. 4.

This need not have been the case. In the opinion of the United States progress had, until recently, been made, and we thought that most of the basic issues underlying the uneasy truce in Palestine were coming nearer to a solution. United Nations efforts in the General Assembly, in the United Nations Relief and Works Age in the Security Council, and in the Truce Su vision Organization were producing hopeful s of progress, and the trend was toward peace. T trend, unfortunately, has recently been reverse

It would be wrong to conclude that the Un Nations has failed in its responsibilities. has not come again to the Holy Land, and we t that it never will. The indispensable facto preventing hostilities thus far has been the Un Nations. The present alarming situation c lenges this organization again to find new m of arresting the present grave trend. This org ization cannot fail to accept that challenge—w has certainly never been more serious than it i this moment.

The United States, having taken fully into count all of the circumstances of the present uation, is convinced that through this organ tion the present tensions must be eliminated the prospect for peace restored. We have sought to come before the Council at this t with any indictment or bill of particulars, or detailed assessment of the blames and shortc ings of one or the other of the participants i outside of the area of conflict. We have felt stead that the situation is much too serious fo to lose any time in setting into motion the authority of the United Nations to deal with present ominous drift.

We propose, therefore, that the Council req the Secretary-General to undertake immedia a personal investigation of ways and mean settling the numerous problems which stan the way of peace.

In these circumstances it is clear that the Un Nations cannot be inactive or indifferent. United States believes that in the first inst United Nations efforts should be concentrate full compliance with the armistice agreement Israel and the Arab States and on the carr out in detail of the Security Council's resolut of 30 March 1955, 8 September 1955, and 19 uary 1956. Each of these resolutions had unanimous support of the members of this C cil. They represent the combined judgment of members as to the essential steps to be take reduce the tensions. There is no question in mind that, if these steps had been carried we would not now have the serious situation w confronts us. All the more reason, therefore, they should be carried out.

'e therefore propose in the draft resolution ›re the Council[4] that the Secretary-General ertake as a matter of urgency discussions with parties and the Chief of Staff of the Truce ervision Organization, General Burns, to find s and means to put these resolutions and the posals which they embody into immediate t.

'e feel that these measures can and must be n special consideration. The Chief of Staff repeatedly emphasized the primary impor- e of several of these measures. We feel that deserve an honest chance. General Burns' ts must therefore have our continued and full ing, and the proposal that we have placed be- this Council would give him exactly that.

he draft resolution proposed by the United es is not intended in any way to derogate n the overall responsibility of the Security ncil in this question. We would expect the ncil to continue to follow with the greatest ern the developments in the area and to hold f in readiness to deal at any time with any lem which might arise.

'e have therefore proposed in the draft reso- n that the Secretary-General should report e Security Council not later than one month the date of the adoption of the resolution, hich time the Council would consider what her steps might be necessary or desirable for take.

r. President, the United States believes that member of the Council will recognize the for the kind of action which we have pro- l. We trust that each member of the Coun- nd the parties will recognize the good faith which this proposal is brought forward and lend to the Secretary-General their full sup- Clearly this is in the mutual interest of us Anything less can only lead to our mutual ment.

TEMENT OF MARCH 28

N. press release 2381 dated March 28

t me first thank the representatives of Cuba, elgium, and of China for yielding to me for few moments so that I may make this state- . I appreciate their courtesy.

. President, when we adjourned on Monday, it was the Council's understanding that after today's meeting we would meet again on Tuesday, April 3. I trust that on April 3 we will come to a vote after having heard further statements by the members of the Council or such statements as the parties care to make. That is my understanding of the sense of the meeting last Monday.

In view of certain remarks which have been made to me since then, it may be helpful if I now make a few words of explanation.

Frankly, the United States draft seemed to us to be so simple and clear that there could be no misunderstanding as to our intention. Indeed, it has come as something of a surprise that anyone could find in it any hidden meaning. That would be a baseless suspicion indeed.

Our draft resolution speaks for itself. Its meaning is right on the surface. The course which we advocate is a normal procedure. It is what we would expect to have done in our case if we were in a similar situation. I do not believe I can put it any more plainly than that.

Note also, please, gentlemen, that each member of the Council has supported the resolutions on which the United States draft is based. In other words they have been unanimously endorsed. That is a significant fact. And note also that the parties to the Palestine question have themselves in recent months expressed growing concern at what they feared to be developments on the part of the other side inimical to themselves.

Now, feeling as we did that this concern was shared by all, we believed there would be—and that there should be—prompt approval of our initiative to bring about discussions between the Secretary-General and the parties to find agreed measures for reducing the tensions and carrying out the armistice agreements.

Now, let me repeat, there are no hidden meanings in this, and if you search from now until doomsday with a magnifying glass the only purpose you will find is to prevent war. That, after all—I need hardly say it in this room—is the first purpose of the United Nations.

As I said on Monday, we do not propose to review the issues in the Palestine question, and we do not feel that others would wish to do so in view of the urgent need for action. This, too, is reflected in the very limited nature of our text.

We wanted two things: to act promptly in the face of a gravely worsening situation, and, in act-

N. doc. S/3562 dated Mar. 21.

ing promptly, to indicate, with the Security Council's endorsement, certain steps which the Secretary-General and the parties might take to carry out the provisions of the armistice agreements. These are not new purposes; the unanimous resolutions of the Security Council, to which our draft resolution refers, likewise had as their purpose the effective functioning of the armistice. That is our sole purpose. Surely no one would deny that, unless the armistice agreements can be effectively carried out, a grave threat to the peace may result.

We had hoped that at the end of today's meeting the Security Council would have approved the mission by the Secretary-General which we propose, and that he could pack his bags and leave right away. But we did not wish to give ground for anyone to say that he had been rushed—even though the proposal is so simple that the more than 8 days which have elapsed since it was given to the Council members and to the parties seems more than enough.

Mr. President, we hope that the Security Council will act speedily and that our resolution will be approved by the Council and the parties. It is in all truth a good-faith effort for peace.

FIRST STATEMENT OF APRIL 3

U.S./U.N. press release 2384 dated April 3

I am confident that there is no basic misunderstanding, either by the parties to the armistice agreement or by the members of the Security Council, as to the intention of the United States in bringing the pending draft resolution before the Council.

But certain questions have been asked which I am glad to answer and which may, I believe, be summarized as follows:

a) Are the measures which the Secretary-General might recommend for discussion with the parties and the Chief of Staff to be within the framework of the General Armistice Agreements?

b) Is the proposal contained in paragraph 3 (a) of the draft resolution to be considered applicable in general, or where appropriate and in accordance with local conditions?

c) Are the demilitarized zones and defensive areas referred to in paragraph 3 (b) those zones and areas as defined in the armistice agreements?

d) Do the various aspects of compliance with the General Armistice Agreements which Secretary-General is requested to survey refe matters outside the General Armistice Agreem or only to those matters with which the Tr Supervision Organization is expected to deal

e) Is it intended that the Secretary-Gen should undertake to amend the armistice ag ments?

f) Are the arrangements referred to in pa graph 3 (c) arrangements in the nature of ag ments by the parties or in the nature of ad forces and machinery?

g) Does the request to the Secretary-Genera report in his discretion refer to the timing or to nature of the report?

These questions can first be answered by rec ing my original statement to the Council on M day, March 26th. In describing the objective the United States I stated that, in the present cumstances, it is clear that the United Nati cannot be inactive or indifferent. I went or say, therefore, that "the United States belie that in the first instance United Nations eff should be concentrated on full compliance w the armistice agreements by Israel and the A States and on the carrying out in detail of Security Council's resolutions of 30 March 19 8 September 1955, and 19 January 1956." pointed out, moreover, that "each of these reso tions had the unanimous support of the memb of this Council. They represent the combi judgment of the members as to the essential st to be taken to reduce the tensions." I said furt that "there is no question in our mind that, if th steps had been carried out, we would not now h the serious situation which confronts us. All more reason, therefore, that they should be c ried out." I said in this same connection that " therefore propose in the draft resolution bef the Council that the Secretary-General undert as a matter of urgency discussions with the part and the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervis Organization, General Burns, to find ways a means to put these resolutions and the propos which they embody into immediate effect. feel that these measures can and must be gi special consideration."

These quotations from my statement introd ing the draft resolution are the core of the Uni States position, but, to make that position unm takably clear, I spoke again at our last meeti

emphasize our concern and to place our pro-
sal in its proper perspective. Thus, at the meet-
g of Wednesday, the 28th of March, I again
mmarized our position as follows: "We wanted
o things: to act promptly in the face of a
ively worsening situation, and, in acting
omptly, to indicate, with the Security Council's
dorsement, certain steps which the Secretary-
neral and the parties might take to carry out
e provisions of the armistice agreements. These
e not new purposes; the unanimous resolutions
the Security Council, to which our draft res-
ution refers, likewise had as their purpose the
ective functioning of the armistice. That is
r sole purpose. Surely no one would deny that,
less the armistice agreements can be effectively
rried out, a grave threat to the peace may result."
I believe that it is fair to say that this ade-
ately summarizes the United States position.
reviewing the questions which have been placed
fore the Council by the parties, it seems to us
ch of these questions is answered by the state-
nts I have referred to.

The representative of the United Kingdom put
e case even more simply when he said "first
ngs must come first." In speaking of those
tters which must receive immediate attention,
r Pierson Dixon went on to say that these were
oblems in which "if one cannot move forward,
e finds one's self slipping back."

It has been this backward trend which the
nited States wished to halt. We see no other
y of preventing such a backward trend at this
oment than by providing for strict compliance
th the armistice agreements between the parties
d the resolutions of the Security Council to
hich I have referred.

What we are dealing with now are the imme-
ate problems standing in the way of peace and
hich concern the compliance of the parties with
e General Armistice Agreements and the carry-
g out of measures which the Security Council
s already endorsed, in its recent resolutions, for
suring compliance with those agreements.

I repeat that this is the immediate problem,
d this is the immediate purpose of the United
ates initiative.

Now to be even more specific: the draft resolu-
on envisages that the Secretary-General should
range, after discussion with the parties and the
hief of Staff, for measures entirely within the
framework of the General Armistice Agreements
and the resolutions under reference.

Such measures would, of course, be applicable
where, by agreement between the Secretary-Gen-
eral and the parties, they consider conditions
warrant.

The references in the draft resolution to the
demilitarized zones and defensive areas are nat-
urally those defined in the armistice agreements.

The various aspects of compliance with the
armistice agreements which the Secretary-General
is requested to survey refer only to matters which
would come within the natural purview of the ar-
mistice machinery and the Truce Supervision
Organization.

The arrangements referred to in paragraph 3
(c) would, of course, be arrangements as agreed
between the parties and the Secretary-General.

It would not be a service to the Secretary-Gen-
eral or to the parties directly concerned to
enumerate further the problems or the measures
with which together they might wish to deal or
those with which he should not deal. We feel
that, with the clear understanding that the mission
of the Secretary-General is governed by the
Security Council's resolutions and the armistice
agreements, such a spelling out is not necessary nor
indeed desirable. The kind of undertaking which
we are asking the Secretary-General to undertake
becomes quite clear when seen in this context.

I hope that these explanations will be received
by the parties in the same spirit of cooperation
as they are given. It lies with the parties in the
end to determine the success or the failure of the
Secretary-General's mission. It will be for them
to determine in the final analysis the steps to be
taken.

The Secretary-General naturally cannot amend
or set aside the undertakings of the parties in the
General Armistice Agreements. As members of
the United Nations and as sovereign nations the
parties share with the members of the Security
Council the responsibility for determining what
can best be accomplished.

The Security Council is, of course, not relin-
quishing its primary responsibility for maintain-
ing international peace and security in adopting
the draft resolution proposed by the United States.

The resolution requests the Secretary-General to
report not later than one month from the date of
its adoption. He may report sooner if he considers

it desirable. This is what the phrase "in his discretion" refers to.

In the light of the Secretary-General's report and of the situation then prevailing, the Council would have to consider whether any further action was required and what that action might be. The United States would not presume to say what the Council should do a month from now. We can and do hope that further action concerning compliance with the armistice agreements and the carrying out of these resolutions will not be necessary.

This attempts to be a completely categorical and responsive reply to the questions which have been raised by representatives of the parties to the armistice agreement.

SECOND STATEMENT OF APRIL 3

U.S./U.N. press release 2385 dated April 3

In accordance with the custom whereby the sponsor of a proposition is expected to express himself on amendments, and as a matter of fact in response to at least one request which has been made, I make this statement on the subject of the amendments which have been introduced by the representative of the Soviet Union.

The amendments to the draft resolution which have been put forward by the Soviet Union are not only in the opinion of the United States not in any way necessary; they also do not seem particularly desirable. Without making a detailed analysis now, it is perhaps enough to say that these amendments are not improvements. This is, I think, an understatement.

Amendment No. 1 goes back into the past without accomplishing anything constructive thereby.

Amendment No. 2 is fallacious because it is clear that failure to comply with three unanimous resolutions of the Security Council is in the words of the resolution "likely" to endanger peace. Now surely it is not exaggerated to say that noncompliance with three unanimous resolutions is "likely" to endanger peace. It seems none too strong.

Amendment No. 3 seems to us to put the cart before the horse. Obviously there must be discussion before there is concordance. To say that concordance must precede discussion seems to us to be a non sequitur. Paragraph 3 as drafted clearly means that agreement of the parties will be necessary for the adoption of measures fo ducing tensions.

The words "in the defensive areas" as nov cluded in the draft resolution make quite that the defensive areas are those areas prov for in the armistice agreements. The Soviet resentative's amendment in this respect is un essary, I submit, and I understood the Soviet resentative to say he would not insist upon i

The objectives of the pending proposal I think, been made clear beyond any shadow doubt. The draft resolution is addressed clear and present danger. Our sole intent i dispatch the Secretary-General to the area s to reduce the growing tension. We believe the present text of the draft resolution is suffic in its present form, and, as every member knows, it was very carefully written.

We also believe that the governments in area are prepared to accept the resolution as i and we think that the debate that has taken p here today and in preceding days has made clear.

As the sponsor of the draft resolution, th fore, we believe it is desirable not to acc amendments.[5]

FIRST STATEMENT OF APRIL 4

U.S./U.N. press release 2386 dated April 4

There of course is nothing wrong with Government of the United States communicat with 3 countries or 30 countries in an effort keep the peace—and I note that the Soviet re sentative did not say there was anything wr with it. This proposal we have here today is a 3-nation proposition. We hope it will soon come an 11-nation proposition.

Gentlemen, in view of the fact that yesterda gave my arguments against the Soviet ame ments, and in view of the fact that the objecti to these amendments have been very eloque explained by the representatives of Peru, United Kingdom, France, and Australia, I not take any more time of the Council to ar against them further.

I perhaps might say that the capitalizing of phrase "Defensive Areas" is not an amendm It is a typographical rectification. The posit

[5] The amendments proposed by the U.S.S.R. (U.N. S/3574 dated Apr. 3) were rejected on Apr. 4.

he United States is still in opposition to
ıdments.

ONDSTATEMENT OF APRIL 4

U.N. press release 2386 dated April 4

efore we adjourn this meeting, perhaps the
bers of the Security Council will forgive me
express my appreciation to the members and
e representatives of the parties for the tone
h they have all observed here; for the high
and the high plane on which this vitally im-
ant and delicate matter has been discussed.
be President of this Security Council is one
e great honors that can come to a man, but for
in this particular case, it is something more
an honor.[6] It has been a very precious ex-
ence indeed to have the cooperation of all of
listinguished men who are seated around this
. I shall always remember it and wish to
ess my thanks to you for it.
t me finally say to you, Mr. Secretary-Gen-
and I feel sure I speak for everyone present
I do so, that as you leave on this mission you
with you not only good wishes and our hopes,
our heartfelt confidence and high regard and
t expectations for your success.

it of Spanish Minister Foreign Affairs

e Department of State announced on April
ress release 175) that Alberto Martin Artajo,
ister of Foreign Affairs of Spain, and Señora
Iartin Artajo would be accompanied by the
wing party during their visit to the United
es from April 9 to April 18:

M. de Areilza, Count of Motrico, Ambassador of Spain
the United States
tess of Motrico
ral Francisco Fernandez-Longoria Gonzales, Chief of
ff, Spanish Air Force
ra de Fernandez-Longoria
de las Barcenas, Director General of Foreign Policy
ra de las Barcenas
José Rovira Sanchez-Herrero, Director General of
nomic Cooperation
lio Valls, Press Section, Foreign Ministry

r. Lodge became President of the Security Council
e month of April.

The Message of America

Remarks by President Eisenhower[1]

I think it was last year, gentlemen, when I met with the Advertising Council,[2] that I made the request that the Council would try to do something about extending their good work to helping the Government solve some of its problems in the foreign field.

Not only has the record of the past year shown that they took me seriously, but I am particularly delighted that this year they brought some of their bosses along with them so that they can get educated also, because we are talking about one of the most pressing problems with which the Government—indeed with which the whole Nation—is confronted constantly. There is nothing that takes place at home of any great importance—if it is a difficult problem, at least—that is not caused by or at least is colored by some foreign consideration.

During this past year the Advertising Council got together a team of experts and went over the whole series of factors involved in these problems and came up with some very fine suggestions. The one I want to mention particularly—a product of their imagination—was the exhibit of "People's Capitalism." I don't know how many of you have seen it, but to me it is the kind of message that America ought to be carrying abroad. I would have liked to have seen some kind of adjective put between "people's" and "capitalism"—something of the order of—if not "democratic," something of the order of "competitive" or something of that kind. But in any event, the exhibit itself shows what the system of capitalism will do for a people. What it has done in this country in a very, very short time, measured by historical units, is a very telling thing.

I actually could hope that the truth that it exemplifies and shows could be brought home to our own people as well as to those abroad for whom it was designed. Because I think too often we forget some of the features of our own system that have been so responsible for the place this Nation has reached. So before I leave that part of what I

[1] Made before the 12th annual Washington Conference of the Advertising Council on Apr. 3 (White House press release).

[2] BULLETIN of Apr. 11, 1955, p. 609.

wanted to say to you, my thanks to the agencies for the time and talent they have contributed and are continuing to contribute through the media—enlisting the space on radio and television—and for the good work of all, particularly to the businessmen supporters of what the Council has been doing, with the Government as its principal beneficiary.

Now, when we consider this system of which we are so proud, we recognize that, like all things human, it is neither perfect nor does it sustain itself forever without the people who are living in it and are part of it doing something about it. Internally and externally any form of government, and particularly self-government, is always subject to some kind of attack, particularly successful government that has brought material prosperity in the measure which ours has. Internally we watch that government, we watch it very carefully. We watch particularly the Federal Government to see that it doesn't transgress into fields from which it should abstain, except only in those cases where the changing miracle of industrial life brings about problems that are not solvable by communities, by private enterprise, or by individuals.

There we try to stick to the old Lincolnian dictum that it is the function of government to do for people those things they could not do for themselves and to stay out of things in places where the people can do things for themselves. We would hope, therefore, to have wisdom in government to help distinguish this line beyond which government should not go and yet be courageous in doing those things that it should do.

Likewise, we should hope always for more wisdom in business leadership, not only in the business man and in business management but in their concert with labor, so that in the individual company or the corporation—particularly the influential ones—we do not make decisions that damage us and the kind of system that we are trying to run. That can easily be done within the corporation just as well as it can within the Congress or within some regulatory commission.

Using Our Influence Abroad

Now, let us turn our eyes abroad. There is an old story about the man in a town who owned the factory on which the living of the community depended. He built a great house on the hill, and all the rest of the people lived in the plain below in fairly meager circumstances. The climax of the story was, when things began to go bad, the man on top found that he was not safe ex only as the people below were contented and lieved that they were advancing. When they came depressed and lost their morale, and company began to fail, this man fell further t the others because he had a greater distance tc

Within a certain degree, that story has plicability in the world today. The United St cannot live alone—a paragon of prosperity— all the rest of the world sinking lower and lc in its standards of living.

There are many ways in which we can use influence to make certain that other peoples re nize the virtues of a free, competitive capital system rather than take the shortcut—the sp ous and false road that is offered them by communistic ideology.

You see, in many of these less developed a of the world, there is a very great ambition tc dustrialize themselves. Now the Commu comes along and says: well, you see what we 40 years ago? Look what communism has for us. And today we can bring to you this mill or help you with this dam, or do this or t

There is a very great appeal, because of very rapid transformation that on the surfac least, and under forms of dictatorship has accomplished in Russia. The man who is lis ing to the story doesn't understand that un neath this great facade of industrial organiza there is slavery, human misery, rather than man happiness—no opportunity for a mar realize his own spiritual, moral, physical, economic aspirations through his own efforts. obeys. He is regimented. But they don't that. As a matter of fact, it is not of import at the moment, because it is only in such a soc as ours, based upon the dignity of man, that importance of that kind of thing to human recognized and catered to.

And so we must carry not only a material sage to the world of what the kind of enterp we have—the kind of system—can do for a pec We must carry those moral values, spiritual va of the worth of man—what he is entitled to a individual. We must say not merely what or that state would do if they would follow line, because I think it is not to be denied, if would give the communistic system to any b ward country, with a complete dictator who c direct everything without question, he could m

he short run, more rapid progress than could y the cooperative method that is inherent in ocracy.

I think that we must realize that, unless we hese things in the world, someone else will do through false doctrines. And we finally will h more and more that place where we are iso- l from the rest of the world, with the whole ld in a position possibly of envy and then of ed, open antagonisms, that will reflect itself in , let us say, refusal to trade, then breaking off tions, and finally and ultimately in a very, very us thing.

here is plenty of time for us to do it if we start and keep doing it. That is the reason that I o delighted that the Advertising Council has cted itself in its efforts along this path.

overnmental officials are busy. They are con- tly putting out "fires." They are on the Hill vering why they need this money or that ey, or sometimes why they don't need this or that someone is trying to give to them. This new phenomenon, and ordinarily applies only ection year.

e need in government is time to think, with the ty of people to do it. Now by the selection of e people of the Advertising Council they are to supplement the work of government and so sist it, to point out new, imaginative ways of the message of America can be carried.

oting Better Understanding

assure you that that message must be carried, nly in the ways I have indicated but it must pressed also in the readiness to help wherever ble on good, sound business arrangements. ther words, let us not forget for one instant when we are putting $36 or $37 billion of nditures every year into arms and armaments, arms and armaments alone, remember, can r take us forward—they will merely defend we have got.

t when you talk about something that pro- s a business arrangement—trade—when you alk about something that promotes a better rstanding between us and the people of the dle East, or the people of Africa, or anybody then you are talking about something con- tive, something that yields results over the years to come. It will not be merely something essentially sterile and negative so far as our capacity for raising human standards is concerned. We will not be merely acting like a policeman to protect what we already have. Of course, protection is necessary. It is just as necessary in this day and time as it can possibly be. But let us not make the ignorant, uninformed decision that only in armaments are we going to find the solution of our foreign problems.

And since we have been favored by the system that our forefathers gave us, by the resources that God gave us, by the good fortune we have of having been born and raised here through the finest educational and health systems in the world, and so on, let us use our brains to make certain we sustain our position by helping everybody else to realize their own aspirations and legitimate ambitions. Not necessarily in the exact pattern of this country—of course not. Nobody starts from the same place, and no other nation would possibly reach the same end.

But we can preach and show that we believe in the dignity of man, in the independence of nations, the right of people to determine for themselves their own faith. We can help. Every dollar we put into this kind of thing, if it is intelligently spent, is to my mind, in the long run, worth any five we put just in sheer defense because in the long run it is a constructive thing. It is a developing thing, the kind of development America has done at home and which we must help do abroad.

So, all of these words, all of these thoughts, my friends, give you the depth of my sincerity when I say thank you for coming here, thank you for helping. The people that talk to you today will come not merely to give you a briefing of what they are doing, but in doing so would hope that from you they will get reactions—in other words, what would you do?

Government is nothing but individuals. Every one of the individuals in government belongs to you. He is your "boy" in some form or other. You put him there directly or indirectly. So the job is still that of the American people, and I couldn't conceive of any job in this world being in better hands than that of the American people.

Thank you very much.

Crusade for Freedom

White House press release dated March 27

The following letter from the President was handed by Mrs. Dwight D. Eisenhower to William A. Greene, President of the Crusade for Freedom, in a ceremony at the White House, March 27, 1956.

DEAR MR. GREENE: The captive European peoples behind the Iron Curtain—Poles, Czechoslovaks, Bulgarians, Rumanians, Albanians, and residents of the Baltic States—are constantly bombarded by Communist propaganda designed to break their will to resist and destroy their hope for a better future.

In the continuing work of combating such propaganda, Radio Free Europe, the radio arm of the Crusade for Freedom, plays a major and effective role. Day in and day out its broadcasts extend the hand of friendship and hope to the people behind the Curtain, assuring them that their plight has not been forgotten by the free world and fortifying their devotion to liberty.

To the National Committee for a Free Europe, I extend congratulations on this and the other valuable activities of the organization, with my best wishes for success in enlisting, through the Crusade for Freedom, the support of the American people. I am confident they will respond generously and thus forward this vital work for the cause of freedom and peace.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Exchange of Messages Following White Sulphur Springs Meeting

The White House on April 2 made public the following exchanges of messages, one between President Eisenhower and Louis St. Laurent, Prime Minister of Canada, and the other between the President and Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, President of Mexico.

President Eisenhower to Prime Minister St. Laurent

MARCH 31, 1956

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: Thank you for your warm and thoughtful letter on our meeting with the President of Mexico at White Sulphur Springs.

I hope you enjoyed the occasion as much as I did, and I am confident that all three of us pro e from the friendly and informal talks that we u These talks will surely bring even closer the mate relations between our three countries.

With warm regard,

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOW

The Right Honorable
LOUIS ST. LAURENT
Prime Minister of Canada
Ottawa

Prime Minister St. Laurent to President Eisenh

OTTAWA, *March 28, 19*

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Immediately on m turn I want you to know how much I enjoyed u informal meeting and how delighted I was t you looking so well and in such good spirits.

We had a pleasant, smooth flight home an rived in Ottawa at 3 p. m.

Thank you for affording me the opportuni the talks with you and the President of M and may you continue to enjoy your present health.

With warm personal regards, I am,

Yours sincerely,

LOUIS ST. LAURE

President Eisenhower to President Ruiz Cortin

APRIL 2, 19

His Excellency
ADOLFO RUIZ CORTINES
President of Mexico

I am deeply grateful for the kind message w you so thoughtfully sent me on your retu Mexico City from White Sulphur Springs. I a source of great satisfaction to me that you the Prime Minister of Canada found it possi join me in our recent informal meeting and you gave me the opportunity to renew our per friendship. I feel sure that such contact further strengthen the friendly ties which ha long and happily been maintained throug usual diplomatic interchange.

In extending my every wish for your conti well-being, I renew to Your Excellency the a ances of my personal consideration and hi esteem.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOW

ident Ruiz Cortines to President Eisenhower

MEXICO CITY, *March 29, 1956*

Excellency

WIGHT D. EISENHOWER

President of the United States of America

n returning to my country I have the honor to vey to Your Excellency the expression of my satisfaction at the friendly personal contacts h upon your happy initiative we have just had White Sulphur Springs and which inaugurate ra of personal relationship between the Ameri- Chiefs of State to the benefit of our countries. e particular pleasure also in expressing to you sincere gratitude for the innumerable manifes- ns which I received of your very cordial hos- lity and your sincere and wholehearted friend- . I beg Your Excellency to accept the rance of my cordial consideration and sincere rds.

ADOLFO RUIZ CORTINES

President of the United Mexican States

ters of Credence

ria

he newly appointed Ambassador of Liberia, rge Arthur Padmore, presented his credentials resident Eisenhower on April 7. For the text e Ambassador's remarks and the text of the ident's reply, see Department of State press se 181.

egation to Baghdad Pact cncil Meeting

release 180 dated April 6

e United States has demonstrated in many its desire to cooperate in the achievement of bjectives of the Baghdad Pact, which coincide our objectives in this area and elsewhere—of , security, and welfare. While the United s has not itself adhered to the pact, we have, e request of the members—Turkey, Iraq, Iran, stan, and the United Kingdom—maintained nuing liaison with the organization and have bservers in attendance at its various meetings. line with this policy, the United States is sending a delegation to the meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council in Tehran from April 16 to 20. The American delegation will be headed by Deputy Under Secretary of State Loy W. Henderson.

Mr. Henderson will be accompanied to Tehran by a special economic adviser and will be joined by Selden Chapin, U.S. Ambassador to Iran, and by Waldemar J. Gallman, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, together with advisers drawn from the staffs of the American Embassies in Tehran and Baghdad.

The group of U.S. military observers at the meeting will be headed by Adm. John H. Cassady, Commander in Chief of the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean Forces, who attended the last meeting of the Council.[1] He will be accompanied by senior representatives of each of the military services.

Significance of New Soviet Line Concerning Stalin Era

News Conference Statement by Secretary Dulles

Press release 171 dated April 3

The official Soviet line, which seems to repudiate the last two decades of Stalin's rule, is highly significant. It is too early to judge its full meaning, but some important conclusions are now possible.

The Soviet rulers must know that the brutal and arbitrary rule of the Stalin era led to a great yearning by the subject peoples for legality and personal security, for tolerance of differences of opinion, and for government genuinely dedicated to the welfare of the governed.

Also the Soviet rulers must now see that their foreign policies encounter effective resistance when they are identified with the use of violence.

The essential question is this: Are the Soviet rulers now attacking the basic causes of this domestic discontent and foreign distrust, or is their purpose merely to allay this discontent and distrust by blaming them on the past? The downgrading of Stalin does not of itself demonstrate that the Soviet regime has basically changed its domestic or foreign policies. The present rulers have, to be sure, somewhat modified or masked the harshness of their policies. But a dictatorship is a dictatorship whether it be that of

[1] BULLETIN of Jan. 2, 1956, p. 16.

one man or several. And the new Five-Year Plan shows a continuing purpose to magnify the might of the Soviet State at the expense of the well-being of most of the people who are ruled.

In the field of foreign policy the Soviet rulers have taken a few forward steps, notably the belated liberation of Austria. But they continue other predatory policies. They forcibly hold East Germany detached from Germany as a whole. The East European nations are still subjugated by Soviet rule. They have not renounced their efforts to subvert free governments. In Asia the present Soviet rulers seek to stir up bitterness and, in the Near East, increase the danger of hostilities. In the Far East they are seeking to coerce Japan to accept a peace treaty on Soviet terms. These and other current actions fall far short of the accepted code of international conduct.

Nevertheless, the fact that the Soviet rulers now denounce much of the past gives cause for hope, because it demonstrates that liberalizing influences from within and without can bring about peaceful change. If the free world retains its strength, its faith and unity, then subversion cannot win where force and brutality failed. And the yearnings of the subject peoples are not to be satisfied merely by a rewriting of past history. Thus we can hope for ultimate changes more fundamental than any that have so far been revealed. The United States, and indeed all the free nations, will eagerly welcome the coming of that day.

Visit of French Foreign Minister

News Conference Statement by Secretary Dulles

Press release 170 dated April 3

I am very pleased to announce that the French Foreign Minister, Mr. Christian Pineau, has accepted an invitation to visit Washington. I have had the possibility of such a visit in mind for some time and first discussed it with Minister Pineau when we met recently at Karachi. The dates for the visit have now been set, and Minister Pineau will be here from June 18 to June 20 inclusive. We will have a further exchange of views on subjects of mutual interest to our two countries. The visit will also provide an occasion for high officials of the United States Government to meet the French Foreign Minister.

Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference

Press release 172 dated April 3

Secretary Dulles: I have two prepared ments to make.[1] . . . Now if you have any tions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us whether has been any change in our policy on Israe quest for jet fighters and other armaments?

A. The policy in that respect remains su tially as it was when I explained it to the S Foreign Relations Committee about a mont [February 24].[2]

Q. Mr. Secretary, is the new version o Bricker amendment, which is known as the sen version, acceptable to the administratio

A. The President has not made, as far as aware, any definite statement on that subjec until he does I would prefer not myself to sp it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, a story out of Tokyo y day indicated that the Japanese Embassy he been directed to protest to the State Depar about the enactment of State laws which a parently designed to boycott Japanese Have you heard of this, first; and, secondly, can you do about it?

A. Well, I am aware of the problem tha refer to. We have not yet received any pr as far as I am aware, from the Japanese Go ment. There is involved a question of trade ties, discrimination, and there is a possibil setting up forces here which could be very ini to the operation of our most-favored-nation p with respect to trade. But, as I say, until w ceive the protest, until we have had a fu chance to study the matter in the light o treaty engagements and in the light of our po I wouldn't want to say what our final concl will be.

Q. Mr. Secretary, according to a UP repo French Prime Minister, Guy Mollet, said y day that the United States was taking the approach to German unification refusing t

[1] These statements were also issued separately as releases 170 (see adjoining column) and 171 (see p. 6

[2] BULLETIN of Mar. 5, 1956, p. 368.

rmament first. I was wondering whether you some comment on that.

Well, you know, I find as I go around the d, and as I read the papers, that there is a good of criticism in other countries, big countries, countries, of United States policy in various s phases, and I feel that the fact that those cisms are made, freely made, is one of the test tributes to the United States that could ade. Because all those countries know that can criticize the United States without any of any reprisals or that we will change the ciples which actuate us. We are not trying n a popularity contest, and we don't give or hold assistance on the basis of whether people ice things about us or not. I think the finest te that could be paid to a country as powerful e United States is that nobody fears to criti- us.

Mr. Secretary, could you return to the ker amendment? I believe the President said he was not going to discuss it with us at the conference until he talked to you about it. he talked to you, and have you taken a posi- on it?

Well, he has talked to the Attorney Gen- but whether he has taken a final position I don't know.

Mr. Secretary, could you tell us what is the lative status of the Bricker amendment? the administration have to decide very soon osition on it?

I understand that the present version of the stitutional amendment has been reported out ommittee. I do not think that it is as yet on calendar, nor do I know what the action will bout whether to put it on the calendar and, if hen. So that I will just say that as far as I now aware it is not on the calendar, and it is a matter of immediate urgency.

Mr. Secretary, the freedom to criticize us to have taken a tangible form in Iceland. ld you discuss the resolution of the Icelandic liament in favor of moving American forces of Iceland?

Well, I think that the resolution reflects an rstandable desire on the part of the Members arliament to reduce to a minimum the presence of foreign troops there. Of course, the resolution itself, as you know, has no operative effect internationally, and I do not anticipate that there will be any decisive action now taken in that matter. Certainly, there is no occasion for any for, I think, a year and a half. But the problem of Iceland has always been a difficult one because Iceland is a quite small country. It has a population of, I think, about 160,000, and in that small population even a modest amount of forces from a foreign land makes a considerable impact. If you were to put it into relative terms, I would say that the situation is as though there were 6,000,000 foreign, non-English-speaking troops in the United States. Well, as the years go by there would, naturally, grow up a desire perhaps to reduce that, and a desire to be sure that the Government did not continue it beyond the time that it was necessary. There is, I think, a feeling in Iceland that perhaps the recent Soviet moves make this less necessary. Undoubtedly, that whole problem will be discussed over the coming months. But I do not think that it is reflective of anything other than a desire to minimize the presence of foreign troops insofar as it can safely be done. The question of how safely it can be done is a matter which would probably be discussed at some of our NATO meetings.

Situation in Near East

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you discuss your views on the present situation in the Middle East with respect to the chances of avoiding a war?

A. It is, of course, basic to United States policy, first, that war in that area should be avoided, and, secondly, that nothing should happen to subvert the genuine independence of the countries of that area. Peace and independence for that area are two basic points of our policy.

I have the feeling that the resolution which is up before the Security Council now, and which was introduced by the United States, will contribute appreciably to minimizing the risk of war in the area.[3]

When I spoke on this subject before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the time that I have already alluded to, I emphasized my thought that the United Nations had a very peculiar responsibility toward Israel and the maintenance of

[3] See p. 628.

peace, because the State of Israel had to an extent been sponsored by the United Nations and the truce and armistice agreements had been sponsored by the United Nations. I felt, therefore, that the United Nations should assume increasing responsibility.

The resolution that we introduced, if it is adopted, as I am hopeful it will be (perhaps today or more likely tomorrow), will, I think, add appreciably to the assurance of peace in that part of the world, and to that extent it will mark, I think, real progress.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the British Foreign Office has criticized Premier Nasser of Egypt on the ground that he has become rather anti-Western and has particularly made difficulties for Britain and France in the area. Are you aware of any such conduct on Nasser's part?

A. In so far as I have been aware of Nasser's public and official statements, I would say that he was actuated primarily by a desire to maintain the genuine independence of the area—the same desire that I expressed. Of course, it is never possible to make final judgments merely on the basis of what people say. But I am not disposed to feel that there is any irrevocable decision on the part of the Government of Egypt to repudiate its ties with the West or to accept anything like vassalage to the Soviet Union.

Q. May I ask one more question on this area: There have been reports published within the last day or so that the United States Government is considering separating from Israel's arms requests certain requests for electronic equipment, chiefly radar, and approving that on the ground that it is purely defensive. Can you comment on these reports?

A. No, I'm afraid not. If that analysis is under way, it is at a level which hasn't yet come to my attention.

Q. Mr. Secretary, getting back to your previous answer, does your answer mean that Israel's arms requests have been turned down?

A. No.

Q. Does it mean they are still open?

A. I would have to ask you to let me stand pretty much on the statement which I made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in public hearing about a month ago. My difficulty, la and gentlemen, is this: that whenever I speak that subject I find that every single word phrase that I use is compared very, very clo with something I may have said a month ago, if I don't use precisely the same words then inferred that we have changed our policy.

Now it is not possible for me—my memory i good enough—to repeat exactly in verbatim te what I said a month ago. And if I try to re it in approximately the same terms, that woul be good enough because the differences, how slight, would be studied with a view to seein they don't hide some change of policy.

Now, broadly speaking, our policy is as I pressed it at that time, and I think rather than tempt to restate it in what might be slightly di ent words from which inferences might unjus ably be drawn, I would just rather stand on previous statement.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you care to tell us makes this interpretation?

A. I would say that those interpretations—I not criticizing them—those interpretations made by the interested parties who, quite prope are seeking to detect, if possible, any changes in policy.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you please commen the exception that the Netherlands appears to h taken to some of your statements in Djakarta?

A. Well, I had a friendly talk, yesterday I th it was, with the Dutch Ambassador here an think, clarified the situation. I believe that position which I took at Djakarta was a posit which, by and large, is in the interest of the Uni States and all of the free nations, and I hope t there will be a better understanding of what I s and did there.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you comment spe cally on the Jungschlaeger[4] case, particularly charge that an American Embassy plane had b used to fly ammunition to the rebels?

A. It is not our practice to comment in gen upon cases that are pending before courts. Th are a great many of these cases all around

[4] Leon Jungschlaeger, retired Dutch naval captai trial in Indonesia for alleged subversive activities aga the Indonesian Government.

·ld, and, in the main, it is our policy to avoid ıment on cases either at home or abroad that pending before the courts. As far as the refer- to the use of a United States plane is con- ıed, I understand that has been publicly and ·ially denied by the United States Embassy.

'. Mr. Secretary, in your appearance before the ate Foreign Relations Committee [in executive ion on March 23] you spoke of the Japanese ·ing about the use of American foreign aid to them in their payments program both in the ted States and Asia. Has anything further eloped on that?

.. No. That theme has been reported by me ɔur economic people here in the State Depart- t and to the ICA [International Cooperation ninistration], and they are studying it to see ıt they may conclude as to feasibility of a prac- l application of that general thesis that we ıld seek to coordinate our economic aid with ı economic aid as may result from Japanese ıration payments and the like.

-World Unity

. Mr. Secretary, in your prepared statement said something about if the free world main- s its unity in the face of the Soviet changes. talked a lot here about criticism from a variety ıations. Do you have any apprehensions the world will maintain its unity in the face of Soviet change?

. I am convinced that the free world will main- its unity. Now unity is something which has ɔe carefully differentiated from conformity. t is the difference between our system and the iet Communist system—at least, as it has been ɔunded up to the present time. Whether they change that or not I don't know. But the old ıet Communist line has been that there had complete conformity and that no differences pinion were tolerated. In a free society the ıtion is the reverse of that. We tolerate and ome differences of opinion, and, indeed, if were no differences of opinion in a free so- there would be something badly wrong with Therefore, the unity and vigor of a free so- is not to be judged by the absence of criticism comments; on the contrary, I think it is a of vigor that these comments and criticisms r.

Now, there is of course some danger always that a change of tactics such as is now going on in the Soviet Union, where—as I put it—it may be that old policies are merely being masked, may temporarily have a deceptive effect. But one of the encouraging impressions that I gained from my trip to Asia is that there is a very large measure of alertness to the possibility of danger from new Soviet tactics. Therefore, I returned from this trip convinced that, at least in so far as that part of the world was concerned, there is a very good hope that the unity of the free nations will be preserved. Not, as I say, in the form of a conformity, or domination, or some nations being satellites to others—goodness knows we don't want any satellites. But the kind of unity which means that they are free from Soviet Communist or Chinese Communist domination and within that freedom each lives its own independent life. I believe that situation is going to prevail.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it has been reported that the United States would not oppose other Western countries selling arms to Israel. Would you explain to us the difference—whether the arms come from the United States or other Western countries?

A. The United States is following its policy in relation to that area for reasons that seem to us to be most conducive to our particular ability to exert influence for the peace and independence of the area of which I spoke. But the same considerations which apply to the United States do not necessarily apply to other countries, and there is certainly no desire on the part of the United States to dictate to other countries what their policy should be.

Policy on Use of Troops

Q. Mr. Secretary, on that same subject how do you interpret the May 25, 1950, declaration in so far as it may involve the use of our own troops to put down any acts of aggression in that part of the world? Are you free, for example, without congressional sanction?

A. Whether we are free or not is a Constitutional question. It is very strongly the disposition of President Eisenhower, as I think you all know, to resolve any of those doubts in favor of going to Congress, assuming that Congress is in session and can be expected to act promptly, or

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could be called into session promptly. I would think that, in the absence of an emergency of such a character, congressional consultation and action would be impractical and the President would not be disposed to act without such consultation and concurrence by the Congress.

Q. Mr. Secretary, didn't the 1950 declaration commit Britain, France, and the United States to follow a common policy?

A. It laid down certain principles which each accepted as a broad guide to its policies. Those principles were, however, so general in their terms that it is not easy to apply them to particulars, and of course the situation has changed since that time in view of the fact that the Soviet Union is now a large purveyor of arms in that area.

Q. Would the consultations you were talking about be of the kind that took place before the Korean War or at the time the Korean War occurred with congressional leaders, or are you speaking of some other kind of consultations with Congress?

A. Well, I thought I coupled two words—I thought I said consultation and approval, although possibly if Congress was not in session and an emergency arose then there might be consultations alone. But I would think, in the light of what the President has said in the past, that he would not normally expect to use the armed forces of the United States in the area where there has been no congressional approval given either through a resolution or through a treaty.

Q. Mr. Secretary, does this Government believe that the shipment of some small arms to Israel by other countries would contribute to the stability of the area?

A. It might do so. That is a difficult question to answer in the abstract, but certainly the United States has no view to the contrary which would lead it to interpose any objections.

"Problems of Leninism"

Q. Mr. Secretary, it has been indicated to us in the past you regarded Stalin's Problems of Leninism *as one of the basic texts in Soviet policy. I wonder if recent events would lead you to subscribe to that in the light of recent events.*

A. I still have it on my desk both here and at my house because, in so far as I am aware, the Soviets, while they have attempted to dis much of Stalin's program and many of his have not themselves come up with any substi There is this to be observed—that the portio Stalin's rule which is apparently being most orously disavowed is, roughly speaking, the 20 years. The *Problems of Leninism* runs as I recall—to 1939, and most of the book emb statements, speeches, etc., made by Stalin pri 1937. It may be, therefore, that the greater of that book will be preserved. Certainly, I think one is justified in assuming that it all go, particularly as the book purports in large to be a statement of Lenin's doctrine.

Lenin wrote so voluminously that one delve into his books and arrive at almost any clusion you wish by picking and choosing. S picked and chose, but much of the book is a qu tion from or an elucidation of Lenin's writi Therefore, I think it is not possible yet to conc that that volume, or the greater part of it, not be preserved as a working model for the C munists.

Q. Mr. Secretary, has this Government been able to get hold of the text or a summar the secret Khrushchev speech or any party inst tions on which you perhaps based your orig statements?

A. We have not as yet been able to get a text or written excerpts from it. We do thinl have, through indirection, a pretty good ide to what was said there. But obviously it is complete because it was a very long speech the recollections which we are able to draw are secondhand and somewhat fragmentary.

Q. Mr. Secretary, about Premier Nasser's st ment, how do you regard Premier Nasser's st ment in the New York Times *that he still weighing the Soviet offer to build the Aswan d secondly, are you aware of a change in hea Egypt in making a prompt start on the dam*

A. In so far as I am aware, there is no prog for making a prompt start, and, indeed, som the preconditions to a start are still under cussion.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in reply to an earlier q tion you said that you thought the President w want congressional approval by either a resolu or a treaty in order to use forces in some for area—

A. In the absence of an emergency in which national interest was involved, and there sn't time to get congressional action.

Q. I would like to ask a question. Do you have y plan or does the President have a plan to ask ngress for such a resolution applying to the iddle East or, alternatively, do you know of any ergency which might require action in the ab-ce of congressional approval?

A. I will answer those questions in reverse order cause it is easier. The first is that we do not ow of any such emergency, and since we do not ow of it we do not have any present plans to seek ngressional action.

Q. Mr. Secretary, earlier you said, I believe, in swer to a question that Israel's request for arms s not been turned down. Has the United States cided to meet this request on the part of Israel?

A. No, it has not made an affirmative decision.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the basis of what you said garding Stalin's writings on Problems of Lenin-n, *are you implying there is primarily a change methodology in the Soviet administration and, so, could not a change of methodology, willingly unwillingly, lead to a change of substance in ir policies?*

A. Yes, I believe so, and that is the basis for the pe which I expressed in the next-to-last sentence the statement which I read to you.

5. Policy Toward Indonesia

Q. Mr. Secretary, with respect to the friction be-een the Netherlands and the United States, uld you answer these two questions: A Christian ience Monitor *editorial recently suggested that e United States should be careful not to take over nomic responsibilities in Indonesia where the therlands is forced to leave off, and the second estion is this: There is a growing sentiment in e Netherlands that the neutrality of the United ates regarding Netherlands New Guinea is about be over. Could you comment on that one?*

A. Well, as far as economic assistance is con-rned, the United States has no desire or intention taking over the Dutch industrial position in Indonesia, if that is the subject of your question. Indonesia was a colony, and there was a very large amount of Netherlands capital which was in there. There is no desire or purpose on the part of the United States, governmentally or through encouraging private business, to take over that dominant economic position which the Dutch enjoyed.

We are giving a certain amount of economic assistance to Indonesia. Just before I was there we signed a Public Law 480 arrangement with Indonesia which involved approximately $95 million worth of agricultural surplus goods.[5] So we are sympathetic to assisting Indonesia where it desires such assistance. But certainly we do not expect to take over the Dutch commercial position in Indonesia.

I think there were two parts of that question. I have forgotten what the second part was.

Q. It concerned Netherlands New Guinea. So far the United States delegation to the United Nations, at least in recent years, has taken a position of absolute neutrality. Some fears are being expressed that is no longer the case.

A. We expect to continue to take a position of neutrality because that is our general policy with relation to these highly controversial matters which involve countries both of whom are friends and where we ourselves are not directly involved.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what does the administration expect Congress will do on long-range foreign aid programs? Are you doing anything about it—trying to sell the idea?

A. Yes, I am doing a good deal publicly and privately. You will find I made two public speeches of a nationwide character, within the last 6 weeks I think, which dealt with that subject.[6] I emphasized it in my appearances before the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees after I returned, and I have talked privately to a number of Senators and Congressmen about it. My belief is that there will be congressional action in this respect which will enable us to go forward on long-range projects with confidence.

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[5] BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1956, p. 469.

[6] *Ibid.*, Mar. 5, 1956, p. 363, and Apr. 2, 1956, p. 539.

The Foundations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy [1]

This coming Wednesday it will be exactly 7 years since that April 4, 1949, when the representatives of 12 nations gathered in Washington to sign the North Atlantic Treaty. It is fitting that we pause on this occasion to see what progress we have made and to look forward to some of the problems facing the Atlantic community.

It is particularly fitting that this symposium be held here in Norfolk. Your city is one of the first to which our ancestors came from across the Atlantic 300 years ago. Today Norfolk may be described as one of the capitals of the Atlantic community, since one of NATO's two major integrated command systems is located here. The other is the NATO headquarters in Paris. Just 2 weeks ago I had a chance to talk over the situation in Europe with General [Alfred M.] Gruenther, the Supreme Commander for Europe stationed in Paris, and I look forward today to renewing my long acquaintance with Admiral [Jerauld] Wright, the distinguished Supreme Allied Commander in the Atlantic.

We in Washington feel special gratitude to the College of William and Mary and to the Norfolk Chamber of Commerce for your sponsorship of these meetings—the one last August and the one beginning today—on the organization and purposes of NATO. Through this kind of discussion and study we will all better understand one of our country's most important activities in the international field. By your example you can help other Americans appreciate the significance of our Atlantic alliance.

[1] Address made at a symposium on NATO sponsored by the College of William and Mary and the Norfolk Chamber of Commerce at Norfolk, Va., on Apr. 2 (press release 168).

This symposium is an important step in th direction, and I am honored that you asked ı to introduce your valuable discussions. Rath than dwell on the general outline of NATO's c ganization and development, with which we a fairly well acquainted, we might talk about soı of the principles and concepts which lie behi the North Atlantic Treaty and some of the reaso why NATO has become a vital force in wor affairs.

It is important that we keep in mind the fundamental facts about our Atlantic allianc We will then be better able to meet some of tl questions we have been hearing recently abo NATO. And it is worth remembering that muc of the talk about NATO comes from greater publ interest and a wider knowledge about our securit problems. This is all to the good and in ou national interest.

All of us are familiar with some of the doub and questions raised during the last few month Some people complain that the United States devoting a great deal of money and manpower t protecting Europe and is not getting enough i return. Others argue that NATO—and in fact th whole concept of collective security—is bein rendered obsolete by the development of the hy drogen bomb and other weapons of massive de struction. Still others suggest that the recen shift in Soviet tactics has greatly lessened th danger of war and therefore reduced the need fo programs and relationships which have develope through NATO.

In my opinion, all these doubts and question have their roots in misconceptions about the prem ises of the Atlantic alliance and about the tru character of the international situation now con

uting this country. The best way to clear up se misconceptions is to take a good look at ro's background—to review some of the basic siderations which led to its formation and ich make it so valuable today.

NATO has not arisen from a single foundation but her from several firm-bedded foundations. e main building blocks of NATO are three: the areness of a common heritage, the presence of mmon danger, and a common determination to ist it. These three elements have blended to vide a solid basis for the most extensive and st powerful association of free peoples that tory has ever known.

ommon Heritage

t is difficult to overestimate the importance of at we might call the "human" foundations of TO. By this, I refer to the multiplicity of spirit-, cultural, and personal ties that link the North antic peoples. We should always remember t NATO did not create the Atlantic community. ther, it was the fact that a community already sted which made NATO possible. The common itage underlying NATO began nearly 500 years with the voyages of discovery and explora-, and the passing centuries have steadily ntened the attachment of North America to rope. Let me give you a few examples.

According to the 1950 census, there were more n 33 million people living in the United States either were born abroad or had parents born oad. Of this number, nearly half came from 14 other NATO countries. Of the remainder of population, an even larger percentage can ce their ancestry back to one of the NATO ions.

We Americans have developed over the years a itical and constitutional structure that is uliarly our own. But its basic principles, in-ling representative government, restraints on ernmental authority, and guaranties of human property rights, had European origins. Most our European allies, despite varying political ictures, still govern themselves under these ic principles. In simple terms, we and our al-share a devotion to the concepts of human edom and political liberty. These concepts are it set the free nations apart in the world today. look at the content of our educational pro-ms shows even more concretely our common heritage with Western and Southern Europe. Here at William and Mary, the second oldest university in the country and one of our best, we find as in other American universities numerous studies in literature, science, art, and the social sciences. If we forget for a moment the portion of this accumulated knowledge that has been produced by the minds and hands of our own countrymen, we will quickly recognize that the greatest part of the remainder has come from the NATO countries of Europe. Our whole culture is an Atlantic culture.

It would be possible to offer many additional examples, but those I have given are sufficient to illustrate my thesis that the Atlantic community was a living reality long before the relationship was formalized by intergovernmental organizations. Perhaps the most vivid demonstration of this community relationship was provided by our experience in the First and Second World Wars. In both instances the American people, after trying to avoid involvement in military hostilities, discovered painfully that the fate of Europe was indissolubly linked with our own. The bonds of blood, friendship, and tradition are not easily broken.

A Common Danger

In the period after 1945, another crisis arose. This danger threatened every one of the Atlantic nations. The Nazi dream of world empire was shattered, but in the process a large part of the Eurasian land mass fell into the hands of the ruthless Communist dictatorship. Within a matter of months, Western hopes that the Soviet Union would restore freedom to the areas occupied by its armies and would cooperate in the establishing of a lasting peace were dashed.

Not only did the Soviet rulers make clear their determination to hold fast to their conquests and to exploit the newly acquired resources and peoples for the aggrandizement of Soviet power, but they made equally clear their intention to continue the expansion of Communist power into other areas. Moreover, it was evident that the Communist bloc possessed powerful capabilities for carrying out these intentions. The external pressures of Soviet imperialism were reinforced by the internal pressures exerted by pro-Communist elements within free societies. Guns were supplemented by propaganda. The specter of political chaos was magnified by the risk of economic col-

lapse. Communism attacked on all fronts at the same time. Its purpose was to destroy every vestige of resistance to a Communist-dominated world. The situation in 1948 and 1949 was desperate. Something had to be done.

A Common Response

The common civilization of the Atlantic community was challenged by a common danger, and this inspired a common response. The Atlantic nations cooperated in various ways to meet the danger. Through the Marshall plan and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, they labored to restore Western Europe's economic health and thereby lay a basis for political stability. Through the Brussels Treaty, five European nations began the construction of a common defense system. But it was painfully evident that even the utmost toil and sacrifice on the part of the Brussels Treaty powers would not be adequate to produce defenses capable of holding the Soviet colossus in check. Just as North American support had proved necessary to European economic recovery, so did North American participation prove essential to an effective defense arrangement. The North Atlantic Treaty was the result.

The North Atlantic Treaty was negotiated by the United States and the 11 other original signatories: Great Britain, Canada, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Portugal, and Italy. Since that time Greece, Turkey, and most recently the Federal Republic of Germany have acceded to the treaty, making a total of 15 members. The main deterrent to aggression, completely apart from the military strength which was later assembled, lay in the unity of purpose which the treaty demonstrated. Secretary Dulles, then a member of the United States delegation to the United Nations, clearly set forth this view when, during the hearings on the ratification of the treaty, he said:

> The treaty takes away from an aggressor one choice that he used to have: the choice of making war on the parties singly, one by one. If he chooses to fight one party to this pact, he must fight them all, and all at the same time.

The Principle of Collective Security

It is clear that the common danger confronting the Atlantic nations provided the immediate stimulus for NATO. But the existence of a common danger is only a part of the story. E more important is the fact that the Atlantic p ers, *in combination*, possess a capacity for sponding to this danger far greater than any of them possesses alone. Of all the tangible intangible elements that have joined together produce NATO, the most significant is the sim fact that Western Europe and Northern Amer need each other—that an amalgamation of th human and material resources is vital to the saf and well-being of both.

Since the end of World War II, there has b little question in the minds of most Europe about the need for American cooperation and s port. Most of them have found it painfully vious that collective security is the only real curity available. But among Americans the n for Europe's cooperation and support is sometin less clearly understood. Old-style isolationi has virtually died out in America, but there still a number of our people who are inclined doubt that we get much out of collective secur arrangements and who suspect that the Unit States protects and assists others while receivi little or nothing in return. This is a fallacy a probably engenders more mistaken thinking ab foreign policy than any other single misconc tion. I think it would be useful, therefore, examine the strategic value of the combination NATO resources primarily from the standpoint America's own national self-interests.

Stripped to its essence, the justification for N is a simple exercise in elementary arithmet North America and free Europe combined n produce about 70 percent of the world's ma factured goods, while the entire Soviet bloc, cluding China, produces only about 20 perce On the other hand, Soviet control of the territo and resources of Western Europe would give Soviet bloc 50 percent of the total world's ind trial production, as against North America's percent. The Atlantic nations, so long as th are joined together, are in a position to maint decisive industrial superiority over the Soviet b for an indefinite period of years. Soviet domi tion of Western Europe would rapidly shift industrial balance to the Communist side.

One of our great deficiencies in the global str gle with communism is manpower. The popu tion of the Communist bloc outnumbers the Ame can population by a margin of 5 to 1. But w free Europe and North America joined togeth

s margin is reduced to approximately 2 to 1. e extent to which the manpower of our ropean allies supplements the manpower of the ited States is vividly illustrated by the armed ces of the two areas. The United States has ut 3 million men under arms. Our NATO allies now adding another 3½ million to the total itary manpower available for free-world de- se. We do not know exactly how many men Communist countries have under arms, but a r estimate would be about 10¼ million.

Our European allies also contribute substantial and air strength, as well as naval and air bases, he common defense. There are now more than NATO air bases in the European area. These es are indispensable for defense and retaliation inst aggression. We should note that our NATO es have not only contributed the land for these es but have paid most of the cost of their struction.

Not the least of free Europe's potential contribu- ns to the strength and well-being of the Atlantic mmunity is Europe's scientific and technological acity. It is worth recalling the nationalities the scientists who contributed to the original elopment of the atomic bomb. The list reads nost like a NATO rollcall; for example, Fermi of ly, Bohr of Denmark, Cockcroft of England.

Finally, I think it is time to lay at rest the myth t the cost of the NATO program rests primarily on the shoulders of the American taxpayer. It true that our defense expenditures are much ater than those of other countries, but it is also e that our national income is nearly three times great as that of all the other NATO nations com- ed. Americans know that the United States made very large contributions to the equipment l training of the military forces of our European es. But relatively few Americans realize that se allies are now spending $6 from their own lget to match every dollar's worth of U.S. assis- ce they receive from us. All told, they are con- buting about $12 billion a year to the common fense program. And $12 billion "ain't hay," n in this age of astronomical budgets. It is a y substantial contribution to the common fense.

These are some of the facts which explain the gin of the North Atlantic Treaty and why it mportant to us. And just as significant as the ies of commitments which the member nations have given to assist one another in the event of aggression is the wide range of collective activity in which they are already engaged. While most of this activity is directed toward the maintenance and improvement of military defense, there have been significant advances toward closer political and cultural cooperation as well.

NATO, with its 15 members, is a cornerstone of our foreign policy, linking the power of North America with that of Western and Southern Europe. We have other important alliances. In this hemisphere we have the Organization of American States, the oldest regional system in the world, and the Rio Pact, which bind us together with 20 Latin American Republics for cooperation and joint defense. In Asia we are members of SEATO, still a new organization, which is steadily gathering strength. We have important bilateral pacts with the Republic of China, Korea, the Philippines, Japan, and Spain, and we have a trilateral security treaty with Australia and New Zealand. The U.S. today is fortified by security arrangements with more than 40 countries. Although we are not members of the Baghdad Pact, which is the very newest defense organization, including Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom, we have a deep interest in its success. The United States has entered into these defense alliances to meet the danger we and our friends face in many parts of the world. Our ability to meet this danger is much more powerful than it was even a few years ago. But the danger has not significantly abated.

Shift in Soviet Tactics

This is true even though during the last year we have witnessed what appears to be a rather striking shift in Soviet tactics. While the Communist leaders have always employed a variety of techniques to pursue their objective of world domination, up until recently they had relied largely on the use or threatened use of military force. As a result of the increasing unity and strength of free nations, there are indications that they have now reached a better appreciation of the suicidal risks of warfare and are beginning to place much more emphasis on the use of political, economic, and psychological techniques in the unending Communist struggle against the free world.

There is a lot we still do not know about what is going on in the Soviet Union. We do not know whether they are changing their policies. In certain vital areas like the unification of Germany, they appear to have made no change. On the other hand, they appear to be trying to change their approach and diplomatic methods, particularly as they deal with South Asia and the Near East. They seem to be stepping up their overtures toward Western Europe. Toward Japan, however, they are still using the heavy hand and their old technique of diplomatic coercion. They have not in the slightest relaxed their control over the satellite nations.

The Stalin story is currently the most spectacular example of the Soviet enigma. We know that Stalin's disciples and collaborators are now blackening his name. *Pravda*, on March the 28th, told the world that Stalin lacked personal modesty, that he did not cut short the glorifications and praises addressed to him, and that all this violated the principles of Marx and Lenin, who, according to *Pravda*, taught that the people must have the right to elect their responsible leaders.

There are a lot of good reasons why the present Soviet rulers would want to push Stalin off his pedestal. They may well have found it necessary to revitalize the political and economic machinery of the Soviet Union, and by attacking Stalin they may hope to shock the Communist Party and the people of the Soviet Union into an awareness that a new response is expected, that the people on down the line in the Soviet hierarchy must take on greater initiative and responsibility. They probably want to stimulate the productive and creative abilities of Soviet engineers, scientists, and artists, who were never sure that Stalin might not change the line and put them out of business. And we cannot forget that the men in Moscow probably feared the wrath of Stalin, knowing what they knew about the purges and the secret police. They may also feel this new line will be appealing to non-Communists and especially to socialists abroad, and that it will get them out from under the domineering rigidities of Stalin's foreign policy.

Time will tell us more about the "cult of the individual" and about the adjustments going on in Russia.

It would be foolhardy, however, to assume that the Communists have changed their objective. We have almost no evidence that the basic totalitari features of the Soviet state have changed in a way. Nevertheless, we can hope that they ha decided to reduce their emphasis on milita strength and threat of force as major instrumen of policy. Such a shift would be an advantageo development from the standpoint of the Unit States and other free nations. The objective U.S. policy is to achieve in peace the blessings liberty, and thus any genuine indication that t danger of armed Communist aggression has d minished would be welcome. We have no reas to doubt the fundamental capacity of free societi to compete with communism by peaceful mean At the same time, there are two things we shou keep firmly in mind when we try to figure o where we stand today.

Communist Capability for Aggression

First, we should remember that the Communi bloc still retains a tremendous *capability* for mil tary aggression. It has a substantial superiorit in military manpower. It is rapidly developin more modern weapons and a modern technolog including an ominous atomic potential. Th Communists possess the capacity to engage in ne military adventures at any time, either on a ge eral or local scale. As long as this *capacity* exist it is obvious that the United States and other fre nations must be watchful of their freedom an safety.

Second, even if the Communists remain cautio about military adventures, we cannot afford to di count the enormous stakes involved in the bitte political and economic contest which they are d termined to continue waging against the fre world. In terms of the ultimate fate of free civili zation, this new strategy is no less dangerous tha the old. In some ways, it is even more difficult t combat, because it is more subtle, more comple and geared to a longer time period. We shoul not make the fatal mistake of assuming that seeming Communist de-emphasis of militar methods of conquest will allow us to take a holida from the struggle for freedom. On the contrar this struggle may become more intense and wil certainly tax our imagination, energy, and patienc to the utmost. Our ability to achieve success i this struggle, like our ability to maintain an ade quate defense posture, will depend in large measur upon our cooperation with other free nation The principle of collective security is as valid to

ay in the political field as it ever was in the mili-
ry field.

I think it is clear that the NATO countries have no
ason to de-emphasize their defense programs.
tually, these very programs have been a princi-
l factor in bringing about the recent shift in
viet tactics. Our current situation reminds me
a story I once heard about a highway that went
rough a mountain village. There was a very
gh cliff at a sharp turn in the highway, and quite
number of travelers failed to make it. There
s considerable agitation for a project to build a
ce at this point, and this was eventually done.
fter several years had gone by, however, a
aveler happened to be passing through the vil-
ge and noticed that the fence had been removed.
e stopped to ask one of the natives about it and
ceived a very simple explanation. "We kept the
nce there for about 3 years," the old fellow said,
ut nobody fell off the cliff any more, so we took
down."

aintaining Our Guard

I feel sure that both the United States and its
ies recognize that this is no time to take down
r fences. We must maintain our guard as long
a threat exists. Even though we hope that the
viet rulers have come to recognize the horrors of
dern warfare, we have no guaranty that they
ll indefinitely desist from military adventures,
ecially if they are tempted by military weak-
sses in neighboring nations.

As I said in the beginning of this discussion, this
amination of NATO's background will help us to
ve positive answers to any of the doubts or ques-
ns raised about the NATO relationship. NATO
mains vital to the interests of Americans and
ropeans alike. The onrush of modern tech-
logy has not lessened the need for collective
ength and collective effort. The new wind
owing from Moscow remains chilly. We must
ways be prepared for stormy weather.

To those who express concern about the oc-
sional differences of opinion among our NATO
ies, I would like to say this. I have never
own even a closely knit family that did not
ve an occasional quarrel. There will be dis-
reement among individuals and nations as long
independent thinking survives, and independ-
ce of thought is one of the things we Americans
d our allies are most determined to preserve.
is true, of course, that frictions and disagree-
ments could weaken the effectiveness of an alliance. We must do everything we can to minimize and resolve differences of this kind, but we must never exaggerate their importance. Even the most important differences among the Atlantic nations cannot begin to match the significance of our common interest in peace and survival.

I do not propose at this time to speculate about the direction which NATO may take in future years. You here today, with your interest and expert knowledge about NATO, are well qualified to do this. I will confine myself, in conclusion, to expressing my deep conviction that the Atlantic relationship, whatever the fluctuations of circumstance, will endure and grow. NATO's foundations are solid, and its accomplishments are substantial. I know that you here in Norfolk will continue your efforts to help it grow even stronger.

NATO Fellowship Awarded to American Woman

The Department of State announced on April 4 (press release 173) that M. Margaret Ball, professor of political science, Wellesley College, Wellesley, Mass., is the U.S. winner of one of the 11 NATO research fellowships offered by the North Atlantic Council. Simultaneous announcement of the award was made at NATO headquarters in Paris.

The NATO Fellowship and Scholarship Program was announced last July in implementation of article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which provides for cooperation in nonmilitary fields. It is designed to promote the study of historical, political, constitutional, legal, social, cultural, linguistic, economic, and strategic problems which will reveal the common heritage and historical experience of the Atlantic countries, as well as the present needs and future development of the North Atlantic area considered as a community. Candidates for these first awards to be made under the program were selected by a committee under the chairmanship of Ambassador L. D. Wilgress, Canadian Permanent Representative to NATO, who is also chairman of the NATO Committee on Information and Cultural Relations. Other members of the committee were James B. Conant, U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany and formerly president of Harvard University; Robert Marjolin, professor at Nancy University and formerly Secretary-General of the Organiza-

tion for European Economic Cooperation; Alberto Tarchiani, formerly Italian Ambassador to the United States; and H. U. Willink, master of Magdalene College, Cambridge, and formerly vice-chancellor of Cambridge University. The Conference Board of Associated Research Councils assisted the Department in recommending a panel of American candidates to be considered by the selection committee.

Miss Ball's research will be on the general subject of NATO and the Western European union movement. She expects to leave this coming autumn to spend the 4-month period of the fellowship in London, Paris, Bonn, and other European capitals.

U.S., Netherlands Begin Negotiation of Air Transport Agreement

Press release 176 dated April 5

The Governments of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States began negotiation of an air transport agreement in Washington on April 5.

The chairman of the delegation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands is Dr. J. J. Spanjaard, Director of the Netherlands Department of Civil Aviation. The delegation also includes representatives of the Governments of Surinam and of the Netherlands Antilles. The opening session was also attended by the Netherlands Ambassador to the United States, Dr. J. H. van Roijen.

Chairman of the U.S. delegation is Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. The vice chairman is Harmar Denny, member of the Civil Aeronautics Board. The U.S. delegation is composed of officials from the Department of State and the Civil Aeronautics Board.

There has never been a bilateral air transport agreement between the United States and the Netherlands. At present Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM) operates from Amsterdam to New York and from Curaçao to Miami under permits granted directly to the airline by the U.S. Government. Similarly, Pan American Airways operates from New York to Amsterdam and beyond to Frankfort, Germany, from New York to Surinam and beyond, and from New York and Miami to Curaçao and beyond under permits granted direct to the airline by the Government of the Kingdo of the Netherlands.

Transfer of Escapee Program to Department of State

White House press release dated March 24

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

President Eisenhower on March 24 issued a Executive order authorizing the Secretary State to carry out the functions pertaining to tl United States Escapee Program through any of cer or agency of the Department of State.[1] It contemplated that this program, which is pre ently being administered by the International C operation Administration, will be transferred the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs i the Department of State. The Escapee Progra is designed to provide immediate assistance f people fleeing from behind the Iron Curtain an for their eventual reestablishment in Europe o overseas. During its 4 years of operation th program has assisted nearly 25,000 persons t resettle in the free world.

The contemplated transfer will consolidate thi humanitarian program with the related refuge functions already administered by the Bureau o Security and Consular Affairs. The Deputy Ad ministrator of the Bureau, who is responsible fo the administration of the Refugee Relief Program will also direct the Escapee Program and repre sent the United States on the Intergovernmenta Committee for European Migration.

Within the International Cooperation Admin istration the Office of the Deputy Director fo Refugees, Migration, and Voluntary Assistanc has been abolished. Those functions in this fiel which remain the responsibility of the Director o the International Cooperation Administratio have been transferred to the Office of the Deput Director for Technical Services. These function are concerned with registration of and relation ships with U.S. voluntary agencies which partici pate in international relief and rehabilitation proj

[1] For an article on the Escapee Program by Mrs. Dorothy D. Houghton, see BULLETIN of Mar. 14, 1955, p. 415.

, and with staff support for the Advisory Com-
ee on Voluntary Foreign Aid.

his change was recommended by a joint State–
task force studying organizational relation-
s concerning these activities. The proposed
sfer has the approval of the Secretary of State
the full concurrence of John B. Hollister,
ctor of the International Cooperation Admin-
ation.

CUTIVE ORDER 10663 [2]

ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESCAPEE PROGRAM

virtue of the authority vested in me by the Mutual
rity Act of 1954 (68 Stat. 832), as amended, includ-
articularly sections 521 and 525 thereof, it is ordered
llows:

c. 1. Section 104 of Executive Order No. 10610
ay 9, 1955 (20 F. R. 3181),[3] is hereby amended by
ng at the end thereof a new subsection (c) reading as
ws:

c) The Secretary of State may carry out the func-
now financed pursuant to section 405 (d) of the
al Security Act of 1954, as amended, through any
r or agency of the Department of State."

c. 2. There is hereby terminated the duty of the
ctor of the International Cooperation Administration
er section 103 (c) of Executive Order No. 10575 of
mber 6, 1954 (19 F. R. 7251),[4] as affected by Execu-
Order No. 10610) to assist the Secretary of State
rmulating and presenting the policy of the United
s with respect to the assistance programs of the Inter-
nmental Committee for European Migration, the
ed Nations Refugee Fund, and the United Nations
lren's Fund.

c. 3. The Secretary of State is hereby authorized
ansfer or assign to any agency or agencies of the
rtment of State such offices, officers, and personnel,
so much of the property and records, of the Inter-
nal Cooperation Administration as he may deem
ssary for the administration by the said agency or
cies of the functions referred to in section 104 (c)
ecutive Order No. 10610, as amended by this order.

c. 4. This order shall become effective on the first
of the first month commencing after the date hereof.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

WHITE HOUSE,
March 24, 1956.

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1 *Fed. Reg.* 1845.
2 BULLETIN of May 30, 1955, p. 889.
3 *Ibid.*, Dec. 13, 1954, p. 914.

Foreign Service Institute Advisory Committee

Press release 177 dated April 6

The Department of State announced on April 6 the appointment of the following persons to serve as members of an advisory committee to the Foreign Service Institute:

Mrs. Frances P. Bolton, U. S. House of Representatives
Ellsworth Bunker, President, The American National Red Cross
Robert D. Calkins, President, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.
Robert Cutler, Director, Old Colony Trust, Boston, Mass.
Clyde K. Kluckhohn, Director, Laboratory of Social Sciences, Harvard University
William L. Langer, Chairman, Committee on Regional Studies, Harvard University
Charles E. Saltzman, Henry Sears & Company, New York, N.Y.
Henry M. Wriston, Director, The American Assembly, Columbia University

The Foreign Service Institute has statutory responsibility for training in the Department of State. It is concerned with indoctrination and training of newly commissioned Foreign Service officers in the intricacies of a diplomatic and consular career and also with the responsibility of preparing officers in mid-career for positions of greater importance in the Service. Additionally, the Institute provides training in many languages, conducts courses in economics and administration, and is responsible for university assignments in pursuit of greater proficiency in such areas as political science, management, and economics. It also furnishes to other officers and employees of the Government such training in the field of foreign relations as is needed.

The committee will meet periodically for the purpose of advising the Director of the Institute on all phases of training.

Negotiations Concerning Debts of City of Berlin

Press release 169 dated April 3

Final arrangements have now been completed to permit the opening of negotiations for the settlement of the external debts owed by the City of Berlin and by public utility enterprises owned or controlled by Berlin.

These arrangements amplify the agreement referred to in the Department of State's press release 8 of January 5, 1956,[1] which lifted the restrictions of article 5 (5) of the Agreement on German External Debts of February 27, 1953,[2] on the settlement of the Berlin external debts. The arrangements were made in similar exchanges of notes between the United States, British, and French Embassies at Bonn and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany. The text of the note sent by the United States Embassy to the Foreign Ministry and an unofficial translation of the reply follow.

Note From U.S. Embassy at Bonn

No. 386

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to refer to the Ministry's note number 507–519–746–71284/55 of the 13th of August, 1955, and to the Embassy's note number 94 of August 29, 1955 on the subject of the settlement of the debts of the City of Berlin and of the Berlin public utility enterprises.

In the opinion of the United States Government, the exchange of notes referred to constitutes the agreement provided for in Article 5 (5) of the London Debt Agreement that negotiations on the settlement of these debts are now considered to be practicable. The Ministry has now raised informally with the British, French and American Embassies the question of the form of the negotiations provided for in Article 5 (5).

The United States Government considers that, with the lifting of the exclusion provided in Article 5 (5), the terms of the London Debt Agreement and the appropriate annexes are applicable to the settlement of the external debts of the City of Berlin and of the Berlin public utility enterprises; and in particular, that the external bonded debts of the City of Berlin fall under Annex I, the bonded debts of the public utilities under Annex II and the miscellaneous debts of the City and of the public utilities, under Annex IV. It, therefore, believes that no further intergovernmental conference is required, but that negotiations may now be undertaken between the debtors and the creditor representatives.

The question of the actual terms of settlem of these debts will naturally be one of the princi objects of the proposed negotiations. The Uni States Government believes that the text of Agreement and the annexes provides ample fl bility to take into account the special politi and economic position of Berlin.

If the Federal Government is in agreem with the views presented above, it is sugges that this note, the identical notes from the Brit and French Embassies and the replies of the F eral Ministry for Foreign Affairs constitute interpretation of the London Debt Agreement, that certified copies of these notes be deposi with the Government of the United Kingdom.

The Embassy of the United States of Amer avails itself of this opportunity to renew to Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs the ass ance of its highest consideration.

American Embassy, *Bonn, Bad Godesberg, F ruary 29, 1956.*

Note Verbale From German Foreign Ministry

507–519–746–5–5–73835/5

The Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs l the honor to acknowledge to the Embassy of t United States of America the receipt of its N Verbale No. 386 of February 29, 1956 concerni the debts of the City of Berlin and of the Ber public utility enterprises and to reply as follo with reference to the Note Verbale of the Fede Ministry for Foreign Affairs of August 13, 195 507–519–746–71284/55—and to the Note of t Embassy of the United States of America of A gust 29, 1955—No. 94—concerning the same su ject:

In the opinion of the Government of the Fede Republic of Germany the exchange of notes me tioned above constitutes the agreement provid for in Article 5 (5) of the London Debt Agr ment that negotiations on the settlement of th debts are now considered to be expedient. T Embassy of the United States of America, t Royal British Embassy and the French Embas have in the meantime informally discussed wi the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs the qu tion of the form in which the negotiations p vided for in Article 5 (5) are to take place.

The Government of the Federal Republic of G many considers that, after the lifting of the def ment provided by Article 5 (5), the terms of t London Debt Agreement and the appropriate a

[1] Bulletin of Jan. 16, 1956, p. 93.
[2] S. Exec. D, 83d Cong., 1st sess.

xes are applicable to the settlement of the ex-
nal debts of the City of Berlin and of the Berlin
blic utility enterprises. It is, in particular, of
opinion that the external bonded debts of the
y of Berlin are to be dealt with under Annex I,
bonded debts of the public utilities under An-
x II, and that the miscellaneous debts of the City
Berlin and the Berlin public enterprises come
ler Annex IV. It, therefore, believes that no
ther intergovernmental conference is required,
l that negotiations can now be opened between
debtors and the creditor representatives.

The question of the actual terms of settlement of
se debts will naturally be one of the principal
jects of the proposed negotiations. The Gov-
ment of the Federal Republic of Germany be-
es that the text of the Agreement and its
nexes provides an ample margin to take into
ount the special political and economic position
Berlin.

The Government of the Federal Republic of
many is in agreement with the opinion of the
ernment of the United States of America that
three identical notes of the United States Em-
sy, the Royal British Embassy and the French
bassy, dated February 29, 1956, and this Note
well as the two identical notes to the Royal
ish Embassy and the French Embassy con-
ute an interpretation of the London Debt
eement, and that certified copies of these Notes
uld be deposited with the Government of the
ted Kingdom.

he Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs avails
f of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy
e United States of America the assurance of
ighest consideration.

x, *March 2, 1956*

estion of Amending Proclamation iiting Dairy Imports

House press release dated March 21

e President announced on March 21 that the
lamation limiting imports of certain manu-
ured dairy products could not, on the basis of
United States Tariff Commission's recent
ed investigation, be amended to include cer-
imports of cheeses not now considered subject
e terms of the proclamation. The President
d with the majority of the Tariff Commission
that the amendments requested by the Department of Agriculture could be considered only after a full-scale investigation under section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended. The Tariff Commission's investigation of last year was made pursuant to subsection (d) of section 22, which provides only for the modification of existing proclamations when "changed circumstances" so require.

Proclamation 3019, which was issued on June 8, 1953,[1] established annual import quotas for certain manufactured dairy products, including specified types of cheeses. Some imports of Italian-type cheeses, either because of the ingredients they contain or because of the way in which they are packaged, have not been regarded by the Bureau of Customs as subject to Proclamation 3019. The Department of Agriculture has viewed these cheeses as indistinguishable from those admittedly covered by the proclamation and has sought to have such importations brought within the purview of the proclamation. On April 7, 1955, the President, pursuant to a request from the Department of Agriculture, directed the Tariff Commission to make a supplemental investigation pursuant to subsection (d) of section 22 to determine whether modification of Proclamation 3019 was warranted.[2]

The Tariff Commission reported its findings and conclusions to the President in July 1955.[3] The majority and minority of the Commission divided on a legal issue, namely, whether the requested amendments to the proclamation to include cheeses not now considered under restriction could be accomplished pursuant to subsection (d) of section 22, or whether such amendments should be the subject of a new, full-scale investigation under subsections (a) and (b) of section 22. The President requested the advice of the Attorney General on this question, and it was his opinion that the requested amendments should not be made on the basis of the limited investigation under subsection (d). This was also the view of the majority of the Tariff Commission. After reviewing the case further, the President concurred with the conclusion of the Tariff Commission majority.

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[1] BULLETIN of June 29, 1953, p. 919.

[2] *Ibid.*, May 16, 1955, p. 815.

[3] Copies of the Tariff Commission's report may be obtained from the U.S. Tariff Commission, Washington 25, D.C.

The advisability of requesting a new investigation under subsections (a) and (b) of section 22 is currently under study in the Department of Agriculture.

Increased Duty on Imports of Canned Tuna in Brine

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

White House press release dated March 17

The President on March 16 issued a proclamation providing that the duty on imports of tuna canned in brine shall automatically increase from 12½ percent to 25 percent ad valorem whenever in any year such imports exceed 20 percent of the previous year's U.S. pack of canned tuna of all varieties.

The proclamation gives effect to an exchange of notes with Iceland[1] which withdraws tuna canned in brine from the 1943 trade agreement with that country and to an invocation of the right reserved by the United States in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to increase the duty on tuna canned in brine.

In any calendar year the increased duty would apply only to those imports in excess of the stated 20 percent and only for the remainder of that year. Imports in any year up to the 20 percent breakpoint would be subject to the 12½ percent ad valorem rate. Because the President's proclamation will become effective on April 14, 1956, it provides that the increased rate of duty will apply this year if and when imports of tuna canned in brine after the April 14 date exceed 15 percent of last year's domestic pack of canned tuna.

In the 1943 trade agreement with Iceland, the United States reduced from 25 percent ad valorem to 12½ percent ad valorem the duty on certain miscellaneous canned fish, including such fish canned in brine, dutiable under tariff paragraph 718 (b) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended. This concession was intended primarily to cover certain speciality canned fish produced in Iceland. When tuna canned in brine became an article of international trade after the war, United States imports of this product were classified as miscellaneous canned fish under tariff paragraph 718 and subject to this reduced rate in the Icela agreement. The withdrawal of this item from Icelandic agreement in no way affects the cession granted on other fish specialties of prim interest to Iceland.

In the 1955 trade agreement negotiations volving Japan's accession to the General Ag ment on Tariffs and Trade, the United St agreed not to increase the existing rate of percent ad valorem applying to imports of t canned in brine, subject to the reservation right to impose a higher rate of duty on imp in any calendar year in excess of 20 percen the domestic pack of canned tuna during the ceding year. This reservation has now been voked. Because annual imports of tuna can in brine are not at present amounting to 20 per of the domestic tuna pack, no immediate appl tion of the increased duty will follow upon President's action.

PROCLAMATION 3128[2]

TERMINATING IN PART THE ICELANDIC TR AGREEMENT PROCLAMATIONS AND SUP MENTING PROCLAMATION NO. 3105 OF JUL 1955

1. WHEREAS, under authority of section 350(a) of Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, the President on Au 27, 1943, entered into a trade agreement with the Re of Iceland, including two schedules annexed thereto Stat. 1078), and by proclamation of September 30, (57 Stat. 1075), he proclaimed the said trade agreem which proclamation has been supplemented by procla tion of October 22, 1943 (57 Stat. 1098);

2. WHEREAS item 718(b) of Schedule II of the trade agreement reads as follows:

United States Tariff Act of 1930 paragraph	Description of Article	Rate of Dut
718 (b)	Fish, prepared or preserved in any manner, when packed in air-tight containers weighing with their contents not more than fifteen pounds each (except fish packed in oil or in oil and other substances):	
	Any of the foregoing (except herring, smoked or kippered or in tomato sauce, packed in immediate containers weighing with their contents more than one pound each, and except salmon and anchovies)	12½% ad val

[1] Not printed.

[2] 21 *Fed. Reg.* 1793.

WHEREAS the Government of the United States and Government of Iceland by an exchange of notes dated ch 5 and 6, 1956, have agreed to the withdrawal, ctive April 14, 1956, of tuna from said item 718(b), the result that the said item shall thereafter read ollows:

ited ates f Act 1930 graph	Description of Article	Rate of Duty
b)	Fish, prepared or preserved in any manner, when packed in air-tight containers weighing with their contents not more than fifteen pounds each (except fish packed in oil or in oil and other substances; except herring, smoked or kippered or in tomato sauce, packed in immediate containers weighing with their contents more than one pound each; and except salmon, anchovies, and tuna)	12½% ad valorem

WHEREAS, under the authority of the said section a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, the President une 8, 1955, entered into a trade agreement providing the accession of Japan to the General Agreement on ffs and Trade,[3] which trade agreement consists of Protocol of Terms of Accession of Japan to the Gen- Agreement, including Schedule XX contained in An- A thereto, and by Proclamation No. 3105 of July 1955 (20 F. R. 5379),[4] he proclaimed the said trade ement, which proclamation was supplemented by a fication of August 22, 1955 from the President to the etary of the Treasury (20 F. R. 6211);[5]

WHEREAS item 718(b) in Part I of the said Schedule reads as follows:

ited ates f Act 1930 graph	Description of Article	Rate of Duty
)	Fish, prepared or preserved in any manner, when packed in air-tight containers weighing with their contents not more than 15 pounds each (except fish packed in oil or in oil and other substances):	
	Tuna	12½% ad val.
	NOTE: The United States reserves the right to increase the rate of duty on fish of the foregoing description which are entered in any calendar year in excess of an aggregate quantity equal to 20 per centum of the United States pack of canned tuna fish during the immediately preceding calendar year, as reported by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service.	

WHEREAS on March 16, 1956 the Government of the ed States notified the Executive Secretary to the TRACTING PARTIES to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade that it invoked the reservation contained in the note to the said item 718(b) set forth in the fifth recital of this proclamation, effective April 14, 1956; and

7. WHEREAS the first general note to the said Schedule XX specified in the fourth recital of this proclamation provides that the provisions of that schedule are subject to the following general note to Schedule XX to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, of October 30, 1947 (61 Stat. (pt. 5) A1362):

4. If any tariff quota provided for in this Schedule, other than those provided for in items 771, becomes effective after the beginning of a period specified as the quota year, the quantity of the quota product entitled to enter under the quota during the unexpired portion of the quota year shall be the annual quota quantity less 1/12 thereof for each full calendar month that has expired in such period:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes, including the said section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, do proclaim as follows:

Part I

In accordance with the exchange of notes specified in the third recital of this proclamation, I hereby terminate in part the proclamations of September 30, 1943, and October 22, 1943, referred to in the first recital of this proclamation, insofar as such proclamations apply to tuna provided for in the said item 718(b) set forth in the second recital of this proclamation, such termination to be effective at the close of business on April 14, 1956, with the result that the rate of duty specified in the said item 718(b) shall thereafter apply only to the articles provided for in the said item as set forth in the third recital of this proclamation.

Part II

In accordance with the notification specified in the sixth recital of this proclamation I hereby terminate in part, effective at the close of business on April 14, 1956, the said proclamation of July 22, 1955, and the said notification of August 22, 1955, referred to in the fourth recital, insofar as such proclamation and notification apply to tuna provided for in the said item 718(b) set forth in the fifth recital which are entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption in the calendar year 1956 after April 14, 1956 in excess of an aggregate quantity equal to 15 per centum of the United States pack of canned tuna during the calendar year 1955, as reported by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, and in any calendar year after 1956 in excess of an aggregate quantity equal to 20 per centum of the United States pack of canned tuna fish during the immediately preceding calendar year, as so reported, with the result that such tuna in excess of such 15 or 20 per centum of the United States pack shall be dutiable at 25 per centum ad valorem, the full rate provided for in paragraph 718(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (46 Stat. (pt. 1) 633).

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

ULLETIN of June 27, 1955, p. 1053.
bid., Aug. 8, 1955, p. 226.
bid., Sept. 5, 1955, p. 397.

DONE at the City of Washington this sixteenth day of March, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred [SEAL] and fifty-six, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eightieth.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

By the President:
HERBERT HOOVER, Jr.
Acting Secretary of State

U.S. Presents Atomic Energy Library to the United Nations

STATEMENT BY HENRY CABOT LODGE, JR. U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE U.N.[1]

U.S./U.N. press release 2379 dated March 28

When speaking of atomic energy, we have become accustomed to talking in terms of reactors and megatons, kilograms of fissionable materials, and millions of dollars for equipment and research. Today we are talking only of books—but books are the bedrock of scientific progress.

The library which the United States Government has the honor of presenting to the United Nations today contains 45 volumes of information on basic research in atomic energy as well as many thousands of articles and technical reports published in this country and abroad. There are also many thousands of cards which index and describe all the nonclassified literature of the Atomic Energy Commission. This library will be kept up to date by the Atomic Energy Commission as new material becomes available.

In a statement made on the floor of the General Assembly on November 5, 1954,[2] I announced that the United States was prepared to make available to other countries the vast amount of documentation on atomic energy that was already freely published—totaling more than 200,000 pages of information. I suggested that we would be able to give 10 libraries containing these documents to countries interested in using them.

Since that time, not 10 but more than 40 cou tries have requested these libraries; 33 have ready been presented, and the others are on th way. Several more have been given to regio and international organizations interested atomic energy development.

Our only request in return is that other operating nations send us their collections of ficial nonsecret papers to be placed in appropri libraries in the United States.

The United States program of using the at for man's betterment rather than for his destru tion has proceeded along two lines of action: ma ing facilities available and making informati available. As President Eisenhower has said, o purpose is to spark the creative and inventi skills, to put them to work for the betterment the conditions under which men must live. T President has also stressed that this must be joint effort—"a continued partnership of t world's best minds."

For these reasons, it is a pleasure for me tod to present to the United Nations Headquarters th library, symbolized by this one volume, for the u of the United Nations Secretariat and the del gations of member countries.

DESCRIPTION OF LIBRARY

U.S./U.N. press release 2380 dated March 28

This is a technical library of nonclassified dat on nuclear energy and its applications. It is comprehensive collection containing the equiv lent of about 300 feet of library shelving and w developed by the Technical Information Servic of the Atomic Energy Commission as one of th several Commission projects supporting the Pres dent's atoms-for-peace program. In it is to b found not only information unique to nuclear r actor technology and nuclear physics but also th recorded impact of atomic energy in such field as chemistry, metallurgy, ceramics, electronic biology, medicine, and agriculture.

The library, which weighs approximately 1,00 pounds, consists of about 10,000 Atomic Energ Commission research and development report 6,500 of which are on microcards; 34 bound vol umes of scientific and technical texts on nuclea theory; and 11 bound volumes of abstracts of som 50,000 reports and articles published in this coun try and abroad. Also included are approximatel

[1] Made at U.N. Headquarters on Mar. 28 on the occasion of the presentation of an Atomic Energy Library to the United Nations.

[2] BULLETIN of Nov. 15, 1954, p. 742.

00 index cards. The library will be kept cur- and additional reports will be supplied as they issued.

he library is one of 44 that have been presented re in the process of being presented by the ted States under the atoms-for-peace program. vious recipients are:

aly	Netherlands	The Council for European Nuclear Research (Switzerland)
ain	New Zealand	
istralia	Portugal	
veden	Peru	Chile
eece	South Africa	Republic of China
ypt	Israel	Dominican Republic
rma	Norway	Haiti
nmark	India	Lebanon
istria	Argentina	Pakistan
ilippines	France	Switzerland
nland	Japan	Thailand
rkey	Brazil	Uruguay
		United Nations Library (Geneva)

ther libraries are in transit to:

ylon	Guatemala	Venezuela
rea	Costa Rica	Iceland
xembourg	Iraq	

S. Requests ECOSOC Study Economic Uses of Atom

S. U.N. press release 2375 dated March 26

he United States on March 26 requested the usion of a new item on the agenda of the 21st sion of the Economic and Social Council re- g to "Studies on Atomic Energy as a Factor conomic Development."

ext of the note follows:

e Representative of the United States of America to United Nations presents his compliments to the Sec- y General of the United Nations and has the honor ropose, in accordance with Rule 13 of the Rules of edure of the Economic and Social Council, inclusion e following topic as a sub-item to Item 5 (Economic lopment of Underdeveloped Countries) of the agenda e Twenty-first Session of the Council: *Studies on ic Energy as a Factor in Economic Development.*

e United States is proposing this item, as a matter gency, with a view to having prepared for submission e Council at an early session an analysis and evalua- of reports and materials available concerning the ible uses of atomic energy for purposes of eco- c development, particularly of the underdeveloped tries.

e United States will in due course submit a draft ution on this matter for consideration of the Council.

r. John C. Baker, the United States Repre- ative to the Economic and Social Council, explained the purpose of this proposal in the following statement:

"A number of public, private, national, and international agencies and organizations are interested in the applications of atomic energy to economic development. It would be a help to realistic economic planning by private and public bodies if information on the economic aspects of this new and challenging subject could be coordinated and brought into one place.

"The United States believes that the Economic and Social Council at this stage is the appropriate organ for taking stock of the many reports and studies which are being made on the potentialities of atomic energy for economic development. The United States Government, therefore, has requested that the above item be placed on the provisional agenda of the 21st Session of Ecosoc."

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Inter-American Travel Congress

The Department of State announced on April 5 (press release 174) that the U.S. Government will be represented at the Sixth Inter-American Travel Congress, which will meet at San José, Costa Rica, April 12–22, 1956, by a delegation composed of the following representatives of U.S. Government agencies and of private groups concerned with travel matters:

Chairman

Henry H. Kelly, Special Assistant on International Travel, Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Department of Commerce

Vice Chairman

Charles P. Nolan, Officer in Charge, Transportation and Communications, Office of Regional American Affairs, Department of State

Members

Malcolm Hope, Chief, General Engineering Program, Division of Sanitary Engineering Services, U.S. Public Health Service

Godfrey Macdonald, Vice President, Grace Lines, Inc., for the American Merchant Marine Institute, Inc., New York, N.Y.

William F. McGrath, Executive Vice President, American Society of Travel Agents, New York, N.Y.

Parks B. Pedrick, Vice President, Mississippi Shipping Co., for the American Merchant Marine Institute, Inc., New York, N.Y.

Norman J. Philion, Colonial Airlines, for the Air Transport Association of America, New York, N.Y.

Russell E. Singer, Executive Vice President, American Automobile Association, Washington, D.C.

Knud Stowman, Special Consultant, Division of Sanitary Engineering Services, Bureau of State Services, U.S. Public Health Service

The Sixth Congress will consider reports of its technical committees on (1) research and organization, (2) removal of travel barriers, (3) travel plant (i. e. hotels), and (4) tourist-travel promotion.

Current Treaty Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. Done at New York June 4, 1954.[1]
Ratification deposited: Austria, March 30, 1956.

Customs convention on temporary importation of private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954.[1]
Ratification deposited: Austria, March 30, 1956.

Slave Trade

Protocol amending the slavery convention signed at Geneva September 25, 1926 (46 Stat. 2183), and annex. Done at New York December 7, 1953. Entered into force for the United States March 7, 1956.
Signature: Burma, March 14, 1956.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention. Signed at Buenos Aires December 22, 1952. Entered into force January 1, 1954. TIAS 3266.
Ratifications deposited: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, February 21, 1956; Jordan, February 23, 1956.
Notification by Federal Republic of Germany of extension to: Land Berlin (effective date to be the same as that for the Federal Republic, i. e. July 26, 1955).

Trade and Commerce

Fourth protocol of rectifications and modifications to annexes and texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva, March 7, 1955.[1]
Signature: Dominican Republic, March 6, 1956.

Protocol of organizational amendments to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.[1]
Signature: Australia, March 2, 1956.

Protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.[1]
Signature: Australia, March 2, 1956.

Protocol amending preamble and parts II and III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.[1]
Signature: Australia, March 2, 1956.

War Criminals

Penal administrative agreement. Concluded at Bonn and deemed to have entered into force May 5, 1955.
Signatures: France, September 29, 1955; Federal Republic of Germany, November 1, 1955; United States, December 20, 1955; United Kingdom, December 22, 1955.

[1] Not in force.

BILATERAL

Austria

Agreement outlining the procedure for financing the livery of nitrogenous fertilizer to Spain pursuant to agricultural commodities agreement of February 7, 1 (TIAS 3505). Effected by exchange of letters at Vie March 5 and 6, 1956. Entered into force March 6, 1

Finland

Agreement supplementing the surplus agricultural c modities agreement of May 6, 1955 (TIAS 3248) by p viding for the purchase of additional commodities, a exchange of notes. Signed at Helsinki March 26, 19 Entered into force March 26, 1956.

Agreement amending articles II and III of the surp agricultural commodities agreement of May 6, 1 (TIAS 3248). Effected by exchange of notes at H sinki March 26, 1956. Entered into force March 26, 19

Netherlands

Agreement extending the agreement of April 11, 1 (TIAS 1777) relating to American war graves in t Netherlands. Effected by exchange of notes at T Hague January 14 and August 29, 1955, and March 1956. Enters into force on the date of receipt by t United States of notification of constitutional appro by the Netherlands.

Spain

Parcel post agreement. Signed at Madrid July 16 and Washington August 30, 1955. Ratified and approved the President September 23, 1955.
Entered into force: January 1, 1956 (the date "mutua settled between the Adminisrations of the two co tries").

THE DEPARTMENT

Resignations

On March 21 President Eisenhower accepted the res nation of Christian A. Herter, Jr., as General Counsel the International Cooperation Administration. The fective date of the resignation was March 19. For t texts of Mr. Herter's letter of resignation and the Pre dent's reply, see White House press release dated March

FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on March 28 confirmed Dempster McInto to be Ambassador to Venezuela.

The Senate on March 28 confirmed Sheldon T. Mills be Ambassador to Afghanistan.

The Senate on March 28 confirmed Jefferson Patters to be Ambassador to Uruguay.

nistan. Mills confirmed as Ambassador 658
iture. Question of Amending Proclamation Limit- Dairy Imports 653
can Republics. Inter-American Travel Congress . 657
c Energy
Presents Atomic Energy Library to United Nations dge) 656
Requests ECOSOC Study of Economic Uses of Atom . 657
a. Exchange of Messages Following White Sulphur ings Meeting (Eisenhower, St. Laurent, Ruiz Cor- s) 636
mic Affairs
sed Duty on Imports of Canned Tuna in Brine (text proclamation) 654
American Travel Congress 657
iations Concerning Debts of City of Berlin . . . 651
Netherlands Begin Negotiation of Air Transport eement 650
tional Exchange. NATO Fellowship Awarded to erican Woman 649
e. Crusade for Freedom (Eisenhower) 636
n Service
mations (McIntosh, Mills, Patterson) 658
gn Service Institute Advisory Committee 651
e. Visit of French Foreign Minister (Dulles) . . 638
ny. Negotiations Concerning Debts of City of Ber- 651
d
sed Duty on Imports of Canned Tuna in Brine (text proclamation) 654
cript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . . . 638
sia. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Confer- e 638
ational Information
de for Freedom (Eisenhower) 636
lessage of America (Eisenhower) 633
ational Organizations and Meetings
ition to Baghdad Pact Council Meeting 637
American Travel Congress 657
. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . 638
a. Letters of Credence (Padmore) 637
. Exchange of Messages Following White Sulphur ings Meeting (Eisenhower, St. Laurent, Ruiz Cor- s) 636
East
ition to Baghdad Pact Council Meeting 637
ity Council Agrees Unanimously on U.S. Proposal Send Secretary-General Hammarskjold to Middle t (Lodge, text of resolution) 627
cript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . . . 638
lands
cript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . . . 638
Netherlands Begin Negotiation of Air Transport eement 650
Atlantic Treaty Organization
undations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organ- on (Murphy) 644
Fellowship Awarded to American Woman . . . 649
ential Documents
le for Freedom 636
nge of Messages Following White Sulphur Springs ting 636
sed Duty on Imports of Canned Tuna in Brine . . 654
essage of America 633
fer of Escapee Program to Department of State . . 651
es and Displaced Persons. Transfer of Escapee Pro- m to Department of State (text of Executive order) . 650
Spain. Visit of Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs . . 633
State, Department of
Resignation (Herter) 658
Transfer of Escapee Program to Department of State (text of Executive order) 650
Treaty Information. Current Actions 658
U.S.S.R.
Significance of New Soviet Line Concerning Stalin Era (Dulles) 637
Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . . . 638
United Nations
Security Council Agrees Unanimously on U.S. Proposal To Send Secretary-General Hammarskjold to Middle East (Lodge, text of resolution) 627
U.S. Presents Atomic Energy Library to the United Nations (Lodge) 656
U.S. Requests ECOSOC Study of Economic Uses of Atom . 657
Uruguay. Patterson confirmed as Ambassador 658
Venezuela. McIntosh confirmed as Ambassador 658

Name Index

Baker, John C. 657
Ball, M. Margaret 649
Dulles, Secretary 637, 638
Eisenhower, President 633, 636, 651, 654
Henderson, Loy 637
Herter, Christian A., Jr. 658
Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr. 627, 656
Martin Artajo, Alberto 633
McIntosh, Dempster 658
Mills, Sheldon T. 658
Murphy, Robert 644
Padmore, George Arthur 637
Patterson, Jefferson 658
Ruiz Cortines, Adolfo 637
St. Laurent, Louis 636

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: April 2–8

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

No.	Date	Subject
168	4/2	Murphy: NATO symposium at Norfolk.
169	4/3	External debts of Berlin.
170	4/3	Dulles: visit of Foreign Minister Pineau.
171	4/3	Dulles: Soviet repudiation of Stalin.
172	4/3	Dulles: news conference transcript.
173	4/4	American winner of NATO fellowship (rewrite).
174	4/5	Delegation to Inter-American Travel Congress (rewrite).
175	4/5	Visit of Spanish Foreign Minister (rewrite).
176	4/5	U.S.-Netherlands aviation talks.
177	4/6	Advisory Committee to Foreign Service Institute.
†178	4/6	Phleger: New York Bar Association.
*179	4/6	Japan credentials.
180	4/6	Delegation to Baghdad Pact Council meeting.
181	4/7	Liberia credentials (rewrite).

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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Thailand is a predominantly agricultural country of small rural communities and relatively few cities and large towns. The agricultural economy is based almost entirely on small-scale, peasant-type family operations, with a majority of the farm operators holding title to their land.

Long known to the world as Siam, this southeastern country of magnificent scenery, of great fertility, and of a largely homogeneous population has never been a colony, even though in the past her neighbors on every side have fallen under foreign rule.

Today, true to its historical tradition, Thailand is determined to resist all Communist imperialist efforts to infiltrate and subvert it, and to impose upon it the new colonialism of world communism.

This 15-page illustrated pamphlet tells about the land, the people, and the industries of this nation that is a little smaller than Texas with a population of approximately 20 million, and discusses briefly the role of Thailand in world affairs.

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The Department of State

Bulletin

XXIV, No. 878

il 23, 1956

MAY
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

FIFTY YEARS OF PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW • *by Herman Phleger, Legal Adviser* 663

A REPORT ON GERMANY • *by Ambassador James B. Conant* 669

THE MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM FOR EUROPE • *Statement by C. Burke Elbrick* 674

THE INTER-AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP • *by Milton S. Eisenhower* 682

For index see inside back cover

The Department of State bulleti

Vol. XXXIV, No. 878 • Publication 632(

April 23, 1956

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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Washington 25, D.C.

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Single copy, 20 cents

The printing of this publication has been approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1955).

Note: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the Department of State Bulletin as the source will be appreciated.

ty Years of Progress in International Law

by Herman Phleger
Legal Adviser [1]

ıere is a special significance in this regional ing of the American Society of International . It was in this city, and at the New York Association, that the Society was organized anuary 12, 1906.

ıis is therefore the 50th anniversary of the ding of the Society.

rthdays are not only times for celebration; are also times for appraisal.

this case the appraisal might be of two kinds: ıs to how well the Society has achieved the tives of its founding; the other as to what ress has been made in the field of interna- l law during the life of the Society.

know we will all agree that the Society is to ngratulated on its achievements during its 50 years. Having in mind the aphorism that irst 50 years are the hardest, I know that Society can confidently look forward to an increasing contribution in its chosen fields.

ess in International Law

hat has been the progress of international law ıg the past 50 years? My comment must be and general.

recall some years ago hearing Sir Norman ett observe that in an early edition of *Anson ontracts* the illustration given of contracts because of impossibility of performance was though one were to undertake to fly the ıtic."

I have myself seen in a 1919 edition of *Anson* the illustration given thus:

> Suppose the defendant had promised to pay 100 pounds, but only on condition that X shall reach the moon. Here the act to be performed by the defendant is quite possible, but the act to be performed by X is not. Here no duty or liability is created.

By the passage of a short span of years the impossible has become possible.

A promise to reach the moon replacing an undertaking to fly the Atlantic, as an example of a promise impossible to perform, will no doubt in turn give way to a new example.

This progression does not represent progress in law but progress in science. The legal principle has remained the same. Only the application of the principle has changed with the changing times.

But there are legal principles which do change, and the last 50 years have witnessed a fundamental change in one principle of international law that affects us all.

Fifty years ago war was accepted as a legitimate instrument of national policy. Learned writers asserted its legality. Collective efforts were largely devoted to ameliorating the harsh conditions of war—agreeing on the rules of the game, so to speak. The Hague Conventions and the later Geneva Conventions regulating the treatment of prisoners of war represented efforts to make war endurable, since its abolition seemed impossible.

But two world wars and the harnessing of nuclear energy have progressively convinced the world of the necessity for providing an effective means of preventing aggressive war. The attempt to reach this objective has resulted in the establishing of a new principle of international

---

[1] dress made before the Association of the Bar of the f New York at a regional meeting celebrating the nniversary of the American Society of International at New York, N.Y., on Apr. 9 (press release 178 Apr. 6).

law and the taking of steps to implement that principle.

The new legal principle is that aggressive war is illegal. The implementation has taken various forms: the League of Nations, the United Nations, and tribunals to apply and administer international law, to name the more obvious.

Aggressive War Becomes Illegal

The experience of World War I resulted in the League of Nations and its principle of collective security with its objective "to promote international cooperation and to achieve international peace and security." It was intended to replace the system of the balance of power by a system of collective responsibility for the future peace.

In the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 the parties condemned recourse to war and renounced it as an instrument of national policy. They agreed not to seek to settle conflicts by any but pacific means. Sixty-five nations have ratified this treaty, and it is in force today.

From the standpoint of international law this treaty was a revolutionary development. At face value it was the agreement of the world community that aggressive war would be a breach of solemn treaty obligations.

Yet 10 years later World War II was under way.

I cannot refrain from quoting the following from Senator [George Wharton] Pepper's admirable autobiography. He wrote, speaking of the spring of 1928:

> During our brief sojourn in Paris, the Kellogg-Briand Pact was signed at the French Foreign Office in an atmosphere of optimism. Mrs. Pepper and I were guests at the Embassy at a brilliant dinner given by Ambassador Herrick to Ambassador Kellogg. My incurable lack of faith in international promises made me less enthusiastic than the rest of the company. They felt, or pretended to feel, that war had at last received its death warrant.

Then came the Second World War and—from its ashes—the United Nations. By its charter its members agree to settle their international disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.

I think it can be fairly said that the charter confirmed the fact that the principle accepted in 1900 that war was a legitimate instrument of national policy had been replaced by the principle that aggressive war is illegal under international law.

This was a fundamental change in internati law, and it has taken place during the 50- existence of this Society.

But those years have witnessed more th fundamental change in a principle of inte tional law. They have also witnessed persis attempts to provide the means of carrying principle into effect.

These attempts have taken, in general, forms. One, to provide a system of colle security with sanctions against an aggressor. other consisted of an attempt to provide a sy of international tribunals available for the judication and settlement of disputes bet states.

In addition international tribunals were es lished for the trial of war criminals. I refe the Nuremberg tribunal established in 1945 the agreement of 23 nations and to the inte tional tribunal for the trial of Japanese criminals.

Modern developments in warfare and the a bomb have made clear how ineffective as a de rent to war is the postwar punishment of indi uals. Indeed, if we were to have another w war, there would be few left to act as jud even if there were enough vanquished still a to stand in the dock.

This emphasizes the necessity of settling dif ences peacefully when they arise, so they will develop into controversies which nations beli can only be honorably settled by war, and necessity of having machinery to settle s disputes.

Adjudication of International Disputes

But machinery is not enough, just as treat renouncing war were not enough. If we are settle international disputes by peaceful mea we must not only have the machinery to se them, but states must use this machinery.

That there now exist fully adequate and av able means for settlement of disputes by th means is obvious.

For a half century we have had the Perman Court of Arbitration at The Hague.

The United Nations Charter, in chapter offers an array of remedies, through the Secur Council and the General Assembly, for states volved in disputes or situations whose continua is likely to endanger international peace.

mmencing in 1921 with the Permanent Court ternational Justice, succeeded in 1945 by the national Court of Justice, a court has been able for the adjudication of disputes be- n states. Some 33 states, including the United s, have now accepted the compulsory juris- on of that Court.

addition, there has been available tradi- l *ad hoc* arbitration which has served so well the years to resolve disputes between nations.

tance of States To Adjudicate Disputes

th this wealth of machinery for the settle- of international disputes, I would like to re- that their utilization is customary and a r of course. But the contrary appears to be se. There seems to be a natural reluctance e part of foreign offices to submit differences dicial examination and adjudication, or to ration.

1937 John Bassett Moore wrote:

> spite of all suppositions and postprandial boasts contrary, it is a fact that nations have not during st half century shown an increasing disposition to to judicial determination disputes involving what nceive to be their important interests.

lay, almost 20 years later, the same observa- ould be made with equal truth. In the past rs the United States has filed four applica- with the Recorder of the International Court stice, one against Hungary,[2] one against oslovakia,[3] and two against Soviet Russia,[4] g out of the shooting down of planes. In nstance the respondent government has re- e to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court.[5] another instance, where the United States sed resort to the Court, it was met with the stion that friends should not litigate their ences but should compose them. A sound sophy, but there has been no composition and seems likely.

ould suggest that if we wish to establish le of law we must not only have the law, we do have, but we must also establish the and custom of being willing to be bound according to the judgment of an independent al. What good does it do to say we agree with the law and then refuse to submit our differences to impartial adjudication of the facts and the agreed law?

Much has been done in this field, but much more could be and must be done if the adjudication of international disputes is to make a significant contribution to our goal of international peace and the rule of law.

U.S.-U.K. Record of Submissions

Our guest of this evening [Sir Lionel Frederick Heald, M. P., former Attorney-General of the United Kingdom] comes from a nation that has a long and distinguished record of submission to arbitration and adjudication in the international field.

The arbitration of the Alabama Claims in 1872 is a landmark in this field. It was followed by the arbitration of the Venezuela dispute in 1904 and then by the North Atlantic Fisheries Arbitration in 1910.

The docket of the International Court of Justice records that the United Kingdom has been a party to more proceedings there than any other state. It has had 13 contentious cases before the present Court and its predecessor. It has participated in 12 of the advisory-opinion proceedings before these two Courts. It has had 7 cases before tribunals of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

I might at the same time note that the United States has been a party to 6 contentious proceedings before the present World Court, has participated in all 10 of the advisory-opinion proceedings there, and has had 6 cases before tribunals of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

That the United States and the United Kingdom have been disposed to engage in a relatively sizable volume of international litigation does not mean that our two countries are contentious by nature. It is simply indicative of a belief that differences should be dealt with on their merits. Where differences on legal questions have resisted settlement by discussion, we have preferred to have them decided by impartial arbiters.

This has not been the practice in the conduct of foreign affairs by many governments. Unsettled disputes have not been referred to an international tribunal for decision and have been allowed to trouble the relations of the parties for an indefinite length of time. The rule of law

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B LETIN of Mar. 22, 1954, p. 449.
Ibid., Apr. 18, 1955, p. 648.
Ibid., Mar. 22, 1954, p. 449, and July 11, 1955, p. 65.
Ibid., July 26, 1954, p. 130, and Mar. 26, 1956, p. 513.

will not be established so long as governments insist on "waging their law" through economic, political, and other pressures, and are unwilling to submit to impartial adjudication.

I believe it can be fairly said that relations between our country and the United Kingdom have long been conducted on the basis of law and justice. This happy tradition has certainly been favored by the ties of history and language, by the heritage of our legal system, and by a common disposition to view situations on their merits and find practical solutions to difficulties. Our two countries have been associated for common ends in war and in peace. Today they are working together in many areas to preserve peace and advance the realization of human values.

Problems of the Future

We cannot honestly be satisfied that the United Nations system as it operates today creates a working regime of law throughout the world. But the present organization of the international community must, of course, be appraised as a stage in development and not as a final condition to be accepted or rejected.

The problem of keeping international peace is currently being approached from the direction of control over armaments and control over national military capabilities in such a way that no nation will feel it desirable to embark on aggressive adventures.

The task of raising worldwide levels of economic development and standards of living is being pursued today in various cooperative international enterprises, soon to be increased by the addition of a new one—the International Atomic Energy Agency.

As we look ahead, the next 50 years promise no diminution of difficult problems to cope with. Doubtless some that most concern us now will have disappeared or receded in importance by the end of another half century. New problems are likely to come to the forefront. The achievements of science and technology constantly demand a redoubling of effort in politics and law to avoid a fatal lagging behind. There can already be discerned future problems in means of subsistence for the earth's growing population and in the development of exploration and travel beyond presently known terrestrial limits.

The world will have increasing need for wider understanding of international relationshi for intelligent designs to promote genera being. This Society and its counterpa world over will not want for ample opport of useful employment.

Conversations With Spanish Mini of Foreign Affairs

Following are the texts of statements m Washington on the arrival of Alberto Artajo, the Spanish Minister of Foreign on April 9 and of a communique issued on 12 at the conclusion of his talks with Se Dulles.

WELCOME AT NATIONAL AIRPORT

Press release 185 dated April 9

Statement by Secretary Dulles

Mr. Minister, it is indeed a very great p to welcome you here with your wife a other members of your party. The last ti I saw you was in Madrid about 6 mont [November 1, 1955], and I shall never for great cordiality of the welcome which I r there from the Head of your State, Franco, and from yourself and the other M and from the people of Madrid, who made their cordial reception of me.

I asked then that you should, if possibl to visit us, and I am delighted indeed th hope of mine has now come to pass. I thi perhaps my visit to Madrid did a little som to evidence the esteem in which the Am people hold the great nation of Spain. I that your visit here, Mr. Minister, you, yo and daughter, and the other members o party, will enable us still further to build t of friendship and good relations which no so happily between our two countries.

We welcome you here and we are glad y see something of our country. And we a fident that out of this trip will come furthe will between us.

Response by Spanish Foreign Minister

The last time I was in America was whe a young man and I came to visit Washingt

York with the International Congress of lents.

oday I come to return the visit to Madrid of etary of State Dulles, who has proven how h can be accomplished when diplomats sit n face to face and talk plainly.

riendship between the American and Spanish les increases as personal knowledge increases, that is one of the reasons why I have come ou.

think this friendship between Spain and rica is important. As you know, we signed ements in the fall of 1953. I would like to ine with members of your Government their ication so far, and also to discuss various cts of world problems which affect our two ons.

nd now, to work!

T OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE

release 193 dated April 12

ring the official visit to Washington of Señor Alberto Martin Artajo, the Foreign Minister ain, conversations were held between him and Secretary of State, Mr. John Foster Dulles, other officials of the United States Govern- These talks were on matters of specific al interest to both countries as well as on ions of general interest to their respective gn policies, including the situation in the East.

e conversations, which were conducted in an sphere of understanding and cordiality, have ered a valuable contribution to the strength- of the ties of friendship and cooperation happily already exist between the two coun- Among other topics, the Foreign Minister the Secretary of State reviewed the results of nutual defense and economic aid agreements d between Spain and the United States on ember 26, 1953. They noted with satisfaction progress made in implementing these agree- s, which constitute a significant contribution estern security. The Minister also reviewed he Secretary's information the recent negotia- in Madrid between the Spanish Government that of the Sultan of Morocco. The Secre- of State expressed his satisfaction with Span- ecognition of the unity and independence of cco.

Spanish-Moroccan Declaration

Press release 186 dated April 10

Department Announcement

On April 7, 1956, the Foreign Minister of Spain and the Prime Minister of Morocco signed a joint declaration which recognized the independence and unity of Morocco and defined the basis for future relations between the two countries.

The U.S. Government has instructed its representatives in Spain and Morocco to express our sincere congratulations for the success of the recent negotiations and our hope for an era of fruitful collaboration between the two nations.

Message to Acting Foreign Minister of Spain[1]

My Government desires to express its congratulations to your Government on the occasion of the signing April 7 of a joint declaration which recognizes the independence and the unity of Morocco. It is gratifying to pay tribute to the realism and statesmanship which has made possible a new era of collaboration between the two nations.

Message to Sultan of Morocco[2]

I have been instructed to convey to His Majesty the Sultan, to the members of his Government and to the Moroccan people my Government's congratulations on the successful conclusion of negotiations with the Spanish Government and to express the hope for an era of fruitful collaboration between the two nations.

Text of Declaration[3]

[Unofficial translation]

The Spanish Government and His Imperial Majesty Mohammed V, Sultan of Morocco, in the desire of establishing an especially friendly relationship, on a basis of reciprocity; of strengthening their relations of secular friendship and of consolidating peace in the area in which their respective countries are located, have agreed to make public the following declaration:

1. The Spanish Government and His Imperial Majesty Mohammed V, Sultan of Morocco, considering that the

[1] Delivered by the American Chargé d'Affaires at Madrid on Apr. 10.

[2] Transmitted to His Cherifian Majesty Mohammed V on Apr. 10 in the name of the U.S. diplomatic agent in Morocco.

[3] Signed at Madrid on Apr. 7 by Foreign Minister Alberto Martin Artajo of Spain and Premier Embarek Bekkai of Morocco.

regime established in Morocco in 1912 does not correspond to present reality, declare that the agreement signed in Madrid on November 27, 1912, cannot determine Hispano-Moroccan relations in the future.

2. In consequence, the Spanish Government recognizes the independence of Morocco, proclaimed by His Imperial Majesty Sultan Mohammed V, and its full sovereignty, together with all the attributes of the same, including its own diplomatic service and army; reiterates its wish to respect the territorial unity of the Empire, which is guaranteed by international treaties; and undertakes to take the necessary measures to effectuate it. Moreover, the Spanish Government undertakes to lend to His Imperial Majesty the Sultan the aid and assistance which will be determined as necessary by common agreement, especially with regard to foreign relations and to defense.

3. The negotiations entered upon in Madrid between the Spanish Government and His Imperial Majesty Mohammed V have as their objective the conclusion of new agreements between two sovereign and equal parties, with the purposes of defining their free cooperation in the field of their common interests. These agreements will also guarantee, in keeping with the above-mentioned particularly friendly spirit, the freedoms and rights of the Spaniards residing in Morocco and of the Moroccans residing in Spain, in the private, economic, cultural and social domains, on a basis of reciprocity and of respect for their respective sovereignties.

4. The Spanish Government and His Imperial Majesty the Sultan agree that, until the above-mentioned agreements come into effect, relations between Spain and Morocco will be determined by the additional protocol to the present declaration.

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL

1. The legislative power is exercised in sovereign manner by His Majesty the Sultan. The representative of Spain in Rabat will be advised of all proposed *dahirs* and decrees which affect Spanish interests and may make appropriate observations.

2. The powers exercised up to now by the Spanish authorities in Morocco will be transferred to the Moroccan Government, in accordance with the modalities which are fixed by common agreement. The prerogatives of Spanish officials in Morocco will be preserved.

3. The Spanish Government will lend its assistance to the Moroccan Government toward the organization of its own army. The present status of the Spanish Army in Morocco will be preserved during the period of transition.

4. The present status of the peseta will not be altered until the conclusion of a new agreement on this matter.

5. As of the time of the present declaration, visas and all administrative formalities required up to now for the travel of persons from one zone to the other will be eliminated.

6. The Spanish Government will continue to assume the protection abroad of the interests of Moroccans native to the zone formerly defined by the agreement of November 27, 1912, and residing abroad, until such time as the Government of His Majesty the Sultan assumes this responsibility.

U.S. Policy in Middle East

Statement by James C. Hagerty
Press Secretary to the President

White House Office (Augusta, Ga.) press release dated A

Before leaving the White House, the Pres
met with the Secretary of State for a discussi
repeated incidents of hostility in the Middle

The President and the Secretary of State re
the situation with the utmost seriousness.

In their discussions concerning the area,
are guided by fundamental principles of U
States foreign policy which are designed to
mote and strengthen world peace. Therefor

1. The United States will support in f
measure the mission of the Secretary-Gener
the United Nations to the area pursuant t
unanimous action of the Security Council,
body on which all the members of the United
tions have conferred primary responsibility
the maintenance of international peace and s
ity. The United States trusts that all U
Nations member countries, including particu
the states directly involved, will similarly su
that mission of peace.

2. The United States, in accordance wit
responsibilities under the charter of the U
Nations, will observe its commitments within
stitutional means to oppose any aggression i
area.

3. The United States is likewise determin
support and assist any nation which might be
jected to such aggression. The United Stat
confident that other nations will act similar
the cause of peace.

NATO Atomic Information Agreem Enters Into Force

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
nounced at Paris on April 10 that the NATO A
ment for Cooperation Regarding Atomic Inf
ation went into force on March 29, 1956, wit
completion of notifications by all NATO go
ments that they were bound by the terms o
agreement. The agreement, signed at Pari
June 22, 1955, by representatives of the
nations, provides that the United States and
NATO members may make various categori
atomic information available to the organiza

[1] BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1956, p. 627.

eport on Germany

by James B. Conant
Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany[1]

e title of my remarks is "A Report on Ger-." That may sound as if I proposed to de- a lecture on the history of the nation to which accredited as Ambassador of the United s; and since college presidents are not noted he brevity of their remarks you may conclude re in for at least an hour's session. But have ar. What I have to say can be said in less 30 minutes for I propose to consider primar- he present situation and the problems which d the German people face together. To this nce, so well informed on world affairs, it is cessary to describe in detail the developments e last 10 years which have resulted in the Ger- of today.

ave said, the Germany of today. Yet it would been more accurate to say, the *three* Ger- s of today. For there is first of all the ral Republic of Germany, a sovereign nation million, with which we are allied as members e North Atlantic Treaty Organization; the ory of this Federal Republic comprises what once the American, British, and French zones cupation. The second part of Germany is art that lies to the east of the frontier which ates the Soviet zone of occupation from the ral Republic of Germany. Within this area he Soviet zone of occupation, a land where 17 million Germans are ruled by the Com- st puppet regime set up by the Soviet au- ties; this is the land of tyranny, whereas the ral Republic of Germany is the land of free- And then there is Berlin, that city with h we Americans have had such close relations the days of the blockade, a city which itself is divided between the three Western sectors—the American, the British, and the French—still in occupation status but nevertheless governed by a freely elected German Government, and the East sector controlled, like the zone, by the Russians through their henchmen.

I could devote a very long speech indeed to the history of the Federal Republic of Germany; yet this history is very short. The Federal Republic itself is less than 7 years old; its sovereignty dates only from last May. The phenomenal industrial recovery of this part of Germany is well known; so too is the remarkably rapid rebuilding of the cities. What is less well known, perhaps, are the steps by which a stable representative system of government has evolved. Separate states with freely elected legislatures were created in the zones of the three Western powers. Then in 1948 delegates from the states met to draft a constitution, or Basic Law, for the federal system. This Basic Law, approved by the three Western occupying powers, was then adopted by the state legislatures in 1949. That summer the first national parliament, or Bundestag, was elected, which in turn elected Konrad Adenauer as Chancellor. He was reelected 4 years later by the second Bundestag, which came into being following the second national election. The third national election, by the way, will be held in the summer of 1957, and this future event is already casting its shadow over German politics. Parliamentary democracy in the federal government and the states has provided a stable political framework within which a free competitive economy has flourished and the basic rights of citizens have been protected. Whatever may be the currents and crosscurrents of German internal politics in the coming years, I have no worry that the framework will be endangered.

[1] dress made before the Los Angeles World Affairs il on Mar. 28.

Last May, you will recall, the Federal Republic of Germany, when it became a sovereign nation, joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In so doing it undertook the responsibility of sharing with the other members, including the United States, the burden of defending Europe. To fulfill this responsibility an armed force is in process of formation. The process has been slower than many imagined it would be 18 months ago when the treaties were signed in Paris. But it is well to remember that the Germans had to start the building of their armed forces completely anew. There was no vestige of the old German Army, Navy, or Air Force left after the surrender; furthermore, for the first few postwar years few, if any, thought of rearming Germany. Quite the contrary. Indeed, the opposition party in the Bundestag (the Social Democrats) questioned the legality of a military force even as part of a European army; only in 1954 was the Basic Law amended so as to clarify this point. (An amendment of the Basic Law requires a two-thirds vote of the Bundestag as well as the upper house, the Bundesrat, where the states are represented.) Within the past month the Government and the opposition have agreed on certain further amendments to the Basic Law which will provide the legal basis for the German armed forces and insure that the ultimate control is in civilian hands. These amendments have just been adopted. In this task of drafting the necessary laws almost all political leaders have had the same ideal in mind: They have wanted to create a military establishment very different from those of the past; they desire that the new army, navy, and air force shall be firmly under the control of a parliamentary government.

We, the United States and the Federal Republic, are now partners on an equal basis; we partake in the defense of Europe and indeed the Atlantic community. This means we share military and economic problems; we must each do our part in keeping the free world sturdy and healthy and ever on the alert. This is no easy undertaking, and differences of opinion among allies are proverbial, but the NATO organization has already proved its ability to reconcile conflicting views. The same procedures can be used, if needed, to make any adjustments required when a year from now numbers of German youth begin to stand side by side with American, British, French, and other soldiers of the Atlantic community in the defense of Europe. So I shall not report further on our common problems as members of N but rather direct your attention to our comm problems that exist because of the division of G many and the position of Berlin.

German Reunification

As President Eisenhower and Secretary of St Dulles have said on more than one occasion, th can be no hope for lasting peace and security Europe until a reunification of Germany achieved. This same point of view has been peatedly emphasized likewise by the heads of British and the French Governments. It hardly necessary to state that reunification is number-one goal of all the inhabitants of G many, whether they be in the Federal Repub of Germany or in the Soviet Zone itself. To sure, in making this statement I must add tha small percentage of the East Zone inhabitants w are convinced Communists or who have thrown their lot irrevocably with the Soviet authorit envisage a reunification of Germany in terms qu different than do the vast majority of their co trymen. These Soviet agents would like a unified Germany which in fact would be anot Soviet satellite state.

To interpret properly the present attitude the Russians toward reunification, one must b in mind their policy of supporting the satel regime in the Soviet Zone. Their immediate g appears to be to force the recognition by the f world, in law or in fact, of the legitimacy of th so-called German Democratic Republic, which present has standing only among Russia's satel nations. The Communist regime, completely s servient to the Soviets, claims to represent the habitants. But, as everyone knows, the so-cal elections by which this government was put power were travesties of free elections. What unfortunate Germans who must suffer under tyranny of this communistic rule really think their German rulers was evidenced by the upris of June 17, 1953. This spontaneous protest, st ing in East Berlin, was ruthlessly put down Russian tanks and soldiers, but there is ev reason to believe that the spirit is by no me dead. When free elections are held in the So Zone, you may be certain that the Commu Party and its allies will receive not more tha very small fraction of the votes. I say, when elections are held, for such free elections of an German government are the first necessary ste

ification. This is the firm position of the Western powers and the Federal Govern- . But I shall return to this subject in a ent. Let me ask you to direct your attention erlin.

er since the blockade, the people of Berlin the people of the United States have been ers in their resistance to Soviet aggression. successful breaking of the blockade was due e brave stand of the Berliners and the effec- ess of the American Air Force aided by our sh and French allies. This was accom- ed, you remember, in '48 and '49. The ts then solemnly agreed that access to the hould be unhampered, and for the last 7 years between free Germany and free Berlin by s of rail, water, and road has been relatively ndered. But within the last year the Rus- claim to have transferred to their puppet ne, the so-called German Democratic Repub- ll control and jurisdiction over traffic to Ber- This claim has been strongly rejected by our rnment, the British, and the French. We pointed out on more than one occasion that oviet Government cannot in this fashion es- responsibility for carrying out the solemn rtakings which they themselves have entered Therefore we shall continue to hold the ts to their promise. We shall insist that be no hindrance to the flow of goods and le from free Germany to Berlin.

t only have the Soviets claimed they could would transfer to their German agents their rity over the roads to Berlin, but they have a similar claim as to the Soviet sector of n itself. Here again their international ob- ons are quite clear: free circulation through- ll the sectors of Berlin was a firm agreement Berlin was first occupied by the Four Pow- That the Soviets see to it that this continues matter on which the three Western powers .

ue Position of Berlin

m glad to report that, in spite of its strange ion, a unique position I might say, of being an d of freedom in a sea of tyranny, free Ber- that is, West Berlin—has prospered since the of the blockade. Thanks in no small measure merican initiative and American aid, indus- have expanded, trade has increased, unemployment has steadily diminished. The spirit of the Berliners continues bold and confident. Those who can freely express their opinion, the 2 million in West Berlin, are quick to demonstrate their realization of what Communist tyranny really means. One has only to cross the sector border into East Berlin to see communism at work, and it is a most depressing and disquieting spectacle, I can assure you. Indeed, I have often said that Berlin was a city that should be visited by any who had illusions about what communism is in fact. A short visit to Berlin would demonstrate to all but convinced members of the party that the Soviet system is a system of brutal suppression of freedom, a police state based on fear.

In Berlin one can readily compare the economic, political, and cultural aspects of the two parts of the world which are divided by the Iron Curtain. In this city the curtain is transparent. And this is one of the reasons why Berlin is so important. Here at least some of the unfortunate Germans who live under the Communist dictatorship can view an example of the world of freedom. From here, uncensored news flows through the American radio station RIAS to the inhabitants of the zone, most of whom can listen, in spite of Soviet attempts at jamming. The Iron Curtain between the zone and the Federal Republic, on the other hand, is not transparent. There are only four border crossing-points; everywhere else armed guards, barbed wire, plowed strips separate the enslaved Germans from their friends and relatives in the West. In some communities the sealed border runs right through a village. In one spot I visited, a town lies in the zone and the railroad station is in the Federal Republic and hence no longer of any use; for in order to go from the town to the station one would have to travel many miles to the one border crossing in that area and then, if the necessary papers were in order, one could cross and again travel back along the border to the station.

Yet the Soviet Zone is far more accessible than any other territory lying the other side of the Iron Curtain. A great number of Germans travel back and forth through the four crossing-points in order to visit relatives and friends. And this traffic is at present encouraged by the Soviets and their agents since they are trying to win the respect if not the affection of all Germans. They are trying particularly to convince the workingman that they are in the process of creating a

"workers' paradise" in their so-called Democratic Republic. Last summer buses were sent through one of the crossing-points to pick up children in border towns who were invited for a 3-week vacation at no expense in this "workers' paradise." And the camps where these youths were entertained—propaganda centers in fact—I have heard were extremely good. How lasting will be the effects of such exposure to Soviet Zone propaganda is an open question.

Soviet Formula for Reunification

Unless I am much mistaken, we are going to see many such efforts; more propaganda will flow from the East to the West. It will be claimed that the German Democratic Republic provides more opportunities for the worker and farmer, more cultural developments, and, above all, is working for peace and a unified Germany in contrast to the Government of the Federal Republic. One of the slogans that is painted on the walls of the official buildings of the Soviet sector of Berlin demands that "Germans sit around one table." This is the Soviets' formula for reunification; they demand that representatives of their puppet government meet with representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany and work out a formula for reunification. To anyone who knows the history of what happened in Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and the other satellite countries it is quite clear what the real aims of such a conference would be. Such a meeting of Russian agents and free Germans could make no progress toward reunification in freedom; it could only serve to build up the prestige of the puppet government and thus be one step toward a kind of reunification that would be an extension of the Soviet system of tyranny well into the heart of Western Europe.

But the propaganda line embodied in the slogan "Germans around one table" has certain disadvantages from the Soviet point of view and, consequently, certain advantages for us in the free world which we should endeavor to make apparent. It means that the border crossing-points where Germans from the West can visit their relatives in the East and vice versa must be kept open by the Soviets. This in turn means that what goes on in the Soviet Zone of Germany is far more exposed to the view of the entire world than what goes on in such satellite countries as Poland or Czechoslovakia. In other words the Iron Cur in Germany is at a few points somewhat por This fact we must make the most of. It beho us to follow very carefully all that transpire the Soviet Zone and to direct world opinion tc shocking contrast between the Soviets' profe intentions and their actual deeds. For when examines the true situation in the Soviet Zone, encounters a record of brutal disregard of hu rights which must shock all except those who hardened by long years of exposure to Commu discipline.

Let me give you one example: Nearly a thous Germans leave the Soviet Zone every day, ma through Berlin, preferring to abandon all t worldly goods than to suffer longer their los liberty. This fact is in itself ample proof of real situation in this so-called democratic la Refugees are a double embarrassment to the So henchmen. They regret to see their labor fo diminished by the departure of able-bodied yo and they realize the refugees are clear evidenc the hate and mistrust with which the governm is regarded by the people. As a consequence m ures are being taken to check the flow. Recen two individuals were prosecuted for having legedly advised some of their neighbors to migr to the Federal Republic of Germany. These fortunates were found guilty by an authoritar court and condemned to death—condemned to for the supposed crime of asking a fellow Gerr to move from one city to another! The out from West Germany and from the free wo seems to have shaken the authorities in East Be a bit, for the sentences have now been commu to life. But even prison terms for such offenses the fact that the alleged advice was regarded as offense, is hard to square with the slogan "Germ around one table!"

Soviet Zone—the Achilles Heel

The Soviet Zone then is to my mind the Achi heel of the Soviet satellite system. We in the f world should take advantage of this fact. should use every occasion to expose the fact t the Russians are exploiting this portion of German population, and exploiting is the pro word. The living standards are low; the econo is arranged for the benefit of the Soviet syst and not for the Germans who do the work; uranium mines are being depleted; the youth

ing forcibly recruited for an army which will inforce the other satellite contingents. Brutal ntences are still meted out; the tales of the refu- es are tales of a terrorized population. How n this day-by-day behavior of the Soviets' agents East Germany be squared with the present viet words about peace and friendly relations th the West? The simple answer is, it cannot. nd this fact to my mind should be continually phasized in every discussion of international oblems. The conscience of the free world must quickened to the injustice of a divided Ger- ny.

Let me conclude by turning your attention once ain to the city of Berlin. This city has stood t boldly against Russian threats for 10 years d more; today it is remarkably strong consid- ing its past ordeals. But the future of Berlin is a capital city of a reunited Germany. For the ng run this is the only solution of the so-called rlin problem, for the Western powers will cer- inly never desert the Berliners as long as they e in danger, which means as long as Germany is vided. The free Berliners, the three Western cupying powers, and the Federal Republic of rmany work closely together to support Ber- ; we share the common task of preparing for e day when the present capital of the Federal public at Bonn will cease to exist and a new ely elected all-German government will take its quarters in Berlin.

I have spoken of a new, freely elected, all- rman government because the present Federal public of Germany is, by its own declaration, ly a provisional, caretaker government. It is e only government today which can speak for the German people, as it is the only freely cted government. Nevertheless, its competence restricted by its own desires and in agreement th the three Western powers. Because it has t derived its mandate from the voters in the viet Zone as well as from those in the three rmer Western zones, it cannot speak for Ger- ny in a discussion of such matters as the final undaries of Germany and the terms of a peace aty. These are affairs which must be left to an -German government which can speak for all e German people. Therefore, today in talking out Germany we meet a paradoxical situation. e welcome the opportunity of cooperating on a st friendly basis with the German government in Bonn, we look forward to its military contribution to the defense of the free world, but at the same time we hope for its replacement by an all-German government in Berlin.

We have a strong and reliable ally in the German people—of that I have not the slightest doubt. Those who can now speak for the free population speak in terms of a close alliance with the West. I have no fear that if the free world remains strong economically, politically, and militarily there will be any reversal of this policy. The peoples of the free European nations, of Great Britain, and of the United States are now united. In this unity there is strength. This strength constitutes a bulwark against further Soviet aggression. In the not too distant future I believe this strength, coupled with a continued exposure of the true conditions in the Soviet Zone, must bring about a reunification of Germany; and with that reunification will come hope for a more peaceful world.

Current Legislation on Foreign Policy: 84th Congress, 2d Session

Technical Assistance Programs. Hearing before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Part 2, January 23, 1956. 35 pp.

Operation and Administration of the Cargo Preference Act. Hearings before the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries on Public Law 664, 83d Cong., 2d sess. January 31, February 1–16, 1956. 601 pp.

Operation of Article VII, NATO Status of Forces Treaty. Hearing before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services to review, for the period December 1, 1954, to November 30, 1955, the operation of article VII of the agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their forces. February 9, 1956. 47 pp.

International Cultural Exchange and Trade Fair Participation Act of 1956. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on S. 3116 and S. 3172, bills to provide for the promotion and strengthening of international relations through cultural and athletic exchanges and participation in international fairs and festivals. February 21, 1956. 39 pp.

Regulation of Exports. Hearings before the House Committee on Banking and Currency on H. R. 9052. February 23, March 5 and 6, 1956. 182 pp.

Control and Reduction of Armaments. Hearing before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations pursuant to S. Res. 93, 84th Cong. Part 2, February 29, 1956. 33 pp.

Reorganization of the Passport Office. Report to accompany S. 3340. S. Rept. 1605, March 1, 1956. 8 pp.

Joint Economic Report. Report of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report on the January 1956 Economic Report of the President with supplemental and minority views and the economic outlook for 1956 prepared by the committee staff. S. Rept. 1606, March 1, 1956. 116 pp.

The Mutual Security Program for Europe

Statement by C. Burke Elbrick
Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs [1]

Acting Secretary Hoover has already discussed with you the concepts underlying the mutual security program as a whole.[2] My purpose today is to discuss in somewhat more detail the aspects of the program that relate to the European area.

With relatively minor exceptions, the proposed mutual security program in Europe is devoted entirely to military defense. More specifically, it is primarily designed to maintain and strengthen the defensive power of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Apart from a minor technical exchange program, no economic aid, defense support, or other economic-type assistance is being proposed for any of the NATO countries covered by the European section of this legislation. Economic-type assistance is requested only for two non-NATO countries—Spain and Yugoslavia—which face unusual economic difficulties in connection with their defense efforts. A moderate sum is also requested to meet special circumstances connected with the maintenance of our vital position in West Berlin.

This program is being put forward at a time when the contest between the Communist bloc and the free world has entered a new phase. Mr. Hoover has already described the rather striking shift in Soviet strategy and tactics, which seems to involve a de-emphasis of military techniques of aggression in favor of a stepped-up campaign to spread Communist power and influence by nonmilitary means. This change in tactics will have significant implications for our policies thro out the world. Free nations will be require give greater attention to erecting and maintai adequate political, economic, and psycholog defenses against communism, and to preser the unity which the Soviet bloc is trying so l to shatter. A large part of the mutual secu program now proposed, as Mr. Hoover has poi out, is designed to assist friendly nations of A Africa, and South America in economic deve ment. At the same time, we should not make fatal error of assuming that we can now ignore military potentialities of the Soviet bloc. Soviet military threat is still with us and is li to remain with us for a long time.

If we are correct in the supposition that Soviet rulers have indeed become more reluct to assume the suicidal risks of modern warf we have every reason to be pleased. Ameri interests will be served by doing whatever we to make sure that Soviet thinking continues al these lines. While we have no present grou for believing that basic Soviet objectives h altered, nor for assuming that the struggle to ch Communist political, economic, and psychologi penetration is likely to be short or easy, I th we all agree that this kind of struggle is infinit preferable to all-out military hostilities. Si the change in Soviet tactics has largely been duced by the growing strength and unity achie under our collective security policies, it is impe tive that these policies be continued without a modification of purpose or relaxation of effort.

However charming may be the smiles that ad the faces of Soviet diplomats, however melodi may be the siren songs of Communist propagan and however tempting may be the economic b

[1] Made before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on Mar. 27.

[2] For President Eisenhower's message to the Congress on the mutual security program for 1957 and a statement by Under Secretary Hoover, see BULLETIN of Apr. 2, 1956, p. 545. For a statement by John B. Hollister, see *ibid.*, Apr. 9, 1956, p. 605.

hich they are holding out to some of the less veloped nations, we cannot ignore the hard ct that the Soviet Union and its satellites are aintaining enormous military capabilities. They ve an overwhelming superiority in military manower, and they are making rapid strides in develping their potential for nuclear warfare. They e also making other ominous technological adances. All told, they possess the capacity to unch a dangerous military attack at any time, ther general or local. We have no assurance hatever that they will indefinitely refrain from litary adventures, particularly if military weakesses in neighboring nations should appear to fer them attractive opportunities for cheap conests. So long as the Soviet rulers retain and crease their *capacity* for military aggression, we nnot afford to base U.S. policies on their anounced *intentions*. We cannot gamble our very rvival upon the mysterious mental processes of e men in the Kremlin.

Every Member of the Congress is already faiiar with the size and cost of the national defense tablishment which the U.S. is maintaining for e purpose of deterring aggression. But we recnized long ago that the preservation of security d peace is not a task for the United States alone. is neither possible nor desirable that the burns of free-world defense should be borne exclvely by the American soldier and American xpayer. Therefore, it has been a major obtive of our foreign policy to supplement and inforce American defensive power by securing e cooperation of other free nations who share r determination to preserve peace and freedom d who are willing and able to contribute to the tainment of this objective. In brief, we have cognized that the only real security available ourselves or to anyone else is collective security.

The free nations of Europe represent a most portant source of support. The peoples of ese nations are skilled in modern technology d are capable of developing and using modern apons. They possess substantial industrial d economic resources. Because of their geoaphic position they are in a position to provide ses strategically situated for deterring or untering a Soviet attack. Most important of l, in my opinion, is the fact that these nations are our belief in freedom, our cultural and moral aditions, and our determination to make all asonable sacrifices to assure peace. We have therefore joined together with 14 nations in a common defense system, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Through this alliance, we are seeking to achieve an efficient combination and utilization of our individual resources in a manner that will increase the security of all.

Progress Under NATO

I have no hesitation in saying that NATO has been a highly successful undertaking. Within a relatively short period of time, the potential European contribution to international peace and security has been translated into actuality. We have faced many complex problems and difficulties, of course, and have many problems still ahead of us. When we look at the NATO program in the perspective of the past 7 years, however, we can see that remarkable progress has been made. This progress is reflected not only in the number of men under arms, the availability of weapons and equipment, the establishment of bases, the improvement of organization, training, and deployment, and similar advances of a strictly military nature, but also in the growth of general political cohesion. It is also noteworthy that the NATO defense buildup has been accomplished without producing an intolerable economic strain on any of the member governments. In fact, it has been accomplished during a period when the overall European economic position has been steadily improving.

On balance, 1955 has been a good year for NATO. Despite political difficulties encountered by certain governments and occasional disagreement among members of the alliance, the basic military operations of NATO have moved forward smoothly. These operations receive few headlines, since they are rarely spectacular. Once the major political and strategic decisions have been made, the day-to-day job of building, maintaining, and improving Western defenses has tended to become more routine and less exciting. But this job has lost none of its importance, and it is being done.

Probably the most notable event of 1955 was the final ratification of the Paris Agreement which restored sovereignty to the German Federal Republic and brought this great nation into the NATO family. The same agreements established the Western European Union, closely linked to NATO, to exercise special armament controls among the seven member countries. The signifi-

cance of this achievement goes beyond the addition to NATO of Germany's sizable military potential. Equally important was the fact that the Paris Agreements afford a new foundation for friendly and cooperative relations between France and Germany, which should do a great deal to consolidate the unity of the Atlantic community as a whole. It is not a coincidence that the radical transformation of Soviet tactics which paved the way for the two Geneva conferences began concurrently with the ratification of the Paris Agreements, thus affording a striking demonstration of the validity of our policies.

There have been other gratifying developments in the European area during 1955, some of which are only indirectly connected with the NATO program but all of which are intimately related to our overall policies of building strength and unity. One of the most important was the signing of the Austrian Treaty, after 8 years of wearisome negotiations with the Soviet Government. This treaty not only restored Austrian independence but had added significance as the first concrete indication of a change in Soviet tactics. It marked the first time since World War II that Soviet troops have taken a backward step.

Special attention is also being given to the political ties that bind the Atlantic allies. There were five NATO ministerial meetings during 1955, the largest number ever held in any one year. Three of these meetings were devoted primarily to general political consultation—to a broad exchange of views on international problems and individual attitudes toward these problems. I believe the consultations held before the two Geneva conferences, in particular, contributed materially to the solidarity of the Western governments in dealing with the issues considered at these conferences.

Soviet Efforts To Destroy Atlantic Alliance

It is no secret that the Soviet bloc is engaged in a major effort to divide and destroy the Atlantic alliance. The dissolution of NATO stands high on the Communist list of objectives, as demonstrated by their words and actions in nearly all recent international negotiations, including the summit conference. They are using every available means to stir up old rivalries and to magnify and exploit the minor differences that inevitably arise even among the closest allies. They are also seeking to delude members of the alliance into a relaxation of their defense efforts, both military and nonm tary, and to persuade them that neutrality o a cheaper and more comfortable course than tinued adherence to the Atlantic system.

It would be an excess of optimism to ass that these Communist maneuvers have no pros of achieving results. There *are* differences am allies. There *are* pressures in allied countrie in every democratic country, to relieve the payers of some of the burdens of defense. T *is* a certain amount of neutralist sentimen Western Europe. To some extent, all these th lend themselves to Communist exploitation. in terms of the policies and actions of allied ernments, it is noteworthy that the Soviet c paign of division and enticement has not produced any significant impact upon the soli ity of the Atlantic alliance. Not only did three Western governments at Geneva maint unshakable harmony on fundamental issues, their general viewpoint was also supported by other Atlantic partners. Nor have the new So tactics yet caused any noticeable relaxation in lied defense efforts. The combined defense penditures, for example, of the European N countries are expected to remain at approxima the same levels next year as this year.

European Integration

One very hopeful development in Europ the revival of the movement toward political economic integration among the European tions themselves. The Congress is already miliar with the successful establishment supranational authority over the production marketing of coal and steel. The movement ceived something of a setback when the plan a European Defense Community failed to rec parliamentary approval, but is now showing signs of life. Several eminent European sta men are currently working on proposals fo multinational pooling of atomic power and for further steps toward a broad common mar As you can understand, we are watching th efforts with the greatest interest and sympat There can be no doubt that the achievement c closely integrated European community wo tend to consolidate and strengthen the Atla alliance as a whole.

As Secretary Dulles has pointed out on m than one occasion, the most significant thing ab

Atlantic alliance is not so much what has pened as what has *not* happened. Before began, we were harassed by a long series of s in Europe, such as the Communist war in ce, the Berlin blockade, the Czechoslovak , military threats against Norway and Tur- and so forth. Since NATO came into being have been no military hostilities of any kind e European area and the Communists have gained a single inch of additional territory. nk this speaks for itself.

reciting the progress made through NATO, it t my purpose to imply that all our difficulties suddenly vanished. We will continue to a great many problems. NATO is not the kind peration that we can ever expect to wrap up forget about. It requires constant attention constant effort by all members of the alliance, ding ourselves.

ntenance of Military Defenses

he mutual security program proposed for fiscal 1957 is directed toward two of NATO's most sing and most continuous problems—the ntenance and the progressive modernization s military defenses. Even the best military em cannot stand still. Weapons and equip- t wear out or become obsolete, and military s require constant revision. These problems always existed, but they have been greatly nified by the incredible sweep of modern nology. While our information about the of Soviet scientific and technical advancement t as precise as we would like, we know enough certain that the continued value of free-world nse forces will depend largely upon our col- ive ability to maintain up-to-date equipment facilities, to replace wornout or obsolete items, to keep pace with the furious advances of nce and technology.

nother current defense problem receiving o attention, of course, is the buildup of Ger- military contingents. Since this buildup is inning from scratch, many different things e to be done, ranging from the enactment of legislation to the actual recruitment, organ- ion, equipment, and training of military forces. s process will necessarily be gradual, but steady gress is being made. The mutual security pro- n recommended for fiscal year 1957 contains dditional funds for the German buildup, since the currently planned U.S. contribution to this program has already been obligated from previous appropriations.

The military problems I have mentioned are now receiving intensive attention by NATO military planners. The Defense Ministers of all member countries, including Secretary of Defense Wilson, held a meeting in October to consider some of these problems, and a subsequent meeting of senior military authorities and the NATO commanders was completed in Paris around March 1. The central problem upon which both these meetings focused is the adaptation of the NATO defense system to the ever-changing requirements and techniques of modern warfare. This problem is gravely complicated by the limited financial resources available. While it is clear to all that this adaptation is essentially evolutionary and that no sudden and drastic displacement of either plans or machinery is in prospect, it is necessary that the process move forward with minimum delay.

Most of the funds requested for NATO during fiscal year 1957 fall under the heading of "maintenance." They will be used to service, repair, and replace facilities and equipment already produced and to provide training in the use of such equipment and facilities. Some of the funds, in addition, are designed to make more modern weapons and equipment available to our allies, with particular emphasis on the improvement of European air defenses and early warning systems.

Modernization of Military Defenses

There are approximately $525 million in this program set aside for advanced weapons, of which $195 million have already been planned for allocation to Europe. The value to the Europeans, both in military and in psychological terms, of acquiring guided missiles and more advanced types of aircraft and electronic equipment cannot be overestimated. Furthermore, it is to our own benefit that we make these more modern weapons available as a means of insuring that American troops in Europe will have at their side well-equipped forces equally able to mount an effective defense.

There is no question but that the Europeans have become increasingly concerned about the rapid changes in the technology of modern warfare and their limited ability to keep pace with the newer developments. Apart from the British and,

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to a lesser extent, the French, our European allies do not have the resources necessary to devote to the large-scale research and development of new weapons. Consequently, most European countries are looking primarily to the United States to help them keep pace with the growing capabilities of the Soviet bloc forces. By sharing the newer weapons as they are developed and produced, we can make it possible for them to participate more effectively in the defense of Western Europe and thus to strengthen the deterrent power of the alliance.

Officials of the Department of Defense will be prepared to give you more detailed information about the projected use of these funds and the military purposes to be served. I will confine myself to a few general observations. First, I think it is obvious that the NATO alliance, one of the mainstays of our security, can be preserved over a long period of time only if our European partners remain convinced that it offers them real protection and that their own contributions to the common defense serve a useful purpose. This conviction, in turn, will depend upon a reasonable assurance that their defense efforts will actually be meaningful within the context of modern instruments and techniques of warfare. Our allies already know that there are certain key items that they cannot produce for themselves and cannot readily accumulate the dollars to buy. Unless they are able to secure, maintain, and replace these things, they will feel that a large part of what they are able to do for themselves would be waste effort.

European Contribution to Mutual Security

I want to emphasize the fact that the things our allies are doing for themselves add up to a very substantial total. Two years ago Secretary Dulles pointed out that our European allies were spending for defense purposes the equivalent of three dollars from their own budgets for every dollar's worth of aid received from the United States. A recent analysis by my staff indicates that these countries are now spending the equivalent of *six* dollars of their own money for each dollar of U.S. aid received. Their total defense expenditures last year came to more than $12 billion, which is an altogether creditable showing for a group of nations whose combined gross national incomes add up to less than one-half of the U.S. national income. These expenditures, tog with the men they have placed under arm output of their factories and laboratories, an bases they have provided, add substantially security of the United States as well as the sec of Europe. It seems to me a matter of ord common sense—a sound business propositi you will—for the United States to continue viding certain weapons, equipment, and tra which will multiply the effectiveness of European efforts and produce more total de than would otherwise be available.

This is the fundamental justification fo whole program. Without the program o character and magnitude being requested, so these countries would undoubtedly feel that just couldn't accomplish enough to make efforts and sacrifices worth while. Some w lack many key items of equipment and w face insuperable difficulties in trying to balanced forces capable of effective action u modern conditions of warfare. The real d sive power produced by their own commitm of money and manpower would be greatl duced and there would be almost irresis temptation to reduce these commitments. final result would be a drastic weakening o whole Atlantic system. In terms of the defensive power available to America and the world, we would clearly lose more than we w save by not having this military assistance gram being requested.

Please understand that I am not making gl predictions. On the contrary, I believe the ge outlook in Europe is fairly bright. I only to emphasize the fact that NATO represents a mendous asset for the security of the entire world, including our own country. We hav ready made a large investment in protecting increasing the value of this asset. The pro now being presented to you is designed to certain that neither the investment nor the itself is lost.

Spain, Yugoslavia, Berlin

I mentioned earlier that a moderate porti the assistance proposed for the European ar fiscal year 1957 is designed to provide econ type support to certain non-NATO areas. The est amount is proposed for support of the Sp defense program. Spain's defense efforts

losely related to the U.S.–Spanish agreements for he construction and joint use of a series of im-ortant strategic air and naval bases. Therefore, ve have a considerable interest in the effective-ness of these efforts. We also recognize that Spain, which did not participate in the Marshall lan nor the early military defense assistance pro-grams, faces unusual economic difficulties in carry-ng out its defense plans.

A smaller amount is proposed to support Yugo-lav defense efforts. While Yugoslavia is not al-ied with the U.S., we have a definite interest in ugoslavia's ability to maintain the independent osition which it has achieved with great risk and acrifice. Yugoslavia is the only country that has uccessfully broken away from the Soviet camp. The measure of this success is best illustrated by he fervent campaign which the Soviet rulers are ow waging to entice Yugoslavia back into the Soviet spider's web. But the Yugoslavs know rom experience what this means, and their na-ion stands today as a vivid reminder to the satel-te areas that it is still possible for enslaved peoples o regain national existence. Yugoslavia is al-eady spending a larger percentage of its national ncome for defense than any other country in free Europe, and the moderate assistance contemplated n this program is intended to help Yugoslavia ontinue to maintain this defense program with-ut unbearable economic strain.

As in past years, we are also requesting special conomic assistance for programs in West Berlin. The strategic and psychological importance of this ey Western outpost is well known, especially to hose Members of the Congress who have had an pportunity to visit the area. West Berlin will ontinue to face extraordinary economic difficul-ies because of its geographic position, and we are letermined to provide all necessary support to al-eviate these difficulties and assure West Berlin's urvival.

In conclusion, I merely want to repeat my con-iction that the European section of the proposed nutual security program represents a good in-estment in our own national security. It has paid ff in the past and we have every reason to antici-pate that it will pay handsome dividends in the future.

Appointments to Advisory Group on Refugee Relief Program

The Department of State announced on April 9 (press release 182) that George Meany, President of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, and Joseph Gimma, partner in the New York investment firm of Hornblower & Weeks, had been appointed to the Public Advisory Group of the Refugee Relief Program.[1] Mr. Meany will be the official representative of the AFL–CIO; Mr. Gimma will serve as a public member.

Other members of the group are:

Msgr. Edward E. Swanstrom, National Catholic Welfare Conference, Chairman of the Refugee Relief Program Committee of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service

Roland Elliott, Director, Immigration Services, Church World Service, First Vice Chairman of the Refugee Relief Program Committee of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service

Miss Cordelia Cox, Lutheran Refugee Service, Second Vice Chairman of the Refugee Relief Program Committee of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service

Arthur Greenleigh, Executive Director, United HIAS Service, Inc.

Dr. William S. Bernard, Executive Director, American Federation of International Institutes, Inc.

Dr. Jan Papanek, President of the American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees, Inc.

Abram G. Becker, Executive Director, International Rescue Committee

Walter H. Bieringer, Canton, Mass., Vice President, Plymouth Rubber Company, and Chairman of the Massachusetts Governor's Committee for Refugees

Mrs. Dorothy D. Houghton, Red Oak, Iowa, former Deputy Director of the International Cooperation Administration

The Rev. Clyde N. Rogers, Columbus, Ohio, Ohio Council of Churches, and Chairman of the Ohio Governor's Committee for the Refugee Program

Clark L. Brody, Lansing, Mich., Executive Vice President of the Michigan Farm Bureau

[1] For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 29, 1955, p. 363.

Hungary Accepts U.S. Offer of Emergency Food Aid

Press release 191 dated April 12

Under the President's authorization, an offer of emergency food aid to victims in Hungary of the effects of the recent European cold wave was presented to the Hungarian Government on February 23, 1956.[1] The offer was not accepted at that time. In view of the increasing severity of flood conditions in that country and the consequent widespread hardships, it was renewed on March 23 by the American Minister to Hungary, Christian M. Ravndal.

The Hungarian Government informed Minister Ravndal on March 27 of its acceptance of the United States offer of food aid.

The U.S. Government is taking prompt steps, with the cooperation of the League of Red Cross Societies, to determine what existing need may be met under the emergency food-aid offer and to institute appropriate arrangements for carrying out such aid as soon as possible.

In undertaking this program, the U.S. Government is motivated by its friendly regard for the Hungarian people and by the traditional desire of the American people to alleviate suffering wherever it may occur.

Triangular Sales of Farm Products to Italy and Austria

The International Cooperation Administration announced on March 31 that it has arranged two "triangular" transactions involving sales of U.S. agricultural commodities to Italy and Austria. The local currencies generated by the sale of the agricultural commodities will finance the purchase of goods in Italy and Austria needed by other countries participating in the mutual security program.

Under agreements signed recently with Italy and Austria, each of the two nations will purchase up to $5 million worth of agricultural commodities, paying for them in local currencies. The lira and schilling proceeds of the sales will be deposited to the account of the U.S. Government. ICA will make these funds available to countries where the United States has defense or economic assistance programs which require commodit available in Italy and Austria. When purchas of such goods in Italy and Austria are agre upon, they will be financed with the U.S.-own lira and schilling funds and the "triangula transaction will be completed.

Procurement authorizations for the agricultu commodities to be sold to Italy and Austria w be issued later by ICA.

The agreements with Italy and Austria we made under section 402 of the Mutual Securi Act. This section requires that at least $300 m lion of the funds authorized for the mutual s curity program during the current fiscal year used to finance the sale of surplus U.S. agric tural commodities for foreign currencies. T local currency proceeds are to be used for mutu security purposes.

To date this year, more than $200 million these commodities have been authorized by I to more than a dozen countries.

[1] BULLETIN OF Mar. 5, 1956, p. 367.

U.S. Aid to Libya

Press release 184 dated April 9

In extended support of Libyan economic dev opment projects, to which it has been contributi since 1954, the U.S. Government will grant Lib $5 million from this fiscal year's mutual securi funds. This is in addition to the $12 million aid which the United States has provided Lib since 1954.

The United States has also informed Libya th it will grant that country another 5,000 tons relief grain, bringing the total help of this natu in fiscal year 1956 to 25,000 tons.

The Government of Libya has also been to that in fiscal year 1957 the U.S. Government wou be prepared, subject to congressional authoriz tion, to provide an additional $7 million in ec nomic development assistance, relief wheat needed up to 25,000 tons, and the military equi ment for expansion of the Libyan Army by additional 1,000 men after a U.S. military surv team has determined the requirements.

On being informed of the U.S. decision outlin above, the Libyan Prime Minister stated public on April 7:

"While making with pleasure and satisfacti this announcement of American aid, I feel it

y duty to emphasize the spirit of understanding nown by the American Government toward ibya's needs and the sincere collaboration ex-nded for meeting them.

"In the name of the Libyan Government and eople I extend my sincere thanks to the Govern-ent of the United States of America with our eep appreciation for their valued assistance hich will not fail to have far-reaching effects on ie progress of our country and on raising the andard of our people."

lew ICA Loan to Turkey

A loan of $25 million to Turkey was announced y the International Cooperation Administration n April 8. This brings the total of U.S. aid to urkey during the 1956 fiscal year, including rants and a gift of emergency food supplies, to 54,885,000. These funds are being used as llows:

—$37.5 million, composed of the $25 million an and a grant of $12.5 million, to finance the nport of commodities such as alloys, chemicals, harmaceuticals, and spare parts for industrial, ining, agricultural, and highway equipment and hicles.

—$2 million in technical cooperation grants.

—$14 million worth of emergency food supplies nated by the United States to stave off shortages sulting from recent floods, an earthquake, and disastrous fire. The food includes 40,000 tons wheat and quantities of butter, cheese, pow-red milk, flour, and rice taken from U.S. agri-ltural reserves.

—$1,385,000 as a grant to pay the costs of ocean ansportation for the emergency food shipments.

The agreement covering the loan was signed for rkey by Ambassador Haydar Gork. Signing r the United States was Samuel C. Waugh, pres-ent of the Export-Import Bank of Washington, hich administers ICA loans.

In announcing the $14 million gift of food sup-es on March 26, ICA said that, since January, 2000 tons of Turkey's grain supply had been dis-tbuted free to disaster victims; an additional fe distribution was to be made during March a l April. The wheat included in the U.S. gift would be used to replenish Turkish stocks from which the free distribution was made.

The other gift foods from the United States—3,600 tons of powdered milk, 2,615 tons of butter, 2,615 tons of cheese, 1,000 tons of flour, and 250 tons of rice—will be distributed free to needy persons. The food is being supplied under title II of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (P. L. 480).

The new loan agreement brings total economic aid to Turkey since the United States began providing such assistance in 1947 to more than one-half billion dollars. The United States has been helping Turkey in its efforts to improve the standard of living of its people and, at the same time, to assume increasing responsibility for the support of its defense efforts.

The greater part of U.S. aid to Turkey has been directed toward such projects as development and improvement of transportation, communications and power facilities, mineral resources, and the increase of industrial capacity. Aid also has been given in various agricultural fields, including improvement of farm management.

In the field of technical cooperation, a recent major project has been assistance in helping Turkey establish a new university at Erzurum in the eastern part of the country. This project is being carried out under contract with the University of Nebraska. Emphasizing education in the agricultural sciences, the new institution has been named Ataturk University in honor of Turkey's first president, Kemal Ataturk.

Vice President of Brazil To Visit U.S.

The Department of State announced on April 13 (press release 196) that Vice President João Goulart of Brazil will visit the United States during the period April 30–May 17, 1956. The invitation was extended on behalf of the U.S. Government by Vice President Nixon during Mr. Nixon's recent trip to Brazil.

Mr. Goulart will be an official guest of the U.S. Government in Washington during the period April 30–May 3 and will stay at Blair House. He then expects to make a private tour of several major U.S. cities.

The Inter-American Partnership

by Milton S. Eisenhower[1]

Three years ago, in this beautiful House of the Americas, President Eisenhower expressed his profound personal dedication to doing all he could to perfect the understanding and trust upon which the American community of nations must rest.

He stated also his desire to visit the other American Republics and know them better. Since he could not himself make a prolonged tour, he sent me as his personal representative to South America. Soon afterward he asked Vice President Nixon to make a similar good-will visit to Middle America.

I look upon my own tour of Latin America as one of the most rewarding experiences of my life. I had abundant opportunity to deepen my understanding of major problems in candid discussions with leaders of government, labor, business, agriculture, and cultural institutions. I observed and studied Latin America's remarkable achievements and thus came to appreciate Latin America's determination to be a mighty, progressive factor in the defense of freedom and the extension of peace. On the basis of a continental perspective developed on the trip I submitted, upon my return, numerous recommendations for strengthening hemispheric solidarity—recommendations which met with approval and were incorporated into United States policy.[2]

It is therefore with a renewal of the pride and pleasure I felt during the period of intensive work in 1953 that, again as the President's personal representative, I come here today to participate in these Pan American Day ceremonies.

[1] Address made at the Pan American Union, Washington, D.C., on Pan American Day, Apr. 14 (OAS press release). Mr. Eisenhower spoke as the personal representative of the President.

[2] BULLETIN of Nov. 23, 1953, p. 695.

It is especially gratifying to be with you w the Council is honoring a distinguished fe citizen who worked so diligently for hemisph cooperation, Cordell Hull. For him, contin cooperation among the Americas was a pilot p ect for all nations. Speaking of the inter-Am can system on this day 13 years ago, in this s House of the Americas, Secretary Hull decl that "the practice of equity is not a design f hemisphere but is a *rule for living* in a free peaceful world."[3]

Implicit in Mr. Hull's statement is a con that is fundamental to the foreign policy of United States as it applies to the other Amer Republics. It is the conviction that mutu helpful, friendly, and abiding relationships am all the American peoples are of transcendent portance and that these relationships do inc afford a working model for the rest of mankin

Historical Nature of Inter-American Cooperatio

It is not especially remarkable that one of Secretaries of State voiced this belief; but i significant that our Secretaries have been sa it generation after generation. Whichever of political parties has been in power, whoever been the incumbent of the White House, what has been the state of world affairs, we have hered firmly to the belief that on the hearth of American family of nations must burn a stead flame to warm and illuminate mankind.

Our first Secretary of State, Thomas Jeffer said, "We have the same object, the success representative government. Nor are we act for ourselves alone, but for the whole human ra

[3] *Ibid.*, Apr. 17, 1943, p. 322.

Secretary Elihu Root, at the Third Interna-onal Conference of American States in 1906, rged the American peoples to show the world at liberty is the twin sister of a just peace. "Let s unite," he urged, "in creating . . . and making fective an all-American public opinion whose ower shall influence international wrong, [and] ring us ever nearer to the perfection of ordered berty."

In 1925 Secretary Charles Evans Hughes em-hasized that hemispheric cooperation, while based n mutual self-interest of the American Republics, oes not isolate our peoples from the rest of the orld. On the contrary, he said, our hemispheric ooperation "in itself constitutes a most important ontribution to world peace."

And only last year Secretary John Foster Dulles xpressed this truth in another way here at the an American Union, saying: "This great inter-merican system, which was first a vision and a ream and then an expression of faith, has become n our time the most solid international organiza-on of free peoples on earth . . . beneficial to all ankind."[4]

biding Family Relationship

This persistent view of our Secretaries of tate—that the family relationship among the merican nations is of an abiding nature and is an xample for all mankind—has long been shared by ur Congress and our Chief Executives. Presi-ents Thomas Jefferson, John Quincy Adams, braham Lincoln, Herbert Hoover, Franklin D. oosevelt, Dwight D. Eisenhower—all have been spired by the power, the peaceful achievement, nd growing potential of the inter-American aternity of nations.

I have thought it worth while to emphasize the istorical nature of our friendship and coopera-on, for the overt propagandists and the covert bversives of today contend that ours is an hemeral solidarity; that there does not really ist a solid basis for continuing harmony; and at our mask of pretension will one day be cast ide to reveal the real creature, the hostile im-rialist. Nearly everyone in the Americas recog-zes this kind of talk for what it is: a calculated, alicious misrepresentation to serve the purposes a clever world conspiracy which holds our epest spiritual convictions in contempt and which seeks, by coercion and subversion, to control the destiny of mankind.

Our cooperation not only has a proud, long history; it also possesses the assurance of a beneficial future. For it is grounded firmly on mutuality in our relations. As I stated in my report to my brother and his associates in the Federal Government, our solidarity is based, *first* upon a genuine understanding of one another—an understanding that permeates not only governments but also the

[4] *Ibid.*, May 2, 1955, p. 728.

Solidarity of the Western Hemisphere

Press release 195 dated April 13

President Eisenhower has issued a proclamation[1] designating the period April 8–14 as Pan American Week, and Saturday, April 14, as Pan American Day. In his proclamation, the President calls attention to the fact that April 14 will mark the sixty-sixth anniversary of the founding of the Pan American Union, the forerunner of the great inter-American system now known as the Organization of American States.

During the past year there have been many examples of the friendly cooperation and common purpose which has been traditionally a hallmark of United States relations with the countries of this hemisphere. Several friendly visits were exchanged by representatives of our respective governments. A number of important new agreements were signed looking to the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy in the Western Hemisphere and providing for mutual economic and technical assistance.

The efficacy and great moral influence of the peace machinery of the OAS were again demonstrated when it was used successfully to bring about a solution of a difficult situation which had arisen between two of our neighbor governments.

Further progress was made in the construction of the Inter-American Highway in Central America, which now is expected to be completed within 2 years.

The United States on its part was privileged to lend assistance in connection with the floods which struck in parts of Mexico and Honduras, and the polio epidemic in Argentina. We ourselves received aid from several of our neighbor republics when floods and hurricanes hit our northeast coast in the summer of 1955.

The solidarity of the sister republics of this hemisphere is based on faith. First and foremost, it is faith in the institutions all are pledged to defend. Secondly, and equally, it is faith in one another. It is in such spirit that the governments and peoples of the 21 American Republics join together to celebrate this Pan American Week.

[1] BULLETIN of Apr. 2, 1956, p. 544.

great masses of all our peoples. It is based, *second*, upon the closely related requisites of mutual respect and the sovereign equality of states. This is especially important in relations between large and small, powerful and weak nations, for nations, like people, have dignity and pride; only if each respects the rights, aspirations, cultures, sensibilities, and equal legal rights of the others can there be permanence in their friendship. Our cooperation is based upon *another* fundamental: mutual security. This is imperative in our threatened world. This concept, indeed, originated among the American family of nations and was formalized, as all know, in the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro of 1947. And the *other* great requisite for our continuing cooperation is firm adherence to common goals—the goals of peace, liberty, independence, rising levels of well-being, and the attainment of spiritual values.

But while we may be satisfied that the elements of our hemispheric unity are correct and firmly established, we recognize that much remains to be done, and no doubt always will remain to be done, if our unity is to yield the constructive results we all desire.

Fortunately, much has been accomplished in the past several years to improve relationships; especially has a great deal been done to improve mutual understanding and to strengthen economic cooperation.

Heightened U.S. Interest

Never has interest in my country in all phases of inter-American relations been so widespread as it is now. This heightened interest was no doubt caused to some extent by the anxiety our people felt for a time at the Communist threat that was so narrowly averted in one American nation.

But it is due also, I am sure, to an increasing awareness of our economic, political, military, and cultural interdependence; to the widespread publicity given to the inter-American conferences at Caracas, Rio, and Ciudad Trujillo; to the swift steps taken by the Organization of American States to settle quickly three serious disputes among member nations; to a tremendous increase in the exchange-of-persons programs, and to the modest additional support of American schools in Latin America; to the most welcome visits to the United States of the President of Uruguay, the President of Guatemala, the President-elect Brazil, the President of Mexico, and the Pri Minister of Canada; to the visits of our V President to Middle America and Brazil; and the visits of our Assistant Secretary of State every Republic of Latin America.

In addition to meetings at high official leve genuine mutual understanding is being contir ally enhanced by the exchange of literally th sands of students, business and professional m and women, and a rising tide of tourists.

The United States Information Agency has panded its programs of intellectual and cultu cooperation in Latin America. More books th ever before are being translated from Portugu and Spanish into English, and vice versa. La American music has invaded the theaters, clu and homes of my country as a welcome retaliati for the infiltration of United States jive and ro and-roll into every nook and corner of the La American Republics. And at this moment, exh its of Argentinean, Chilean, Peruvian, Venezuel and Caribbean arts are being shown in ma parts of the United States.

Most of all, however, mutual understanding being increased through the growing volume material in the press and on the radio and te vision; in every country of the American co munity our people are being exposed to inform tion and ideas about all the other countries of t hemisphere.

Increased understanding and mutual respe valuable in themselves, have also effectiv strengthened economic cooperation—the real k to better relations among our countries a peoples.

Consistent Economic Programs

The most important recommendation I made my report to the President nearly 3 years ago w that the United States adopt and adhere to tra policies with Latin America which possess st bility and a minimum of mechanisms permitti the imposition of increased tariffs or quotas. emphasized that real cooperation in this hem sphere can flow only from intelligent adherence consistent economic programs, honorably a continuously observed.

I can proudly say today that both by congr sional enactments and by firm policies establish by the executive branch of the United States G

rnment, greater stability has been infused into our rade, financial, and other economic relationships. Assurance of access to the great market of the 'nited States, with a minimum of changes in the ules, is the most effective guaranty of economic tability in Latin America. Similar assurance hat the other nations of this hemisphere can coninue to buy much of our surplus production is an ssential of economic prosperity in the United States.

In the last several years, too, the United States Government has recognized that public and priate lending for sound development projects must o forward on a substantial scale. Production and roductivity are increasing more rapidly in Latin America than anywhere else in the world. This dvance creates an insatiable demand for capital.

We of the United States are placing greatest eliance, as we should, upon a flow of private apital for investment. That flow can be encourged best by the Latin American nations themelves. Nonetheless, the United States has anounced repeatedly in the last several years that favors public loans to finance those sound projcts for which private financing is not available. ndeed, we have assured all nations of Latin America that we will do everything we can to atisfy all applications for sound economic-delopment loans for which capital is not reasonbly available either from private sources or from e International Bank. Both the Export-Imort Bank and the International Bank, I am told, ave ample funds to lend; indeed, they are prepared to process applications greatly in excess of ose now on hand.

Since its creation in 1934, the Export-Import ank has authorized loans totaling more than 2,500,000,000. Some 20 months ago the Bank nnounced a new policy designed to expand its tivities in Latin America. In the next full ear, loans to Latin America increased by more an 500 percent to $284,000,000, or 58 percent of e Bank's total loans. The Export-Import Bank n be counted on to continue to make important ontributions to the economic development of this emisphere.

Inter-American cooperation is developing proams of atomic energy for peaceful purposes—operation which may one day be recognized as significant turning point in history. For nuear science may bring productive energy to any nations which now suffer a serious deficiency and which are constantly having difficulty with foreign exchange because of the imperative need to import oil, coal, and other fuels.

Truly impressive progress has been made on the construction of the Inter-American Highway; through greatly increased appropriations the United States is contributing a major share of the cost of what may soon become the most traveled artery of the Americas. Additional programs of technical assistance have been worked out in education, agriculture, public health, and related fields.

Many of our countries, the United States among them, have suffered in recent years from such natural disasters as floods, hurricanes, and epidemics of disease; all countries, including the United States, have received prompt and generous assistance from other American peoples. This aid has been, indeed, a persuasive demonstration of the heart of America.

It is a long story, this story of inter-American cooperation for better health, better education, better living conditions; for peace, for freedom, for order, and for independence.

It has been said, and justly said, that inter-American neighborliness is not only the policy of the American governments but also a state of mind of all our peoples. I am sure this is so. But while we have made traditional the practice of proclaiming this fact anew every year on Pan American Day, I believe all of us here would agree that this attitude must in fact guide our actions every day of every year.

Good Partners

So far as the United States is concerned, I think I may confidently say that our state of mind in this regard is better than ever before. The development is sufficient that we have had to find words to describe our thinking. We have gradually dropped the phrase "good neighbor" and have substituted, with sincerity, the phrase "good partner."

This signifies much more than a difference of words. It underscores a new approach to the problems we share.

As neighbors, each American Republic tried in the economic field to adopt policies and follow courses which would not prejudice the interests of the other members of the total community. Each sought in good faith to respond construc-

tively to requests for cooperation and assistance from others. In the United States the good-neighbor policy gave a new and meaningful direction to our hemispheric programs and relations.

That policy has logically carried us to the relationship that exists and must exist between us today—a relationship which is so close that it can no longer accurately be described as that of neighbors. So interdependent are our destinies today that each American Republic must recognize its direct, continuing, and even selfish interest in the solution of the critical problems of every other member of the family. We must now be dependable, honorable *partners* in a great and lasting enterprise—the peaceful independence, the prosperity, and the happiness of all our peoples—peoples with great and marvelous cultural diversity but with equally great and inescapable interdependent goals.

In the spirit of partnership we have in recent years made substantial progress toward better understanding and mutual respect, and improved political, military, and economic cooperation. That must give us all deep satisfaction. As I said in concluding my report on Latin America to President Eisenhower:

"Working together, the nations of this Hemisphere can, if history should so decree, stand firmly against any enemy in war, and prosper mightily together in times of peace."

World Trade Week, 1956

A PROCLAMATION[1]

WHEREAS it is the continuing desire of the people of the United States to strengthen our ties of friendship with all nations of the free world and to foster understanding and cooperation among them; and

WHEREAS international trade, travel, and investment make vital contributions to international stability and the mutual development of resources, security, and culture; and

WHEREAS the expansion of international social, cultural, and business relationships promotes the unity and solidarity of the nations of the free world; and

WHEREAS the national interest requires that we join with friendly nations in dealing with our trade problems on a cooperative basis:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim the week beginning May 20, 1956, as World Trade Week; and I request the appropriate officials of the Federal Government and of the several States, Territories, possessio and municipalities of the United States to cooperate the observance of that week.

I also urge business, labor, agricultural, education and civic groups, as well as people in the United Stat generally, to observe World Trade Week with gatherin discussions, exhibits, ceremonies, and other appropria activities designed to promote continuing awareness the importance of world trade to our economy and o relations with other nations.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand a caused the Seal of the United States of America to affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this twenty-four day of March in the year of our Lord ninete [SEAL] hundred and fifty-six, and of the Independen of the United States of America the one hundr and eightieth.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

By the President:
JOHN FOSTER DULLES
Secretary of State

[1] No. 3130; 21 *Fed. Reg.* 1953.

Western Europe Cuts Curbs on Dollar-Area Imports

The International Cooperation Administratio announced on March 28 that substantial progre in relaxing restrictions on imports into Wester Europe from the dollar area had been reporte that day by the Organization for European Ec nomic Cooperation. As of January 1, 1956, som 54 percent of all private imports by the 17 OE member countries from the United States an Canada, based on their dollar value, were free c quantitative restrictions. This compares wit only 11 percent free of such restrictions at th beginning of 1953.

The progress report brought an expression c approval from John B. Hollister, Director of th International Cooperation Administration, wh headed the U.S. delegation to the recent OE Council meeting at Paris.

"This report," said Mr. Hollister, "constitut positive evidence that Western European cou tries are following through on their commitme under the General Agreement on Tariffs an Trade, to remove restrictions on imports as the external financial position improves. The Unite States Government is pleased to note this progre in Western Europe."

On the whole, the level of liberalization has been gher for food and feedstuffs and for raw mate- al than for manufactured goods.

For the first 9 months of 1955, member coun- ies' total imports from the United States and anada were 40 percent above those of the cor- sponding period in 1954, while their total im- orts from all sources showed a 15 percent rise.

The increase in dollar imports contributed to enlargement of the trade deficit with the nited States and Canada, since member country ports did not increase correspondingly. How- er, there was an overall increase in gold and ollar holdings in 1955 by more than $800 million, ie primarily to American military expenditures.

With regard to so-called "invisible" transac- ons, such as payments for services and ware- ousing charged for goods in international trade, turns on foreign investments, business travel, c., the report indicates that liberalization with spect to the dollar area is more general and more tensive than in the case of commodity trade.

The OEEC report is entitled *Liberalization of urope's Dollar Trade.* It is based on replies of ember countries to a questionnaire, on docu- ents relating to commercial policies, and on dis- issions between government representatives from ie United States, Canada, and the Western Euro- ean countries.

OEEC member countries are Austria, Belgium, enmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ire- nd, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Nor- ay, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and ie United Kingdom. Canada and the United tates are associate members.

ariff Negotiations With Finland, rance, Dominican Republic

ess release 194 dated April 12

The United States has concluded negotiations ith the Dominican Republic, Finland, and rance whereby these countries withdrew or modi- d under article XXVIII of the General Agree- ent on Tariffs and Trade a number of tariff con- ssions previously granted to the United States. lthough no changes in U.S. tariff rates were in- olved, the negotiations permitted the United tates to obtain new concessions from the three untries designed to offset the concessions with- drawn or modified and to maintain the previous level of reciprocal concessions.

At specified but infrequent intervals and in accordance with established procedures, the contracting parties of the general agreement are permitted to withdraw or modify tariff concessions previously granted. These concessions are either reductions in tariff rates or agreements not to increase these rates. In such cases, the contracting party with whom the concession was originally negotiated or any other contracting party having a substantial trade interest in the concessionary item has the right to negotiate for new concessions with the objective of reestablishing the previous level of concessions.

In such negotiations a variety of factors is considered in assessing the compensatory concessions offered for those withdrawn or modified. The trade value of the products affected is one item. Another is the extent and severity of modifications and withdrawals contrasted with the probable trade-expansion potential of the compensatory concessions which might be granted. The existence and operation of quantitative restrictions may also be significant, as well as different methods of valuing the same product, i. e., whether as an import on the one hand or as an export on the other. An examination of all pertinent factors is, therefore, conducted before a new balance is struck in order to assure that compensatory offers in reality maintain the existing level of reciprocal concessions.

United States participation in these negotiations was guided by the recommendations of the Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements, the group which advises the President on trade agreement matters.

A summary of the principal changes involved in the present set of negotiations follows.[1]

Dominican Republic. The Dominican Republic modified three concessions made to the United States relating to paints and varnishes. With regard to varnishes, the modification consisted wholly in revising the Dominican tariff classification of this commodity, breaking up the previous "basket" item into a number of categories,

[1] For details, see Department of State publication 6324. Results of similar negotiations with 16 other countries will be found in Department of State publications 5881, 6001, 6201, and 6291.

without increasing the duty for any of the component parts. The paint and pigment category was similarly revised, but duties in this instance were, in general, increased. Imports by the Dominican Republic from the United States for this latter group of paints and pigments were $559,000 in 1954.

To compensate for these increases, the Dominican Republic reduced concessionary rates already granted on six items and provided new concessions on five items. Imports from the United States of these 11 items by the Dominican Republic in 1954 amounted to $543,000, of which the most important were cigarette tobacco and wheat semolina.

Finland. Finnish rates of duty on 17 items, directly negotiated with the United States, were increased and rebound at the higher rates. In 1954 Finland imported nearly $600,000 of all of these items from the United States, the most important being certain varieties of fruit preserves and preparations, compressors and air pumps, and miscellaneous machinery and apparatus.

In return, Finland made concessions on 11 items. In four instances duties were reduced and rebound; in seven, concessions on new items were gr ınted. Imports from the United States of these 11 items by Finland amounted to $819,000 in 1954. Lubricating oils and tinned sheet iron and steel comprised the principal part of this trade.

France. Of the 14 tariff concessions modified by France, six were originally negotiated with the United States. All of these modifications increased French import duties. According to French statistics for 1953, the latest data supplied, imports of these items from the United States amounted to $283,000, the preponderant part being unsweetened fruit and vegetable juices. United States trade data showed exports of $238,000 for all 14 items to France in 1954.

As compensation, France reduced duties on four items and bound rates on two others. French statistics indicated imports of these items from the United States to be $1,791,000 in 1953, most of them being fresh oranges. United States statistics for 1954 listed exports of $466,000 for all of these items, fresh oranges again ranking as the principal item. As an additional concession, France agreed not to seek compensation for the United States withdrawal in August 1955 of its tariff concession on bicycles.

Continuation of Rate of Duty on Imports of Hatters' Fur

White House press release dated March 29

The President on March 29 concurred wi the Tariff Commission's recent finding that formal investigation should be instituted at tl time to determine whether the tariff should reduced on imports of hatters' fur.[1] The Pre dent found, with the Tariff Commission, th there is no sufficient reason at this time to reop the escape-clause action which resulted in an i crease of the duty on imports of hatters' fu The President's decision means that the increas rate of duty established in 1952 as a result escape-clause action will continue to apply wit out reduction or other modification.

The President's action was taken after the vie of all interested departments and agencies of t executive branch had been received and studie The Tariff Commission's report was made pu suant to Executive Order 10401, which requi periodic review of actions taken under the esca clause. It was transmitted to the President February 6, 1956.

The tariff on hatters' fur was reduced as t result of trade agreement negotiations in 19 and again in 1948. Effective February 9, 19 the tariff on imports of hatters' fur was increas as the result of an escape-clause action to its pr ent rate of 47½¢ per pound but not less than percent nor more than 35 percent ad valorem.

The Tariff Commission's report constitutes third periodic review of the escape-clause acti taken on this product.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference

The Department of State announced on Ap 11 (press release 187) that the U.S. Governme will be represented at the Inter-American P and Harbor Conference, which will meet at S José, Costa Rica, April 25–May 6, 1956, by

[1] Copies of the Tariff Commission's report may be tained from the U.S. Tariff Commission, Washington D.C.

·legation composed of the following representa-
ves of U.S. Government agencies and of private
roups concerned with port administration and
aritime transportation:

hairman

harles P. Nolan, Officer in Charge, Transportation and Communications, Office of Regional American Affairs, Department of State

ce Chairman

oward J. Marsden, Chief, Division of Port Development, Maritime Administration, Department of Commerce

dvisers

njamin P. Clark, Commander, USCG, Chief, Port Security Section, United States Coast Guard, Department of the Treasury

Eugene Kennedy, Assistant Collector of Customs, Baltimore, Md., Department of the Treasury

orge J. Leovy, American Merchant Marine Institute, New York, N.Y.

bert E. Mayer, President, Pacific American Steamship Association, San Francisco, Calif.

atthew C. O'Hearn, American Merchant Marine Institute, Washington, D.C.

rrold P. Turner, President, American Association of Port Authorities, Mobile, Ala.

The purpose of the meeting is to bring together
ualified technical experts of the American Re-
iblics to discuss matters relating to port admin-
ration, port practices and regulations, terminal
eration (including warehousing), cargo han-
ing, cargo loss prevention, port congestion, port
odernization, and free-trade zones.

larshall Islanders' Petition
n Nuclear Tests in Pacific

ATEMENT BY BENJAMIN GERIG [1]

The United States delegation has just been in-
rmed by the Department of State that a petition
ncerning the forthcoming nuclear tests to be
ld at the Pacific Proving Grounds was received
the chairman of the Visiting Mission from the
arshallese Congress Hold-Over Committee.

In accordance with rule 84, paragraphs 1 and 2,
e original was sent to the Secretary-General
and a copy to the United Nations Acting High Commissioner of the Pacific Trust Territory. We assume that the original has been or will shortly be received by the Secretary-General and will be made available to the Trusteeship Council.

The petitioners in effect reiterate their petition of April 20, 1954,[2] expressing the desire that the nuclear tests should cease or that, if considered necessary in the interest of world peace and security, should be conducted with all feasible precaution. I may say parenthetically that all such precautions are being taken.

Mr. President, we can all understand the feelings of these people, and we share with them the hope that a fully safeguarded disarmament program, including an "open sky" agreement, will be reached which will make such testing unnecessary. Although we have already discussed the essentials of this problem and although the petition raises no new questions, the United States delegation wishes to make clear that it is prepared to have the Council discuss the petition at the present session if it desires to do so.[3]

OBSERVATIONS OF THE U. S. GOVERNMENT AS ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY [4]

Nothing would please the Administering Authority more than to be able to comply with the wishes of the Marshallese people that nuclear tests be discontinued in their islands, but this is not yet possible. The Marshallese people can, however, be assured that the decision to hold further tests in these islands was considered a matter of such gravity that it was taken by President Eisenhower himself. Moreover, it was not taken until very careful and comprehensive studies were made that

[1] Made in the Trusteeship Council on Mar. 20 (U.S./
N. press release 2371). Mr. Gerig is Deputy U.S. Rep-
entative in the Trusteeship Council.

[2] BULLETIN of June 7, 1954, p. 887.

[3] On Mar. 29 the Council, by a vote of 9 to 4, approved the proposal of its Standing Committee on Petitions (U.N. doc. T/L. 649) that the Council draw to the petitioners' attention the observations of the Administering Authority; reaffirm its resolution of 1954; and recommend that all necessary measures should be taken "to guard against any possible dangers," "to settle forthwith all justified claims by the inhabitants of Bikini and Eniwetok relating to their temporary displacement" in connection with the earlier nuclear tests which were held in the Pacific Proving Grounds in 1954, and "to compensate the families which may have to be temporarily evacuated, for any losses which may result from further nuclear weapons tests."

[4] U.N. doc. T/OBS.10/5 dated Mar. 26.

convinced him that there was at present no practicable alternative.

Under President Eisenhower's leadership, the United States is earnestly seeking, along with other Governments, a fully safeguarded disarmament agreement which would make such tests unnecessary. Until such an agreement has been reached and as long as there is the threat of aggression, elementary prudence requires the United States to continue its tests. It is the conviction of the United States that it has a responsibility not only to its people but to all the peoples of the free world to maintain at a maximum its capacity to deter aggression and preserve peace. Thus it believes that, under present circumstances, further tests are, in the words of the petitioners, "absolutely necessary for the eventual well being of all the people of this world".

The question remains as to whether such tests could not be conducted elsewhere than in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. An exhaustive examination of alternative sites in the United States and in other parts of the world was undertaken. The conclusion reached was that there was no other technically suitable site available to the United States where such complete safeguards against possible hazards could be taken.

Even after this conclusion was reached, there was no decision to hold further tests in the islands until a system of precautionary measures was worked out that gave convincing assurance that no human being, inhabitant of the Trust Territory or otherwise would be in any way endangered by the tests.

Thus the Administering Authority believes that, although the United States Government is regrettably unable to comply with the first request of the petitioners, so far as is humanly possible the authorities are complying with the second, namely that "all possible precautionary measures be taken before such weapons are exploded".

To begin with, a danger area has been established. The boundaries of this area and the date they become effective have been continually publicized since 1 March by all available means, not only in the Trust Territory but to all parts of the world. Every effort has been made to see that the people of the Trust Territory, as well as all other people, are aware well in advance that it will be dangerous to enter this area after 20 April. Such warnings alone will not be relied on. Elaborate sea and air patrols before each test will e conducted to make sure that no vessel or aircr t has strayed into the area.

The Administering Authority would like to - fer to the statement on 12 January 1956 of e Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission o the effect that

> The forthcoming series of nuclear tests at the Eni- tok Proving Grounds, as announced today by the C- mission and the Department of Defense, will inv e weapons generally smaller in yield than those tes d during the 1954 test series.
>
> It is anticipated that the energy release of the lar t test will be substantially below that of the maxim n 1954 test.

The timing of all test shots will be govern i by the judgement of weather experts assisted v new devices and techniques. The precauti s that will be taken will ensure that "fallout" v l occur only in the danger area, which does not - clude inhabited islands.

Among the steps that will be taken are e following:

1. Improved techniques will provide for m e reliable weather predictions. The number f weather stations in the Pacific will be increas . aircraft will fly at high altitude to collect weat l r data and new type weather balloons and rock s will ascend to greater altitudes to gather weat l r data. Recently developed computers have me - anized most of the computational problems f predicting *fallout* patterns, permitting foreca s to be made much more rapidly than heretofo .

2. Following each detonation, aerial flights v l be initiated to accomplish a quick radiologi l survey of the islands and surrounding seas.

3. There will be U.S. Air Weather Service a l U.S. Public Health Service personnel present a sixteen islands for monitoring purposes. Tl y will be equipped with adequate radiological m - itoring devices and two-way radios. These islan s are as follows: Rongerik, Tarawa, Wotho, Utir , Majuro, Kusaie, Ujelang, Midway, Kwajalein, I o Jima, Guam, Johnson, Truk, Wake, Ponape, a d Rongelap.

4. Radioactive clouds caused by the tests v l be tracked by airplanes to check on their course

In paragraph 2 (a) of their petition the M - shallese request that "all human beings and th r valuable possessions be transported to safe d - tances first, before such explosions occur". It v l not be necessary to evacuate any of the Marshall e

ople from their present homes prior to the tests. is fully expected that no evacuation will be lled for during or after the tests, but in con-rmity with good planning complete plans have en prepared for emergency evacuation of the habitants.

In paragraph 2 (b) the petitioners request that ll the people living in this area be instructed in fety measures", and in paragraph 2 (d) they k that "courses be taught to Marshallese Medical ractitioners and Health-Aides which will be use-l in the detecting of and the circumventing of eventable dangers". These requests are being et in the following way: Scientific personnel who e trained radiological monitors equipped with diation detection devices and two-way radios d fully acquainted with the necessary safety ecautions will be stationed on the sixteen islands entioned above. Medical doctors will also be the area. Prior to and during the new series tests training will be given to Marshallese med-l practitioners and health aides in all necessary ecautionary measures.

In paragraph 2 (c) the petitioners request that dequate funds be set aside to pay for the pos-ssions of the people in case they will have to be oved from their homes. This will include lands, uses and whatever possessions they cannot take th them, so that the unsatisfactory arrange-ents for the Bikinians and Enewetak people all not be repeated." It is not anticipated that y of the inhabitants will have to be moved from eir homes; however, should this prove necessary should the inhabitants suffer any other hard-ip as a result of the tests, adequate funds as well other facilities will be available to make appro-iate compensation.

The United States is pleased to note the peti-oners' opinion that the people of Rongelap, who ere evacuated from their homes after the last ts, have been well cared for by the Administer-g Authority in their temporary location at Ejit. e United States Special Representative de-ribed in some detail to the sixteenth session of the uncil [5] the measures being taken to care for the splaced Rongelapese. He made clear that the dministration is at the same time acutely aware at these temporary arrangements do not provide ormal existence for these people. He indicated at it was the Administration's intention to repatriate them as soon as scientific surveys indicate that there will be no danger to the inhabitants in so doing. Several such surveys have been made, one very recently, and it is now hoped that this move can be made in the early autumn.

One of the most difficult questions referred to by the petitioners is that of the land claims in the Marshall Islands, including those of the people of Bikini and Eniwetok. It is true that in the complicated process of settling land claims in the Territory greater progress has been made in other districts than in the Marshall Islands District. This situation results from greater availability of land in these other areas than in the Marshalls. Recently, however, agreement has been reached within the United States Government on general terms under which compensation in the Marshalls and elsewhere will be possible. Administrative arrangements are now being worked out pursuant to this agreement in order to permit early satisfaction of the claims. It should be recalled, however, that both the Bikini and Eniwetok people have been relocated on other land that has been deeded to them and have been given considerable assistance in their resettlement and readjustment.

The Administering Authority deeply appreciates the friendly sentiments towards the United States expressed by the petitioners, all of them members of the Marshallese Congress. The Administering Authority hopes that, despite the hard decision that the United States Government has felt obliged to make, the other measures described will reassure them that the Administering Authority is exercising its trust with the highest possible sense of responsibility, conditioned only by its broader responsibility for world peace and security.

PETITION FROM MARSHALLESE CONGRESS HOLD-OVER COMMITTEE [6]

Letter From Sir John Macpherson [7] to U.N. Secretary-General

Majuro, 11 March 1956

In accordance with rule 84 paragraph 1 of the rules of procedure of the Trusteeship Council, I have the honour to transmit to you a communication dated 9 March 1956 from the Marshallese Congress Hold-Over Committee which was received by the Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories in the Pacific.

[5] BULLETIN of July 25, 1955, p. 153.

[6] U.N. doc. T/PET. 10/29 dated Mar. 20.

[7] Chairman of U.N. Visiting Mission.

A copy of this communication has been transmitted to the Acting High Commissioner of the Trust Territory.

In transmitting the present communication to the Secretary-General, the Mission wishes to record the circumstances in which it was received.

On 8 March 1956, the Mission held a meeting at Majuro with the members of the Marshallese Congress Hold-Over Committee in the course of which a wide range of matters came under discussion. The Committee stated that the people of the Marshall Islands had been informed officially that further nuclear tests would take place in the near future in the Trust Territory. The Committee wished to go on record before the Visiting Mission that they reiterated the position they had taken when they presented their petition in April 1954, namely: (a) that nuclear explosion tests in the Marshalls be discontinued; (b) that if these experiments were absolutely necessary for the eventual well-being of all the people of the world and could not take place elsewhere, all measures enumerated in their petition (T/PET. 10/28) should be taken.

On the following day the Mission held a private meeting of its own to discuss several matters. During this meeting, doubts were expressed as to whether it was the intention of the Hold-Over Committee that their statement should be brought to the attention of the Trusteeship Council prior to the completion of the Visiting Mission's report. In order to clarify the situation, the Mission called in a representative of the Hold-Over Committee who stated that the Committee wished to have its views brought to the immediate attention of the Trusteeship Council and was prepared to put them in writing. On 10 March the Mission received the present communication.

The Mission also desires to record that during a discussion with him, the Acting High Commissioner informed the Mission that all possible precautions were being taken to ensure the safety and the well-being of the people in the vicinity of the test area.

It is requested that the present letter be transmitted to the members of the Trusteeship Council at the same time as the attached communication.

JOHN MACPHERSON

Text of Petition

March 9th, 1956

To: The United Nations Visiting Mission

From: The Marshallese Congress Hold-Over Committee

Subject: Re-iteration of the Marshallese people's petition to the United Nations, dated April 20th, 1954, regarding the explosion of lethal weapons within our home islands.

In view of the official announcement to the Marshallese people of the coming nuclear test in this area in the not too distant future, we, the members of the Marshallese Congress Hold-Over Committee and other interested leaders of our people re-iterate our petition of April 20th, 1954, which dealt with the explosion of lethal weapons within our home islands.

Our petition emphatically stated that:

1. All the experiments with lethal weapons wit this area be immediately ceased.

2. If the experiments with said weapons should judged absolutely necessary for the eventual well being all the people of this world and cannot be stopped changed to other areas due to the unavailability of oth locations, we then submit the following suggestions:

(a) All possible precautionary measures be taken fore such weapons are exploded. All human beings a their valuable possessions be transported to safe distanc first, before such explosions occur.

(b) All the people living in this area be instructed safety measures. The people of Rongelab would ha avoided much danger if they had known not to dri the waters on their home island after the radio-acti dusts had settled on them.

(c) Adequate funds be set aside to pay for the p sessions of the people in case they will have to be mov from their homes. This will include lands, houses a whatever possessions they cannot take with them, that the unsatisfactory arrangements for the Bikinia and Enewetak people shall not be repeated.

(d) Courses be taught to Marshallese Medical Pra titioners and Health-Aides which will be useful in t detecting of and the circumventing of preventat dangers.

Our request Number 1 was not heeded, another te will soon be made. Request Number 2, to some degre has been taken care of to the satisfaction of the Ma shallese people. The Rongelab people are well subsist and housed, and the medical care rendered them is e cellent, yet, they are still on the small island of Eji but together with the Administering Authority, the r sponsible Rongelab leaders, and other Marshallese reali that long living in an abnormal existence is detriment to their society. They were told that they will soon going back to their home island, Rongelab, and with the the other Marshallese are looking forward to the fulfi ment of this promise.

Bikini and Enewetak, like all the other land clain in the Marshall Islands, have not been compensated fo or returned to the owners. We should like to repeat he that, "Land means a great deal to the Marshallese. means more than just a place where you can plant yo food crops and build your houses; or a place where y can bury your dead. It is the very life of the peopl Take away their land and their spirits go also."

Therefore, we, the members of the Marshallese Co gress Hold-Over Committee, who are empowered by t Marshallese Congress to act in its name when it is n in session and which is in turn a group of membe representing all the municipalities in the Marshalls, d to the undiminishing threat to our life, liberty, happine and possession of land, do hereby submit this docume to the United Nations Visiting Mission with the reque that they send this on to the United Nations Truste ship Council as soon as possible, which with its knowled of our great concern may then act on our urgent plea a take all steps within its power to help remedy the sit ation.

In closing, we, the members of the Marshallese Co gress Hold-Over Committee want to make it very clear

United Nations Visiting Mission that this should not interpreted as a reflection of the Trust Territory ernment's deliberate ill-treatment of the Marshallese ple or be misconstrued as a repudiation of the United tes as our governing agency for the United Nations er the trusteeship Agreement, for aside from repeat- our plea to have the nuclear tests within our home nds stopped as we are fearful of the danger these al weapons can and have inflicted on people living in Marshalls, and the deep concern we have for the ber of people who have been dispossessed of land, have found the Administering Authority the most eable one we ever had.

Respectfully submitted,

ABUA KABUA	7. HENRY SAMUEL
TLAN ANIEN (absent)	8. JIBLOCK
WIGHT HEINE	9. AISEIA DAVID
OBERT REIMERS	10. AMATA KABUA
. DOMINICK	11. LAZARUS SIMON (absent)
AMU ERMIS (absent)	12. LAJIBILI (absent)

rrent U.N. Documents: Selected Bibliography

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International Co-operation with respect to Water Resource Development. Report by the Secretary-General. E/2827, February 23, 1956. 43 pp. mimeo.

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Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Bills of Lading

International convention for unification of certain rules relating to bills of lading, and protocol of signature. Done at Brussels August 25, 1924. Entered into force June 2, 1931. 51 Stat. 233.
Accession deposited: Turkey, July 4, 1955.

Cultural Property

Convention for protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict, and regulations of execution. Done at The Hague May 14, 1954.[1]
Ratifications deposited: San Marino, February 9, 1956; Burma, February 10, 1956.

Protocol for the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict. Done at The Hague May 14, 1954.[1]
Ratifications deposited: San Marino, February 9, 1956; Burma, February 10, 1956.

Genocide

Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. Done at Paris December 9, 1948. Entered into force January 12, 1951.[2]
Ratification deposited: Burma, March 14, 1956.

BILATERAL

Chile

Agreement providing an interim arrangement for certain transactions pending the entry into force of the surplus agricultural commodities agreement of March 13, 1956. Effected by exchange of notes at Santiago March 20 and 26, 1956. Entered into force March 26, 1956.

China

Agreement regarding passport visas and visa fees. Effected by exchange of notes at Taipei December 20, 1955, and February 20, 1956. Entered into force February 20, 1956.

Colombia

Agreement providing for disposition of equipment materials furnished by the United States under military assistance agreement of April 17, 1952 (T 2496), and no longer required by Colombia. Effec by exchange of notes at Bogotá February 22 and Ma 14, 1956. Entered into force March 14, 1956.

France

Agreement relating to the grant of plots of land loca in France for the creation of permanent military ce teries or the construction of war memorials, with nexes. Signed at Paris March 19, 1956. Entered i force March 19, 1956.

Uruguay

General agreement for a program of technical coop tion. Signed at Montevideo March 23, 1956. Will er into force on date Uruguay notifies the United St of its ratification.

Viet-Nam

Agreement providing for direct forces support pursu to economic cooperation agreement of September 1951 (TIAS 2346). Effected by exchange of notes Saigon February 21 and March 7, 1955. Entered i force March 7, 1955.

Agreement relating to the disposition of equipment materials furnished by the United States found surp to the needs of the Vietnamese armed forces. Effec by exchange of notes at Saigon March 1 and May 1955. Entered into force May 10, 1955.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

First Career Ambassadors Sworn In

In simultaneous ceremonies at Washington, The Ha and Rio de Janeiro, the United States' first four Car Ambassadors took the oath of office on April 9. T are: James Clement Dunn, Ambassador to Brazil; W. Henderson, Deputy Under Secretary for Admi tration; H. Freeman Matthews, Ambassador to Netherlands; and Robert Murphy, Deputy Under S retary of State. All four are veteran career Fore Service officers. (For biographic details, see press lease 183 dated April 9.)

The class of career ambassador was created by Pu Law 250, 84th Congress. Under the terms of the l nominees for appointment to the class must have had least 15 years of Government service in a position of sponsibility, including at least 3 years as a career m ister, and must have rendered exceptionally distinguis service to the Government.

Confirmations

The Senate on April 12 confirmed Lowell C. Pinker to be Ambassador to the Sudan.

[1] Not in force.
[2] Not in force for the United States.

rican Republics
Inter-American Partnership (Milton Eisenhower) . . 682
r-American Port and Harbor Conference 688
larity of Western Hemisphere 683

nic Energy
shall Islanders' Petition on Nuclear Tests in Pacific
Gerig, text of petition) 689
O Atomic Information Agreement Enters into Force . 668

ria. Triangular Sales of Farm Products to Italy and
ustria 680

il. Vice President of Brazil To Visit U.S. 681

rress, The
ent Legislation 673
Mutual Security Program for Europe (Eibrick) . . 674

inican Republic. Tariff Negotiations With Finland,
rance, Dominican Republic 687

nomic Affairs
tinuation of Rate of Duty on Imports of Hatters' Fur . 688
ff Negotiations With Finland, France, Dominican
epublic 687
ngular Sales of Farm Products to Italy and Austria . 680
ld Trade Week (text of proclamation) 686
tern Europe Cuts Curbs on Dollar-Area Imports . . 686

ope
Mutual Security Program for Europe (Eibrick) . . 674
tern Europe Cuts Curbs on Dollar-Area Imports . . 686

and. Tariff Negotiations With Finland, France,
ominican Republic 687

ign Service
firmations (Pinkerton) 694
t Career Ambassadors Sworn In 694

nce. Tariff Negotiations With Finland, France, Do-
inican Republic 687

many. A Report on Germany (Conant) 669

gary. Hungary Accepts U.S. Offer of Emergency Food
id 680

rnational Law. Fifty Years of Progress in Interna-
onal Law (Phleger) 663

rnational Organizations and Meetings. Inter-American
ort and Harbor Conference 688

y. Triangular Sales of Farm Products to Italy and
Austria 680

ya. U.S. Aid to Libya 680

rocco. Spanish-Moroccan Declaration (texts of mes-
ages, declaration, and protocol) 667

ual Security
Mutual Security Program for Europe (Eibrick) . . 674
ICA Loan to Turkey 681
Aid to Libya 680

r East. U.S. Policy in Middle East (Hagerty) . . . 668

-Self-Governing Territories. Marshall Islanders' Peti-
ion on Nuclear Tests in Pacific (Gerig, text of peti-
ion) 689

th Atlantic Treaty Organization
Mutual Security Program for Europe (Eibrick) . . 674
TO Atomic Information Agreement Enters Into Force . 668

sidential Documents. World Trade Week 686

ugees and Displaced Persons. Appointments to Advis-
ugees and Displaced Persons. Appointments to Advi-
ory Group on Refugee Relief Program 679

in
versations With Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs
Dulles, Martin Artajo, text of joint communique) . . 666
nish-Moroccan Declaration (texts of messages, declara-
ion, and protocol) 667

an. Pinkerton confirmed as ambassador 694

Treaty Information
Current Actions 694
NATO Atomic Information Agreement Enters Into Force . 668

Turkey. New ICA Loan to Turkey 681

United Nations
Current U.N. Documents 693
Marshall Islanders' Petition on Nuclear Tests in Pacific
(Gerig, text of petition) 689
U.S. Policy in Middle East (Hagerty) 668

Name Index

Conant, James B. 669
Dulles, Secretary 666
Dunn, James Clement 694
Eisenhower, Milton S. 682
Eisenhower, President 686
Eibrick, C. Burke 674
Gerig, Benjamin 689
Goulart, João 681
Hagerty, James C. 668
Henderson, Loy W. 694
Macpherson, John 691
Martin Artajo, Alberto 666
Matthews, H. Freeman 694
Murphy, Robert 694
Phleger, Herman 663
Pinkerton, Lowell C. 694

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: April 9–15

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Press release issued prior to April 9 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 178 of April 6.

No.	Date	Subject
182	4/9	Advisers on Refugee Relief Program.
183	4/9	Ceremonies for career ambassadors (rewrite).
184	4/9	U.S. aid to Libya.
185	4/9	Welcome to Spanish Foreign Minister.
186	4/10	Spanish-Moroccan declaration.
187	4/11	Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference (rewrite).
*188	4/11	Merchant nominated Ambassador to Canada.
*189	4/12	Mills sworn in as Ambassador to Afghanistan.
†190	4/12	*Foreign Relations* volume.
191	4/12	U.S. food aid offer to Hungary.
†192	4/12	Holland: "Ideological Aspects of the Communist Problem."
193	4/12	U.S.–Spanish communique.
194	4/12	Negotiations under GATT.
195	4/13	Pan American Day and Week.
196	4/13	Visit of Brazilian Vice President.
*197	4/13	Holland: "The Soviet Policy of Peaceful Coexistence."

*Not printed.
†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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the Department of State

Available in pamphlet form—two recent statements by Francis O. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs.

The United Nations: Some New Perspectives After Ten Years

This address before the National Press Club, January 13, 1956, assesses the implications for U.S. foreign policy of recent developments affecting the United Nations. Among its topics are the impact of the Bandung conference and the Geneva summit conference, the admission of new members to the United Nations, peaceful uses of atomic energy, disarmament, economic assistance to underdeveloped countries, and review of the United Nations Charter.

Publication 6047 **10 cents**

The Soviet Challenge and the United Nations

This address was made before the Annual Convention of the American Association of Junior Colleges at New York City, March 9, 1956. It deals with the new look in Soviet tactics which became manifest at the Geneva summit conference and was shown in the rewriting of some of the Stalinist dogma by the Soviet 20th Congress. The pamphlet discusses why Soviet tactics have changed, what the challenge of the new Soviet strategy means to the United Nations, and what colleges and universities can do about it. It emphasizes that study of the United Nations is of great importance in the teaching of international affairs, and examines facts and fallacies about the United Nations.

Publication 6310 **15 cents**

Both of these pamphlets are available from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C.

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The Department of State bulletin

XXXIV, No. 879

April 30, 1956

OUR QUEST FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM • *Address by President Eisenhower* 699

DEVELOPING NATO IN PEACE • *Address by Secretary Dulles* 706

THE SOVIET REAPPRAISAL OF STALIN • *by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy* 719

OBJECTIVES OF THE MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM IN ASIA • *Statement by Assistant Secretary Robertson* 723

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY IN AFRICA • *by Assistant Secretary Allen* 716

For index see inside back cover

The Department of State bulletin

VOL. XXXIV, No. 879 • PUBLICATION 6329

April 30, 1956

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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)ur Quest for Peace and Freedom

Address by President Eisenhower[1]

Three years ago, when I last talked to you, tories from battlefields and fighting fronts rowded the front pages of our press. Human reedom was under direct assault in important ectors by the disciples of communistic dictatorhip. Violence and aggression were brutal daily acts for millions of human beings. Fear of glo-al war, of a nuclear holocaust, darkened the fu-ıre. To many, the chance for a just and enduring eace seemed hopeless.

Today, only 3 years later, we have reason for autious hope that a new, a fruitful, a peaceful ra for mankind can emerge from a haunted ecade. The world breathes a little more easily)day.

The prudent man will not delude himself that is hope for peace guarantees the realization of eace. Even with genuine good will, time and fort will be needed to correct the injustices, to ıre the dangerous sores that plague the earth to-ıy. And the future alone can show whether the ommunists really want to move toward a just ıd stable peace.

Yet not for many years has there been such romise that patient, imaginative, enterprising fort could gradually be rewarded in steady de-ease in the dread of war; in an economic surge at will raise the living standards of all the world; growing confidence that liberty and justice ill one day overcome statism; in the better under-anding among all peoples that is the essential elude to true peace.

This week marks the anniversary of one of the ost important events in freedom's progress. One hundred eighty-one years ago on April 19th, our forefathers started a revolution that still goes on. The shots at Concord, as Emerson wrote, were heard "round the world."

The echoes of Concord still stir men's minds.

The Bandung meeting, last year, of Asian and African leaders bears witness to Emerson's vision. There, almost two centuries after Concord, and halfway round the earth, President Sukarno of Indonesia opened the conference with an eloquent tribute to Paul Revere and to the spirit of the American Revolution.

Why do the musket shots of a few embattled farmers at the Concord bridge still ring out in far-off lands?

The reason is clear.

Concord was far more than a local uprising to redress immediate grievances. The enduring meaning of Concord lies in the ideas that inspired the historic stand there. Concord is the symbol of certain basic convictions about the relationship of man to the state.

Those convictions were founded in a firm belief in the spiritual worth of the individual. He must be free to think, to speak, and to worship according to his conscience. He must enjoy equality before the law. He must have a fair chance to develop and use his talents. The purpose of government is to serve its citizens in freedom.

Our forefathers did not claim to have discovered novel principles. They looked on their findings as universal values, the common property of all mankind.

These deep convictions have always guided us as a Nation. They have taken deep root elsewhere in the Western World. In the 19th century they inspired a great surge of freedom through-

[1] Made before the American Society of Newspaper Edi-rs and broadcast over radio and television at Washing-n, D. C., on Apr. 21 (White House press release).

out Western Europe and in our own hemisphere.

These ideas of freedom are still the truly revolutionary political principles abroad in the world. They appeal to the timeless aspirations of mankind. In some regions they flourish; in some they are officially outlawed. But everywhere, to some degree, they stir and inspire humanity.

The affairs of men do not stand still. The ideas of freedom will grow in vigor and influence—or they will gradually wither and die. If the area of freedom shrinks, the results for us will be tragic. Only if freedom continues to flourish will man realize the prosperity, the happiness, the enduring peace he seeks.

Newly Independent Nations

The appeal of the ideas of freedom has been shown dramatically during the past decade. In that time, 18 nations, totaling some 650 million people—a quarter of the human race—have gained independence.

In manifold ways these nations differ widely from each other and from us. They are the heirs of many ancient cultures and national traditions. All of the great religions of the world are found among them. Their peoples speak in a hundred tongues.

Yet they share in common with all free countries the basic and universal values that inspired our Nation's founders.

They believe deeply in the right of self-government.

They believe deeply in the dignity of man.

They aspire to improve the welfare of the individual, as a basic aim of organized society.

The new nations have many of the sensitivities that marked our own early years as a free Nation. They are proud of their independence and quick to resent any slight to their sovereignty. Some of them are concerned to avoid involvements with other nations, as we were for many years.

Certainly we Americans should understand and respect these points of view. We must accept the right of each nation to choose its own path to the future.

All of these countries are faced with immense obstacles and difficulties. Freedom and human dignity must rest upon a satisfactory economic base. Yet in many of these new nations, incomes average less than $100 per year. Abject poverty blinds men's eyes to the beauty of freedom's ideals. Hopelessness makes men prey to any promise of a better existence, even the most false and spurious.

Ofttimes the peoples of these countries expected independence itself to produce rapid material progress. Their political leaders are therefore under heavy pressure to find shortcuts and quick answers to the problems facing them.

Under these conditions, we cannot expect that the vision of a free society will go unchallenged. The Communists, aware of unsatisfied desires for better conditions of life, falsely pretend they can rapidly solve the problems of economic development and industrialization. They hold up the Soviet Union as a model and a guide. But the Communists conceal the terrible human costs that characterize their ruthless system of dictatorship and forced labor.

We have a vital interest in assuring that newly independent nations preserve and consolidate the free institutions of their choice.

The prospects for peace are brightest when enlightened self-governing peoples control the policy of nations. Peoples do not want war. Rulers beyond the reach of popular control are more likely to engage in reckless adventures and to raise the grim threat of war. The spread of freedom enhances the prospect for durable peace.

That prospect would be dimmed or destroyed should freedom be forced into steady retreat. Then the remaining free societies, our own among them, would one day find themselves beleaguered and imperiled. We would face once again the dread prospect of paying dearly in blood for our own survival.

In every corner of the globe, it is far less costly to sustain freedom than to recover it when lost.

Moreover, our own well-being is bound up in the well-being of other free nations. We cannot prosper in peace if we are isolated from the rest of the world. If our economy is to continue to flourish and grow, our Nation will need more trade, not less. The steady growth of other nations, especially the less developed countries, will create new and growing demands for goods and services. It will produce an environment which will benefit both them and us.

Indeed, Atlanta, Pittsburgh, Seattle—every American town and farm—has a stake in the success or failure of these new nations—a stake almost impossible to exaggerate.

If these new nations are to achieve economic progress with freedom, they will have to provide

many of the necessary ingredients for themselves.

Only these peoples and their leaders can supply the initiative and determination essential for success. And they must mobilize the larger part of the resources they require.

But these nations are gravely lacking in trained men for management, production, education, and the professions. Their institutions for such training are limited. Hence they are handicapped in trying to extend modern techniques to agriculture, industry, and other fields.

They also face shortages of capital and foreign exchange, even though they strain to mobilize their own resources. Private foreign investment should be utilized as much as feasible; but, for many areas, it will clearly fall far short of the requirements. Moreover, their task of improving conditions of life is made the more difficult by their large and steadily increasing populations.

Inevitably these nations must look abroad for assistance, as ours did for so many years. They want help, first of all, in real and enduring friendship. They want help in training skilled people and in securing investment capital to supplement their own resources. For such help they will look to us as the most prosperous and advanced economy of the world.

Foresight will compel an understanding response from us. In our own enlightened interest we can and must do much to help others in pursuit of their legitimate aspirations.

Further, we must recognize that economic and technical assistance cannot be a transitory policy. The problems of economic progress are not to be solved in a single spurt. Our efforts must be sustained over a number of years.

To do the most good, some part of our material help will have to be furnished on a long-term basis which these nations can plan on. For some purposes, commitments on a strictly annual basis are not sufficient. It takes time to complete major projects like hydroelectric and reclamation developments. If the new nations can plan on some part of our help for several years, they will be better able to mobilize resources of their own and assistance from others.

Furthermore, our assistance must be used flexibly to fit needs and plans as they develop. We must be ready to adapt our help promptly to meet changing conditions.

The development program for mutual security now before the Congress is based on these considerations. It seeks from the Congress the additional authority that would add essential flexibility and continuity to a part—a modest part—of the program. The amounts requested are the practicable minimum. In its entirety it is not, I assure you, an excessive program. It is in our national interest, in the fullest sense of that term.

"Collective" Dictatorship in U.S.S.R.

The ideas of freedom are at work, even where they are officially rejected. As we know, Lenin and his successors, true to Communist doctrine, based the Soviet State on the denial of these ideas. Yet the new Soviet rulers who took over 3 years ago have had to reckon with the force of these ideas, both at home and abroad.

The situation the new regime inherited from the dead Stalin apparently caused it to reappraise many of his mistakes.

Having lived under his one-man rule, they have espoused the concept of "collective" dictatorship. But dictatorship it still remains. They have denounced Stalin for some of the more flagrant excesses of his brutal rule. But the individual citizen still lacks the most elementary safeguards of a free society. The desire for a better life is still being sacrificed to the insatiable demands of the state.

In foreign affairs, the new regime has seemingly moderated the policy of violence and hostility which has caused the free nations to band together to defend their independence and liberties. For the present, at least, it relies more on political and economic means to spread its influence abroad. In the last year, it has embarked upon a campaign of lending and trade agreements directed especially toward the newly developing countries.

It is still too early to assess in any final way whether the Soviet regime wishes to provide a real basis for stable and enduring relations.

Despite the changes so far, much of Stalin's foreign policy remains unchanged. The major international issues which have troubled the postwar world are still unsolved. More basic changes in Soviet policy will have to take place before the free nations can afford to relax their vigilance.

Guidelines for Future

At Concord, our forebears undertook the struggle for freedom in this country. History has now called us to special tasks for sustaining and advancing this great cause in the world.

As we take stock of our position and of the problems that lie ahead, we must chart our course by three main guidelines:

First: We must maintain a collective shield against aggression to allow the free peoples to seek their valued goals in safety.

We can take some cautious comfort in the signs that the Soviet rulers may have relegated military aggression to the background and adopted less violent methods to promote their aims. Nevertheless, Soviet military power continues to grow. Their forces are being rapidly modernized and equipped with nuclear weapons and long-range delivery systems.

So long as freedom is threatened and armaments are not controlled, it is essential for us to keep a strong military establishment ourselves and strengthen the bonds of collective security.

Without help from us, many of our allies could not afford to equip and maintain the forces needed for self-defense. Assistance to them is part of our proper contribution to the systems of common defense. If those systems did not exist, we would have to bear much greater costs ourselves. Thus, in aiding our allies the mutual security program also advances our own security interests.

We hold our military strength only to guard against aggression and to insure that the world remains at peace. War in our time has become an anachronism. Whatever the case in the past, war in the future can serve no useful purpose. A war which became general, as any limited action might, could only result in the virtual destruction of mankind.

Hence our search must be unceasing for a system to regulate and reduce armaments under reliable safeguards. So far, the Soviet Union has refused to accept such safeguards. But even now we are earnestly negotiating toward this end. The problems involved are difficult and complex. We cannot afford to underestimate them. But we cannot slacken our efforts to lift the burden of armaments and to remove their threat.

If effective measures of disarmament could be agreed upon, think how the world could be transformed! Atomic energy used for peace—not war—could bring about the development of a new industrial age. Far more human energy and output could be devoted to reducing poverty and need. To that end, as I said to you 3 years ago, we would "join with all nations in devoting a substantial percentage of the savings achieved by disarmament to a fund for world aid and reconstruction."

Of even more importance, the pall of mutual suspicions, fear, and hatred that covers the earth would be swept away in favor of confidence, prosperity, and human happiness.

Our second guideline: Within the free community, we must be a helpful and considerate partner in creating conditions where freedom will flourish.

Beyond defense, the crucial task of the free nations is to work together in constructive ways to advance the welfare of their peoples. Arms alone can give the world no permanent peace, no confident security. Arms are solely for defense—to protect from violent assault what we already have. They are only a costly insurance. They cannot add to human progress. Indeed, no matter how massive, arms by themselves would not prevent vital sections of the world from falling prey to Communist blandishment or subversion.

If we are to preserve freedom here, it must likewise thrive in other important areas of the earth. For the welfare of ourselves and others, we must therefore, help the rest of the free world achieve its aspirations. For our mutual benefit, we must join in building for greater future prosperity, for more human liberty, and for lasting peace.

Within the Atlantic community, our aim must be to strengthen the close bonds which have steadily developed since the war. On Monday next the Secretary of State will speak on this topic.

In the less developed nations, the urgent need is for economic and social progress for their peoples. Tonight I have spoken particularly about the newer nations of Asia and Africa which face such urgent problems. Of equal importance is continuing progress in other areas, especially by our neighbors in Latin America, who are our fast friends. These developing nations need the full measure of our help in understanding and resources.

The steady progress of the free world also depends on the healthy flow of peaceful trade. Our example will be of crucial importance in freeing the channels of such trade from wasteful restraints. We can take an important step to this end by joining the Organization for Trade Cooperation. Our national interest will be served by passage of the legislation for that purpose now pending in the Congress.

Another important task is in helping to resolve putes between friends we value highly. Such putes impair the unity of the free nations and pede their advance. In these situations, each e would like the United States to back its point view without reservation. But for us to do so ıld seldom contribute to the settling of the dis-tes. It would only sharpen the bitter enmities ween the opposing sides and impair our value helping to reach a fair solution.

Our aim and effort must be to assist in temper-; the fears and antagonisms which lead to such putes.

My words apply with special force to the ubled area of the Middle East. We will do all our power—through the United Nations when-r possible—to prevent resort to violence there. e are determined to support and assist any na-n in that area which might be subjected to ag-ession. We will strive untiringly to build the ındations for stable peace in the whole region. In these and many other constructive ways, our tion must help to build an environment con-ıial to freedom.

Our third guideline is this: We must seek, by ry peaceful means, to induce the Soviet bloc to rect existing injustices and genuinely to pursue ıceful purposes in its relations with other na-ns.

As I have said, many of the wrongs of Stalin ainst other nations still prevail under his suc-sors. Despite the efforts of the West at Berlin d Geneva, Germany is still divided by the Soviet o of free all-German elections. The satellite tions of Eastern Europe are still ruled by Soviet ppets. In Asia, Korea remains divided and ble peace has not yet been achieved.

We must be tireless in our efforts to remedy these ustices and to resolve the disputes that divide e world. These knotty problems will yield to tient and sincere effort. We stand ready to plore all avenues for their just settlement. We ll not grow weary in our quest for peaceful nedies for the enslavement or wrongful division once-free nations.

The interests and purposes of the United States d of the free world do not conflict with the gitimate interests of the Russian nation or the pirations of its people. A Soviet government nuinely devoted to these purposes can have iendly relations with the United States and the free world for the asking. We will welcome that day.

Need for Devoted Effort

We cannot doubt that the current of world history flows toward freedom. In the long run dictatorship and despotism must give way. We can take courage from that sure knowledge.

But as a wise American, Mr. Justice Holmes, once said: "The inevitable comes to pass through effort." We should take these words to heart in our quest for peace and freedom. These great aspirations of humanity will be brought about—but only by devoted human effort.

Concord is a symbol of the faith, courage, and sacrifice on which the victory of freedom depends. We in our day must strive with the same dedication that brought the militiamen to the Concord bridge. If we do so, freedom will surely prevail.

[After the President went off the air, he spoke to the society as follows:]

To give you my feeling about what I would like to say now, I will tell you a story of when I was a young lieutenant in a regiment on the Mexican border. There was not a great deal to do in those days, and some people indulged in acquaintanceship with John Barleycorn more than they should.

One morning a couple of us young second lieutenants were up as usual long before the captains were, and we were standing by one captain's tent as he got his feet out of the bunk. He was sitting there on the edge of it with his head in his hands, and he says: "I am nothing but a mountain goat. All I do is jump from jag to jag."

Now any man who through 35 minutes or 30 minutes has been trying to hit the high spots of the world today, and America's position in the international situation, certainly feels that he has been jumping from jag to jag on the mountain tops.

So I wanted rather to come off the summit of those high spots and talk with you for just a few minutes about some of the very great intricacies in this problem that we call developing foreign policies and in implementing them throughout the world.

Now I think there is no use explaining the cold war. We all have pretty clear ideas of what is going on. But one thing that we do worry about is: Who is winning and who is losing?

Well, I don't think anybody knows, because the situation differs in every single corner of the

globe. I have heard many people at home here say that we are losing the cold war every day. Others take exactly the opposite view, and these more hopeful ones can point to some facts rather than merely allegations about our prestige abroad, or how many friends do we have, and that sort of thing.

Change in Soviet Policy

For example, why was there such a sudden change in the Soviet policy? They are out—their basic aim is to conquer the world—through world revolution if possible, but in any way. Their doctrine—anyone that has read any of their books knows that their doctrine is lies, deceit, subversion, war if necessary, but in any way: conquer the world. And that has not changed.

But they changed their policies very markedly. They were depending on force and the threat of force only. And suddenly they have gone into an entirely different attitude. They are going into the economic and political fields and are really wearing smiles around the world instead of some of the bitter faces to which we have become accustomed.

Now any time a policy is winning and the people are completely satisfied with it, you don't change. If you change policies that markedly, you destroy old idols, as they have been busy doing. You do it only when you think a great change is necessary. So I think we can take some comfort; at least we can give careful consideration to the very fact they had to change their policies.

And I think the whole free world is trying to test and determine the sincerity of that plan, in order that the free nations themselves, in pursuing their own policies, will make certain that they are not surprised in any place.

But from the Communists—we look at some of the advances we think they have made, but let us remember: They did not conquer Korea, which they announced they were going to do. They were stopped finally in the northern part of Viet-Nam, and Diem, the leader of the southern Viet-Nam, the southern Vietnamese, is doing splendidly and a much better figure in that field than anyone even dared to hope.

The Iranian situation, which only a few short years ago looked so desperate that each morning we thought we would wake up and read in our newspapers that Mossadegh had let them under the Iron Curtain, has not become satisfact but that crisis has passed and it is much bet

The difficulty in Egypt between our Bri friends and our Egyptian friends over the big b was finally settled.

The Trieste problem, which had plagued world for many years, if not an ideal soluti has had a practical solution.

The first bridgehead that communism had s ceeded, or practically succeeded, in establish in our hemisphere has been thrown out.

These are cold-war victories, because the p poses of the Russians were defeated.

Now they have attempted to go into econor fields, and here their unity of action, brou about by the fact they are a single governme is creating new problems.

Free-World Economic Problems

A group of free nations can stay together fai easily when you have got a definite threat to th very existence right in their faces. As long as t Germans, for example, were powerful and aggr sive in Europe in the Second World War, the was no great trouble in keeping the other natio pretty well together in policy and in action. B when those are lifted and you go into the econon field, each of us—each country—has its own ec nomic problems of itself; now it becomes ve difficult for a group of free nations through spo taneous cooperation to achieve a unity to oppo the other man.

Let me take one example, just to show you ho these things work out. Let us take Japan. The is no one in this room that needs a blueprint how important it is to us that Japan stay ou side the Iron Curtain. A nation of 90 millio industrious and inventive people, tied in wi Communist China and with the Soviets, wou indeed pose a threat to us that would be very gra indeed.

Japan is 90 million people living on fewer arab acres than there are in the State of Californi How are they going to live? Well, they ha got to trade. They have got to deal with oth people outside. We won't trade with ther Every day—well, if not every day, every week there come to government, including to my des pleas for greater protection against Japane goods.

Now this is not wholly one-sided, because son

ır citizens have found out that last year—I k my figures are correct—while we were buy- 60 million dollars' worth of cotton textile ls from Japan, they bought 120 million dol- worth of our cotton. So even that problem t clear in exactly what you should do.

ıt anyway, we won't trade with them, so they make a living with us except on a minor scale. we get tired, properly— we can't be trying to in any other nation just with our money. So on't just give them the millions by which they go and buy all the things they need abroad.

ıt the next thing we come up against: We are certain in our own minds that some of these ons—not all the United States people, but of them, are very loud in their denunciation ny country that trades with the Communist tries. So the Japanese can't trade with their ral markets, with Manchuria and China. So ly all of those southeastern markets, all the heastern Asian markets, have been largely oyed; they are so poor they can't support n.

what does Japan do? Where are we chasing Chasing her to one place. She has to look and less to us and more to her mainland next r. She has to, now, begin to look rather long- unless something is done. Now that is the of cross-purpose that comes up, and this goes round the world. Britain and France and nany, indeed every country with which we has some problem different economically our own.

we have a real job in trying to get agreed ies among the free nations and then to imple- them.

for Information

nd I come, then, to the real purpose for ask- you people to listen to me for a few minutes after my rather long, prepared address.

is this: Our Nation is called to leadership— I am not going to argue the point, I know you nderstand—leadership in the world, to lead ward freedom, to keep expanding our areas of lom and not allow the Communist cloud to lf us little by little.

ow when a nation leads, it is not enough that an entire government, legislative and execu- should see this problem as one. That doesn't e it a truly national policy in anything that is as long-term, as vital, as is required in national leadership of the whole world. Every citizen has a job that he cannot delegate. He cannot delegate it to the most powerful and the most influential political leaders. He must take his part in getting himself informed.

What I want to say is this: There is nothing more important in the world today than that America—167 million Americans—shall be informed on the basic facts in this whole struggle.

We ought to get it as far away from demagoguery, from political partisanship, from every extraneous influence that we possibly can. Just get the naked truth to these people with interpretation through editorial pages, and so on, to let them see the relation of one fact to another.

There are no easy panaceas. You can't say, "We simply won't trade with the Communist nations"—make that work for all of us. In fact, to make such a statement is, to my mind, giving up one of the great strengths for which the Yankee has always been noted—he is a good trader.

In that kind of trade, who gets the best of it?

We should think of those things and not try to pull out any slogan, any single idea, that will meet this situation. All that is necessary is to get the facts to the American people.

The other is to get, so far as we possibly can, the facts of America's purposes—her intentions, her disinterested motives, her lack of ambition for other territory and increased domination—to the world. We must get it out to the world.

This is difficult because all over the world we don't have you people. We don't have American newspapers. Some of our wire services reach part way, but very inadequately. The United States Information Service is merely to help. It would be far better did we not have to depend on it at all. It should even itself depend on private media wherever it can reach them in other countries.

This information should go out abroad, just as at home, through the processes of a free people so far as possible, and government should only support that effort.

One more point, and I am finished.

The world changes, and in these days it changes rapidly. A policy that was good 6 months ago is not necessarily now of any validity. It is necessary that we find better, more effective ways of keeping ourselves in tune with the world's needs

and helping to educate the world to know that it itself—each nation—must do the major part of the job. Any outsider can merely be helpful, can give moral and some little physical support—material support.

But the sums that we put out are a bagatelle compared to what is needed and what these people, most of them impoverished, must provide for themselves if the whole free world is to advance.

Now there are different kinds of means, one of which, I should think, would be getting together and keeping a sort of rotating advisory body of citizens, who are not burdened with the general and never-ending cares of office, to devote th brains to the job in partnership with governme We must constantly keep "up to snuff" beca if we don't we are bound to lose. We must ahead of the problem. We must see its ma parts. We must get its critical factors set up that we understand them thoroughly in sim fashion, and then we must pursue a common cou vigorously, persistently, and with readiness make whatever sacrifies may be demanded.

And then, I say, we will be worthy of t farmers of Concord.

Developing NATO in Peace

Address by Secretary Dulles[1]

I feel honored to speak before this important gathering of our free press. We share a great responsibility. I believe that the public should be as fully informed as possible about what we are doing in the State Department and what our foreign policy is. Under our form of government the effectiveness of our Nation's foreign policy depends in large measure upon public understanding and support. And our free society would indeed be in trouble without the diligent reporting and alert appraisal of world events that you make possible.

We are at a point in time when important events occurring in rapid succession change the scene in Europe, in the Near East, in Asia, and in Russia. It seems that this second postwar decade upon which we have entered will mark a new phase in the struggle between the forces of despotism and the forces of freedom.

The first postwar decade was marked by two sharply contrasting trends. In those parts of the world where the West had been politically dominant, freedom flourished and independence spread. Over 650 million people who were non-self-governing in 1945 have now become 18 independent and sovereign nations.

On the other hand, during that decade Soviet type of Communist despotism, which 1945 ruled only 200 million people, aggressiv extended its rule to an additional 700 million p ple belonging to what had been 13 independ nations.

Inevitably these opposing trends to freed and to despotism led to a sharp cleavage of world. In response to the Soviet policies of v lent expansion, the free nations drew close gether. They submerged any differences of th own in the face of the threat of open aggress from without. Since they could not depend the United Nations Security Council, because Soviet veto power, they created their own coll tive security associations. Forty-five free-wo nations joined with others for collective defer

These arrangements, backed by United Sta mobile striking power, have constituted a gr deterrent to the open use of violence.

Also, the free peoples built moral bulwar They unitedly condemned the violent and int erant practices of Soviet communism and m manifest their repugnance of Soviet despoti and its tactics. They subjected the Soviet Chinese Communists to a kind of moral, soc and—to some extent—economic ostracism.

By such measures the free world found

[1] Made before the annual luncheon of the Associated Press at New York, N. Y., on April 23 (press release 210).

s to halt the Soviets in their hot pursuit of free nations one by one.

ut the policies of the free world were never gned to be purely defensive. Freedom is inently dynamic and expansive. We renounce use of force and violence to promote freedom. we have sought in manifold other ways that sia should be governed in accordance with lized standards.

e reject the idea that we are dedicated to perual hatred of Russia. What we hate is the that Russia's rulers do. The arbitrary potism of a police state, governmental intoler- and enforced conformity, the enslavement of ple for the magnification of the state, the use violence and the threat of violence in interional relations, the use of fraud and trickery orrupt and overthrow free governments—these the things which we abhor and against which stand. But United States foreign policy is merely negative. We seek, above all, to ade the inevitable day when the historic friend- between the Russian and American peoples again be fully manifested. Therefore, we take p satisfaction from the fact that we can today within Russia some signs of light which could k the dawning of that new day.

iet "New Look"

he Soviet rulers who have replaced Stalin seem ave concluded that the time had come to pre- a "new look" at home and abroad.

n much of the world the Soviet rulers now to present an aspect of conciliation. They softly of "peaceful coexistence" and often r their diplomatic activity to economic "aid"— alled—rather than to threats of violence.

Within the Soviet Union there is a change which even more significant because, while Soviet eign policy is readily reversible, it is not so easy rase the consequences of internal liberalization. talin, the brutal demigod, has been dethroned. llective leadership" now replaces one-man potism. Violence is no longer preached as the y way. The sway of the secret police has, it ns, been curtailed. There is greater tolerance independent thinking, and even the heresy of toism" has been made respectable. There is obvious effort to give individuals a sense of ater freedom and security and to respect the ands inherent in the higher and broader edu- ion of many of the Russian people.

Vicious doctrinal works such as Stalin's *Short History of the Communist Party* have been withdrawn from circulation, and the fate of Stalin's *Problems of Leninism* remains in doubt. Those are the two works which for the last 20 years have been the "bible" of Soviet and world communism. Soviet doctrine and history are currently being rewritten.

This must please at least the Russian school children, for they are excused from taking examinations in history. No one yet knows the "correct" answers.

Appraisal of Soviet Shift

It is important to appraise what these changes mean and also what they do not mean.

They mean, I think, that unity and strength of the free nations have shown the Soviet rulers the futility of their policies of violence. Also they must mean that forces for liberalization are at work within the Soviet bloc and are powerful enough to require some response, or at least the appearance of response.

All of this is immensely important. It is more than the free world dared hope for a few years ago.

But satisfaction must be restrained.

True, Stalin has been demoted. But we do not yet see, in the Soviet bloc, the reality of representative government or respect for the basic aspirations of the peoples.

The Soviet rulers profess to have renounced violence. But they press feverishly to develop their military establishment, particularly nuclear weapons and the means for their delivery.

The countries of Eastern Europe, including East Germany, are still under the iron heel of Soviet force.

In Asia and the Near East the Soviet rulers have become merchants of hatred and fomenters of violence.

In relation to Japan, Soviet foreign policy is still ugly in its aspect.

In some places Soviet foreign policy is baited with economic lures which may superficially seem attractive. But close scrutiny shows that the bait is attached to a hook and that the hook is attached to a line and that the other end of the line is purposefully held by Moscow.

And, if they have admitted some of the lies and false testimony which marked political trials of the Stalin era, they have failed to repudiate two

of the most outrageous lies ever perpetrated by any government, and both perpetrated by Stalin—the lie that South Korea was the aggressor in the Korean War and the lie that the United Nations forces in that war used germ warfare against the Chinese Communists.

Khrushchev said last December, "We never renounced and we will never renounce our ideas, our struggle for the victory of communism." So long as that victory is the Soviet goal; so long as it is backed by a vast military establishment and the underground apparatus of international communism; so long as these instruments are at the absolute disposal of despots who repudiate moral principles as restraint upon their conduct—so long as this combination exists, it would be folly for the free nations to consider that they can safely lower their guard and fall apart.

I have often said in relation to the Soviet Communist problem that the moment of greatest danger would be the moment when we relaxed. Never was that statement more relevant than it is today. If we treat the *prospect* of success as being itself a complete success, that could turn into an ultimate disaster.

The Task of the Free Nations

To say that is not to say that we should act as though nothing had happened. We cannot and would not set the clock back. There is no longer the mood of fear that gripped the free world when in quick succession there occurred the Communist guerrilla war against Greece, the seizure of Czechoslovakia, the blockade of Berlin, and the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea. We would not, if we could, smother the hope that a benign transformation may have begun.

Our new task is to build more on hope and less on fear. That is, of course, a more difficult task.

Fear makes easy the tasks of diplomats, for then the fearful draw together and seek the protection of collective strength.

Soviet rulers and their agents, in their new garb, have somewhat greater acceptability and therefore more chance for mischief.

Allies no longer feel the same compulsion to submerge differences as when they faced together a clear and present danger.

Collective security arrangements, born primarily out of fear of armed aggression, seem to some less important now than 5 years ago.

Neutralism can now be plausibly portrayed a safe and even profitable course.

Under these conditions our tasks are harder-so much so that some people deplore the rece developments because they confuse what, unt then, had been a rather simple scene.

That is not our view. Of course war, and da ger of war, is a simplifier. When the issue is "wl dies and who lives?" all other issues seem unir portant. But we do not want simplicity at th price. Nor do we intend to invoke needless fea and a sense of emergency because that would mal our tasks more simple.

We cannot undo the changes that have con upon the world. And we do not want to rever what holds so much of promise, merely becau it also holds some risk of loss. Our task is n to seek to reverse change but to build constru tively upon all the changes that hold a possibilit of good. In that way we may make our hop come true.

Because Soviet military capabilities remain s vast and because their intentions are subject t rapid change, we must maintain our vigilance an our strength. But also we must increase the unit and dynamism of the free world by greater en phasis on cooperation *for* something rather tha merely *against* something. Let us exalt freedo by showing better what freedom can do.

President Eisenhower, speaking day before ye terday, outlined the task which lies before the fre nations of the world. He emphasized that tas as it relates to the newly independent and newl developing nations of the world.

There is also need to maintain and develo the strength and vitality of the older free-worl nations. Here, too, there is vast opportunit Our peoples have many common aspirations an interests that go far beyond the instinct of sel preservation and which we can more surely achiev if we work together than if we work apart. W can, in association, form major steppingstone along the path to universal peace and justice an human welfare.

We had all hoped that the United Nations woul establish order on a universal basis. It has i deed done much in this respect, and certainl we should do nothing to detract from the Unite Nations. It remains the cornerstone of Unite States foreign policy.

But the United Nations was never expected t be an exclusive means for developing world orde

e charter itself looks to regional and collective ense organizations to play a major role in this at task.

loring the Possibilities of NATO

The Organization of American States illustrates possibilities of a regional organization. It es account of external perils. But it concentes primarily upon its own positive accomplishnts.

That Organization traces its origins back 66 rs to when the Pan American Union was nded. It is held together by considerations ich long preceded, and which will long succeed, fear of Soviet armed attack.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is aner organization which, in its own distinctive y, contains the possibilities of great developnt. It was, to be sure, conceived primarily as ilitary alliance, and that aspect of the organiion remains vitally important. But the Orization can and should be more.

The Canadian Government has notably espoused s point of view, and at last December's minrial meeting of the Council both the French l Italian delegations introduced resolutions ng this line. I expect that this matter will be lt with further at next week's ministerial meet- to be held in Paris.

Ve basically have so much in common that we uld be able to do more in common.

All of our peoples embrace a religious faith ich makes atheistic materialism abhorrent to m. We have a common sense of moral values. Our political institutions predominantly reflect nocratic conceptions which had their origin in eece and legal institutions which had their gin in Rome.

Our economies are similar. We all believe in l encourage the private ownership of property, l there is a large and flourishing private trade ween our countries.

Our educational systems are much the same and vide a broad basis for the free exchange of ws and the gaining of common understanding. Not only do we have this firm and broad founda-n, but also we hold in common many guiding nciples of action which should enable us to elop practically our fellowship.

Ve all believe that the days are past when any t of the world, or any particular civilization, uld dominate others. Several of the members of NATO are more than Atlantic countries. The United Kingdom, for example, is a member of the British Commonwealth. The United States is a nation of the Americas and a Pacific nation. We are today members not only of NATO but of the Organization of American States, of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and several other collective defense treaties in the Pacific. We are associated with the Baghdad Pact. All NATO members would, I think, agree that NATO should not attempt to represent the totality of their policies.

We all believe that no government has just powers except as it derives them from the consent of the governed. At the same time we all recognize that political independence is illusory unless those who obtain it are able to sustain it and carry its responsibilities. Also we reject the conception which would prevent different races from freely uniting in one political system. Under these conditions we all strive to advance the historic evolution of non-self-governing peoples to self-government or independence.

We believe that the spirit which in the last decade has provided so many non-self-governing peoples with political independence ought also to operate peacefully to stimulate independence for those subject to the ruthless colonialism of Soviet Russia. Peace and welfare in Europe require that East Germany should be allowed to unite in freedom with the Federal Republic and that the nations of Eastern Europe should once again be independent.

We believe in the closer integration of some Western European countries, such as is represented by the Coal and Steel Community, by the Western European Union created by the Brussels Treaty, and by the prospective development of "Euratom," the means whereby the members of the Coal and Steel Community would apply like community principles to the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Such European integration, and the development of NATO, are complementary and not mutually exclusive processes.

The NATO members believe in the principle of political consultation between allies and are increasingly practicing it in the NATO Council. Every NATO country, of course, has certain vital national interests that may sometimes require independent judgment. Some of us have grave worldwide responsibilities that cannot be effectively discharged unless there is a capability of

prompt decision and corresponding action. Our consultations must be designed to assure essential harmony in our viewpoints on fundamentals. But the processes of consultation should never enmesh us in a procedural web so that we fall victim to the ability of despotisms to act suddenly and with all their might.

None of our governments is predatory. We want military power to be used as a community force to prevent aggression and not as a national force for aggrandizement. Indeed, the amended Brussels Treaty for Western European Union already sets an example in armament limitation that we can ask the whole world to follow.

No NATO member, I suppose, wishes to drift into some new and ill-defined relationship which could be provocative of future misunderstandings. But the unanimity of our thinking upon the great basic issues makes it apparent that the time has come to advance NATO from its initial phase into the totality of its meaning.

The Mission of the West

Western civilization has made an immense contribution to the welfare of the whole world. It has been a dynamic force which, like everything human, has made its mistakes. But on the whole it has reflected an enlightened view of the nature of man and of his God-given right to enjoy life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Furthermore, the Western view of the nature of man has made it inevitable that its influence should on the whole be a liberalizing influence. Some nations take pride in the size of their domain and the number of people under their rule. But the Western nations can feel that their greatest success was to have brought to much of the world a knowledge, a political freedom, and an economic opportunity which it had never enjoyed before.

But the mission of the West is not completed. More independence needs to be perfected. More economic development needs to be planned and supported throughout the world. More sense of equality and human brotherhood needs to be developed. Also, the West needs to appreciate better how rich are the gifts other civilizations have to offer.

The historic weakness of the West has been its disunity. Out of this disunity came wars which have taken the lifeblood of its finest youth and weakened its economies. A major task of postwar statesmanship was to find ways whereby the W can maintain its solidarity. Much—indeed, much—has been done. But more can still be d to make sure that the good in Western civiliza is not again negated by differences.

The peoples who make up the Atlantic c munity ought, in increased unity, to resume t greatness; and true greatness is not to be measu by ability to impose on others what they do want but by ability to find new ways whereby men can better realize their aspirations.

The North Atlantic Treaty already serve an indispensable and vital instrument of Atlantic community. But the time has, I beli come to consider whether its organization not need to be further developed if it is adequa to serve the needs of this and coming generati If that be the common desire of the NATO m ber nations, the United States will join eagerl exploring the possibilities which now beckon forward.

Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference

Press release 198 dated April 17

Secretary Dulles: I have no statement of own to volunteer, so I am ready for questior

Middle East

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have any commen an announcement from the Soviet Foreign O that the Soviet Union is prepared to sup United Nations measures for peace in the Mi East?

A. That was brought to my attention abou minutes ago, and I do not yet have the full of the Soviet statement, and we have learne these matters that it is important to read the print. That I do not yet have. But I would this: The United States took the position s time ago that this was properly a matter of cern for the United Nations. I emphasized very strongly in my testimony before the Se Foreign Relations Committee on February 24,[1] since then the United States introduced the r lution into the Security Council which was un mously adopted[2] and pursuant to which Se

[1] BULLETIN of Mar. 5, 1956, p. 368.
[2] *Ibid.*, Apr. 16, 1956, p. 627.

ıry-General Hammarskjold is now on his mission ı the Near East. Last week the President is-ıed his statement from Augusta[3] emphasizing ur full support of the United Nations and of the Iammarskjold mission and calling upon all mem-ers of the United Nations also to give that sup-ort. If it turns out that this Soviet statement ; responsive to the President's appeal and that ıere is a genuine Soviet desire to support and ack up the United Nations in this matter, that ould, of course, be welcomed by the United States.

Q. Mr. Secretary, has there been any diplomatic fort on the part of this Government to contact he Russians in the aftermath of the President's atement to get their reactions to U.N. action?

A. There has been no specific diplomatic pro-edure of that kind. Of course, our Embassy at Ioscow was advised of the President's statement.

Q. It was not conveyed to Premier Bulganin in ny personal message or anything like that?

A. No.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been much specula-on in this connection with the so-called down-rading of the Three-Power Declaration of 1950. Vill you tell us what the United States Govern-ıent's position is on that declaration today?

A. Well, the position is the same, I think, as it as always been. The declaration of 1950 itself alled for action—I think it said—consistently ith the obligations of the parties as members of ıe United Nations, and called for action within r without the United Nations. Now the United ations Charter itself provides that the Security ouncil has "primary responsibility" for the main-enance of international peace and security. So hen the 1950 declaration said the action would e taken "consistently with their obligations as ıembers of the United Nations," it made it quite ear, I think, that we looked upon the U.N. Secu-ty Council as the primary means of avoiding ostilities and maintaining peace and security. hat is the interpretation the United States has lways put upon it and we believe that it is prefer-ble to act within the United Nations. That is, as say, the way which I think the declaration itself ıdicates as the preferable way to act. Now if ıat shouldn't work, then we would have a new situation. But, generally speaking, the action which is now being taken through the United Nations we regard as consistent with the 1950 declaration and not in derogation of that declaration.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have the reports of Mr. Hammarskjold's mission thus far indicated to you a sense or indication of success in stopping the hostilities so that it might be possible now to move forward along the lines suggested in the Russian statement toward the actual settlement of the Palestine problem?

A. Well, I think it would be overoptimistic to feel that the immediate troubles have been so fully cleared away that we are yet at the point of dealing with the problem broadly along the lines of, for example, my August 26 speech.[4] I think that Mr. Hammarskjold feels that he has made good progress, but he has by no means completed yet the first phase of his activity, which is to establish procedures and dispositions there which will exclude the likelihood of future border incidents, commando raids, and the like, which build up tension and ill will on both sides to a point where long-range settlements are almost out of the immediate question. Now the mandate from the Security Council contemplated he should work out such things as arriving at a greater freedom of movement for the armistice observers there, for perhaps a drawing apart of the forces along the armistice line so they would not be in direct contact with each other. And while he has, I think, made a good start, it would be premature to say that that phase of his work has been completed or even that successful completion is definitely assured.

Q. Sir, when the time comes, if it does, when it is possible to think in terms of permanent settlement, is it our position that this is primarily a U.N. responsibility or one between Israel and her neighbors directly?

A. Well, obviously the problem is one in which the parties at immediate interest are Israel and the neighboring Arab States, and no one could or should try to impose forcibly any solution upon them. On the other hand, it is certainly a situation where the United Nations can play a considerable role. There was established, you may

[3] *Ibid.*, Apr. 23, 1956, p. 668.

[4] *Ibid.*, Sept. 5, 1955, p. 378.

remember, some years ago—I think it was in 1948—a U.N. commission, which has been rather inactive, which was composed of Turkey, France, and the United States, to play a role in this conciliation effort between the two sides.[5] In the speech of mine of August 26 which outlined a plan which had been previously discussed with a number of other nations, we indicated there that there would be an important role for the United Nations to play. We spoke of a United Nations role, in which the United States would participate, designed to accomplish the dual purpose of helping to solve the refugee problem and also to produce more land which could be cultivated. Those are, in a way, two sides of the same coin. That, we thought, would be a United Nations operation in the first instance, although it would require financial support from member countries like the United States. We also spoke of a guaranty of the result and a situation in which we suggested there would be a United Nations guaranty participated in by member nations. So we have always assumed that, while the solution would, as I say, in the first instance be a direct problem for the parties, it might in fact not be possible for them to arrive at a solution without assets from outside—financial assets and assets in the form of strong guaranties. Those would be necessary ingredients of any final settlement and they could best be contributed by or through the United Nations.

Communism in Latin America

Q. Mr. Secretary, two of the officials of the Government, Mr. Brownell and your own associate, Mr. Holland, have discussed the Communist situation this week in speeches to the Inter-American Bar Association. Does that mean that there is a growing concern about communism in that area, and will you give us your views on the Communist situation in Latin America?

A. I am not aware of any growing concern. Indeed, my concern today is not nearly as great as it was at a time when international communism had virtually gotten control of Guatemala. The Caracas Declaration of 1954, which provided that, if international communism got control of the political institutions of any American state, tl would be a threat to the peace and security of all, has created a political background agai which Communist activity has become less. N they realize that if they should succeed in a one country all the rest of the countries would prepared to work against them. We saw the i fluence of that resolution shortly afterward what happened in Guatemala. I want to inj here that, as perhaps you know, just a day or t ago [April 5] the Government of the Argenti which had abstained on that resolution at Cara declared its adhesion to that declaration, and th is very warmly welcomed by the United Stat Now that Caracas resolution provided, amo other things, for certain implementing machine in the way of exchange of information betwe the countries about subversive activities and t like. There has not been as effective a build of that exchange mechanism as we would ha hoped, and we are trying constantly to keep th antisubversive exchange of information growin It is not because we have any new fears of t situation, but because, as I have said time a again, the moment of greatest danger would the moment that we relaxed. We do not inte to relax.

Japanese Textile Imports

Q. Mr. Secretary, Japan has expressed conce at laws in two of our sovereign states which th feel are aimed at Japanese textile imports, a they feel that it is a violation of our treaty friendship, commerce, and navigation. Can yo say if the United States intends to reply shortly that and what our feeling is about it?

A. We are replying to the note.[6] We sha the concern that you refer to. It seems to us tha the action could be a very serious threat, not ju to Japanese trade but to our own foreign trad Our trade all over the world—and it is, as yo know, huge—is protected against discriminatio and boycott by these very same treaties. The treaties are what enable our own business to ope ate with dependability throughout the whol world. If there should be violations of thos treaties on our side, we would have to anticipat that there would perhaps be reciprocal action o other sides and that it would seriously imperil th

[5] For text of the General Assembly resolution establishing the Conciliation Commission for Palestine, see *ibid.*, Dec. 12, 1948, p. 726, and Dec. 26, 1948, p. 793.

[6] For text of Japanese note and U.S. reply, see p. 728.

le world structure of multilateral trade which United States has supported for quite a few s now and upon which we believe a great deal he prosperity of the United States and the ving strength of all the free world is based. refore, we do look on the situation with very t concern.

. *Mr. Secretary, there has been a report of resentative Celler which says the Egyptians due to buy six submarines from the Soviet . Has any such report about submarines from Communists reached the State Department?*

. We have heard the same reports that prob- have come to Representative Celler, but ther, in fact, there is an arrangement for sub- ines and whether it has been carried out we do know.

. *Mr. Secretary, have you given any indica- of your views on the Israeli request for jet es made to Canada? Have the Canadians informed whether you would appreciate their ng that request?*

. The Canadians are aware of the fact that e is no intention or desire of the United States ry to establish a worldwide boycott of the ernment of Israel as far as arms are concerned. own policy is based on certain considerations ch are, in some respects at least, distinctive to selves and not necessarily a pattern which we k all the world should follow, certainly not a tern which we are trying to impose upon other ntries of the world.

. *Mr. Secretary, you just mentioned reference some machinery to implement the Caracas laration. I wonder if you propose to use this hinery to keep watch on the recent Soviet trade rs made to Latin Americans to see that they not accompanied by political penetration.*

. We have to rely primarily upon the vigilance he countries concerned where the subject mat- is one which is out in the open, as it is when le agreements are involved. The United tes doesn't try to impose its views on others in se respects. The type of machinery I referred s designed to counter underground activities international communism.

. *Mr. Secretary, there has been some talk the t several days of the United Nations Security ncil meeting in Geneva or Rome or some place in Europe to hear Mr. Hammarskjold's report on his mission and take the next step. What is the United States position on that?*

A. The United States position on that is that it is entirely a matter for the Security Council itself to decide where it wants to meet. It can meet other than in New York. It has met, as I recall, both in London and Paris in the past, and, if it is the desire of the members generally to meet somewhere else, the United States would not oppose that.

Q. We don't take a strong position one way or another?

A. No.

Cyprus

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you regard putting Cyprus under NATO as a feasible temporary arrangement?

A. No, I would doubt that would be feasible because, you see, NATO is not, I might say, a corporate entity. NATO is an organization where a lot of sovereign states gather to discuss things but it has no corporate existence, you might say. It is like the United Nations. When the United Nations exercises its trusteeship, it always does it through some one or more countries. It picks one of the member countries to exercise the trusteeship on its behalf because the United Nations does not act of itself. It isn't a supergovernment which has itself authority, with operating functions and responsibilities. The same is true of NATO. There is a group of what we call "permanent representatives" that meet and exchange views. But that is a group which can take no action except by unanimous consent of all the governments concerned. And to put a situation like Cyprus under the administration of a council of—what is it now—15 nations acting through representatives who have to discuss everything at great length, and cannot agree on anything except after lengthy discussion, is not an effective form of government.

Q. Has that been suggested to you?

A. I have heard of the idea, but it has not been suggested as far as I am aware in any official way by any government.

Q. Both you and the President have talked recently of the necessity of gearing our sights for longer-term foreign aid, but opposition on the

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Hill seems to be more rather than less. What is the administration doing at this point to push the program of foreign aid? Or is it?

A. Yes, we are working actively on that matter. The presentations have begun before the Foreign Affairs Committee and I discussed the situation with Chairman Richards of the committee a few days ago. He felt the presentations had been effective although of course he did not attempt in any way to forecast the committee action. The President may be discussing this problem in his talk that he is making on Saturday although that talk has not yet been finalized. But I know he has had in mind at least referring to the subject at that time.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think it will be possible to reach a solution of our problems in the Middle East without the consultation and participation of the Soviet Union?

A. Well, to the extent we work this problem out through the United Nations and the United Nations Assembly, or Security Council—presumably the United Nations Security Council—that automatically does involve a certain participation with the Soviet Union because the Soviet Union is inescapably a member of both those bodies.

Q. The Sudanese have indicated they are asking the Russians for technical assistance. Do you anticipate a widespread and successful Soviet drive through the technical assistance program?

A. Well, I would expect there will be a Soviet drive, but I have no reason to think it will be successful. Recently the efforts which they made in relation to Libya have received a setback, and I think there is the same skepticism in most of the African countries that there is in other countries of the "hookers" in Soviet technical assistance.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Spanish Foreign Minister said in New York yesterday that he thought the United States would supply the Spanish Army with the most modern weapons. Did he make such a request while he was here?

A. Not to me. He did have talks, I believe, with some of the defense people and Admiral Radford. I don't know what he said there.

Q. Would you comment on the visit this week to London of Bulganin and Khrushchev, with particular reference to talks on the kind of question we have been discussing here?

A. No, I think it would not be appropriate f me to comment on that matter.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the House Foreign Affai Committee hearing Chairman Richards presente a somewhat new concept of handling foreign ai that is, that the United States follow somewhat the footsteps of the Soviet. For instance, t Soviets come to Sudan or Libya—come to the countries and say, "We will put up so much mon to build a dam," etc., and the United States say "Go ahead and take that and then we will con along and we will supply you with what t Russians don't make up and when they let y down," etc. What is your thought on that? M Richards seriously presented that in a hearing no going on.

A. Well, I am not familiar with that present tion of that point of view, and I would prefer n to comment on it. I presume all these hearin have been in executive session, haven't they?

Q. No, not all that I know of.

A. Was this presentation made at a publ hearing?

Q. No. Well, as you well know, Mr. Secretar a lot of things that go on behind closed doors lat become public.

Germany

Q. Mr. Secretary, does this Government fav the diplomatic talks on reunification that German intends to begin soon with the Soviet Unio through its Ambassador in Moscow?

A. I don't understand that there is any Germa proposal to negotiate with the Soviet Union f reunification. I understand that what Foreig Minister von Brentano said was in answer to question as to whether they thought of invitin Bulganin to come to Bonn to discuss reunificatio He said there was no necessity to invite him t come now that they have diplomatic represent tion—they have embassies in both places. But, I read what he said, I did not interpret it as mea ing there was any present intention of carryin on negotiations; in fact, I think he expressly sai that any steps in that direction would only b taken in agreement with the Western powers.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the Wes ern powers were wrong at the last Foreign Mini ters meeting to put German reunification ahead German security as you did?

A. No, I think we were right in doing that. Ex-se me. I think perhaps I misinterpreted your estion, or did not answer it quite responsibly. thought you were referring to putting German nification ahead of disarmament.

Q. Yes. I incorrectly stated the question. That what I meant to say.

A. That is what I thought, and my answer goes what you meant to say.

Q. I didn't know you were a mind reader.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Yugoslav Ambassador id last week he thinks war will be avoided in the iddle East. Do you think that is an overopti-stic statement, or do you share that view?

A. I will certainly accept one-half of it, that r can be avoided.

Q. You think it will be, and you have reason r believing so?

A. I certainly am not going to be said to feel at I think there will be war in the Near East be-use I think that the chances are that there will t be war. But I think it would be rash to say w that there was no risk whatever of hostilities that area.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to go back a minute to the viet trade offers, it was said in Geneva last week at they are considerably more realistic now than y have been in the past. I wonder, if that is the e, whether you think the same as you indi-ed—that Soviet trade offers will continue, es-ially in Latin America?

A. I don't feel that I can make a very clear swer to that question. All that I can say is that have been having occasional talks here with the mbassadors of the other 20 American Republics, d we talk about these problems and there seems be a general consensus of thinking that there are ngers in this situation and the need to approach problem in a very cautious way. But I ildn't speak for all and each of these countries to what they will do.

ecial Study of Foreign Aid

Q. Mr. Secretary, I understand that Chairman Gorge proposed over the weekend the creation some sort of special high-level group to study reign aid. Do you think this will be a good idea?

A. I think that the time has probably come when it would be useful to have a comprehensive study made of this whole problem, both from the standpoint of our own machinery for conducting the aid and the effectiveness of the present machinery, and also from the standpoint of the Soviet activities and the extent to which those may be relevant to our program. There is the question, for example, of whether more should be done in terms of loans and less in terms of grants. There is the question of whether or not more should be given through international agencies like the United Nations or whether they should be done wholly on a bilateral basis or done through regional organizations. There is a great mass of serious problems of that sort which have been growing up over the past few years. The administration, I may say, is itself making plans to explore that problem and Senator George's thinking actually parallels thinking that has been going on within the administration itself. I would think that we would be receptive to working out some program of that sort which would, I hope, command the confidence of the country and of the Congress. The question of just how to set it up raises questions but I do believe that the time is here when a comprehensive examination of that program is due.

Q. Would that be by a commission outside the administration?

A. I don't want to express myself at this time as to the machinery which would be best adapted because we have no clear conclusions within the administrative or executive department on that subject ourselves. And, whatever we did, we would want to concert with the thinking of Congress so, as I say, the result would carry a good deal of confidence not only in the country as a whole but in the Congress. So I don't want to pronounce today on the machinery.

Q. When would it be held, Mr. Secretary?

A. I would think the studies ought to be, as Senator George has I think indicated, carried on between the present, or whenever the committee, commission, or whatever it is, is set up, and next January when the Congress would reconvene.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been reports Paul Hoffman came to you a few weeks ago and asked you for your opinion about setting up a citizens'

council on foreign aid and you turned it down. Is that correct?

A. It is true that Mr. Hoffman did come to me and did talk about that subject but it has not been turned down. That is one of the ideas that i the hopper and which we are thinking abou line with what I described as the thinking of administration on this subject.

United States Foreign Policy in Africa

by George V. Allen
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs [1]

The problems confronting United States foreign policy in the vast continent of Africa are at least as varied and manifold as the different stages of evolution of the various countries making up that continent. I would not presume to add to the information about Africa which has been proffered to you by the specialists in this field during the past 48 hours. Instead, I believe the most useful contribution I can offer to this symposium is to attempt to place the policy problems confronting the United States in Africa in perspective as we see them and then to analyze for you briefly and in broad strokes the unique aspects of the problems confronting us in Africa and the basic principles from which we approach their solution.

A responsible foreign policy toward Africa requires of the United States a deep understanding of the aspirations and problems of the individual African countries both in their relationship with the European powers and in their urge toward self-determination so that we may lend our good offices and assistance in promoting an orderly progress toward independence and nationhood.

Africa in World Perspective

In recent years the principle that the developed countries have a moral obligation to aid the less developed countries, such as those of Africa, has become almost universally recognized, even taken for granted. There is a sound basis for the lidity of this principle. In a world wherein countries and continents are becoming next-(neighbors, glaring disparities in living stand can produce tensions and animosities easily far into conflict. In its postwar policies the Un States has been actively pursuing peace by tr to mitigate such tensions. More recently the Soviet Union has begun belatedly to make tures of cooperation and assistance toward underdeveloped countries. While this constit an important change in Soviet tactics, it rem to be seen whether the change is consistent the basic Communist objective of world d nation.

All this is highly pertinent to the considera of African problems. Besides the disturbing ment introduced in the Middle East by the C arms deal with Egypt, the Soviets, either dire or indirectly, have made overtures to Libya, E opia, and Liberia; and there is evidence of C munist activity in areas as widely separate the Sudan and the Union of South Africa. would be betraying our position of leadershi the free world if we assumed that these initiat are in the pursuit of normal, responsible for relations. The old familiar pattern of exploi and championing local dissent and grievance create chaos and confusion is too fresh in minds.

The terms "imperialism" and "colonialism" be correctly used to describe a relationship, w existed more in the past than at present, betw

[1] Address made before the American Academy of Political and Social Science at Philadelphia, Pa., on Apr. 21 (press release 206 dated Apr. 20).

metropolitan powers and their colonies, a rela-
ship which most of the free-world powers have
ady rejected in principle.

ardly a day passes that some further evidence
he passing of colonialism does not appear in
press. Morocco and Tunisia both obtained
r independence last month. A Moroccan Gov-
nent is now operating in Rabat, and an all-
isian Government in Tunis. This month
isia held its first national elections. As for
occo, the United States has never ceased to
gnize the sovereignty of the Sultan and the
ted States alone has always maintained a
omatic representative in Tangier.

nialism

he United States attitude toward colonialism
nown. In the light of our historical origins
our traditions this attitude could hardly be
erent. But the application of this principle
present-day foreign-policy problems all over
world requires patient understanding and a
sense of responsibility regarding the ulti-
e and basic security interests of the United
es. All of the so-called colonial powers repre-
ed on the continent of Africa are our friends
allies in the worldwide contest between the
and Communist worlds. Relationships estab-
ed by them with countries in Africa date from
era when the concepts of international rela-
s were different. No one but a demagogue
ld deny that basic advantages were brought
he African territories by this process of open-
wider horizons and that, in fact, the impetus
ard modern nationhood grew out of these con-
s with Western civilization.

urthermore, in the course of this relationship
ween the metropolitan powers and the African
itories, there grew up interlocking economic
tions, the violent disruption of which would
ously weaken our European allies. Similarly,
dden break of these lifelines would create con-
ons of political and economic instability most
mful to our African friends. It is more largely
uestion of transforming this relationship into
operative endeavor by which the newly emerg-
states in Africa achieve and *maintain* their
ional self-respect and apply in their own way
benefits of their national resources to improv-
the lot of their own people. A strong, free,
friendly Africa is extremely important to
United States security. Our security interests and our moral interests are both effectively served by the same general line of action—we need friendly and cooperative relations with Europe and Africa, just as their own interests require the maintenance of intimate ties with each other.

In Africa our allies are aware of the basic attitude of the United States toward colonialism, but they are equally aware of our intention to work as friends of both sides toward an orderly solution of these problems. Great Britain has publicly announced its policy of helping the countries of Africa toward independence, and its record in Asia is an earnest of its sincerity. In line with its policy as a responsible power, however, it does not wish to create perhaps greater problems by precipitate action which granting of immediate independence might create. This is a time when political vacuums are a great danger to world peace.

In North Africa, France has recently recognized the independence of Morocco and Tunisia [2] and is engaged in trying to find a liberal solution to the problem of Algeria. Spain has also recognized the independence of its zone of Morocco,[3] and that country has now the opportunity to become unified. Both Spain and France are engaged in working out arrangements by which the mutual economic benefits derived from their past association with Morocco can be continued in the light of the new relationship. In other areas of Africa, France is also looking toward creating a new relationship with the groups which are gradually developing a higher degree of political consciousness. The Belgians have recently established two universities in the Belgian Congo to meet the educational needs of the Congolese.

Nationalism

The United States attitude toward nationalism is not so easily definable. After World War II, when the threat of international communism endangered our security, United States opinion was inclined toward promoting a greater faith in federations in Europe which cut across—and, we hoped, would eventually obliterate—nationalistic rivalries. But in other areas of the world we recognized the strength of nationalism in resisting

[2] BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1956, p. 466, and Apr. 2, 1956, p. 552.

[3] *Ibid.*, Apr. 23, 1956, p. 667.

the threat of international communism. Communism cynically exploits the passions of revolt for the sole purpose of creating unrest, chaos, and revolution so that the small organized minority may seize power and permanently bury the instincts of healthy nationalism under the requirements of blind and absolute obedience to Moscow. This issue assumes a special importance in Africa, where the varying degrees of political experience, the large amount of illiteracy, and the insecurity of the individual in the process of exchanging his old loyalties for new ones make the population particularly vulnerable to exploitation of this issue by unprincipled demagogues.

Again the principle of understanding and responsibility in the conduct of foreign relations should guide us and other nations in relations with the countries of Africa so that the elements of nationalism which contribute toward genuine independence and stability will be encouraged and those which tend to be purely negative, anarchic, and disruptive be curbed.

Racialism

In the light of experience which the United States is undergoing domestically in developing harmonious race relations, I think it behooves us to approach the problem of race elsewhere in the world in all humility. This aspect of relations between people of different races living together in multiracial states involves deep-seated emotions and prejudices which can only be overcome gradually. The principle for which the United States stands and is known throughout the world is perfectly clear: it is embodied in our Constitution and in our Bill of Rights. But it is equally clear that the application of force and oppression can only exacerbate the issue.

The vast continent of Africa illustrates this problem in all its facets, from countries in which the intermingling of races on an equal basis has become an accepted and unquestioned fact to countries in which an attempt is being made to legislate segregation down to its last logical consequence. The problem is infinitely complicated in Africa by the presence of groups who wield political and economic power but who are not otherwise identified with the country and people among whom they live. This tends to confuse the issue of racialism with questions of political, economic, social, and cultural discrimination and makes the approach to a solution of the problem more di cult by making it virtually impossible to isol the issue from all the other problems.

Again it behooves us not to become identif with any of the conflicting factions but rat while preserving our adherence to our own ba principle of racial equality, to attempt to exer moderating influence upon the extremists and oppose those who are exploiting these tensions ulterior purposes.

Challenge to U.S. Diplomacy

The continent of Africa presents a wide vari of foreign policy problems to the United Sta as varied as the number of countries and territo it comprises and as complicated as the degree emergence toward independent statehood and complexity of relationships with the differ metropolitan powers with which the various sta are associated. Yet there is a unifying fac in this diversity: the entire continent is und going simultaneously, even if in varying degr a transformation along political, economic, soc logical, and racial lines. The substitution of n ties for old tribal or family relationships in or to assure security for the individual, the excha of old values for new ones in the attempt to tain social and economic status, the growing des for political self-expression, and the need for veloping new approaches to produce stability multiracial groups devoted to common econo and political goals—all these combine to cre a condition of ferment and potential progr which is a real challenge to American diploma.

The United States, as a nation, has no self interests in Africa except the preservation of own security, which we consider, in present wo circumstances, inextricably bound up with the ki of future the African countries desire for the selves. We are dedicated to the preservation world peace, which we consider an indispensa corollary to the kind of development Africa nee Because of our origins and traditions we are ba cally in sympathy with the desire for indepe ence and nationhood of the emerging states, we are also friends and allies of the powers w must help to shape this new status. This pla us in a position from which we hope and beli our influence can be exerted to make the tra formation of Africa a process of orderly evo tion and not one of violent revolution.

e Soviet Reappraisal of Stalin

by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy[1]

our society was founded in 1922, and at that e I was a young officer in the Foreign Service he Department of State. During the years ch have elapsed, we have witnessed tremendous rovements in the coverage and dissemination ews. At my first post in Bern, Switzerland, he end of World War I, we had only sketchy infrequent reports on developments in Wash- on and elsewhere. The contrast between those s and the present—with the almost instantane- coverage that you give to world affairs today— normous, as is its impact on the conduct of our ign affairs. Perhaps no other single item has cted the techniques of diplomacy as has the po and completeness of your activities in the rmation field.

n our small way, we in the Department of State indebted to you for your valuable coverage of rnational affairs. Our modern society would ard pressed to maintain its strength and its dom without the intelligent reporting and n appraisal of world events that you make ible.

erhaps the greatest difference between our n of civilization and that of the Communist- rolled powers is in our respective concepts he role and function of news media. To us full rmation and freedom of expression are pri- y. Without them we would not have the in- ned public opinion on which our society de- ds. Communist countries by their structure unable to have full and free information. ir leaders cannot tolerate it. Their media of ression are designed to present the views of the ng group. Only carefully selected items of news are disseminated, and the important items are scrupulously edited either to generate public confidence in the governing group or to inflame resentment against enemies of the state, real or imaginary. The people of Russia and Communist-dominated countries live in a world that closely resembles the nightmare described by George Orwell in *1984*. What news they are allowed to read and hear is presented to them to develop a state of mind or point of view carefully chosen for them in advance by the ruling group.

We have recently witnessed a rather ostentatious reappraisal of Stalin, resulting in his denigration and downgrading. In this performance we have an exceptionally clear example of Soviet treatment of the news and their concept of the role of the news media in Communist society.

Rise and Fall of Stalin Cult

For 25 years all members of Communist-controlled countries, whether within the Soviet Union or without, had been increasingly conditioned to the acceptance of Stalin as the all-wise and the always-right. Any outward manifestation of less than complete belief in Stalin's wisdom and correctness led to unpleasantness. For 25 years Communists at home and abroad were indoctrinated in this credo. Stalin's views of history and science, Communist doctrine, the arts, and literature were the only views possible for Soviet or Communist-controlled citizens to have or at least to express. Cities and mountains, factories and industrial plants, theaters, stadiums were named in his honor. Art galleries, public buildings, offices, and private homes were decorated with his pictures and his statues. What was deemed good in the Communist world was associated with Stalin. And what was evil and what was danger-

[1] ddress made before the American Society of News- r Editors at Washington, D. C., on Apr. 19 (press se 205).

ous was deviation, no matter how slight, from any view on any subject that Stalin might have had or was likely to have.

In the course of the 3 years since Stalin's death the present Soviet oligarchy decided to "shrink" Stalin, to devalue him and to change the worship of his name. The process of Stalin's devaluation provides a spectacular example of the difference in the ways in which our respective systems of news dissemination function.

You are no doubt weary of references to the February meeting in Moscow of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Before this meeting there had been hints and suggestions that Stalin was no longer regarded by the Politburo with the traditional worshipful reverence. There were innuendoes on occasion that some parts of Stalin's foreign policy had been less than perfect. But the symbol of Stalin, the all-wise and the impeccable, had been treated gingerly. On his birthday anniversary last December all of the important Soviet news media referred to him as enjoying a secure and lasting place in the trinity. His name was, as always, coupled with those of Marx and Lenin. In January, at a series of lesser Party congresses, this treatment of him continued.

Denunciation at Party Congress

Just as the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was to meet, there came an indication that the dam was about to break. The Congress opened with a minute of silent remembrance for three comrades who had died since the 19th Congress. The three were Stalin, Gottwald, and Tokuda. The pairing of the great Stalin with these lesser foreign figures was in itself an insult. Then, during the Congress, his name was mentioned less than a half dozen times during the 11 days of speechmaking. In one speech by Mikoyan, Stalin was mentioned only once, though his policies were severely criticized. When the texts of the speeches made at the Congress were published, it was obvious that he had been under severe attack. But the detailed denunciation of Stalin was saved for a climax speech by Khrushchev at a closed session on the last day.

Seven weeks have elapsed since then, and the Soviet press has not yet printed the Khrushchev speech. Nor have they printed all the charges made in the speeches, nor the widespread criticism that has since been made of Stalin by satelli leaders. Khrushchev's speech was made on Febr ary 25th and is said to have lasted for 2½ hou You have seen public reports that the text runs 60 pages. Yet up to now the people of the Sovi Union have not been told of the speech or even the fact of its delivery. I am sure the Sovi Ambassador will not mind if I say that I express to him our interest in seeing the text.

Campaign of Defamation

As you know, Khrushchev's secret speech w apparently the signal for a general campaign defamation of Stalin throughout the Commun satellite countries. In almost all these countri there has been severe, definite, and personal cri cism of Stalin and his policies, yet it was not un March 28 that *Pravda* denounced some of t evils of the Stalin regime. While the satelli countries have been allowed to be free in the post-Congress criticism and while foreign co respondents in Moscow have been allowed to r fer to the Khrushchev speech since March 17, t Russian press has been under heavy wraps.

The manner in which the devaluation of Stal has been handled by the Soviet press is hard f Americans to conceive. In our eyes this trea ment of news verges on the burlesque, yet w know and understand that the leaders of the Sovi Union do not embark on any such major chan in the accepted dogma of their system without t most careful and calculated preparation. It usually done with all the abandon of a caref chess player. The Soviet leaders had to make major and dangerous decision when they start their process of devaluation. Apparently they a willing to risk the consequences of a period of co fusion and doubt. Apparently they are con dent that they will be able to use their news med for persuasion and at the same time their vario means of coercion to keep their people in line unt a new mythology has been established. We ev have reports that examinations in Soviet histo are being suspended in Russian schools becau the teachers do not know what history is corre

Why are the Soviet leaders doing this? Do it mean any real change in Soviet policy? T answers to these questions gradually unfold. is our opinion that this is a carefully planned o eration conducted largely for internal, domest reasons. Its impact abroad is incidental and m even risk losses and Party discomfort. But t

jor stakes in this instance are inside the Soviet ion, where the dead weight of the Stalin ap- ratus and heritage had to be lifted in order that Party program could breathe again and move ward. The Soviet leaders are not easily em- rassed by criticisms or ridicule from abroad, they are relentlessly vigilant to protect their mary source of power at home. The cult of lin was corrupting that power. It had to be troyed. On the foreign front they move ndly ahead, with successive maneuvers—a new armament proposal, an announcement of the solution of the Cominform which is really ong overdue obituary, a dramatic plug for dit in the Middle East, a Bulganin and rushchev visit here and there. They are confi- t in the ability of the free world soon to forget purge of Stalin as the purge of the old lshevists was forgotten. But the leadership er forgets its source of power.

Perhaps you may recall a celebrated passage m Sir Winston Churchill's speech at Massa- setts Institute of Technology back in 1949, time when the power of the Soviet threatened whole of Western Europe. Sir Winston, aking in parables, wanted to make the point t unforeseen events mitigate the course of his- y, and he did it in this way:

> our or five hundred years ago Europe seemed about e conquered by the Mongols. Two great battles were ht almost on the same day near Vienna and in Poland. oth of these the chivalry and armed power of Europe e completely shattered by the Asiatic hordes. It ned that nothing could avert the doom of the famous inent from which modern civilization and culture spread throughout the world. But at the critical ent the Great Khan died. The succession was vacant the Mongol armies and their leaders trooped back on r ponies across the 7,000 miles which separated them their capital in order to choose a successor. They r returned 'til now.

ow I would not imply from this that the in- tors of the power of Josef Stalin (he was e described as Genghis Khan with a tele- ne!) have fallen out to any crippling degree— ough the death of Beria and his friends and rehabilitation of many both living and dead cate deep subsurface disturbances. We can harply aware of the fact that the Soviet Union process of radical transition from one-man to group dictatorship. This might be called process of institutionalizing a dictatorship. s is perhaps the essence of the counterrevolu- going on in Russia today.

Rule by committee instead of by single dictator inevitably has brought about a certain loosening in the chain of command. The differing ways the satellites have reacted to the anti-Stalin campaign is just one case in point. Official rehabilitation of Stalin victims—as in Hungary and Bulgaria—is one end of the spectrum. A tendency to blame all past excesses on officials of the Beria stripe is another. The dissolution of the Cominform, long since a fact but only announced 2 days ago, is an index of a trend.

In the Department of State we do not assume that the Communists have changed their basic objectives. We have no evidence that they have. We recall that Karl Marx, nearly 100 years ago, aptly said that "the policy of Russia is changeless . . . its methods, its tactics, its maneuvers may change, but the polar star of its policy—world domination—is a fixed star."

Nevertheless, the Soviet leaders today are reducing their emphasis on military strength and threat of force as major instruments of policy. They are shifting and diversifying their methods. Such a shift may be an advantageous development from the standpoint of the United States and other free nations.

Implications for U.S. Policy

A principal objective of United States foreign policy is to prevent a devastating war. We would welcome any genuine indication that the danger of armed Communist aggression has diminished. We have no reason to doubt the fundamental capacity of free societies to compete with communism by peaceful means. At the same time, there are two facts we should keep firmly in mind when we try to figure out where we stand today.

First we should remember that the Communist bloc retains a tremendous capability of military aggression. It has a substantial superiority in military manpower. It is rapidly developing more modern weapons and a modern technology, including, of course, an ominous atomic potential. The Communists possess the capacity to engage in new military ventures at any time, either on a general or local scale. As long as this capacity exists, it is obvious that neither the United States nor other free nations can afford to risk their freedom and safety on an optimistic reassessment of Communist intentions.

Secondly, even if the Communists remain cautious about military ventures, we cannot afford to

discount the vast stakes involved in the bitter political and economic contests which they are determined to wage against the free world. In terms of the ultimate fate of free civilization, this new strategy is no less dangerous than the old. We assume it to be equally hostile but more deceptive to combat. It is more subtle, more complex, and geared to a longer time period. We should not make what could be the fatal mistake of assuming that a Communist deemphasis on military methods of conquest will allow us to take a holiday. On the contrary, the struggle to protect our freedom may become more intense and will certainly tax our imagination, our resources, and our patience. Our ability to achieve success, like our ability to maintain an adequate defense posture, will depend in large measure upon our cooperation with other free nations. The principle of collective security is as valid today in the political-economic field as it ever was in the military field.

We are interested in what may have changed within the Soviet Union. It is even more important to remember what has not changed in the Soviet Union.

First: The power for political decision is still vested in a few men. The people of the U.S.S.R. have no voice in political decisions.

Second: The U.S.S.R. is the most heavily armed nation in the world, and it is continuing to develop new weapons.

Third: The power structure of the U.S.S.R. is bolstered by an ideology that is basically hostile to any system it is unable to control.

It is still much too soon to make any final appraisal of what this internal change means. Stalin has been criticized for his domestic mistakes. He has been criticized for not preparing the Soviet Union against attack from Germany. His foreign policy, the injustices committed abroad, have not been subject to the same withering reexamination. There has been no indication that a free Germany will be allowed to unite. There is little indication of a new attitude toward Japan. There has been no indication that the satellite countries will be free.

There is one development that clearly seems to stem from the emerging Soviet system of institutionalizing, of group dictatorship. That is a return to the *processes* of diplomacy.

You have perhaps seen the announcement just made by Secretary-General Hammarskjold that Egypt and Israel have agreed to an unconditi cease-fire on their borders. This is indeed a come development. It reflects credit upon parties immediately concerned, upon the effort Mr. Hammarskjold, and, if I may say so, on President and the Secretary of State, because United States wanted this dispute settled thro the United Nations. In the course of this ta have not had the occasion to touch on the Mi East, although I can assure you I am not una of a certain focusing of interest there on y part and by others. But I suggest that methods by which the new economic-political flict is being waged are increasingly through lomatic channels, and in the Middle East tha especially true.

And because the prevention of war is the mate goal of the diplomat, the lifelong pur to which his life is dedicated, perhaps we may h that this may be progress, even though very sn progress, toward the true peace for which yo your important field and we in the State Dep ment all long and for which we all strive.

Israel and Egypt Agree To Observe Armistice

Statement by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
U.S. Representative to the United Nations

U.S./U.N. press release 2390 dated April 19

The United States pointed out in the Secu Council on April 3[1] that unless the armist agreements can be effectively carried out, a gr threat to the peace may result.

It is heartening evidence of the good faith of parties that it has been possible for the Secreta General to announce that both Israel and Eg have notified the Chief of Staff of the U.N. Tr Supervision Organization of orders issued in plementation of assurances for the observation article 2 (2) of the Egyptian-Israeli Armist Agreement.

This word of progress coming from the Se tary-General is most welcome and shows that is discharging well the mandate given him by Security Council on April 4.[2]

[1] BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1956, p. 630.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 628.

jectives of the Mutual Security Program in Asia

Statement by Walter S. Robertson
Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs[1]

appreciate the opportunity to appear in sup-
t of the Far East portion of the proposed
tual security program for the fiscal year 1957.
n the area with which we are concerned today,
United States is extending aid under the
tual security program to nine countries—Ja-
, Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Indonesia, Viet-
m, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand. I should
to make a general statement highlighting the
ation in the region and the political considera-
ns that make it so important for the United
tes to continue these programs. After that,
specific programs will be summarized for you
Dr. Raymond Moyer, ICA [International Co-
ration Administration] Regional Director for
Far East, and by Deputy Assistant Secretary
Guire of the Department of Defense.

The area we are talking about—the free-world
East—is a region only in a geographical sense.
ere are greater differences than similarities be-
en the countries except that they, all but one,
re the common problem of being underde-
oped by Western standards. In the area are
rly 300 million people, most of whom are small
mers with an average holding of about one to
acres. The variation in population density is
matic, ranging from 16 per square mile in Laos
,000 or more in some parts of Java and Japan.
body really knows what the per capita income
but the best estimates we have run from about
a year in the poorest country to $300 a year in
richest country.

The area provides the free world with about 92
cent of its abaca, 88 percent of its natural rubber, 41 percent of its rice, 66 percent of its copra, and 65 percent of its tin. There is still a tremendous potential of available minerals—oil, bauxite, iron ore, chromium, tin, manganese, sulfur, nickel, etc.

Politically the area is characterized by a very strong spirit of nationalism and independence. These nations are determined no longer to be regarded at home or abroad as second-class citizens. To many of them the colonialism they have experienced appears to be more of a menace than the threat of communism.

The primary objective of our policy in the Far East can be stated quite simply. It is to strengthen the free world and to curb the power and prevent the expansion of communism. The mutual security program is an increasingly essential factor in the attainment of that objective.

The people of these countries have aspirations for a better life which they are determined to fulfill. This program, through technical and economic-development assistance, is helping them to achieve these objectives. The military assistance part of the program is assisting them in maintaining internal order and security and in creating a first line of defense against aggression while they build up in a nonmilitary sense internally. But it is the success or failure of this mutual security program, in giving these nations hope that they will be more secure and better off tomorrow than they are today, that will determine whether they succumb to the blandishments of communism. This hope, if it is to last, must be firmly grounded in their own experience that progress is being made; that they are, in fact, better off today than they were yesterday; and that, when tomorrow becomes today, the same thing will be true.

[1] Made before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the ise of Representatives on Apr. 11.

As Secretary Dulles said upon his return from his recent trip to the Far East:[2]

> The day is past when the peoples of Asia will tolerate leadership which keeps them on a dead center economically and socially, and when each generation merely ekes out a bare subsistence, with a brief life expectancy, and passes on to the next generation only the same bleak prospect.

As you know, I had the privilege of accompanying Secretary Dulles on his recent trip. The situation in this part of the world is still serious; there are still many points of tension; but there is general improvement in free-world competence to deal with these tensions. Doubtless there will be setbacks from time to time, but the general course is one of progress.

The Asian leaders whom we saw uniformly desired to preserve the independence of their countries. They too recognized that political independence of itself is not enough. Eight out of ten countries we visited were anti-Communist. Those two which call themselves neutrals, however, were also appreciative of United States aid and the help that United States policy affords them in preserving their independence. Faith and hope are the stuff of which free nations are made. Our aid programs are assisting the governments of free Asian countries in making such faith and hope possible.

For well over a year the forces of armed aggression in the area have been held in check. This fact, and the radical change in Soviet tactics in recent months, are, in my opinion, evidence of the effectiveness of the courses of action we have been following. Millions of free Asians have, in consequence, enjoyed a measure of peace even though living under the constant threat of a renewal of armed aggression. That threat remains deadly serious throughout the region as it did a year ago. Let us look at it squarely.

Nature of Communist Threat

In Korea the Communists have not slackened the buildup of their combat capability in the north. Chinese Communist troops are still in occupation of North Korea. They have introduced, in flagrant violation of the armistice agreement, a modern jet air force and new types and larger quantities of other equipment that greatly increase their striking power. The experience with aggression in 1950, the enormous stake which the Unit States and the United Nations have in a free ar independent Korea, and this threat posed by tl Communists to the north make it essential th we maintain our guard in Korea. We cannot l complacent in this situation.

Opposite Taiwan, the Chinese Communists a building 10 airfields between Shanghai and Ca ton to accommodate jet planes, multiplying the gun positions, and constructing a military railro into the port of Amoy.

The Korean story is repeated in Viet-Nar where, in callous violation of the Geneva agre ment of 1954, the effective strength of the fightir forces of the Viet Minh has approximately double since the cease-fire and it is reported that artille firepower has been increased some sixfol Equipment and training are being furnished b the Chinese Communists.

In other parts of the region the Communi tactics are more insidious, but the threat is non theless real and menacing.

In Japan, that industrial powerhouse which a prime Communist target, the Communist Part is a legal entity with a following estimated close to 1 million. One of the few gestures in tl Far East toward the spirit of Geneva was mac by this organization when in July 1955 it r nounced past "errors" of violence and extremisr This lipservice would have meant more if tl Party had not maintained an underground o ganization with a paramilitary arm which the have used for purposes of espionage, sabotag and the instigation of mass violence.

In Laos, the Pathet Lao, flaunting the Genev agreement, continue to occupy the major parts c two northern provinces. They send their agen into other parts of the country to stir up troubl and subvert the legitimate government.

In Thailand, the people recognize the potenti threat to them of continued occupation of thes Lao provinces and see beyond in adjacent Re China the "Greater Thai State" created by th Communists. There they see a former Th premier calling upon people of the Thai rac living in Thailand, Laos, and Burma to over throw their free government and substitut communism.

In Singapore, Communist elements have mad disturbing advances particularly in the fields c education and labor with their tactics of violenc and subversion. In the Federation of Malaya, th

[2] Bulletin of Apr. 2, 1956, p. 539.

ritish are still fighting their long war against mmunist guerrilla terrorism.

In Indonesia, a country which 8 years ago put wn forcefully an attempted Communist mili- ry coup, the Communists have succeeded in establishing themselves in the political sphere d in the recent general elections polled 16 per- nt of the vote and emerged as Indonesia's fourth gest party. However, on the plus side, a new n-Communist government coalition has been rmed which includes all major non-Communist ments.

In Burma, the Soviet bloc has moved swiftly d adroitly to exploit the situation there. Faced th a large, burdensome surplus of rice, Burma s been forced to find markets in any quarter. consequence, Burma is one of the neutrals that re singled out for special courtship by Bulganin d Khrushchev with offers of technicians, equip- nt for agricultural and industrial development, ools, and cultural exchanges. During a recent it, Mikoyan initialed an agreement with Burma which the Soviets will supply capital and other ods as well as "technical services" in exchange r 400,000 tons of rice annually for 4 years.

Finally, throughout the area, internal pressures the form of subversion and economic and ychological warfare are being brought to bear every country in the Far East.

ogress Made in Last Year

It is clear that there is much to be done. It is so true that much has been done and that genuine ogress has been made in the last year.

A little less than a year ago, when the aid pro- am for fiscal year 1956 was presented before this mmittee, you were informed of the tremendous ds against which the newly independent Gov- nment of Viet-Nam was fighting. It was faced th the military and subversion threat of the mmunists to the north of the 17th parallel; it s confronted with internal strife. There was e ominous challenge to the government's control sed by the armed, self-seeking, political-religious ts; there was the urgent necessity for resettling ndreds of thousands of refugees who had fled mmunist domination following the military rtition. The problems were well-nigh over- elming. The program you approved at that ne has made possible our continued support of is new republic in the economic and military here. We can, I believe, take great satisfaction in the remarkable improvement in the situation which without our contribution, we believe, would have been impossible.

We now find a firmly entrenched nationalist government under the leadership of President Diem. This government has proved its capacity not only to survive in the face of Communist subversive efforts but to assume the responsibilities of independence. The Diem government has achieved a decisive victory in the recent elections for the Assembly, which is now meeting to ratify a constitution for free Viet-Nam.

Our own efforts in Viet-Nam are directed in the first place toward helping to strengthen internal security forces. These consist of a regular army of about 150,000 men, a mobile civil guard of about 45,000, and local defense units which are being formed to give protection against subversion on the village level. We are providing budgetary support and equipment for these forces and have a mission assisting in the training of the army. We are also helping to organize, train, and equip the Vietnamese police forces. Some 600,000 refugees who fled to South Viet-Nam to escape the Viet Minh are being resettled on productive lands with the assistance of funds made available by our aid program. In various ways under "defense support" our program also provides assistance to the Vietnamese Government designed to strengthen the economy and provide a better future for the peoples in that area.

In Korea, we are demonstrating with other nations of the United Nations that a free nation can successfully be defended against Communist aggression and can be reconstructed and built up to defend itself. Our aid program is the major factor in the support of the Korean Army, which is now the fourth largest in the world and the largest among the free nations of Asia. That army has obviously become an effective deterrent against further aggression by the Red Chinese and North Korean armies entrenched beyond the 38th parallel. Korea's 21 divisions, which we believe continue to be essential, are far beyond its ability to support. Even without the burdens of this military force, Korea would need outside economic assistance for several years to come to complete the rehabilitation of the country and develop the economy so that it can ultimately become self-supporting.

Taiwan continues to occupy a position of key importance in the free world's island chain of

defense in the western Pacific. We continue to regard its defense as essential to the non-Communist countries of the Far East, as well as of the United States itself. As the Communists continue to improve and expand their military establishment on the mainland, the defensive significance of Taiwan assumes even greater importance than heretofore.

The Government of the Republic of China provides a source of hope for the mainland Chinese and an alternative focal point for their loyalty. It also furnishes a political alternative to Communist influence for some 13 million overseas Chinese residing in strategic parts of Southeast Asia. As the Peiping regime intensifies its repression and murder at home and subversive actions abroad, the maintenance of a China that is free and independent assumes an ever-increasing importance.

During the past year good progress has been made in strengthening the defensive capability of the forces on Taiwan and in stabilizing the economy. Substantial assistance from the United States continues to be necessary, however, since the economic resources of Taiwan are still limited in relation to the increasing population and the large defense establishment.

Economic Value of Defense Support

At this point, let me interpolate a moment. It should be clear to all of us that the term "defense support" covers programs important to economic development as well as to military objectives. A highway, an airport, a harbor, a bridge, a factory may in the first instance be vital for the military purposes, but its construction in most instances also contributes a much-needed economic item. Furthermore, as in Taiwan, the necessity for capital development to support military requirements goes hand in hand with an important objective we all have very much in mind—to reduce the burden on the U.S. taxpayer. As the economy of a country strengthens, it is self-evident that it can do more for itself and the need for grant aid correspondingly declines.

Turning to Japan, while much remains to be done, during the past 2 years Japan's self-defense forces have grown in size and have obtained useful training. The ground forces, numbering 150,000, are regarded as adequate for the maintenance of internal security but are not yet either quantitatively or qualitatively adequate for the defense of Japan. The Japanese Government, strengthened by the merger of the two conservative parties la fall, has under study specific plans which wou improve the country's ability to defend itself u aided. These plans have not yet been approve The assistance for Japan contemplated under t mutual security program will continue the he given heretofore in the organization, training, a equipping of Japan's self-defense forces. Japa economic recovery and its growing self-defen capabilities have already made it an asset to t free world. Further advance and developme should enable Japan to assume a greater share its own defense responsibilities and will perm redeployment of certain American forces present stationed in Japan.

We regard the Philippine Republic as an i creasingly important partner in the collective d fense arrangements in the Pacific area. The inte nal threat of armed communism has been general overcome, thus making it possible for Preside Magsaysay to proceed with his plans for the ec nomic development of his country. Through co tinued U.S. aid programs we are assisting Phili pine efforts to strengthen the main weaknessess the economy—the rate of industrial developme and backward rural conditions. We are also pr viding help to improve the defensive capabiliti of the armed forces.

Cambodia has made good progress in deali with elements inside the country which had be a threat to internal stability. Our aid is assis ing Cambodia to strengthen its armed forces accordance with the expressed desire of the Ca bodians to defend the independence of their cou try and to build up an effective internal securi force to thwart subversion. Our program assisting in strengthening the civilian econo by improving inland waterways, irrigation, a land reclamation and constructing a highway fro the capital city to a port on the Cambodi coast.

Regionally in the Far East, the mutual securi program for fiscal year 1957 seeks to advance t objectives of the network of mutual-defen treaties that has been created in the Pacific are The program provides equipment, training, a economic support essential for the military a police forces, as well as aid for economic deve opment purposes. Our mutual-defense treati are designed to deter the aggressor and to gi greater assurance and confidence to the participa ing governments. Those arrangements are ma

; a real contribution to the security of the area d to the hopes and aspirations of Asian people nerally. This was deeply impressed on all of who accompanied Secretary Dulles to the rachi meeting of the SEATO Council of Minis-s. After a most thorough review of the activ-s carried forward during the first year under ATO—a year devoted necessarily to preparatory asures—it was apparent on all sides that a high se of optimism, based on solid achievements, evails among the treaty members.[3]

We can anticipate that during the months ead many of the free people of Asia, especially se in the newly independent countries, will eive a variety of enticements from the Soviets squerading as their bounteous benefactor. The viets will hold themselves out as ready, willing, d able to solve all their problems with the Soviet nd of military, economic, and technical assist-ce. We propose to meet this challenge by con-uing our own constructive aid programs in the r East on the same sound principles that have n the foundation for those programs in the t. While not departing from the main course have charted, we will be better equipped to help free countries of Asia deal with this new Soviet ve, as well as with other situations that may ll develop, if the requested authority for reased flexibility can be written into the islation.

On the whole, I believe we can all derive genuine isfaction from the collective strength that the e nations of Asia have been able, with our help, achieve. The job is by no means finished, how-r, nor have the threats to security lessened. our own interest, as well as theirs, we must ntinue our help to them at a rate and in a manner equate to the needs of the developing situation.

S. Policy Toward Cambodia

ss release 204 dated April 19

Following is the text of a letter from Secretary lles to Foreign Minister Nong Kimny of Cam-dia delivered on April 19 at Phnom Penh by nerican Ambassador Robert McClintock.

DEAR MR. FOREIGN MINISTER: I am disturbed learn that recent statements from various quar-s have given increasing publicity to allegations that the United States has been attempting to coerce Cambodia into the SEATO alliance under the penalty of withholding economic aid, and that the United States has obliged the independent and friendly nations of Viet-Nam and Thailand to impose measures of economic warfare upon Cambodia for the same alleged end.

I regret that these allegations have been made since they are utterly false and could harm the friendly relations existing between our two countries.

The American Ambassador on April 2 officially advised Their Majesties the King and Queen of Cambodia that the United States at no time had made any official public observation on Cambodian foreign policy. United States policy in Cambodia is based on a simple precept: That is, the United States through its military and economic aid programs seeks to assist the Cambodian Government in its endeavor to maintain the sovereign independence of the Kingdom. This assistance is extended only at the wish of the Royal Cambodian Government, which officially requested military aid on May 20, 1954 and military and economic aid on September 1, 1954.

Although the United States believes that the free nations can most effectively meet the threat of Communist aggression through collective defense, nevertheless United States policy recognizes that certain countries, though determined to defend themselves against aggression or subversion of their independence, have preferred not to join regional security arrangements. That choice we respect. The United States does not seek ties of mutual defense with any country unless that country believes that this application of the principle of collective security will better assure its independence.

Recognition of the position of these countries in no way prevents the maintenance of close and cordial relations with them. In giving economic and military assistance to friendly countries to improve their capacity to defend themselves against aggression or subversion, the United States is guided primarily by consideration of its own national interests. It considers it to be in its national interest to help in the economic and social advancement of all free nations.

I trust that this letter will dispose of the false allegations concerning our policy, which, I venture to repeat, aims only at assisting free nations to preserve their liberty and independence.

[3] For text of the Council's first annual report, see *ibid.*, r. 12, 1956, p. 403.

May I take this occasion to extend warm personal greetings and best wishes for success in the new mission to which you have been called.[1]

State Legislation Regarding Japanese Textiles

Press release 199 dated April 17

Following are the texts of a Japanese Embassy note of April 4 concerning legislation in South Carolina regarding Japanese textiles, and of the Department of State's note of April 16 in reply.

Japanese Note

The Ambassador of Japan presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of State and has the honor to draw the attention of the latter to the following facts.

The Senate and the House of Representatives in the State of South Carolina passed a bill on March 6, 1956 which requires all wholesale and retail establishments in the State dealing in Japanese textile goods, or garments made therefrom, to display a sign "Japanese Textiles Sold Here". The bill was approved by the Governor of the State on March 8, 1956 and has since become effective. Furthermore, it is reported that the State legislature by resolution has requested the other southern and New England states, where the textile industry is prominent, to take similar steps.

The above-mentioned legislation discriminates against the sale of Japanese textile goods in the State of South Carolina. Such discrimination, in the view of the Japanese Government, is in contravention of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between Japan and the United States which provides, in Article 16, that products of either party shall be accorded, within the territories of the other party, national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment in all matters affecting internal taxation, sale, distribution, storage and use.

As the Secretary of State already knows, the Government of Japan and the Japanese textile industries concerned, in view of strong complaints by the American cotton textile industries against increased imports of Japanese products and motivated by the sincere desire to settle the problem amicably, voluntarily started to control the expo of cotton goods to the United States in Janua 1956.[1] The voluntary initiation of this contr required great sacrifice on the Japanese side. resulted in the cancellation of a considerable nu ber of outstanding contracts, which had been co cluded before the export quota was set, with t consequent serious economic impact upon the te tile industries concerned, particularly the mediu and small enterprises. Yet these efforts have n been met by the discrimination imposed in t State of South Carolina. Furthermore, it feared that similar steps might be taken by oth states. The Government of Japan is deeply co cerned about the adverse effects such discrimin tory action might have upon the friendly relatio ship between the two nations.

In view of the foregoing, the Ambassad under instructions from the Government of Japa has further the honor to request the Governme of the United States urgently to take appropria measures to meet this regrettable situation and prevent similar situations from arising in oth states.

Embassy of Japan,
Washington, *April 4, 1956.*

United States Note

The Secretary of State presents his complimen to His Excellency the Ambassador of Japan a has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of h note of April 4, 1956, concerning legislation e acted by the State of South Carolina which r quires all wholesale and retail establishments that State dealing with Japanese textile goods garments made therefrom to display a sign "Ja anese Textiles Sold Here". The views of the Ja anese Government that this legislation discri inates against the sale of Japanese textile goods South Carolina and that such discrimination is contravention of Article XVI of the Treaty Friendship, Commerce and Navigation betwe the United States and Japan have received t most careful consideration.

It is the policy of the United States Governme to effect the orderly elimination of unnecessa

[1] Mr. Nong Kimny became Foreign Minister in early April.

[1] For an exchange of correspondence between Secreta Dulles and Senator Margaret Chase Smith on cott textile imports from Japan, see Bulletin of Dec. 26, 19 p. 1064.

ıd artificial restraints on international trade. he United States Government has made conıued efforts to bring about a full acceptance of ıpan as a member of the world trading commuty. The considerable degree of success that has tended these efforts is a source of deep satisfacon to this Government, which regards the althy and sound expansion of Japan's commerce beneficial to the economies not only of the nited States and Japan but of all the countries the free world. In addition, the United States overnment has contributed to a higher level of ade between the two countries, notably through e negotiation of mutually advantageous tariff ductions, the absence of quantitative restrictions imports and the conclusion of the Treaty of riendship, Commerce and Navigation to which e Ambassador's note refers. The results of this licy are reflected in the expansion of trade beeen the United States and Japan during recent ars.

The United States Government has noted the tion taken by the Government of Japan which luntarily imposed quotas on the export of cotton ods to the United States starting from January 56. It is aware that this voluntary action inlved difficulties for an important segment of the panese economy.

Because of its conviction that a higher level of ade on a mutually beneficial basis between the ited States and Japan is advantageous not only om an economic but also from a political and urity point of view, this Government is opposed attempts to frustrate that development. With pect to the South Carolina law referred to in Ambassador's note and the recently enacted in Alabama, the United States Government st depend upon proceedings brought by intered parties in appropriate courts to uphold the idity of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce l Navigation. The fact that this is the regular ocedure under the constitutional system of the ited States for securing authoritative determiions regarding the consistency of state laws h treaties is always pointed out by the United tes representatives during the negotiation of h treaties.

The Government of the United States shares the cern of the Government of Japan about the adse effects which laws such as those now enacted South Carolina and Alabama might have upon the friendly relations between the two nations. Accordingly, the Secretary of State has the honor to inform the Ambassador of Japan that he communicated with the Governor of Alabama concerning the political, economic and legal problems connected with such laws in order to make the Governor aware of the adverse effects of the bill while it was awaiting his signature. The Secretary of State has the honor further to inform the Ambassador of Japan that he is forwarding an expression of concern to the Governor of South Carolina together with a copy of this note and the Ambassador's note referred to above.

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, D. C., *April 16, 1956.*

Conclusion of 12-Nation Talks on Atomic Energy Agency

FINAL COMMUNIQUE DATED APRIL 18

The twelve-nation Working Level Meeting today unanimously adopted the text for a Statute for the proposed International Atomic Energy Agency which will be presented for consideration at an International Conference to be convened in September at U.N. Headquarters in New York.

While several delegations participating in this meeting reserved their positions on certain details, all delegations voted in favor of the Statute as a whole.

The twelve-nation group is composed of the following countries: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Portugal, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and United States. It met for eighteen sessions from February 27 to April 18, 1956 to consider a previous draft Statute circulated on August 22, 1955[1] in the light of comments received from other countries during discussions at the Tenth General Assembly of the United Nations and subsequently.

This Working Level Meeting is the most recent in a series of negotiations on an international atomic energy agency which grew out of a proposal made by President Eisenhower to the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 8, 1953.

[1] BULLETIN of Oct. 24, 1955, p. 666.

Detailed arrangements for the September Conference will be worked out at meetings of the negotiating group at the adviser level.

Progress in the French Cameroons

Statement by Benjamin Gerig [1]

The general impression gained by the United States delegation after reviewing conditions in the French Cameroons is that substantial progress has been made in the economic, social, and educational fields. We are confident that within the very near future the Administering Authority will be able to raise the political status of the inhabitants to the level existing in the economic, social, and educational fields.

It is our feeling that the inhabitants of the territory are capable and willing to accept new responsibilities in the political field. As a first step, my delegation would like to urge that the Administering Authority take positive and energetic steps to implement as soon as possible the constitutional improvements elaborated in the bill on constitutional reform drafted in 1953. We believe that a reappraisal of this bill might be well warranted to determine whether its various provisions envisaged to reform the political situation in the territory are, in view of the important developments of the past year, adequate to allow the inhabitants to assume sufficient political responsibility.

We hope, moreover, that the feeling of increased antagonism and hostility between the north and south which resulted from the May riots will soon be eliminated as the result of continued efforts by the Administering Authority to develop the territory in all fields, and particularly by increased educational efforts of the inhabitants of all sections of the population. We realize that in this "hinge of Africa," where many races and cultures merge, there is likely to be some friction among the different groups. However, we feel confident that such a situation may be solved by the continued efforts of the Administering Authority to foster a national consciousness.

In this connection, we should like to pay tribute to the measures already suggested by the Administering Authority to remove the differences tween the two sections of the territory. In sl these include a program to increase the con between all people of the territory and to raise standard of living and education of the peopl the north in order to diminish the misunderst ings which have occurred toward those of south. We feel that these efforts, which are orated on page 41 of the Visiting Mission Re (T/1231), should be commended by the Counc realistic efforts on the part of the Administe Authority to assist the development of the t tory toward self-government or independen

The notable achievements of the Administe Authority to develop and spread municipal local government institutions should also be mended by this Council. In the field of l government, while it has been noted that n progress has occurred in the southern forest a and in the progressive Bamileke and Bamoun bal areas, my delegation feels that continued additional efforts of the Administering Aut ity—despite initial opposition by the po tion—are warranted in order to democratize local government institutions in the pred nantly Moslem north.

We look forward with expectation to the i tution of the single electoral college which representative of France informed us woul effective in the very near future. We should like to associate ourselves with the expressio satisfaction voiced by the Visiting Mission a steps taken to date by the Administering Aut ity to broaden the base of the electorate in territory. We feel that the Council as a whol been pleased by the increase in the number o electors during the last 6 years from 50,0 750,000 and hope that the Council of the Rep will soon take action on the draft law which w give universal suffrage to the territory.

The United States delegation has taken with satisfaction that in almost every phase economic life the Cameroons under French Ad istration is making solid advancement despit difficulties presented by the land and the cli From the new hydroelectric plant at Edea, w we understand is the third largest in the Fr Union, down to the small sawmills, progr evident everywhere in this agriculturally ric sparsely populated, territory.

We note especially the intensive measures

[1] Made in the Trusteeship Council on Mar. 22 (U.S./U.N. press release 2314). Mr. Gerig is Deputy U.S. Representative in the Trusteeship Council.

en by the Administration to acquaint the ican with modern methods of cultivation, rketing, and the maintenance of quality ough the "Sociétés Africaines de Prevoyance" ıp), the "Secteurs de Modernisation," and the stes de Paysannat." In this connection, we ed the findings of the Visiting Mission that, in south, dependence of whole regions on such gle crops as coffee and cocoa was currently ing widespread hardship due to the low world-rket prices for those commodities. To meet hardship, we believe that the Administering thority should consider the formation of bilization funds and that further efforts should nade to diversify the food crops.

Ve realize the difficulties encountered by the ninistration in establishing an effective forest servation policy because of the noncooperation the population with respect to classification of ests. We feel nonetheless that the Trusteeship ncil should once again draw the attention of inhabitants to the wisdom and necessity for ent action by the Administering Authority in empting to implement this policy of reforesta- and classification of forests. It is our hope t, as a result of a continued educational pro- m, the inhabitants will cease their resistance to h a commendable program of activity.

Other noteworthy efforts undertaken by the ministering Authority in the economic field and rthy of commendation by the Council are its rts to increase the standard of living of the ulation, the promotion of cotton and rice cul- ation, improvement of livestock and pasturage, dences of new progress in the promotion of ll industries, efforts to develop the cooperative vement, agricultural experimentation, stock- eding, road and bridgebuilding, the introduc- of fish farming, and improvements in com- nications. It is our hope that, as a result of the ration of the new electrical plants, there will, the near future, be an increase in the establish- nt of secondary industries throughout the ritory.

My delegation was pleased to learn of the de- opments in medicine and public health through- the Cameroons. The generous cooperation of Administering Authority in subsidizing hos- als and dispensaries of the religious missions— ich has set a record rarely equaled in Africa— uld be commended. At the same time we are concerned over the scarcity of medical supplies in the hospitals and dispensaries in the territory.

Further developments in the social field of which the Council should take note are the advances in the field of public and cooperative housing, attempts to hold down the cost of living, the encouraging inroads being made against the "bride price" practice, and the many new community centers for teaching domestic science. As a requisite to complete abolishment of the "bride price," we feel that continued education of girls with this view in mind is necessary. We should like to urge that the Administering Authority continue its campaign to reduce alcoholism throughout the south and that efforts be made to improve sanitary conditions in the prisons. In this connection also, we hope that increased attention may be given to the necessity of bringing offenders more quickly to trial.

Generally speaking, few African territories can equal the record achieved by the French in the Cameroons for the percentage of school-age children actually enrolled in schools. The overall average is an impressive 55 percent, a figure which is, however, unevenly distributed geographically, ranging from 86 percent in parts of the south to 6 percent in parts of the north. Yet it will be noted that everywhere in the north where the Mission visited it was met by demands for new schools. This must be considered as a promising omen, and we should like to support the suggestion of the Visiting Mission that the Council "commend the Administering Authority for its successful educational campaigns in the north and to urge it to continue to make every effort to satisfy this keen desire for knowledge by apportioning, in the future, more funds for schools and teachers in the northern area and to apply regulations regarding school-age as flexibly as possible."

Finally, we should like to express our appreciation for the successful efforts of the administration to adapt education to the local environment, particularly with respect to curricula, textbooks, and teaching methods, and to promote technical training of the inhabitants. The notable increase in schools and teachers throughout the territory as well as a substantial increase in the number of pupils enrolled in the schools, including girls, is indeed an encouraging sign.

Ray T. Hickok Appointed Chairman of U.S. Committee for U.N.

Press release 201 dated April 18

Secretary Dulles on April 18 announced the appointment of Ray T. Hickok of Rochester, N. Y., as 1956 chairman of the U.S. Committee for the United Nations. Mr. Hickok is chairman of the board of directors and president of the Hickok Manufacturing Company.

Prior to this appointment, Mr. Hickok has served for the past 2 years as a member of the executive committee of the U.S. Committee for the United Nations. He is a member of the finance committee of the Committee for Economic Development and holds office in a number of business and civic associations, including the Young Presidents' Organization, of which he was founder and first president.

In inviting Mr. Hickok to serve as chairman, Secretary Dulles pointed out the importance of the program of the U.S. Committee for the United Nations as evidence of our firm support of the United Nations in the United States.

Mr. Hickok, in accepting the appointment, said he did so because he is "deeply convinced that the United Nations constitutes a major hope for an orderly and peaceful world." He said: "Every effort that can be made to increase public awareness and education about the United Nations is both worth while and necessary."

The U.S. Committee for the United Nations was established in 1948 by the U.S. Government in response to a U.N. General Assembly resolution which called upon member nations to observe October 24 annually as United Nations Day. The Committee is composed of more than 130 national organizations representing civic, business, labor, agriculture, veterans, religion, education, welfare, youth, women, and trade. Its primary purpose is to promote and coordinate citizen programs across the Nation in observance of United Nations Day in an effort to increase public understanding and support of the United Nations.

The chairman of the Committee is appointed annually by the Secretary of State. Mr. Hickok as the ninth chairman succeeds James S. McDonnell, Jr., president of the McDonnell Aircraft Corporation of St. Louis, Mo. Chairmen in the 3 previous years were Morehead Patterson, president, American Machine and Foundry Company; Thomas J. Watson, Jr., president, I national Business Machines Corporation; Frank L. Weil, Weil, Gotshal and Manges.

Senate Confirms Deputy Representa in U.N. Security Council

The Senate on April 12 confirmed James Barco to be a deputy representative of the Ui States in the Security Council of the Ur Nations.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

South Pacific Conference

The Department of State announced on A 21 (press release 208) that the U.S. Governm will be represented at the third session of South Pacific Conference, which will meet at S Fiji, April 23–May 4, 1956, by the following server delegation:

United States Commissioner

Knowles A. Ryerson, Dean of the College of Agricul University of California, Berkeley, Calif.

Advisers

Edna H. Barr, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Dep ment of State

Arthur S. Osborne, M. D., International Health Re sentative, Division of International Health, Pu Health Service, Department of Health, Education, Welfare

The Conference, an auxiliary body to the So Pacific Commission, meets every 3 years in on the territories of the area and is composed of d gates, alternates, and advisers from the 19 depe ent territories. It was provided for in orde associate with the work of the Commission re sentatives of the local inhabitants and of offi and nonofficial institutions in the South Pac area. These representatives meet together consider their common problems of health, edu tion, and general economic and social welfare, to make recommendations for solving these pr lems on a regional basis. The commissioners advisers from the member governments attend observers for the purpose of advising the delega from their respective dependent territories.

Guam and American Samoa are the only U possessions that fall within the scope of the So

ic Commission. The Trust Territory of the ic Islands, under U.S. administration, also een brought within the scope of the Com- on.

e first session of the South Pacific Conference held at Suva, Fiji, in 1950, and the second n was held at Nouméa, New Caledonia, April , 1953.

e substantive items of the agenda for the session provide for consideration of (1) s in the field of industrial and commercial ress and development, such as (a) progress digenous industries, (b) problems of modern- and mechanizing industrial and commercial prises, (c) processing of agricultural and ne products; (2) farming systems, including lace of livestock, in the South Pacific; (3) erative societies and credit unions as a means romoting the welfare of the South Pacific le; (4) infant and maternal welfare, having rd to social services, community organiza- , and the improving of living conditions; (5) encouragement and retention, where use- of indigenous arts, customs, and culture.

the close of the third session of the South fic Conference, the commissioners and ad- s of the member governments of the South fic Commission will meet to consider the rec- endations made at the Conference.

TREATY INFORMATION

rent Actions

MULTILATERAL

nany

ement on German external debts. Signed at London ruary 27, 1953. Entered into force September 16, 3. TIAS 2792.
tification deposited: Yugoslavia, March 15, 1956.

erty

ention for the protection of industrial property. ned at London June 2, 1934. Entered into force gust 1, 1938. 53 Stat. 1748.
herence effective: Monaco, April 29, 1956.

ping

national loadline convention. Signed at London y 5, 1930. Entered into force January 1, 1933. 47 t. 2228.
Notification by France of extension to: Overseas France, from February 28, 1956.

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Signed at Geneva March 6, 1948.[1]
Acceptance withdrawn: Greece, March 26, 1956.

Trade and Commerce

Fifth protocol of rectifications and modifications to the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3, 1955.[1]
Signatures: Luxembourg, March 2, 1956; Sweden, March 6, 1956; United Kingdom, March 8, 1956; Austria, March 9, 1956.

BILATERAL

France

Agreement relating to the establishment and operation of a rawinsonde observation station on the island of Guadeloupe in the French West Indies. Effected by exchange of notes at Paris March 23, 1956. Enters into force on the date representatives of the Weather Bureau and the Météorologie Nationale sign a memorandum of arrangement embodying the technical details.

Germany

Air transport agreement, and exchange of notes. Signed at Washington July 7, 1955.
Entered into force: April 16, 1956 (date of receipt by the United States of notification of approval by the Federal Republic of Germany).

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Resignations

Homer Ferguson as Ambassador to the Republic of the Philippines, effective April 8.

PUBLICATIONS

Foreign Relations Volume

Press release 190 dated April 12

The Department of State on April 21 released *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1938, Volume V, The American Republics.* This is the final volume of the *Foreign Relations* series of five volumes for the year.

The first part of this volume consists of a general section treating multilateral subjects. These

[1] Not in force.

include the Eighth International Conference of American States at Lima, the Chaco dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay, conciliation of differences between the Dominican Republic and Haiti, a dispute between the United Kingdom and Guatemala with respect to British Honduras, and boundary disputes between Argentina and Chile, Ecuador and Peru, and Honduras and Nicaragua. The Conference of American States was notable for the adoption of the Declaration of the Principles of the Solidarity of America, generally known as the Declaration of Lima.

The remainder of this volume deals with bilateral relations of the United States with individual American Republics, the topics being arranged under country headings. The subject given most attention is that of trade agreements, negotiations of that nature being recorded with 10 countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Other topics treated include military missions, protection of business interests, exchange restrictions, debts, and claims.

Copies of volume V (v, 995 pp.) may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., for $4.25 each.

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3459. Pub. 6259. 18 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Argentina—Signed at Buenos Aires December 21, 1955. Entered into force December 21, 1955.

Atomic Energy, Cooperation for Civil Uses. TIAS 3461. Pub. 6257. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Netherlands—Signed at Washington July 18, 1955. Entered into force December 30, 1955.

Technical Cooperation, Program of Housing. TIAS 3462. Pub. 6264. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Colombia, extending agreement of June 24 and 30, 1954. Exchange of notes—Signed at Bogotá December 1 and 21, 1955. tered into force December 21, 1955; operative ret tively April 26, 1955.

Passport Visas. TIAS 3463. Pub. 6267. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Pakistar vising agreement of October 10 and 18, 1949, as rev Exchanges of notes—Dated at Karachi August 4, ber 20, November 25 and 29, 1955. Entered into December 1, 1955.

Atomic Energy, Cooperation for Civil Uses. TIAS Pub. 6269. 26 pp. 15¢.

Agreement between the United States and Japan—Si at Washington November 14, 1955. Entered into December 27, 1955.

Mutual Defense Assistance, Return of Unusable Mat TIAS 3467. Pub. 6276. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Norway. change of notes—Dated at Oslo December 12 and 28, Entered into force December 28, 1950.

Mutual Defense Assistance, Disposition of Surplus E ment and Material. TIAS 3468. Pub. 6277. 3 pp.

Agreement between the United States and Norway, plementing agreement of December 12 and 28, 1950. change of notes—Dated at Oslo May 15 and June 26, Entered into force June 26, 1953.

Atomic Energy, Cooperation for Civil Uses. TIAS 3 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Urugu Signed at Washington January 13, 1956. Entered force January 13, 1956.

Atomic Energy, Cooperation for Civil Uses. TIAS Pub. None. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Swed Signed at Washington January 18, 1956. Entered force January 18, 1956.

Financial Arrangements for Furnishing Certain Sup and Services to Naval Vessels. TIAS 3479. Pub. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Cuba—Si at Habana January 10, 1956. Date of entry into fo April 9, 1956.

Relief Supplies and Equipment, Duty-Free Entry Exemption From Internal Taxation. TIAS 3480. None. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Libya. change of notes—Signed at Tripoli December 6 and 1955. Entered into force December 22, 1955.

Atomic Energy, Cooperation for Civil Uses. TIAS Pub. None. 6 pp. 5¢

Agreement between the United States and Peru—Si at Washington January 25, 1956. Entered into f January 25, 1956.

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[1] Assignment of publication numbers to the TIAS se pamphlets was discontinued with TIAS 3474.

ica
gress in the French Cameroons (Gerig) . . . 730
ed States Foreign Policy in Africa (Allen) . 716
erican Principles. Our Quest for Peace and reedom (Eisenhower) 699
erican Republics
eign Relations Volume 733
nscript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . 710
a
ectives of the Mutual Security Program in Asia Robertson) 723
th Pacific Conference 732
mic Energy. Conclusion of 12-Nation Talks on tomic Energy Agency (text of communique) . 729
nbodia. U.S. Policy Toward Cambodia (Dulles) . 727
rus. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conrence 710
nomic Affairs. State Legislation Regarding panese Textiles (texts of notes) 728
pt. Israel and Egypt Agree To Observe Armisce (Lodge) 722
eign Service. Resignations (Ferguson) . . . 733
nce. Progress in the French Cameroons Gerig) 730
rnational Organizations and Meetings. South acific Conference 732
el. Israel and Egypt Agree To Observe Armisce (Lodge) 722
an
e Legislation Regarding Japanese Textiles exts of notes) 728
nscript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . 710
ual Security
eloping NATO in Peace (Dulles) 706
ectives of the Mutual Security Program in Asia Robertson) 723
Quest for Peace and Freedom (Eisenhower) . 699
nscript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . 710
r East. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News onference 710
-Self-Governing Territories
gress in the French Cameroons (Gerig) . . . 730
th Atlantic Treaty Organization. Developing ATO in Peace (Dulles) 706
lippines. Resignation of Ambassador Fergu-n 733
sidential Documents. Our Quest for Peace and reedom 699
lications
eign Relations Volume 733
ent Releases 734
aty Information. Current Actions 733
.S.R.
eloping NATO in Peace (Dulles) 706
Our Quest for Peace and Freedom (Eisenhower) . 699
The Soviet Reappraisal of Stalin (Murphy) . . . 719
Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . 710
United Nations
Conclusion of 12-Nation Talks on Atomic Energy Agency (text of communique) 729
Israel and Egypt Agree To Observe Armistice (Lodge) 722
Progress in the French Cameroons (Gerig) . . 730
Ray T. Hickok Appointed Chairman of U.S. Committee for the U.N. 732
Senate Confirms Deputy Representative in U.N. Security Council 732

Name Index

Allen, George V. 716
Barco, James W. 732
Dulles, Secretary 706, 710, 727
Eisenhower, President 699
Ferguson, Homer 733
Gerig, Benjamin 730
Hickok, Ray T. 732
Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr. 722
Murphy, Robert 719
Robertson, Walter S. 723

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: April 16-22

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Press release issued prior to April 16 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 190 of April 12.

No.	Date	Subject
198	4/17	Dulles: news conference transcript.
199	4/17	Notes on State legislation on Japanese textiles.
†200	4/17	Henderson, Seager: statements at Baghdad Pact Council meeting.
201	4/18	Hickok appointed Chairman of U.S. Committee for U.N.
*202	4/19	Pinkerton sworn in as Ambassador to Sudan.
*203	4/19	Warren sworn in as Ambassador to Turkey.
204	4/19	Dulles letter to Cambodian Foreign Minister.
205	4/19	Murphy: "The Soviet Reappraisal of Stalin."
206	4/20	Allen: "U.S. Foreign Policy in Africa."
†207	4/21	Delegation to UNESCO education conference.
208	4/21	Delegation to South Pacific Conference.
†209	4/21	Delegation to Inter-American Meeting of Ministers of Education.

*Not printed.
†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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The Department of State bulletin

XXXIV, No. 880

May 7, 1956

THE INSTITUTIONALIZING OF PEACE • *Address by Secretary Dulles* 739

THE PURGE OF STALINISM • *by Allen W. Dulles* . . 758

THE U.S. STAKE IN WORLD TRADE • *by Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks* 767

PROPOSED REVISION OF IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT • *Statement by Secretary Dulles* . 773

TEACHER DEVELOPMENT WORKSHOP AT THE UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO • *Article by Howard H. Russell* 778

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For index see inside back cover

The Department of State bulletin

Vol. XXXIV, No. 880 • Publication 6331

May 7, 1956

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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The Institutionalizing of Peace

Address by Secretary Dulles [1]

It is a conspicuous honor to address this 50th nnual meeting of the American Society of Inter- ational Law. The first meeting was addressed y the then Secretary of State, Elihu Root, the nitial president of your society. Mr. Root pos- essed one of the finest legal minds this country or ny other country has ever known, and he made utstanding contributions to the development of nternational law. Two of the original vice presi- ents of the society were former Secretaries of tate—John W. Foster, my grandfather, and ichard Olney. That tradition of close associa- on of the society with the Department of State as been continuous. It is due to that tradition hat I am today an honorary president of your ociety and afforded the opportunity of speaking n this important anniversary.

Before coming here, I reread Secretary Root's ldress and I was struck by the way in which story repeats itself. That address discussed au- oritatively the treatymaking power and con- etely the relation of that power to a State law hich seemed to violate our treaty of 1894 with apan. Today we are still discussing the treaty- aking power, and much the same issue that Mr. oot discussed is raised by recent State laws which em to contravene our 1953 treaty with Japan.

Secretary Root concluded his address with a owerful plea for a spirit of international friend- ip and treaty observance without which, he said, here can never be a world of peace."

I turn now to the broad problem of achieving e "world of peace" of which Secretary Root oke. That problem today overshadows all other problems, because the instruments of war have become so powerful that their full use would destroy vast segments of the human race.

It is particularly fitting that this problem should be considered in this society of international lawyers, because the problem will never be solved without the help of those members of the legal profession who are also students of international affairs. Lawyers have always had a special aptitude in the formulation of political institutions; and that is an art which is demanded at this juncture in world affairs. Peace should not depend upon the winds of emotion being friendly and fair; or upon the deterrent of fear; or upon the skills and improvisations of diplomacy. Now, as never before, peace must be solid, and to be solid it needs to be an institution.

Until recent years it has been war, not peace, that has been an institution. It has been the means whereby international change has been effected. Not only has war been lawful, but the concept of the "just war" has been deeply rooted in our moral and political code.

By the latter part of the 19th century, statesmen began to take note of the heavy economic burden of armament and of the increasing destruction that could be wrought by armament. This led to the calling of the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907. These conferences did not, however, attempt to abolish or replace the war system. Rather they sought to assure that war would continue to be a tolerable institution. It was sought that war should interfere as little as possible with the lives and with the businesses of civilians; that private property should be immune from seizure in time of war; that blockade should be used only in exceptional circumstances; that contraband be limited so that peaceful trade could

[1] Made before the 50th annual meeting of the American ciety of International Law at Washington, D.C., on r. 25 (press release 216).

go on; and to "prohibit the discharge of projectiles and explosives from balloons."

Mr. Foster attended the second Hague Peace Conference, and through him I became one of the junior secretaries of the conference. I well remember those days, and particularly the debate which took place between various of the delegations as to whether or not humanizing war tended to reduce resort to war. I recall that it was then the German delegation that held the thesis which reappears today—that peace is more apt to prevail if war is terrible, because then all will avoid it.

You may recall that a third Hague conference was planned for 1914. But World War I came instead. At its close, an exhausted world sought for the first time to institutionalize peace.

The League Effort

The League of Nations was designed to establish, at least in rudimentary form, those institutional elements which enable mature democratic societies to preserve order and observe justice.

In the national state, order is maintained and violence is prevented primarily (1) by laws, written or unwritten, which reflect the moral judgment of the community subject thereto; (2) by political machinery to change these laws from time to time so that, as conditions change, laws will continue to meet the test of justice and not perpetuate obsolete concepts; (3) by an executive body to administer law; (4) by courts which settle disputes of a justiciable character in accordance with law; (5) by superior public force which deters violence by its ability to apprehend and punish adequately any who breach or defy the law; and (6) by a state of public well-being sufficient so that the people heed the dictates of reason and of prudence and are not driven by a sense of desperation to follow ways of violence.

The League of Nations had, in its Assembly, the rough equivalent of a broadly based legislative body, but requiring unanimity for most action. That Assembly was authorized to advise a reconsideration of treaties which might become inapplicable and of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace. The Council and the Secretariat of the League represented a form of executive power. There was a Permanent Court of International Justice to hear and settle international disputes. A measure of police power was to be found in the provisions for sanctions to be applied in the case of illegal resort to war. There was a call for "equitable treatment for commerce."

The Pact of Paris

The United States, although it largely inspired this effort to institutionalize peace, did not join it. We initiated another project which superficially seemed easier and simpler—that was to abolish war. By the Pact of Paris of 1928 over 60 nations of the world, including all the great powers, renounced war as an instrument of national policy and agreed to settle all disputes or conflicts by pacific means.

This pact marks a milestone in history in that for the first time war was made illegal. But also that pact demonstrated the futility of attempting, merely by the stroke of a pen, to abolish an institution as deeply rooted as the war system, when no adequate compensating institutions were brought into being to replace it.

In an effort to put "teeth" into the Pact of Paris, Secretary Stimson in 1932 proposed the doctrine of nonrecognition of "any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928." But aggressors continued to find the fruits of their aggression to be quite palatable, even though others denied their right to such enjoyment.

Limitation of Armament

Another field of endeavor during the interwar period was that of the limitation of armament. It was argued that, since modern war cannot be waged without armament, the likelihood of war is reduced as armaments are reduced. Guided by that simple proposition, the victors of World War I sought first of all to disarm and keep disarmed the defeated nations. At the same time they kept up a search of ways and means to lessen armaments for everyone. The League of Nations was active in the field of disarmament, with the United States participating in certain phases of its work. In addition, there were efforts at naval disarmament undertaken largely on the initiative of the United States. There resulted a certain measure of agreement among the leading naval powers on limitations of specific categories of ships. But the broader problems of disarmament proved baffling.

The United Nations

All of these efforts became engulfed by World War II. When that war was nearing its end, 51 nations gathered at San Francisco in a new effort to institutionalize peace so as to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war."

The pattern of this new effort followed the pattern of effort after the First World War. The League of Nations was replaced by the United Nations, and the covenant by the charter. There is, as under the League, a Council and an Assembly. The Permanent Court of International Justice is replaced by the International Court of Justice. This time the renunciation of war, which was found in the Pact of Paris but not in the League Covenant, is in substance written into the charter of the United Nations (article 2 (4)). The quasi-legislative function, which was embodied in the authority of the League's Assembly to consider the revision of treaties and international conditions, is replaced by articles 13 and 14 of the charter which, among other things, call for "the progressive development of international law and its codification" and which authorize the General Assembly to "recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations." The charter makes limitation of armament a goal, as did the Treaty of Versailles.

Of course, no constitution is self-executing. The League provisions were inadequately implemented. We may properly and usefully ask: How well are the charter provisions being implemented?

The Development of International Law

First of all, there is the problem of law. The charter itself establishes some basic international law, notably by article 2, which deals with sovereign equality, the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means, and the renunciation of the threat or use of force. Chapter XI, dealing with non-self-governing territories, also contains an important enunciation of legal principle.

Article 13, as we have noted, calls for "development of international law and its codification." Under this provision the General Assembly has established the International Law Commission, which has since 1949 met annually to carry out this provision of the charter. Much useful work has been accomplished by the Commission. But progress in incorporating its proposals into the body of international law has so far been minimal.

There is, as you well know, a considerable body of so-called treaty law, represented by treaties as between the nations. But not all treaties represent "law" in the sense we here use the term. Some treaties are multilateral and prescribe agreed rules of conduct in relation to such matters as the treatment of aliens and international trade. Other treaties, usually bilateral, represent merely bargains and are not law in the sense of being a rule of conduct formulated in response to a community sentiment. They are somewhat the counterpart of private contracts within a national society. There has occurred a healthy growth in the multilateral, lawmaking type of treaty.

There is also a body of world opinion which, when it is crystallized and brought to bear on particular situations, plays a role equivalent to our "common law." There has been gratifying progress in developing this kind of community judgment, and the gatherings of the nations at the General Assembly of the United Nations greatly promote this result. There international conduct is judged, sometimes formally but more often informally; and even the most powerful nations feel it expedient to be able to represent their conduct as conforming to this body of world opinion.

While there is good progress, it must be admitted that the total of international law still falls far short of what is needed to institutionalize peace.

Peaceful Change

Then there is the matter of peaceful means to effect international change. We have referred to article 14 of the charter, which authorizes the General Assembly to recommend change. Of course, power to *recommend* change is considerably less than power to *enact* change. Nevertheless, the power to recommend, when exercised in a responsible way by a great majority of the nations of the world, is a considerable power, and many Assembly recommendations have been transformed into fact.

It must, however, be recognized that debates in the General Assembly in relation to resolutions calling for change tend to be emotional, and votes are sometimes cast not on the basis of impartial study and judgment of the facts but rather on the basis of the political alinement of the members

and sometimes on the basis of what one might refer to as international "logrolling." Sometimes Assembly debate is counterproductive and makes change less likely because it arouses nationalistic sentiments. Indeed, it sometimes seems that world opinion is more powerful when it is sensed than when the United Nations tries to formulate it in an Assembly resolution.

There are vast potentialities in article 14, but these potentialities are not yet sufficiently well developed so that peaceful change is a well-ordered function of the Assembly.

Change to and From Independence

World opinion bears particularly upon the conduct of those peoples who, in the words of our Declaration of Independence, feel they owe "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind." It is largely through this force, which found expression in chapter XI of the charter, that there has occurred the greatest peaceful evolution that history has ever known. During the 11 years since World War II ended and the United Nations Charter came into force, over 650 million people have gained a new political independence, now represented by 18 newly sovereign nations. Other non-self-governing peoples are at the threshold of independence.

It is highly encouraging that these vast changes should have come about peacefully. It demonstrates dramatically that a very large measure of peaceful change is possible. But also we must record the fact that these changes only took place within the free nations and that elsewhere there has been an obstinate resistance to the moral pressure for change toward independence and self-government.

There is not, in the world as a whole, any adequate assurance of peaceful change.

Enforcement of Law and Order

Let us turn now to the problem of the administration and enforcement of law. We have in the United Nations Security Council a body which, by the charter, is given primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The charter contemplates (article 43) that the Security Council shall have at its disposal armed forces necessary for maintaining peace.

Unfortunately, the charter scheme for a Security Council action backed by an international police force has, up to now, not been realized be cause of the so-called veto power. Thereby con fidence in the Security Council has been badl shaken and its usefulness impaired.

In an effort to meet that situation the Genera Assembly adopted in 1950 a resolution known a "Uniting for Peace." It asked the members vol untarily to hold in readiness armed contingent available for United Nations use in maintainin international peace and security. Also the Assem bly set up a procedure for meeting on 24 hours notice in the event of a threat to the peace and paralysis of the Security Council through exercis of the veto power.

This partially compensates for the undependa bility of the Security Council as a law enforce ment body. However, the General Assembly i primarily a deliberative body and includes s many members that it cannot serve effectively a an executive or enforcement agency.

As further moves to reinforce the processes fo peace, 45 nations have joined in collective securit arrangements under article 51 of the charter which acknowledges the inherent right of col lective self-defense against armed attack. Mos of these collective security arrangements ar backed by the mobile striking power of the Unite States. These arrangements go far to deny ag gressors the opportunity to follow the typical pat tern of aggression which consists of picking u weaker nations one by one.

The Judicial Process

Let us turn now to the judicial process. Her we find that, despite much lipservice to tha process, most nations prefer to seek the settlemen of their disputes by diplomatic means, or perhap they prefer to keep the disputes open for domesti political reasons. In the 10 years since the ne International Court of Justice has been in bein there have been 21 contentious cases brought b fore the Court. There have been only 9 judg ments on the merits; 2 cases are pending; and th remaining 10 have been disposed of without a d cision, principally because the respondent has d nied jurisdiction and refused to appear. Durin the same period of time there have been 8 a visory opinions delivered, and 2 requests for a visory opinions are pending. This post-Worl War II record, as far as contentious cases a concerned, approximates the record of the Pe

nent Court of International Justice, which sat 23 years between the First and Second World ars and dealt with 22 cases on the merits. How-r, relatively more advisory opinions were ren-ed by the Permanent Court.

t is significant that, with all the disputes which st in the world, there are only two contentious es now on the docket of the International Court Justice. It is demonstrated that nations are ictant to settle serious disputes on the basis of es of law.

nomic Well-Being

'here remains to consider the conditions of nan welfare.

)n the whole there has been a vast improvement conomic conditions throughout the world dur-the first postwar decade. Much of this is due he fact that the economically mature states e practiced an enlightened self-interest where-hey have assisted others and have encouraged tilateral trade on a most-favored-nation basis. rty-five nations work through the General eement on Tariffs and Trade to promote world le on a multilateral basis. The United Na-s has economic commissions for Europe, Asia, South America.

n the other hand, it must be recognized that of this effort rests upon a fragile international s. It is open to the nations to escape from r present tariffs and to create obstacles which ld seriously interfere with world trade and rely disrupt the economic life of many coun-s.

he danger of this is increased by the fact that domestic impact of imports is always plain identifiable and the role of such imports in ing for exports is not so readily apparent. rld economy is in no sense organized to a it where any one nation can feel that the wel-of its people is free from grave hazard at will of other nations.

Present Inadequacy

f one were to summarize the present state of irs, it could permissibly be concluded that con-rable progress, even unprecedented progress, been made in some of the essentials of an inter-onal order. There is more international law n ever before. There are greater enforcement ibilities than ever before, particularly in terms of deterrence to open armed aggression. There is more peaceful change than ever before.

But even if we recognize, as we gladly do, that international society is moving in a sound direction, we must, I think, seriously ask ourselves whether we have adequately learned, and are with sufficient rapidity applying, the lessons of history. Humanity survived through World War II, despite the failure after World War I. But we cannot be sure that we shall be given a second reprieve. The new nature of warfare, as exemplified by the atomic bomb which burst upon a startled world just after the United Nations Charter was signed, gave notice that there may not be an amplitude of time with which to seek progress by the timid route of pragmatic trial and error.

The Need for More International Law

The foregoing analysis suggests that there are certain areas which particularly require development at the present time.

One such area is the field of international law. There needs to be a greater and more significant body of such law. Popular attention tends to focus upon the police functions of an international order. These are more spectacular than law itself. But law is absolutely essential to prevent despotism. A policeman must know whom he is to apprehend and why, and a citizen must know when he can count upon the policeman to protect him and when he must fear arrest. Without law a policeman, whatever uniform he wears, is a despot or a tool of despotism.

This necessity for law creates a perplexing problem because so much of the world is ruled by those who do not believe in law in our sense of the word. "Law," within the Communist bloc, is considered the means whereby those in power maintain their power and destroy their enemies. Since communism is materialistic and atheistic, its leaders cannot accept the view that law represents man's efforts to apply to human affairs principles of justice which derive from a higher being. For them there is no natural or moral law. Neither can they understand the concept of rulers being themselves subject to law since, by their creed, the rulers are themselves the source of law.

Nevertheless, there is some glimmering of hope in this respect. Recent developments within the Soviet Union indicate an effort to provide greater personal security than existed when everyone was

subject to liquidation through the secret police at the will of an enemy who possessed the greater power. Vyshinsky's code of "trial by confession" rather than by evidence is being repudiated. So, despite the Communist doctrinal rejection of our concept of law, there may be emerging a de facto acceptance of law as a protection of the individual against the capricious will of those in authority.

It is also a fact that on the international plane the Soviet rulers, if only grudgingly and as a matter of expediency, take some account of the opinions of mankind. And these, as we have observed, can form a body of common or unwritten international law.

Therefore, it is not hopeless to seek to develop a greater body of law even on a universal basis.

In view, however, of the great difficulty of gaining multilateral acceptance of formal codifications of international law, we shall have to place much reliance upon unwritten law. This, in turn, requires constant education of public opinion, so that it will reflect a sound judgment about international conduct. There needs also to be improvement of the processes of the United Nations General Assembly so that, when it acts in a quasi-legislative or judicial capacity, it will comply with such high standards as evoked the Anglo-Saxon concept of the King's conscience which the Equity Chancellor was to apply.

There can also be a useful development of law among the free-world nations as a whole and also among those groups of free nations as naturally draw together. The Organization of American States has already done much to develop a body of American law and precedent which helps to keep peace and order in the new world.

The Need for More Peaceful Change

When we consider the question of law, we must always consider it jointly with the problem of peaceful change. Law does not conduce to peace if it merely perpetuates the status quo after that status has ceased to serve the needs of a vital and changing community. So far, force or the threat of force has been by far the most effective means of bringing about change. If force is to be eradicated, adequate means for peaceful change must exist. While, as we have seen, peaceful change has already occurred to an unprecedented degree in the evolution of subject peoples to independence, there still remains danger of war from efforts to perpetuate situations which by any standard of e ought to be changed.

This makes it of the utmost importance nations be responsive to informed world opi and that the "peaceful adjustment" article o United Nations Charter (article 14) should b to better use.

The Stabilization of International Trade

Another area which needs concentrated a tion is the area of international trade. The often a lack of appreciation of the close rela ship which exists between international trade the problem of war or peace. That relation seems better understood by Soviet political dents. They consider that the vicissitude trade under the capitalistic system are its gre weakness and provide them with their best ch to overthrow that system.

The last important publication of Stalin fore he died [2] argued that war between the munist world and the capitalistic world migh be inevitable because the capitalistic world w almost surely war within itself. This, Stalin tended, would take place as a result of the qua which would develop out of the need of the in trial countries of the West to find markets their goods, given the addition of Germany Japan as major industrial producers and the traction of the Soviet-Chinese Communist w as free markets for the West.

One of the most recent and authoritative S Communist publications is that brought ou 1954 under the title of *Political Economy.*[3] deals thoroughly with the relationship of trad international relations and the issues of war peace.

When we think of the causes of the Se World War, we tend to identify them with personalities of Hitler and the Japanese war lo But we would do well to go behind them to economic condition that brought Hitler and Japanese war lords into power in the early 19 Edmond Vermeil, an outstanding French stu of Germany, in his book, *Germany's Three Rei* said that the economic crisis "suffices in itsel

[2] *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.* (Oct. 30, 1952).

[3] Textbook published by the Academy of Scie U.S.S.R. (1954).

plain the final triumph of Hitlerism in 1930." hn Wheeler-Bennett, outstanding British his-rian, in his book, *Munich—Prologue to Tragedy*, ote, "The forces of nationalism . . . revived th renewed vigor under the influence of eco-mic disaster." And G. C. Allen of the Univer-y of London, writing in the book, *The Industri-ization of Japan*, said, "The sufferings incidental the depression brought discredit on the [lib-al] government"; and Hugh Borton of Colum-a University in his book on *Japan*, speaking of e Japanese Premier's efforts in 1931 to keep the ar lords under control, wrote, "Unfortunately for m and for liberalism in Japan, he came to power st when the world depression struck Japan. . . . he cry of the militarists that Japan's economic s could be cured only by direct action in China d by the exploitation of Manchuria fell on sym-thetic ears."

As we pointed out, economic conditions since orld War II have, on the whole, been sound ithin the free world and there has been a definite ing of standards of living. But there seems yet no adequate popular or even political alization of how vital it is for peace that this end should continue.

Any serious interruption of international trade uld readily again bring reckless men to power hard-hit countries, demanding for their coun-ies the resources and markets needed for eco-mic well-being. This could precipitate world ar III.

We have noted the need for peaceful change. f all forms of change, that of national boundaries the most difficult to effect peacefully. But the ed for change of boundaries becomes less if undaries are not barriers to the reasonable flow trade and movement of persons and ideas. The ore boundaries are barriers, the more need there to change them and the more difficult it is to complish the peaceful change which is the only ternative to violent change.

mament as Community Power

I have left to the last the problem of armament. his is in some ways the most important and in any ways the most complex of the components institutionalized peace.

There exists today, primarily in the possession the Soviet Union and the United States, vast wer of atomic and thermonuclear weapons. However, these two nations do not possess a monopoly. The United Kingdom also is developing nuclear weapons. And as atomic energy becomes used for peacetime purposes, others will have opportunity to get the weapons material which is a byproduct of the production of nuclear power.

Nations are working today on several fronts in an effort to bring nuclear power under international control. There is the Disarmament Subcommittee of the United Nations, now negotiating at London, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, in process of formation pursuant to President Eisenhower's atoms-for-peace proposal of 1953.

The task of controlling atomic power to exclude the possibility of diversion to military use of the byproduct material is, however, very difficult. Science has yet to devise means to assure effective supervision, control, and accounting for byproduct fissionable material.

I do not intend to go into the highly complicated problem of general limitation of armament, a problem found insoluble after World War I. Here, I think, we must rely, in part at least, upon a lessening of political tensions and such reciprocal fear-dispelling knowledge as could result from President Eisenhower's "open skies" plan. If it be possible to create an atmosphere free of fear, that will facilitate arms limitation because nations will no longer feel it necessary or expedient to spend vast sums upon their armament. Indeed, under these conditions, it would be practically impossible to prevent substantial reductions of armaments.

There is, however, one aspect of the matter which I would touch upon tonight. That is the relationship between the powerful new weapons and the establishment of an effective international force to deter and, if need be, punish violations of international law.

How will it be possible to make community power superior to that of the lawbreaker if individual nations possess atomic and nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery?

The answer, it seems, must be found in growing recognition that destructive power such as that now represented by atomic and nuclear weapons is so great a power that it is clothed with a public and community interest. Such power ought never to be the tool of any single nation, to promote its national objectives or to permit it to defy community law and order. Unless that concept

is accepted, it is impossible for peace ever to become a stable and dependable institution.

The United States has already made clear its own purpose never to use the vast new power which comes from new weapons and new means of delivery except in the defense of principles which the whole world accepts. These principles are established by the charter of the United Nations, which requires that "nations shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force," and which also recognizes that nations have an "inherent right of individual and collective self-defense" as against armed attack.

It is generally accepted by the free-world peoples that the United States means what it says in these respects. They believe it not merely because we say it but because what we say conforms to the traditions of our Nation and to the moral principles which our people and their government generally espouse.

The same cannot be said of the Soviet Union, where power is despotic and exercised by those who deny the existence of moral law or of principles superior to the self-interest of the dictators. Nevertheless, the time must come when the Soviet rulers, if only as a matter of expediency and in deference to what should be incessant demands of world opinion, will be prepared to take steps to assure that the new power of modern weapons is in fact subjected to the will of the community.

It may seem that this prospect is remote. But when we consider the many startling changes which from time to time have occurred within the Soviet Union, we need not regard this particular prospect as wholly visionary.

In the meantime, and in order that we may set an example which will be influential, the United States itself, I suggest, should increasingly make clear, by word and deed, through the United Nations and through collective-defense associations to which we belong, that it is our intent that this new power be used only in defense of principles to which the community of nations subscribes.

Paragraph 5 of the Vandenberg Resolution (1948) called for progress along two fronts, "maximum efforts to obtain agreements to provide the United Nations with armed forces" and also "agreement . . . upon universal regulation and reduction of armaments" of member nations. Progress along these two lines, building community power and diminishing purely national power, is necessary to the establishment of inte national law and order.

The Task Is Imperative

When we review the task of making peace stable institution through processes of law a justice, and enforcement thereof, it is easy to b come discouraged. We must not, however, adm of discouragement, because the task is much t important. The fact that the task is difficult, a that the road to the goal may be long, is a reas not for delay or for despair but rather for great urgency and for greater effort.

There is much to be done and much that ca be promptly done. Where universality may n be practical, we can find in regional and collectiv defense associations an area where notable pro ress can be made. These associations can ser as important steppingstones toward a univers order. They can, as between their own member develop such principles of conduct as we have r ferred to, and they can make force into a sanctio for these principles, thus making it serve the con munity.

The essential thing is not that the ultimate go be immediately reached but that the peoples the world demonstrate the vision and the c pacity to move steadily and hopefully toward th goal. The spectacle of men working together i fellowship on great tasks of creation is itself powerful influence for peace and order. That a tivity deters the unruly from seeking by violen to interrupt a process which carries with it th hopes of all mankind.

We need not assume that we are set to run hopeless race with time. We can gain time b intermediate efforts such as I describe. Als what may seem to be far away today may b reached much more quickly than we might su pose. There has been a great evolution in thinkin in the last three decades. Already there is pro ress such as the world has never known befor Also, never before was there such an awareness o the need as now flows from a knowledge of th nuclear menace. Whereas, in the past, it seeme reckless to take chances for peace, today it is reck less not to do so.

We must assume, as our working hypothesi that what is necessary is possible. And we mus prove it so.

ranscript of Secretary Dulles' ews Conference

ss release 212 dated April 24

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been a lot of in-est and speculation on your remarks in New rk yesterday about expanding the operation or rpose of NATO.[1] *This interest has been in-ased by the fact that in this conference several eks ago you talked rather negatively about what be done. Will you give us some of your fur-r ideas on this subject?*

A. I do not feel that I can properly at this time in very much what I said yesterday. Broadly eaking, it is our view, and I think has been our w, that an organization of this kind either ows or tends to dry up. And we believe that the rth Atlantic Treaty Organization ought to be the class of organizations which grow rather an those which dry up because they only were signed to serve a limited purpose which may in e course be fulfilled.

As I indicated yesterday, I believe that there is basis for continuing vitality in the Atlantic nmunity comparable to that which brought into ng the Pan American Union and the Organiza-n of American States, which have been in exist-e for over 66 years and which will go on, I ess, for a great many more years.

Now, I do not think that there was an incon-ency in what I said yesterday with what I said my earlier press conference.[2] I did say at that lier press conference that I felt that certain es of activity in relation to economic trade as ween the members of NATO could perhaps be ter carried on through the OEEC [Organiza-n for European Economic Cooperation], which ludes in the main the members of NATO and o one or two other countries who are not mem-s of NATO. But I did not intend in that par-ular remark, which I still stand by, to indicate t there was no opportunity for the growth and lity of NATO.

Now, I don't want to discuss the details because are only one of 15 members of the North At-tic Treaty Organization. This matter will loubtedly be discussed rather actively next week in Paris, and I think that it is appropriate that we should have an exchange of views around the Council table with our partners and learn more of their views before we attempt to refine and define our own.

Q. Mr. Secretary, NATO is essentially operated as a military organization. It would appear that political and economic possibilities are the only other two. Are you thinking more, broadly speaking, in the economic or the political line in your latest remarks?

A. Well, I would say we are thinking on both.

Q. But you do feel that OEEC is the more proper way to handle economic matters?

A. Economic matters as within Europe. But there are also economic problems which could conceivably relate to activities between NATO countries, or some of them, and non-European countries.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us whether the United States Government plans to take to the next NATO meeting any specific plans or proposals for expansion or development of NATO or whether we are just going with an open mind on the matter?

A. Well, we will go with some thoughts to exchange, yes. I may say that the general concept of my speech was discussed with the permanent representatives at Paris, who make up the NATO permanent Council there, about a week ago, before I made my speech, because I wanted to be sure there would be a general receptivity to that point of view, and I found that there was.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you thinking of the kind of political development of the organization, for example, that might make it possible, for instance, to consider such problems as Cyprus, and so on?

A. Well, now you're pinning me down a little bit more closely than I care for.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you said economic questions and non-European countries, had you in mind underdeveloped areas which might be assisted by NATO or areas such as the Middle East upon which NATO is dependent for its fuel?

A. I would think that both of those aspects of the matter should be considered. Whether there is agreement to deal with them or not I wouldn't

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BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1956, p. 706.

For transcript of Feb. 28 press conference, see *ibid.*, r. 12, 1956, p. 409.

know. But I think probably they should be discussed. It is certainly relevant, I would think, to the Atlantic community and to NATO that much of its economy depends upon oil that comes from the Middle East and if that was cut off you would be cutting off an element upon which NATO is very dependent as a military organization. That is one aspect of the matter.

There are also possibilities of joint efforts which might include all or some of the NATO countries to assist in neighboring areas such as North Africa. The French have made proposals along that line. I don't want to imply that those proposals would be acceptable, but I merely mention them as indicating the possible range of thinking.

NATO and OAS

Q. Mr. Secretary, in general terms when you point out OAS as an organization which NATO may grow to be like, do you have in mind agencies like the Inter-American Peace Commission, which deals with regional disputes, and the Economic and Social Council?

A. Well, again, I prefer not to go into that at this time. I would say this: I do not suggest that there should be any exact patterning of NATO to correspond with the Organization of American States. I was careful in my remarks yesterday to say, after speaking of the Organization of American States, that NATO or the Atlantic community might grow in its own distinctive way. I used the word "distinctive" for the very purpose of indicating that it would not necessarily be exactly the same pattern.

Q. Mr. Secretary, one of the characteristics of the Organization of American States in this hemisphere has been within the limit of the area and its universality. Do you anticipate any change in the basic character of NATO which would make it have appeal to all the non-Communist countries in the European area? I mean such countries, specifically, as Switzerland and Sweden.

A. Well, I do not contemplate the membership of such countries in NATO because NATO is a defensive military alliance. Its military activities are major and for some time probably will be a major phase of its activities, and in view of the neutral status which those countries have elected to take I could hardly expect that they would actually join NATO.

Q. How about Spain? Do you envisage Spai as being a partner?

A. Well, as far as the United States is co cerned, we would be very happy to see Spai a member of NATO. And if the broadening c NATO activities makes that easier, that woul from our standpoint, be one of the good byproc ucts of it. But, of course, there is some differenc of opinion within NATO about Spain, and we a not trying to press our views, or force our view upon other countries.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us why there a feeling among NATO countries today that the is a danger of its drying up?

A. I don't think I said that they felt that the was a danger of its drying up. What I said r ferred to a law of nature that it is inevitable th things either grow or they do tend to dry up. An an organization which is created to meet an eme gency or a special situation tends to diminish i vigor as it is judged that the occasion for its con ing into being disappears.

Now, then, the question is, do we consider NAT as an organization which was created and whic has its life only for the duration of the thre that brought it into being? If so, you do not loo ahead through long vistas of time. Or you co sider that NATO is an organization which reflec the spirit of Western civilization, which has bee a great and vital factor in the world for a gre many years but the efficacy of which, as I pointe out in my speech, has been greatly diminished b the disunity as between its members. A gre task of postwar statesmanship is to heal the di unities which in the past have so often been th cause of war. We have had wars which have con out of the West almost every generation for a goo many years.

Now, a great deal has already been done to he that breach—through bringing the Federal R public of Germany into NATO; through the Bru sels Treaty, which now creates what is calle Western European Union. But if the divisio of Western Europe are healed by organizatio which themselves are looked upon as emergenc and temporary organizations, then you have n got the element for a permanent healing of tho divisions and the creation of unity. So I think is important, from the standpoint of the lon range future of Europe and the avoidance c

hat has in the past been a frequent cause of war, at the things that tie together the countries of 'estern Europe have the quality of permanency ıd not be merely emergency ties.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been a good al of criticism at home and abroad to the effect at our approach to world affairs has been over-ilitarized. Could it be that your speech yester-ıy indicates that you are at least exploring the ssibility of a different emphasis without sacri-ing the military—that you're thinking of in-easing the accent on the economic and political proach?

A. I think that that would be a fair interpre-tion of what the President said on Saturday[3] ıd what I said on Monday. In certain parts of e world, at least, it seems that the Soviet activi-es are putting less emphasis upon violent means ıd more emphasis upon other means. Perhaps ıat appraisal needs a little adjustment, in the ght of Khrushchev's outburst in London yester-ıy. But in the main there is an effort to elim-ate from their doctrine, and perhaps to some tent from their practice, the Stalin thesis that ıly violence would serve. As I perhaps have ıoted or paraphrased here before, Stalin said ıat anybody who believed that communism, oviet communism, can achieve its goal without sort to violence has either gone out of his mind else does not understand the basic funda-entals of Communist philosophy. Well, now parently they are trying to get away from that int of view, both doctrinally and to some extent, believe, in practice. And it's necessary and ap-opriate that we should, I think, adapt our tac-s to the changes in Soviet Communist tactics.

e Cold War

Q. Mr. Secretary, in that connection, it was the nsensus of a group of American newspaper itors in Washington last week that the United ates is losing the cold war. On the same day, e President expressed the opinion that exactly e opposite was true. Can you spell out for us me of the ways in which we may be countering e cold war?

A. Well, of course, when you approach the ques-on of whether we are winning or losing the cold ar, I suppose the first thing to determine is, what do you mean by the "cold war"? As I tried to point out yesterday, the cold war is not simply a defensive operation. If by cold war you mean merely to keep alive hatred of Russia, or to keep the Russians permanently ostracized and to deny them any access to the free world, then I suppose it could be judged that we are not winning the cold war. But that is not my concept at all of what the cold war is.

The cold war basically is an effort, first of all, to do away with the great danger of hot war. I notice that the same people who said we were losing the cold war also agreed that there was very much less danger of war than there has been before. Well, if you call that losing, it's not my definition of losing. And we also, of course, primarily are looking to the day when Russia will be something that we can be friends with and not have to treat as enemies. And there has developed a beginning at least of a change within the Soviet Union. The change that has happened outside, which causes some to fear, is responsive to what the world judges has happened inside. It is widely judged, rightly or wrongly, but the fact is it is widely judged by responsible people, that the Soviet Union is not to be feared as much now as it was before. And if, in fact, the Soviet Union is not as much to be feared as it was, if it has become more tolerant, if it has put aside the use of violence, if it is beginning to move in a liberal way within, then I would call that progress toward victory in the cold war.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your last press conference[4] you pointed out that the fine print has to be read on the Moscow statement on the Middle East. I wonder if that reading of the fine print has been completed and you can give us your assessment of that statement.

A. Yes, I can say I have now read the fine print and my impression is about the same as I expressed last week. It does seem to me that the statement is responsive to President Eisenhower's statement.[5] Now, when I say responsive to, I don't mean to say that it is in response to, which is slightly different. I don't mean to say that the Soviets made their statement because President Eisenhower made his statement. But the Soviet statement does, it seems to me, fit in with and

[3] *Ibid.*, Apr. 30, 1956, p. 699.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 710.

[5] Issued at Augusta, Ga., on Apr. 9; see *ibid.*, Apr. 23, p. 668.

in that sense is responsive to President Eisenhower's statement, which called upon all of the member nations to support the Hammarskjold mission and the efforts of the United Nations in this respect. And I think to the extent that the statement seems to commit the Soviet Union to the support of the Hammarskjold mission and to the handling of this matter in the United Nations, and we can hope a handling which would exclude its use of the veto power in the Security Council, that is all in the right direction.

Relations With the Philippines

Q. Mr. Secretary, reports from the Philippines, including an AP dispatch, tell of the dissatisfaction with the prospective nominees for United States Ambassador there. Other reports tell of a rising anti-American sentiment. We are accused of treating the Philippines as an orphan. The New York Times *recently described the situation as "serious, if not critical." The question is, do we give weight to Philippine public sentiment and its impact on friendly United States–Philippine relations in our diplomatic and other dealings with them?*

A. We attach the greatest of importance to good relations with the Philippines, and I believe that the relations at the present time are basically good, although I am not unaware of the fact that some are critical of the United States because they do not feel that we are cutting the Philippines in sufficiently upon our economic aid program.

When I was in Manila on my last trip, a month ago, I was quite aware of the criticism that was made in that respect. There was a good deal of attention paid to a chart which was drawn from a United States newspaper which, for example, showed a list of the countries that had received the greatest aid from the United States. The chart gave 10 countries, and the Philippines was last on that list. That was interpreted in some quarters as indicating that we were, as you put it, treating it as an "orphan." Well, the chart did not mean that. It picked the 10 countries that have gotten the most aid and merely lumped together the others, some 45, who had gotten less aid. The whole purport of the chart was to show that the Philippines was among the 10 who had gotten the most aid out of the approximately 50 who had been aided. And even there the chart was inac rate because it showed the total aid as appro mately $1 billion, whereas the actual amount economic aid, including loans and U.S. expen tures in the Philippines, is about $2.5 billion.

Also there is—very naturally, perhaps—n understanding as to the nature of our aid. don't give foreign aid like a generous grandpar to his grandchildren on Christmas Day, v passes out checks to the favorite grandchild and gives the biggest check to the one that he lo the most. This is a serious business—where are trying to build up defenses against the dang of Soviet communism. In Asia there is stil very considerable military danger, and the tr to renunciation of violence which I spoke of relation to the Soviet Union is not fully appar yet as far as Communist China is concerned. T great bulk of our aid in that part of the worl going to Korea, to Taiwan, and to Viet-Na which are three danger points. There are th actual wars suspended by armistices but not s pended by formal peace, and there is actual sho ing going on sporadically around Taiwan. Wl we give help to those countries to hold back military threat of the Chinese Communists, are by that very fact helping the Philippin which itself is in an exposed position. If we did help Korea, Taiwan, and Viet-Nam, as we doing, the Philippines would be very much wo off. So that our program in those countries also in aid of the Philippines. These things not fully understood. We are trying to make th more clearly understood, because we greatly va Philippine friendship.

I think you made some reference at the beg ning of your question to the acceptability of new Ambassador.

Q. Yes.

A. Well, I understand that the *agrément* him has been received.[6]

Q. Mr. Secretary, testimony before a congr sional committee last week about the Soviet sail who have gone back to the Soviet Union indica that Mr. Sobolev and his associates of the Sov delegation in the United Nations may have dulged in activities not necessarily consistent w his position as a United Nations representat

[6] Albert F. Nufer was nominated to be Ambassador the Philippines on Apr. 25.

re. Does the State Department plan to protest tion in that respect?

A. Well, that depends upon what the facts de- lop to be. I understand that situation is being amined by the Department of Justice and the BI. It falls within their jurisdiction, and I do t yet have any report. Of course, if the re- rt justifies it, we would make protest. [See p. 5.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, have you made any investiga- n to find out why these five seamen went back Russia?

A. Well, that investigation is what is going on. it that investigation is conducted not by the ate Department but by the Department of Jus- e.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in regard to the changes in ssia, is there any evidence of any kind that the ssians are modifying their hold on the satel- es?

A. There is no evidence that they are voluntarily odifying their hold. I would say that there is little evidence that their hold is getting some- at weaker, not because they want it to be so t because the changes that have occurred in the viet policy have put a certain premium now on Titoism. And while we think always in ms of the effect of Soviet policy in creating neu- alism in the free-world camp, the acceptance w of Titoism in the Soviet camp has a certain sturbing influence upon the Soviet hold over the ellites who think that perhaps Tito is getting e best of both worlds and that seems to be en- ely acceptable now to the Soviet Union; there- re, why shouldn't they follow on that same path? I do think that, while the Soviets have not licated any policy of relinquishing their hold, eir hold is becoming looser.

oposed Advisory Board

Q. Mr. Secretary, President Eisenhower Satur- y night suggested some sort of rotating advis- y board for foreign policy. Have you given any ought to a plan like that? Do you know what meant?

A. Yes, I think I know what he meant. I spoke re last week of the fact that we recognized the sirability of having a study made of the for- gn aid and whether it is being conducted along the most effective lines, and so forth. That statement of the President was in pursuance of the same thought. We are studying that whole question rather intensely at the present time, and I hope that within a few days we may be able to come up with some concrete proposals in that sense. We are, of course, in that respect, taking account of the point of view which has been expressed in Congress by Senator George in relation to the Foreign Relations Committee. We know that, also, Congressman Richards and the Foreign Affairs Committee are interested in that problem.

Q. Will this board be confined strictly to foreign aid, Mr. Secretary, or a broader range?

A. Well, it is primarily conceived of in terms of foreign aid. Did you mean to imply economic aid as distinguished from military?

Q. No. It seemed to me that the President was suggesting a board which would consider a wider range of foreign problems rather than—

A. No, I think he was only thinking of it in terms of the foreign aid, and perhaps primarily the economic aspect of it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to go back, if we may for a second, to the Middle East, are we or would we attempt to discourage Israel from resuming digging in the so-called demilitarized zone on the Jordan River project?

A. Well, the situation still is, I suppose, juridically the same as it was when that project was interrupted about 3 years ago, at the behest of the United Nations, of General Bennike, then the Chairman of the Armistice Commission, on the ground that it was a violation of the armistice. And I don't know of anything that has happened to change that juridical position since then.

Policy Toward U.S.S.R.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your discussion of the cold war, you say you reject—if I heard it correctly—the idea of keeping alive the hatred of the Soviet Union. The President has said, I believe, that the Russian basic concept of world communism has not changed despite these surface changes. And you attach a number of "ifs" to the possibility of changes within the Soviet Union. What, sir, should be the attitude of the average American

toward the Soviet Union in this context? What do we do about exchange of students? The University of Chicago wanted to invite a Russian student, which was not permitted, according to the story. Do we have, as yet, a new concept of the American posture, so to speak, toward Russia?

A. We are adopting a somewhat more liberal policy in that respect than was the case a year or more ago. On the other hand, we do in the application of our policy consider not merely the question of whether or not a particular action would be good or even tolerable, as between our two countries, but we also take into account the effect of our example upon other countries who perhaps might not be able to have the same relationship without their getting into difficulties. The Soviets are very prone to turn to a smaller, weaker country, and say, "Well, we had this kind of relationship with the United States. Why don't you do the same? If the United States does it, well, why not you?" Now, it may very well be that the Soviet Union has projects to ensnare that smaller and weaker country which would be promoted if that country had the same kind of relationship which we could have with impunity. Therefore, we take into account not merely the question of whether or not what we do would be tolerable as between our two countries, but what use the Soviet Union can make of that example when it turns to a third country and says, "Well, now, the United States set the example; why shouldn't you follow it?"

Q. Mr. Secretary, in London the other day Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Bulganin reportedly said that that was the half-way stop on the way to America and that they would like to come here after the election. Has any thought been given to asking them?

A. Well, I am not aware of any such thought being given to their coming here, and possibly after they have had this experience with the half-way stop they might not want to go all the rest of the way. (Laughter)

Q. Have we given any thought to inviting Mr. Zhukov here?

A. Not that I know of.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when do you plan to leave for Paris?

A. On next Tuesday afternoon.

Communism and Nationalism

Q. Mr. Secretary, you referred to certain changes in the Soviet Union as putting a premium on Titoism. Could you specify for us which particular changes you have in mind?

A. Of course, the most important characteristic of Titoism is the fact that it recognizes that communism can be a national organization, not necessarily an international organization. That was the thesis which was held in Russia by Bukharin and his associates, who were purged and executed in the 1930's because they took the view that there could have communism within a country but it not necessarily have to be a part of what is commonly called international communism.

The view then held by Stalin was that you could not have communism just within one country that you had to have communism as a dynamic movement which was trying to get control of all countries. In that sense Stalin's communism was incompatible with nationalism. Indeed, Stalin himself said that Soviet communism is the most international of all organizations because it tends to break down all of the national boundaries. As against this some people held the view that communism could be a national phenomenon rather than an international phenomenon. That was the view that Tito held, and he broke with Stalin on that issue because Moscow did not admit his right to have a national communistic state which would primarily be dedicated to the welfare of Yugoslavia.

If the Soviet Communists now say that it is all right to have communism on a national basis, that offers a great prospect to the Poles, the Czechs, and so forth, who would much rather have their own national brand of communism than be ruled by Moscow.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Khrushchev seems to have created some excitement in Britain yesterday with a remark about working on a guided missile with an atomic or hydrogen warhead. Do you have any comment on this remark of his?

A. Well, that is not primarily within my area. I think it is no secret that they have been working on this for some time. I just checked, for curiosity, this morning to see what the interpretation of Mr. Khrushchev's remark was as being given out by the Soviet press, because there was some question as to just what he had said. And I just was

en, as I came down here, a note which says that Soviet radio reports it as follows: "I also think t we are not behind in the development of ded missiles," which is a slightly more moder- statement than what was reported by some as version of what he said.

). Mr. Secretary, I believe Isaac Stern, a young erican violinist, is going to the Soviet Union Saturday for a 4-week tour. This is in re- for some very successful Russian appearances . Do you think this favors the thawing of tions, or does it create some erroneous impres- s here—the way you felt, I believe, about the icultural mission at one point?

A. No, I would think that the exchange of uine artists would probably be a good thing. course, if the artists are spies in disguise, that's ther matter. But a genuine artist, I believe, go about the world, and it is good for every- y to have fine music made available.

). Thank you, sir.

cond Meeting of Council Baghdad Pact Organization

ollowing are texts of statements made by ted States observers during the second meeting he Baghdad Pact Council at Tehran, April 20, together with the final communique issued April 20. [1]

TEMENT BY LOY W. HENDERSON [2]

release 200 dated April 17

take this occasion to express on behalf of the gation of the United States our deep appreciation of the courtesies and consideration which we receiving from our kind hosts, the Government ran, and of the effective measures which have taken for the organization of this meeting. take pleasure in bringing to you today the tings of the President of the United States, Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense on this occasion of the second meeting of the Council of the Baghdad Pact Organization.

It means much to me personally again to be in the Middle East and to have the opportunity to meet so many old friends and to make new friends from countries whose friendship my own country values so highly.

Our delegation considers it a privilege to be able to sit with such a distinguished group of representatives of friendly nations which, like the United States, are so deeply interested in the maintenance of the peace and security of the Middle East on a basis which would assure the preservation of the territorial integrity and the independence of the various nations of the area and would afford the peoples of the area maximum opportunities for political, economic, and social development.

Ambassadors Chapin and Gallman, Admiral Cassady, Mr. Seager, and I, together with the staffs which accompany us, are prepared to contribute to your deliberations and to assist in the work of your committees. We are anxious to do here all that is possible and appropriate to promote the achievement of our common objective.

At a time when the peace of the world is threatened in numerous areas by divisive conflicts, we look with hope toward those groups of nations which have banded together for their common security and welfare. We desire to work with such groups and so to strengthen them that they will demonstrate to other nations in the area that such cooperation is the true road to the achievement of national aspirations.

The American people are increasingly happy to work with the nations grouped in the Baghdad Pact in their cooperative efforts in the Middle East. In planning for the bilateral programs of economic and military assistance which we have with each of the Pact nations, we are taking strongly into account the courageous and unequivocal steps you have taken in forming this association. We have come prepared to discuss the supplementing of these bilateral programs through a program of broader economic cooperation coordinated through the Pact Organization. We will be pleased to carry back with us to our Government any suggestions which you may make for closer cooperation in the many fields of common endeavor which the Pact has opened.

We are certain, however, that we express the feelings of all who are here represented when we

[1] or text of the communique issued after the Council's meeting, see BULLETIN of Jan. 2, 1956, p. 16.

[2] ade before the Council on Apr. 16. Deputy Under tary Henderson headed the U.S. delegation to the ng.

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say that it is our sincere desire to retain close, friendly, and effective ties with other nations of the area. We believe the Pact, based as it is on friendship toward all and hostility toward none, serves the interests of the area as a whole and provides no reason for impairing the good relations we all wish to maintain with your neighbors. In our relations with the other nations we shall continue to make clear our firm support for the Pact and our belief that it represents an effective organization for area cooperation and defense.

My colleagues and I look forward to a rewarding and stimulating conference with you during this meeting.

STATEMENT BY CEDRIC SEAGER[3]

Press release 200 dated April 17

The United States is deeply interested in the countries of the Baghdad Pact and their economic and social advancement. The United States will continue its assistance to these and other Middle East countries to raise their standards of living and safeguard their freedom and independence. Significant steps are being taken by all the Pact members to strengthen their internal economies. The economic progress which is being made holds encouraging promise for the future.

The United States believes that the work of the Economic Committee of the Baghdad Pact is contributing effectively toward the advancement of development programs which will bring greater prosperity and greater economic stability for all. The United States has followed with great and sympathetic interest the work of the Economic Committee and its subcommittees. They have assessed a broad range of subjects of common interest on which cooperative action is desirable. At its current session the Economic Committee has given stimulus to the progress which is being made in the economic development of the countries of the Pact. The United States looks forward with pleasure to a continuation of its cooperation with the members of the Pact, and I feel assured from this meeting that the Economic Committee is determined to carry forward the task it has undertaken. I congratulate the Economic Co mittee on its excellent work.

[3] Made at the closing session of the Council's Economic Committee on Apr. 11. Mr. Seager is Regional Director for the Near East, South Asia, and Africa, International Cooperation Administration.

CLOSING STATEMENT BY MR. HENDERSO APRIL 20

On behalf of the United States observers I aga desire to express our appreciation to His I perial Majesty, the Shahinshah, and his Gover ment for the warmth of their welcome, their h pitality, and for the excellent facilities made ava able to us.

Prime Minister Ala has chaired our meetin with the statesmanship and ability for which has long been famous. We wish to congratula the Secretariat which, under the capable directi of the Secretary-General, has done a superb j in its reporting and in making the necessary a rangements to permit the meetings to r smoothly.

Our participation in this meeting has been stir ulating and inspiring. We have been deeply ir pressed by the restraint, wisdom, and understan ing displayed by all of the delegations. We a firmly convinced that any area which can pr duce the statesmanship which has been evidenc at this meeting is certain to play a significa and beneficial role in world affairs.

As we bid you adieu we have the warm feelir which comes from being among friends. Y may be sure that we, the United States observe will faithfully convey to our Government t views which have been expressed to us. We wi all of you continued success in the implementir of this Pact which means so much to the securi and welfare of the peoples of this area.

TEXT OF FINAL COMMUNIQUE

The Council of the Baghdad Pact held its second me ing of Ministers in Tehran from 16th to 19th April, 19 under the Chairmanship of His Excellency Hussein A Prime Minister of Iran.

2. The meeting was attended by the Prime Ministe and Foreign Ministers of Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Tu key and by the Minister of Defence of the United Kin dom. The United States were represented by a del gation of observers headed by the Hon. Loy Henderso Deputy Under Secretary of State.

3. The Council emphasised that their several Go ernments adhered firmly to the principles that inspir the United Nations Charter. The Baghdad Pact w

y in conformity with those principles. Its object was assist in achieving the Charter's primary purpose of intaining international peace and security and pro- ing human welfare. The Pact was wholly defensive character. While its members were determined to end themselves against aggression, they desired at the e time to live in peace with all Governments and peoples.

. The Council had before it the task of considering reports and recommendations of various committees he Baghdad Pact Organisation, and of reviewing the rnational political situation especially from the point iew of its repercussions on the Pact area.

. In the light of their thorough review of the political ation, the Council considered that although there was hange of tactics, the basic objectives of international mmunism remained unchanged. Its activities in the n required that the free world continue to exercise easing vigilance if its solidarity was to be maintained freedom and peace were to be preserved. There ld be no relaxation of measures designed to strengthen defensive capacity of this area. In the view of the ncil, the criticism and attacks from neutralist and r sources directed against the Baghdad Pact and other ilar organisations created to provide for the legitimate ence and peaceful development of their member na- s, spring largely from lack of knowledge and mis- erstanding of its true purposes. It is the hope of Council that as these purposes become better known, e criticisms will give way to sympathetic and active peration and that the Baghdad Pact will become, as intended to be, a unifying factor among the peoples he region who wish to preserve a free and democratic of life. Meanwhile, these criticisms and attacks can help to keep the region divided and weak and mem- countries decided to counter them actively and lutely.

Specific problems which were causing tension in this were also discussed thoroughly and frankly in a pit of mutual comprehension. In particular, the Coun- mphasised the need for an early settlement of the stine and Kashmir disputes.

In the midst of this troubled political situation, it the Council's conviction that the Baghdad Pact offered best means of safeguarding the peace and stability of promoting the welfare and unity of the area, whilst he same time it effectively served the cause of world e. Urgent steps must, therefore, be taken to ngthen this Pact. For this purpose, member coun- in this area must be equipped with the means for loping their military and economic strength and the must yield positive visible results. At the same , systematic efforts should be made to create a better erstanding of the Pact among the nations which are sing it.

The Council adopted the report of the Economic mittee and the various resolutions submitted by it. e provide for the establishment of a Centre for im- ing training in the use of agricultural machinery in methods of soil and water conservation, for es- shing joint training centres for anti-malaria opera- and health education, for undertaking jointly by two or more countries surveys in the field of locusts and pests, for co-ordination of research in certain fields, and for exchange of technical personnel and of information on scientific and technical subjects. The Council agreed that it was necessary to implement the resolutions without delay, particularly those relating to projects which are likely to yield early and visible results and to promote the well being of the people in the Pact area. The Council noted with satisfaction that the Atomic Energy Centre was expected to open at Baghdad in January, 1957.

9. The Council drew special attention to the importance of joint projects of mutual interest to one or more member countries. It was decided that a technical Committee comprising members of each of the interested Governments should take place at Ankara to make a preliminary study of the possibility of a joint development plan of the water resources of the Tigris and Euphrates basin and to make recommendations for the carrying out of any further detailed studies which may be required. The possibilities of development of mineral resources in the eastern parts of Iran and the timber reserve in Caspian provinces by the joint efforts of Iran and Pakistan were noted. The Council also decided to set up a working party to meet in June, 1956, at Tehran to consider the means whereby regional projects of interest to two or more members of the Pact could be studied and implemented through economic and technical assistance. The Council recognised the far reaching need for regional co-operation and joint projects in the fields of industry and communications.

10. The Council noted that the Economic Committee would undertake a detailed study of the pattern of production and trade between member countries with a view to promoting trade within the Pact area. The Council considered that notwithstanding the fact that the needs of the member countries in the Pact area were at present similar, there was scope for expansion of trade in this area in the immediate future. In this connection, Pakistan's recent offer to buy dates from Iraq was welcomed.

11. The Council recognised the importance of technical assistance between member countries. The Council agreed that the Secretariat should co-ordinate this work on the basis of the offers already received by the Economic Committee. It noted that the United Kingdom and Pakistan had offered technical assistance.

12. The Council welcomed the active participation of the United States in the work of the Pact Organisation. The Council considered that the active and continuing support of the United States for the Pact and its objectives was an essential factor in the strengthening and development of the member countries and in the realisation of their peaceful aims. The United States reaffirmed its solid support of the Pact and stated that it would continue to lend support to the individual and collective efforts of the Member nations to attain the political, defensive, economic and social objectives of the Pact.

13. The United States, on the invitation of the Council, became a full member of the Economic Committee and the Counter Subversion Committee. The terms of reference of these two Committees provide for the extension of membership to non-signatory governments at the discretion of the Council.

14. The United States delegate to the Economic Committee reaffirmed the intention of his country to continue its bilateral technical and economic assistance to the member nations, and indicated that the United States would consider ways of assisting joint projects undertaken by members of the Economic Committee of the Pact.

15. The United States observer to the Military Committee offered to establish a Military Liaison group at the permanent Headquarters of the Baghdad Pact, headed by a Flag or General Officer. The Council welcomed and accepted this proposal.

16. The United States observers expressed their Government's intention of continuing its military assistance to the member countries.

17. The Council considered that there is a threat of subversion in this area and agreed that it can be met most effectively by co-operation among members of the Pact. To this end the Council decided to establish a permanent organisation under the administrative control of the Secretary General. The Council recognised that while the threat of subversion could be countered with measures designed to expose its real nature and give the widest publicity to the aim and activities of the Pact, the essence of combating subversion lay in the eradication of the conditions in which it thrives, namely, economic under-development and defensive weakness. Both must be remedied as soon as possible.

18. In the light of the common determination that the territorial integrity of the Member states of the Pact shall be defended the Military Committee decided to expedite all necessary further measures for the defence of the Baghdad Pact countries. The Council considered the report of the Committee and noted that considerable progress had already been achieved in the military sphere.

19. The Council decided that its next meeting at Ministerial level should be held at Karachi in the month of January, 1957, and that in the meanwhile the Council will continue to meet regularly at the Deputies' level.

Visit of Vice President of Brazil

The Department of State announced on April 26 (press release 220) that the members of the party of João Goulart, Vice President of Brazil, who will visit Washington from April 30 to May 3, will be as follows:

João Goulart, Vice President of the Republic of the United States of Brazil; Senhora Goulart
João Lima Teixeira, Senator from the State of Bahia
Fernando Ferrari, Federal Deputy from the State of Rio Grande do Sul
Roberto Silveira, Lieutenant Governor of the State of Rio de Janeiro
Geraldo Eulalio Nascimento e Silva, Foreign Service Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Eugenio Caillar, Executive Secretary to the Vice President
Yara Vargas Lopes, Secretary to Senhora Goulart

The party will leave Washington on May 3 for a 2-week private tour which will include vi to the King Ranch in Texas, Kansas City, Detr and New York.

Change in NATO Command

Following are texts of statements and do ments relating to the retirement of Gen. Alf M. Gruenther, Supreme Allied Comman Europe, and the appointment of Gen. La Norstad as his successor.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT OF APRIL 13

White House Office (Augusta, Ga.) press release

The White House today announced that President has with deep regret accepted the quest of General Alfred M. Gruenther for ret ment from the United States Army toward end of this year.

General Gruenther is at present serving Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, under pointment by the North Atlantic Council. Council has acceded to the President's req that General Gruenther be released fr this NATO Command upon retirement.

The White House also announced that, in sponse to a subsequent request by the North lantic Council, the President has nominated the Council has approved the appointment of G eral Lauris Norstad, United States Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, in suc sion to General Gruenther. The appointment take effect at a date to be decided later.

In a letter to General Gruenther, the Presid said, "The announcement of your decision to quest relief as Supreme Allied Comman Europe, and to retire from active military serv will be received with great disappointment by European Allies and by the American people. appreciate the magnificent contribution you h made toward the fulfillment of the objectives NATO and, I am certain, will wish to join with in congratulating you on your performa You have been intimately associated with N since its inception. To your task as Supr Allied Commander, Europe, you brought a we of military experience and a unique quality leadership which you have unselfishly and great distinction employed in improving the e

eness and solidarity of the forces under your mmand."

In the letter nominating General Norstad, the esident said, "General Norstad is an officer of tstanding ability. He has the special qualifica- n of long years of experience in Europe, cul- nating in almost three years of devoted service Air Deputy to SACEUR. The confidence placed him by the Member Nations has been amply nonstrated. It is our common purpose to deter l, if need be, defend against aggression so that nkind may live and prosper in freedom. I am fident that under General Norstad's leadership s high resolve will continue to be steadfastly held."

NOUNCEMENT BY NORTH ATLANTIC COUN-, APRIL 13

. The North Atlantic Council have been in- med of the contents of a communication from President of the United States of America to Secretary General and Vice-Chairman of the ncil, in which he asked that the member gov- ments should agree to the release at his own uest towards the end of this year of General fred M. Gruenther from his assignment as preme Allied Commander Europe in order to mit his retirement from active duty.

. The Council agreed with great regret to re- e General Gruenther from his assignment as preme Allied Commander Europe. They rec- ised that General Gruenther had fully dis- rged the trust reposed in him by the Council n, in May 1953, they appointed him as Su- me Allied Commander Europe. They ex- sed to General Gruenther, in the name of the ernments represented on the Council, lasting titude for the distinguished service rendered him.

The Council then unanimously decided to re- st the President of the United States of erica to nominate an officer of the US Armed ces for appointment by the Council as Su- ne Allied Commander Europe to succeed Gen- Gruenther. The request was immediately smitted to the President of the United States, informed the Council of his nomination of eral Lauris Norstad for consideration by the ncil as successor to General Gruenther.

The Council at a meeting this afternoon unanimously adopted a resolution declaring that they reposed the greatest faith in General Norstad and appointed him Supreme Allied Commander Europe, as successor to General Gruenther, with the same powers and functions. The appointment will become effective towards the end of this year.

ANNEX I. LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO LORD ISMAY

10TH APRIL, 1956

DEAR LORD ISMAY,

I am addressing you as Vice-Chairman of the North Atlantic Council with the request that appropriate action be taken at an early date to secure the release toward the end of this year of General Alfred M. Gruenther from assignment as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. In making this request through you to the Member Nations who appointed him, I ask that they give favorable consideration to his release.

Personal considerations have led General Gruenther to request retirement from active duty in the Armed Forces of the United States toward the end of this year. I believe his distinguished career of dedicated national and international service has earned for him the right to have his request granted.

The steady growth of Communist armed strength, compelling the NATO Nations to maintain their deterrent and defensive strength, emphasizes the continued necessity for outstanding leadership at SHAPE. The Council will shortly proceed to appoint an able officer to the vacancy created by General Gruenther's retirement. Surely the Nation invited to nominate a successor will propose its most eligible officer available.

Afforded the same high degree of trust and cooperation that Nations have extended to General Gruenther, the new SACEUR will, I am confident, be successful in carrying out his vital responsibilities.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

The Right Honorable LORD ISMAY, G.C.B., C.H., D.S.O.,
Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
Palais de Chaillot,
Paris.

ANNEX II. COUNCIL RESOLUTION ACCEPTING THE RELIEF OF GENERAL ALFRED M. GRUENTHER AND REQUESTING NOMINATION OF A US OFFICER TO BE HIS SUCCESSOR

THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL:

Having considered a communication by the President of the United States to the Secretary General and Vice-Chairman of the Council requesting him to initiate appropriate action to secure the release of General Alfred M. Gruenther from assignment as Supreme Allied Commander Europe,

Agrees with great regret to the release towards the end of this year of General Gruenther from assignment as Supreme Allied Commander Europe;

Recognises that General Gruenther has fully discharged the trust reposed in him by the North Atlantic Council

when in May 1953, the Council appointed him Supreme Allied Commander Europe;

Expressed to General Gruenther, in the name of the Governments represented on the Council, lasting gratitude for the distinguished service rendered by him;

Unanimously requests the President of the United States to nominate an officer of the Armed Forces of the United States for appointment by the Council as Supreme Allied Commander Europe to succeed General Gruenther, at a date to be decided later.

ANNEX III. LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO LORD ISMAY

13TH APRIL, 1956

DEAR LORD ISMAY,

Pursuant to the request of the North Atlantic Council that I nominate an officer of the Armed Forces of the United States for appointment by the Council as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, to succeed General Alfred M. Gruenther, I hereby nominate General Lauris Norstad.

General Norstad is an officer of outstanding ability. He has the special qualification of long years of experience in Europe, culminating in almost three years of devoted service as Air Deputy to SACEUR. The confidence placed in him by the Member Nations has been amply demonstrated.

It is our common purpose to deter and, if need be, defend against aggression so that mankind may live and prosper in freedom. I am confident that under General Norstad's leadership this high resolve will continue to be steadfastly upheld.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

The Right Honorable LORD ISMAY, G.C.B., C.H., D.S.O.,
Secretary General of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The Purge of Stalinism

by Allen W. Dulles
Director of Central Intelligence[1]

There is never a dull moment in my job as Director of Central Intelligence. Events which seem to defy analysis happen somewhere in the world every day. Few trends seem to follow a predictable course.

These last few weeks there have been developments in the Soviet Union which have puzzled all the experts who generally have ready answers—sometimes more ready than accurate—to explain Soviet conduct. Just at a time when some are saying that everything is going wrong with foreign policy in the free-world countries but that everything in the Soviet Union is progressing according to some great master design, the Soviet collective leadership, as they call it, comes forward to beat their collective breasts and indulge in the most extreme self-criticism.

The men in the Kremlin now tell us that all they said earlier about events in the U.S.S.R. during the 20 years preceding Stalin's death is quite wrong; that in fact this was an era of infamy, crime, and shame. They admit that their past adulation of Stalin was based on fear, not on fact. The man they themselves used to call the "glorious Stalin, genius of mankind" is now being publicly accused of "grave errors" and privately described as a malicious monster.

The Soviet leaders do not very clearly explain why the new collective leaders waited for 3 years after Stalin's death to tell it to their people. They do not make a very satisfactory showing as to why they themselves sat acquiescent in the seat of the mighty during all the period of Stalin dictatorship, exercising great powers as members of his inner circle.

Possibly, as Khrushchev is reported to have admitted, the price of nonconformity was a bullet in the head. This is a very human excuse but a poor qualification for high office on the part of those who now assert the rights and prerogatives of leadership. In the free world, where we aspire to build on the great traditions of the past, not to repudiate them, we revere as our heroes and leaders those who refused to conform, whatever the risk, when the principles of liberty were at stake.

[1] Address made before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on Apr. 13.

ı the U.S.S.R., evidently, acquiescing in ıe as the price of simple survival under a tical tyrant is sanctioned as legitimate con-. As they put it: "The point was not to save s own life; the point was to save the revolu-."

rs of Stalin's Power

efore going further into the details of this nge development in the Soviet Union it may vorth while to review briefly what had been ng place there during the years of Stalin's er. Here we may find clues as to why the in the Kremlin now take the serious risks of ıdiating their late hero for having put the vidual above party and substituting a per-ıl dictatorship for a collective one.

talin himself ran through a series of revolu-ary combinations, somewhat akin to collec-leaderships, during the 1920's. For example, 1924–25 he combined with Zinoviev and nenev against Trotsky. From 1925–27, a new ınce between Stalin, Bukharin, and Rykov formed and routed a Trotsky–Zinoviev–nenev combination. And finally, from 1927–Stalin worked with Molotov, Voroshilov, oyan, and others to crush Stalin's recent s, Bukharin and Rykov.

was during the 10 years which preceded sia's entry into World War II that Stalin com-ed the consolidation of his control over the ımunist Party machinery. By that time he placed his loyal stooges in all important posi-s of authority throughout the Soviet Union the army was brought under political control. mong the major charges said to have been led against Stalin by Khrushchev is the charge in the late thirties he deliberately liquidated shal Tukhachevsky and thousands of the best ers in the Soviet Army, presumably to insure political control of the military apparatus. ainly today there is good reason to believe Marshal Tukhachevsky was falsely accused onniving with the Germans. There is some ence that there was a clever German plot to redit Tukhachevsky, which happened to fit in Stalin's own plans.

e do know that during and after the war there burning resentment among the Soviet profes-al soldiers at Stalin's interference in the con-of the war, his unjust and capricious be-ıng of heroes such as Zhukov, and his arrogant claims to personal credit for Soviet victories. A senior Soviet general, for example, is recently reported as having privately branded their so-called documentary film, "The Fall of Berlin," which shows Stalin as the great military mastermind, as a "tissue of lies."

Today the collective dictatorship is assiduously repairing the injured dignity of the military and incorporating its leadership into Communist Party membership. They must realize that, following the usual pattern of revolutions, the military leaders might tire of being the pawn of dictators, whether individual or collective.

But whatever the faults of Stalin in the prewar decade, one can hardly ascribe them to his old age or senility. Stalin was then in his prime. Furthermore, one can hardly believe that the acts of the dictator in a war from which he emerged as a hero are the motivating causes for the present attempt to liquidate his memory. In fact, the most recent Soviet pronouncements are tending to refer to "good" and "bad" Stalin eras. Naturally, there is no desire to repudiate such measures as farm collectivization and the rapid industrialization under the Five-Year Plans, which are so closely associated with his name. The beginning of the "bad" period was in 1934, when the great Stalin purges began. If they denounce his war record, the purpose here must be to eliminate him from the hero class and to give the military some of the credit he had arrogated to himself.

But to find the real reasons for the de-Stalinization campaign, we must, I believe, look to the more recent past, particularly to the hard autocratic period during the last 6 or 7 years of Stalin's life. Here we find two major motivations for cutting away from Stalin worship.

Internationally, from about 1947 onward to the time of his death, Stalin's often bellicose policy in the international field had been a failure and had tended to unite the free world against international communism. Domestically during this period his police state was meeting ever-increasing disfavor, not only with the helpless people but with the top politicians, generals, and industrial managers who were essential to the working of the Soviet system. This began to create problems for the regime.

The International Problem

First, let us look at the international picture. In the immediate postwar era, riding the crest of the common victory and maintaining military

strength and power, Soviet policy had notable successes. It consolidated the grip on the European satellites and helped the Chinese Communists to victory.

But beginning with about 1947 in Europe, somewhat later in Asia, the free world at last began to realize the implications of the forward drive of international communism and started to take countermeasures, and the tide began to turn.

What happened in these years? The Marshall plan, which Stalin and Molotov indignantly rejected and tried to defeat, was put into effect, and Europe was saved from economic chaos. In Greece, the Soviet effort to take over by guerrilla tactics was thwarted.

When the Soviet attempted to take over Berlin and destroy this outpost of Western freedom, the Berlin blockade was frustrated by the airlift, and West Berlin remains a show window of what the free world can do. Tito survived his ejection from the Cominform and the wrath of Stalin and struck back with telling criticisms of Stalinist policy—almost identical with what Soviet leaders are now themselves saying.

Later the North Atlantic alliance was organized, and despite Soviet threats the way was opened for German rearmament in close union with the West.

Thus frustrated in the European field Stalin turned to the Far East and, working with the North Korean and Chinese Communists, attempted to take over Korea as the first step toward driving America from the western Pacific. Again the Communists were blocked, and, most important of all, an alarmed and awakened American public opinion proceeded to the defensive rearmament of this country. Our nuclear power was vastly increased.

It is understandable that Stalin's successors should have found it convenient to place upon him the blame for Greece, Berlin, Korea, Yugoslavia, German rearmament, and the like and, in particular, for the generally hard Soviet line which has led to the buildup of American defense forces and NATO. It was these successes which led the Soviet Union to conclude that a peace treaty with Austria was necessary to build up their badly shattered reputation as peacemongers and to prepare the way for a summit conference, their pilgrimage of penitence to Belgrade, and their effort to line the Socialist parties into new popular fronts.

The Domestic Situation

But the foreign scene alone by no means exp the urge the present Kremlin leaders felt to b with the hard Stalinist past. They were alr making progress in allowing the memory of St to fade in international recognition and pre without going to the extreme of total destruc of the Stalin myth with their own people. the clue to their present policy lies more in internal Soviet situation than in the requirem of their foreign policy.

Domestically they have been caught in a lemma. In order to compete with the Wes World in the fields of science and industry, w was vitally important for their economic gr and their rearmament program, it was essentia the Soviet to speed up the education of their ple, especially in the scientific and technical f After Stalin's death the regime encouraged objectivity in scientific inquiry and put on shelf some pseudoscientists such as Lyse After all, they had found out early in the g that in the present nuclear age one could not around with scientists who tailored their a the whims of Marxism.

Obviously, the Soviet leaders could not their educational processes to the scientific fi and more and more young men and women graduating from schools which correspond to high schools and colleges and are taking adva degrees comparable to our degrees of Maste Arts and Doctor of Philosophy. Even with the indoctrination in Communist teachings w they give to their young students it is impos to prevent education from developing the c cal faculties which every thinking human b possesses.

Furthermore, as part of their new campaig sweetness and light, they have found it wis take down some of the bars which have impe travel between the Soviet Union and the countries; and while the Iron Curtain still mains and there is a careful selective proces to those who are permitted to leave the So Union or to visit it, it is obvious that today t is far more contact between the people of U. S. S. R. and outside countries than at any t in recent years.

All this has tended to build up pressures u the Soviet rulers to create an impression, not o internationally but also domestically, that a di torship of the Stalin type was dead forever.

The Soviet leaders are trying to meet their external and internal dilemmas by finding a convenient "devil" which they can use to explain away past Soviet sins to the world abroad and to their own people, as well as to demonstrate that the present rulers of the Soviet are different mentally and morally than they were under Stalin. Thus they hope that their own people will accept their protestations that the days of government by arbitrary policymaking, secret trials, deportations, and prison camps are over. Furthermore, they are again promising that they will do something to raise the standard of living so that the promise of individual freedom will be seasoned with a greater share of consumers goods and a more abundant life.

Threat to Communist Party

The extent of the opposition to the Stalinist-type regime must have been gaged by the Kremlin as far stronger and deeper among the Russian people than we had dared to hope. Nonetheless, the destruction of the Stalin myth carries with it a very real threat to the internal discipline and units of the Soviet Communist Party and the international Communist movement.

That calculated risk must have been taken deliberately by men who knew they had to have a scapegoat if they were to hope to preserve the dictatorship on which their own power and very survival rested. By attacking the personal symbol of Stalin and the worst excesses of his rule, they hope to be able to preserve many of the essentials of the Stalinist system—now labeling it Leninism—the monopoly of all power by a single party, the complete subordination of the courts and individual rights to arbitrary Party decree, the governmental control of the press and of all organs of public information.

Basic Structure To Be Preserved

This basic structure is meant to be preserved intact. Already the regime has publicly warned that some "rotten elements" have taken the de-Stalinization campaign too literally and are "trying to question the correctness of the Party's policy." This, *Pravda* thundered, is "petty bourgeois licentiousness" of a kind the "Party has never tolerated and will never tolerate." A dead and dishonored Stalin, therefore, is likely to be merely a device—here possibly a Trojan corpse rather than a Trojan horse—with which the long-suffering Russian people are, I fear, to be deceived in their expectation of a freer and better life.

Obviously the Soviet rulers concluded that it would take something more than a mere repetition of the old clichés to have any effect. Apparently this necessity was deemed to be urgent and impelling. They had tried to do the trick with the liquidation of Beria, but the secrecy surrounding his execution was hardly a persuasive bit of evidence of a new dawn of liberty. It was in the worst tradition of the Stalin era—and he, after all, generally gave his victims at least a drumhead public trial.

The degradation of Stalin, if the Soviet program had worked as the leaders had apparently planned it, was to be under strict Party discipline. But it seems to have got out of hand. When Khrushchev briefed the Party leaders assembled at the 20th Congress in Moscow at a secret meeting on February 25th, the representatives of foreign Communist Parties were excluded but the Party leaders from all parts of the U.S.S.R. were there. They were to take the gospel by word of mouth to the local precinct leaders. What was planned, apparently, was a gradual process of burying the dead leader's memory. Different medicine was to be reserved for the faithful followers of Stalin in the satellites, each according to their needs.

Something may have gone wrong with this careful planning. It is possible that difficult questions were posed by those Party workers who had been taught for decades to worship Stalin and who knew that Khrushchev, Bulganin, and the whole Politburo owed their positions to him. On the other hand, Khrushchev may have deliberately planned to give the Party the "shock treatment" to give more conviction to the "new men" and "new times" theory.

At any rate, whatever may have been the plan, the reports are unanimous, as published in the press of every free country without effective denial from Moscow, that Khrushchev ended up by branding Stalin not only as a heartless dictator but as a tyrant and murderer, an incompetent military leader whose bungling in both war and peace had brought the Soviet Union to the verge of ruin. In the same breath, Stalin, the leading theoretician of communism for the past 25 years, was labeled a heretic and his interpretations of the Marxist-Leninist philosophy were rejected.

It may be well at this point to consider the position and character of the men who have now brought these charges. All of them had been for many long years prominently associated with Stalin's policies. Some had been his hatchetmen in many of the less savory acts of his checkered career. Certainly no leader in history ever took such elaborate precautions as Stalin to insure that the men around him were loyal beyond the shadow of a doubt. That his henchmen, now that he is dead, so bitterly repudiated Stalin is a commentary on the totalitarian system of government itself and the leaders it breeds.

Position and Character of the Accusers

The main attack on Stalin's record was made by the Party Secretary, Nikita Khrushchev. He had held key jobs under Stalin since 1935 and had organized and carried through, for Stalin, the purges in the Ukraine. In January of 1938, he was named as alternate member of the Politburo and has been a full member of that body since 1939. Without wavering, he followed the Stalinist lines and on the dictator's 70th birthday, December 21, 1949, he had this to say:

> Hail to the father, sage teacher, and brilliant leader of the Party, the Soviet people, and the toilers of all the world, Comrade Stalin.

The number-two man in the anti-Stalin crusade has been Anastas Mikoyan. In fact, he was the first at the recent 20th Congress to criticize Stalin by name. Mikoyan held key jobs under Stalin for approximately 30 years. Stalin installed him as Commissar of Trade and made him candidate member of the Politburo in 1926, when Mikoyan was 31—the youngest person ever to attain Politburo rank. He has adjusted to every turn of the Soviet policy line and remained in the front political ranks ever since.

Others who have been parties to this great debunking exercise were, of course, Bulganin, who had worked with Stalin since 1931; Kaganovich, who had been at his side since 1924; Malenkov, who had been a member of his personal secretariat for some 25 years, whose career was made by Stalin; and, finally, Molotov, the longest Stalin associate of them all. He had worked with the dictator since about 1912 in the early days of the illegal Communist conspiracy.

There is good reason to believe that Molotov has joined the ranks of Stalin detractors with rel tance. Certainly a Stalinist at heart, he must ha viewed recent events with a heavy heart and wi the knowledge that the recent deviations of whi he has been openly accused are a prelude to l gradual retirement from the duties of his offi. I incline to believe that Molotov's real sentimer are those he expressed at Stalin's grave and th more recently when, after Malenkov's demotion 1954, he exuberantly reaffirmed his faith in Stali ist principles.

All of these men, while they now find it co venient to dissociate themselves from the de tyrant, show no intention of accepting the norm consequences of long association with a repudiat leader and a discredited policy nor of relinquis ing the benefits they acquired under Stalin and t power which they are now enjoying as his pup and successors.

The leaders of the Soviet Union today are wal ing a dangerous tightrope. They are trying discredit Stalin without discrediting the Co munist Party, which he led so long, or the men wl worked with him. Human memories are short ar perhaps they may succeed in this maneuver. B surely many a Communist will question the go faith of these leaders. The reversal is too abru to invite confidence. After all, it was only a litt over 3 years ago, on March 9, 1953, that Stalin w buried. At that time these men who are no castigating him joined in the most lavish tribu and they brought together in Moscow the Con munist leaders of China and the European sate lites to do him homage.

This is what his short-time heir, Georgi Male kov, had to say:

> The policy of Stalin will live for ages and thankf posterity will praise his name just as we do. . . . Co rade Stalin, a great thinker of our epoch, creatively d veloped in new historical conditions the teachings Marxism-Leninism. Stalin's name justly stands with t names of the greatest people in all the history of ma kind–Marx–Engels–Lenin.

The Chinese Communists and the Moscow-de ignated rulers of the European satellites who a tended Stalin's funeral must now have some que tion in their minds today as to the forthrightne of the present Kremlin leaders who induced the to join in this homage. Recently, the Chine Communists spent several weeks before publish ing their acceptance of Moscow views of the la Soviet dictator.

ısis for Questioning Their Sincerity

Certainly it is not for us to defend the Stalinist ıctatorship, its cruelties and perversions, as gainst its present detractors. We do have a ght, however, to question the sincerity of those ho today tell us that for 20 years and more they ere a party to foisting on the world a tissue of es and deceit.

Their sincerity is basically to be questioned on ıree counts. First, they have been willing to riticize and condemn only carefully selected ıults of the Stalin regime. They have spefically endorsed acts that both within Russia nd in the world at large caused the most widepread and terrible human suffering: for example, ıe deliberate starvation of the Russian peasantry uring the collectivization campaign of the early ıirties; and the exploitation of the captive eoples of the eastern European satellites, where roud and independent nations were crushed in efiance of solemn international obligations. Iikoyan at the 20th Congress even had the ffrontery to boast of the Czech coup as an exmple of how Communist parties can come to ower by "peaceful" and "parliamentary" means.

Secondly, they have failed to repudiate the rbitrary dictatorial rule that allows life and eath issues to be settled by a handful of men—hether by one or a half-dozen matters not to the Russian peasant.

The 20th Congress in its unreal and sheepike unanimity was an example of the fact that he present four-, five-, or six-man leadership inends to permit little real debate and criticism of asic policy. Not one voice was raised to protest he decree designed to force the peasants on the colective farms to devote all their efforts to the ollective by severely limiting the time allowed or work on their private plots. The widespread pposition to this decree that must exist among he Russian farmers went unrepresented and unıeard as the last Party Congress proceeded to ubberstamp every resolution put before it.

Thirdly, whatever improvements have been nade in assuring the personal security and welare of the individual Russian, that progress is lependent on the whim of the Presidium, popuarly known as the Politburo. The stick can be ısed later if the carrot doesn't work.

What we now have is a kind of "mutual protecive association" among a few men who suffered under Stalin so long that they are willing to cooperate to keep the full police power of the state out of the hands of any one man. There is no hint that any ordinary Russian who tries to dissent against the regime will escape the wrath of Servo's gunmen any more than he would have escaped when Beria was alive. If necessary to preserve their own skins, these men might return to unrestricted terror like ducks to water. It was their native element for years.

The final and real test of the intentions of the Soviet leaders will remain their willingness to accept those basic institutional changes that can give the Russian people and the world in general genuine assurance that a one-man—or three- or four-man—dictatorship cannot again plot in secret the massive domestic or international crimes of the recent past.

In the end, opposition parties, an independent judiciary, and a free press are the only real safeguards against successive dictators, each with his own power lust and a new cult of personality.

Problems the Communists Face

The problems which this right-about-face presents for the worldwide Communist movement both within and outside of the U.S.S.R. are immense. Here are a few of them:

Stalin was not only the dictator of his country for more than two decades; he was also hailed as its great military leader in war, its prophet, and the interpreter of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. His writings, particularly the *Problems of Leninism* and the *Short History of the Communist Party*, are scattered in tens of millions of copies throughout the Communist world. It will be years before they can be removed from circulation. In fact, all Soviet history for the past 30 years must now be rewritten. They won't be able to handle this quite as they did in the case of Beria. Here they sent to all holders of the Soviet encyclopedia instructions to excise the pages praising Beria and insert a puffed-up story on the Bering Straits (which fitted in in proper alphabetical order).

Stalin's name is on thousands of streets and squares. Cities and towns bear his name throughout the Communist world. For the people of the Soviet Union, Stalingrad stands as the symbol of their victory over Hitlerism. Will his name remain here and elsewhere, or will the attempt be made to blot it out?

Stalin's henchmen were put in key positions throughout the length and breadth of the Soviet Union. They hold key places in the European satellite regimes. Each and every one of these appointees must today fear not only for his future but for his life.

Already political idols are toppling or at least swaying in the wind from Moscow—in Bulgaria, in Hungary, in Poland. Names of former leaders who crossed Stalin are coming back into repute daily, and political circles in the satellites are plainly in confusion and near panic trying to figure out where the line of propriety will be drawn next.

As Alfred Robens, a leader of the British Labor Party, recently remarked, "How do you correct the mistake of having shot a man? Do you restore him to the history books or give him a posthumous reward?"

The problem of justifying past crimes is especially difficult in the foreign Communist parties, such as those in France and Italy, where local leaders clung to Stalin's coattails and did his bidding without having the excuse of the pistol at their head. These men could have denounced Stalin's crimes earlier and lived—unlike the men in Moscow. Why did they not do so? This is the question we ought to keep asking every Italian tempted to play ball with Togliatti.

And what about the reputation of Trotsky, a key Stalinist victim, still on the Soviet blacklist? Here and there, in places as far distant from each other as Ceylon and Bolivia, his followers are meeting to stage a comeback, and the view is being tolerated, at least, in the satellites that he was not a traitor but merely a misguided and erroneous would-be leader.

And what about the numerous violations of those international agreements signed by Stalin? Was he a "devil" when he made them, or when he broke them, or both?

The Soviet people well remember that Stalin himself started as one of a triumvirate not very different from the collective leadership of which the Soviet leaders now boast. How can the Soviet people themselves be sure that this small group of men in the Politburo who exercise complete and arbitrary control over the lives of all the peoples of the U.S.S.R. will not, in the course of a few years, again lead to a personal dictatorship with all the vices that they now attribute to Stalinism? Is it not the system itself rather than the "cult of personality" that breeds tyranny n cruelty and ends in the revolution devouring it own children?

And, finally, is it not possible that the Soviet people, with the leaven of education they are receiving, will demand some decisive share in the selection of their own leadership and some checks and balances against the danger of tyranny, dictatorship and the "cult of personality"?

All Marxists have been trained in the doctrine that human beings are the products of their environment. Might not Soviet Marxists begin to think there is something wrong with a political environment in which, over the years, an incredible percentage of the most influential leaders—including Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin, Beria, and now Stalin—have turned out to be criminals? Might not the Soviet people, and even some of their present or future leaders, come to believe that "power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely"?

In Moscow the pictures of Stalin are gradually disappearing. I am told that the Red Army theater has solved the problem of filling the space formerly occupied by an enormous portrait in an ingenious way that may be symbolic. On the wall where Stalin's picture used to hang is now a huge mirror. Any ambitious leader can see himself in Stalin's place. Might this not prove to be the curse of the Stalinist system—one which cannot be easily escaped by pious resolves?

The only element of power in the Soviet Union which is not directly implicated in the excesses and atrocities of Stalin, namely the military leadership, may have something to say about all this. While there is nothing concrete to suggest it now, some day a "man on horseback" might fancy himself in that mirror.

Weighing the Issues

When the present Soviet leaders took the risks involved in their present policy, they must have carefully weighed the consequences. They must have realized the grave issues it would raise in the Communist world outside of the U.S.S.R., among the Party faithful in every free country and among their own peoples.

Abroad they probably hoped there would be some counterbalancing advantages. If it would bring about a feeling of relaxation in the free world, defensive rearmament here and among our

allies might slow down, defensive alliances might tend to weaken, the possibility of peaceful coexistence, for which everyone yearns, might be more and more accepted. All this they hoped would give them time to build up their own strength, economic and military. If we are naive, then the Soviet Union may get some international benefits from their present tactics.

But there is another side to the picture which bears pondering. The Soviet leaders may have had no real alternative and took the course which they felt held out the best chance of keeping their own power. The Kremlin leaders, as I mentioned, were under heavy domestic pressures to do something to persuade their people that a new era was in the making. During recent years the leavening process of education has developed the critical faculties of millions of Russians. The Kremlin can no longer sell the old line to all of their people. They must now not only rewrite the history of Stalin but rewrite the story they have been telling their people about the outside world.

These leaders—Khrushchev, Bulganin, Mikoyan, Kaganovich—have got over the hump of Stalin's death without losing their grip on his power. They profess a great deal of confidence in their ability to perpetuate the system of collective dictatorship they have instituted by basing it more broadly on the top layer of elite Party managers, generals, engineers, and intellectuals who have a stake in the Soviet regime.

Only time can tell whether the present leaders with their past close association with Stalinism really can do this and make the Soviet dictatorship work without going much farther and giving their people something more than mere lipservice in the direction of the right to free speech, free worship, and protection for the individual from arbitrary action.

Possibly what we are seeing will end up as a temporary period of attempted fraud on the Russian people, a cloak to sell them a collective dictatorship as against a personal dictatorship. Possibly it is a first hesitant step toward giving a greater number of the Russian people a chance to share in the decisions which shape their destinies. I am sure the Russian leaders themselves do not know how their effort to "de-Stalinize" the Soviet Union will turn out. I am also sure they would be dismayed if they thought they were paving the way for the establishment in Russia of what we could call a decent and responsible government.

The Communists, despite their self-confidence, do not and will not control the fate of mankind. In the face of firm free-world resistance to their international barbarities and exposure of their political frauds and malpractices, at home and abroad, and under the pressure of their own people, there may be a gradual move toward more normal modes of life and behavior. If so, then hopes of world peace will be given a mighty impulse forward. This possibility the free world must watch prayerfully, alert to opportunities for peace provided by progress in this direction. We must be equally alert to perceive and denounce the dangers implicit in the fraud of a mere attempt to bury a shabby past.

Departure of Former Seamen of Soviet Tanker

Press release 217 dated April 25

At the request of the Department of State, Soviet Ambassador Georgi Zaroubin called on Assistant Secretary Livingston Merchant this afternoon. The Ambassador was handed a note concerning the departure from the United States of five former seamen of the Soviet tanker *Tuapse*.[1] The text of the note follows:

"The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the circumstances surrounding the departure from the United States for the Soviet Union on April 7, 1956 of five former seamen of the Soviet tanker *Tuapse*.

"It has been determined after thorough investigation that members of the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations assumed authority and engaged in activities with respect to the seamen which are incompatible with the status of the Soviet Delegation. In this regard the conduct of Aleksandr K. Guryanov and Nikolai Turkin was particularly objectionable. Ambassador Arkady Sobolev himself insisted on intervening, despite the presence of an accredited representative from the Soviet Embassy in Washington, during the interview conducted at Idlewild by the authorities

[1] For background, see BULLETIN of July 12, 1954, p. 51; July 26, 1954, p. 131; and Aug. 22, 1955, p. 302.

of the Immigration and Naturalization Service prior to departure of the seamen.

"It is considered that members of the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations thereby performed acts of an improper character exceeding the scope of their official capacity and thereby abused the privilege of their residence in contravention of the terms of the Headquarters Agreement between the United States and the United Nations.

"It is requested that the Soviet Government instruct Ambassador Arkady Sobolev and his staff henceforth to adhere to their recognized functions. In view of the special character of the activities of Aleksandr K. Guryanov and Nikolai Turkin, the Soviet Government is informed that their presence in the United States is no longer desirable. It is accordingly requested that Aleksandr K. Guryanov make expeditious arrangements to leave the United States. On the same grounds the request for a return visa for Nikolai Turkin to reenter the United States is hereby refused."

Export Controls Simplified for European Soviet Bloc

The Department of Commerce announced on April 27 the simplification of certain export controls by the establishment of a new general license order under which shipment from a select roster of peaceful goods can be made to the U.S.S.R. and its European satellites without the filing of export license applications.[1] The action came in the form of an initial listing of some 700 nonstrategic items in over 57 commodity categories which U.S. exporters may now ship under general license to the European Soviet bloc.

All of the goods included on the new roster are of the type that would be approved for export under existing licensing policy. The new general license procedure in no way reflects a change in the policy of banning strategic goods to the Soviet bloc. The main purpose is to reduce the paper burden on the American export community and the Government by eliminating the previous requirement of separate forms for each shipment, and thereby to facilitate increased peaceful commerce.

In announcing the action, Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks said:

Today's simplification in licensing procedures in re to the European Soviet bloc is designed to carry ou Government's objective, first announced by Pres Eisenhower at Geneva last July, "to create condi which will encourage nations to increase the exchan peaceful goods throughout the world." This obje subsequently was advanced at the Foreign Mini Conference in Geneva last October when Secretar State John Foster Dulles indicated the intention o United States Government to simplify export co procedures on shipments of peaceful goods to the S bloc.

The new arrangement will broaden opportunities increased trade by providing U.S. exporters with a r of peaceful goods which will not require the grantin the Commerce Department of individual, specific lic for shipment to the Soviet bloc.

It should be noted that our ban on strategic ex continues and that U.S.-origin commodities not on new general license roster will continue to require vidual licenses for shipment to the U.S.S.R. or its satel and may not be reexported to Communist-controlled a without clearance from the Bureau of Foreign Comm Also, the total embargo against all shipments to munist China and North Korea remains unchanged. shipments to the Communist-controlled areas of Viet- and Laos, as well as the maritime provinces of the U.S. R. continue to require individual export licenses.

Included in the new general license list selected items in the following categories: l erages, rubber products, drugs and pharmace cals, fibers, wood, paper products, glass, products, cutlery, hardware, cork, electrical ho hold appliances, commercial refrigerating eq ment, office machines, dyes, leather, hides skins, pigments, paints, chemical specialties, improvement compounds, soap and toilet photographic equipment, plumbing fixtures, o cal goods, musical instruments, toys, dental eq ment, jewelry, lamps, sponges, notions, beauty barber supplies, and shoe findings. The lis items may be shipped under general license to following destinations: Albania, Bulga Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Estonia, Hung Latvia, Lithuania, Outer Mongolia, Poland Danzig, Rumania, and the Union of Soviet cialist Republics, except the maritime provin (Far Eastern seaports) of the U.S.S.R.

A substantial increase in the volume of licens to the Soviet bloc took place in the first quarte 1956, according to statistics prepared for inclus in a forthcoming report by Secretary Weeks export control operations. Licenses granted Soviet-bloc destinations totaled $8,788,543 in first quarter of 1956, compared with $1,624,856 the fourth quarter of 1955, and $4,968,322 in

[1] For detailed announcement, see *Bureau of Foreign Commerce Current Export Bulletin 763.*

initial quarter of 1955. The bulk of first-quarter 1956 licensing to the bloc consisted of agricultural products and equipment, which together accounted for $7,294,844 of the total licensed.

Actual shipments, however, have not as yet reflected the increase in licensing. U.S. exports to the European Soviet bloc totaled $1,151,000 in the fourth quarter of 1955, compared with $1,051,000 shipped during the third quarter of 1955.

For the year 1955, U.S. exports to the bloc were valued at $7,248,000, as compared with $6,120,000 for 1954, and $1,776,000 for 1953. The 1955 and 1954 totals included $4,743,000 of food grains, insecticides, and drugs shipped to Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany under the President's flood-relief program for the Danube basin. In 1947 and 1948, U.S. exports to the bloc were valued, respectively, at $339,857,000 and $123,241,000.

The U.S. Stake in World Trade

by Sinclair Weeks
Secretary of Commerce[1]

Whenever I come to New Orleans I cannot help reflecting on the stroke of destiny which, in the early days of the Republic, brought New Orleans and the trans-Mississippi Valley into the United States.

But for a twist of fate on the international chessboard, but for Napoleon's colonial ambitions which made Louisiana French, but for those far-off European events which turned Napoleon's mind away from the New World, this great country as we know it today might never have been.

What good fortune it was for us to have had in Paris at the critical moment a skilled and courageous negotiator ready to strike, in his country's interest, while the iron was hot. And—if a New England Republican may make so bold as to praise a Southern Democrat—what a magnificent vision of the future moved Thomas Jefferson bravely to accept the challenge of the moment and lead our country toward its destiny.

This is your annual Mississippi Valley World Trade Conference, and as we gather here today I need not remind you that one of the principal functions of the Commerce Department is to foster, promote, and develop world trade. Presumably, this relationship is what prompted you to invite me.

It is stating the obvious to repeat that the United States has a tremendous stake in world trade in economic terms as well as in security terms. Forty million acres of American farmland today find overseas markets for their products. Ten percent of U.S. manufactured goods are exported. Upwards of 4 million American workers and their families rely on foreign trade. On the import side, we must look abroad for many essentials, including manganese, chrome, and tin. Eighty percent of our newsprint, 100 percent of our industrial diamonds, 100 percent of our vital nickel supply must be imported. Food products too are important items in the import list. They include almost 100 percent of our coffee, tea, cocoa, and bananas.

The United States stake in exports continues unabated. For example, last year, without considering at all the impact of foreign aid, United States manufacturers alone sold abroad a wide range of products, in the total amount of approximately $10 billion. This, of course, reflects the fact that we can and do compete successfully in markets throughout the world.

But in this process American industries are confronted in many foreign markets with restrictions which continually limit the opportunities to sell their products. In the absence of such restrictions, which include, among other things, quotas, special taxes, and exchange restrictions—in other words, under conditions of normal commercial competition—American manufacturers

[1] Address made before the Mississippi Valley World Trade Conference at New Orleans, La., on Apr. 10 (Department of Commerce press release).

would have sold abroad even more than the $10 billion figure just referred to. Our industries do not seek special governmental advantages in selling their products in foreign markets; they seek only to be allowed to compete fairly in foreign markets on the commercial merits of their products.

These are all among the factors which influence the dynamic foreign-trade policy of the President and his administration. Let me summarize the main elements of this program:

1. In accord with the terms of H. R. 1,[2] adopted last year, the reciprocal and modest reduction of unnecessary barriers to world trade and payments.

2. The creation of a healthy business climate for stimulating investment abroad, particularly in the less developed areas of the world.

3. The encouragement of tourism to enable the peoples of the world to get to know and understand each other better.

4. The participation by the Government and American businessmen in trade fairs throughout the free world to carry the message of the American way of life and the products of free enterprise to foreign shores.

One of the most useful devices we have found for carrying through this program is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

Objectives of GATT

What does the GATT stand for? The GATT—the largest and most comprehensive trade agreement in history—is an agreement among 35 nations reflecting principles which have for good reason been cardinal points of United States trade policy. The Department of Commerce plays an important role in the policy formulations of United States–GATT relations.

First of all, GATT contains for each member country an item-by-item list of tariff rates which that country agrees not to exceed in charging duties on imports from the remaining GATT countries. Collectively, these lists cover almost 60,000 items, embracing a large share of world trade. The remainder of the agreement consists of a set of "general provisions" which each country agrees to observe in international trade. An important purpose of these general rules, which restrain the use of such things as taxes, quotas, subsidies, and administrative procedures, is to insure that these devices will not be used to nullify the intended value for members of the tariff-rate agreements.

GATT objectives closely correspond to established principles of American commercial policy, principles which include the most-favored-nation treatment, for example, which the United States in its own interest has long urged upon other nations. Generally speaking, however, as far as GATT is concerned, it is better from every standpoint to have 35 nations join in one agreement than to have to go through the motions 35 separate times with 35 separate agreements finally arrived at. For example, Department mathematicians tell me that, if we had to negotiate entirely through bilateral agreements, it would require approximately 595 separate treaties.

The combination of such negotiations produces results not possible in a series of separate bilateral agreements and, to my mind, certainly makes it possible for the United States to obtain greater trade benefits than could otherwise be achieved.

The OTC

There is now pending before the Congress a bill (H. R. 5550) to authorize the President to accept United States membership in the Organization for Trade Cooperation (OTC).[3] The main function of this organization would be to administer the GATT. In addition, it would provide a forum for discussion of other trade problems, with each government remaining entirely free to adopt or reject recommendations growing out of such discussion. It would also assemble and publish data on world trade.

The Department of Commerce has an important interest in OTC, and because of this I have carefully reviewed the proposal for it from every angle. Both as a member of the President's Cabinet and as a former manufacturer I earnestly hope that the Congress will approve this vital legislation promptly.

So long as it is the policy of this Government to carry on foreign trade under the aegis of reci

[2] Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955.

[3] For a Department of State memorandum on legal aspects of the GATT and OTC, see *Cong. Rec.* of Apr. 2, 1956, p. 6088. See also *The Agreement on the Organization for Trade Cooperation*, Report of the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, To Accompany H. R. 5550; H. Rept. 2007, 84th Cong., 2d sess., Apr. 18, 1956.

ocal trade agreements and to do it by the GATT rocess, I am convinced that the creation of the OTC will enable American industry and trade to erive additional and increased benefits from the GATT and the tariff concessions we have received. The agreement for the OTC has been so drafted hat United States interests are fully safeuarded.[4] OTC would not be supranational. It ould not change a single tariff rate. It could not mpose new obligations on the United States withut our consent.

This whole proposition is essentially very imple. The OTC would provide machinery to enble the GATT nations to do better those things hich the GATT already provides for. It would ot extend the GATT provisions to any additional spects of trade, nor would the OTC take any new inds of action on aspects already covered by GATT. The new machinery to administer GATT s designed solely to enable the member nations to ake more promptly and more effectively those oint actions already provided for in GATT, with espect to those tariff and trade matters already overed by GATT.

GATT and OTC project into the international rena trade-policy objectives with which the nited States has long been associated.

We cannot lose by cooperating with our friends n the trade area of our foreign relations, just as e cooperate with them in a variety of other direcions. We cannot stand at arm's length from hem in this field and hope to meet the unanimity f action which the Soviet Union and its satellites chieve by force and terror.

rade Controls

When we speak of the Soviet bloc, it brings to ind the other and perhaps darker aspect of our oreign-trade policy—the use of controls by the nited States and our friends to avoid a signifiant free-world contribution to the buildup of the oviet war potential.

I hope we may some day see the kind of governent and the kind of policy in the Soviet Union hich would make it possible to bring that nation nd its present satellites fully into the family of riendly nations. That day is not yet here, and ntil it arrives we cannot afford to lower our uard.

[4] For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 4, 1955, p. 579.

The destruction of the cult of Stalinism means only, perhaps, that a policy of naked aggression is being replaced by a more subtle and insidious effort to achieve world Communist domination through propaganda, infiltration, and economic penetration. The lures and enticements put out by the Communist leaders are devices to trap the unwary as the spider traps the fly. A true index of Soviet policy may lie in a statement reportedly made by Khrushchev last September as follows:

> We value trade least for economic reasons and most for political purposes as a means of promoting relations between our countries.

We do not, of course, want to reject out of hand such opportunities as may arise to reduce world tensions. We must ever be alert to carry forward the principles of peace and peaceful exchanges among nations which President Eisenhower has dedicated himself to achieve.

The problem of East-West trade—how, when, and to what extent it shall be carried on—becomes a complex issue of international relations. Individual transactions or groups of transactions must be viewed from the perspective of our total foreign and national security policy. The results should be of a kind which brings the greatest advantage and the greatest relative strength to the free world.

Perhaps a specific example of Soviet tactics may illustrate the problem. Last month (March 4) the newspapers reported that an American firm had made a licensing agreement to produce in the United States a Soviet-designed turbodrill for drilling oil and gas wells. This device was heralded as being much more efficient than American oil rigs and as a sign of Soviet willingness to exchange their technical advances with those of the United States.

Much less attention was given at first to the quid pro quo desired by the Russians from us, namely, the technological information needed for producing advanced types of boring bits for drilling wells.

From the Soviet point of view this type of "exchange" is designed to create the impression of a fair exchange, in contrast with earlier attempts at one-way acquisition of Western prototypes. But on closer examination—of the type which this Government always gives to such proposals—an appraisal must be made as to whether this exchange might not open the door for the

Soviets to the whole range of developments in American oil production technology. In this type of "exchange" would the Soviets stand to profit more, because of their state control over domestic technical data and because they might latch on to an industry in which they are, on balance, in an inferior position technologically?

Charting the right course in the deadly serious economic contest between East and West requires the greatest wisdom and ingenuity that our policy-makers can muster. From a national security standpoint, this whole business of East-West trade and trade restrictions has caused a great deal of misunderstanding not only here in the United States but among free-world countries as well.

Investigation of East-West Trade

I have recently done some testifying on East-West trade before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. The committee was particularly interested in the revisions in East-West international trade controls which took place in 1954.

The hearings were heated. Aside from questioning the policy followed in 1954, the hearings involved issues relating to the constitutional separation of powers as between executive and legislative and to the conduct of affairs within the executive branch. I should like to discuss with you some of the points made in the hearings.[5]

First, I want to say that naturally the committee has every right to make such an investigation. In fact, I think it is completely appropriate that constant surveillance of the executive be maintained by Congress. But even here it has been difficult to prevent gross misunderstanding of the issues involved, of the policies which are maintained, and of the results achieved.

Secondly, I should make it absolutely clear that the inquiry had no relationship whatsoever to U.S. export controls on goods shipped from the United States. We have our own controls, and they were not in question. The committee was concerned solely with the products which our allies ship in East-West trade and with the voluntary multinational controls set up by our allies in agreement with us.

Controls maintained by the United States on shipments to the European Soviet bloc and Communist China are stricter than those of our al We have an embargo on all exports to Commu China and North Korea.

No shipments can be made to the Europ Communist bloc from the United States witl first obtaining an export license through the partment of Commerce. Such licenses are a matically denied on items which are in short ply in the United States or which are, gener speaking, of strategic nature. When items either of these categories are exported to frie foreign countries, determination is made in vance that transshipment to the Communist not to be expected.

Shipments of peaceful goods to the Europ Soviet bloc are authorized through the gran of export licenses. Such trade is relatively sı in volume, however.

I have mentioned earlier that other free-w countries working together and with us main similar restrictions on trade with the Sov Their restrictions are of a more liberal order, h ever, than are ours. Many items are thus ship to the Russians from European countries wl the United States would not itself ship to th Some of these items are strategic in nature.

During its investigation the Senate commi has frequently referred to the difference stringency between U.S. controls and multilat controls over shipments to the Reds. The in ence has been drawn from time to time that are somehow to blame for the fact that the C munists have been able to obtain materials strategic significance from others which they not buy from us.

When I appeared before the committee I mac clear that if I had my way all free-world co tries would exercise the equivalent in restricti over the sale of strategic goods to the Soviet those maintained by the United States. I st further that to the best of my knowledge this s position had been consistently maintained by e interested department in our Government.

I also reported, however, that no power on e is available beyond the power of persuasion control the economic activities of other nati If I remember correctly, I cited to the commi by way of illustration the old adage, "You lead a horse to water, but you can't make drink."

Much as I believe that it is in the free-world terest to keep these controls strict, I think, h

[5] For a statement made before the committee by Under Secretary Hoover, see *ibid.*, Apr. 9, 1956, p. 619.

ver, it must be recognized in all fairness that we annot compare our situation in the United States o that of European countries without finding remendous pressures there for different policies n terms of East-West trade.

Iodification of European Controls

Thus in August 1954 the multilateral controls naintained by European countries as a limitation pon exports to the Communist bloc were subtantially modified. This modification resulted n a shortening of the list of items under multiational control.

What were some of the reasons which led to this iodification?

It must be recognized that there are historic atterns and other factors affecting the East-West rade interests of European free-world countries hich are far different from those which apply in he United States. For example, Department of ommerce statistics show that, while U.S. exports epresent only approximately 3.5 percent of our ross national product, the United Kingdom rees upon exports for 15.6 percent of its G. N. P. he pressure for international trade in the United Kingdom is based on the long-established fact hat without adequate trade Britain cannot surive, let alone maintain a decent standard of livng or a satisfactory national defense.

Other European countries lean heavily upon oreign trade. Individual export items become itally significant to the economic welfare of these ountries and result in heavy pressures for trade xpansion.

As an illustration, the shipment of 2,000 tons f soft unalloyed aluminum by Norway to the oviet bloc was a required concession as a means f providing a market in the bloc for otherwise nsalable seafood products—a major export item. enmark is called upon to sell butter abroad or iffer disastrous results in its domestic economy. ut in order to sell its butter to the Soviets, Denark is called upon to supply merchant ships. Vest Germany finds it difficult to become comletely separated in an economic sense from East ermany.

Much of the story of the revisions of the conols in 1954, the reasons for them and the results, as been made available to the public in reports sued by Mr. Stassen, the Battle Act Administrar in 1954, and by myself. Additional informaon classified for reasons of national security has been made available on this basis to six committees of the Congress and is being offered to the Investigations Subcommittee on the same basis.

Certain papers of a highly sensitive nature which cover intelligence information, matter relating to international negotiations, and internal working papers of the executive branch could not be furnished. To do so would reveal information classified for the purpose of withholding it from the Soviet bloc.

Now, I am sure that you will all agree with me that, insofar as possible, we should not give the Communists even a scrap of information which would be of significant value to them in the cold war, any more than we should let them have commodities of strategic significance.

If closely guarded information were to be publicized in open hearing, the entire proceedings could be observed by agents of hostile powers and the entire public record could be reported abroad by representatives of the Communist press. We do not want to bare to the Communist nations some of our secret knowledge of their needs and deficiencies and those of our allies and ourselves. We do not want to tell them our own strategic and short-supply reasons for control or decontrol.

In the general area of separation of powers let me cite in conclusion some chapter and verse on the reasons why the executive branch declines certain informational material to the Congress.

At every level of the executive branch of the Government, issues are vigorously debated, and it is only human nature that there will be sharp differences of opinion. The same thing I am sure happens in the executive sessions of congressional committees. It happens in the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court. Does the Congress or the Court offer such discussion to public scrutiny?

Among such operations are preliminary research, undigested data subject to later appraisal, early drafts of memoranda as yet unchecked for errors, incomplete surveys which give only a fractional part of the final report, and other initial thinking and recommendations which must later be revised and perfected or overruled because of new facts or circumstances. Revelation of such embryonic data ripped from context would give an utterly false picture of a situation.

All of us want the unbiased and candid advice of our staffs and subordinates. No organization, no government, no military commander could

operate efficiently if all the scraps of paper and advices and recommendations of staffs and subordinates were to be cast in the public view. If this were done, it would no longer be possible for those charged with action to obtain candid and energetic expressions of opinion at advisory levels in the Government. Rather it might create among subordinates a yes-man complex or a fear of standing by one's own sincere convictions.

It boils down to this: The position of the executive branch is:

1. that we have not withheld facts which could properly be released,
2. that in the national interest we have refused to disclose, except in executive session, certain secrets which potential enemies might use to injure the United States and our allies, and
3. we decline under any conditions to make available internal executive working papers.

So, although we have kept the Congress and the public informed, I have described both practical reasons and security reasons which made it impossible to comply with all of the demands of the Senate subcommittee.

Underlying this whole issue is the historic principle of the separation of powers in our Government, one of the constitutional foundation stones of this Republic.

From George Washington down to Dwight Eisenhower, Presidents have found it necessary, in obedience to their oaths of office, to maintain the proper constitutional balance between the executive and legislative branches. In this way only—with vigorous forthright leadership—can our country go forward on the principles which made our Nation great and which today make it the hope and inspiration of the free world.

U.S. Farm Goods Sold to Germany in Triangular Transaction

The International Cooperation Administration announced on April 27 that it had arranged an $8-million triangular transaction involving sales of U.S. agricultural commodities to the Federal Republic of Germany. Germany will purchase from the United States $7 million worth of coarse grains—corn, barley, grain sorghums, and oats—paying for them in deutschemarks. An additional $1 million has been authorized for shipping costs. The deutschemarks derived from the sale of products in Germany will be deposited to the account of the U.S. Government. ICA will make these funds available to countries where the United States has defense or economic-assistance programs requiring goods available in Germany. When purchases of such goods in Germany are agreed upon, they will be financed with the U.S.-owned deutschemarks and the triangular transaction will be completed.

The trade with Germany was made under section 402 of the Mutual Security Act. This section requires that at least $300 million of the funds authorized for the mutual security program during the current fiscal year be used to finance the sale of surplus U.S. agricultural commodities for foreign currencies. The local currency proceeds are to be used for mutual security purposes. To date this year, more than $285 million of these commodities have been authorized by ICA to 29 countries.

U.S. Aid to Philippines for 1956 Emphasizes Rural Development

The International Cooperation Administration announced on April 22 that the $29.1 million in aid which the United States is providing to the Philippines during the 1956 fiscal year is being used in the following manner:

—$4.2 million to support an expanded rural development program.

—$7.6 million to import equipment and commodities needed for projects to expand and diversify the base of the Philippine economy—in particular, rural road construction (principally on the island of Mindanao), port and harbor improvements, rural health units, and water supply and land development projects.

—$6.7 million, proceeds from the sale of U.S. agricultural commodities, which was loaned to the Philippine Government for relending through commercial banks to help expand small- and medium-size industries.

—$5.9 million for technical cooperation, including the financing of contractual services of U.S. firms and universities for assistance in advancing public administration, education, agriculture, labor, and industry; training Filipino technicians in the U.S.; technical advisory services of U.S. Government personnel; and supplies and equip-

ent for demonstration and instruction in all ajor fields of activity.

—$4.7 million to continue the military con- ruction program begun in fiscal 1955 in con- ection with the reorganization of the Philippine rmy.

Most of the U.S. assistance is in support of resident Magsaysay's comprehensive economic evelopment program, for which that country has udgeted $79.5 million of its own funds this fiscal ear to encourage industrialization under private usiness, to improve government services, and to xpand transportation and communications fa- lities. The main emphasis, however, of joint .S.-Philippine efforts is to improve the living onditions and earning capacity of the rural popu- ition, who make up 70 percent of the Philippines' otal population of 22 million.

The United States has conducted an organized id program in the Philippines since July 1950, ollowing 5 years of cooperation in rehabilitating ie war-damaged country. The 6-year nonmili- ıry aid total of over $137 million has been more ıan matched by Philippine funds used in the ıme program. Each year the Philippine Gov- nment has taken over and assumed responsibility or the support and administration of an increas- ıg number of projects initiated with the help f U.S. aid funds.

Here are some of the results since 1950 of this utual undertaking:

Public health. New American drugs, scientific eatment, and hygiene are beginning to wipe out ourges—malaria, trachoma, tuberculosis, and hers—which have plagued villagers for genera- ons.

Agriculture. Philippine agricultural agents, hose organization has been patterned after the .S. Agricultural Extension Service, are showing ırmers how to increase crop yields through the e of better farming practices, implements, fer- lizers, and plant varieties, so that food consump- on can be increased.

Education. New and better schools, established ith help from such American universities as tanford, Cornell, and the University of Michi- ın, under ICA sponsorship, are giving young Fili- nos an opportunity to obtain a better education.

Industry. In 1955, the rate of new industrial evelopment doubled the 1954 rate largely as a sult of U.S. technical assistance and U.S. loans.

THE CONGRESS

Proposed Revision of Immigration and Nationality Act

Statement by Secretary Dulles [1]

First of all, I wish to affirm my belief that revision of the Immigration and Nationality Act is necessary and desirable in the interests of the United States. The present law contains inequities and imperfections. I concur wholly with the President that it is in our national interest to provide for increased immigration to our land and to do so under equitable laws.

Obviously, I do not mean to imply that the present law is all bad. As a matter of fact, the Departmental officers charged with responsibility for the application of this law advise me that, technically, it represents a vast improvement over the numerous statutes which governed prior to its enactment in 1952.

I believe, however, that much improvement is still possible. For that reason, I am here today to support the proposals which the President has made to the Congress and which are embodied in the bills which this subcommittee is considering.

Many of the items in these bills have to do with domestic subjects within the competence of the Attorney General. He has discussed the detailed provisions of the bills with the subcommittee. I desire to support his statement with, however, particular emphasis on the foreign policy aspect of the legislation.

There are three principal items in this category which I should like to discuss. One is the national-origins system of determining quotas. Another is the recommendation to forgive certain mortgaged quotas. The third is the proposal which would permit the waiving of the fingerprinting requirement for those who apply for nonimmigrant visas.

The President has recommended, in view of our expanding economy and high standard of living, that we increase our quota immigration by ap-

[1] Made before the Subcommittee on Immigration of the Senate Judiciary Committee on Apr. 25 (press release 213). For the President's message on immigration legislation, see BULLETIN of Feb. 20, 1956, p. 275.

proximately 65,000 numbers to a total of approximately 219,000 annually. I fully support the President's recommendations in this respect.

However, my primary concern as Secretary of State is that whatever overall quota is adopted by the Congress be apportioned equitably. Our quota restrictions should not discriminate among persons merely on the basis of their national origin, nor should the restrictions discriminate unfairly against any of the friendly nations which have an interest in common with us in the defense of the free world. The present system of determining quotas is offensive on both counts.

Discrimination Under Present Quota System

He would, indeed, be bold to the point of recklessness who would identify any national-origins group as unable to contribute to the vigor of our society. Yet in actual operation the national-origins system denies to many of our citizens privileges which are accorded to other citizens and, in fact, to some resident aliens. For example, any American citizen or any resident alien who has a brother born in England, or Germany, or Ireland, or any country having a current quota, may bring his brother to the United States without encountering any delay whatsoever. However, under the present law, an American citizen who has a brother born in Italy, or Spain, or Greece, or the Philippines, or in any of a score of other countries, may not bring his brother to this country as an immigrant except after a waiting period varying from many months to many years. In my opinion, the national-origins system, which draws a distinction between the blood of one person and the blood of another, cannot be reconciled with the fundamental concepts of our Declaration of Independence which, as Abraham Lincoln said, applied not only to this country but to all men and meant "that all should have an equal chance."

It is easy to understand, therefore, the depth of the resentment that is felt by many of our own citizens who are denied the opportunity to reunite their families in the United States. This feeling has its reflection overseas, particularly in those countries where many desire to become United States citizens, where honorable persons, willing and eager to make their home in the United States, know that they cannot do so except after a wait of many years, while other persons similarly situated but living in more favored countries, can do so without delay. The impact of this situation is felt in our relationships with friendly nations every day. It is particularly awkward and difficult to explain when, year after year, large numbers of authorized quota numbers go unused and yet no relaxation is allowed in the limitations placed on immigration from those countries which most need our assistance in this regard, and which we desire to assist.

The problem which confronts us, therefore, is to find a method of distribution of our quota numbers which is more reasonable than the national-origins system. I realize the inherent difficulty in fairly apportioning quota numbers under an overall ceiling. Traditionally, and as a practical matter, this has been and continues to be a subject for congressional determination. Therefore, I fully support the recommendation that the Congress immediately appropriate sufficient funds to explore thoroughly this entire problem and to devise a system of quotas which is not tied to the discriminatory national-origins concept.

Interim Measures

However, I believe that the necessity for the alleviation of certain flagrant discriminations contained in the present system is pressing. I support the President's recommendations for interim measures which will alleviate as much as possible the inequities which the Department of State encounters in applying the provisions of the present law.

I believe that the method by which the President has computed, and suggested allocation of, the recommended ceiling of 219,000 is fair and reasonable. Under the President's proposed temporary system, no country will be allocated a smaller quota than it has under the present law and the inequity which results when large numbers of authorized quota numbers go unused will be corrected by the pooling of the unused numbers on an annual regional basis. If this system of pooling unused numbers is adopted, the large waiting lists of preference applicants, who have a priority that is largely theoretical under the present law, can be realistically attacked.

Another feature of the President's proposal to which I would comment is the recommendation for an allotment of 5,000 quota numbers annually to be placed in a special pool, without regard to national origins, to fulfill our needs for persons

aving special skills who may be desirable refugees r escapees. The most practical method by which his Government is able presently to grant asylum o escapees is through the Refugee Relief Act. When that act expires, there will be no special ethod by which this Government can offer asyum to any of the desirable escapees from behind he Iron Curtain. We attach great importance to rgent action on this provision.

orgiving Certain Mortgaged Quotas

Another item which the Department strongly upports is that recommendation which would orgive mortgages placed on certain quotas under he terms of previous legislation. It is damaging o our foreign relations, for example, that Greece—NATO ally—has one-half of its annual quota of 8 mortgaged for the next 61 years.

ingerprinting Requirement

Now a few words with respect to the waiver of he fingerprinting requirement. Our recommenation is based primarily on the fact that, in most riendly countries in Europe, citizens may not be ngerprinted until they have been convicted of a riminal offense. The idea, which has recently ecome acceptable in the United States, of the esirability of having one's fingerprints on file as means of positive identification in case of a isaster, has not caught on outside of this country. ecause the taking of fingerprints connotes susicion of criminal activity in many countries, we nd that in fact we are requiring our friends to rovide us with a record which their own governents require only of convicted criminals. I think is easy to perceive why to many visitors this is distasteful requirement. It would facilitate not nly the travel of these desirable visitors but the stering of good relations between ourselves and riendly populations if the Congress would be illing to drop the mandatory aspects of this reirement which, as the Attorney General said, is ot necessary to the safety or security of this untry.

Incidentally, I might mention that our attitude recommending a provision for waiver is not, by y means, based on the intransigence of the oviet Union and its satellites with respect to this estion.

I wish to say one final word about the Refugee elief Program. I took great satisfaction last eek, Mr. Chairman, in announcing the issuance of the 100,000th visa under this program. We are now issuing visas at a rate of approximately 2,000 a week, and we can say with conviction that the available allotments of visas for most of the countries involved will be used before the act expires. During the early days of the program many critics made gloomy predictions that it would be a total failure, and indeed the task of accomplishment has not been easy. For this reason, I am particularly pleased by this tangible evidence that the act is being successfully administered to achieve the ends which were intended for it.

Nevertheless, we are still hampered by certain needless difficulties. As you know, the President made 10 proposals for amendment of the Refugee Relief Act during the last session.[2] Other constructive suggestions have since been made. The need for amendment becomes greater as the final date of the act approaches. I therefore urge in the strongest terms that the Congress give immediate attention to this matter.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

84th Congress, 2d Session

Status of Forces Agreements. Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H. J. Res. 309 and similar measures providing for the revision of the Status of Forces Agreement and certain other treaties and international agreements, or the withdrawal of the United States from such treaties and agreements, so that foreign countries will not have criminal jurisdiction over American armed forces personnel stationed within their boundaries. Part 2, January 31, February 1 and 2, 1956. 497 pp.

Cotton Imports, Exports, and Minimum Acreage Allotments. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Cotton of the House Committee on Agriculture on H. R. 8658, 8659, 8322, and 8703, a bill to amend the Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended, and the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended. February 6, 7, and 8, 1956. 302 pp.

Departments of State and Justice, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1957. Hearings before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations: U.S. Information Agency. February 7–21, 1956. 400 pp.

Report of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems. Message from the President transmitting the report of the National Advisory Council on international monetary and financial problems, covering its operations from January 1 to June 30, 1955, pursuant to section 4 (b) (5) of the Bretton Woods Agreements Act. H. Doc. 336, February 10, 1956. 69 pp.

Engineering and Scientific Manpower in the United States, Western Europe and Soviet Russia. March 1956. Joint committee print. 85 pp.

[2] *Ibid.*, June 13, 1955, p. 951.

Calendar of Meetings[1]

Adjourned During April 1956

U.N. Trusteeship Council: Standing Committee on Petitions	New York	Jan. 3–Apr. 3
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 17th Session	New York	Feb. 7–Apr. 6
U.N. Trusteeship Council: Standing Committee on Administrative Unions.	New York	Feb. 21–Apr. 4
International Atomic Energy Agency: Working Level Meeting on Draft Statute.	Washington	Feb. 27–Apr. 18
8th International Congress of the Vineyard and Wines	Santiago	Mar. 21–Apr. 1
U.N. ECAFE: 4th Regional Conference of Statisticians	Bangkok	Mar. 29–Apr. 7
ITU International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR): Study Group XI, Color Television Demonstrations.	London	Apr. 3–7
ICAO: 3d Caribbean Regional Air Navigation Meeting	Ciudad Trujillo	Apr. 3–24
Inter-Parliamentary Union: Executive Council	Dubrovnik (Yugoslavia)	Apr. 4–8
ILO Petroleum Committee: 5th Session (reconvened)	Geneva	Apr. 4–13
U.N. Economic Commission for Europe: 11th Session	Geneva	Apr. 5–21
UNESCO Executive Board: 43d Session	Madrid	Apr. 9–20
International Instrumentation-Automation Exhibition	Oslo	Apr. 9–22
ITU International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR): Study Group XI, Color Television Demonstrations.	The Hague	Apr. 10–11
Inter-American Travel Congresses: 3d Meeting of Permanent Executive Committee.	San José	Apr. 10–14
International Sugar Council: 8th Session	London	Apr. 12–13
6th Inter-American Travel Congress	San José	Apr. 12–22
FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: Working Party of Consultative Subcommittee on Rice.	Rome	Apr. 16–30
U.N. International Wheat Conference: 2d Session (reconvened)	London	Apr. 16–25
ITU International Telegraphic Consultative Committee (CCIT): Study Group IV, Phototelegraphy and Facsimile.	London	Apr. 17–21
WMO Executive Committee: 8th Session	Geneva	Apr. 17–30
UNESCO Conference on Cultural Integration of Immigrants	Habana	Apr. 18–27
ITU International Telegraphic Consultative Committee: Study Group V, Joint CCIT/CCIR Committee on Phototelegraphy.	London	Apr. 23–25
WMO Eastern Caribbean Hurricane Committee of Region IV (North and Central America).	Ciudad Trujillo	Apr. 25–27
U.N. ECE Steel Committee	Geneva	Apr. 25–27

In Session as of May 1, 1956

North Pacific Fur Seal Conference	Washington	Nov. 28–
GATT Contracting Parties: 1956 Tariff Negotiations	Geneva	Jan. 18–
U.N. Disarmament Commission: Subcommittee of Five (reconvened).	London	Mar. 19–
U.N. ECOSOC Statistical Commission: 9th Session	New York	Apr. 16–
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 21st Session	New York	Apr. 17–
UNESCO Conference on Asian-U. S. Cultural Relations	San Francisco, Minneapolis, Boston, Louisville, Ann Arbor, Washington.	Apr. 19–
ITU Administrative Council: 11th Session	Geneva	Apr. 21–
9th International Film Festival	Cannes	Apr. 23–
South Pacific Conference: 3d Session	Suva (Fiji)	Apr. 23–
U.N. International Law Commission: 8th Session	Geneva	Apr. 23–
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 11th Session	Geneva	Apr. 23–
UNESCO Regional Conference on Free and Compulsory Education in Latin America.	Lima	Apr. 23–

[1] Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Apr. 25, 1956. Following is a list of abbreviations: U. United Nations; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Africa and the Far East; ITU, International Telecommunicat Union; CCIR, International Radio Consultative Committee (Comité consultatif international des radiocommunicatio ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; UNESCO, United Nati Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; CCIT, International T graphic Consultative Committee (Comité consultatif international télégraphique); WMO, World Meteorological Orga zation; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; ECOSOC, Econo and Social Council; UPU, Universal Postal Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; SUNFED, Spe United Nations Fund for Economic Development; ECLA, Economic Commission for Latin America; UNREF, Uni Nations Refugee Fund; WHO, World Health Organization; CIGRE, Conférence internationale des grands rese électriques; PAIGH, Pan American Institute of Geography and History; PASO, Pan American Sanitary Organizati IBE, International Bureau of Education.

n Session as of May 1, 1956—*Continued*

nter-American Port and Harbor Conference	San José	Apr. 25–
.N. Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories: 7th Session.	New York	Apr. 27–
th International Philatelic Exhibition (FIPEX)	New York	Apr. 28–
LO Coal Mines Committee: 6th Session	Istanbul	Apr. 30–
PU Executive and Liaison Committee	Bern	Apr. 30–

Scheduled May 1–July 31, 1956

.N. Trusteeship Council: Standing Committee on Petitions	New York	May 1–
nter-American Cultural Council: 2d Meeting	Lima	May 3–
d Inter-American Meeting of Ministers of Education	Lima	May 3–
nter-American Indian Institute: Governing Board	México, D. F.	May 3–
.N. Exploratory Meeting on International Trade in Cocoa	New York	May 3–
ATO: Ministerial Meeting of the Council	Paris	May 4–
outh Pacific Commission: 15th Session	Suva (Fiji)	May 4–
NESCO Intergovernmental Meeting on International Principles Governing Archeological Excavations.	Palermo (Italy)	May 4–
.N. *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Establishment of SUNFED: 1st Meeting.	New York	May 7–
.N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade: 3d Session.	New York	May 7–
nternational Cotton Advisory Committee: 15th Meeting	Washington	May 8–
th World Health Assembly	Geneva	May 8–
NESCO Regional Seminar on Curriculum for Latin America	Lima	May 9–
LO Building, Civil Engineering, and Public Works Committee: 5th Session.	Geneva	May 14–
.N. ECE Housing Committee and Working Parties: 12th Session.	Geneva	May 14–
.N. ECLA Committee of the Whole: 5th Meeting	Santiago	May 14–
nter-American Technical Cacao Committee: 6th Meeting	Salvador (Brazil)	May 20–
th International Congress of Mediterranean Citrus Growers	Israel	May 20–
MO Working Group on International Radiosonde Comparisons	Payerne (Switzerland)	May 20–
.N. International Sugar Conference	New York	May 21–
NREF Standing Program Subcommittee: 3d Session	Geneva	May 23–
aribbean Commission: 22d Meeting	Cayenne (French Guiana)	May 24–
NESCO Meeting of Experts on Radioisotopes	Paris	May 25–
HO Executive Board: 18th Session	Geneva	May 28–
LO Governing Body: 132d Session	Geneva	May 28–
NREF Executive Committee: 3d Session	Geneva	May 28–
6th International Conference on Large Electric High-Tension Systems (CIGRE).	Paris	May 30–
AIGH Directing Council: 1st Meeting	México, D. F.	May
nter-American Commission of Women: 11th General Assembly	Ciudad Trujillo	June 1–
nternational Seed Testing Association: 11th Congress (Executive Committee Meetings June 1 and 10).	Paris	June 4–
ASO Executive Committee: 28th Meeting	Washington	June 5–
nternational Meeting of Tonnage Measurement Experts	Copenhagen	June 5–
.N. ECAFE Working Party of Senior Geologists on the Preparation of a Regional Geological Map for Asia and the Far East: 2d Meeting.	Tokyo	June 5–
nternational Labor Conference (ILO): 39th Session	Geneva	June 6–
.N. Trusteeship Council: 18th Session	New York	June 7–
nternational Commission for Criminal Police: 25th General Meeting.	Vienna	June 7–
nternational Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: 6th Annual Meeting.	Halifax	June 11–
NESCO Intergovernmental Copyright Committee	Paris	June 11–
.N. ECAFE Subcommittee on Mineral Resources Development: 2d Meeting.	Tokyo	June 12–
nternational Rubber Study Group: Management Committee	Paris	June 14–
th World Power Conference	Vienna	June 17–
AO Committee on Commodity Problems: 27th Session	Rome	June 18–
AO Council: 24th Session	Rome	June 18–
CAO Assembly: 10th Session	Caracas	June 19–
th International Congress on Bridge and Structural Engineering	Lisbon	June 25–
AO Meeting of Fish Processing Technologists	Rotterdam	June 25–
.N. ECE Coal Trade Subcommittee	Geneva	June 25–
.N. ECE Coal Classification Working Party	Geneva	June 26–
.N. ECE Coal Utilization Working Party	Geneva	June 29–
nternational Exposition of the Sea	Marseille	June
.N. Economic and Social Council: 22d Session	Geneva	July 3–

Scheduled May 1–July 31, 1956—*Continued*

FAO Technical Advisory Committee on Desert Locust Control: 6th Session.	Tehran	July 3–
FAO Desert Locust Control Committee: 3d Session	Tehran	July 8–
19th International Conference on Public Education (Joint IBE/UNESCO).	Geneva	July 9–
UNESCO Executive Board: 44th Session	Paris	July 11–
International Whaling Commission: 8th Meeting	London	July 16–
International Congress on Housing and Town Planning	Vienna	July 22–
International Association of Theoretical and Applied Limnology: 13th Congress.	Helsinki	July 27–
20th International Physiological Congress	Brussels	July 30–
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Housing and Building Materials: 4th Meeting.	Bangkok	July 30–
PAIGH Commission on Geography	Rio de Janeiro	July
South Pacific Commission: Technical Conference on Community Development.	Hollandia (New Guinea)	July
U.N. ECOSOC Technical Assistance Committee	Geneva	July

Teacher Development Workshop at the University of Puerto Rico

by Howard H. Russell

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, unique in many ways, serves as a cultural bridge between the United States and the other American Republics. United States foreign policy in this hemisphere, dedicated as it is to the development of a true partnership with the Republics to the south of us, must be based on mutual understanding and respect between our peoples. In carrying out its international educational exchange program, designed to increase such understanding, the Department of State has long been aware of the advantages which Puerto Rico offers as a midway point—a meeting ground for cross-cultural interpretation. Thus ways have constantly been sought to make use of Puerto Rico's excellent educational facilities and other resources of this progressive Commonwealth.

Recently Puerto Rico participated in the introduction of a new and highly successful exchange project. A Teacher Development Workshop, e first to be conducted by the International Edu tional Exchange Service outside the continen United States, was held at the University f Puerto Rico from February 11 through 28, 19 Initiation of the new project resulted, in pa from recommendations made by Vice Presid t Nixon at the close of his visit to the Cent American and Caribbean area a year ago.[1]

Fifty-five elementary and secondary sch teachers and supervisors from the Central Ame can and Caribbean area attended the Worksh which was designed to provide:

(a) An understanding of the philosophy, pr ciples, characteristics, and organization of edu tion in the United States.

(b) Opportunity to observe and evaluate m ern methods of instruction relevant to the phil ophy and principles of education in the Unit States.

(c) Training in the preparation of inexpens instructional materials for elementary, seconda and vocational schools.

• *Mr. Russell, author of the above article, is Deputy Director of the International Educational Exchange Service and represented the Department at the Teacher Development Workshop.*

[1] For Mr. Nixon's report on his visit, see BULLETIN f Apr. 11, 1955, p. 587.

(d) Opportunities to visit schools of all types nd observe the use of modern methods and techiques.

(e) Opportunities to visit commercial, indusial, and agricultural projects.

In planning the Workshop, the Department had e enthusiastic cooperation of Puerto Rican ofcials and of the United States Office of Educaon, which assists the International Educational xchange Service in administering the teacher delopment program.[2] Dr. Arturo Morales Carión, Under Secretary of State of the Commonealth of Puerto Rico, gave full support to the roject and arranged a program of entertainment nd hospitality for the visiting educators. Dr. scar E. Porrata, Dean of the College of Educaon of the university, offered the services of the culty of his school in planning and conducting e Workshop. The chancellor of the university, aime Benítez, made all facilities of the uniersity available. Dr. José M. Gallardo served as ordinator of the Workshop. Throughout the ntire program, other members of the staffs of e College of Education and of the Commonealth's Department of Education gave assistance hich contributed significantly to its success.

election of Participants

The Workshop was designed for school adminisators and teachers in the fields of elementary, condary, and vocational education. Selection of articipants was conducted in accordance with the rocedure used in selecting foreign grantees for e regular 6-month teacher development proram. Since the Workshop was conducted in panish, however, a command of English—one of e requirements for grantees coming to the connental United States—was not necessary. Canidates were nominated by their respective Minsies of Education and selected by the Department n the basis of recommendations submitted by the arious United States Embassies and the United tates Office of Education.

Forty-seven grants were awarded to educators rom Costa Rica, Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti, Honuras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and El Salvador. In addition, eight grantees from some of these same countries who were completing 6-month projects in the continental United States were awarded supplementary grants to enable them to attend the Workshop. These eight contributed to the success of the Workshop by sharing their recent experiences in the United States with their fellow participants.

At the opening ceremonies, Chancellor Jaime Benítez gave the official message of welcome, expressing the pleasure of the university at the opportunity presented by the Workshop to serve the cause of inter-American solidarity and cultural exchange. He described Puerto Rico as an area of rapid social change and discussed the role of the university and the educational system in meeting the challenge of modern life and their contribution to the evolution of Puerto Rican society. The State Department representative extended greetings to the participants on behalf of the Department and briefly discussed the importance attached to the Workshop by the International Educational Exchange Service.

Education in U. S. Discussed

During the following days the mornings were occupied by planning sessions devoted to discussion of the philosophy, characteristics, and organization of education in the United States. These discussions were led by educators selected for their specialized interest in, and knowledge of, the subjects treated. Dr. Theodore Brameld, visiting Professor of Education, and Professor Carmen Gómez Tejera conducted the session on the philosophy of education. A discussion of the organization and administration of education in the United States was led by Dean Porrata, who gave a historical summary, tracing the development of our system from its beginnings as a community enterprise, in contrast with other systems which have developed as a result of centralized State control, and by Professor Hermina Vázquez, who spoke on the present structure of the educational system.

One of the most stimulating plenary sessions was that dealing with the psychological basis of education. A team of psychologists under the leadership of Dr. Ramón Ramírez López made a brilliant presentation of the role psychology has played in education in the United States.

Two other sessions were devoted to the academic and vocational aspects of the curriculum. Discus-

[2] Under the teacher development program, more than 00 foreign teachers and school administrators come to e continental United States each year for 6-month proams of specialized study and observation of educational ethods.

sion of the academic curriculum was led by Dr. Aida A. Vergne, assisted by Professor Elroy Cintrón Medina, Principal of the University High School, and Mrs. Cecilia A. Olmeda, Principal of the University Elementary School. A team of specialists headed by Miss María S. Lacot guided the discussion of the vocational curriculum. Dr. Vergne also participated in a discussion of teacher training, which was the topic of the last planning session of the Workshop.

For the afternoon sessions, the participants were divided into three groups according to their interests: elementary, secondary, and vocational. The main objectives of these sessions were to observe and evaluate modern methods and techniques of the educational system of the mainland as adapted to conditions in the island and to train the participants in the preparation of inexpensive materials for instructional purposes at all levels. Elementary school teachers focused their attention in these sessions on language arts, arithmetic, science, social studies, and arts, music, and crafts. Secondary school teachers covered similar topics at their level. Those interested in vocational education directed their attention to industrial, trade, agricultural, and commercial education, industrial arts, and home economics. All of the sessions involved discussion of objectives as well as methods and techniques. Some methods classes at the university had prepared instructional kits which were then presented to the Workshop members by the future teachers of Puerto Rico.

Members of the Workshop also had a chance to see an exhibition of teaching aids, to attend educational films, and to discuss the teaching of English as a second language. English classes were offered for Workshop members interested in learning or improving their mastery of the language.

At one session Dr. Teófila Gamarra and Donald Keiller led a discussion on "The Role of Audio-Visual Aids in Learning." They considered the relation between good teaching and communication, and the effect of the new tools of learning on the curriculum. The discussion developed the idea that communication is the basis of all teaching and that instructors should avail themselves of all media which will strengthen and add meaning to the bonds of communication. The other topic of discussion was the preparation of low-cost materials. The criteria for the selection of material, the principles for effective use, and the techniques for effective presentation were considered.

One day was given over to visiting eight public schools in the metropolitan area. On another occasion the group visited public schools in the Caguas district, where they saw urban and rural schools in operation. The visitors were favorably impressed with the Puerto Rico Second Unit Rural School, whose curriculum includes vocational agriculture for the boys and home economics for the girls. These rural schools have always emphasized community cooperation and are an important factor in the improvement of rural life. The visits enabled the group to see how teachers in Puerto Rico use modern methods and techniques in their daily tasks. They were especially impressed by the effective way in which the Commonwealth has adapted educational principles and practices of the mainland to the needs of the island. They observed the informality of the student-teacher relation and the active role played by the pupil. Many noted the spirit of teamwork in the schools and expressed their conviction that Puerto Rico had evolved a dynamic school system which offered many possibilities for further adaptation in other Latin American areas.

Many of the participants who were interested in the industrialization program of Puerto Rico utilized free time to visit industrial areas. The feeling was expressed that it is impossible to undertake such a program of industrialization successfully without a solid educational basis. The tours outside the metropolitan area afforded an opportunity to observe the agricultural development of Puerto Rico and to note the modern methods and techniques applied in the sugarcane fields, dairy farms, and pineapple plantations.

There was time, too, for many of the teachers to visit agencies in which they had special interest, such as the Department of Public Instruction, Social Programs Administration, Department of Health, Industrial Development Administration, etc. Some also visited the Puerto Rico Teachers Association, where they received information on the activities of that organization, e. g., its medical services, hospitalization plan, and credit cooperative.

The Workshop was brought to an end with a reception given by the university chapter of the Puerto Rico Teachers Association. After brief remarks by Dr. Thomas E. Cotner of the United

ites Office of Education, Dean Porrata presented *certificados* to the teachers.

Evaluation of Project

At the conclusion of the project participants wrote a brief evaluation of the Teacher Development Workshop. The general consensus was that they had achieved a better understanding of the educational system of the United States; that they had learned a great deal about modern methods, techniques, and procedures; that they had discovered many useful teaching aids and materials; and that they had observed the results of a dynamic philosophy of education in Puerto Rico. They agreed that Puerto Rico is an excellent field for training and observation and were enthusiastic about its hospitality.

The most frequently expressed criticism was that 2 weeks is not long enough for a workshop of this nature, which should last a minimum of 4 weeks to allow more time for tours to schools, facilities, and other projects. Because of the time element, only 2 days had been allowed for this purpose. It was suggested that observation visits be made in small groups over a longer period. All the participants felt there should be more seminars of this nature and that some system of follow-up should be set up to keep in touch with the Workshop members and assist them in making the most effective use of what they had learned. Several delegations inquired into the possibility of having teams from the University of Puerto Rico visit to their countries to assist in workshops and other educational activities.

The Workshop is expected to have a far-reaching influence on seminars held in the various countries. The members of the Cuban delegation, for example, gathered materials to prepare for six "Little Workshops," which were held upon their return home. Other delegations requested materials for similar activities. The Cuban delegation is also writing a 50-page pamphlet on *The Educational Experience of Puerto Rico*, in which they show the application of the principles and practices of the educational system of the United States to the Cuban environment. This pamphlet will be distributed in other Latin American countries.

As significant as the professional results of the Workshop is the contribution which it made to the strengthening of inter-American solidarity. The friendships that grew up, the spontaneous expressions of appreciation for the international educational exchange program, and the informality of all discussions and exchange of views evidenced the feelings of good will and cooperation that prevailed among the visitors and the staff. Again people of different cultures had added to their mutual understanding of each other's countries through working together on problems of common interest and concern. The visitors also took away with them a new conception of the relations existing between Puerto Rico and the United States. Letters received reflect admiration of the progress achieved by Puerto Rico and an interest in pursuing studies at the university there. The Workshop has illustrated once again the significant role Puerto Rico is playing as a meeting ground for the cultures of the Western Hemisphere in furtherance of our common goals.

It is evident that the Workshop not only succeeded in attaining its immediate objectives but also created widespread interest in increased participation in related educational exchange projects. In order to meet this growing interest the International Educational Exchange Service has made tentative plans for holding another workshop next year in Puerto Rico. This second workshop will probably be of longer duration, in accordance with recommendations made by the participants this year. Requests have been received, also, for sending abroad teams of educators from the University of Puerto Rico. These teams would meet with teachers and school administrators and conduct sessions similar to those held at the Workshop. The enthusiasm prompting these requests makes it clear that Puerto Rico will play an increasingly important role in the U. S. international educational exchange program.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

UNESCO Conference on Education in Latin America

The Department of State announced on April 21 (press release 207) that the U.S. Government will be represented at a Regional Conference on Free and Compulsory Education in Latin America of the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), scheduled to meet at Lima, Peru, April 23–May 5, 1956, by the following delegation:

Bess Goodykoontz, *Chairman*, Director, International Educational Relations, Division of International Education, Office of Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

George Greco, Chief, Education Division, U.S. Operations Mission, Lima, Peru

Thomas A. Hart, Chief, Education Division, U.S. Operations Mission, La Paz, Bolivia

This conference, organized by UNESCO in collaboration with the Organization of American States and the Government of Peru, is being called for the purpose of studying the practical problems arising from the gradual application of free and compulsory education in the states and territories of the Latin American region, and of making recommendations that might serve as the basis for a plan of effective action. The work of the conference will be divided among three committees concerned with questions in the fields of administration and finance, curriculum, and the training and status of teachers.

This meeting of specialists will be immediately followed by a Second Inter-American Meeting of Ministers of Education. The last named meeting, convened by the Organization of American States, will meet at Lima from May 3 to 8, 1956, and will consider the technical conclusions reached by the participants of the UNESCO conference.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. Done at New York June 4, 1954.[1]
Senate advice and consent to ratification given: April 19, 1956.

Customs convention on the temporary importation of private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954.[1]
Senate advice and consent to ratification given: April 19, 1956.

Aviation

Protocol relating to certain amendments to the convention on international civil aviation. Done at Montreal June 14, 1954.[1]
Senate advice and consent to ratification given: A 19, 1956.

[1] Not in force.

Organization of American States

Charter of the Organization of American States. Sig d at Bogotá April 30, 1948. Entered into force Decem r 13, 1951. TIAS 2361.
Ratification deposited: Argentina, April 10, 1956.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention. Signed t Buenos Aires December 22, 1952. Entered into fo e January 1, 1954. TIAS 3266.
Notification by Belgium of extension to: Belgian Co o and Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi, March 1956.
Ratifications deposited: Laos, March 28, 1956; Ruma a (with a declaration), March 28, 1956.

Trade and Commerce

Protocol on terms of accession of Japan to the Gene l Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Gen a June 7, 1955. Entered into force September 10, 1 . TIAS 3438.
Notification of intention to apply concessions receiv Finland, April 10, 1956 (effective May 10, 1956).

Protocol of rectification to French text of the Gene l Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Gen a June 15, 1955.[1]
Signature: Sweden, April 10, 1956.

BILATERAL

Colombia

Agreement for establishment and operation of a raw sonde observation station on the island of San Andr . Effected by exchange of notes at Bogotá Februar 6 and March 14, 1956. Enters into force on date a me randum of arrangement is signed by the cooperat g agencies of the two governments.

Germany

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of ato c energy. Signed at Washington February 13, 1956.
Entered into force: April 23, 1956 (day each gove ment received from the other a written notificat that it had complied with all statutory and consti tional requirements).

Japan

Agreement providing for Japanese financial contri tions for United States administrative and related penses during the Japanese fiscal year 1956 under mutual defense assistance agreement of March 8, 1 (TIAS 2957). Effected by exchange of notes at Tol April 13, 1956. Entered into force April 13, 1956.

Agreement setting forth understandings with respect the program of aircraft assembly or manufacture Japan, pursuant to the agreement of June 3, 1955 (TI 3383). Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo A 13, 1956. Entered into force April 13, 1956.

Union of South Africa

Agreement relating to the reciprocal issuance of passp t visas to nonimmigrants. Effected by exchange of no at Capetown March 28 and April 3, 1956. Entered i force May 1, 1956.

merican Republics
eacher Development Workshop at the University of Puerto Rico (Russell) 778
NESCO Conference on Education in Latin America 781
razil. Visit of Vice President of Brazil 756

ongress, The
ongressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy 775
roposed Revision of Immigration and Nationality Act (Dulles) 773

conomic Affairs
xport Controls Simplified for European Soviet Bloc 766
.S. Farm Goods Sold to Germany in Triangular Transaction 772
he U.S. Stake in World Trade (Weeks) 767

ducational Exchange. Teacher Development Workshop at the University of Puerto Rico (Russell) 778

urope. Export Controls Simplified for European Soviet Bloc 766

ermany. U.S. Farm Goods Sold to Germany in Triangular Transaction 772

ealth, Education, and Welfare
eacher Development Workshop at the University of Puerto Rico (Russell) 778
NESCO Conference on Education in Latin America 781

nmigration and Naturalization. Proposed Revision of Immigration and Nationality Act (Dulles) 773

ternational Law. The Institutionalizing of Peace (Dulles) 739

ıternational Organizations and Meetings
ıiendar of Meetings 776
eacher Development Workshop at the University of Puerto Rico (Russell) 778
NESCO Conference on Education in Latin America 781

utual Security
econd Meeting of Council of Baghdad Pact Organization (Henderson, Seager, text of communique) 753
ranscript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . 747
.S. Aid to Philippines for 1956 Emphasizes Rural Development 772

ear East
econd Meeting of Council of Baghdad Pact Organization (Henderson, Seager, text of communique) 753
ranscript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . 747

orth Atlantic Treaty Organization
ıange in NATO Command (Eisenhower, Ismay) . 756
ranscript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . 747

Philippines
Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . 747
U.S. Aid to Philippines for 1956 Emphasizes Rural Development 772

Presidential Documents. Change in NATO Command 756

Puerto Rico. Teacher Development Workshop at the University of Puerto Rico (Russell) . . . 778

Treaty Information. Current Actions 782

U.S.S.R.
Departure of Former Seamen of Soviet Tanker . 765
Export Controls Simplified for European Soviet Bloc 766
The Purge of Stalinism (Allen Dulles) 758
Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . 747

United Nations. The Institutionalizing of Peace (Dulles) 739

Name Index

Dulles, Allen W. 758
Dulles, Secretary 739, 747, 773
Eisenhower, President 757, 758
Goulart, João 756
Gruenther, Alfred M. 756
Henderson, Loy W. 753, 754
Ismay, Lord 757
Norstad, Lauris 757
Russell, Howard H. 778
Seager, Cedric H. 754
Weeks, Sinclair 767

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: April 23–29

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

Press releases issued prior to April 23 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 200 of April 17 and 207 of April 21.

No.	Date	Subject
210	4/23	Dulles: "Developing NATO in Peace" (printed in issue of April 30).
†211	4/23	Delegation to Inter-American Cultural Council.
212	4/24	Dulles: news conference transcript.
213	4/25	Dulles: testimony on immigration policy.
†214	4/25	Robertson: Wilson Centennial Celebration.
*215	4/25	Nominations of Nufer, Lyon, Beaulac.
216	4/25	Dulles: American Society of International Law.
217	4/25	Note concerning Russian seamen.
*218	4/26	Sixth annual awards ceremony.
†219	4/26	Agreement with Germany on film tariffs.
220	4/26	Program for Goulart visit (rewrite).
†221	4/27	Wilcox: "The U.N. in the Mainstream of History."
†222	4/27	Dulles: awards ceremony.
†223	4/27	Nixon: awards ceremony.

*Not printed.
†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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The remainder of this volume deals with bilateral relations of the United States with individual American Republics, the topics being arranged under country headings. The subject given most attention is that of trade agreements, negotiations of that nature being recorded with 10 countries—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Other topics treated include military missions, protection of business interests, exchange restrictions, debts, and claims.

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XXXIV, No. 881

May 14, 1956

THE MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY • *Statement by Secretary Dulles* 787

SIXTH ANNUAL HONOR AWARDS CEREMONY • *Remarks by Vice President Nixon and Secretary Dulles* . . . 811

THE IDEALS OF WOODROW WILSON • *by Assistant Secretary Robertson* 805

COORDINATION OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN POLICY IN WORLD AFFAIRS • *by Ambassador Winthrop W. Aldrich* 798

ATOMIC ENERGY AS A FACTOR IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Statements by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., and John C. Baker 816
Text of Resolution 819

TECHNICAL COOPERATION IN THE NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA • *Article by Stephen P. Dorsey* . . . 792

For index see inside back cover

The Department of State bulletin

VOL. XXXIV, NO. 881 • PUBLICATION 6338

May 14, 1956

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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The Mutual Security Program and the National Security

Statement by Secretary Dulles [1]

I am here to ask for authority to continue our mutual security program in accordance with the President's message of March 19, 1956.[2] This program is part of a national insurance policy which we take out as against a serious and evident threat from the Soviet Communists. The total cost of this insurance is over $40 billion a year. Most of this, approximately 90 percent, is spent on our own United States military establishment—our Army, Navy, Air Force, etc. Approximately 10 percent is spent through foreign governments, for the most part to help our allies hold positions which are vital both to us and to them. This 10 percent makes up what we call a mutual security program.

It is particularly tempting to try to save on this mutual security part of our insurance bill, which involves payments to other governments. Of course, $4 billion is a large sum, and we would all like to save it and use it for tax reductions or for public works here at home. It is hard-earned taxpayers' money and it ought not to be taken and spent unless it is really needed to protect our country.

The President, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I, myself, the Secretary of State, are all convinced that this expenditure is necessary for the security of the United States. Congress has in past years shared the same view. Each year, after the most careful scrutiny, it has appropriated the funds to sustain this program at approximately the present rate of expenditure, and indeed for several years the rate of expenditure was much higher. Nothing has yet happened to make it prudent to terminate or curtail the present program. Let me make a few illustrations.

Asia

In Korea there is an armistice, but there is no peace. In Taiwan (Formosa) there are almost daily military engagements between the forces of the Republic of China and the Chinese Communists, who, so far, stubbornly reject our proposal for a renunciation of force in the area. In Viet-Nam there is an armistice, but no peace. In these three world positions, a total of approximately 50 million free people are confronted by Communists who are using the 600 million people they rule to build a vast military establishment.

Each of these positions is of vital importance from the standpoint of the United States. If any one of them was lost it would involve a dangerous breakthrough into the Western Pacific area.

The importance of Korea is shown by the fact that, when Korea was attacked in 1950, we went to Korea's aid and spent many billions of dollars and incurred over 150,000 United States casualties to assist the Republic of Korea to throw back the aggressors.

The importance of Taiwan (Formosa) is shown by the fact that a little over a year ago the Congress, by almost unanimous vote of both Houses, authorized the President of the United States to send our own forces, if need be, to defend that area from Chinese Communist aggression.

The importance of Southeast Asia is shown by the fact that the Senate, by a nearly unanimous vote, approved our Southeast Asia Treaty, which

[1] Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Apr. 30 (press release 224).

[2] For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 2, 1956, p. 545. For statements concerning the program in Europe, see *ibid.*, Apr. 23, 1956, p. 674; in the Far East, *ibid.*, Apr. 30, 1956, p. 723.

commits the United States to action in the event of Communist armed aggression in that area.

These three acts indicate the vital importance which the Executive, the Congress, and the whole Nation attach to the freedom of the Republic of Korea, the Republic of China, and the three new nations of Indochina.

These positions are primarily held by local forces largely trained and equipped by the United States. But the governments of these impoverished countries cannot maintain their present forces without some economic help also. Therefore, we give not only direct military aid but what is called "defense support," which is the budgetary and economic aid needed to enable a country to have the armed forces which we judge reasonably related to the threat of aggression and our continued plans to prevent it.

The estimate of military-aid and defense-support expenditure next year for Korea, China, Indochina, and other area allies—the Philippines, Thailand, and Japan—is in the neighborhood of $1.5 billion.

Is it worth while? Well, without this help, these forward positions would have to be held by greatly increased United States forces or else left exposed to a Communist takeover, which either we would have to accept, with grave danger to the United States security position in the Pacific, or else we would have to use our own forces to go over there and drive the Communists out as we did in the case of Korea.

Of course, the armed forces of these allies are not alone sufficient to withstand the full might of Chinese Communist military power backed by the Soviet Union. But we maintain in the general area of the Western Pacific United States mobile striking power to back up the local ground forces. The cost of this United States force is in our defense budget. But the two costs essentially complement each other. Neither would be sufficient without the other.

Middle East

Then there is the Middle East situation. Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey all have common borders with the Soviet Union, and Iraq is close to it. All four are subject to Soviet threats and the proximity of Soviet power. Pakistan is an ally of ours under the Southeast Asia Treaty; Turkey is an ally of ours under the North Atlantic Treaty; and all four of these countries have united for col lective security under the Baghdad Pact. The hold the gateway to the south, where are foun the oil reserves which are vital to the militar power and industrial strength of Western Eu rope. Also, just beyond is the gateway to Africa It would be reckless not to help these countrie to help themselves and at the same time to hel us. The estimate of military-aid and defense support expenditure next year for these countrie is in the neighborhood of $800 million.

Western Europe

Then we come to Western Europe. There th military forces of NATO stand guard over th greatest industrial and military treasure that ther is within the free world, except for the Unitec States itself. So important do we consider thi that a substantial part of United States armec force is stationed in Western Europe for its de fense. We help maintain the military strengtl of our European allies by supplying them witl certain types of weapons. Also, we now have a base agreement with Spain, and this involves sub stantial costs. We also think it prudent to hel Yugoslavia to maintain its national independence The expenditure for military aid to NATO (excluding Turkey, of which we already spoke) anc military aid and defense support for Spain anc Yugoslavia is estimated for next year at abou $1 billion.

These three situations which I have described—the one in the Pacific, the other in the Middle East, and the other in Europe—plus some military help to Latin America, account roughly for 83 percent of the estimated expenditures under the mutual security program for next year. These expenditures not only make it possible to hold vital positions at less cost than any other way which can be contrived, but they provide diversified locations around the globe from which Russia could be struck, with devastating effect, should its rulers launch a war of aggression. This capacity of retaliation is a great deterrent to war and vitally serves the cause of peace and our own security here at home.

The remaining 17 percent of the program is a figure which for next year, as for this year, will involve expending an estimated $700 million. It is not directly related to military considerations, although much of the money goes to allies. These

expenditures, however, wherever they go, are directly related to our security. They help areas in the world which are threatened by Communist subversion and which contain people, resources, and strategic locations which, in our own interests as well as theirs, should be secure from hostile alien domination. It helps their economic development and also their public health and education, both through our own programs and those of the United Nations.

In these countries the political leaders and the people as a whole want to maintain their independence. They do not want to be subjected to the new Soviet colonialism that grips Eastern Europe. They are themselves carrying the main burden of seeking to preserve their liberty—and this is as it should be. But oftentimes this is a hard task and they need and deserve some outside help.

This portion of the program can easily be justified from the standpoint of our national security, since it offsets efforts by hostile forces to expand their power. But it has a much broader justification.

The United States is far and away the most wealthy nation in the world. Our productivity is not much less than that of all the rest of the world put together. Our annual per capita income is over $2,000, whereas in the newly developing countries of Asia it is under $100. The United States cannot live either happily or safely as an oasis of prosperity in a desert of misery.

No wealthy individual can live happily in a community of poverty to which he is indifferent. It is the same with the society of nations. Always the wealthy and economically developed nations have in fact helped less developed countries to develop. We were helped from abroad when we were beginning to develop this continent. That is a law of social life and we cannot violate it except at our peril.

That is more true than ever, since the Soviets are now themselves offering development aid.

I indicated earlier that the Soviet Communist "new look" did not warrant our curtailing our mutual security program. It is true that Soviet policies and doctrine now seem to put less emphasis on violence, and that is encouraging. The danger of general war seems somewhat less, and that is an immense relief. But let us ask ourselves why the danger of violence has receded. It is because the network of mutual security treaties, sustained by our mutual security program and backed by our mobile striking power, makes it unprofitable for the Soviets to follow their old policies of violence.

Their change is not due to any spiritual conversion. They have not gotten religion. They realistically take account of what the free nations have done to make violence an unprofitable tactic.

But if we want them to continue to desist from violence, we had better continue doing the things which have led them to desist. Our policies are paying off in this respect. But that is not a reason for abandoning the policies, but for continuing them. The Soviets have by no means lost the *capacity* to be violent, and their old policies could quickly reappear if we faltered in the policies which have checked them.

The Soviets' new tactics seek influence with the newly developing countries through posing as an exponent of mutually beneficial relations with these countries. They are seeking to employ trade credits, technical assistance, and sales of military equipment to give credence to this new image of the Soviet-Chinese Communist bloc. They seek to capitalize on the desire of these newly developing countries for economic progress and their need to dispose of raw materials and foodstuffs which are not entirely absorbed by Western markets. Undoubtedly, the Soviet and Chinese Communists hope in this way to expand their influence while at the same time eliminating the risk of war. These tactics also reflect a new stage in the development of the Soviet economy, where industrial development creates needs for agricultural and other raw materials and makes it possible to offer in exchange a wide range of capital goods and technical skills.

Need for Flexibility and Continuity

These new Communist tactics make it more than ever imperative that the United States should continue the economic phase of our mutual security program and should continue it with greater flexibility and with greater assurance of continuity than ever before. That is why the President has asked for more discretionary funds and why he has asked for the right to commit, out of future nonmilitary appropriations, if granted, up to $100 million a year for 10 years on long-range development projects. This represents about 2½ percent of the total mutual security program as it is running.

Today we operate in a very cumbersome manner. Already the State Department and the International Cooperation Administration are, at the request of the Bureau of the Budget, preparing programs to be submitted for fiscal year 1958. After those programs have been reviewed by the executive branch and are finally submitted to the Congress, and after the next Congress has authorized and appropriated, then the plans must be adjusted to meet that congressional action and the changing world scene. Then the task of implementing the plans is begun, and there is usually a lag of a year or two between the obligating of the funds in 1958 and the actual getting of the funds into equipment, supplies, and services at the foreign destination. In the case of much of the military equipment, the delay is longer. And when all this process has been completed, it is applicable only to a single year's operation, and there is no assurance that funds will be available to complete the task then begun if it is a long-range project.

All of this points up to the importance of giving the President greater discretion in the use of funds so that to that extent we do not have to try to define their use several years in advance and also so that there should be a modest expectation of continuity.

I should perhaps say at this point that I have spoken in terms of estimated expenditures rather than in terms of authorizations because in that way it is possible to get a better overall picture of what we are trying to do. Actually, the authorization now sought for next year is $4,672,000,000, which is larger than the estimated expenditures for next year. This is primarily because in both 1955 and 1956 authorizations and appropriations were considerably less than expenditures.

It may be asked whether this mutual security program will have to go on forever. The answer, I think, is that that part of the program which contributes to the security of the United States will have to go on so long as our security is threatened. I hope that that part of the task which relates to the development of the newly developing countries may, more and more, be taken over by private capital. But for that there must be a lessening of the political risks.

The program could, of course, be curtailed if there were an effective plan for supervised limitation of armament. We are trying persistently to get that, and we are negotiating with flexibility. But it could not honestly be said that there ar good prospects of early success.

Of course, this part of the program could b reduced if there should come into being in Russi a nondespotic form of government which wa genuinely dedicated to the welfare of the Russia people and which gave up ideas of aggressiv expansion.

There are for the first time signs that the yearn ings of the Russian people for greater freedon from fear and from want and for greater free dom of thought are assuming such proportion that the Soviet rulers find it expedient to take ac count of them. On the other hand, Stalin's suc cessors may be seeking to preserve, in a new garb the essence of his despotism and to substitute fo genuine reforms a rewriting of past history. Ex ternal successes would, of course, help them t postpone a domestic day of reckoning. Therefore, it is now more than ever important to den such successes to the Soviet rulers and to preserv the means of doing so—our mutual security program.

Proposed Independent Study

Consideration is being given to an independent study of some of the aspects of our mutual security program. There are a number of aspects of the program which the President feels, and which perhaps you, Mr. Chairman, and this committee feel could usefully be studied by men who are highly qualified but who are not available to serve the Government on a full-time, long-term basis.

I have in mind questions as to the relative role of the State Department and the Defense Department in administering the program; as to whether we should seek to put more of our program on a loan rather than a grant basis; as to whether the program needs to be enlarged and given greater continuity to meet the new Soviet tactics; as to whether, and if so, how, we can speed up our program so that there is not the present long delay between the conception of programs and their execution, and sometimes regrettable gaps between our promises and our performance. There is the question of the degree to which it is feasible to give Congress a dependable itemization of programs which may not come to fruition for several years, by which time the surrounding circumstances may have considerably altered. There is the question of the degree

which it is useful to provide funds on a bilateral asis as against use of United Nations or regional gencies. There is the question as to whether e should emphasize short-term projects of poplar interest or long-range projects which have no bvious popular appeal.

These are all important matters which justify, believe, a kind of study which it is difficult for abinet members or Members of Congress themelves to undertake.

But none of these questions relates to the basic alidity of the program itself. It would indeed e ironic if, now that the Soviet has begun giving id to its allies in terms of billions and offering conomic aid to free nations in terms of hundreds f millions, the United States should withdraw rom that program which it invented and let the Soviet take over that field.

The President has, under the Constitution, the esponsibility to formulate the foreign policy of he United States. And surely it is significant hat he judges this mutual security program to e "vitally important to our people" and "an indispensable part of our national effort." That udgment, expressed in his message to the Congress of March 19, 1956, has not been altered. The President told me that this morning. To ave this program appreciably reduced, interfered with, or put in jeopardy would gravely endanger the security of the United States. That s the considered judgment of the President and ll his advisers who are charged with safeguarding our national security. I urge, therefore, that he requested authorization be granted.

Secretary Dulles' Departure for NATO Council Meeting

White House Announcement

White House press release dated May 1

The Secretary of State, prior to his departure for Paris this afternoon, conferred with the President in relation to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

They discussed the political development of the Atlantic community, of which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is an important manifestation. The President expressed his great interest in the matter, an interest which he has long held and which was intensified by his experience as Supreme Commander (Europe) of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1951–1952.

Secretary Dulles' Departure Statement

Press release 229 dated May 1

I am leaving for Paris to attend the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This will be an important meeting because I think it is generally realized that the North Atlantic community needs to organize itself into something more than a military alliance.

This does not imply that the military aspects of NATO have outlived their usefulness. On the contrary, it remains essential to maintain the military strength and unity of the free nations. It is this strength and unity which have contributed to the present disposition of the Soviet to deemphasize violence as an instrument of their international policy. If we want that happier condition to continue, we must continue the policies which brought it about.

But the North Atlantic community is held together by sentiments far more profound than fear and by objectives far more fundamental than military strength. I hope and expect that at this meeting we will begin to search out new ways to express our common purposes.

In addition to attendance at the NATO meeting I will have the welcome opportunity to exchange views with various of my colleagues with respect to matters of common concern to our countries. Such meetings are a usual byproduct of a NATO Council meeting and are of great value in maintaining harmony and understanding between the United States and other friendly governments.

I plan to leave Paris for Washington next Sunday.

Letters of Credence

Rumanian People's Republic

The newly appointed Minister of the Rumanian People's Republic, Silviu Brucan, presented his credentials to President Eisenhower on April 30. For the text of the Minister's remarks and the text of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 225.

Technical Cooperation in the Near East and South Asia

by Stephen P. Dorsey

The countries of the Near East and South Asia—the Arab States and Israel, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, and Nepal—together comprise not only the subcontinent of the great Asian land mass but also its bridge to the other continents of Europe and Africa. They have known the tramp of armies and the harsh hand of the conqueror from the beginning of our civilization, which was cradled in their midst. Their people vary in many respects from one country to another because of differences in their indigenous circumstances and in the foreign influences to which they have been exposed, but they share a common heritage of economic deficiency and political difficulty.

Of fundamental significance is the dire poverty that characterizes most of this region. Rainfall is erratic—there is either too much or too little. Water supply is a cause of constant concern. Much of the best farmland would be regarded as submarginal in this country. Even in the rich valleys of the great rivers, limited water supply and the acute density of population make life difficult. The farmer—and the average man is a farmer—lives his short life with his family, and often his draft animal, in a one- or two-room mud hut on a caloric intake at best not more th two-thirds that of the average American, on annual income of perhaps $75.

As a result there is everywhere an almost ove powering interest in development—in "catchi up" on economic progress. The impact of We ern civilization in recent years has jarred t people from the passivism of centuries, a through various channels better ways of life ha been revealed. This fact, coupled with the are poverty, has produced the social unrest that cha acterizes the Middle East and South Asia toda

The late Dr. Henry Garland Bennett, who ga so much to the effective launching of the point program, used to say that the peoples of the unde developed countries had recently been able to s through a glass window the way people lived the Western World. It was now up to us to ope the window and enlarge it to a door throug which they might pass to share some of the tec niques and accomplishments of the West. If t door was not provided, he implied, these peopl would blow the roof off to gain access to what the wanted.

In recent visits that I have made to the area have been deeply impressed by the intense an almost universal drive to telescope evolutionar progress. Governments are under compulsion t bring progress to the masses in tangible, realizab form *now*. It is almost as if the air were charge with an impatience for economic developme which will not be denied. In this very imp tience, of course, lies the danger that, in the searc for a panacea for poverty, some may accept th promises of Moscow as the easiest way out.

• *Mr. Dorsey, author of the above article, is Deputy Regional Director for the Near East, South Asia, and Africa, International Cooperation Administration. His article is based on an address made on February 17 before the Institute on International Affairs, Washington State College, Pullman, Wash.*

onomic and Political Problems

Extraordinary difficulties block the way of eco-mic development and effective assistance by the nited States in its accomplishment. This is a gion in which the economic, the political, and e emotional are mixed together to an unusual gree. Indeed, one simply cannot speak of eco-mic problems and plans as if they were distinct nature and reasonably separable from political oblems. A few specific current examples are) the extended difficulties between Saudi Arabia d Britain over boundaries in the oil-rich Ara-an Peninsula, (2) the Pushtunistan issue be-een Afghanistan and Pakistan, (3) the Indus ver water dispute between Pakistan and India,) the problem of dividing the Jordan River ters for the mutual benefit of both Arabs and raelis.

Problems of this sort create uncertainties as ll as serious tensions. These uncertainties affect ivate business and private investment, foreign d domestic; they affect what the local govern-ents are able to do and the degree to which the nited States can help. In dealing with these oblems we are confronted not merely with a mplex situation but with a perilous one. The treme nationalism of these new nations is com-icated by their fears and memories of colonial-n and by the feeling that economic dependency a primary source of political weakness. In the iddle East, the years since the Palestine par-ion have brought no healing of the wounds ated in the Arab-Israel struggle. These have en 7 years of unabated tensions and bitterness d recurrent bloodshed. They have also been 7 ars of a continuing, painstaking search for ace. Yet there is no peace in Palestine. The spute between the Arab States and Israel under-s all the problems with which that area is beset d remains a lighted fuse that could at any time ich off a potential world war in the atomic age. To the north the Soviet bloc and Communist ina, together controlling one-third of the rld's population and a quarter of the earth's rface, border this arc of the Middle East and uth Asia which contains resources vital to the lfare of the free world. Here are not only anganese, chrome, mica, and other minerals but o some two-thirds of the world's proven oil re-ves. I need not remind you that these Com-inist neighbors maintain 10 million men under ms—the largest force ever assembled in peace-time during the history of the world; that their resource development and nuclear capabilities are steadily increasing; or that their leaders have vowed that their system will eventually achieve world domination. During the 1940 negotiations with the Nazis, the Soviets made it clear that "the focal point of the aspirations of the Soviet Union . . . [lay] in the general direction of the Persian Gulf."[1] Their courtship of the Near East during the past year is abundant evidence that they still feel the same way.

Launching of U.S. Aid Program

Thus the security of this area has necessarily come to be a source of deepest concern to the United States and to the rest of the free world. For when any nation falls victim to Communist aggression the Soviets become stronger and U.S. safety is reduced. The mutual security program was established to meet this threat to human liberty through measures both political and economic. Its military provisions were established to provide, to countries which desire such aid, limited military programs which will contribute to their internal security and which will strengthen their ability to resist external aggression.

As for the economic phase of the mutual security program, it undertakes to aid in the preservation of stable free governments and institutions, the development of self-sustaining economies, and the removal of discriminations and restrictions impeding trade with and among the individual states.

In 1953 President Eisenhower said, "We are ready, in short, to dedicate our strength to serving the *needs*, rather than the *fears*, of the world." On returning from his trip to the Near East the same year, Secretary Dulles put it another way:

> The peoples of the Near East and Asia demand better standards of living, and the day is past when their aspirations can be ignored. The task is one primarily for the governments and the peoples themselves. In some cases they can use their available resources, such as oil revenues, to better advantage. There are, however, ways in which the United States can usefully help, not with masses of money but by contributing advanced technical knowledge about transport, communication, fertilization, and use of water for irrigation. . . . Money wisely spent for this area under the Mutual Security Program will give the American people a good return in terms of better understanding and cooperation.

American private enterprise has long engaged

[1] *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941*, Department of State publication 3023, p. 259.

in economic cooperation with the Near East and South Asia. Yankee traders went to this part of the world in the early days of the new Republic. One of the first American technical experts might be said to be Eli Smith from Northford, Conn., who took the printing press to Syria in 1834. Ex-Confederate technicians contributed their skills to the development of the area after the end of the Civil War. These, however, were all private ventures. It was not until World War II that the U.S. Government extended limited lend-lease aid and credits to some of the countries of the area.

In January 1949 technical assistance under government auspices was announced as the fourth point of President Truman's inaugural address. The following year the first technical experts under point 4 reached the Near East and Asia. A program of this sort could not be developed overnight. It took time. But today some hundreds of U.S. technicians are attached to International Cooperation Administration missions in the area, advising cooperating governments in new methods and techniques in agriculture, forestry, fisheries, health, housing, education, natural resources, industry, transportation, communications, and public administration. Near Eastern and South Asian technicians in these fields are brought to the United States for advanced training or are provided basic instruction in regional training courses at the American University of Beirut. Today bilateral programs are operating in Iran, India, Israel, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, and all of the independent Arab States except Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen.

Although Moscow tries to represent them as instruments by which underdeveloped countries are forced into imperialist subjugation, the general agreements under which technical cooperation programs are authorized must be based on other governments' requests for technical assistance. They provide for open publication of essential information pertaining to the program. Moreover, the requesting country agrees to integrate the programs and make good use of their results, to cooperate with other countries in carrying out technical programs and maintaining world peace, and to bear a fair share of the costs. Thus technical cooperation is not a one-way transaction. Rather it is a completely voluntary, two-way partnership that grows from mutual respect, trust, and the recognition of common interests.

Together with the broad general agreements, program and project agreements establish U. and local government contributions to, and t administration of, particular technical assistan projects. There are today some 700 such agr ments in effect with the countries of the Near Ea and South Asia.

Our technical assistance programs have be growing in many ways. The number of technicia operating in the Near East and South Asia h increased from 850 in 1953 to 1,100 at the end 1955; the scope of the programs, at first confin largely to the immediate and basic needs for mo food, better health, and more education, has be expanded to cover many other fields. For sor countries our technical assistance programs ev include training in the peacetime uses of atom energy.

Our bilateral technical assistance programs the Near East and South Asia have been suppl mented by United Nations technical assistan programs, the U.S. contributions to which ha increased steadily each year. Our first contrib tion for the 18-month period from July 1, 1950, December 31, 1951, was $12,007,500. For the sixt period (calendar year 1956) $15,500,000 w authorized by the Congress. The limiting fact on the U.N. technical programs has not been tl amount of money which the United States is wil ing to put into these multilateral programs; it rather the inability or failure of other nations t increase their contributions. We are convinced the value of a U.N. program. We do not want to become a U.S. program in disguise.

Need for Development Aid

In the early days of point 4 the hope was tha technical assistance would be enough to help th countries of the Near East to help themselve As time went on, it became apparent that increas ing technical competence was not enough unless could be harnessed. There is no sense in teachin farmers how to double their crops, for exampl if the increased harvest cannot be marketed, or i increasing efficiency and thus releasing labor fro the farm if it cannot find profitable utilizatio elsewhere. Conversely, credits for a Helmand Va ley project in Afghanistan are useless if techni cians have not been trained to carry on the neces sary operations and maintenance. In the man countries of the area in which there are serious ec nomic imbalances, technical assistance and deve

opment or special economic aid clearly cannot be divorced from each other.

The first U.S. Government grant aid to the Arab States and Iran for capital development and other purposes was authorized by the Congress in 1953. Israel had already received such funds for "relief and resettlement projects" for refugees coming into Israel, and there had been grants to the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA). In South Asia funds for development had been similarly available but were not separately delineated until after 1953. Since the mutual security program first got under way in fiscal year 1951 an average total of $275 million, including both technical assistance and development aid, has been provided annually to the cooperating countries of the Near East and South Asia. The major beneficiaries have been India, Israel, Pakistan, Iran, and Egypt, with the remaining countries receiving annual assistance averaging several million dollars per year. It is significant that of total mutual security funds available to the area in fiscal year 1956 over one-third are in the form of loans.

In addition development aid has taken the form of direct loans from the Export-Import Bank and of indirect credits through our 32 percent interest in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The Export-Import Bank, as of the end of fiscal year 1955, had afforded credits totaling $300 million in the Near East and South Asia. Of these the largest have been $135 million to Israel, $53 million to Iran, and $39.5 million to Afghanistan. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has extended loans in the following amounts: Iraq, $12.8 million; India, $139.7 million; Pakistan, $77.25 million; and Lebanon, $27 million (for the Litani River Development Project). Last February Egypt announced that agreement in principle had been reached with the bank on its offer to lend $200 million to help finance Egypt's $1.3 billion High Aswan Dam project.

The response to the program, with a few exceptions, has been favorable throughout the area. I have gained this impression from direct contacts not only with officials, who appreciate the soundness of its long-range goals, but also from the man in the street who has had direct contact with U.S. technicians and projects. In personal visits to many of our projects in the field I have found everywhere able, dedicated Americans who work with their hands, in dirty clothes, far from the comforts of the local capital, next to eager local citizens who are learning at their sides. They are true shirt-sleeve ambassadors. No greater compliment to the effectiveness of their work could be paid to them than the Communists' recent adoption of a program of economic aid to the Near East and South Asia.

Programs in India and Pakistan

It might be of interest to evaluate the program, its goals and accomplishments, in two great countries of South Asia—India and Pakistan.

The Government of India is deeply aware of lessons learned from revolutionary history over the last 10 years. It knows that agrarian discontent in China was used by Mao Tse-tung as an effective weapon to overthrow the National Government. The same agrarian discontent was Ho Chi Minh's weapon in Indochina. In India the 75 percent of the people living in small villages have seen just enough change to whet their appetite for substantial betterment in their lives. Accordingly, India's first Five-Year Plan, which has just ended, emphasized improvement in rural life, not only by increasing the food supply but by returning the benefits of that production to the farmers. In the first years of our program in India more than 90 percent of American assistance went into helping that country meet its goals.

Picture an Indian village in midsummer. The sun burns through clouds of dust choking everyone who walks through the dirt paths in the 112-degree temperature. Clustered closely together so as to use no more of the precious land than is absolutely necessary are the windowless, mud houses in which families of a dozen persons often live in an area the size of an ordinary American living room. Teen-age boys labor to do a man's work plowing the baked ground in anticipation of the monsoon. Girl wives pound chapatis—flat, hard pancakes—amid clouds of flies, their babies lying in the dirt beside them.

But there is no depression or self-pity among these people. The village leaders proudly show a visitor the new school, the first the village has ever had; the covered well, sanitary for the first time; the village handicraft industry. They tell you proudly of the community-development and extension program which in the past 2 years has reached some 60 million of India's poorest people. In the Ganges Plain 3,000 new deep wells will irri-

gate more than 1 million acres. New water-storage dams will provide irrigation for another 4 million acres, increasing food production by over 2 million tons when completed. American technicians have provided catalytic acceleration in these enterprises and in the control of malaria, improvement of sanitation, provision of pure drinking water, village schools, and improved farming methods, including soil conservation and land reclamation.

As for urban life, India's second Five-Year Plan, launched April 15, will emphasize the speeding-up of industrialization. In the cities great numbers of unemployed and underemployed people walk the streets searching for work, eking out a precarious existence by performing odd jobs for little pay. The U.S. program over the last year and in future years will augment India's increasing emphasis on industrial growth. The United States will extend assistance in electric power, transport, and industry. Private industrial development will be assisted by advisory technical and managerial assistance, industrial credit, and the encouragement of foreign private capital investment. The second Five-Year Plan aims to absorb 8 million new people into the labor force.

There has been much discussion in India and here concerning the division of industry by the Government into a public and a private sector, giving rise to misunderstanding of what some characterize as India's "socialization." Where private capital is not available for investment the state has stepped in to enable the economy as a whole to advance rapidly, for rapid advance is essential to success. Prime Minister Nehru, for all his neutralism and his display of friendliness during the visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev, is and has been determinedly anti-Communist domestically. In fact India has not hesitated to jail numbers of Communists at any time that she deemed it necessary to protect public security.

Our aid to India, although substantial, has been only a small portion of what India herself has invested in her electrifying development from the stagnation of Indian life under colonial rule. We are vitally concerned in the successful evolution of India, for it is a free and democratic state. Although the United States takes a different stand from that of Nehru with regard to the realities of Soviet designs on Asia, nevertheless we can agree emphatically with his determination to build a democratic and free society under an independent government.

There are two large show windows in Asia. That of Communist China displays temptingly wares produced by totalitarian methods. India's is based on the principles of freedom, independence, and democracy. If Communist China's experiment proves the more successful, the peoples of Asia may believe that in that direction lies the best means for achieving their desires for a better life. If India does not succeed, the result would be massive tragedy for the United States and the world.

In this context it is important for India to be able to count on our aid year by year until she achieves her goals. The amount of the aid is not as important as the certainty on the part of India's Government that a definite amount can be counted on, so that India can make a long-term calculation of the resources available to her in connection with the achievement of her second Five-Year Plan. It is important also that Indians feel that we appreciate their struggle and do not begrudge them assistance. The people of India are determined to achieve a better life with us or without us. If we are unwilling or begrudging in our assistance, Russia stands ready to take our place as their friend.

Turning to Pakistan, we find a country which has taken a clear stand at our side in unconditional opposition to Communist aggression. Pakistan has joined with other freedom-loving nations to the East to form the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and is united with countries to the West in the Baghdad Pact. Pakistan entered this company of free and independent nations confronted with the economic absurdity of her territory's division into two parts by a thousand miles of Indian territory. Her major economic difficulties arise from the poverty and low productivity of her masses of people, the heart-rending problem of providing for her refugees, and her critical budgetary and foreign exchange situation. These problems reach staggering magnitude because Pakistan entered upon her independence with only a handful of skilled managerial and administrative leaders and technically trained experts. In the old colonial days most Hindus of good families attended British schools, but few Moslems had this advantage. Pakistan's capacity to progress is limited by the very small

number of Pakistanis trained sufficiently to cope with the country's towering problems of economic and social development.

Nevertheless, Pakistan Government leaders are struggling valiantly with the maintenance of political stability, the development of adequate military strength for national defense, and above all the betterment of daily life for the population at large on which depends the achievement of the first two goals. In 1954 a combination of natural disasters and unfavorable market conditions taxed Pakistan's resources to the limit, forcing her to request emergency aid from the United States. The country is just rallying from that year of adversity.

In assisting the Pakistan Government to develop its economy, the United States has emphasized agricultural production, mineral and forest exploitation, stimulation of new industry and investment, and supplying of critical raw materials and consumer goods. Defense support has also been granted to supply Pakistan with equipment to strengthen her armed forces and to assist in developing and expanding industry and transportation. In West Pakistan, which is much too dry, and East Pakistan, which is subjected to recurrent floods, the assistance which we are giving to the water resources program has been crucial. Pakistan's inflationary problems and the consequent pressures on standards of living have been eased by financial assistance for importation of essential consumer goods and raw materials.

But in the villages Pakistan's poorest people will tell you that they want more than enough to eat. "We want a school," they say in village after village in Pakistan. If you ask why, they tell you that they cannot cope with the new issues arising in their lives. "We cannot read," they say. "We don't know how to protect ourselves when we sell our products or make a rental agreement or a contract or try to understand the tax laws." They also say, "We don't know how to protect ourselves against sickness." Pakistan's awakening people not only need but *demand* education. But this demand is particularly difficult for Pakistan to meet because of the shortage of trained people. To assist at this critical point five major United States educational institutions have entered into contracts with provincial educational institutions in Pakistan. Other United States technicians are assisting in the fight against malaria and tuberculosis, village environmental sanitation programs, and village training centers, which are developing local Pakistan workers to help in a countrywide cooperative program with this stanch protagonist of the free world.

U.S. Objectives

To recapitulate briefly, the United States has tried in recent years to render assistance to the Near East and South Asia in response to the area's needs for rural and industrial development. It has provided technical assistance to most of the countries; its efforts have complemented U.N. programs in the same field. It has made substantial loans both directly and through its membership in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. It has provided some special economic aid of a capital nature.

We shall not be stampeded by Russian promises of extensive aid to that part of the world, but we shall carry out the most effective programs of technical cooperation and economic-development assistance programs that we can devise. In our programs we shall continue to emphasize mutuality of interest and flexibility of approach. Apportionment of funds among countries will depend much on need and demonstration of effective absorptive capacity. And, finally, we shall work to encourage conditions under which private investment will show an increasing interest in the area and reduce the need for public assistance. We hope that these measures will be effective in aiding the countries of the area toward a better economic and social climate, toward peace and stability, and toward a strong will to withstand imperialist encroachment against the free nations of the world.

German Atomic Energy Minister To Visit United States

The Department of State announced on May 4 (press release 239) that Franz Josef Strauss, German Federal Minister for Atomic Energy Affairs, will arrive in the United States on May 11 upon the invitation of the U.S. Government. He will visit various AEC installations and call on the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission. He will also discuss with U.S. officials matters of common interest relating to the special area of his responsibility.

Minister Strauss is a member and cofounder of

the Christian Socialist Union (CSU), the Bavarian counterpart of Chancellor Adenauer's Christian Democratic Union (CDU). As a member of the Cabinet, he has had a major part in the framing of legislation establishing effective parliamentary controls of the German Armed Forces. He has also been a stanch advocate of plans promoting European security and integration. His present post as Minister for Atomic Energy is a newly created Cabinet position, with responsibilities encompassing national and international problems of nuclear energy.

Coordination of British and American Policy in World Affairs

by Winthrop W. Aldrich
Ambassador to Great Britain [1]

I doubt very much whether any of you here are fully aware of the glory which attaches to the name of Coventry in the minds of the American people. The name of this city is a synonym for courage of the highest order. During the anxious years of World War II, the American newspapers and radio told us of the destruction which you were suffering. We marveled at your endurance and morale. We marveled at your ability to sustain a high rate of industrial production on which the very life of this nation depended, when it seemed to us that hardly a brick could have been left standing here or a wheel kept turning. We were proud to think that we had as our allies people who could set us such an example of fighting spirit.

You have virtually built a new Coventry in the past 10 years, and you have done it beautifully. It is modern and efficient; it offers pleasing vistas to the eye; and it bespeaks the progressive, forward-moving spirit of the men and women of Coventry.

No one has to tell me why Warwickshire is one of the great industrial centers of this nation. I have seen the reason for myself.

I said a moment ago that we Americans were proud to have you as our allies. We felt that way in World War I and again in World War II, and we feel the same way today.

What is it that through two hard-fought wars and 10 following years of international crises has maintained unbroken and completely unimpaired the close and intimate alliance between us? Can it be that this is simply because of the fact that we are an outgrowth of this country, indebted to you for our free institutions, for industrial and other discoveries first made here, indebted for the very blood in the veins of so many of our citizens? This is certainly a great part of the answer.

Respect for the Dignity of Man

I suggest, however, that the fundamental reason lies in the fact that we have an almost identical attitude toward mankind which makes us natural allies. Expressed in the simplest possible terms, this attitude reflects the fact that we both respect the dignity of man.

This respect for man's dignity is the foundation of our free societies and is the basis of our approach to world affairs. We not only intend to preserve our own freedom and independence, but we stand together in unalterable opposition to tyranny, terrorism, and aggression anywhere on the face of this globe—to any form of oppression which denies the rights of man.

In the joint Anglo-American declaration issued in Washington in February,[2] Prime Minister Eden and President Eisenhower gave us a timely reminder that this very question of the dignity of man is the central issue confronting the world in this year of 1956. Our position reflects our common belief that the state exists for the benefit

[1] Address made before the Warwickshire Rotary Clubs at Coventry, England, on Apr. 19.

[2] BULLETIN of Feb. 13, 1956, p. 231.

f man—that people have a basic right to a government of their own choice.

To make clear exactly where we stand, as the 'rime Minister and the President did in the Washington Declaration, serves a valuable purpose. 3y explaining to those with whom you have differences just why you take issue with them, a asis is provided for an approach to a better unerstanding. An opportunity is created to reconile your differences. In concrete terms, you tell ther nations what you expect from them and what ou are ready to give in return.

Our aims and intentions are well known, and hey are made clear by our actions. We have oined together with other nations to form voluntary associations for the purpose of establishing decent and orderly world in which all may have he opportunity to advance their legitimate intersts. Our sole object is to deter aggression, preent unwarranted interference by any nation in he internal affairs of its neighbors, and thereby o preserve peace.

In the past 10 years, Britain and America have y their independent action assisted more than 600 illion people in scores of lands to become free ations. Britain's record in this respect is paricularly admirable. While you most proprly have refused to bow to terrorism or to acquisce in lawless action, you are continuing to foster nd support orderly movements toward self-government among peoples as they show themselves eady for it. At this very moment in Malaya, frica, and the Caribbean you are assisting Brith territories in their progress toward entry into he community of independent nations.

Our two countries have also demonstrated their ympathetic concern for the economic difficulties f others; and in order to help peoples to improve heir standards of living, we have provided goods, echnical aid, and funds on a prodigious scale. Since 1945 the United States alone has provided ver $52 billion in various forms of aid to other ations and has sought a general expansion of rade on a mutually beneficial basis. In no intance of rendering such aid to others has either Britain or America attached any conditions to the iving which would in any way jeopardize the reedom or integrity of the recipients.

As a means of preventing aggression, we have anded together with some 50 nations in collective ecurity arrangements. Simultaneously, we keep the door open and encourage all nations to seek the solution of their differences and disputes through peaceful negotiation. Many nations are ready to assist in such undertakings, and the United Nations offers an ever-present tribunal for this purpose.

Let others show us a genuine change of heart, and I am confident that they will not find in Britain or America any lack of will to bridge the differences and cleavages that sharply divide the world.

Joint Efforts in Middle East

While we watch vigilantly and unceasingly for signs of such a true change, we shall continue to exert our not inconsiderable influence to prevent conflicts and maintain peace. An example of the close coordination of British and American policy for this purpose is seen in the efforts we are making in the Middle East. May I emphasize, in this connection, that I deplore the erroneous impression given recently in the press that a major difference of opinion exists between our two Governments on Middle East policies. From time to time rumors have circulated alleging friction or disagreement between London and Washington.

Only last week, in Kansas City, Sir Roger Makins referred to these rumors and said: "Frequently I, who am in continuous contact with the United States administration, am unable to fathom what people are talking about." On the basis of my own continuous contacts with Her Majesty's Government I fully concur with my Washington colleague's statement. It can and should be stated clearly and unequivocally that the American and British Governments are in close contact and constant touch on all problems in which they are jointly concerned throughout the world and specifically concerning the present tension in the Middle East.

The United States is fully aware of the importance of that area, of the fact that its security vitally affects the safety of Western Europe, and of the fact that the problems there are critical and delicate. As President Eisenhower pointed out, we are dealing with a situation that is like a pile of jackstraws; and we must take care not to bring down the entire heap. Yet everything possible must be done to preserve peace in the area and to encourage a settlement which does justice to the interests of all parties concerned.

There is no divergence whatsoever between Britain and America on these objectives, and we are in full accord on the two major lines of policy that are called for. The first is to give our strong support to the United Nations mission which has been sent to the area. President Eisenhower pledged this support, declaring that the United States "will observe its commitments within constitutional means to oppose any aggression" in the Middle East and will support and assist any nation which might be subjected to such aggression.

Baghdad Pact

The second great need for the maintenance of peace and security for the Middle East area is to provide adequate protection against aggression from outside. For this purpose, free nations of the area, together with Britain, have associated themselves in a collective security agreement under the Baghdad Pact. Though the United States is not a member, it gives constant support to the objectives of the Pact and is providing substantial economic and military assistance to the Pact members. The extent of our support is indicated by the strength of the U.S. observer delegation which, under the leadership of Deputy Under Secretary of State Loy Henderson and Admiral [John H.] Cassady, is now in Tehran for consultation with the meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council.[3]

The deep personal interest which President Eisenhower takes in the Middle East situation, and his strong desire to see tranquillity restored to the area, was demonstrated in his sending personal messages last week to the Heads of the Egyptian and Israeli Governments.

British good will with respect to that area was also concretely demonstrated by your announcement in Tehran last week of substantial new economic assistance for the member nations of the Baghdad Pact. American good will was demonstrated by the U.S. announcement in Tehran on April 16 of our readiness to discuss a program of broader economic cooperation coordinated through the Baghdad Pact organization, and only yesterday the U.S. became a full member of the Economic Committee of the Pact. The benefits of British and American assistance are bound to extend to all the nations of the area.

This, then, is the pattern of British and American policy toward their neighbors throughout e world—encouraging the peaceful settlement f differences and disputes, offering our offices to t s end, joining in defenses against aggression, a l providing full-scale economic assistance for 'e improvement of standards of living.

This is a pattern of international conduct wh ı must appeal to all men of good will. It is ɛ- propriate to discuss these matters with rep- sentatives of International Rotary, which ɜ pledged to the advancement of understandii, good will, and world peace through world fello- ship.

The approach of our two countries to world ɜ fairs is, I believe, the portent of a dawn that t, world has long awaited. It reflects the good w and determination of all the world's millions w are dedicated to the ways of freedom. T British Commonwealth of Nations, the Unit States of America, and the many nations close associated with us are the true guardians of tl good will and determination and will hold alc the light of freedom until its rays may reach in all the dark places of the earth.

[3] *Ibid.*, May 7, 1956, p. 753.

Commemoration of First U.S.–Swedish Treaty

Following are texts of statements made Stockholm on April 3 by John Moors Cabot, U. Ambassador to Sweden, and Swedish Foreig Minister Östen Undén on the occasion of the pr sentation to the Swedish Government of tl Franklin Commemorative Medal.[1]

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR CABOT

One hundred and seventy-three years ag your country and ours signed their first Treaty c Amity and Commerce. This year, many organ zations in more than 50 countries of the world ai celebrating the 250th anniversary of one of th men who helped to negotiate this treaty.

As people in these nations pay their tributes t Benjamin Franklin, I like to remember what h said about formal treaties. Franklin once wrot

[1] For a description of the Franklin Medal and othe background on the observance of Franklin's anniversar see BULLETIN of Feb. 13, 1956, p. 249; for an account o Franklin's diplomatic career, see *ibid.*, Jan. 9, 1956, p. 5

hat friendship between peoples created ties ronger than any treaties could make.

We believe sincerely in that philosophy. We ave been privileged to enjoy that kind of friendhip with Sweden since our new country was born. 'oday, we pay a double measure of gratitude to hose great Swedish and American patriots who uilt so well on this enduring foundation.

It has been a particularly happy circumstance or us to know that your great scientist, Arne 'iselius, was awarded the coveted Franklin Medal y the Franklin Institute in Philadelphia on Janary 18, at their meeting to celebrate Franklin's 50th anniversary. No greater ties can be made etween peoples than the honors, respect, and riendship we pay to each other.

Benjamin Franklin was a scientist even before e became a statesman. He knew that great scienists—men like Arne Tiselius—were building peronally the bonds which would help unite nations n friendship equally as well as the relations beween their governments. And so, even when he ecame an official of government, he continued to ay the highest of tribute to the relations between he individual peoples themselves.

RESPONSE BY FOREIGN MINISTER UNDÉN

I am very glad, indeed, to accept on behalf of ny Government the medal that by authorization f the Congress of the United States has been reated in memory of the birth of Benjamin Franklin and of his distinguished service to science, the humanities, the arts, and enterprise.

Benjamin Franklin's great interest in a better nderstanding amongst nations is symbolized on he medal by the key that opens the ways of understanding in all directions. This seems to have een a guiding principle not only for Benjamin Franklin but also for other founding fathers of he American Revolution.

At an early stage Sweden grasped the significance of the American Revolution and realized that, in spite of all the initial difficulties of the young Nation, the independence of the American States was definitely achieved and that there were justified reasons to recognize this development. As a matter of fact, at the side of France, Sweden was the first country to recognize the United States by entering on April 3, 1783, the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce that we commemorate today.

When this decision had been taken, our Ambassador to France, Gustav Philip Creutz, who with Benjamin Franklin signed the agreement, wrote to King Gustaf III that he had received many compliments on the King's behalf because he "had been the first to procure for his country the advantage of entering into fruitful relations with this new republic."

It is evident by the diplomatic correspondence that Creutz shared his King's opinions and regarded this treaty as one of his great diplomatic feats.

Creutz was a very distinguished Swedish poet and a man of great vision. He saw in this treaty the beginning of a fruitful friendship between the United States and Sweden and a flourishing trade unhampered by unnecessary tariffs and regulations. But certainly he could not foresee that Benjamin Franklin and himself initiated an association that a hundred years later would bring millions of Swedish citizens to join in building up this great Nation of yours. I think it would be in the spirit of Benjamin Franklin to commemorate not only the treaty he signed but also all the close personal ties between citizens of our two countries.

Proposed Negotiations With Rumania

Press release 241 dated May 4

In a note delivered to the American Legation in Bucharest on March 7, 1956,[1] the Rumanian Government proposed that negotiations be opened in Bucharest on problems relating to the claims of some U.S. citizens, Rumanian assets in the United States, and trade relations between the United States and Rumania. In its note the Rumanian Government expressed the hope that such negotiations might lead to improved relations between the two countries.

The U.S. Government has now replied in a note dated April 28, 1956, delivered to the Rumanian Ministry for Foreign Affairs by the American Legation in Bucharest.[1] The note indicated that the U.S. Government is prepared to discuss the economic problems mentioned in the Rumanian note provided the Rumanian Government is prepared to discuss various other points at issue between the two Governments. The U.S. Govern-

[1] Not printed.

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ment has accordingly proposed that an exchange of memoranda be effected in which each Government would set forth in detail matters which each may deem appropriate for consideration, on the ground that such memoranda would serve the useful purpose of indicating whether there is sufficient basis for undertaking arrangements for negotiations.

United States Protests to Poland on Repatriation Activities

Press release 226 dated April 30

Department Announcement

Deputy Under Secretary Robert Murphy on April 30 handed to the Ambassador of the Polish People's Republic, Romuald Spasowski, a note referring to the Polish Government's attempts to prevail upon Polish nationals in this country to return to their native land. The note reaffirmed the U.S. Government's adherence to the principle of voluntary repatriation and its recognition of the right of a foreign diplomatic mission to normal intercourse with its citizens, but it was made clear that this Government will not tolerate unsolicited personal visits by representatives of the Warsaw regime on behalf of the Polish repatriation campaign.

This campaign has been conducted intensively for several months by the Polish Government throughout the free world by Communist radio and press, by propaganda sent through the mails, by letters signed by relatives and friends in Poland, and by telephone calls and personal visits by regime representatives bringing such letters with them. The campaign has met very little success thus far.

No Polish national in this country is prevented from having contact with Polish Government officials or from returning to Poland, if, of his own free will, he chooses to do so. But an uninvited visit exposes the Polish national in question, without his permission, to the overtures of a personal representative of a state exercising complete control over the lives of relatives and friends in Poland and hence affords the opportunity for pressure, intimidation, and coercion. The U.S. protest arises from this Government's determination not to permit police-state activity in this country and to make clear that the full protection of American laws extends to all aliens residin in the United States.

Text of Note to Polish Ambassador

The Secretary of State presents his com ments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Polish People's Republic and has the honor to m reference to the Polish Government's current f forts to induce Poles to return to Poland, wh h was the subject of the Ambassador's call on Dep y Under Secretary Murphy on November 7, 195

It has recently come to the attention of the partment that, in conducting that campaign, r resentatives of the Polish Government, includ g members of the Polish Embassy, are seeking t Polish nationals in this country and, in the cou e of unsolicited personal visits and by various me ods, are attempting to prevail upon them return to Poland. As one means of achieving t s purpose these Polish officials take advantage of fact that close relatives of such Polish nation still live in Poland, and have presented in pers letters bearing the signature of such relatives, though private correspondence would norma proceed by the regular mails.

As the Government of the Polish People's R public is aware, the United States Governme adheres to the concept of voluntary repatriatic This Government interposes no obstacles to t return to Poland of any persons who choose tl course.

The United States Government of course reco nizes, in principle and in practice, the right of foreign diplomatic missions in this country normal intercourse with their citizens.

The above-described activities of represent tives of the Polish Government, however, are n compatible with the principle of voluntary rep triation. Moreover, the United States Gover ment does not consider that these activities con within the scope of normal and accepted dipl matic practice. Attempts to exert pressure upc or to influence in this manner private persons li ing in this country are contrary to the traditio of democracy and individual freedom which pr vail in the United States.

It is therefore requested that Polish represent tives in this country cease immediately the obje tionable practice of unsolicited personal visits i furtherance of the Polish Government's repatri tion campaign.

ational Day of Poland

ss release 236 dated May 2

On May 3, the anniversary of Poland's Con-tution of 1791, all true Poles and their friends roughout the world have traditionally celebrated oland's national day. But in recent years May 3 s assumed an added significance. It has become lay on which the United States reaffirms its as-rances that it is not reconciled to the bondage Poland. And at the same time we ask the ople of Poland not to despair nor to succumb to e propaganda insinuation that their country has en forgotten.

May 3 is the day on which this country and the ople of Poland renew a mutual faith in freedom d in the strong bonds of friendship and common rpose which unite us across all the barriers the on Curtain imposes.

resident of Indonesia o Visit United States

The Department of State announced on May 4 ress release 240) that the itinerary has been com-eted for the State visit of Dr. Sukarno, President the Republic of Indonesia, who will arrive in ashington on May 16. President Eisenhower's vitation to President Sukarno to visit the United tates was extended by Secretary Dulles during s trip to Indonesia in March of this year.

After a 3-day visit in Washington, the President f the Indonesian Republic will begin an extended ur that will include Charlottesville, Va., Camp ope and Fort Bragg, N. C., Annapolis, New York ity, Philadelphia, Springfield, Ill., Detroit, rand Canyon National Park, Los Angeles, San rancisco, Salt Lake City, and Niagara Falls.

ssistant Secretary Allen o Visit Africa

ress release 233 dated May 3

George V. Allen, Assistant Secretary of State or Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Af-airs, will leave Washington on May 10 for a 3-eek tour of the west and central parts of Africa outh of the Sahara. Mr. Allen is making the ir trip to inform himself firsthand on recent de-elopments in this area. He will confer with U.S. Foreign Service officials and officials of the various countries and territories which he will visit during his tour.

Mr. Allen's tentative itinerary is as follows:

May 10	Leave Washington
May 12	Arrive Johannesburg, Pretoria (South Africa)
May 14	Arrive Capetown (South Africa)
May 16	Arrive Port Elizabeth, Durban (South Africa)
May 17	Arrive Lourenço Marques (Portuguese East Africa)
May 18	Arrive Salisbury (Southern Rhodesia)
May 21	Arrive N'dola (Northern Rhodesia)
May 22	Arrive Elisabethville, Léopoldville (Belgian Congo)
May 23	Arrive Accra (Gold Coast)
May 25	Arrive Lagos (Nigeria)
May 27	Arrive Monrovia (Liberia)
May 31	Arrive Dakar (French West Africa)
June 2	Arrive New York

Vice President Goulart of Brazil Visits United States

Following are the texts of remarks made on the arrival of the Vice President of Brazil, João Goulart, at Washington on April 30, and on his departure on May 3.

WELCOME AT NATIONAL AIRPORT

Press release 227 dated April 30

Remarks by Vice President Nixon

Mr. Vice President, it is a very great privilege for Mrs. Nixon and me and for members of our party to welcome you and Senhora Goulart to the United States. We recall with pleasure our visit to your country, and I remember particularly the great ovation you received on the occasion of your inauguration as Vice President of our great friendly Republic to the south. We know that this will be a very brief visit for you, but we trust that in every place you go in the United States you will receive the same kind of friendly welcome that, I can assure you, you will receive here today.

May I also express another hope. We have put on very special weather here today for you—very much like Rio at its best. We hope the sun al-

ways shines during the few days that you are in the United States for the balance of your visit. And now I know that your friends in this country and also your friends at home would like to hear some words from you.

Response by Vice President Goulart

Mr. Vice President, still very deeply moved on setting foot for the first time on the soil of the United States, in reply to a very generous invitation extended to me by the distinguished Vice President of the United States, Mr. Richard Nixon, I wish to thank you very deeply, personally and also on behalf of Mrs. Goulart and all the members of my party who are coming with me on this visit, for the very cordial welcome which has been extended to me by Vice President Nixon, on behalf of this great Nation.

At the same time I wish to bring here a most cordial salutation from the people of Brazil and from President Juscelino Kubitschek and also bring the salutation on behalf of the young generation of Brazilians who are uniting themselves with me in making ever stronger the traditional bonds of friendship that unite our two countries.

DEPARTURE FROM WASHINGTON

Press release 237 dated May 3

Remarks by Acting Secretary Hoover

Mr. Vice President, it has been an honor to have Your Excellency and Senhora Goulart as our guests in Washington. Your presence here has brought us personal pleasure and has strengthened the bonds which so strongly exist between our two countries.

As you travel across this country, you will become acquainted with many of the phases of American life—cattle raising in Texas, an occupation you already know so intimately, to American industrialization in its highest form, as you will see in Detroit. These experiences will, I am sure, point out the similarities between our peoples and our institutions that have served over so many years to unite Brazil and the United States in our common purposes.

On behalf of my Government I extend best wishes for a most pleasant journey to you and Senhora Goulart and all the members of your party. Goodbye and good luck.

Response by Vice President Goulart

On leaving now this city of Washington I [illegible] to express once more how grateful I am, not [illegible] personally but on behalf of my wife and mem[illegible] of my party, for the kind and generous hospit[illegible] which was shown to us at every moment bot[illegible] the people and by the Government of the Ur[illegible] States. I am leaving now for what is the equ[illegible]lent of the State of Rio Grande do Sul in Br[illegible] that is the State of Texas.

I want to thank all of you for the gene[illegible] hospitality and to express once more the deep [illegible]isfaction that I experienced from the very [illegible] moment that I set foot in this generous cour[illegible] I am very sure that this visit will forge an [illegible] stronger link in the solid relationships that l[illegible] united and will always unite the United St[illegible] and Brazil.

I am very grateful to Under Secretary Ho[illegible] for the very kind words that he has just said, [illegible] I also want to extend my thanks to the dis[illegible]guished labor leaders that I have had the pl[illegible]ure of meeting here in Washington who s[illegible]rounded me and the members of my party wit[illegible] much friendship. I feel that the friends[illegible] shown by the labor leaders is also a manifesta[illegible] of the very strong bonds that do and should u[illegible] the workers of Brazil with their fellow worl[illegible] in the United States.

I would also like to ask Under Secretary Ho[illegible] to convey my thanks to the great President of [illegible] country, President Eisenhower, and also to tra[illegible]mit a message of friendship to my good friend [illegible] President Nixon. And once more, I am v[illegible] grateful for this magnificent welcome that I [illegible]ceived in this land that is a stanch friend [illegible] my own country.

Surplus Commodity Agreement Signed With Paraguay

Press release 231 dated May 2

The United States and Paraguay on Ma[illegible] signed an agreement authorizing the sale to Pa[illegible]guay, through private U.S. traders, of wheat, flo[illegible], edible oils, lard, and dairy products to a to[illegible] value of $2,600,000. The agreement also cov[illegible] ocean freight in the amount of $400,000. Th[illegible] sales are being made under authority and pro[illegible]sions of the Agricultural Trade Development a[illegible] Assistance Act of 1954, as amended. The agr[illegible]

ent was signed at Asunción by the Foreign Min-
ter of Paraguay, Hipolito Sanchez Quell, and
e American Ambassador, Arthur A. Ageton.
This agreement provides that payment under the
les program will be made in Paraguayan cur-
ncy. A part of the currency accruing will be
rmarked for loans designed to contribute to Paraguay's economic development and will be payable in dollars or Paraguayan currency under the terms of a supplemental loan agreement which will be concluded at a later date. The balance will be reserved for the use of the United States in Paraguay.

he Ideals of Woodrow Wilson

by Walter S. Robertson
Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs [1]

Had I been told 38 years ago that I was to have
e honor to represent President Eisenhower on
is occasion, I should have been a frightened,
azed, and awestruck young man—frightened
the role I personally must play today, amazed
at an unknown young second lieutenant of in-
ntry by the name of Eisenhower was destined
r a mighty role in world affairs which would
nd him in the White House, and awestruck by
e magic name of Wilson.

At that time President Wilson was my Com-
nder in Chief, albeit a remote one. I was a
wly embryo second lieutenant at an air-service
ing school. I had a fervent admiration for what
oodrow Wilson stood for and for the man him-
f, whose ideals, integrity, and eloquence had
ven the military participation of the United
ates in the First World War a character it could
rcely otherwise have had.

It has been suggested that my admiration for
oodrow Wilson may not be unrelated to the fact
at he was born in Virginia, in this historic and
vely town of Staunton. This allegation I pro-
st, though I must admit to a prejudiced view
here Virginians are concerned, and certainly my
miration for Mr. Wilson is in no way lessened
the proud circumstance of his birth.

While Wilson was taken to Georgia at an early
e—too early for him to have any say-so in the matter—and did not return to his native State until he entered the law school of the University of Virginia, he has always appeared to me to stand in a tradition of statesmanship to which Virginia has so richly contributed. He was a man of high ideals, unyielding moral convictions, strong emotions, and great intellect—a man who combined a bearing that tended to the aristocratic with a belief in democratic representative government that had in it an almost religious purpose. In his two terms as President, through the "new freedom" as he called it, he advanced to new goals the cause for which our Nation was founded—the cause of freedom and opportunity for all its citizens. In the principles he proclaimed in taking our Nation into full participation in world affairs—into war—he awakened hopes among the subject peoples of autocracies everywhere, giving the name of our country a force and magic in other lands it had not possessed since the days of the American Revolution and the early years of the Republic. In his address to Congress asking a declaration of war, he proclaimed:

> . . . we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts,—for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own Governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free. To such a task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we are and everything that we have, with the pride of those who know that the day

[1] Address made at the Woodrow Wilson Centennial
lebration at Staunton, Va., on Apr. 28 (press release
4 dated Apr. 25).

Woodrow Wilson Centennial Year

A PROCLAMATION[1]

WHEREAS Woodrow Wilson, the twenty-eighth President of the United States, gave to this Nation and to the world a concept of peace based on justice and freedom and supported by the brotherhood of man; and

WHEREAS this scholar, educator, and statesman led the United States successfully through the ordeal of a devastating war, which was fought to preserve those high principles which this Nation cherishes; and

WHEREAS Woodrow Wilson's outstanding character, his devotion to his country's service, his efforts to strengthen the Government and to promote the public welfare, his dependence upon divine guidance, and his unfailing confidence in our system of free government and the ultimate wisdom of the American people, are a lasting inspiration to the Nation; and

WHEREAS the year 1956 marks the one hundredth anniversary of the birth of Woodrow Wilson, and the Congress, by a joint resolution approved August 30, 1954, 68 Stat. 964, established the Woodrow Wilson Centennial Celebration Commission to develop plans for commemorating that event; and by a joint resolution approved April 27, 1956, has authorized and requested the President to issue a proclamation inviting the people of the United States to observe the anniversary with appropriate ceremonies:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America, do hereby call upon the people of the United States to observe the centennial of the birth of Woodrow Wilson; and I urge interested individuals and organizations, both private and governmental, to participate in appropriate ceremonies during 1956 designed to honor and commemorate his life, his ideals, and his concern for the freedom of peoples throughout the world.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this twenty-seventh day of April in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and fifty-six, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eightieth.

[SEAL]

Dwight D. Eisenhower

By the President:
JOHN FOSTER DULLES
Secretary of State

[1] No. 3134; 21 *Fed. Reg.* 2913.

has come when America is privileged to spend her blo and her might for the principles that gave her birt and happiness and the peace which she has treasure God helping her, she can do no other.

In the past 15 years we have come far clos to Wilson than we had been in the 20 years th followed his administration—20 years durin which many dedicated Americans earnestly tried t believe that what went on beyond the oceans nee not concern or disturb us. In these past 15 yea we have lived in a divided world. Also confronte with a divided world, Wilson, in April 1917, mad his fateful choice and led the Nation out of it traditional isolation. Most of us can remembe back to the 1920's when, in reaction to the idea ism of the war years, some spoke with derisio of the contention that World War I had bee fought "to make the world safe for democracy. Certainly, we have since then paid a fearful pric in pursuit of that ideal. We have had t learn once more that when Wilson said "the worl must be made safe for democracy" he was expres ing a necessary and transcendent objective of ou Nation's foreign policy, the end we still mus achieve if we mean to survive. Since then w have been confronted with two new mortal chal lenges to democracy, and one of them faces u today stronger than ever.

An Invincible Belief in Man

Much has been said and written about the fear ful ideological contests of our generation, nazis and communism. Clearly the survival of free dom is the basic issue in these contests. But wh do some men believe passionately in freedom whil to others freedom is an object of contempt an ridicule? The answer, it seems to me, is power fully suggested in the character of Woodrow Wil son. Wilson's life, his writings, his actions ar illuminated by an unmistakable and invincibl belief in man himself and in his promise, a con viction that man is worthy of justice and liberty To a large degree, I think—perhaps more tha we sometimes like to admit—our estimate of man kind reflects what we have, all unconsciously, ob served of our own selves. In the high estima tion of humanity that inspired the battles Wilso fought, it seems to me that we can read the reflec tion of a nature that was itself generous, imagina tive, creative, courageous. Can we conceive of Hitler or a Stalin respecting his fellow man o

·onsidering him as other than corruptible, devoid ›f integrity and soul, not to be trusted outside ·onfinement?

There were those in Wilson's lifetime who con-idered that he had altogether too much confidence n mankind. They accused him of being an dealist. He replied that, if he was an idealist, it vas because he was an American.

It was to be Wilson's destiny to give American 'oreign policy the most important redefinition it ıad had in three-quarters of a century, since its onndations had been established as the avoidance f involvement in the affairs of the Old World, he Monroe Doctrine, and "manifest destiny."

Wilson's first serious problem of foreign policy rose as a result of the seizure of power in Mexico y General Huerta. It was an instructive prob-em, for in it two principles, both recognized as alid by Wilson, were at cross-purposes. He felt e could not promote the establishment of order h Mexico by supporting Huerta. "We have no vmpathy," Wilson wrote, "with those who seek ɔ seize the power and government to advance heir own personal interests." And Huerta had chieved control of the government by assassinat-ıg his predecessor. On the other hand, while he elt it necessary after provocations by Huerta to ınd an American force at Vera Cruz to prevent ıe unloading of weapons from a German ship, ıe prospect of a military campaign against Iuerta was equally unthinkable to him. In the rcumstances he welcomed and quickly accepted n offer of mediation from the so-called ABC owers—Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. In doing ›, Wilson recognized the desirability of making a onflict between two governments a matter of gitimate interest and concern to the larger com-ıunity, thus spreading a responsibility which a ngle nation could scarcely hope to discharge ithout arousing dangerous and lasting bitterness r being drawn into costly hostilities.

While disorder continued in Mexico and gave Vilson considerably more trouble, the experience f cooperation between the United States and the BC powers gave rise to a highly significant move ›ward the establishment of more active security easures in the Western Hemisphere. The essence f an agreement drafted by Wilson to this end ıd discussed with the ABC powers was: "Mutual uarantees of political independence under re-ublican form of government and mutual guar-ıtees of territorial integrity." The wording of this article strongly suggests the covenant of the League of Nations. The idea of a Pan American security agreement was itself absorbed in the greater concept of a world organization.

When world war came in Europe, Wilson was primarily concerned to keep our Nation out of it. He had been 8 years old at the end of the War Between the States and had seen at firsthand in Georgia the horror that follows in the wake of war. It made a terrible and lasting impression upon him. His devotion to peace was genuine and compelling. However, he angrily denied that mere safety was the object of the neutrality he urged. Rather he considered it the obligation of the one great Nation that could "play a part of impartial mediation and speak the counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan, but as a friend." Wilson's counsel to the American people that they be "impartial in thought as well as in action" may sound impractical to some today, but we must reflect that it was the rivalry of two empires in the Balkans—those of the Hapsburgs and Romanoffs—that touched off the war. It is not surprising that Wilson should have seen it in the beginning as an outgrowth of imperialistic conflict and secret diplomacy.

American Peace Efforts

With both sides infringing America's neutral rights on the seas, Wilson deduced speedily that the main hope of keeping the United States out of the war was to bring it to a negotiated end. His personal representative, Colonel House, explored with the belligerents in 1914, 1915, and 1916 the possibility of finding enough common ground between them to warrant the calling of a peace conference. Wilson's own personal appeals for a compromise peace culminated in his request to both sides in December 1916 for a statement of war aims as a basis for a possible settlement. In the light of what followed, the refusal of the contestants even to be explicit about what they were fighting for, let alone to attempt seriously to compromise their differences, must seem to us as tragic madness. By contrast, Wilson's statesmanship stands out as mature and inspired. He could not have tried harder than he did to bring about "peace without victory," but no man could have held back the tide of events which was to follow—the sacrifice of more hundreds and thousands of lives, the achievement of power by the Communists in Russia, the internal collapse of Ger-

many, and the eventual rise of nazism, bringing upon Europe another and near-fatal war.

The failure of American peace efforts early in 1917 accompanied by the declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare by the Germans made the abandonment of American neutrality inevitable. President Wilson explained the historic change in our policy in these words:

> We tried to persuade ourselves that the European business was not our business. We tried to convince ourselves that no matter what happened on the other side of the sea, no obligation of duty rested upon us, and finally we found the currents of humanity too strong for us. We found that a great consciousness was welling up in us that this was not a . . . struggle which was to be confined to Europe . . . but that it was something that involved the very fate of civilization; and there was one great nation in the world that could not afford to stay out of it.

Recognizing the hideous destructiveness of modern war and the certainty that the United States would inevitably be drawn into any major war of the future, Wilson was determined that the hostilities in which the United States was then involved had to be concluded by a workable peace settlement and effective measures to prevent the recurrence of war. Even as early as May 1916, at a conference of the League To Enforce Peace, which had been organized the year before under ex-President Taft, he said, "We are participants whether we like it or not in the life of the world. The interests of all nations are our own also, we are partners with the rest. . . . The nations of the world have become each other's neighbors." He declared that the United States should become "a partner in any feasible association of nations formed to realize these objectives and make them secure against violation."

The Fourteen Points

The war took on a new character with our entry into it. In his Flag Day address of June 1917 the President made dramatically clear that it was the "military masters of Germany who denied us the right to be neutral" that we were fighting and not the German people, "themselves in the grip of the same sinister power that has stretched its ugly talons out and drawn blood from us." He went on to declare: "This is the People's war, a war for freedom and justice and self-government amongst all the nations of the world, a war to make the world safe for the people who live upon it . . . the German people themselves included."

In pursuit of his lofty objective he proposed th Fourteen Points as a basis for the cessation o fighting and the making of peace. In these point he dealt concretely with the most urgent problem of the peace and, last of all, with his most preciou proposal for "a general association of nations . . affording mutual guarantees of political inde pendence and territorial integrity to great an small states alike."

This historic peace program was a poten weapon of war in the hands of the President. It psychological effect was overpowering. It was bombshell in the ranks of the enemy, seriousl undermining German morale in the closing year of the war.

On the basis of these principles, the German sued for peace in October 1918—instead of makin a last stand and fighting on for, as Marshal Focl thought they might have, "maybe three, mayb four or five months. Who knows?"

At that point, with the defeat of Germany, th struggle with the Allies began. The Allies ha never taken the Fourteen Points seriously. Cle menceau had never troubled to read them. Speak ing to the Chamber of Deputies in late December Clemenceau said: "There was an old system whicl seems to be condemned today and to which I d not fear to say that I remain a faithful adheren at this time . . . this system—solid frontiers . . and balance of power seems to be condemned b certain other high authorities." And he adde that "this system of alliances" would be his guid ing principle at the peace conference.

Wilson had warned the so-called "realists" o what could be expected from imposing a punitiv peace upon the German people. Such a peace, h said, would be "accepted in humiliation unde duress . . . and would leave a sting, a resentment a bitter memory upon which terms of peace woul rest, not permanently, but only as upon quick sand." It was a prophetic utterance.

Wilson has been pictured as having failed lamentably at the peace conference. Actually, th final settlement would have been far more short sighted had it not been for the stand he had taken He saved the Germans from having to pay the en tire cost of the war. He obtained general recogni tion that colonial peoples were not chattels whe he gained acceptance of the system of mandate for the former German colonies. He obtained a undertaking by Japan to restore Shantung Prov ince to China. The primary obstacle to the ap plication of Wilsonian principles was actually no

he unregeneracy of the other members of the Council of Four but the unregeneracy of the complicated facts of Europe's situation. Wilson had o recognize, as his heirs have had to recognize, hat the pursuit of high principle can in some ituations lead into contradiction. This does not nean that there is no higher morality in international relations—as some whose minds are on the ontradictions would have us believe—but only hat a higher morality is not simple to apply and hat sometimes its application requires great atience.

It was in part because he foresaw the inevitable mperfections of the settlement that Wilson insisted that the Covenant of the League of Nations hould be included in the peace treaty and not be eft for subsequent consideration after the peace erms had been given to Germany. The League of Nations was, he exclaimed "in a sense the most essential part of the peace settlement itself," for he League, he said, "is necessary to guarantee the eace; and the peace cannot be guaranteed as an fterthought." On this issue, over bitter opposition from Allied quarters and over opposition even rom within his own delegation, the President on a spectacular and most significant victory. On April 28, 1919, 37 years ago today, the Paris Peace Conference adopted the final draft of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

President Wilson's defeat came not in Paris but t home. It is not my purpose to explore here the auses of that rejection. No one can question the arnest patriotism of the opposition. No one can uestion that the blame must be shared. It is nough for us to recall that on July 28, 1945, the United States Senate voted in favor of American embership in the League's successor, the United Nations, vindicating Woodrow Wilson's ideals by e startling vote of 89 to 2. We had by then paid copious measure for our failure to join the eague that Wilson had created.

In the 1930's when aggressor nations struck at Manchuria and Ethiopia, the League of Nations roved unequal to the challenge. Thus, when World War II came upon us, we had to learn gain that there are "currents of humanity too rong for us" and that we could not remain apart rom a "struggle . . . that involved the very fate f civilization."

We were not to make the same mistake again. We helped create the United Nations and joined wholeheartedly. And when the ominous pattern of the past began to reemerge with the attack in June 1950 upon the Republic of Korea and it was clear that once more the "rights and liberties of small nations" were at stake, we did not hesitate. As the leader of a great coalition of the United Nations we made amends for Manchuria and Ethiopia. By repelling the aggression, we stemmed a tide that could have led only to a third world war.

Impress of Wilsonian Ideals

In recalling a few outstanding examples of Woodrow Wilson's approach to international relations, I have tried to define the meaning that Wilson's policies have for us today; for Wilson's approach to world problems was, in a fundamental sense, to shape the character of our response to such problems for as long as we can see ahead. Wilson had to lead a people naive and inexperienced in international affairs, still speaking in terms of doctrines that were appropriate enough for the weak seaboard Republic of the early 19th century but wholly inadequate for the giant who straddled a continent and would inevitably greatly influence the shape of the future world. After our false start toward imperialism in the Philippine venture—an outgrowth of the war with Spain—Wilson enabled us to find ourselves in terms of what we really are and of the reality of the world at large.

It is the test of great men that they affect substantially the way a people thinks of itself—the image it has of itself. It is also the function of great men to refine and elevate that image.

The picture we have of ourselves as Americans and to which we feel we must live up in our conduct with other peoples bears indelibly the impress of Wilsonian ideals. "The United States," Wilson declared in Mobile in 1913, "will never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest." This has become axiomatic with us. Some who today are strongly attracted by the notion of "realism" in the conduct of foreign affairs might reject a statement made by Wilson in that same speech that "it is a very perilous thing to determine the foreign policy of a nation in the terms of material interest." Yet in our hearts most of us agree that material interest alone is not a standard high enough for this Nation. There is a cause of humanity, and the obligation has been laid upon us by our favored circumstances and the vision of our great leaders to serve

it. It is not in all cases a clear cause. Sometimes its currents divide and seem to run at cross-purposes. Sometimes it makes irreconcilable demands. And yet it is always there and in a larger perspective has a true and ascertainable course.

We may not always succeed in promoting the cause of cooperation and collective security for all peoples. We may not always succeed in achieving "the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own Governments." We are not allwise or more than human.

Yet when we fall short, we shall know no rest. We are like a people to whom a whisper of infinite possibilities has been vouchsafed, and for us there is no way station where we may tarry in contentment. The voices of the great spokesmen for the American ideal—all who have ever lived—continue to make their demands of us, like an inspiration, like a conscience, impelling us to the sacrifice of 35,000 of our most precious lives in Korea, to the contribution of $60 billion in 10 years to the war-stricken and the underprivileged of other lands. Among these voices will always be that of Woodrow Wilson, speaking to us of that "universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free."

I shall close with the last words spoken by Mr. Wilson in public, on the occasion of Armistice Day, 1923, to a small crowd that had formed outside his house:

"I cannot refrain from saying it: I am not one of those who have the least anxiety about the triumph of the principles I have stood for. . . . That we shall prevail is as sure as that God reigns."

Visa Applications Cut Off for Refugees of Chinese Ethnic Origin

Press release 230 dated May 1

Because of heavy oversubscription of the 2,000 visas allotted by the Refugee Relief Act to refugees of Chinese ethnic origin, whose passports for travel to the United States must be endorsed by the Government of the Republic of China, the Department of State announced on May 1 that it would accept no new applications for visas after midnight, May 7, 1956. The Chinese Government discontinued acceptance of applications for endorsed passports by Chinese refugees wishing to apply under the Refugee Relief Act as of noon, April 17, 1956. At that time, the Chines Government had already received 3,500 applica tions for the allotment of 2,000 visas.

In instructions to the consulates, Pierce . Gerety, Deputy Administrator of the Refugee Re lief Program, emphasized that:

1. The cutoff would not apply to orphan ap plicants residing in the Far East who are proc essed under another section of the act.

2. The cutoff would not apply to nonindiger ous refugees residing in the Far East. Thes cases are also processed under another section c the Refugee Relief Act.

3. Although assurances for Chinese ethnic re ugees received after the cutoff date will not b processed under the Refugee Relief Act, suc assurances will be sent to the appropriate cor sular authorities to permit the applicant to es tablish a priority registration date under th normal annual quota of the Immigration an Nationality Act.

As of April 20, 1956, the total worldwide issu ance of visas under the Refugee Relief Act wa 100,936.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

84th Congress, 1st Session

United States Technical Assistance and Related Acti ties in Latin America. Hearings before a subcor mittee of the House Committee on Governme Operations. October 10–28, 1955. 685 pp.

84th Congress, 2d Session

Amendment to Refugee Relief Act of 1953. Heari before the subcommittee of the Senate Committee on t Judiciary on S. 2248, a bill to amend the Refugee Reli Act of 1953, so as to permit the issuance of visas 20,000 persons of Armenian ethnic origin. Janua 18, 1956. 35 pp.

The United States and International Health. Hearin before a subcommittee of the House Committee on I terstate and Foreign Commerce. February 8 and 1956. 95 pp.

East-West Trade. Hearings before the Permanent Su committee on Investigations of the Senate Committ on Government Operations. Part 1, February 1 March 6, 1956. 287 pp.

Control and Reduction of Armaments. Hearing before subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign I lations pursuant to S. Res. 93 and 185, 84th Congre Part 3, March 7, 1956, 80 pp.; Part 4, March 15, 19 33 pp.; Part 5, April 9, 1956, 137 pp.

Niagara Redevelopment Act of 1956. Report togeth with individual views and minority views to acco pany S. 1823. S. Rept. 1408, March 9, 1956. 30 pp.

ixth Annual Honor Awards Ceremony

On April 27 the Department of State held its xth annual honor awards ceremony at Constitu-on Hall, Washington, D.C. Following are texts f remarks made by the Vice President and Sec-tary Dulles at the ceremony.[1]

EMARKS BY SECRETARY DULLES

ess release 222 dated April 27

This occasion is a double honor.

We are honored by the presence of our Vice resident, who has made his own record of dis-nguished service in his work toward gaining the ood will and understanding of leaders and peo-es of other nations around the world.

We are honored also to be here today to honor ose among our number who have been chosen r recognition of outstanding service to our De-artment and our Nation.

We have come to recognize some who, in hard-ip or personal injury or even facing the risk of ath, have carried on their duties with dedica-on and courage in far places. Characteristic of ese is one who disregarded serious injuries suf-red in an airplane crash in Austria to salvage a plomatic pouch from the burning wreckage and en refused all medical attention until he was le to deliver the pouch into safe hands.

We recognize others who in less dramatic but less essential ways have carried out their re-sonsibilities with industry and with loyalty and ility of the highest order. In particular do we nor one among these whose recent death came a shock to us all, who as Deputy Assistant Sec-ary and Budget Officer displayed patience, skill, d devotion to duty in handling difficult and com-x responsibilities.

[1] For a list of individuals and units honored for out-nding performance, see press release 218 dated Apr. 26 t printed).

When President Eisenhower met with us for the award ceremonies in 1954, he pointed out that in his previous career he had attended many ceremonies rewarding military personnel for unusual ability, devotion, and dedication. But he said to us in the field of diplomacy that "in my conviction your work is now more important than theirs."[2]

The recent shift in the tactics of the Communist dictatorship from warlike to more peaceful means of aggression cannot but shift the main burden of the contest for the world upon the processes—and therefore upon the people—of diplomacy.

The President said further that in selecting one man for an award we must pass over another, or several others, whose service in the face of hardship, danger, or privation should entitle him also to recognition.

In the time that I have served as Secretary of State I have come to realize more and more how much the accomplishment of those of us in the public eye depends upon the devotion and ability of many, many people upon whom the spotlight may never focus.

In no sense does this fact lessen the honor of those of you who are here to receive awards today. But it means that the awards we give to you are symbols of the awards we owe to the many who, like you, have served our country honorably and well.

Many of those receiving awards this year are members of the Foreign Service, now on duty overseas. Their awards will be conferred on them at their posts.

Our ceremony today reaffirms an honorable tradition of service to the Nation. The achievements to which we pay tribute are but a few expressions of the spirit of our Department and Service and of their high standard of performance. Our fu-

[2] BULLETIN of Nov. 1, 1954, p. 636.

ture success will depend upon this spirit and upon the maintenance of this standard. At future ceremonies like this one I know that others of you here today, and many more besides, will step forward to receive recognition for your part in making this Nation stronger and this world a place of true and lasting peace.

It is now with pride and pleasure that I present to you the Honorable Richard M. Nixon, Vice President of the United States.

REMARKS BY MR. NIXON

Press release 223 dated April 27

The Secretary, in his usually concise manner, has stated virtually everything that I perhaps could have said on this occasion to reflect my own views with regard to those of you who are to receive awards today as well as those others in the Department who are here to witness the award ceremony. But I would like to speak a bit from personal experience, Mr. Secretary, and the rest of you, if you will allow me just a moment for that purpose.

When the State Department came before the Congressional Appropriations Committee last year, I testified on behalf of the representation fund. I spoke from personal experience after having visited countries abroad as a member of the Herter Committee in 1947 and since that time as Vice President, in 1953, 1955, and 1956. To me it is almost an incredible performance when some of the members of the Appropriations Committees of the House and the Senate—they are, I believe, generally in the minority—fail even to understand, first, the great service that is being rendered, and, secondly, the fact that the United States position in the world today requires that we be represented abroad not only by the best in personnel but also by those who have adequate facilities and adequate means to represent this country as it should be represented in the high councils in which we participate.

Now, as I said, I gave testimony to that effect previously and I make that statement again today from personal experience.

It has not been my privilege to meet those to whom I will give awards or any of the others who will receive their awards from the Secretary of State later in the meeting today. But I have had a chance to see members of the Department here in Washington at briefing sessions which I ha attended prior to trips I have taken, and to those who have traveled with me, and, final to see those in the outposts all over the world w have handled this business for Mrs. Nixon and r Ever since I have been Vice President she has be along on the visits we have made to those cou tries, and on those occasions these things have i pressed me.

Of course, as the President mentioned in remarks in 1954 and as the Secretary reiterat there are those who properly should rece awards for exceptionally meritorious performa but there are literally thousands of others w must do the day-by-day work in the Departm who should also have recognition.

I recall back in 1947, when I was a very gr Congressman traveling in Europe, how impres I was to be entertained by the then Ambassa to Italy, James Dunn, and his wife, and also h very grateful I was to a man who was then a me ber of the staff of the Ambassador of Italy, Jo nie Jones, and his wife. I remember t Jones—we were there 2 weeks—on two occasi invited the whole subcommittee to his home we had dinner with them and had a wonder time. I think Johnnie will recall we had a pi and it was one of the rare times when I pla the piano and the others gathered around sang. I, of course, don't usually bring that up political campaigns.

The illustration of this is obvious. W VIP's travel around the world or when Americans travel, members of the staffs of embassies abroad, as well as members of the s here in Washington, have extra work to Mimeograph machines have to be run to get the schedules, based on what country you hap to be visiting, and arrangements have to be m for luncheons and dinners and the like. And I just say, speaking from my own experience, t for all of those here in Washington and abr who have done that day-to-day work, work wh I assume must be most boring and work whic assume must require mature judgment, may I that those of us on the Hill, as well as the m other Americans—tourists, businessmen, etc.— eternally grateful.

I can only add that as we look at the State partment and its personnel today and as the Se tary has already suggested, as we consider financial remuneration you receive, the w

hich you do is truly a labor of love. It isn't even labor in which recognition is always received, hat is, the kind of recognition that will shortly be itnessed by everybody in this room. But as the ecretary has indicated, as the Communist dictatorship around the world seems to be shifting heir tactics, the work of those who are skilled in he arts of peace becomes increasingly more important. That means that the future of the nited States, of free peoples and people who ant to be free all over the world, is in the hands f the diplomats and all of those who work in the epartment with the diplomats and in the embassies around the world.

I know that the performance which you have reviously given will continue to be at its high evel. May I express, on behalf of the Congress, nd I think I can speak for both Houses, having een a member of both, and for the administration, nd also may I speak for the American people in xpressing appreciation to all of the personnel in he Department of State in Washington and broad for what you have done.

To those of you who have engaged in special ctivities which deserve special recognition, of ourse, special appreciation is due. But many imes in this life, as we all are aware, the test of person, of his ability, of his character, is not n doing the things that are dramatic, not in doing he things that are heroic, but in doing the things hich are difficult to do. As I put it sometimes ore simply, the real test is doing the thing you on't like to do rather than doing the things you ke to do, and we all, each day we live, encounter little of both.

I would not want this opportunity to pass without saying one word also about the man immediately preceding me on the rostrum. I read over the st of those who received awards and his name as not among them. But he, of course, is the ecretary of State, and as such he receives recognion, recognition from many quarters, depending n the point of view of those who want to recogize him.

I should like to say just this word about the ecretary of State. In a political campaign obously we both, Republicans and Democrats, are artisan and in the general course of events say r Secretary of State is a great Secretary of State. happen to believe that myself personally. I so will agree that it is not possible, when we talk out or discuss great events which are occurring at this time, to judge the performance of a man until many years later. But this much I am sure of, as far as our present Secretary of State is concerned, there is no member of the President's Cabinet who has more stamina; there is no member of the President's Cabinet who works harder; there is no member of the President's Cabinet who is more devoted to his duty than the present Secretary of State. I would also like to add that as far as those three elements are concerned, elements which generally are decisive in determining whether a performance is good or goes beyond that point and is great, there is no question where our present Secretary of State will stand.

Speaking to that point, as I conclude, I have noted references that I am supposed to have considerable stamina and that is attributed to the fact that I am relatively young. I am supposed to be able to travel many miles in airplanes and still be able to go on traveling and speaking, but, believe me, I could not have possibly done what the Secretary of State has done in the past few years. Not only has he traveled the many miles he has, but here is a man who writes all the speeches he makes, and that, believe me, is a very unusual accomplishment, and one above and beyond the call of duty.

Advisers Report to President on Tariff Negotiations

White House press release dated May 4

Following is the text of a statement made to President Eisenhower on May 4 by the non-Governmental advisers to the U.S. delegation negotiating tariff agreements at Geneva.[1]

Having had an opportunity to observe at first hand the tariff negotiations now drawing to a conclusion at Geneva, we are happy to report to you that the interests of our country have been well served. We have been greatly impressed by the competence of the career men from the nine de-

[1] The advisers were Elliott V. Bell, editor and publisher of *Business Week* and chairman of the Executive Committee, McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., Inc.; Homer L. Brinkley, executive vice president, National Council of Farmer Cooperatives; Bryant Essick, president of the Essick Manufacturing Co., Los Angeles, Calif.; and Stanley N. Ruttenberg, director of research, AFL–CIO. For the announcement of their appointment, see BULLETIN of Jan. 16, 1956, p. 96.

partments and agencies of the Government who have handled these important negotiations. The members of the Trade Agreements Committee, particularly, have worked long hours for many months with a high degree of concentration and effort.

We were particularly impressed with the unfailing concern of our negotiators to advance the broad interests of the United States. By no stretch of the imagination could the tariff negotiations, as we observed them, be called a giveaway program. The entire program is, of course, based upon reciprocal concessions, and we found our negotiating teams and the Trade Agreements Committee to be bargaining in what seemed to us to be the best Yankee tradition. They insisted on obtaining concessions of full value for each concession made by the United States. There is great need for a better public knowledge of these facts.

The hard work and intelligence that went into the tariff negotiations are the more noteworthy because the present tariff session, following upon earlier negotiations, was restricted to a comparatively narrow range of trading. It required patience and persistence on the part of our representatives to obtain the many important agreements that are being reached.

On the basis of our observations in Geneva, we are strongly of the opinion that there is need for the permanent administrative machinery that is provided for in the proposed Organization for Trade Cooperation. The adoption of this administrative machinery subscribed to by all the interested nations would clearly be in our enlightened self-interest. It would help make all our trade agreements more truly reciprocal. It would also strengthen both the resolve and ability of the member nations to continue their efforts toward an expanding and mutually profitable world trade. It would provide an effective, continuously operating instrument in giving fuller effect to existing commitments to remove such trade barriers as currency restrictions, quotas, discriminatory taxes, and other indirect devices that limit the exchange of our goods with other nations. Failure on the part of the United States, the world's greatest trading nation, to join in setting up this organization would cause great dismay and disappointment throughout the free world at a time when the Soviet Union is stepping up its foreign economic efforts.

Accordingly, we wish to support very strongly your recommendation for adherence by the Unit States to the OTC.

We appreciate deeply the opportunity that h been given us to participate as observers in the tariff negotiations. It has been for all of us a interesting and rewarding experience.

Agreement With Germany on Motion Picture Films

Press release 219 dated April 26

Representatives of the United States and tl Federal Republic of Germany signed on Apr 26 at Bonn an agreement, negotiated under artic XXVIII of the General Agreement on Tarif and Trade (GATT), making certain changes in tl German tariff concession affecting motion pictu films.

The new agreement eliminates a clause in tl German GATT schedule which provided amor other things that if the Germans established "screen quota" for domestic films—that is, a quo guaranteeing to their own film producers a ce tain percentage of theater exhibition time—th would not make such quota higher than 27 pe cent.

In compensation for this withdrawal, Germar agreed: (1) until December 31, 1957 (extendib for another year unless specifically denounced not to impose any restrictions upon the importatic or exhibition of foreign films in Germany th would not be applied in a like manner to domest films, and (2) should a screen quota be establish after the above period and should, in addition, tl German foreign-exchange position warrant tl imposition of further prohibitions or restriction the latter would be imposed only on the transf of earnings. This second obligation may be d nounced in any year.

Article XXVIII of the general agreement pe mits contracting parties under specified circun stances to withdraw or modify concessions pr viously granted. These concessions normally tal the form of reductions in tariff rates or of agre ments not to increase tariff rates, but sometim embody other specific commitments. When country invokes article XXVIII, as Germany d in the present case, it holds negotiations with tl country with which the concession was original negotiated and with other countries having a su stantial trade interest in the concession. A pu

e of this negotiation is to endeavor to maintain previous level of reciprocal concessions.

'he results of the present negotiations provided the elimination of the following note to tariff ı 3708 (other cinematograph film exposed or eloped) in the German GATT schedule:

ıould the Federal Republic of Germany establish a en quota for the exhibition of films of German origin, Federal Republic would then not maintain or estab- any prohibitions or restrictions (other than non-dis- ıinatory rates or other charges), whether made ef- ıve through quotas, import or export licenses or other sures, on the importation of films which are the luct of any other contracting party. Furthermore, ıld the Federal Republic establish such screen quota, should not exceed 27 percent.

is, however, confirmed herewith that, should a screen ı be instituted as indicated above, and in case the ıan foreign exchange position demands prohibitions estrictions these can only be effected through the transfer of proceeds.

he text of the agreement follows.

EMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND E FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY REGARDING FILMS

le 1

e United States of America agrees to the entire elimi- n of the note to Tariff No. 3708 of Schedule XXXIII e General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade with re- to a screen time quota for the exhibition of foreign in the Federal Republic of Germany.

le 2

e Federal Republic of Germany agrees not to impose ther or more burdensome conditions or requirements the importation of foreign films into or their exhibi- in the territory of the Federal Republic until Decem- 1, 1957, unless they are measures which apply in the manner to domestic and foreign films. The period e undertaking in this article will be automatically ded for a further period of one year unless specifi- denounced by either party before September 30, 1957. Contracting Parties agree that this obligation does xclude the application of Article XIX of the General ment on Tariffs and Trade.

ıle 3

ould a screen time quota be instituted after the ex- ion of the period mentioned in Article 2 and, in this should the German exchange position demand pro- ons or restrictions, these can only be imposed igh the non-transfer of proceeds. This undertaking e denounced in any year up until the 30th of Septem- vith effect on December 31 of that year.

rtle 4

h Contracting Parties specifically reserve all rights ıg from Article XXIII of the General Agreement on ıfs and Trade.

rtle 5

is Agreement also applies to the Land Berlin, which for the purpose of the Agreement comprises only those areas over which the Berlin Senat exercises jurisdiction, provided that within three months following the effective date of the Agreement, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany shall have furnished to the Government of the United States of America a written notification that all legal procedures necessary for the application of the present Agreement in Berlin have been complied with.

Article 6

The present Agreement shall enter into force one month after the date of receipt by the Government of the United States of America of notification of its constitutional ratification in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Peru and United States Sign Educational Exchange Agreement

The Department of State announced on May 4 (press release 238) that the Governments of Peru and the United States signed an agreement that day putting into operation a program of educational exchanges authorized by the Fulbright Act. The agreement was signed at Lima by Adm. Luis Edgardo Llosa, Foreign Minister of Peru, and U.S. Ambassador Ellis O. Briggs.

The agreement provides for the expenditure of Peruvian currency over a 3-year period equivalent to a maximum of $300,000 received from the sale of surplus agricultural products in Peru to finance exchanges of persons between the two countries to study, do research, teach, or lecture.

Under the terms of the agreement, a Commission for Educational Exchange between the United States and Peru will be established to assist in the administration of the program. The Commission will consist of six members with equal representation as to Peruvian and U.S. citizens in addition to the American Ambassador, who will serve as honorary chairman. All recipients of awards under the program authorized by the Fulbright Act are selected by the Board of Foreign Scholarships, whose members are appointed by the President of the United States.

With the signing of this agreement, Peru becomes the 30th country and the second of the other American Republics to participate in the educational exchange program initiated almost 10 years ago under authority of the Fulbright Act. Educational exchanges between Peru and the United States have been carried out for a number of years under the Act for Cooperation between the American Republics, the Smith-Mundt Act, and other legislation.

Atomic Energy as a Factor in Economic Development

STATEMENT BY JOHN C. BAKER U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ON ECOSOC [1]

The proposal of the United States to place on the agenda an item on "Studies on Atomic Energy as a Factor in Economic Development" [2] was circulated by the Secretary-General on March 29, 1956. You will find the details of this proposal in document E/2845.

This is not the time to enter into the substance of our proposal. I simply want to commend it to you for inclusion on the agenda on the obvious ground that the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy is bound to have a profound influence upon the economic development of the world at large, and it will be particularly important to the future of the less developed countries. The issue, therefore, is one which does not only fall clearly within the competence of the Economic and Social Council but must be considered one of the most important issues with which the Council is likely to deal during the years to come. It is therefore none too early for the Council to lay some groundwork for its own activities in this area, to discover what studies are already available regarding the uses of the atom for purposes of economic development and what research is either presently undertaken or planned. The action which we shall ask the Council to take in this respect is a modest action but essential to our future activities.

In view of the particular importance of atomic power as a source of new energy needed for industrial development, we propose that the item should be accepted as a subitem to item 5 [Economic Development of Underdeveloped C tries].

Mr. President, and members of the Coun warmly recommend this item to you for acceptance in the agenda of this 21st sessi the Council.

[1] Made in the U.N. Economic and Social Council on Apr. 17 (U.S./U.N. press release 2388).

[2] BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1956, p. 657.

STATEMENT BY HENRY CABOT LODGE, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATI

Mr. President, I am glad to have this o tunity of meeting with you and the other men of the Economic and Social Council to discus role that this Council can play in applyin new and fast-growing body of nuclear know to the old and ever-challenging question of nomic development.

For 10 years this Council has coordinate United Nations efforts to raise the level of l for the people of all countries. It has fo attention on the many United Nations prog for more food, better health, longer life, an provement in the welfare of many of the w peoples. It has shown that cooperative effor speed the attainment of those better conditio life which men have always sought but seek t with increasing determination and impatien.

Nuclear energy is bound to play an impo part in future world economic development terms of atomic energy we are all underdevel All countries are, therefore, pioneers. On years ago the first atomic reactor was ma work. Only 2 years and 4 months ago Pres Eisenhower presented to the United Natio program of a world effort to harness this

[3] Made in ECOSOC on Apr. 24 (U.S./U.N. press re 2397). On Apr. 25 the Council referred the item Economic Committee.

rce of power for man's betterment, gearing it ıope rather than to fear, to construction rather n destruction.

n these few years the speed of development exceeded all forecasts. We were and still are tioned not to expect miracles overnight. While ping this in mind, we still cannot fail to be ›ressed by the progress made by science and ustry in using atomic energy to improve man's .

\ complete catalog of these accomplishments ıld take far too long.

t would have to include the highly successful of radioisotopes—for example, in treating dis- es which have defied cures by other means; in ›ducing more food and in preserving food from ›d years to lean years.

t would have to include experiments in the of atomic energy in ship propulsion and in ustrial processing.

'robably the greatest overall contribution of mic energy to human welfare will be in the eration of electric power—to light homes, to machines, and to lighten backbreaking labors. the United States our first full-scale power nt will come into operation next year—at Ship- gport, Pennsylvania. It will have an eventual acity of 100,000 kilowatts. Plans for six other l-scale commercial-type plants have already n concluded. Still other smaller plants are ıg planned for rural areas with capacities of m 10,000 to 12,000 kilowatts. Entire plants t can be transported by air are also under de- ı for use in remote regions where other types ›ower are unobtainable.

'rom the purely economic point of view none these plants will be producing economically ıpetitive power right away—that is, power ıch costs as little as that produced by conven- ıal power plants in this country. Atomic ver development costs much money; the best ss is that the United States spends about 0–$300 million a year for such research and elopment. But valuable economic as well as ınical information will be obtained from the ppingport plant and the others when they are ıpleted, which will be of help to everyone in- sted in the potential uses of atomic energy for nomic development, and particularly to the less eloped countries.

'he most recent forecasts made by the Atomic Energy Commission are that we are now in the research and development stage of economic nuclear power. Some time the economic advantages of nuclear power will become so compelling that a relatively large proportion of new power plants will be nuclear. When this second phase is reached, the proportion of nuclear power plants to the total number being built will increase from around 5 percent to perhaps something like 60 percent in 10 years or less. In the third phase, when this proportion has been reached, it will probably be maintained for some years; in areas where coal, oil, and waterpower are abundant there will continue to be an economic need for them as well.

It is evident that the economic implications of nuclear power development are enormous for this country and for others. The rate of development will necessarily vary from country to country according to conditions in each. It will be related to the level and distribution of incomes, the availability of capital and technical skills, the relative cost of other fuels, and many other factors. But we can clearly see that nuclear fuel is a tremendous potential source of new energy and it will be put to use in the lifetime of most of us.

U.S. Emphasis on Cooperation

In our development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy the United States has been firmly following the road of international cooperation, the road marked out by President Eisenhower here at the United Nations. The President has repeatedly stressed that the use of the atom for man's welfare can best be achieved by a cooperative spirit. He has stressed the necessity for a "continued partnership of the world's best minds."

This partnership, as far as the United States is concerned, has taken two directions: making facilities available and making information available.

The most recent step toward sharing materials was the announcement last February that we would make available 20,000 kilograms of U–235 for use in nuclear reactors in other countries.[4] This was in addition to 200 kilograms previously announced.

On the information side, it should be set down that 40 complete atomic energy libraries have been

[4] BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1956, p. 469.

sent abroad,[5] each containing more than 200,000 pages of information. In addition, more than 200 students from other countries have come here for training or study in nuclear development.

Evidences of the partnership of the world's best minds, here at the United Nations, have also come in rapid succession. Last summer there was the historic Geneva Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. Last autumn a United Nations Committee To Study Problems of Radiation was created. And now we have the agreed draft statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The United States is gratified that plans for this agency are moving ahead in a cooperative atmosphere, and we look forward to the meeting in September when the final action will be taken to set up this newest member of the United Nations family of agencies.

The link between this new agency and the Economic and Social Council will be close—similar though not identical with the tie that exists between the United Nations and other specialized agencies. By the terms of the draft statute the agency will submit reports to this Council on matters within its competence.

Because of the rapid progress that is being made in nuclear technology, together with the rapid progress that is being made internationally for sharing its benefits, the United States, Mr. President, would like to see the Economic and Social Council begin now a program of studies on economic aspects of atomic-energy development. To achieve an orderly progress, to avoid duplication, and to establish a realistic approach, there should be one place where pioneer economic thinking is centered.

Need for Inventory of Studies

We have in mind, for the present, a report by the Secretary-General of the possible applications of atomic energy to promote economic development. This report would include an evaluation of the studies and publications on the potential economic uses of nuclear energy which are already available. It would include materials from the Geneva conference; out of the 100 sessions, 8 were concerned with this aspect of the question. It would include reports of work being done by the specialized agencies and any discussions of this subject by the regional commissions, as well as studies originating with governments or private research. It is probable that such a report will show up gaps in the research work now under way; if so, this will facilitate further studies, either through the United Nations or through other channels, and their coordination.

The whole field is new; the potentials are unknown. But the advantages of having available in one place an inventory of studies on the possible applications of atomic energy for economic development are self-evident.

Benefits From Nuclear Technology

Nobody can foresee exactly where the atomic revolution will take us. But we do know that countries in all stages of economic development are bound to benefit from advances in nuclear technology. The highly industrialized countries will benefit because nuclear power will be an essential supplement to available supplies of coal and oil. It will allow for growth and continued rising levels of living. In fact without this new source of energy we might indeed face a decline in living standards. The experts have estimated that the world's energy needs by the year 2,000 will be from 2½ to 5½ times the 1950 level.

For countries which have not yet completed their industrialization, atomic power will create many new opportunities to short-cut the development process. In many cases, where waterpower or coal or oil are now lacking, it may, in time, supply the needed source of energy. In such underpowered areas, in time, as experience is gained and people are trained to operate the new plants, atomic power can multiply muscle power not 2,000 times, as with the high-speed machines known today, but by something more like 25,000 times.

With these possibilities before us, Mr. President, I believe it is more than ever essential that nations work together for the good of the human race. Power is morally neutral. Atomic energy is power, but its potential for good or evil is multiplied beyond anything we have ever thought of in the past. It makes self-seeking attempts by nations to subvert, penetrate, or sabotage other nations all the more reprehensible. By the same token it makes our continued partnership of the world's best minds all the more essential.

In this partnership the Economic and Social Council has a significant role to play and an i

[5] For description of libraries and list of recipients, see *ibid.*, Apr. 16, 1956, p. 656.

rtant beginning can be made by undertaking e project that is now proposed.

EXT OF RESOLUTION[6]

N. doc. E/Res (XXI)/16

The Economic and Social Council,

Considering its responsibilities under Article 62 of the arter,

Recognizing that actual and potential developments the field of atomic energy may have profound implitions in the economic sphere, particularly affecting the onomic development of less-developed countries,

Taking into account the complexity of the subject, the versity of studies already made or in process under rious auspices, and the need for further information which to determine its future actions in this important ld.

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General in co-operation with e specialized agencies concerned to prepare for subssion to the twenty-fourth session of the Council a rert on possible applications of atomic energy, especially the fields of power, industry and agriculture;

2. *Recommends* that, in preparing the report, the Sectary-General survey the available studies and the rearch presently being undertaken in this field, and give e consideration to the materials submitted to the Inrnational Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic ergy, and the views expressed during the twenty-first ssion;

3. *Invites* Members of the United Nations and of the ecialized agencies to make available to the Secretaryneral for the purpose of his report such documentation aring on the subject as they may be able to provide;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General, after consultation th the Advisory Committee referred to in General Asnbly resolution 912 (X) and the competent specialized encies, to submit to the Economic and Social Council its twenty-fourth session a report on the possibility devoting as much as possible of the programme of the cond International Conference on the Exchange of Techal Information regarding the Peaceful Uses of Atomic ergy to the practical applications of nuclear energy the interest of promoting the economic development of der-developed countries and/or the desirability of ivening a separate conference on this subject;

5. *Transmits* to the Advisory Committee the records the discussion of the Council on this item;

6. *Decides* to place the subject of atomic energy as a ans of economic development on the agenda of the enty-fourth session of the Economic and Social Council r further consideration.

[6] The original draft (E/L.703) was sponsored by Brazil, nada, France, U.K., and U.S.; Egypt subsequently beme a cosponsor of a revised text (E/L.703/Rev. 2) ich the Council adopted unanimously on May 4.

Question of Opening Date of General Assembly Session

Following is the text of a note transmitted to U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold on April 17 by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. Representative to the United Nations, together with a note circulated to U.N. members by the Secretary-General on March 27.

U.S. Note of April 17

U.S./U.N. press release 2387 dated April 17

The Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary General of the United Nations and has the honor to refer to the Secretary General's note of March 27, 1956, OR–421 (11th), concerning the question of postponing the opening date of the 11th Regular Session of the General Assembly.

The United States shares the hope of the Secretary General that a postponement of the opening date would provide a greater opportunity for preparatory work and thereby expedite the deliberations of the session. The United States therefore supports the proposal submitted by the Governments of Chile, Cuba and Ecuador that the opening of the 11th Regular Session of the General Assembly be convened at Headquarters on Monday, November 12, 1956, or any other day of that week which meets the convenience of the Members.[1]

Secretary-General's Note Transmitting Proposal of Chile, Cuba, and Ecuador

U.N. press release dated March 29

The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative of . . . . . to the United Nations and has the honor to transmit a copy of a note dated 26 March 1956 from the Permanent Representatives of Chile, Cuba and Ecuador to the United Nations on the question of the opening date of the eleventh regular session of the General Assembly.

As requested in the above-mentioned note and availing himself of the procedures of consultation with Members provided for in the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General has the honor to request the Per-

[1] As of Apr. 30, 51 member nations had concurred in the proposal; on May 1 the Secretary-General announced that the Assembly would open at U.N. Headquarters on Nov. 12.

manent Representative to inform him before 30 April 1956 of the position of his Government with regard to the proposal submitted by the Governments of Chile, Cuba and Ecuador that the eleventh regular session of the General Assembly be convened at Headquarters on Monday, 12 November 1956.

It is the hope of the Secretary-General that a postponement of the opening date of the eleventh session of the General Assembly would provide opportunity for delegations, and especially those of the new Members, to engage in more complete preparatory work and thus expedite the deliberations of the session.

27 March 1956

[Enclosure]

TEXT OF NOTE DATED 26 MARCH PROPOSING POSTPONEMENT

The Permanent Representatives of Chile, Cuba and Ecuador to the United Nations present their compliments to the Secretary-General and, in pursuance of instructions received from their Governments, have the honour to refer to the question of the opening date of the eleventh regular session of the General Assembly.

While the opening date of the eleventh session would, in accordance with the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, take place on Tuesday, 18 September 1956, it is the feeling of a number of delegations that a postponement of the opening of the session would be generally welcomed. Therefore, the Permanent Representatives of Chile, Cuba and Ecuador have the honour to propose, on behalf of their Governments, that the eleventh regular session be convened at Headquarters on Monday, 12 November 1956.

The Permanent Representatives would be grateful if the Secretary-General would transmit this proposal to the other Members of the General Assembly for their consideration.

NEW YORK, N. Y., *26 March 1956*

RUDECINDO ORTEGA
Permanent Representative of Chile
EMILIO NUÑEZ-PORTUONDO
Permanent Representative of Cuba
JOSÉ VICENTE TRUJILLO
Permanent Representative of Ecuador

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Inter-American Meeting of Ministers of Education

The Department of State announced on April 21 (press release 209) that the U.S. Government will be represented by the following delegation at the Second Inter-American Meeting of Ministers of Education opening at Lima, Peru, on May 3, 1956:

U.S. Commissioner of Education

Samuel M. Brownell, Commissioner, Office of Educatio Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

Advisers

Albert A. Giesecke, American Embassy, Lima, Peru
Bess Goodykoontz, Director, International Education Relations, Division of International Education, Office Education, Department of Health, Education, and W fare
George Greco, Chief, Education Division, U.S. Operatio Mission, Lima, Peru
Thomas A. Hart, Chief, Education Division, U.S. Oper tions Mission, La Paz, Bolivia
Paul Packer, Chief, Education Division, U.S. Operatio Mission, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Simon N. Wilson, Office of Regional American Affai Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of Sta
Mariano Villaronga, Secretary of Education, Commo wealth of Puerto Rico, San Juan, P.R.

This meeting is an Inter-American Specializ Conference convoked by the Council of the O ganization of American States. The agenda approved by the OAS Council on July 23, 195 includes two main topics: (1) eradication of i literacy; (2) extension of elementary educatio

A UNESCO Regional Conference on Free a Compulsory Education in Latin America will me at Lima immediately prior to the Second Inte American Meeting of Ministers of Educatio The Ministers of Education meeting will discu concrete suggestions and comprehensive plans f the extension and improvement of compulsory ed cation in Latin America on the basis of the tec nical conclusions reached by the participants the UNESCO conference.

The First Conference of Ministers and Directo of Education of the American Republics was hel at Panamá in 1943.

Inter-American Cultural Council

The Department of State announced on Apr 23 (press release 211) that Mary P. Hollera Dean of Faculty of Hampton Institute, Ham ton, Va., and U.S. Representative on the Inte American Cultural Council (IACC) of the Orga ization of American States, will head the U. delegation to the second meeting of the Counc at Lima, Peru, May 3–12, 1956. Arturo Morale Carrión, Under Secretary of State of the Con monwealth of Puerto Rico, has been designated serve as the alternate U.S. Representative for th meeting. Dr. Holleran and Dr. Morales will assisted by the following advisers:

oward F. Cline, Director, Hispanic Foundation, Library of Congress
bert A. Giesecke, American Embassy, Lima, Peru
ss Goodykoontz, Director, International Educational Relations, Division of International Education, Office of Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
una Lee, Chief, South American Section, Public Affairs Staff, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
orge T. Moody, Chief, Program Planning, International Educational Exchange Service, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State
mon N. Wilson, Office of Regional American Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
rothy Woodward, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, N.Mex.

The Inter-American Cultural Council is one of e three technical organs of the Council of the rganization of American States.

Topics on cultural cooperation and organizaonal matters will be considered at the forthcomg meeting. Of primary interest will be the commendations of the second meeting to the ouncil of the OAS regarding the development of "basic and practical program of cultural action" r the OAS. For this purpose the Cultural Coun- l will consider the activities of the Pan American nion in education, literature, art and music, and ience, including social science. The meeting will so discuss a number of studies prepared by the as Committee for Cultural Action in Mexico City ermanent committee of IACC) on a variety of bjects including Indian education, validation academic degrees, exchange of publications and rsons, and the teaching of geography and hisry.

O Coal Mines Committee

The Department of State announced on May (press release 234) that the United States will represented by the following delegation at sixth session of the Coal Mines Committee of International Labor Organization convening Istanbul, Turkey, May 2–12.

oresenting the Government of the United States

rry F. Weaver, Chief, Division of Coal Mine Inspecion, Bureau of Mines, Department of the Interior, Vashington, D.C.

rge Tobias, Labor Attaché, American Consulate Genral, Geneva, Switzerland

orcsenting the Employers of the United States

J. Connolly, Chairman of the Board, Pennsylvania oal Company, Scranton, Pa.

James W. Haley, Vice President, Jewell Ridge Coal Corporation, Washington, D.C.

Representing the Workers of the United States

Paul K. Reed, International Representative, United Mine Workers of America, Washington, D.C.

Joseph Yablonski, International Executive Board Member, United Mine Workers of America, Clarksville, Pa.

The Coal Mines Committee is one of eight industrial tripartite committees that have been established by the ILO since 1945 to deal with problems of international significance in several industries. The other committees are concerned with inland transport; petroleum; metal trades; iron and steel; building, civil engineering, and public works; textiles; and chemical industries. Two special topics will be considered at this session. They relate to safety in coal mines and to recruitment and vocational training.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

BILATERAL

Ceylon

Agreement providing for a development assistance program in Ceylon. Effected by exchange of notes at Colombo April 28, 1956. Entered into force April 28, 1956.

Japan

Agreement relating to the reduction during Japanese fiscal year 1956 of Japanese contributions, under article XXV of the Administrative Agreement of February 28, 1952 (TIAS 2492), for United States services and supplies in Japan. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo April 24, 1956. Entered into force April 24, 1956.

Agreement providing for an annual progressive reduction of Japan's contribution for the United States Security Forces in Japan, pursuant to article XXV of the Administrative Agreement of February 28, 1952 (TIAS 2492). Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo April 25, 1956. Entered into force April 25, 1956.

Peru

Agreement amending the voluntary agency relief agreement of October 21 and 25, 1954 (TIAS 3128). Effected by exchange of notes at Lima June 23 and August 3, 1955. Entered into force August 3, 1955.

Philippines

Agreement amending and supplementing agreement relating to military assistance of April 27, 1955 (TIAS 3231). Effected by exchange of notes at Manila April 20, 1956. Entered into force April 20, 1956.

Status Lists

Convention on International Civil Aviation

Formulated at Chicago December 7, 1944

State	Date of signature	Date of deposit of instrument of ratification	Date of receipt of notification of adherence	Date of entry into force [1]
Afghanistan	Dec. 7, 1944	Apr. 4, 1947		May 4, 1947.
Argentina			June 4, 1946	Apr. 4, 1947.
Australia	Dec. 7, 1944	Mar. 1, 1947		Apr. 4, 1947.
Austria			Aug. 27, 1948 [2]	Sept. 26, 1948
Belgium	Apr. 9, 1945	May 5, 1947		June 4, 1947.
Bolivia	Dec. 7, 1944	Apr. 4, 1947		May 4, 1947.
Brazil	May 29, 1945	July 8, 1946		Apr. 4, 1947.
Burma			July 8, 1948	Aug. 7, 1948.
Cambodia			Jan. 16, 1956	Feb. 15, 1956.
Canada	Dec. 7, 1944	Feb. 13, 1946		Apr. 4, 1947.
Ceylon			June 1, 1948	July 1, 1948.
Chile	Dec. 7, 1944	Mar. 11, 1947		Apr. 10, 1947
China	Dec. 7, 1944	Feb. 20, 1946 [3] and Dec. 2, 1953.[3]		Apr. 4, 1947. Jan. 1, 1954.
Colombia	Oct. 31, 1947	Oct. 31, 1947		Nov. 30, 1947
Costa Rica	Mar. 10, 1945			
Cuba	Apr. 20, 1945	May 11, 1949		June 10, 1949
Czechoslovakia	Apr. 18, 1945	Mar. 1, 1947		Apr. 4, 1947.
Denmark	Dec. 7, 1944	Feb. 28, 1947		Apr. 4, 1947.
Dominican Republic	Dec. 7, 1944	Jan. 25, 1946		Apr. 4, 1947.
Ecuador	Dec. 7, 1944	Aug. 20, 1954		Sept. 19, 1954
Egypt	Dec. 7, 1944	Mar. 13, 1947		Apr. 12, 1947
El Salvador	May 9, 1945	June 11, 1947		July 11, 1947.
Ethiopia	Feb. 10, 1947	Mar. 1, 1947		Apr. 4, 1947.
Finland			Mar. 30, 1949 [4]	Apr. 29, 1949
France	Dec. 7, 1944	Mar. 25, 1947		Apr. 24, 1947
Greece	Dec. 7, 1944	Mar. 13, 1947		Apr. 12, 1947.
Guatemala	Jan. 30, 1945	Apr. 28, 1947 [5]		May 28, 1947
Haiti	Dec. 7, 1944	Mar. 25, 1948		Apr. 24, 1948
Honduras	Dec. 7, 1944	May 7, 1953		June 6, 1953.
Iceland	Dec. 7, 1944	Mar. 21, 1947		Apr. 20, 1947
India	Dec. 7, 1944	Mar. 1, 1947		Apr. 4, 1947.
Indonesia			Apr. 27, 1950	May 27, 1950
Iran	Dec. 7, 1944	Apr. 19, 1950		May 19, 1950
Iraq	Dec. 7, 1944	June 2, 1947		July 2, 1947.
Ireland	Dec. 7, 1944	Oct. 31, 1946		Apr. 4, 1947.
Israel			May 24, 1949	June 23, 1949
Italy			Oct. 31, 1947 [6]	Nov. 30, 1947
Japan			Sept. 8, 1953 [7]	Oct. 8, 1953.
Jordan			Mar. 18, 1947	Apr. 17, 1947
Korea			Nov. 11, 1952	Dec. 11, 1952
Laos			June 13, 1955	July 13, 1955
Lebanon	Dec. 7, 1944	Sept. 19, 1949		Oct. 19, 1949.
Liberia	Dec. 7, 1944	Feb. 11, 1947		Apr. 4, 1947.
Libya			Jan. 29, 1953	Feb. 28, 1953.
Luxembourg	July 9, 1945	Apr. 28, 1948		May 28, 1948
Mexico	Dec. 7, 1944	June 25, 1946		Apr. 4, 1947.
Netherlands	Dec. 7, 1944	Mar. 26, 1947		Apr. 25, 1947
New Zealand	Dec. 7, 1944	Mar. 7, 1947		Apr. 6, 1947.
Nicaragua	Dec. 7, 1944	Dec. 28, 1945		Apr. 4, 1947.
Norway	Jan. 30, 1945	May 5, 1947		June 4, 1947.
Pakistan			Nov. 6, 1947	Dec. 6, 1947.
Paraguay	July 27, 1945	Jan. 21, 1946		Apr. 4, 1947.
Peru	Dec. 7, 1944	Apr. 8, 1946		Apr. 4, 1947.
Philippines	Dec. 7, 1944	Mar. 1, 1947		Apr. 4, 1947.
Poland	Dec. 7, 1944	Apr. 6, 1945		Apr. 4, 1947.
Portugal	Dec. 7, 1944	Feb. 27, 1947		Apr. 4, 1947.
Spain	Dec. 7, 1944	Mar. 5, 1947		Apr. 4, 1947.
Sweden	Dec. 7, 1944	Nov. 7, 1946		Apr. 4, 1947.
Switzerland	July 6, 1945	Feb. 6, 1947 [8]		Apr. 4, 1947.
Syria	Dec. 7, 1944	Dec. 21, 1949		Jan. 20, 1950
Thailand	Dec. 7, 1944	Apr. 4, 1947		May 4, 1947.
Turkey	Dec. 7, 1944	Dec. 20, 1945		Apr. 4, 1947.
Union of South Africa	June 4, 1945	Mar. 1, 1947		Apr. 4, 1947.
United Kingdom	Dec. 7, 1944	Mar. 1, 1947		Apr. 4, 1947.
United States of America	Dec. 7, 1944	Aug. 9, 1946		Apr. 4, 1947.
Uruguay	Dec. 7, 1944	Jan. 14, 1954		Feb. 13, 1954
Venezuela			Apr. 1, 1947	May 1, 1947.
Viet-Nam			Oct. 19, 1954	Nov. 18, 195
Yugoslavia	Jan. 6, 1954			

International Air Services Transit Agreement and International Air Transport Agreement

Formulated at Chicago December 7, 1944

State	Date of signature of		Date of receipt of acceptance of	
	Transit agreement	Transport agreement	Transit agreement	Transport agreement
anistan	Dec. 7, 1944	Dec. 7, 1944	May 17, 1945	May 17, 1945.[9]
ntina			June 4, 1946	
ralia	July 4, 1945		Aug. 28, 1945	
ria				
ium	Apr. 9, 1945		July 19, 1945	
ia	Dec. 7, 1944	Dec. 7, 1944	Apr. 4, 1947	Apr. 4, 1947.
il				
a				
bodia				
da	Feb. 10, 1945		Feb. 10, 1945	
on				
	Dec. 7, 1944			
a		Dec. 7, 1944		June 6, 1945.[3]
mbia				
a Rica	Mar. 10, 1945	Mar. 10, 1945		
	Apr. 20, 1945	Apr. 20, 1945	June 20, 1947	
hoslovakia	Apr. 18, 1945		Apr. 18, 1945	
nark	Dec. 7, 1944	Dec. 7, 1944	Dec. 1, 1948	
inican Republic		Dec. 7, 1944		Jan. 25, 1946.[10]
dor	Dec. 7, 1944	Dec. 7, 1944		
t	Dec. 7, 1944		Mar. 13, 1947	
lvador	May 9, 1945	May 9, 1945	June 1, 1945	June 1, 1945.
pia	Mar. 22, 1945	Mar. 22, 1945	Mar. 22, 1945	Mar. 22, 1945.
nd				
ce	Dec. 7, 1944		June 24, 1948	
e	Dec. 7, 1944		Sept. 21, 1945	Feb. 28, 1946.[11]
emala	Jan. 30, 1945	Jan. 30, 1945	Apr. 28, 1947 [5]	
	Dec. 7, 1944	Dec. 7, 1944		
duras	Dec. 7, 1944	Dec. 7, 1944	Nov. 13, 1945	Nov. 13, 1945.
nd	Apr. 4, 1945	Apr. 4, 1945	Mar. 21, 1947	
	Dec. 7, 1944		May 2, 1945 [12]	
nesia				
	Dec. 7, 1944	Aug. 13, 1946	Apr. 19, 1950	
	Dec. 7, 1944		June 15, 1945	
nd				
L			June 16, 1954	

he convention, in accordance with the provisions of e 91(b) thereof, entered into force initially Apr. 4,

he participation of Austria effected in accordance the provisions of article 93 of the convention and ition of June 9, 1948, by Assembly of ICAO. Effec- Sept. 26, 1948.

eservation accompanying acceptance of China: acceptances are given with the understanding that rovisions of Article IV Section 3 of the International ransport Agreement shall become operative in so far e Government of China is concerned at such time as onvention on International Civil Aviation . . . shall tified by the Government of China." (Chinese in- ent of ratification of the Convention on International Aviation deposited Feb. 20, 1946. China denounced nternational Air Transport Agreement Dec. 11, 1946. tive Dec. 11, 1947. Notification of denunciation by of Convention on International Civil Aviation ed May 31, 1950. Effective May 31, 1951. China sited another instrument of ratification of the con- on on Dec. 2, 1953.)

he participation of Finland effected in accordance the provisions of article 93 of the convention and ition of June 9, 1948, by Assembly of ICAO. Effec- Apr. 29, 1949.

otification of denunciation by Guatemala of Con- on on International Civil Aviation and International ervices Transit Agreement received June 13, 1952. emala canceled its notification of denunciation of convention and transit agreement on Dec. 8, 1952, and requested that denunciation be considered as withdrawn.

[6] The participation of Italy effected in accordance with the provisions of article 93 of the convention and resolution of May 16, 1947, by Assembly of ICAO. Effective Nov. 30, 1947.

[7] The participation of Japan effected in accordance with the provisions of article 93 of the convention and resolution of July 1, 1953, by Assembly of ICAO. Effective Oct. 8, 1953.

[8] The Minister of Switzerland made the following statement in the note transmitting the Swiss instrument of ratification: "My government has instructed me to notify you that the authorities in Switzerland have agreed with the authorities in the Principality of Liechtenstein that this Convention will be applicable to the territory of the Principality as well as to that of the Swiss Confederation, as long as the Treaty of March 29, 1923, integrating the whole territory of Liechtenstein with the Swiss customs territory will remain in force."

[9] Afghanistan denounced the International Air Transport Agreement Mar. 18, 1948. Effective Mar. 18, 1949.

[10] The Dominican Republic denounced the International Air Transport Agreement Oct. 14, 1946. Effective Oct. 14, 1947.

[11] Reservation accompanying acceptance of Greece: "In accepting this Agreement [transport] in accordance with Article VIII, paragraph two thereof, I am directed to make a reservation with respect to the rights and

(*Footnotes continued on following page*)

International Air Services Transit Agreement and International Air Transport Agreement—*Contin*

Formulated at Chicago December 7, 1944

State	Date of signature of		Date of receipt of acceptance of	
	Transit agreement	Transport agreement	Transit agreement	Transport agre
Italy	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
Japan	. . .	. . .	Oct. 20, 1953	. . .
Jordan	. . .	. . .	Mar. 18, 1947	. . .
Korea	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
Laos	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
Lebanon	Dec. 7, 1944	Dec. 7, 1944 [13]	. . .	. . .
Liberia	Dec. 7, 1944	Dec. 7, 1944	Mar. 19, 1945	Mar. 19, 194
Libya	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
Luxembourg	July 9, 1945	. . .	Apr. 28, 1948	. . .
Mexico	Dec. 7, 1944	Dec. 7, 1944	June 25, 1946	. . .
Netherlands	Dec. 7, 1944	Dec. 7, 1944 [14]	Jan. 12, 1945	Jan. 12, 1945
New Zealand	Dec. 7, 1944	. . .	Apr. 19, 1945 [16]	. . .
Nicaragua	Dec. 7, 1944	Dec. 7, 1944	Dec. 28, 1945	Dec. 28, 194
Norway	Jan. 30, 1945	. . .	Jan. 30, 1945	. . .
Pakistan	. . .	. . .	Aug. 15, 1947 [18]	. . .
Paraguay	July 27, 1945	July 27, 1945	July 27, 1945	July 27, 1945
Peru	Dec. 7, 1944	Dec. 7, 1944	. . .	. . .
Philippines	Dec. 7, 1944	. . .	Mar. 22, 1946 [19]	. . .
Poland	Dec. 7, 1944	. . .	Apr. 6, 1945	. . .
Portugal	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
Spain	Dec. 7, 1944	. . .	July 30, 1945	. . .
Sweden	Dec. 7, 1944	Dec. 7, 1944	Nov. 19, 1945	Nov. 19, 194
Switzerland	July 6, 1945	. . .	July 6, 1945	. . .
Syria	July 6, 1945	July 6, 1945 [20]	. . .	. . .
Thailand	Dec. 7, 1944	Dec. 7, 1944	Mar. 6, 1947	Mar. 6, 1947
Turkey	Dec. 7, 1944	Dec. 7, 1944 [22]	June 6, 1945	June 6, 1945
Union of South Africa	June 4, 1945	. . .	Nov. 30, 1945	. . .
United Kingdom	Dec. 7, 1944 [24]	. . .	May 31, 1945 [25]	. . .
United States of America	Dec. 7, 1944	Dec. 7, 1944	Feb. 8, 1945 [26]	Feb. 8, 1945
Uruguay	Dec. 7, 1944	Dec. 7, 1944	. . .	. . .
Venezuela	Dec. 7, 1944 [27]	Dec. 7, 1944 [27]	Mar. 28, 1946	Mar. 28, 194
Viet-Nam	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
Yugoslavia	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .

obligations contained in Article I, Section 1, paragraph (5) of the Agreement, which, under Article IV, Section 1, Greece does not wish, for the time being to grant or receive."

[12] Reservation accompanying acceptance of India: "In signifying their acceptance . . . [transit], the Government of India . . . do not regard Denmark or Thailand as being parties thereto. . . . " (Reservation respecting Thailand withdrawn by India June 6, 1947. Reservation respecting Denmark withdrawn by India Feb. 14, 1950.)

[13] Reservation accompanying signature of Lebanon: "Ad referendum concerning the fifth freedom enumerated in Art. I Section 1 [transport]."

[14] Reservation accompanying signature of the Netherlands: "In accordance with the provisions of Art. IV Section 1 of this agreement [transport] the Netherlands Delegation hereby accept only the first four privileges in Art. I Section 1." (Reservation relinquished by the Netherlands Sept. 21, 1945.)

[15] Reservation accompanying acceptance of the Netherlands: ". . . the signatures . . . affixed to the . . . International Air Transport Agreement (with reservation set forth in Article IV Section 1) constitute an acceptance . . . by the Netherlands Government and an obligation binding upon it." (Reservation relinquished by the Netherlands Sept. 21, 1945.)

[16] Reservation accompanying acceptance of New Zealand: ". . . the New Zealand Government does not regard Denmark or Thailand as being parties to the Agreement [transit]. . . ." (Reservation respecting Thailand is regarded as having been withdrawn by New Zealand Jan. 31, 1947. Reservation respecting Denmark withdrawn by New Zealand Dec. 13, 1949.)

[17] Nicaragua denounced the International Air Tra Agreement Oct. 7, 1946. Effective Oct. 7, 1947.

[18] The Ambassador of Pakistan informed the Sec of State by note no. F. 96/48/1 of March 24, 194 ". . . by virtue of the provisions in Clause 4 Schedule of the Indian Independence (Intern Arrangements) Order, 1947, the International Air S Transit Agreement signed by United India contin be binding after the partition on the Dominion of tan." The acceptance by India on May 2, 1945, transit agreement applied also to the territory, t part of India, which later, on Aug. 15, 1947, b Pakistan. The Ambassador of Pakistan informe Secretary of State by note no. F. 96/50/3 of Nov. 28 of the withdrawal of the reservation made by Indi applied to Pakistan after partition from India, with to Denmark in connection with the transit agre the withdrawal being effective Aug. 15, 1947.

[19] Reservation accompanying acceptance of the pines: "The above acceptance is based on the unde ing . . . that the provisions of Article II, Sectio the International Air Services Transit Agreement sh come operative as to the Commonwealth of the Phili at such time as the Convention on Internationa Aviation shall be ratified in accordance with the Co tion and laws of the Philippines." (Philippine inst of ratification of the Convention on Internationa Aviation deposited Mar. 1, 1947.)

[20] Reservation accompanying signature of Syri accordance with Art. IV section 1 of this agre Syria accepts only the first four privileges in Art. I 1 [transport]."

(Footnotes continued on following page)

Thailand denounced the International Air Transport ement Mar. 18, 1953. Effective Mar. 18, 1954.

Reservation accompanying signature of Turkey: accordance with the provisions of Art. IV section 1 his agreement [transport] the Turkish delegation by accept only the first four privileges in Art. I sect. 1 leave the acceptance of the fifth privilege to the dis- on of their government."

Reservation accompanying acceptance of Turkey: . the reservation made by the Turkish Delegation on fifth freedom of the air contained in the International Transport Agreement is explained in the following le of the law by which the aforementioned instruments been ratified: 'The Turkish Government, when con- g bilateral agreements, shall have the authority to pt and apply for temporary periods the provision rding the fifth freedom of the air contained in the rnational Air Transport Agreement.' "

Reservation accompanying signature of the United rdom: "I declare that, failing later notification of sion, my signature to this Agreement [transit] does cover Newfoundland." (Reservation withdrawn by ed Kingdom Feb. 7, 1945.)

Reservation accompanying acceptance of the United gdom: "In signifying their acceptance of the said ement [transit], the Government of the United King- . . neither regard the Governments of Denmark Siam [Thailand] as being parties thereto. . . ." ervations respecting Denmark and Thailand with- n by United Kingdom Mar. 10, 1950.)

Reservation accompanying acceptance of the United es: "These acceptances by the Government of the ed States of America are given with the understanding the provisions of Article II, Section 2, of the Interna- al Air Services Transit Agreement and the provisions rticle IV, Section 3, of the International Air Transport ement shall become operative as to the United States merica at such time as the Convention on International l Aviation . . . shall be ratified by the United States merica." (The United States of America denounced International Air Transport Agreement July 25, 1946. ctive July 25, 1947. United States instrument of ication of the Convention on International Civil Avia- deposited Aug. 9, 1946.)

Reservation accompanying signature of Venezuela: Delegación de Venezuela firma *ad referendum* y deja tancia de que la aprobación de este documento por su ierno está sujeta a las disposiciones constitucionales de Estados Unidos de Venezuela." (Transit and trans- agreements accepted by Venezuela Mar. 28, 1946.)

Venezuela [denounced] the International Air Trans- Agreement June 3, 1954. Effective June 3, 1955.

PUBLICATIONS

cent Releases

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A work paper by Reinhold Niebuhr, Vice President of the Faculty and Professor of Christian Ethics, Union Theological Seminary, with a discussion outline by F. Ernest Johnson, Chief Study Consultant, Department of the Church and Economic Life, National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U. S. A. and Professor Emeritus of Education, Columbia University, prepared for Citizen Consultations sponsored by the U. S. National Commission for UNESCO in cooperation with the Adult Education Association of the U. S. A.

Thailand. Pub. 6296. Far Eastern Series 71. 51 pp. 10¢.

A background summary on Thailand's current state of affairs and what is being done to solve its social welfare, economic, and political problems.

SEATO—Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. First Annual Report of the Council Representatives, March 1956. Pub. 6305. Far Eastern Series 72. 27 pp. 15¢.

This report explains the purposes and functions of SEATO, records the progress made in the course of the Organization's first year, and examines the outlook for the future.

The Soviet Challenge and the United Nations. Pub. 6310. International Organization and Conference Series III, 114. 23 pp. 15¢.

An address made by Francis O. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, before the Annual Convention of the American Association of Junior Colleges at New York City on March 9, 1956.

International Sugar Agreement. TIAS 3177. Pub. 5848. 230 pp. $1.00.

Agreement between the United States and other governments—Dated at London October 1, 1953. Entered into force May 5, 1954.

Colón Corridor and Certain Other Corridors Through the Canal Zone. TIAS 3180. Pub. 6213. 19 pp. 4 maps. 50¢.

Convention between the United States and Panama—Signed at Panamá May 24, 1950. Entered into force April 11, 1955.

Highway Convention. TIAS 3181. Pub. 6214. 15 pp. 25¢.

Convention between the United States and Panamá—Signed at Panamá September 14, 1950. Entered into force April 11, 1955.

North Atlantic Ocean Stations. TIAS 3186. Pub. 5898. 34 pp. 15¢.

Agreement, with annexes, between the United States and other governments—Signed at Paris February 25, 1954. Entered into force February 1, 1955.

Economic Cooperation—Informational Media Guaranty Program. TIAS 3187. Pub. 5871. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines—Modifying agreement of February 18 and 19, 1952. Exchange of notes—Signed at Manila October 14, 1954, and January 19, 1955. Entered into force January 19, 1955.

Emergency Relief Assistance—Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3188. Pub. 5872. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Pakistan. Exchange of notes—Signed at Karachi January 18, 1955. Entered into force January 18, 1955.

Economic Assistance to Israel. TIAS 3189. Pub. 5876. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Israel—Amend-

ing agreement of November 25, 1953. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tel Aviv and Jerusalem January 31, 1955. Entered into force January 31, 1955.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3190. Pub. 5877. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Peru—Signed at Lima February 7, 1955. Entered into force February 7, 1955.

Mutual Security—Disposition of Balance in Counterpart Special Account. TIAS 3191. Pub. 5878. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Ireland—Signed at Dublin June 17, 1954. Entered into force February 16, 1955.

Air Force Mission to Bolivia. TIAS 3192. Pub. 5948. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Bolivia—Extending Military Aviation Mission Agreement of September 4, 1941, as extended and amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at La Paz December 3 and 22, 1954. Entered into force December 22, 1954; operative retroactively September 4, 1953. And agreement—Extending and amending the agreement of September 4, 1941, as extended. Exchange of notes—Dated at Washington October 20, 1949, and January 20 and March 30, 1950. Entered into force March 30, 1950; operative retroactively September 4, 1949.

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Agreement between the United States and Yugoslavia. Exchange of notes—Signed at Belgrade February 7 and 9, 1955. Entered into force February 9, 1955.

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Agreement between the United States and Costa Rica. Exchange of notes—Signed at San José October 19 and 26, 1954. Entered into force October 26, 1954.

Constitution of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration. TIAS 3197. Pub. 5987. 42 pp. 20¢.

Constitution adopted by the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration at Venice, October 19, 1953. Acceptance by the United States deposited September 21, 1954. Entered into force November 30, 1954.

Sale of Feed Grain and Purchase of Building Materials for United States Defense Purposes. TIAS 3199. Pub. 5900. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany—Signed at Washington February 18, 1955. Entered into force February 18, 1955.

Establishment in Canada of Warning and Control System Against Air Attack. TIAS 3218. Pub. 5932. 10 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Canada. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington May 5, 195 tered into force May 5, 1955.

German External Debts. TIAS 3233. Pub. 6008. 15¢.

Administrative agreement, with annex, betwe United States and other governments—Implement nexes IX and X to agreement of February 27, Signed at Bonn December 1, 1954. Entered int December 1, 1954. With exchange of notes betw Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany an Acting High Commissioner for Germany—Signed a and Bad Godesberg December 1, 1954.

Mexican Agricultural Workers—Recommendatio Joint Migratory Labor Commission. TIAS 3242 6020. 14 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Mexic change of notes—Dated at México, D. F., April 1 Entered into force April 14, 1955.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3250 6071. 7 pp. 10¢.

Interim agreement between the United States and Exchange of notes—Signed at Tokyo May 31, 195 tered into force May 31, 1955.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: April 30–May 6

Releases may be obtained from the News I sion, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C

Press releases issued prior to April 30 which pear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 20 April 21, 211 of April 23, 214 of April 25, 21 April 26, and 222 and 223 of April 27.

No.	Date	Subject
224	4/30	Dulles: testimony on mutual secu program.
225	4/30	Rumania credentials (rewrite).
226	4/30	Note to Poland on repatriation tivities.
227	4/30	Nixon, Goulart: remarks on arriva
*228	4/30	Dulles: death of Senator Barkley.
229	5/1	Dulles: departure for NATO mee
230	5/1	Cutoff date for visa applications Chinese refugees.
231	5/2	Surplus commodity agreement Paraguay.
*232	5/2	Murphy: Pittsburgh Foreign P Association.
233	5/3	Allen to visit Africa.
234	5/2	Delegation to ILO Coal Mines mittee (rewrite).
†235	5/2	Inter-American Indian Institute write).
236	5/2	National day of Poland.
237	5/3	Hoover, Goulart: remarks on d ture.
238	5/4	Educational exchange agreement Peru (rewrite).
239	5/4	Visit of German Minister for At Energy Affairs (rewrite).
240	5/4	Visit of Indonesian President write).
241	5/4	Reply to Rumanian note.
†242	5/4	Delegation to World Health Asse (rewrite).

*Not printed.
†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

ica. Assistant Secretary Allen To Visit Africa . . 803

erican Principles. The Ideals of Woodrow Wilson Robertson) 805

erican Republics
er-American Cultural Council 820
er-American Meeting of Ministers of Education . . . 820

a. The Mutual Security Program and the National Security (Dulles) 787

mic Energy
mic Energy as a Factor in Economic Development Baker, Lodge, text of resolution) 816
man Atomic Energy Minister To Visit United States . 797

ation. Status lists on aviation treaties 822

nl. Vice President Goulart of Brazil Visits United tates (Nixon, Goulart, Hoover) 803

na. Visa Applications Cut Off for Refugees of Chinese Ethnic Origin 810

gress, The
gressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy . . 810
Mutual Security Program and the National Security Dulles) 787

artment and Foreign Service. Sixth Annual Honor wards Ceremony (Dulles, Nixon) 811

nomic Affairs
isers Report to President on Tariff Negotiations . . 813
eement With Germany on Motion Picture Films . . 814
mic Energy as a Factor in Economic Development Baker, Lodge, text of resolution) 816
Coal Mines Committee 821
plus Commodity Agreement Signed With Paraguay . 804

cational Exchange. Peru and United States Sign Educational Exchange Agreement 815

ope. The Mutual Security Program and the National ecurity (Dulles) 787

many
eement With Germany on Motion Picture Films . . 814
man Atomic Energy Minister To Visit United States . 797

lth, Education, and Welfare
er-American Cultural Council 820
er-American Meeting of Ministers of Education . . . 820

a. Technical Cooperation in the Near East and South sia (Dorsey) 792

onesia. President of Indonesia To Visit United States . 803

ernational Organizations and Meetings
Coal Mines Committee 821
er-American Cultural Council 820
er-American Meeting of Ministers of Education . . . 820

ual Security
Mutual Security Program and the National Security Dulles) 787
hnical Cooperation in the Near East and South Asia Dorsey) 792

r East
rdination of British and American Policy in World Af-airs (Aldrich) 798

The Mutual Security Program and the National Security (Dulles) 787
Technical Cooperation in the Near East and South Asia (Dorsey) 792

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Secretary Dulles' Departure for NATO Council Meeting (Dulles) 791

Pakistan. Technical Cooperation in the Near East and South Asia (Dorsey) 792

Paraguay. Surplus Commodity Agreement Signed With Paraguay 804

Peru. Peru and United States Sign Educational Exchange Agreement 815

Poland
National Day of Poland 803
United States Protests to Poland on Repatriation Activities (text of note) 802

Presidential Documents. Woodrow Wilson Centennial Year . 806

Publications. Recent Releases 825

Refugees and Displaced Persons
Visa Applications Cut Off for Refugees of Chinese Ethnic Origin 810
United States Protests to Poland on Repatriation Activities (text of note) 802

Rumania
Letters of Credence (Brucan) 791
Proposed Negotiations With Rumania 801

Sweden. Commemoration of First U.S.–Swedish Treaty (Cabot, Undén) 800

Treaty Information
Agreement With Germany on Motion Picture Films . . 814
Current Actions 821
Peru and United States Sign Educational Exchange Agreement 815
Status lists on aviation treaties 822
Surplus Commodity Agreement Signed With Paraguay . 804

United Kingdom. Coordination of British and American Policy in World Affairs (Aldrich) 798

United Nations
Atomic Energy as a Factor in Economic Development (Baker, Lodge, text of resolution) 816
Question of Opening Date of General Assembly Session (Lodge, Hammarskjold) 819

Name Index

Aldrich, Winthrop W 798
Allen, George V 803
Baker, John C 816
Brucan, Silviu 791
Cabot, John Moors 800
Dorsey, Stephen P 792
Dulles, Secretary 787, 791, 811
Eisenhower, President 806
Goulart, João 804
Hammarskjold, Dag 819
Hoover, Herbert, Jr 804
Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr 816, 819
Nixon, Richard M 803, 812
Robertson, Walter S 805
Strauss, Franz J 797
Sukarno, Dr 803
Undén, Östen 801

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The Department of State bulletin

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XXXIV, No. 882

May 21, 1956

DEVELOPING THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY
Address by Secretary Dulles 831
Letter From President Eisenhower to Senator Walter F. George. 836
North Atlantic Council Communique 836

THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE MAINSTREAM OF HISTORY ● *by Assistant Secretary Wilcox*. 841

BASIC PRINCIPLES IN U.S.-ARGENTINE RELATIONS ● *by Ambassador Albert F. Nufer*. 839

EXPANDING INTERNATIONAL TRADE ● *by Ben H. Thibodeaux*. 848

TEXT OF DRAFT STATUTE OF INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY. 852

LAUNCHING THE U.N. STUDY OF EFFECTS OF ATOMIC RADIATION ● *Article by Dr. Shields Warren* . 860

For index see inside back cover

The Department of State bulletin

Vol. XXXIV, No. 882 • Publication 6342

May 21, 1956

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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)eveloping the Atlantic Community

Secretary Dulles on May 7 returned from a inisterial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, ld at Paris on May 4 and 5. The principal de-ion taken at the meeting was that the Atlantic ommunity should be further developed, particu-irly in political and economic fields. The Sec-tary reported on the meeting briefly on his rival at Washington and on May 8 made an ad-ess on the subject. On May 9 President Eisen-wer requested Senator Walter F. George to rve as his personal representative "in the de-lopment of this evolutionary step within the orth Atlantic Community."

Following are texts of the Secretary's address, s arrival statement, the President's letter to nator George, and the communique issued at the nclusion of the Paris meeting.

ADDRESS BY SECRETARY DULLES[1]

I greatly appreciate the opportunity to speak fore this organization, and I thank you for the rm welcome given me. Your organization nds for human values which are honored wher-er men believe in the spiritual nature of man. u believe in the dignity of the human individual l in the brotherhood of man without regard to e or religion. You find in your religion basic ths which are also enunciated by all the world's at religions.

The law of your Prophets was, "Thou shalt e thy neighbor as thyself," and that was ac-ted by Jesus when He said, "All things what-ver ye would that men should do to you, do ye n so to them: for this is the law and the phets." And the Buddha said, "Hurt not others in ways that you yourself would find hurt-ful"; and the Prophet of Islam taught, "No one is a believer until he desires for his brother that which he desires for himself."

It is these fundamental truths taught by all the great religions that your organization prac-tices. You engage in acts of compassion. In doing so, you are helping to lay the only depend-able foundation for the world society of peace and justice for which we strive.

I have just returned yesterday afternoon from a meeting in Paris of the Foreign Ministers of the 15 North Atlantic Treaty countries. That treaty and its organization, called NATO, is one of the means designed to promote peace with justice. So far it has sought to do so primarily by setting up a military shield which would deter armed aggres-sion and behind which moral principles could take root and grow strong and bear good fruit. We primarily dealt with the question of whether or not our countries were, in fact, doing all that they could or should to develop their own unity be-hind the military shield which was the initial and, so far, the dominant purpose of NATO.

The Situation in the Near East

I want to talk primarily about this problem of developing the Atlantic Community. But before getting on to that I will mention one other topic of great interest to all Americans at this time which was discussed at the NATO Council meeting—that is the situation in the Near East.

That area is of intimate concern to the Atlantic Community. For many generations, indeed for many centuries, the Western nations have had close ties with the Near East. In recent years there has developed a large measure of economic interdependence affecting the very nature of the daily lives of the people of both areas.

The members of the NATO Council were acutely

[1] Made before the triennial convention of B'nai B'rith at Washington, D. C., and broadcast to the Nation on May 8 (Press release 246).

conscious of the problem of maintaining peace in the Middle East. When the Palestine mandate came to an end, the United States and other Western nations supported United Nations consideration on the future of Palestine which resulted in the creation of the State of Israel. As members of the United Nations we all intend that the State of Israel shall be maintained in its independence. Also we want friendly political, cultural, and economic relations with all of the nations of the area on a basis of impartiality. We do not believe that these two goals are incompatible.

There was grave concern that the Soviet Union had sought to further its ends by playing fast and loose with peace in the area. There was the feeling that that very fact made it more important for the Western nations to act with firm deliberation and with care.

There was recognition at Paris that wide discrepancies in armed strengths would be likely to create tensions. There was also a conviction that the safety of the countries of the Middle East is not to be found in an arms race, particularly one which tended to pit great world powers against each other.

It seemed particularly important to avoid a situation where great military powers confronted each other, by proxy, under conditions which would engage their respective prestiges in a manner ominous for peace, not only within the area but possibly throughout the world.

There was a belief that reliance should, above all, be placed upon the processes of the United Nations and that we can, perhaps, do so now with somewhat greater confidence since the Soviet Union seems increasingly aware of the dangerous consequences of reckless action and has indicated that it, too, would be prepared to support a solution through the United Nations.

We all welcomed the active part now being taken by the United Nations Security Council to preserve the integrity of the armistice agreements, and we are encouraged by the fact that the Secretary-General's mission to the area seems to have produced some initial positive results.

We believe that solid reliance can be placed upon the principles of the United Nations Charter and that no nation of the area which conforms internationally with those principles will stand alone. President Eisenhower made it clear, in his statement of April 9, 1956,[2] that, so far as the United States is concerned, there could not be a gression with impunity.

Past efforts to move toward a settlement of t substantive issues in the Middle East have e countered serious obstacles. The task is i mensely complex. I have no illusions that re solutions will be easily come by. But if progr is difficult, it is also necessary. And we contin to make it. There are now grounds for hope th it may be possible to maintain the momentum n established by Mr. Hammarskjold's current forts. That the United States will seek to do.

Progress Toward Atlantic Unity

Let me turn now to the problem on which spent most of our time in Paris. That was t development of the Atlantic Community i something more solid than is now the case.

All who know and share Western civilizati can take great pride in its accomplishments. was based upon the Judeo-Christian conception the spiritual nature of man. Out of this fa came individual resourcefulness and a sense mission which brought much of good to much the world.

But when we think with pride of what Weste civilization has accomplished, we must also thi with regret of the fact that it has never yet fou the way to live within itself at peace. If today t West is seriously challenged by believers in atheistic creed, it is largely because two wo wars, coming in quick succession, drained off t lifeblood of our finest and bravest youth a gravely impaired the economic strength of t West. Also the West has lost in moral author because while professing a religion of peace it l not found a sure way to make peace a perman reality within its own membership.

Since the end of World War II great stri have been taken to create unity at various lev within the Atlantic Community. All th measures have been taken within the framew of the United Nations Charter, which recogni the inherent right of collective self-defense a which encourages development along regio lines.

The broadest effort at unity is represented by t North Atlantic Treaty itself, now embracing nations including two from this hemisphere, C ada and the United States. Under this tre great progress has been made, particularly military terms. There is an integration of m

[2] Bulletin of Apr. 23, 1956, p. 668.

y forces on the continent of Europe—including tributions from Great Britain, Canada, and United States—the like of which has never n seen before. The newly developing forces the Federal Republic of Germany will share t integration.

The military unity under NATO is supplemented the new (1954) treaty for Western European ion, which unites France, Germany, Italy, the ited Kingdom, and the three Benelux coun- s under a system for limitation of armament l of armament supervision and control which he most thorough and extensive that has ever been put into force. Thus on the military nt there has developed a unity and combined anization which is of immense value and which produced a morale which is itself of great fying value.

In addition to these efforts on the military front re is the Coal and Steel Community, whereby ance, Germany, Italy, and the three Benelux ntries deal with the production of coal and el. This is the first time that European nations ve subordinated national powers in favor of a ly European organization.

There is the Council for Europe, where ministers l parliamentarians of European countries regu- ly meet for discussion of matters other than fense. There is the Organization for European onomic Cooperation (OEEC) and the European yments Union, which contribute greatly to sing trade as between the members. These are ne of the many steps which have been taken ce World War II to establish unity within all part of the Atlantic Community.

ed for More Adequate Organization

But at Paris last week we had to ask ourselves ether what has been done is good enough, par- ularly in terms of consultation about matters ich seriously affect each other. There has been narked development of the consultative process. t it still remains the fact that matters of vital portance to the Atlantic Community are not ng given timely consideration on a community is.

I have already referred to the problem of the ddle East, which had never been seriously dis- sed by the North Atlantic Treaty Council even ugh the future of Western Europe is deeply aged by developments there.

We have seen in North Africa serious dis- turbances within a part of the North Atlantic Treaty area which have brought about a shifting of forces from continental Europe which alters the capability of defense as against a possible aggression from Eastern Europe.

There is the problem of Cyprus, which deeply concerns three parties to the North Atlantic Treaty—the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey.

I do not suggest that any of these problems should today be made a matter of common consideration around the NATO Council table. At the point to which these particular problems have now developed, there can reasonably be questions as to whether consultation is or is not desirable. Neither do I imply any criticism of the past, for there has never been agreement or understanding that problems of this type should be discussed. And, indeed, the Council is not really equipped to deal seriously with these problems. But surely the Atlantic Community is not adequately organized if matters of this nature, which could shake the community to its foundation, develop over the years without any effort at broad consultation between the members.

Then there is the problem of the reunification of Germany. That subject was discussed by the NATO Foreign Ministers at special meetings which were held just prior to the Geneva summit conference with the Soviet rulers and before the Four-Power Foreign Ministers Conference which followed. But, as we know, the Geneva agreement by Messrs. Bulganin and Khrushchev on "the reunification of Germany by means of free elections" has been ignored by them and they now unashamedly continue the division of Germany as though they had never agreed to the principle of reunification. Most of the Western powers have said, and rightly said, that there cannot be lasting peace and security in Europe unless Germany is reunified. But has the Atlantic Community as a whole sufficiently focused world opinion on the moral aspects of this problem? I wonder.

Relation to Newly Independent Nations

Then we have the problem of the relation of the Atlantic Community to the newly independent nations of the world. They now represent upwards of 650 million people composing 18 independent nations, and more non-self-governing peoples are at the threshold of independence or

knocking at the door. What has happened is an amazing tribute to the basic beliefs of the West in the rights of man and in government by consent. Nevertheless it would be a great mistake to conclude that, because these newly independent peoples have peacefully won their independence from the Western powers, relations between the former rulers and the newly self-governing peoples are in all respects good. In many cases there remain unresolved problems between the newly independent countries and the colonial powers. Above all, there remain barriers in terms of sensitiveness to racial arrogance which has at times been practiced by some persons of the West.

One-third of the world's population is ruled by Communist despots. Another third are new nations which are today the special target of the predatory tactics of international communism, which seeks to stimulate the prejudices and to appeal to the aspirations of these peoples. The members of the Atlantic Community have so much to offer in the way of genuine brotherhood, they can do so much to strengthen the political and economic institutions of the newly independent peoples, that it is tragic that the outcome is anywhere in doubt.

Certainly, as was often said at our Paris meeting last week, NATO, until now primarily military in its nature, is no proper organ for implementing political and economic policies between the Atlantic Community and the newly independent countries. But the community does contain within its own membership nations which themselves have been through the experience of being colonies and winning their independence. Also it contains colonial powers who have demonstrated and are illustrating today great statesmanship in promoting evolution from colonialism to self-government or independence. Surely the members of such a community could generate greater dynamism to help, in acceptable ways, to sustain political and economic independence elsewhere. Also we should be able to help to find relationships expressive of true brotherhood and recognition of the fact that other civilizations than our own have immense values. We perhaps have material and technical things to give. They too have things to give. And if we are wise enough to perceive and to take what other civilizations have to offer, the balance struck between us will not be one-sided by any true measure of values and will be consistent with the equal dignity of all the parties.

A New Approach to the Community Relationship

It may be said that the North Atlantic Treat members already have a permanent Council wher problems can be discussed which vitally affect th welfare and integrity of the Atlantic Community There is a Council composed of Permanent Repre sentatives, who are men of stature and grea ability. In theory they could discuss any prob lems of common concern. The fact is that, as the are now established, their discussions often hav been merely reports of actions already taken o decisions already made. That is because the gov ernments concerned have never taken the basic de cision to have a council to which problems affectin the Atlantic Community would normally and regu larly be brought. If that decision were taken, i would greatly alter the entire character of th community relationship. It would not require dif ferent personalities at the Council table, but a dif ferent approach and far greater "depth" in term of political advisers than is now the case. Bu above all is the basic decision to take seriously th unity of the Atlantic Community and seek to pro mote it, not by supergovernment but by commo counsel.

Such a decision has not yet been taken, except i military terms.

This was the problem which was most activel discussed at Paris during the past week. In tha connection we discussed the Soviet threat—th acts of violence which had marked Soviet foreig policy until recently and the latest changes in tha policy. We recorded the fact that our joint mili tary efforts had successfully deterred Soviet ag gression in Europe and had contributed to th adoption by the Soviet Government of the so-calle policy of coexistence. Our joint communique sai that, to the extent that this Soviet policy involve a certain easing of tension and the admission b the Government of the Soviet Union that war i not inevitable, it is welcomed by the Atlantic pow ers. But also we recorded our joint conclusio that the reasons which gave rise to the Atlanti military alliance have not disappeared and tha the Western powers cannot relax their vigilanc while many outstanding problems have not bee solved and when there is no effective disarmamen plan. Therefore, we said, "Security remains . . a basic problem, and the Atlantic Powers mus continue to give priority to the maintenance o their unity and strength. However, presen

ospects seem to leave scope for further peace-l initiatives on the part of the Atlantic Powers."

ree Foreign Ministers To Report

Then we went on to record what may prove to be historic decision. The communique said that he Atlantic Council consider it timely and use-l for the members of the Atlantic Community to amine actively further measures which might taken at this time to advance more effectively eir common interests." And the Foreign Min-ers went on to designate three of their members advise "on ways and means to improve and ex-nd NATO co-operation in non-military fields and develop greater unity within the Atlantic Com-unity." The three Ministers were asked to sub-it their report as soon as possible.

It is significant of the importance attached to is matter that the task of exploration was given and assumed by, three Foreign Ministers them-lves—the Foreign Ministers of Canada,[3] Italy,[4] d Norway.[5] They are each men of wide experi-ce. Each of them personally believes in the de-lopment of the Atlantic Community both on a oad base and, within the framework of that oad base, as between groups of members which n in certain respects work together with greater timacy than can the whole. These three Min-ers will be conferring with each of the 15 gov-nments during the coming weeks and, in the light what they learn, will submit a report, perhaps rly next fall, which the governments then can rther consider from the standpoint of further tion.

It would, I think, be prudent to note that there as yet no clear definition of the concept of closer lantic unity. And we could hardly expect ac-ptance in advance of close analysis.

The United States perhaps can visualize that ncept more readily because of its membership the Organization of American States. That ganization traces its origin back 66 years to the undation of the Pan American Union. It is t only the oldest but by far the most effective gional organization which has been created. It als effectively with problems as between its mbers and has conspicuously done so within last year or two in relation to the broad threat international communism, and in relation to particular situations such as those that arose in Guatemala, in Costa Rica, and as between Ecuador and Peru. It seeks to develop hemispheric international law.

It is obvious that the Organization of American States, which has developed in a particular environment to deal with problems typical of this hemisphere, cannot usefully be duplicated in detail as regards the Atlantic Community. Each community is distinctive. But the experience which the United States has had, in cooperation with the other American Republics, enables us perhaps to see more clearly the possibilities inherent in the Atlantic Community.

Speaking on April 23 prior to this last meeting of the NATO Council I said,

> The North Atlantic Treaty already serves as an indispensable and vital instrument of the Atlantic community. But the time has, I believe, come to consider whether its organization does not need to be further developed if it is adequately to serve the needs of this and coming generations. If that be the common desire of the NATO member nations, the United States will join eagerly in exploring the possibilities which now beckon us forward.[6]

It is gratifying to report to you that it is the common desire of the NATO member nations at least to explore seriously these new possibilities. That decision was taken not lightly but after a discussion which prolonged our meeting of Friday and Saturday into the early hours of Sunday morning. The decision was recognized by all as being a decision which could be of historic importance since it could contribute mightily toward erasing what has been the great weakness of the West, namely, its disunity. To erase that disunity, which has given birth to so many tragic consequences, is one of the supreme tasks of postwar statesmanship. Much has already been done. But much remains to be done. You can, I think, feel—as I feel—solid satisfaction that a great new advance is under way.

ARRIVAL STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY

Press release 244 dated May 7

I return from a meeting of the 15 Foreign Ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty countries.

This meeting could be, and I believe it will be, a turning point for NATO.

Lester B. Pearson.
Gaetano Martino.
Halvard Lange.

[6] BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1956, p. 706.

It was recognized that the unity of the Atlantic Community must be further developed if it is to surmount the shifting tactics of international communism and if it is to serve the needs of this and coming generations.

NATO was conceived primarily as a military organization. Nothing that has happened has led us to believe that we can safely drop our guard. But it is generally agreed that the time has come to further develop the unity of the Atlantic Community, particularly in the nonmilitary political fields.

No time is to be lost in realizing this enlarged goal for NATO. So three of our Foreign Ministers have undertaken to consider all proposals along this line and to make a report as quickly as possible. The importance of this task is emphasized by the fact that it is being undertaken by Foreign Ministers themselves.

There was general confidence that the Atlantic Community will meet the demands for its own political evolution, and thus meet the challenge of our times.

PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO SENATOR GEORGE

White House press release dated May 9

DEAR WALTER: I know that your present term in the Senate expires this year. In view of that fact, I should like to say two things to you:

It has been my great hope that you would continue on in the Senate where you have been able to make so great a contribution to peace through helping to develop and sustain a non-partisan foreign policy. Your contribution in that respect has been incalculable and I believe it was the overwhelming desire of the American people that you would have found yourself able to continue in the Senate.

I can, however, realize that you may desire to concentrate more exclusively on the great problems of war and peace which confront our nation, free of the other responsibilities which inevitably go with the Senatorship. If that is your preference, I earnestly hope that you will be willing to act for this nation with reference to the development of the North Atlantic Community so that it will in greater unity and greater effectiveness serve the cause of international peace and the preservation of those ideals of human liberty and freedom which are so deeply rooted in the Community.

As you know, at the latest meeting of the Nor Atlantic Treaty Council, it was decided to explo ways and means by which the North Atlantic Co munity, through the NATO Council or otherwis might more fully realize its potential for pea and human welfare. I regard the contributi which the United States can make to this proje as of the utmost importance and feel that it m indeed play a decisive role in the achievement a just and durable peace and the preservation the great values inherent in our Western civiliz tion.

It would be a great service to the nation an indeed in a broader sense, to the whole world if y would be willing, for as long as I may hold m present office, to act as my Personal Represent tive and Special Ambassador in the developme of this new evolutionary step within the Nort Atlantic Community. In case you do feel in pelled to lay down the responsibilities of yo present office, I can think of no way where y could better serve our nation and more fitting crown your great career as a statesman.

I may say that Foster Dulles has asked me express his warm concurrence in what I say an that he greatly hopes that you will favorably co sider this important mission.

With warm personal regard,

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

NAC COMMUNIQUE OF MAY 5

The North Atlantic Council met in Paris on May 4 an 5 under the Chairmanship of Dr. Gudmundsson, Foreig Minister of Iceland, and issued the following communiqu

I. The Atlantic Powers, seven years ago, entered in the North Atlantic Treaty in face of the Communist thre to their common ideals and civilisation. For they had se imperilled all the human rights which their peoples r gard as essential for their life and freedom, particular representative government, freedom of the individua the rule of law and liberty of the press.

With the disappearance of the last free regime Eastern Europe, that of Czechoslovakia, the Berlin Bloc ade in 1948, and two years later, the invasion of Kore the concern of the free world reached its climax. T need for collective military defence was all the mo obvious because at the end of the Second World War t free world had disarmed.

These were the circumstances which led to the cre tion of NATO and its military strength, and this is wh the sacrifices necessary for the defence of the Atlant Community have since then been borne in common.

I. The collective defence efforts of the Atlantic Powers e not been in vain. They have successfully deterred iet aggression in Europe and have contributed to adoption by the Soviet Government of the so-called icy of co-existence.

'o the extent that this policy involves a certain easing tension and the admission by the Government of the .S.R. that war is not inevitable, it is welcomed by Atlantic Powers, who have always supported this idea. s now possible to hope that those principles of the ted Nations Charter which have regulated the rela- s between the peoples of the Atlantic Community y eventually also regulate the relations between the iet Union and the Western Powers.

II. The reasons which gave rise to the Atlantic iance have not, however, disappeared. No progress been made towards solving certain vital European blems, including the reunification of Germany in free- n, which have to be solved on a basis which would isfy the legitimate security needs of all. The Western vers cannot relax their vigilance until these problems e been solved and until a disarmament plan providing necessary guarantees to all and an effective control tem has been put into effect. Soviet military power tinues to increase. Security remains therefore a ic problem, and the Atlantic Powers must continue give priority to the maintenance of their unity and ngth. However, present prospects seem to leave scope further peaceful initiatives on the part of the Atlantic vers. They are determined to pursue these initiatives h the same energy that they displayed in building up ir defence organization and with which this will be intained.

'hey solemnly affirm that this policy will be pur- d in common, and based on the unity, solidarity and operation of peoples sharing common ideals and stand- together in the cause of freedom.

V. The Atlantic Council consider it timely and useful the members of the Atlantic Community to examine ively further measures which might be taken at this e to advance more effectively their common interests. e Atlantic Powers already possess in the North At- tic Council an instrument of unity and a forum for sultation regarding policies of general interest. In er to enable the Council better to perform these tasks, Ministers agreed to appoint a Committee of three isters to advise the Council on ways and means to rove and extend NATO co-operation in non-military ds and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic nmunity. The Committee of Three was requested to mit its report as soon as possible.

'. In the meantime, the Council agreed:

(a) to undertake periodical examinations of the political aspects of economic problems;

(b) to strengthen economic co-operation between member countries, to seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies, and to promote conditions of stability and well-being;

(c) to instruct the permanent representatives of the Council to examine economic problems in the light of the ideas set out above and of the plan put forward by M. Pineau, Foreign Minister of France, calling upon the services of a committee of technical advisers working under their authority.

VI. The members of NATO are by their Treaty dedicated to "safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law".

Their first seven years of working together have resulted in marked success and have strengthened the bonds between them.

The members of NATO are determined to remain united and steadfast to their ideals. They face the future with confidence.

Department's Views on Address by Sir Winston Churchill

The Department of State on May 11 issued the following statement in response to questions from correspondents concerning the address made by Sir Winston Churchill at Aachen, Germany, on May 10.

Sir Winston Churchill has stated that, "if" the Russian repudiation of Stalin is sincere, we have a new Russia to deal with and that, if so, there is no reason why the new Russia should not join in the spirit of the solemn agreement of the North Atlantic Treaty to fight the aggressor, whoever he may be. Sir Winston went on to say that "that is for the future" and that in the meanwhile we should go forward toward that future by reinforcing patiently and surely the arrangements which we have so far achieved. He also spoke of the vital need for German reunification.

The first suggestion of Sir Winston is in accord with the proposal which the three Western Foreign Ministers made to the Soviet Union at Geneva on October 27, 1955,[1] during the consideration of the linked problems of European security and the reunification of Germany. In this connection, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States proposed a "Treaty of Assurance" which contemplated reciprocal renunciation of force and withholding of support from aggressors and an agreement that armed attack in Europe would endanger the peace and security and that all parties would then take appropriate action to meet the common danger. This proposal has never been accepted by the Soviet Union, even as a basis for discussion.

Sir Winston's second suggestion for "reinforc-

[1] BULLETIN of Nov. 7, 1955, p. 730.

ing" the arrangements which we now have is a welcome support for the action taken at last week's meeting of the NATO Ministerial Council, which established a committee of three of the Foreign Ministers to study ways and means to improve and extend NATO cooperation in non-military fields and to develop their unity within the Atlantic Community.

The United States welcomes the spirit and substance of Sir Winston's important address on these points.

Four-Power Declaration of Principles Relating to Disarmament

Following is the text of a declaration relating to disarmament issued at London on May 4 by the U.S., Canadian, French, and British delegations to the meetings of the subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission.[1]

I. In order to promote peace, security and prosperity through disarmament, the delegations of Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States reaffirm their determination to seek agreement on a developing programme of disarmament in accordance with their mandate from the United Nations. This programme should begin without delay and should include measures, under effective international control, to end the present competition in armed forces and armaments of all kinds.

(1) The programme should proceed by stages. Progress from one stage to another must depend upon the satisfactory execution of the preceding stage and upon the development of confidence through the settlement of major political problems.

(2) The programme should begin, under effective international control, with significant reductions in armed forces, to such levels as are feasible in present unsettled world conditions. There should be corresponding reductions in conventional armaments and in military expenditures. Further reductions would be carried out as world conditions improved.

(3) The programme should provide that, at an appropriate stage and under proper safeguards, the build-up of stockpiles of nuclear weapon would be stopped and all future production o nuclear material devoted to peaceful uses.

(4) The programme should provide for a stron control organization with inspection rights, in cluding aerial reconnaissance, operating from th outset and developing in parallel with the dis armament measures. The control measures shoul also provide against major surprise attack. Thi is particularly important so long as it is impos sible to account for past production of nuclea material.

(5) Preliminary demonstrations of inspectio methods on a limited scale would help to develo an effective control system and could bring neare agreement on a disarmament programme.

(6) Provision should be made for the suspen sion of the programme, in whole or in part, if a major State failed to carry out its obligations or i a threat to peace under Chapter VII of the Unite Nations Charter should occur.

II. The proposals introduced in the Disarma ment Sub-Committee by the delegations of France the United Kingdom and the United States are in spired by these principles. The Soviet delegatio did not accept these proposals. The difference between the position of the Soviet delegation an those of the other four delegations were not recon ciled in the meetings of the Sub-Committee.

III. The four delegations recognize that i accordance with the instructions of the Disarma ment Commission it is now time to report to th Commission. They express their conviction tha a reconciliation of the opposing points of view i possible and necessary and they reaffirm their de termination to continue their efforts within th United Nations, and particularly in the Disarma ment Commission and its Sub-Committee, to see agreement on disarmament in accordance with th desire of the peoples of all nations.

[1] Reprinted from the subcommittee's third report to the Disarmament Commission (U.N. doc. DC/83), which includes working papers and proposals submitted during the London meetings, Mar. 19–May 4, 1956.

France To Buy U.S. Farm Products in Triangular Transaction

The International Cooperation Administratio announced on May 3 that it has arranged a "tri angular" transaction involving sales of $30 millio worth of U.S. agricultural commodities to France Under the agreement, France will purchase $2

illion worth of raw cotton and $6 million of heat from the United States and will pay for ese commodities in francs.

The francs derived from the sales will be de-osited to the account of the U.S. Government. ICA will make these funds available to Viet-Nam part of the mutual security program for that untry. The francs will be used by Viet-Nam finance purchases in the franc area, and, when ch purchases are agreed upon, the triangular ansaction will be completed.

The trade with France was made under section 402 of the Mutual Security Act. This section requires that at least $300 million of the funds authorized for the mutual security program during the current fiscal year be used to finance the sale of surplus U.S. agricultural commodities for foreign currencies. The local currency proceeds are to be used for mutual security purposes. To date this year, ICA has approved purchases of about $330 million worth of these commodities by 21 countries.

asic Principles in U.S.–Argentine Relations

by Albert F. Nufer
Ambassador to Argentina[1]

. . . . . .

Within the framework of the Organization of nerican States, the Americas work together on any problems. Paramount among these is the eat political threat of this half of the 20th century—the penetration of alien communism. At the ter-American Conference held in Caracas in 54, a foreign policy declaration adopted by the nerican Governments said in effect that, if the ernational Communist movement came to domite or control the political institutions of any nerican State, that would constitute a threat to e sovereignty and political independence of all e American States and would endanger the peace the Americas. One test of this principle was t successfully by the Guatemalan people at the ry time that the American Governments were eparing to meet and to consider a threat to the urity of the hemisphere.

As Secretary Dulles has repeatedly pointed out, mmunist tactics continually change, but the in objective—the conversion of the world to nmunism—remains. . . . It is well that we ve the Caracas Resolution and a growing appeciation in this hemisphere of the nature of this racontinental threat to our way of life.

Early this month—on April 5, to be exact—the Argentine Government by decree announced that it would support fully the Caracas Resolution. As of now, 20 American nations fully approve this important policy declaration.

But inter-American cooperation is more than just a means to attain security. It continues to demonstrate, as it did at the Conference of Ministers of Finance held late in 1954 at Rio de Janeiro, that steady progress through the coordination of government policies and the efforts of private enterprise can accelerate the growth of the economic potential of all the American nations. The horizons of opportunity broaden as the years go by. Early in 1957 a hemisphere economic conference will be held in Buenos Aires. We can be confident that the results will be an added contribution to hemisphere development and the welfare of all our peoples.

The foregoing is a preface to the parting words which I have to offer to you, to the American community in Argentina, and, if I may be so presumptuous, to the Government and people of Argentina.

Since 1952 I have had the honor to serve as United States Ambassador in Argentina—one of the great Republics of this hemisphere and the nation of San Martín and Sarmiento. During that time the basic principles that guided me in the conduct of our relations with Argentina can be summarized as follows: mutual respect for the rights and the obligations of each nation, which means, among other things, strict adherence to the

[1] Excerpts from an address made before an American Legion post at Buenos Aires on Apr. 27. Mr. Nufer has since been confirmed as Ambassador to the Philippines.

policy of noninterference in internal affairs; a firm belief in the power of the united brotherhood of the Americas and the inter-American system; and the furtherance of the welfare of the people of Argentina, the people of the United States, and the people of each and every one of the American nations.

In recent weeks and months here in Argentina I have lived through one of the great experiences of my life. You, as well as I, have seen the surge of civic forces which have given a powerful, undeniable impetus to the Argentine nation. A newfound tenacity of purpose, a spirit of decision, and a strong confidence in a great future based on democratic principles have seized the nation.

To be sure, there was, unfortunately, during this time the dread scourge that laid an unseen hand upon scores of children and brought tragedy to many a happy Argentine home. In the task of providing the best of modern care our Government and our National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis did their small part, joining efforts with the Argentine medical and nursing professions and the Argentine people.[2]

May I say that a country like ours, founded on government of the people, by the people, and for the people, must never forget that in the projection of its foreign policy the welfare of other people must necessarily be that policy's ultimate objective and test. A basic principle such as this must never become trite, nor taken for granted, nor should we ever be reluctant to repeat it on occasions such as this or to translate it into action.

In the humanitarian sense it may be a national disaster such as a flood, the blight of crops, an earthquake, or an infantile paralysis epidemic.

In the political and social fields each of our nations may find inspiration in the other for nourishing and strengthening their institutions and enriching each other's culture, thereby fortifying the elements of our common unity. We can be inspired in this respect by the great work accomplished, to give an example, by the Argentine–United States Cultural Centers which the citizens of this country have built as monuments to understanding.

In the field of economics, we fully realize that a country must build its future mainly by the industry and enterprise of its own citizens and with the products of its national savings. But capital from abroad, both public and private, can play an important part. Thus, for instance, U.S. investments in Argentina have contributed significantly to the economic expansion of Argentina and thereby to the welfare of the Argentine people. They have brought to this country new enterprises which have not only provided jobs and produced new products but have given Argentina the benefit of their parent companies' industrial research and latest advances in technological skills.

We and the Argentine people, in a hemisphere built on boundless confidence, know that the welfare of all the peoples of the continent constitutes the key to the future and a continuation of that optimism which has been so singularly an American characteristic since the discovery of this continent by Columbus.

And now for the last word. What I have spoken contains my deepest impressions and thoughts and the guideposts of the past 4 years in Argentina. We all realize that life is never smooth, that it has its ups and downs and its difficult moments. All is not "beer and skittles" even for us diplomats, and I too have had my share of problems. But with all, it is for me a heartfelt satisfaction, to which I point with pardonable pride, that as I depart this wonderful country the relations between Argentina and the United States are better than they have ever been in the history of the two nations. May this ever be so. And may I wish to each and to all of you: Farewell, Godspeed, and *hasta la vista.*

[2] BULLETIN of Mar. 26, 1956, p. 527.

he United Nations in the Mainstream of History

by Francis O. Wilcox
Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs [1]

As a member of the fraternity of international w, I am honored to appear before you tonight the Society celebrates its 50th anniversary. We ve been colleagues for a long time. It may metimes seem to you, as it does to me, that we in overnment tend to lose touch with the well-rings of scholarship and speculation that are dispensable to intellectual vigor. The scholar, r his part, may sometimes get too far away om the harsh realities of political action. Au-ste Comte, I am told, practiced the policy of rebral hygiene—he didn't read any books ex-pt his own. This kind of sterility of thought ust be avoided at all costs, and I hope the day ver comes when we in the Government read only r own memoranda.

Both the public service and the learned pro-ssions can profit from increased contact between r two worlds. Organizations such as the Amer-n Society of International Law can and should ovide a helpful bridge in this connection.

In wondering how to use this opportunity to-ght, I thought it might be beneficial to step ck from the immediate and the obvious and look on the United Nations from a historical point view.

How can we sum up its first decade? How ould we evaluate the trends that have set in? hat are the main problems that lie ahead?

First of all, we should abandon the notion, metimes held, that in 1945 the United Nations rang into being from nowhere, like Minerva om the brow of Jupiter. The analogy, rather, ould be the phoenix arising from its own ashes. For, while many felt it wise in 1945 to avoid dwelling on antecedents, those who labored to create the United Nations would have had an extremely difficult time without the precedents of the League of Nations to guide them.

Indeed, the ancestry of the United Nations reaches back to such historic landmarks as the rise of the nation-state, the evolution of constitutional government, the beginnings of modern economic patterns, and the development of international jurisprudence from the time of Grotius and Vitoria.

From these early roots the process which Secretary Dulles has called "the institutionalizing of peace" [2] has slowly taken form, culminating in our age in the creation of the United Nations.

We can criticize history but we can never rewrite it, despite the best efforts of both Stalin and his ungrateful proteges. When the United Nations came into being, men and nations had reached a certain point in their development. It was at this point, and this point only, that the United Nations could be constructed.

By no means all men realized that we had reached that historic watershed. There were those, as there still are, who out of conviction or prejudice denied the possibility of true international cooperation. Much past history was available to support their pessimism.

Others went well beyond that point. Optimistic about man's innate virtue, they sought—and still seek—utopian solutions.

In the main, the United Nations Charter represents a consensus—if not of men, at least of governments. The document itself is a remarkable com-

[1] Address made before the American Society of Internanal Law at Washington, D.C., on Apr. 27 (press release 1).

[2] For the Secretary's address to the Society, see BULLETIN of May 7, 1956, p. 739.

promise in the name of political reality. However, it has provided a satisfactory framework within which the organism has been able to live, to experiment, and to grow. That no nation, however dissatisfied, has withdrawn its membership bespeaks both the intrinsic value of the organization and increasingly articulate world public opinion. One can only conclude that it has been in the interest of member states to participate. This in itself is a major tribute to the architects who, by and large, confined themselves within the bounds of political interests and possibilities. The organization has had to function in a world of fundamental changes, and its responses to those changes show that it has a strong survival factor.

The First Decade—Two Overriding Facts

What are the great changes in the first decade of the organization's life? Two facts of paramount importance stand out.

First of all, after military victory in World War II was assured, the Soviet Union resumed its doctrinal hostility to the non-Communist world and above all to the United States—the symbol of all that stands between it and world domination.

To say this is to describe how the hopeful notion of universal collective security has had to be transformed, at least for this age, into quite a different pattern of coalitions and alliances. It describes the growth and the competition of two great powers—one determined to subvert free societies, the other equally determined to preserve from assault and subversion the values of Western civilization and the practice of freedom under law. This fact has dimmed the United Nations' bright promise of cooperation and peace enforcement. For once the cold war began in earnest, the United Nations had to adapt itself to an intensely competitive, often hostile, and flagrantly "undiplomatic" world of tensions among the great powers. If it had not been able to do so, it would have expired.

A second momentous development has marked the postwar decade. For the first time in modern history the scene of political and social action has significantly shifted from the European West to the great cradle of civilization lying athwart the Equator, stretching from North Africa to the islands of Melanesia. This half of the world, which seemed to slumber through the great revolutions of the West, is rising from the remains of mighty past.

In one apocalyptic moment, as history tells tin this ancient world has erupted like some lon forgotten volcano. Today, 11 years after the wa 14 nations containing 600 million people ha achieved political independence and become mei bers of the United Nations. Hundreds of m lions of their neighbors are moving toward a ne political status, either quickly or slowly. The too, lay claim to the status and the opportuniti of the West, demanding an equal share of both.

Those members of the United Nations who sha similar backgrounds or similar problems in rel tion to colonialism and economic developme command a parliamentary strength today whi few dreamed of in 1945. This balance w strengthened by the admission of 16 more stat to membership last fall. What they ask, in shor is freedom from poverty, freedom from contr and freedom from inequality. In the United N tions this takes on concrete shape in the repudi tion of a passing age of Western colonialism, expectations of economic help toward industrial zation, and in demands for recognition of the claims for racial, social, and cultural equality. T gether these ambitions represent a dynamic em tional force that has swept the subcontinents the Eastern Hemisphere.

The collision in the United Nations betwee these two currents, one running between the fr world and international communism, the other b tween Europe and its old imperial holdings, ha served to mold the United Nations to the shape the world it represents. It may have set di couraging limits to the organization. But it ha also opened new possibilities for utilizing th United Nations to keep within peaceful bound these sweeping tides and currents. The foremo task facing both the policymaker and the schola is to determine how best these forces can be turne to good and constructive use, in pursuance of ou goals of peace with justice.

The First Decade—Other Problems

But it is only too easy to forget that if thei had been no cold war and if the colonial revolutio had not broken out with such energy there woul still be a formidable array of international prob lems. Finding solutions for some of these prob lems has sorely taxed human ingenuity.

If nationalism is a vital force in Asia, it is n

ess so in the rest of the world. Disputes arise between nations over questions of trade, or territory, or simply prestige. Effective machinery is necessary to direct such disputes into peaceful channels. It is likewise necessary for conflicts that arise out of efforts to change the established order. One reason why it is so hard to speak of law as a governing principle of the United Nations is that, like the League, its most pressing problems arise from the desire of nations not to see their legal rights enforced but to change the law itself.

The clash and interplay of conflicting claims and competing systems and cultures has had a transforming effect on the concept of multilateral relations that prevailed in 1945. For one thing, nations have tended to draw together in the United Nations in voting blocs on the basis of their special interests and their estimate of the parliamentary-power situation. Those who placed a high premium on traditions of political and civil liberties have united for defense against world communism. Those who shared a definable corner of the globe tended to find community in regional alliances. Those who administered dependent territories tended to unite on the principle of noninterference in colonial affairs. The non-Communist but anti-colonial nations have banded together to create parliamentary strength out of individual weakness. In this situation, the Communist bloc has worked, as might be expected, to take advantage of these divisions of interest in the free world.

The unreliability of the Security Council, given its unworkable premise of great-power unity, has placed a premium on the Assembly. New voting patterns, involving shifting groups of states, have come to characterize the Assembly. It was there that the Asian, African, and Latin American nations found new ways to exert their influence. It was there that we ourselves turned in 1950 to unfreeze the organization's potential for collective defense against aggression, in the face of the deadlock in the Security Council. And it is there that the great powers have had to present and defend their policies before the rest of the world.

In this setting, the United Nations has tended to become less and less of a tribunal where abstract justice could be meted out and where, when the chips were down, the great powers would together enforce the peace. At the same time, it has also tended to become less of a tight coalition of pro-Western nations. Instead, it has been revealed for what it really was all along—a sort of log-cabin community house where the entire neighborhood, friends and strangers, rich and poor, law-abiding and law-breaking, are all present.

Their mood indoors is not appreciably different from what it is outdoors, but one great purpose is shared in common by most members: to settle differences peacefully, arguing national policy on a give-and-take basis, negotiating agreements under public pressure, and, if one member gets unruly, trying as best they can to deal with him.

The ground rules are primitive, but those that work are indispensable to world order. The dreams of a future model community under law do not die, nor should they. But just as law is a product of the community, so the community must follow from a consensus, however modest, as to the common goals and purposes of the individual members. The development of this community and the broadening of its underlying consensus is the greatest long-term task facing us today.

How the U.N. Has Developed—Adaptation to Reality

We have so far depicted the United Nations in broad terms. What has happened to it in the face of changing conditions? The combination of pressures on the organization has led it to adapt in a number of significant ways. None of these has been formally ratified by amendment of the charter. In some cases there was no suitable charter provision to change. But in the main, these were adaptations designed to permit the machinery to function without having to rewrite the charter.

Chief Justice Marshall once said of our Constitution that "it was intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs." Throughout our history the process of constitutional growth has gone on unceasingly. Specifically, the Constitution has grown in four ways: through formal amendments, through interpretation by the courts, through custom and usage, and through basic legislation passed by Congress. With remarkably little textual change, the Constitution has been kept a living document.

In somewhat the same fashion the charter has proved flexible enough to meet new situations not foreseen 10 years ago. Despite the fears of some, these are not changes in the *powers* of the organization as a whole in relation to its member states. The United Nations' legal powers are no less and

no greater than what was agreed to at San Francisco, although they have been in some respects clarified. The purposes and goals have not changed either. Indeed the changes I refer to have brought these goals closer to fruition by avoiding futility and refusing to accept impotence.

These informal evolutions fall into four categories.

In the first place, some provisions of the charter early became obsolete and unworkable. Much of chapter VII dealing with Security Council enforcement had to be put aside so long as the great-power unanimity it presupposed was impossible to achieve. Similarly, article 106 on interim enforcement measures called for great-power unanimity, and similarly it became unworkable in a setting where one of the powers itself constituted the chief threat to the peace.

In the second place, new interpretations were found for existing charter provisions. The practice of abstention prevented total paralysis of the Security Council on occasions where an outright veto could be sidestepped. The Secretary-General's role has come to be interpreted quite liberally, opening the way to new possibilities in the peaceful settlement of disputes. A new set of activities in the colonial field has grown out of interpretations of article 73 regarding responsibilities with respect to non-self-governing territories, a development which we must help to keep constructive and balanced. And, as I have indicated, the General Assembly has largely replaced the Security Council as the principal forum for consideration of political issues, including many arising from the colonial revolt against the West.

In the third place, international agreements have been developed to fill out gaps in the charter. I have in mind such important treaties as the Atlantic Pact, the SEATO agreement, and other regional and collective defense pacts based on articles 51–54.

These pacts, I am aware, have sometimes been criticized on the ground that they run counter to the spirit, if not the letter, of the charter. Actually they are based on the obvious fact that the enforcement procedures outlined in the charter were denied vitality by the Soviet Union.

Finally, the major organs of the United Nations have used their authority to create subsidiary organs, such as the Interim Committee and the various Ecosoc regional commissions, to assist the parent organs in performing their prope functions.

It is clear that, if the United Nations is to de velop without charter amendments, we must strik a balance between the extreme positions of loos and strict construction. The idea that the charte is so flexible that it can be changed at will merel by interpretation may be dangerous not only fo the member states but also for the United Na tions. For obviously a member that supports broad interpretation on one occasion might fin the precedent very much against its interests o another occasion. And a General Assembly tha might seek to enlarge unduly the area of its powe by narrow voting margins would probably find it influence weakened in a relatively short time.

The Future of the U.N.—Some Central Issues

When the member nations come to reexamin the powers, functions, and structure of the Unite Nations in connection with the proposed charte review conference, these developments all consti tute vital background. Nothing could be mor futile than to scrutinize the charter in a politica vacuum, in the vain hope that improvements i language alone will somehow transform the be havior, the interests, or the motivation of nations But it would be equally irresponsible, in my judg ment, to assume that no real improvements ar possible.

This is a uniquely propitious time to be takin a hard look at international organizations and a the role the United States should play in them For we appear to be living through one of thos electric periods when the whole apparatus of his tory seems to hesitate, shift gears, and move ahea on a new and different track.

Certainly the program of the Soviet Union ha shown startling signs of alteration—if not o policy, then of strategy and tactics. We must no be deluded into a false set of assumptions abou its continuing purpose. But the tactical shift o the Soviets should not be minimized. It is a major political development, and it has alread had an important impact in the United Nations Indeed, its effects confront us everywhere wit new and challenging problems. Their solutio will call for the most imaginative balance betwee the continuing need for military defenses and th growing possibility that economic, social, and cul tural weapons may be decisive factors in an er of competitive coexistence.

We still have some distance to go to prepare rselves to act effectively in the long pull ahead. deed, the comments made at the first meeting of s Society in 1907 by its president, Elihu Root, still discouragingly timely:

The education of public opinion, which should lead sovereign people in each country to understand the inite limitations upon national rights and the full scope l responsibility of national duties, has only just begun.

What do we see when we look ahead to the next years? Our world has changed drastically er the last 10; have we reason to believe the ocess will stop?

My own crystal ball is no better than yours. it it is possible to project ahead some of the fun- mental issues with confidence that, whatever else ppens to these problems, they will not disappear.

The Problem of Domestic Jurisdiction.—The ost profound issue involving the United Na- ns has to do with the scope of its authority in ation to member states. Around this central estion revolves the whole galaxy of controver- l problems involving supranational powers, do- estic jurisdiction, the veto, human rights, the velopment of world law, and many others. e can see the two extreme poles of this argu- ent—world government at one end, relatively mplete national freedom of action at the other. it, like all extremes, these are misleading and practical.

We can equip ourselves to deal intelligently th this problem only if we clarify our own nking as to the nature and authority of the ited Nations.

There is no more persistently recurrent—and justified—criticism of the U.N. than that it eatens the sovereignty of the United States. is is a good illustration of how mischievous a le misinformation can be. The misinforma- n in this case is that the U.N. allegedly has the wer to make treaties automatically binding on member nations. This, of course, is just not The United Nations or its specialized agen- s can, if its members wish, freely draft and ommend conventions or treaties. However, ne of these can ever be binding on any nation til that nation has given consent through its rmal constitutional processes. In our case, this ans approval by two-thirds of the United ites Senate.

The member states of the U.N. are sovereign. ey have agreed to collaborate in certain fields in their common interest. If they wish to use the U.N. as a forum for reaching international agreement on a variety of matters, there is, of course, nothing in the charter to prevent them from doing so. But there is nothing to prevent those same countries from reaching agreement on the same matters *outside* the U.N. The point is that it is the states which make this decision, *not* the organization; and it is, as it always has been, up to the individual state to enter into a treaty or not.

In considering the matter of jurisdiction and the United Nations we would do well to keep emotions from obscuring the facts.

Collective Security Under the Charter.—Another central issue is the matter of collective defense against aggression. There has been abundant evidence that the original premises of universal collective security were unattainable in today's world, in the sense that nations would not commit themselves in advance to fight any aggression, anytime, anywhere. If the great powers were the antagonists, this seemed to be particularly true.

When great-power unanimity proved unrealistic, the United States took the lead in devising alternative methods of developing collective defense under the charter. This took two forms. When it was seen that the Security Council was able to act in the Korean aggression only because of the absence of the Soviets, we sponsored the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, strengthening the Assembly's capacity to respond to similar emergencies. Also, we have played a leading part in organizing regional defense pacts and mutual security arrangements, the possible need for which had already been anticipated by the charter.

Some people have complained that our Government has been suffering from a case of "pactitis." We should all recall, however, that soon after the end of World War II the Soviet Union, which alone of the great powers had not disarmed, began to employ military threats and pressure to expand its influence and territories. The urgency of the formation of collective defense pacts was obvious. Behind these bastions nations have been able to put their political and economic houses in order and develop their own defenses. These pacts, along with the "Uniting for Peace" program, have been the answer to the Soviet Union's abuse of the veto. They have provided free-world security inside the charter but outside the veto.

Today, as the world political situation changes,

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the United States and other nations are exploring the possibilities of giving greater effect to the potentialities of NATO, for example, in the nonmilitary field, without losing sight of its primary role as a bulwark against aggression. We must now go on to encourage and support other aspects of cooperation inside and outside the U.N. This leads to a third great issue relating to the U.N.: the technical and economic fields.

U.N. Social and Economic Activity.—It is important to remember that the charter did not specifically create any of the specialized agencies or the now flourishing technical assistance program. It merely authorized and approved their establishment. In my mind their growth and vitality constitute one of the most remarkable developments in the last 10 years. They reflect a high degree of successful international cooperation.

The United States has from the beginning given the strongest support to this aspect of the U.N. system. It is clearly in our national interest, and it constitutes a powerful force for peace and international understanding. The Soviet Union, after years of indifference or downright hostility, now seems prepared to play a more active role in this work. If this participation is genuine, it is welcome. This is a field in which we do not hesitate to compete with the Soviet Union.

In carrying on its social and economic programs the U.N. and its specialized agencies must be guided by two cardinal principles. In the first place, in their natural enthusiasm to get results, they should be very careful not to alienate public opinion by invading the domestic jurisdiction of their member states. This engenders adverse criticism and loss of valuable support out of which only harm can come to the organizations and their objectives. There is plenty to do within the limits of their present authority, and it can be done most effectively if the agreed metes and bounds are respected.

In the second place, the U.N. should not attempt to do more than it reasonably can. Progress in the social and economic fields is painfully slow, and there is much to do. Yet I believe that modest programs, well conceived and effectively administered, will take the U.N. further toward its goal than more grandiose programs that exceed the organization's present capabilities. We must recognize that the U.N. will lose ground, and may indeed suffer incalculable damage, if it tries to move too far too fast.

Other Basic Issues

I have dealt with only three of the issues t must be thought through in the years to co Other problems will persist and other vistas opportunity will open up. There is, for exam the issue of colonialism, and the possibilities herent in the U.N. for resolving colonial disp and establishing nonviolent patterns of cha There is also the important field of pacific set ment and international adjudication.

In this connection I might say just a word ab Secretary-General Hammarskjold's mission to Middle East. It is, of course, too early to pre the final outcome of his efforts. Up to this p he has made a valuable contribution in easing t sions in the area and avoiding the possible break of war. He may well lay the groundw for a more lasting peace. His role illustrates o more the fact that there are many resources peace within the charter—including the techniq of direct and quiet diplomacy—which have yet been fully tapped.

In evaluating the political work of the Uni Nations let us remember one hard fact. M important and difficult international problems solved outside the organization. But the re tough ones, the well-nigh insoluble ones, come the United Nations. It is, in a way, the court last appeal.

U.S. Relations With the United Nations

The United Nations is, as I have emphasize voluntary partnership of nations which have s scribed to a set of common purposes and pri ples. In trying to look into the future of t organization we cannot speak for other natic We can, however, speak for ourselves.

Last fall 16 new members were admitted to United Nations. Other qualified states are w ing, and the membership list may soon exceed 80 mark. It is our view that this trend tow approximate universality will add new vital and strength to the organization.

There are, of course, a few prophets of glo who have been predicting that the United Sta will lose its role of leadership in the United tions. I have no fear of such a development. the General Assembly the democratic process worked remarkably well. The small countr on nearly all important issues, have rallied to cause of the free world.

Thus far whatever leadership we have exer-
ed has stemmed largely from the logic of our
sition and our ability to persuade other nations
the rightness of our cause. We intend to con-
ue to rely on these principles. And if the time
ould ever come when we are consistently out-
ted in the General Assembly, then we had better
gin to reexamine our basic policies.

As we move into the second decade let us keep
mly in mind the fundamental principles which
derlie our participation in the United Nations.

First: We intend to live up to the purposes
d principles of the charter. We shall refrain
om the use of force, and we shall do our utmost
settle our disputes by peaceful means. If other
tions will do the same there can be established
at mutual confidence which is the indispensable
gredient of permanent peace.

Second: We shall continue to foster and en-
urage the concept of collective security so that
ose nations which wish to remain free may
and together in protective unity under the char-
against the threat of aggression.

Third: We shall earnestly pursue our quest,
thin the framework of the United Nations, to
ing about adequately safeguarded disarmament.
his is the most complex and the most urgent of
world problems.

Fourth: We shall continue to cooperate with
her countries in our mutual efforts to attain the
cial and economic goals of the charter. To this
d our Government can be counted on to con-
ue our strong financial support to the United
tions technical assistance program and the
rk of the specialized agencies.

May I tarry on this point for just a moment.
here are suggestions from a few critics to the
ect that the United States should limit its par-
ipation in, or even withdraw from, certain of
specialized agencies. One argument is that
reasing Soviet and Communist satellite activity
these agencies is a threat to free-world interests.
his seems to me to be an additional reason, if
y were needed, why we should continue in, and
en increase our support for, the specialized
encies.

Actually, if we were to withdraw from enter-
ses of this kind every time we encountered a
ious obstacle or an unpleasant situation, we
uld perforce be compelled to desert almost every
ternational activity of any consequence in which
participate. And it is extremely difficult for
me to understand how we can wage peace successfully by running away from all the battlefields.

Fifth: We shall do what we can to encourage through the United Nations the development of international law. Unfortunately this is a period of history in which certain nations ignore moral principles and break rules of law when it suits their convenience. That is precisely the reason we should put renewed effort into the great search for that consensus of world opinion which will make permanent peace the unwritten law of relations among the nations.

It now seems possible that we have an opportunity to wage the sort of diplomacy we ought to excel at—the diplomacy of peace. Such a peace, if it should persist, will not be a static one. It will have to be maintained in a world of conflicts, of passions, and of change. In the background will still lurk the terrible possibility of nuclear war. The hostility of world communism will be long sustained. The working out of far-reaching transformations in the formerly colonial areas and in economically undeveloped regions will be slow and precarious.

But in the sort of world we are working in and toward—a world of peaceful change—the United Nations can continue to grow and flourish as a patron of peace, striving always to create community out of discord and law out of community.

Commodity Agreement With Peru

Press release 245 dated May 8

U.S. Ambassador Ellis O. Briggs and the Foreign Minister of Peru, Adm. Luis Edgardo Llosa, signed an agreement at Lima on May 7 authorizing the sale to Peru, through private U.S. traders, of wheat and/or wheat flour to a total value of $2,470,000. The agreement also covers ocean freight in the amount of $310,000. These sales are being made under the authority and provisions of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended.

The agreement provides that payment under the sales program will be made in Peruvian currency. A part of the currency accruing will be earmarked for loans designed to contribute to Peru's economic development with eventual repayment to the United States. The balance of the Peruvian currency will be used to meet U.S. Government expenses in Peru.

Expanding International Trade

by Ben H. Thibodeaux
Director, Office of International Trade and Resources[1]

As a member of the Department of State, much of my work has to do with our relations with other governments on problems of international trade. If we and other governments can agree on opening the passages of trade and on the observance of fair rules of good behavior in the conduct of trade, the way is made easier for private enterprise to operate. It would then be up to the American businessman to establish and maintain his markets through the sale of quality goods at competitive prices, with the minimum of Government restrictions. And given these conditions, I do not believe that I will arouse any argument in this group if I express the belief that you can sell your product much better yourself than the Government can do it for you.

Unfortunately, foreign trade restrictions have been all too plentiful, a fact that has made normal business operations extremely difficult. It is true that in many cases these trade restrictions arose from necessity, but that does not make them less painful. We have had the distressing experience, for example, of seeing our former large flow of deciduous fruit to Europe get squeezed down to a trickle by an array of import quotas, foreign exchange controls, and other restrictive devices. Some of these restrictions are purely protectionist. But, for the most part, they were imposed because of the shortage of dollars or, what amounts to the same thing, the shortage of any currency that could be converted to dollars. And when dollars were scarce, foreign governments rationed their use for imports of things such as basic foods, raw materials, and industrial items. In these circumstances, American fruit was regarded by other countries as a luxury that could be dispensed with until more essential needs from the dollar area had been met.

Time and again in postwar Europe I had the frustrating experience of meeting with former importers of American fruit and foreign officials to try to arrange for freer imports from the United States, only to be told, "Yes, the people in our country want your excellent American fruit, but we have no dollars to pay for it."

The period of dollar shortages has been an extended one. Including the war years, it is now nearly 17 years since the days when Europe was our big fruit market. Things happen in that length of time. People deprived of imports of American fruit began to produce their own, and we now have a situation of greatly expanded production of deciduous fruit in Europe. New trade arrangements were made, and imports from non-dollar sources were expanded. And when these things have happened, they are not easily changed.

The net result of these conditions is increased difficulty for American fruit in the European market. Somewhat comparable conditions have also restricted fruit exports to many countries outside of Europe.

Major Factors in Fruit Exports

But certainly these difficulties are not insurmountable if we have the will and ability to cope with them. At the risk of overgeneralization I venture to say that fundamentally the outlook for fruit exports will be conditioned largely upon three major factors:

(a) The ability and willingness of the American producer to compete commercially in the foreign market on the basis of quality of product, price, and service;

(b) Continued economic improvement abroad,

[1] Address made before the California Grape and Tree Fruit League at Yosemite, Calif., on Apr. 7.

accompanied by increased demand for commodities such as fruit and by increased earnings of American dollars that may be used to buy American fruit; and

(c) The reduction of trade barriers.

All three of these conditions take a lot of doing if they are to be realized. They do not just happen.

Your ability and willingness to compete in foreign markets is a matter within your own responsibility and capability, assisted by the technical aids and market information available to you. No further comment is needed from me on the point other than to say that I have complete confidence in the competitive ability of the American fruit producer. When I heard the quality of American fruit praised in the European market, I was proud to be associated with it. I do not believe I am overstating the situation when I say that American prestige abroad was furthered by the excellent quality of the fruit you have exported. It is important that this high reputation be maintained.

Moreover, I should like to venture a suggestion from my experience abroad. Your trade representatives need to maintain constant and close relations with foreign dealers and importers, who in turn should not neglect to press their governments for permission to import American products as promptly as conditions make this possible. I do not believe it is necessary for me to labor this point.

I would like to discuss at more length, however, the other two conditions I have outlined. For, regardless of your ability to compete, your commercial export situation is not improved one bit unless other countries can pay for your fruit and unless they permit it to enter their markets. And this boils down largely to the kind of trade program we have and to our cooperation with other countries in international trade.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

Under our trade agreements program, we have joined with a large number of other countries to work for the expansion of international trade on a commercial basis, with full opportunity for private enterprise to conduct that trade. Our major instrument for achieving this objective is through our participation in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the GATT).

As you know, our participation in the GATT has been severely criticized in some quarters. It has been described as a sinister plot by the Department of State to sell the country down the river. It has been wrapped in a heavy air of mystery and mysticism.

It is true that the Department of State has responsibility for heading the negotiations under the GATT, as it has for any negotiations with foreign governments. But these negotiations are conducted under the guidance of the President and in teamwork with all of the Government departments and agencies concerned with foreign trade, including notably the Department of Agriculture. As a staff member I should like to claim credit for the Department of State for all the benefits that the United States has derived from the GATT, but I cannot honestly do so.

And there is no mystery about the GATT. It is simply a trade agreement. Instead of being a *bilateral* trade agreement between two countries only, it is *multilateral* and includes 35 countries. These 35 countries account for about 85 percent of world trade. The United States has participated in the GATT since 1948 under the authority vested in the President by the Trade Agreements Act. It is nothing new.

As to the mysticism, there is none. True, the GATT is written in legal language, like your insurance policy or like any contractual document that deals with a complicated subject. But the content and objective of the GATT can be simply stated. The GATT has two major substantive parts: (a) schedules of tariff rates for each country and (b) a set of rules of good behavior in international trade. Its objective is to facilitate the expansion of international trade on a sound basis. I regret in one sense that the GATT has nothing mysterious or romantic about it, for if it did perhaps more people would become interested in learning about it.

Our participation in the GATT has paid off. Tariff levels have been lowered on a reciprocal basis. Tariff rates have been kept more stable than at any time since World War I, a factor that has enabled importers and exporters to plan their operations with more assurance. The GATT has also provided a forum where critical trade disputes have been settled on an amicable basis. And a very important development from the point of view of our fruit industry is the fact that the GATT countries have accepted the obligation to remove

their balance-of-payment restrictions against our exports as improvements occur in their reserves of gold and dollars.

On this point the United States is now collecting dividends. The Western European economy generally has now improved to a point well ahead of where it was before the war. Since 1950 there has been a substantial increase in dollar and gold holdings abroad. Regrettably, a number of countries are still having dollar difficulties. But where improvement has occurred, it has enabled us to press for the removal of balance-of-payment restrictions against imports of American products. And on this I am glad to report that real progress is being made.

In 1953, for example, only 2 of the 13 Western European countries in the GATT had relaxed their restrictions on dollar imports to any extent. Today, as a consequence of their improved foreign-exchange position and in keeping with their obligation to us under the GATT, 11 of these 13 countries have taken measures to reduce their dollar-import restrictions. Of these 11 countries, 8 have completely removed their restrictions on more than half their trade with the United States, with the percentage going up to 87 percent for Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg and 99 percent for Greece. Moreover, import licenses for dollar goods are much easier to get, even when restrictions still apply.

As regards American fruit and fruit products, as many of you know, import restrictions have been loosened in such important markets as the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Sweden, and Austria. Some American fruit is now moving into Germany, France, and other countries under premium-paying and other arrangements. On March 16, Norway announced an allocation of foreign exchange for the first importation of United States canned peaches and pineapples in 16 years and for the first importation of United States oranges in the postwar period.

For deciduous fruits, the problem continues difficult. I have already referred to the increased production in Europe. This factor, as might be expected, has undoubtedly played a part in the resistance we encounter to liberalizing trade in these fruits. Indeed, restrictions apply to imports among the European countries as well as from the United States. We have made repeated representations that restrictions be reduced for deciduous fruits along with other commodities, and we propose to continue to press for freer access to these markets.

Fruit Exports to United Kingdom

I should like to comment briefly on the United Kingdom, formerly your biggest market in Europe. I regret to say that the fruit picture there continues cloudy. Our fruit industry understandably has been looking forward to an early resumption of commercial purchases in that important market. But, to put it simply, the British are strapped for dollars. There was a heartening increase in the British official gold and dollar reserves to about $3 billion in mid-1954 and hopes for freer dollar imports rose accordingly. But by the end of 1955, these reserves had declined to $2.1 billion. The seriousness of this figure is emphasized when we recall that the prewar British reserves stood at about $4.4 billion at a time when sterling was fully convertible and world prices were much lower.

We are gratified that the British are taking strong fiscal and monetary measures to put their house in order instead of adding more import restrictions. Let us wish full success to them in overcoming their difficult economic and financial problems.

In view of British reluctance to spend scarce dollars for fruit, we negotiated another special fruit program for the United Kingdom for the 1955–56 season, to be financed by the International Cooperation Administration. The total program amounted to $22.3 million. Of this total, fresh deciduous fruit comprised $3.4 million, canned deciduous $5 million, dried fruit $9.1 million, and fresh and processed citrus $4.8 million. There were delays in the negotiations and in the eventual issuance of licenses by the British, but even so there was substantial improvement over the preceding year. This year we are holding early conversations with the British as to the kind of fruit program that may be developed for the 1956–57 season.

Exports to Western Hemisphere

Let us turn now to the Western Hemisphere. Here the picture is brighter. The dollar earnings and dollar availabilities of some of our neighbors to the north and south have been good. Notable among the group are Canada, Cuba, and Venezuela. None of these three countries has any pay-

ment restrictions on imports from the United States. They are good customers for our fruit, and there is no frustrating waiting around by the fruit importer for a governmental official to decide whether to give him an import permit. And, I am sure you will agree, that is how it should be. It is our hope to make these favorable conditions widespread. We are working toward that end.

Following this brief sketch of conditions abroad, I believe that I am justified in repeating that our participation in the GATT has paid off. Through the GATT, and because of its rules of good trade behavior, we have been able to exert effective pressure on other countries to relax their payment restrictions against American exports as fully as their gold and dollar reserves allowed.

The results have been good, and they are getting better as economic conditions and dollar earnings abroad continue to improve. The progress that is being made is reflected in our exports. For the last quarter of 1955, the value of our exports exclusive of military grant-aid was at an alltime record high. We want to make it possible for American fruit to join fully in this march of trade.

Need for OTC

The GATT has served us well, but it must be made more effective through better administration. As I have said, the GATT is an agreement. It is not an organization. The important business of the GATT is handled principally at the annual meetings of the member countries. This method of operation may have sufficed in the early postwar period, before world trade had recovered. But with an increasing volume of trade and the concurrent efforts to remove restrictions came the imperative need to deal quickly with urgent trade problems. It became increasingly difficult to defer the settling of these problems until the annual meeting of the GATT countries. It became obvious that a full-time, responsible organization was sorely needed. At the initiative of the United States, therefore, the GATT countries last year negotiated an agreement to establish the Organization for Trade Cooperation (the OTC).[2]

The primary function of the OTC would be to administer the GATT on a good housekeeping basis. The purpose is to make the operation of the GATT more systematic, more efficient, and hence better able to cope with the problems associated with the tremendous expansion in world trade now taking place. The OTC would also serve as a continuing forum for trade negotiations and consultation and would publish information on trade matters.

If the Congress approves United States membership, it is probable that the OTC will be approved by the other GATT countries and be established. If the Congress disapproves, the OTC cannot come into effect. It must be approved by countries accounting for 85 percent of the foreign trade of the GATT members. The United States, the largest importer and exporter in the world, accounts for more than 20 percent of the trade of the GATT countries. The decision as to United States membership is crucial, therefore, in determining whether there will be an OTC.

The decision by the Congress on the OTC is important to the fruit industry, to all of us in the United States, and to our trading partners abroad. For, as President Eisenhower said in his state of the Union message this year,

"Our membership in the OTC will provide the most effective and expeditious means for removing discriminations and restrictions against American exports and in making our trade agreements truly reciprocal. United States membership in the Organization will evidence our continuing desire to cooperate in promoting an expanded trade among the free nations."

[2] For text of OTC agreement, see BULLETIN of Apr. 4, 1955, p. 579.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

84th Congress, 2d Session

Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with the Republic of Nicaragua, and a Protocol Relating Thereto. S. Exec. G, March 9, 1956. 17 pp.

Interim Report on Abandonment of Panama Railroad. Interim report pursuant to H. Res. 118, 84th Cong. H. Rept. 1878, March 13, 1956. 2 pp.

Continuing the Policy of the United States Concerning Certain International Injustices in the World. Report to accompany H. Res. 370. H. Rept. 1877, March 13, 1956. 4 pp.

Providing Additional Authorization for the Continued Construction of the Distant Early Warning System (DEW Line). Report to accompany S. 3452. S. Rept. 1660, March 14, 1956. 3 pp.

International Cultural Exchange and Trade Fair Participation Act of 1956. Report to accompany S. 3116. S. Rept. 1664, March 16, 1956. 8 pp.

Draft Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL TO SECRETARY-GENERAL

U.S./U.N. press release 2396 dated April 24

Following is the text of a letter transmitted on April 24 to the U.N. Secretary-General by James J. Wadsworth, Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations.

I have the honor to transmit four copies of the Draft Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. This Draft Statute was unanimously approved at Washington, D. C. on April 18, 1956 by the Delegations comprising the Twelve Nation Negotiating Group.[1] The Negotiating Group considered a previous draft statute circulated on August 22, 1955,[2] in the light of comments received from other countries during the discussion at the Tenth General Assembly of the United Nations and subsequently.

In accordance with the decision taken by the Group at its April 18th session, distribution of the Draft Statute is being made to the Delegations in New York and the diplomatic missions in Washington, D. C. of the Governments Members of the United Nations and of the Specialized Agencies. Copies of the Draft Statute are to be distributed to the press for release at noon on Wednesday, April 25.

You will recall that negotiations on an International Atomic Energy Agency grew out of a proposal made by President Eisenhower to the United Nations General Assembly in December 1953.

TEXT OF DRAFT STATUTE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ARTICLES I –Establishment of the Agency
II –Objectives
III –Functions
IV –Membership
V –General Conference
VI –Board of Governors
VII –Staff
VIII –Exchange of Information
IX –Supplying of Materials
X –Services, Equipment, and Facilities
XI –Agency Projects
XII –Agency Safeguards
XIII –Reimbursement of Members
XIV –Finance
XV –Privileges and Immunities
XVI –Relationship with Other Organizations
XVII –Settlement of Disputes
XVIII–Amendments and Withdrawals
XIX –Suspension of Privileges
XX –Definitions
XXI –Signature, Acceptance, and Entry into Force
XXII –Registration with the United Nations
XXIII–Authentic Texts and Certified Copies
ANNEX I –Preparatory Commission

ARTICLE I

Establishment of the Agency

The Parties hereto establish an International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as "the Agency") upon the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth.

ARTICLE II

Objectives

The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to the peace, health, and prosperity of the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose.

ARTICLE III

Functions

A. The Agency shall be authorized:

1. to encourage and assist research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world; and, if requested to do so, to act as an intermediary for the purposes of securing the performance of services or the supplying of materials, equipment, or facilities by one Member of the Agency for another; and to perform any operation or service useful in the practical application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes;

2. to make provision, in accordance with this Statute, for materials, services, equipment, and facilities to meet the needs of research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful purposes, in-

[1] For text of communique, see BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1956, p. 729.

[2] *Ibid.*, Oct. 24, 1955, p. 666.

uding the production of electric power, with due con-
deration for the needs of the underdeveloped areas of
e world;

3. to foster the exchange of scientific and technical
formation on peaceful uses of atomic energy;

4. to encourage the exchange of scientists and experts
the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy;

5. to establish and administer safeguards designed
ensure that special fissionable and other materials, serv-
es, equipment, facilities, and information made available
the Agency or at its request or under its supervision
control are not used in such a way as to further any
ilitary purpose; and, at the request of the parties to
y bilateral or multilateral arrangement not otherwise
der the Agency's supervision or control, to apply these
feguards to such arrangement;

6. to establish or adopt standards of safety for pro-
ction of health and minimization of danger to life and
operty (including standards for labor conditions), and
provide for the application of these standards to its
n operations as well as to the operations making use
materials, services, equipment, facilities, and informa-
n made available by the Agency or at its request or
der its control or supervision; and, at the request of
rties to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement not
herwise under the Agency's supervision or control, to
ovide for the application of these standards to opera-
ns under the arrangement;

7. to acquire or establish any facilities, plant, and
uipment useful in carrying out its authorized func-
ns, whenever such facilities, plant, and equipment
herwise available to it in the area concerned are in-
lequate or available on terms it deems unsatisfactory.

B. In carrying out its functions, the Agency shall:

1. conduct its activities in conformity with policies
the United Nations furthering the establishment of
feguarded world-wide disarmament and in conformity
th any international agreements entered into pursuant
such policies;

2. establish control over the use of special fissionable
aterials received by the Agency, in order to ensure that
ese materials are used only for peaceful purposes;

3. allocate its resources in such a manner as to secure
icient utilization and the greatest possible general bene-
in all areas of the world, bearing in mind the special
eds of the underdeveloped areas of the world;

4. submit reports on its activities to the General As-
mbly of the United Nations and, when appropriate, to
e Security Council: if, in connection with the activities
the Agency there should arise questions that are within
e competence of the Security Council, the Agency shall
tify the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main
sponsibility for the maintenance of international peace
d security, and may also take the measures open to it
der this Statute, including those provided in paragraph
of Article XII;

5. submit reports to the Economic and Social Council
d other organs of the United Nations on matters within
e competence of these organs.

C. In carrying out its functions, the Agency shall not
ake assistance to members subject to any political, economic, military, or other conditions incompatible with the provisions of this Statute.

D. Subject to the provisions of this Statute and to the terms of agreements concluded between a State or group of States and the Agency, the activities of the Agency shall be carried out with due observance of the sovereign rights of States.

Article IV

Membership

A. The initial Members of the International Atomic Energy Agency shall be those States Members of the United Nations or of any of the specialized agencies which shall have signed this Statute within ninety days after it is opened for signature and shall have deposited an instrument of ratification.

B. Other members of the Agency shall be those States, whether or not Members of the United Nations or of any of the specialized agencies, which deposit an instrument of acceptance of this Statute after their membership has been approved by the General Conference upon the recommendation of the Board of Governors. In recommending and approving a State for membership, the Board of Governors and the General Conference shall determine that the State is able and willing to carry out the obligations of membership in the Agency, giving due consideration to its ability and willingness to act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

C. The Agency is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members, and all Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with this Statute.

Article V

General Conference

A. A General Conference consisting of representatives of all Members shall meet in regular annual session and in such special sessions as may be convened by the Director General at the request of the Board of Governors or of a majority of Members.

B. At such sessions, each Member shall be represented by one delegate who may be accompanied by alternates and by advisers. The cost of attendance of any delegation shall be borne by the Member concerned.

C. The General Conference shall elect a President and such other officers as may be required at the beginning of each session. They shall hold office for the duration of the session. The General Conference, subject to the provisions of this Statute, shall adopt its own rules of procedure. Each Member shall have one vote and, except as otherwise provided in this Statute, decisions shall be adopted by a majority of those present and voting. A majority of Members shall constitute a quorum.

D. The functions of the General Conference shall be:

1. to elect Members of the Board of Governors in accordance with Article VI;

2. to admit new Members in accordance with Article IV;

3. to suspend a Member from the privileges and rights of membership in accordance with Article XIX;

4. to consider the annual report of the Board;

5. in accordance with Article XIV, to approve the budget of the Agency recommended by the Board or return it with recommendations as to its entirety or parts to the Board, for resubmission to the General Conference;

6. to approve reports to be submitted to the United Nations as required by the relationship agreement between the Agency and the United Nations, except with respect to the reports referred to in paragraph C of Article XII, or return them to the Board with its recommendations;

7. to approve any agreement or agreements between the Agency and the United Nations and other organizations as provided in Article XVI or return such agreements with its recommendations to the Board, for resubmission to the General Conference;

8. to approve rules and limitations regarding the exercise of borrowing powers by the Board, in accordance with paragraph G of Article XIV;

9. to approve amendments to this Statute in accordance with paragraph B of Article XVIII.

E. The General Conference shall have the authority:

1. to make recommendations to the Board of Governors on any matter relating to the functions of the Agency;

2. to make recommendations to the Board on any matter brought to the attention of the General Conference by the Board;

3. to propose matters for consideration by the Board and request from the Board reports on any matter relating to the functions of the Agency.

Article VI

Board of Governors

A. The Board of Governors shall be composed as follows:

1. The outgoing Board of Governors (or in the case of the First Board, the Preparatory Commission referred to in Annex I) shall designate for membership on the Board the five Members most advanced in the technology of atomic energy including the production of source materials and the Member most advanced in the technology of atomic energy including the production of source materials in each of the following areas not represented by the aforesaid five:

(1) North America
(2) Latin America
(3) Western Europe
(4) Eastern Europe
(5) Africa and the Middle East
(6) South Asia
(7) Southeast Asia and the Pacific
(8) Far East.

2. The outgoing Board of Governors (or in the case of the First Board, the Preparatory Commission referred to in Annex I) shall designate for membership on the Board two Members from among the following other producers of source materials: Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Portugal; and shall also designate for membership on the Board one other Member as a supplier of technical assistance. No Member in this category in a one year will be eligible for redesignation in the sa category for the following year.

3. The General Conference shall elect ten Memb to membership on the Board of Governors, with due gard to equitable representation on the Board as a wh of the Members in the areas listed in subparagraph A–1 f this Article, so that the Board shall at all times incl in this category a representative of each of those ar except North America. Except for the five Memb chosen for a term of one year in accordance with pa graph D of this Article, no Member in this category any one term of office will be eligible for re-election the same category for the following term of office.

B. The designations provided for in subparagraphs A and A–2 of this Article shall take place not less than si days before each regular annual session of the Gene Conference. The elections provided for in subparagr A–3 of this Article shall take place at regular ann sessions of the General Conference.

C. Members represented on the Board of Governors accordance with subparagraphs A–1 and A–2 of t Article shall hold office from the end of the next regu annual session of the General Conference after their d ignation until the end of the following regular ann session of the General Conference.

D. Members represented on the Board of Governors accordance with subparagraph A–3 of this Article sl hold office from the end of the regular annual session f the General Conference at which they are elected u the end of the second regular annual session of the G eral Conference thereafter. In the first election foll ing that of the First Board, however, five shall be cho for a term of one year.

E. Each Member of the Board of Governors shall h one vote and decisions shall be made by a majority those present and voting, except as otherwise provi in this Statute. Two-thirds of all Members of the Bo shall constitute a quorum.

F. The Board of Governors shall have authority carry out the functions of the Agency in accordance w this Statute, subject to its responsibilities to the Gene Conference as provided in this Statute.

G. The Board of Governors shall meet at such times it may determine. The meetings shall take place the headquarters of the Agency unless otherwise de mined by the Board.

H. The Board of Governors shall elect a Chairman other officers from among its Members and, subject to provisions of this Statute, shall adopt its own rules procedure.

I. The Board of Governors may establish such c mittees as it deems advisable. The Board may app persons to represent it in its relations with other org zations.

J. The Board of Governors shall prepare an annual port to the General Conference concerning the affairs the Agency and any projects approved by the Age The Board shall also prepare for submission to General Conference such reports as the Agency is or be required to make to the United Nations or to any o organization the work of which is related to that of

gency. These reports, along with the annual report, hall be submitted to Members of the Agency at least one ıonth before the regular annual session of the General onference.

ARTICLE VII

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A. The staff of the Agency shall be headed by a Direc- or General, who shall be appointed by the Board of overnors for a term of four years. The Director General hall be the chief administrative officer of the Agency.

B. The Director General shall be responsible for the ap- ointment, organization, and functioning of the staff and hall be under the authority of and subject to the control f the Board of Governors. He shall perform his duties n accordance with regulations adopted by the Board.

C. The staff shall include such qualified scientific and echnical and other personnel as may be required to ful- ll the objectives and functions of the Agency. The gency shall be guided by the principle that its perma- ent staff shall be kept to a minimum.

D. The paramount consideration in the recruitment and mployment of the staff and in the determination of the onditions of service shall be to secure employees of the ighest standards of efficiency, technical competence, and tegrity. Subject to this consideration, due regard shall e paid to the contributions of Members to the Agency nd to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide geographical basis as possible.

E. The terms and conditions on which the staff shall e appointed, remunerated, and dismissed shall be in ac- rdance with regulations made by the Board of Gov- rnors, subject to the provisions of this Statute and to eneral rules approved by the General Conference on the ecommendation of the Board.

F. In the performance of their duties, the Director eneral and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions om any source external to the Agency. They shall re- ain from any action which might reflect on their posi- on as officials of the Agency. Each Member under- kes to respect the international character of the re- onsibilities of the Director General and the staff and hall not seek to influence them in the discharge of their uties.

G. In this Article the term "staff" includes guards.

ARTICLE VIII

xchange of Information

A. Each Member should make available such informa- on as would, in the judgment of the Member, be helpful the Agency.

B. Each Member shall make available to the Agency all ientific information developed as a result of assistance xtended by the Agency pursuant to Article XI.

C. The Agency shall assemble and make available in n accessible form the information made available to it nder paragraphs A and B of this Article. It shall take ositive steps to encourage the exchange among its Mem- rs of information relating to the nature and peaceful ses of atomic energy and shall serve as an intermediary mong its Members for this purpose.

ARTICLE IX

Supplying of Materials

A. Members may make available to the Agency such quantities of special fissionable materials as they deem advisable and on such terms as shall be agreed with the Agency. The materials made available to the Agency may, at the discretion of the Member making them available, be stored either by the Member concerned or, with the agreement of the Agency, in the Agency's depots.

B. Members may also make available to the Agency source materials as defined in Article XX and other materials. The Board of Governors shall determine the quantities of such materials which the Agency will accept under agreements provided for in Article XIII.

C. Each Member shall notify the Agency of the quantities, form, and composition of special fissionable materials, source materials, and other materials which that Member is prepared, in conformity with its laws, to make available immediately or during a period specified by the Board of Governors.

D. On request of the Agency a Member shall, from the materials which it has made available, without delay deliver to another Member or group of Members such quantities of such materials as the Agency may specify, and shall without delay deliver to the Agency itself such quantities of such materials as are really necessary for operations and scientific research in the facilities of the Agency.

E. The quantities, form and composition of materials made available by any Member may be changed at any time by the Member with the approval of the Board of Governors.

F. An initial notification in accordance with paragraph C of this Article shall be made within three months of the entry into force of this Statute with respect to the Member concerned. In the absence of a contrary decision of the Board of Governors, the materials initially made available shall be for the period of the calendar year succeeding the year when this Statute takes effect with respect to the Member concerned. Subsequent notifications shall likewise, in the absence of a contrary action by the Board, relate to the period of the calendar year following the notification and shall be made no later than the first day of November of each year.

G. The Agency shall specify the place and method of delivery and, where appropriate, the form and composition, of materials which it has requested a Member to deliver from the amounts which that Member has notified the Agency it is prepared to make available. The Agency shall also verify the quantities of materials delivered and shall report those quantities periodically to the Members.

H. The Agency shall be responsible for storing and protecting materials in its possession. The Agency shall ensure that these materials shall be safeguarded against (1) hazards of the weather, (2) unauthorized removal or diversion, (3) damage or destruction, including sabotage, and (4) forcible seizure. In storing special fissionable materials in its possession, the Agency shall ensure the geographical distribution of these materials in such a way as not to allow concentration of large amounts of such materials in any one country or region of the world.

I. The Agency shall as soon as practicable establish or acquire such of the following as may be necessary:

1. plant, equipment, and facilities for the receipt, storage, and issue of materials;

2. physical safeguards;

3. adequate health and safety measures;

4. control laboratories for the analysis and verification of materials received;

5. housing and administrative facilities for any staff required for the foregoing.

J. The materials made available pursuant to this Article shall be used as determined by the Board of Governors in accordance with the provisions of this Statute. No Member shall have the right to require that the materials it makes available to the Agency be kept separately by the Agency or to designate the specific project in which they must be used.

Article X

Services, Equipment, and Facilities

Members may make available to the Agency services, equipment, and facilities which may be of assistance in fulfilling the Agency's objectives and functions.

Article XI

Agency Projects

A. Any Member or group of Members of the Agency desiring to set up any project for research on, or development or practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful purposes may request the assistance of the Agency in securing special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, and facilities necessary for this purpose.

B. Any such request shall be accompanied by an explanation of the purpose and extent of the project and shall be considered by the Board of Governors.

C. The Agency may arrange for the supplying of any materials, services, equipment, and facilities necessary for the project by one or more Members or may itself undertake to provide any or all of these directly.

D. For the purpose of considering the request, the Agency may send into the territory of the Member or group of Members making the request a person or persons qualified to examine the project. For this purpose the Agency may, with the approval of the Member or group of Members making the request, use members of its own staff or employ suitably qualified nationals of any Member.

E. Before approving a project under this Article, the Board of Governors shall give due consideration to:

1. the usefulness of the project, including its scientific and technical feasibility;

2. the adequacy of plans, funds, and technical personnel to assure the effective execution of the project;

3. the adequacy of proposed health and safety standards for handling and storing materials and for operating facilities;

4. the inability of the Member or group of Members making the request to secure the necessary finances, materials, facilities, equipment, and services;

5. the equitable distribution of materials and other resources available to the Agency; and

6. such other matters as may be relevant.

F. Upon approving a project, the Agency shall enter into an agreement with the Member or group of Members submitting the project, which agreement shall:

1. provide for allocation to the project of any required special fissionable or other materials;

2. provide for transfer of special fissionable materials from their then place of custody, whether the materials be in the custody of the Agency or of the Member making them available for use in Agency projects, to the Member or group of Members submitting the project, under conditions which ensure the safety of any shipment required and meet applicable health and safety standards;

3. set forth the terms and conditions, including charges, on which any materials, services, equipment, and facilities are to be provided by the Agency itself, and if any such materials, services, equipment, and facilities are to be provided by a Member, the terms and conditions as arranged for by the Member or group of Members submitting the project and the supplying Member;

4. include undertakings by the Member or group of Members submitting the project (a) that the assistance provided shall not be used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and (b) that the project shall be subject to the safeguards provided for in Article XII, the relevant safeguards being specified in the agreement;

5. make appropriate provision regarding the rights and interests of the Agency and the Member or Members concerned in any inventions or discoveries, or any patents therein, arising from the project;

6. include such other provisions as may be appropriate.

G. The provisions of this Article shall also apply where appropriate to a request for materials, services, facilities, or equipment in connection with an existing project.

Article XII

Agency Safeguards

A. With respect to any Agency project or other arrangement where the Agency is requested by the parties concerned to apply safeguards, the Agency shall have the following rights and responsibilities to the extent relevant to the project or arrangement:

1. to approve the design of any specialized equipment and facilities, including nuclear reactors;

2. to require the observance of any health and safety measures prescribed by the Agency;

3. to require the maintenance and production of operating records to assist in ensuring accountability for source and special fissionable materials;

4. to call for and receive progress reports;

5. to approve the means to be used for chemical processing of irradiated materials and to specify disposition of any special fissionable materials recovered or produced as a by-product, and to require that such special fissionable materials be deposited with the Agency except for quantities authorized by the Agency to be retained for specified non-military use under continuing Agency safeguards;

6. to send into the territory of the recipient State or States inspectors, designated by the Agency after

onsultation with the State or States concerned, who shall ave access at all times to all places, persons, and data ecessary to account for source and special fissionable maerials supplied and fissionable products and to determine whether there is compliance with the undertaking against se in furtherance of any military purpose referred to in ubparagraph F–4 of Article XI, with the health and afety measures referred to in subparagraph A–2 of this rticle, and with any other conditions prescribed in the greement between the Agency and the State or States oncerned;

7. in the event of non-compliance and failure by the ecipient State or States to take requested corrective steps within a reasonable time, to suspend or terminate assistance and withdraw any materials and equipment made vailable by the Agency or a Member in furtherance of the roject.

B. The Agency shall, as necessary, establish a staff of nspectors. The staff of inspectors shall have the responsibility of examining all operations conducted by the gency itself to determine whether the Agency is complying with the health and safety measures prescribed by t for application to projects subject to its approval, upervision or control, and whether the Agency is taking dequate measures to prevent the source and special fissionable materials in its custody or used or produced in ts own operations from being used in furtherance of any nilitary purpose. The Agency shall take remedial action orthwith to correct any non-compliance or failure to take dequate measures.

C. The staff of inspectors shall also have the responsibility of obtaining and verifying the accounting referred o in subparagraph A–6 of this Article and of determining whether there is compliance with the undertaking referred o in subparagraph F–4 of Article XI, with the measures eferred to in subparagraph A–2 of this Article, and with ll other conditions of the project prescribed in the agreement between the Agency and the State or States conerned. The inspectors shall report any non-compliance o the Director General who shall thereupon transmit the eport to the Board of Governors. The Board shall call pon the recipient State or States to remedy forthwith ny non-compliance which it finds to have occurred. The Board shall report the non-compliance to all Members nd to the Security Council and General Assembly of the Jnited Nations. In the event of failure of the recipient State or States to take fully corrective action within a easonable time, the Board may take one or both of the ollowing measures: direct curtailment or suspension f assistance being provided by the Agency or by a Member, and call for the return of materials and equipment nade available to the recipient Member or group of Members. The Agency may also, in accordance with Article XIX, suspend any non-complying Member from the exerise of the privileges and rights of membership.

Article XIII

Reimbursement of Members

Unless otherwise agreed upon between the Board of Governors and the Member furnishing to the Agency maerials, services, equipment, or facilities, the Board shall enter into an agreement with such Member providing for reimbursement for the items furnished.

Article XIV

Finance

A. The Board of Governors shall submit to the General Conference the annual budget estimates for the expenses of the Agency. To facilitate the work of the Board in this regard, the Director General shall initially prepare the budget estimates. If the General Conference does not approve the estimates, it shall return them together with its recommendations to the Board. The Board shall then submit further estimates to the General Conference for its approval.

B. Expenditures of the Agency shall be classified under the following categories:

1. administrative expenses: these shall include

(a) costs of the staff of the Agency other than the staff employed in connection with materials, services, equipment, and facilities referred to in subparagraph B–2 below; costs of meetings; and expenditures required for the preparation of Agency projects and for the distribution of information;

(b) costs of implementing the safeguards referred to in Article XII in relation to Agency projects or, under subparagraph A–5 of Article III, in relation to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, together with the costs of handling and storage of special fissionable material by the Agency other than the storage and handling charges referred to in paragraph E below;

2. expenses, other than those included in subparagraph 1 of this paragraph, in connection with any materials, facilities, plant, and equipment acquired or established by the Agency in carrying out its authorized functions, and the costs of materials, services, equipment, and facilities provided by it under agreements with one or more Members.

C. In fixing the expenditures under subparagraph B–1 (b) above, the Board of Governors shall deduct such amounts as are recoverable under agreements regarding the application of safeguards between the Agency and parties to bilateral or multilateral arrangements.

D. The Board of Governors shall apportion the expenses referred to in subparagraph B–1 above, among Members in accordance with a scale to be fixed by the General Conference.

E. The Board of Governors shall establish periodically a scale of charges, including reasonable uniform storage and handling charges, for materials, services, equipment, and facilities furnished to Members by the Agency. The scale shall be designed to produce revenues for the Agency adequate to meet the expenses and costs referred to in subparagraph B–2 above. The proceeds of such charges shall be placed in a separate fund which shall be used to pay Members for any materials, services, equipment, or facilities furnished by them and to meet other expenses referred to in subparagraph B–2 above which may be incurred by the Agency itself.

F. Any excess of revenues referred to in paragraph E over the expenses and costs there referred to, and any voluntary contributions to the Agency, shall be placed

in a general fund which may be used as the Board of Governors, with the approval of the General Conference, may determine.

G. Subject to rules and limitations approved by the General Conference, the Board of Governors shall have the authority to exercise borrowing powers on behalf of the Agency.

H. Decisions of the General Conference on financial questions and of the Board of Governors on the amount of the Agency's budget shall require a two-thirds majority of those present and voting.

Article XV

Privileges and Immunities

A. The Agency shall enjoy in the territory of each Member such legal capacity and such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of its functions.

B. Delegates of Members together with their alternates and advisers, Governors appointed to the Board together with their alternates and advisers, and the Director General and the staff of the Agency, shall enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary in the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Agency.

C. The legal capacity, privileges, and immunities referred to in this Article shall be defined in a separate agreement between the Agency, represented for this purpose by the Director General acting under instructions of the Board of Governors, and the Members.

Article XVI

Relationship with other Organizations

A. The Board of Governors, with the approval of the General Conference, is authorized to enter into an agreement or agreements establishing an appropriate relationship between the Agency and the United Nations and any other organizations the work of which is related to that of the Agency.

B. The agreement or agreements establishing the relationship of the Agency and the United Nations shall provide for:

1. submission by the Agency of reports as provided for in subparagraphs B-4 and B-5 of Article III;

2. consideration by the Agency of resolutions relating to it adopted by the General Assembly or any of the Councils of the United Nations and the submission of reports, when requested, to the appropriate organ of the United Nations on the action taken by the Agency or by its Members in accordance with this Statute as a result of such consideration.

Article XVII

Settlement of Disputes

A. Any question or dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Statute which is not settled by negotiation shall be referred to the International Court of Justice in conformity with the Statute of the Court, unless the parties concerned agree on another mode of settlement.

B. The Board of Governors is empowered, subject to authorization from the General Assembly of the United Nations, to request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question arising within the scope of the Agency's activities.

Article XVIII

Amendments and Withdrawals

A. Amendments to this Statute may be proposed by any Member. Certified copies of the text of any amendment proposed shall be prepared by the Director General and communicated by him to all Members.

B. Amendments shall come into force for all Members when (i) approved by the Board of Governors, (ii) approved by the General Conference by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting, and (iii) accepted by two-thirds of all the Members in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. Acceptance by a Member shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument of acceptance with the depositary Government.

C. At any time after five years from the date when this Statute shall initially take effect in accordance with paragraph E of Article XXI or whenever a Member is unwilling to accept an amendment to this Statute, it may withdraw from the Agency by notice in writing to that effect given to the depositary Government, which shall promptly inform the Board of Governors and all Members.

D. Withdrawal by a Member from the Agency shall not affect its contractual obligations entered into pursuant to Article XI or its budgetary obligations for the year in which it withdraws.

Article XIX

Suspension of Privileges

A. A Member of the Agency which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Agency shall have no vote in the Agency if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two years. The General Conference may, nevertheless, permit such a Member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the Member.

B. A Member which has persistently violated the provisions of this Statute or of any agreement entered into by it may be suspended from the exercise of the privileges and rights of membership by the General Conference acting by a two-thirds majority of the Members present and voting upon recommendation by the Board of Governors.

Article XX

Definitions

As used in this Statute:

1. The term "special fissionable material" means plutonium-239; uranium-233; uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233; any material containing one or more of the foregoing; and such other fissionable material as the Board of Governors shall from time to time determine; but the term "special fissionable material" does not include source material.

2. The term "uranium enriched in the isotopes 235

233" means uranium containing the isotopes 235 or 3 or both in an amount such that the abundance ratio the sum of these isotopes to the isotope 238 is greater an the ratio of the isotope 235 to the isotope 238 oc-rring in nature.

3. The term "source material" means uranium con-ning the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature; ura-ium depleted in the isotope 235; thorium; any of the regoing in the form of metal, alloy, chemical compound, concentrate; any other material containing one or re of the foregoing in such concentration as the Board Governors shall from time to time determine; and such ner material as the Board of Governors shall from ne to time determine.

ARTICLE XXI

gnature, Acceptance, and Entry into Force

A. This Statute shall be open for signature on _____ _____, 1956, by all States Members of the United tions or any of the specialized agencies and shall re-in open for signature by those States for a period of iety days.

B. The signatory States shall become parties to this atute by deposit of an instrument of ratification.

C. Instruments of ratification by signatory States and struments of acceptance by States whose membership s been approved under paragraph B of Article IV of s Statute shall be deposited with the Government of United States of America, hereby designated as de-sitary Government.

D. Ratification or acceptance of this Statute shall be ected by States in accordance with their respective nstitutional processes.

E. This Statute shall come into force when eighteen ates have deposited instruments of ratification in ac-rdance with paragraph B of this Article, provided that ch eighteen States shall include at least three of the lowing States: Canada, France, the United Kingdom Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of viet Socialist Republics, and the United States of nerica. Instruments of ratification and instruments of ceptance deposited thereafter shall take effect on the te of their receipt.

F. The depositary Government shall promptly inform States signatory to this Statute of the date of each de-sit of ratification and the date of entry into force of the atute. The depositary Government shall promptly in-m all signatories and Members of the dates on which ates subsequently become parties thereto.

ARTICLE XXII

gistration with the United Nations

A. This Statute shall be registered by the depositary vernment pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the ited Nations.

B. Agreements between the Agency and any Member or mbers, and agreements between Members subject to proval of the Agency, shall be registered with the ency. Such agreements shall be registered with the ited Nations if registration is required under Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE XXIII

Authentic Texts and Certified Copies

This Statute, done in the _____ and _____ languages, each being equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the depositary Government. Duly certified copies of this Statute shall be transmitted by the depositary Government to the Governments of the other signatory States and to the Governments of States admitted to membership under paragraph B of Article IV.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Statute.

Done at _____, this _____ day of _____, one thousand nine hundred fifty-six.

ANNEX I

Preparatory Commission

A. A Preparatory Commission shall come into existence on the first day this Statute is open for signature. It shall be composed of one representative each of Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Portugal, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and United States of America, and one representative each of six other States to be chosen by the International Conference on the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Preparatory Commission shall remain in existence until this Statute comes into force and thereafter until the General Conference has convened and a Board of Governors has been selected in accordance with Article VI.

B. The Preparatory Commission shall

1. make arrangements for the first session of the General Conference; and

2. make designations for membership on the First Board of Governors in accordance with subparagraphs A–1 and A–2 and paragraph B of Article VI.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Trusteeship Council

Examination of Annual Reports. Observations of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization on the Annual Reports for 1954 on the Trust Territories of Tanganyika, Ruanda-Urundi, the Cameroons under British administration, the Cameroons under French administration, Togoland under British administration and Togoland under French administration. Letter dated 24 January 1956 from the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization to the Secretary-General. T/1223, February 1, 1956. 78 pp. mimeo.

United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories of the Cameroons under British Administration and the Cameroons under French Administration, 1955. Report on the Cameroons under British Administration. T/1226, February 6, 1956. 155 pp. mimeo.

Conditions in the Cameroons Under British Administration. Working paper prepared by the Secretariat. T/L.639, February 28, 1956. 59 pp. mimeo.

Launching the U.N. Study of Effects of Atomic Radiation

FIRST MEETING OF SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE ON EFFECTS OF ATOMIC RADIATION, MARCH 14–23

by Shields Warren

The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation held its first meeting at United Nations Headquarters from March 14 to March 23, 1956. The nations represented were Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, France, India, Japan, Mexico, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The following United Nations organizations were also represented: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Labor Organization (ILO), U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), World Health Organization (WHO), and World Meteorological Organization (WMO).

The work of the committee was scientific in nature. It conducted most of its work in closed sessions, organized as working parties. In detailed, technical discussions, the committee surveyed the scientific problems involved in carrying out the mandate of the General Assembly to examine the effects of radiation on man and his environment.[1] It asked the U.N. Secretariat to collect from members of the United Nations and specialized agencies by August 1, 1956, preliminary measurements of natural radiation background and of environmental contamination caused by manmade radioactivity. Information will also be assembled in other scientific fields for evaluation by the committee at its next meeting in October 1956.

Working groups of the committee discussed seven topics: genetics, the effects of irradiation by internally absorbed isotopes, the effects of external radiation, natural radiation background, exposure during medical procedures, occupational exposure, and environmental contamination. The committee requested information more rapidly on natural radiation and environmental contamination for two reasons:

First, these physical measurements are fundamental to scientific evaluation in other fields. For example, the genetic effects of radiation cannot be evaluated without a knowledge of the amount of natural radiation to which humans, animals, and plants throughout the world are exposed day after day throughout their lives. Occupational exposure and exposure during medical procedures also must be evaluated in terms of how much they increase this "normal" amount of radiation exposure.

Second, the committee felt that more immediately usable information was available on the results of these physical measurements than exists in certain other areas of knowledge under consideration.

In the field of genetic effects, for example, the committee members pointed out during discus-

● *Dr. Warren, scientific director of the Cancer Research Institute of the New England Deaconess Hospital, Boston, represents the United States on the U.N. Scientific Committee.*

[1] For text of the resolution adopted by the 10th General Assembly on Dec. 3, 1955, see BULLETIN of Nov. 21, 1955, p. 855.

ons that sufficient knowledge or information on hich to base definite conclusions is not available. efore making specific recommendations for re-arch projects, the committee will collect infor-ation on natural mutation rates, changes in utation rates after different radiation dosages, d spontaneous (natural) detrimental mutations d their effects. (A mutation is a change pro-ced in succeeding generations by a change in e structure of the genes, the hereditary factor in production; a spontaneous mutation is a gene ange that occurs without any definitely known use.) Specific information on local geographic, ophysical, or demographic conditions will also requested by the committee from member na-ons. These data will be studied to see if any rrelation in biological changes can be obtained om areas with different levels of natural radia-n background.

Information which the committee plans to col-t on the effects of irradiation of the human body m internally absorbed isotopes and the effects external radiation may come from different urces. Among these are patients who have been ated with radiation or have undergone repeated diological examinations; workers who have been posed to these hazards in their occupation; and ses of possible exposure to radiation from tests nuclear weapons. Physiological and patho-ical changes resulted from overexposure to diation in the initial work with radiation. Such ects as leukemia, malignancies, changes in the od and bone marrow, and biochemical changes ve been found. It should be pointed out, how-er, that cases of extreme exposure and extreme ects are quite rare today, and one of the aims the committee is to collect data on relatively w exposures. These exposures usually result in ysiological changes which the body can repair, opposed to pathological changes such as cancer.

The committee considered that fundamental ological research should be encouraged, includ-g methods of detecting biological effects of low-ensity irradiation and the study of chemical thods capable of altering the biological action irradiation.

This need for indicators of the biological effects small doses of radiation has also been pointed t by the committee in its recommendations for search in the field of natural radiation. In dition to obtaining data on measurements of natural radioactivity and its distribution over the world, the committee is seeking uniform methods for estimating the amount of radiation received by certain parts of the human body from natural radioactive materials in it. Methods of estimating the biological effect of small doses are considered so essential that the committee has requested its members to submit preliminary reports on them by August 1, 1956.

The committee decided to establish a means of prompt collection and examination of information on any accidental overexposure of human beings, and it is seeking information on the amount of radiation exposure that occurs during medical procedures such as diagnostic radiological examinations.

For all individuals whose occupation exposes them to ionizing radiations, the committee has recommended the maintenance of continuing personal files that would include information from periodic medical examinations.

In addition to measurements of radioactive fallout over the surface of the globe, the committee has asked for information on the amount, distribution, and composition of radioactivity that still remains in the upper atmosphere. Part of this activity falls on the earth each year and is thus a continuing source of possible increases in radiation levels. However, data available to the committee at this time from India, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States indicate that fallout to date is only a fraction of the natural background.

While calling for information almost immediately in several of these scientific areas, the committee recognized that standard procedures of measurement have not been formulated and accepted internationally. It has therefore decided to distribute information on known procedures of measurement as quickly as possible. At the same time, the committee will study and compare these procedures prior to its next meeting with the hope that internationally acceptable standards can be achieved as quickly as possible.

At its first session, the committee also took note of statements by representatives of the World Health Organization, the U. N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and the Food and Agriculture Organization on ways in which these specialized agencies might cooperate with the committee in its work.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Inter-American Indian Institute

The Department of State announced on May 2 (press release 235) that the U.S. Government will be represented at the meeting of the Governing Board of the Inter-American Indian Institute, which convenes at Mexico City on May 3, 1956, by Isabel T. Kelly, who was designated alternate U.S. representative on the Governing Board of the Institute on April 26, 1956. Alexander G. Jacome, the U.S. representative on the Governing Board of the Inter-American Indian Institute, will be unable to attend the forthcoming meeting.

The Inter-American Indian Institute, which has its headquarters at Mexico City, is a specialized organization of the Organization of American States. Formally established in 1941, the Institute has 15 member governments. They are Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela, and the United States. Functions of the Institute are to conduct scientific investigations on all phases of Indian life in the Americas and to develop information of use to the member governments in connection with policies related to their Indian populations. In addition to its other functions, the Institute acts as the permanent committee of the Inter-American Indian Conference.

World Health Assembly

The Department of State announced on May 4 (press release 242) that the U.S. Government will be represented by the following delegation at the 9th World Health Assembly convening at Geneva, Switzerland, on May 8:

Delegates

Dr. Leonard A. Scheele, *Chairman*, Surgeon General, U.S. Public Health Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

Dr. Charles Mayo, Professor of Surgery, Mayo Clinic, Rochester, Minn.

Francis O. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs

Alternate Delegates

Howard B. Calderwood, Office of International Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State

Dr. Lowell T. Coggeshall, Special Assistant for Heal and Medical Affairs, Department of Health, Educati and Welfare

Dr. H. van Zile Hyde, Chief, Division of Internatio Health, Bureau of State Services, U.S. Public Heal Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfa

Advisers

Col. Theodore C. Bedwell, Jr., USAF, Office of t Surgeon General, Department of the Air Force

Dr. Daniel Bergsma, State Commissioner of Health, Tr ton, N.J.

Wendell B. Coote, Office of International Administrati Department of State

Dr. John J. Hanlon, Chief, Public Health Division, Int national Cooperation Administration

Lucille P. Leone, Chief Nurse, U.S. Public Health Servi Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

Dr. James R. Reuling, American Medical Association, B Side, N.Y.

Kenneth S. Watson, Sanitary Engineer, General Elect Company, Schenectady, N.Y.

Secretary of Delegation

Henry F. Nichol, U.S. Resident Delegation for Intern tional Organizations, Geneva, Switzerland

Staff

William F. Marshall, *Documents Officer*, American Co sulate General, Geneva, Switzerland

G. Lucille Batchelder, Bureau of Inter-American Affai Department of State

Velma Heine, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary State for Political Affairs

Josephine Hirschinger, U.S. Public Health Service, D partment of Health, Education, and Welfare

Beatrice Kinn, American Consulate General, Genev Switzerland

The World Health Assembly is the supreme a thority of the World Health Organizati (WHO), a specialized agency of the United N tions. At the present time, the governments 81 countries are members of the WHO, while t governments of 4 countries are associate membe The Assembly meets in regular annual session a determines the policies of the Organization.

Besides reviewing the work of the WHO duri 1955, the participants in the 9th World Heal Assembly will review the program and budget WHO for 1957; review reports on the business co ducted by the Executive Board at its 16th a 17th sessions; and determine the scale of asses ments for 1957. Other items to be considered i clude WHO's participation in the expanded pr gram of technical assistance; peaceful uses atomic energy; international quarantine; malar eradication; WHO's relations with the United N

ions Children's Fund (UNICEF); and a review f decisions of the United Nations and of other pecialized agencies on matters affecting the acivities of WHO.

The work of the Organization embraces interational programs on a wide variety of public ealth questions: the control and eradication of ommunicable diseases; measures for the improvement of maternal and child health; dental health nd occupational health; the provision of advice nd assistance to national governments in developg and encouraging the application of higher andards in respect to such activities as nursing, ublic health administration, and professional edcation and training. In addition, the WHO ndertakes or participates in technical health ork of international significance through estabshing biological standards, determining the adiction-producing properties of drugs, exchanging ientific information, preparing international anitary regulations, revising the international st of diseases and causes of death, and collecting nd disseminating epidemiological information. Through its field programs, the WHO also assists overnments in the control of various diseases.

The 8th World Health Assembly was held at léxico, D. F., May 10–27, 1955.

nternational Cotton Advisory Committee

The Department of State announced on May (press release 243) that 79 countries and 10 inernational organizations have been invited to send elegates or observers to the 15th plenary meetng of the International Cotton Advisory Comittee, which is to be held at Washington, begining on May 8, 1956, under the auspices of the .S. Government.

The U.S. Government will be represented at the neeting by the following delegation:

elegates

Iarvin L. McLain, *Chairman*, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture

. Marion Rhodes, *Vice Chairman*, Director, Cotton Division, Commodity Stabilization Service, Department of Agriculture

dwin Dean White, *Chairman of Standing Committee, ICAC*, Associate Director, Office of Food and Agriculture, International Cooperation Administration

lternate Delegate

tanley Nehmer, Office of International Trade and Resources, Department of State

Government Advisers

George A. Sallee, *Secretary of Delegation*, Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Department of Commerce

Robert C. Sherman, Director, Cotton Division, Foreign Agricultural Service, Department of Agriculture

A. Henry Thurston, Director, Textiles and Clothing Division, Business and Defense Services Administration, Department of Commerce

Industry Advisers

William Rhea Blake, Executive Vice President, National Cotton Council of America, Memphis, Tenn.

Read P. Dunn, Jr., Director, Foreign Trade Division, National Cotton Council of America, Washington, D. C.

Robert C. Jackson, Executive Vice President, American Cotton Manufacturers' Institute, Washington, D. C.

Walter L. Randolph, Vice President, American Farm Bureau Federation, Montgomery, Ala.

Jack Stoneham, American Cotton Shippers Association, Dallas, Tex.

The purpose of the meeting will be to make a thorough review of the factors currently affecting the consumption, production, and international trade in cotton and to study any measures that may be suggested for the purpose of encouraging international collaboration in the improvement of the world cotton situation.

Of the 79 invited countries, 32 and the United States are members of the International Cotton Advisory Committee. That Committee was established in 1939 to provide a mechanism for observing and keeping in close touch with developments in the world cotton situation and for suggesting, as and when advisable, measures for international action in respect of cotton.

Membership in the Committee is open to any member of the United Nations or of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations having a substantial interest in cotton. The present members, each of whom is entitled to be represented at the forthcoming meeting by delegates, are:

Argentina	Greece	Spain
Australia	Guatemala	Sudan
Austria	India	Sweden
Belgium	Italy	Switzerland
Brazil	Japan	Syria
Canada	Republic of Korea	Turkey
Colombia	Mexico	United Kingdom
Denmark	Netherlands	United States
Egypt	Nicaragua	
Finland	Norway	
France	Pakistan	
Federal Republic of Germany	Peru	
	Portugal	

The countries and international organizations which are not members of the Committee but which have been invited to send observers to the forthcoming meeting are:

Afghanistan
Bolivia
Burma
Cambodia
Ceylon
Chile
China
Costa Rica
Cuba
Czechoslovakia
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Ethiopia
Haiti
Honduras
Hungary
Iceland
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Jordan
Laos
Lebanon
Liberia
Libya
Luxembourg
Nepal
New Zealand
Panama
Paraguay
Philippine Republic
Poland
Rumania
Saudi Arabia
Thailand
Tunisia
Union of South Africa
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Uruguay
Venezuela
Viet-Nam
Yemen
Yugoslavia

U.N. Commission on International Commodity Trade
Economic and Social Council of the Organization of American States
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
Interim Coordinating Committee for International Commodity Arrangements
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
International Monetary Fund
Organization for European Economic Cooperation
Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
International Federation of Agricultural Producers
International Federation of Cotton and Allied Textile Industries

ILO Building, Civil Engineering, and Public Works Committee

The Department of State announced on May 10 (press release 250) that the United States will be represented by the following delegation at the fifth session of the Building, Civil Engineering, and Public Works Committee of the International Labor Organization at Geneva, Switzerland, May 14–26:

Representing the Government of the United States

Arnold E. Chase, Chief, Construction Statistics Division, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor

Frank J. Meistrell, Deputy Administrator, Housing a Home Finance Agency

George Tobias, *Adviser*, Attaché, American Consul General, Geneva, Switzerland

Representing the Employers of the United States

Robert T. Morrill, President, National Association Plumbing Contractors

Lester C. Rogers, President, Bates and Rogers Constr tion Corporation, Chicago, Ill.

Representing the Workers of the United States

O. William Blaier, Vice President, United Brotherhood Carpenters and Joiners of America

Howard McSpedon, President, New York City Buildi and Construction Trades Council

The Building, Civil Engineering, and Publ Works Committee is one of eight industri committees that have been established by the I since 1945 to deal with problems of internation significance in several industries. The other co mittees are concerned with coal mines, inla transport, iron and steel, metal trades, textil petroleum, and chemical industries. In additi to making a review of recent events and develo ments in the construction industry, the commi tee will consider two special topics: safety the construction industry, and national housi programs and full employment.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Customs convention on the temporary importation private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 195
Ratified by the President: May 4, 1956.

Convention concerning customs facilities for tourir Done at New York June 4, 1954.[1]
Ratified by the President: May 4, 1956.

Aviation

Convention on international civil aviation. Done at Cl cago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 1947. TIAS 1591.
Adherence deposited: Federal Republic of German May 9, 1956.

International air services transit agreement. Signed Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force for t United States February 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693.

[1] Not in force.

Acceptance deposited: Federal Republic of Germany, May 9, 1956.

otocol relating to certain amendments to the convention on international civil aviation. Done at Montreal June 14, 1954.[1]

Ratified by the President: May 4, 1956.

pyright

iversal copyright convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Ratification deposited: Liberia, April 27, 1956.

otocol 1 concerning application of the convention to the works of stateless persons and refugees. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Ratification deposited: Liberia, April 27, 1956.

otocol 2 concerning application of the convention to the works of certain international organizations. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Ratification deposited: Liberia, April 27, 1956.

ermany

reement relating to external debts of the City of Berlin and of public utility enterprises owned or controlled by Berlin. Effected by exchange of notes at Bonn February 29 and March 2, 1956.[2] Entered into force March 2, 1956. TIAS 3545.

reement relating to the return of captured files and archives of the former German Foreign Office at present in the territory of the United Kingdom. Effected by exchange of notes at Bonn March 14 and April 18, 1956.[2] Entered into force April 18, 1956.

arcotic Drugs

rotocol for limiting and regulating the cultivation of the poppy plant, the production of, international and wholesale trade in, and use of opium. Done at New York June 23, 1953.[1]

Ratification deposited: Monaco, April 12, 1956.

haling

mendments to paragraphs 4 (2), 5, 7 (a), and 8 (a) and (c) of the Schedule of the International Whaling Convention of 1946 (TIAS 1849). Adopted at the Seventh Meeting of the International Whaling Commission, Moscow July 18–23, 1955. Entered into force November 8, 1955, with the exception of amendments to paragraph 8 (a) and (c). Amendments to paragraph 8 (a) and (c) entered into force March 7, 1956, except for the United States and certain other countries. TIAS 3548.

omen—Political Rights

ter-American convention on granting of political rights to women. Done at Bogotá May 2, 1948. Entered into force April 22, 1949.[3]

Signature: Nicaragua, April 24, 1956.

[1] Not in force.
[2] Similar notes were exchanged *mutatis mutandis* between the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, and between France and the Federal Republic.
[3] Not in force for the United States.

BILATERAL

Canada

Agreement relating to the construction of family housing units at Pepperrell Air Force Base, St. John's, Newfoundland, with contract attached. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa April 18 and 19, 1956. Entered into force April 19, 1956.

Chile

Agreement for a cooperative program of geological and mineralogical investigations of the uranium resources of Chile. Effected by exchange of notes at Santiago April 10 and 20, 1956. Enters into force upon receipt by the United States of notification by Chile of its ratification.

Colombia

Agreement for technical cooperation activities in civil aviation pursuant to general agreement of March 5 nd 9, 1951 (TIAS 2231), and superseding agreement of October 23 and December 3 and 22, 1947 (TIAS 1738). Effected by exchange of notes at Bogotá January 17 and March 27, 1956. Entered into force March 27, 1956.

Finland

Agreement further supplementing the surplus agricultural commodities agreement of May 6, 1955 (TIAS 3248), by providing for the purchase of additional commodities and amending the supplemental agreement of March 26, 1956 (TIAS 3533). Signed at Helsinki April 26, 1956. Entered into force April 26, 1956.

Italy

Agreement relating to the grant of food for an emergency feeding program in areas of Italy still suffering from devastation brought about by the winter storms. Effected by exchange of notes at Rome April 27, 1956. Entered into force April 27, 1956.

Peru

Agreement for a program of educational exchanges authorized by the Fulbright Act (60 Stat. 754). Signed at Lima May 4, 1956. Entered into force May 4, 1956.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on May 7 confirmed Livingston T. Merchant to be Ambassador to Canada.

The Senate on May 10 confirmed Willard L. Beaulac to be Ambassador to Argentina.

The Senate on May 10 confirmed Cecil B. Lyon to be Ambassador to Chile.

The Senate on May 10 confirmed Albert F. Nufer to be Ambassador to the Philippines.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3284. Pub. 6003. 44 pp. 20¢.

Agreement, with official minutes and exchange of notes, between the United States and Japan—Signed at Tokyo May 31, 1955. Entered into force June 25, 1955.

Protection of War Victims—Civilian Persons. TIAS 3365. Pub. 6142. 181 pp. 60¢.

Convention, with annexes, between the United States and other governments—Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Date of entry into force with respect to the United States, February 2, 1956.

Trade—Withdrawal of Concession and Grant of Compensatory Concessions Under General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. TIAS 3473. Pub. 6295. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Governments of the Netherlands and the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union—Signed at Geneva June 8, 1955. Entered into force July 24, 1955.

Trade—Withdrawal of Concession and Grant of Compensatory Concessions Under General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. TIAS 3474. Pub. 6294. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Canada—Signed at Geneva June 8, 1955. Entered into force July 24, 1955.

Parcel Post. TIAS 3475. 32 pp. 15¢.

Agreement and detailed regulations between the United States and Pakistan—Signed at Karachi July 20, 1955, and at Washington October 7, 1955. Entered into force January 1, 1956.

Mutual Defense Assistance—Loan of United States Naval Vessels to the Republic of Korea. TIAS 3481. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Republic of Korea. Exchange of notes—Signed at Seoul December 28, 1955. Entered into force December 28, 1955.

Passport Visas. TIAS 3484. 9 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Dominican Republic. Exchange of notes—Dated at Ciudad Trujillo December 14 and 16, 1955. Entered into force February 1, 1956.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3485. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Spain—Amending agreement of April 20, 1955, as amended—Signed at Madrid January 21, 1956. Entered into force January 21, 1956.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3486. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Yugoslavia—Amending agreement of January 5, 1955, as amended—Signed at Belgrade January 19, 1956. Entered into force January 19, 1956. And related note.

Economic Assistance to Yugoslavia. TIAS 3487. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Yugoslavia. Exchange of notes—Dated at Belgrade January 19, 1956. Entered into force January 19, 1956.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3488. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Finland—Amending agreement of May 6, 1955. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington January 12, 1956. Entered into force January 12, 1956.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3489. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Israel—Modifying agreement of November 10, 1955. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington January 31, 1956. Entered into force February 1, 1956.

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. TIAS 3490. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Republic of Korea—Signed at Washington February 3, 1956. Entered into force February 3, 1956.

Emergency Wheat Aid to Libya. TIAS 3491. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Libya. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington June 30 and July 18, 1955. Entered into force July 18, 1955.

Mutual Defense Assistance. TIAS 3492. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Norway—Amending Annex C of agreement of January 27, 1950, as amended. Exchange of notes—Dated at Oslo December 10 and 16, 1954. Entered into force December 16, 1954.

Status of Canadian Forces Stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany. TIAS 3495. 10 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Canada. Exchange of notes—Signed at Bonn and Bonn/Bad Godesberg April 19, 1955, and January 26, 1956. Entered into force January 26, 1956.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3496. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Egypt—Modifying agreement of December 14, 1955. Exchange of notes signed at Washington February 8, 1956. Entered into force February 8, 1956.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3497. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Israel—Amending agreement of November 10, 1955, as modified—Signed at Washington February 10, 1956. Entered into force February 10, 1956.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3498. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Union of Burma—Signed at Rangoon February 8, 1956. Entered into force February 8, 1956.

Air Transport Services. TIAS 3504. 38 pp. 15¢.

Agreement and exchange of notes between the United States and India—Signed at New Delhi February 3, 1956. Entered into force February 3, 1956.

ʌriculture
ɔnmodity Agreement With Peru 847
ɔpanding International Trade (Thibodeaux) . . 848
ɪnce To Buy U.S. Farm Products in Triangular Transaction 838
ıernational Cotton Advisory Committee . . . 863

ʌerican Republics. Inter-American Indian Institute 862

ɪgentina
ɜsic Principles in U.S.-Argentine Relations (Nufer) 839
ɜıulac confirmed as Ambassador 865

ɪmic Energy
ɔıft Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (Wadsworth, text of draft statute) . . 852
ɪnching the U.N. Study of Effects of Atomic Radiation (Warren) 860

ɔıada
ɔır-Power Declaration of Principles Relating to Disarmament 838
ɪrchant confirmed as Ambassador 865

ɔle. Lyon confirmed as Ambassador 865

ɔıgress, The. Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy 851

ɔarmament. Four-Power Declaration of Principles Relating to Disarmament 838

ɔnomic Affairs. Expanding International Trade (Thibodeaux) 848

ɔrope. Developing the Atlantic Community (Dulles, Eisenhower, text of communique) . . 831

ɔnce
ɔır-Power Declaration of Principles Relating to Disarmament 838
ɔnce To Buy U.S. Farm Products in Triangular Transaction 838

ɔılth, Education, and Welfare. World Health Assembly 862

ıernational Organizations and Meetings. U. S. Delegations to International Conferences . . 862

ɔtual Security. France To Buy U.S. Farm Products in Triangular Transaction 838

ɔth Atlantic Treaty Organization
ɔartment's Views on Address by Sir Winston Churchill 837
ɔeloping the Atlantic Community (Dulles, Eisenhower, text of communique) 831

ɔu. Commodity Agreement With Peru . . . 847

ɔlippines. Nufer confirmed as Ambassador . . 865

ɔsidential Documents. Developing the Atlantic Community (letter to Senator George) . . . 831

ɔlications. Recent Releases 866

Treaty Information
Commodity Agreement With Peru 847
Current Actions 864

United Kingdom
Department's Views on Address by Sir Winston Churchill 837
Four-Power Declaration of Principles Relating to Disarmament 838

United Nations
Current U.N. Documents 859
Draft Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (Wadsworth, text of draft statute) . . 852
Four-Power Declaration of Principles Relating to Disarmament 838
ILO Building Committee 864
Launching the U.N. Study of Effects of Atomic Radiation (Warren) 860
The United Nations in the Mainstream of History (Wilcox) 841
World Health Assembly 862

Viet-Nam. France To Buy U.S. Farm Products in Triangular Transaction 838

Name Index

Beaulac, Willard L. 865
Churchill, Winston 837
Dulles, Secretary 831
Eisenhower, President 836
Kelly, Isabel T. 862
Lyon, Cecil B. 865
Merchant, Livingston T. 865
Nufer, Albert F. 839, 865
Thibodeaux, Ben H. 848
Wadsworth, James J. 852
Warren, Shields 860
Wilcox, Francis O. 841

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: May 7–13

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

Press releases issued prior to May 7 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 221 of April 27, 235 of May 2, and 242 of May 4.

No.	Date	Subject
243	5/7	Cotton Advisory Committee Meeting (rewrite).
244	5/7	Dulles: arrival statement.
245	5/8	Surplus commodity agreement with Peru.
246	5/8	Dulles: report from NATO.
*247	5/9	Merchant sworn in as Ambassador to Canada.
†248	5/10	Dulles: testimony on mutual security.
†249	5/10	Austrian social security benefits.
250	5/10	Delegation to Building Committee, ILO.
*251	5/11	Program for Sukarno visit.

*Not printed.
†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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The Department of State bulletin

Vol. XXXIV, No. 883

May 28, 1956

BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM • *Statement by Secretary Dulles* 871

STATE DEPARTMENT BUDGET FOR 1957 • *Statement by Secretary Dulles* 907

THE MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM FOR THE NEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA • *Statement by Assistant Secretary Allen* 875

THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY • *by James J. Wadsworth* 898

THE PROBLEM OF FORCED LABOR
Statement by John C. Baker 903
Text of ECOSOC Resolution 906

IMPLEMENTING THE GREAT LAKES FISHERIES CONVENTION WITH CANADA • *Statement by Warren F. Looney* 890

REPORT ON INTER-AMERICAN SPECIALIZED CONFERENCE ON CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES: CONTINENTAL SHELF AND MARINE WATERS 894

For index see inside back cover

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The Department of State bulletin

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May 28, 1956

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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lasic Elements of the Mutual Security Program

Statement by Secretary Dulles[1]

I know that this committee has held extensive larings on the mutual security program for next yar, as proposed in the President's message of larch 19, 1956.[2] I am glad to try now to sum up te administration's position. I shall confine mysf to the broad philosophy of the measure, knowig that others have dealt with details.

The President has requested the Congress to athorize appropriations of $4,672,475,000 for fisd year 1957 and to appropriate $4,859,975,000. A you know, these figures are larger than our eimated expenditures for next year, which will robably be in the neighborhood of $4.2 billion. This is approximately the same rate of expenditre as we had last year and will have this year. I wish that I could recommend a lesser amount. I annot do so, consistently with my view of the eential needs of the United States for security. Sme slight adjustments may be appropriate in vw of new information which has developed sce the program was submitted. But I cannot s how we can safely change the order of magnitle now proposed.

It is, I think, important to see this mutual secrity program in proper perspective. It is an eential part of our overall security program, a pgram which includes the military establishnnt of the United States itself. The total figure f all forms of national security, domestic and foreign, is about $40 billion. Of this about 90 percent is spent on our own United States military establishment. Approximately 10 percent is spent through foreign governments, for the most part to help our allies hold positions which are vital both to us and to them. This 10 percent makes up what we call a mutual security program.

This entire program has been carefully considered by the administration. The President, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I, myself, the Secretary of State, are all convinced that this expenditure is necessary for the security of the United States. This mutual security part of this program is a contribution to our security just as is our own defense establishment. Congress has in past years shared that view. Each year, after the most careful scrutiny, it has appropriated the funds to sustain this program at approximately the present rate of expenditure, and indeed for several years the rate of expenditure was much higher.

Nothing has yet happened which in my opinion would make it prudent to terminate or curtail the present program. Last week I was in Paris attending one of the NATO ministerial meetings. There were present the 15 Foreign Ministers of the member countries. We considered at length the Soviet change of tactics and the recent developments within the Soviet Union. We agreed that these changes were on the whole encouraging. They seemed to increase the chance of peace and to suggest the possibility that Soviet Russia might ultimately have a government responsive to an educated public opinion and reflecting a code of conduct such as is accepted by other civilized nations and as is embodied in the principles of the United Nations Charter. However, we unani-

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[1] Made before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Iuse of Representatives on May 10 (press release 248).

[2] BULLETIN of Apr. 2, 1956, p. 545. For texts of statemnts on area programs made before the committee by Dartment officers, see BULLETIN of Apr. 23, 1956, p. 674 (irope), and Apr. 30, 1956, p. 723 (Far East); for a stement made by Assistant Secretary Allen before the State Foreign Relations Committee on the Near East, S th Asia, and Africa, see p. 875.

mously agreed that "the Western Powers cannot relax their vigilance" and that "security remains a basic problem, and the Atlantic Powers must continue to give priority to the maintenance of their unity and strength." [3]

This, I remind you, was the view shared by the North Atlantic Community, particularly in relation to Europe, where the Soviet Union seems to be on its best behavior. But their behavior is not so good in the Middle East, where they have played fast and loose with peace in the area by a reckless policy of dispensing arms. This is an area which is of great importance to the United States, both because it includes the State of Israel, with which the United States has close ties, and also because the area produces the oil required for industry and the military establishment of Western Europe.

The situation is even less stable when we look to the Far East, where the Chinese Communists maintain a threatening posture and refuse to agree to any meaningful renunciation of the use of force.

As General Lemnitzer has already told you, we have an armistice in Korea but no formal peace. In Taiwan there are almost daily military engagements between the forces of the Republic of China and the Chinese Communists. In Viet-Nam, there is an armistice, but no formal peace. In these three world positions, a total of approximately 50 million free people are confronted by Communists who are using the 600 million people they rule to build a vast military establishment.

The importance of these areas to the United States is already demonstrated by the fact that the United States has concluded treaties covering them which provide that an armed attack by the Communists upon them would be dangerous for the peace and safety of the United States. You will also recall the congressional action, led by this committee, which authorized the President to use the Armed Forces of the United States, if need be, to resist attacks which might be directed against Taiwan (Formosa).[4]

We do not, of course, want to have to use United States troops to hold these areas, although we do maintain some forces in Korea. In the main, these areas are protected primarily by local forces, largely trained and equipped by the United States. But the governments of these impoverished countries cannot maintain their present forces without some economic help also. Therefore, we give not only direct military aid but also budgetary and economic aid necessary to enable these countries to have the armed forces which we judge reasonably related to the threat of aggression and our continued plans to prevent it.

The estimate of military aid and defense support assistance next year for Korea, China, Indochina, and other area allies—the Philippines, Thailand, and Japan—is in the neighborhood of $1.5 billion.

U.S. Mobile Power in Pacific

Of course, the armed forces of these allies are not alone sufficient to withstand the full might of Chinese Communist military power backed by the Soviet Union. But we also maintain in the general area of the western Pacific United States mobile striking power to back up the local ground forces. The cost of this force is in our defense budget. As Admiral Radford has already testified to this committee, the two costs essentially complement each other. Neither would be sufficient without the other.

I have already referred to our security interests along the Soviet perimeter in the Middle East. Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey all have common borders with the Soviet Union, and Iraq is close to it. All four are subject to Soviet threats and the proximity of Soviet power. Pakistan is an ally of ours under the Southeast Asia Treaty. Turkey is an ally of ours under the North Atlantic Treaty, and all four of these countries have united for collective security under the Baghdad Pact.

These countries hold the gateway to the south, where the oil reserves so vital to the military power and industrial strength of Western Europe are located. Just beyond is the gateway to Africa. It would be reckless not to help these countries to help themselves and at the same time to help us. The estimate of expenditures for military and defense-support assistance next year for these countries is in the neighborhood of $800 million.

In Western Europe the military forces of NATO stand guard over the greatest industrial and military treasure that there is within the free world, except for the United States itself. So important do we consider this area that substantial United

[3] *Ibid.*, May 21, 1956, p. 836.
[4] *Ibid.*, Feb. 7, 1955, p. 213.

ates armed forces are stationed in Western rope for its defense.

We help maintain the military strength of our ropean allies by supplying them with certain es of weapons. We also have a base agreement th Spain, and this involves substantial costs. e also think it prudent to help Yugoslavia to intain its national independence. The expendi- e for military aid to NATO (excluding Turkey, which we have already spoken) and military l and defense support for Spain and Yugo- via is estimated for next year at roughly $1 lion.

Our military assistance and supporting economic to the countries in these three critical areas, s some military help to Latin America, account roughly 83 percent of the estimated expendi- es under the mutual security program for next r. These expenditures make it possible to hold al positions at less cost than in any other way ich can be contrived. These expenditures pro- e diversified locations around the globe from ich Russia could be struck, with devastating ct, should its rulers launch a war of aggression. ese expenditures are fundamental to our own ce and security.

nmilitary Aid

The balance of the mutual security program— other 17 percent—will involve spending next r, as this year, a little over $700 million. This ney is not directly related to military considera- ns, although much of the money goes to allies. erever they go, these expenditures are directly ted to our security. They help areas in the ld which are threatened by Communist sub- sion and which contain people, resources, and tegic locations which, in our own interests as l as theirs, should be secure from hostile ination.

n these countries the political leaders and the ple as a whole want to maintain their inde- edence. They do not want to be subjected to new Soviet colonialism that grips Eastern rope. They are themselves carrying the main den of seeking to preserve their liberty, but is a hard task and they need and deserve some side help. Our help supports their economic elopment and, through both our programs and e of the United Nations, such activities as lic health, education, and technical assistance. h help is essential to supplement their efforts to develop freely and independently in the world today.

The importance of this aspect of the matter is emphasized by the fact that the Soviet Union, having transformed itself into an industrial state, now sees the advantage of having a "mutual security program" of its own with its allies and with other countries.

It is said that imitation is the sincerest flattery. We would indeed be flattered if we could feel that the Soviet Union was sincerely seeking to strengthen the political and economic independence of other nations. Unhappily, it is demonstrable that the Soviet bloc, already impoverished in terms of consumer's goods, diverts economic strength to other peoples only for the purpose of bringing about what Lenin called the "amalgamation" of these peoples into the Soviet Communist bloc. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the fact that the Soviet Union today measures its assistance to its satellite allies in terms of billions of dollars and its assistance to other countries in terms of hundreds of millions of dollars. It would indeed be ironical if the United States should sharply curtail its mutual security program just at the time when the Soviet Union is moving with predatory intent into the field which we would thus vacate.

The new Communist tactics make it more than ever imperative that the United States should continue the economic phase of our mutual security program. It is also important that it should be continued with assurance of continuity. Of course, I realize that one Congress cannot bind a future Congress to appropriate money. We can, however, and do, have continuing policies. It is the continuing policy of the United States to maintain its own military establishment. The funds for that are appropriated annually. But no one doubts that this program is a continuing one, and so it needs to be, at least for the foreseeable future, as regards our mutual security program. It is, as I said, a vital component in our total program for national security.

The world needs to know that this program will continue so long as there is a threat to our security. Other countries with whom we share our security effort cannot do their own planning intelligently, or appropriate their own funds dependably, or obtain supplementary funds from other quarters unless they believe that there will be a reasonable measure of continuity in our pro-

gram. Also, to a limited extent, we need a measure of project continuity. That is why, Mr. Chairman, we have contemplated the committal of a modest amount of funds on a long-term basis subject, of course, to congressional appropriations on a yearly basis.

We also believe that there is need for greater flexibility in the executive.

This committee has had many explanations of the long-time cycle involved in the planning and executing of this program. We are already engaged, in May of 1956, in preparing, at the request of the Bureau of the Budget, programs to be submitted for fiscal year 1958. After those programs have been reviewed by the executive branch and are finally submitted to the Congress, and after the next Congress has authorized and appropriated the funds, then the plans must be adjusted to meet that congressional action and the changing world scene. Only then can the task of implementing the plans be commenced, and there is usually a lag of a year or two between obligating the funds and actually getting the funds into equipment, supplies, and services at the foreign destination. In the case of some of the military equipment, the delay is greater.

All of this points up to the importance of giving the President greater discretion, particularly with respect to the use of the distinctively economic portion of the fund.

Before concluding, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that consideration is being given to an independent study of some of the aspects of our mutual security program. There are a number of matters relating to the administration of this program which the President feels, and which perhaps members of this committee feel, could usefully be studied by men who are highly qualified but who are not available to serve the Government on a long-term basis.

I have in mind certain questions which have arisen in the course of these hearings, such as the relative role of the State and Defense Departments in administering the program; whether we should seek to put more of our program on a loan rather than a grant basis; whether the program needs to be enlarged and given greater continuity to meet the new Soviet tactics; whether, and if so, how, we can speed up our program so that there is not long delay between the conception of programs and their execution and sometimes regrettable gaps between our promises and our performance. There is the question of the degree to which it is feasible to give Congress a dependable itemization of p grams which may not come to fruition for se eral years, by which time the surrounding circu stances may have considerably altered. There the question of the degree to which it is useful provide funds on a bilateral basis as against of United Nations or regional agencies. There the question as to whether we should emphas short-term projects of popular interest or lo range projects which have no obvious popu appeal.

These questions, as I indicated, are questions f method and technique. None questions the ba validity of the program, which is essential to own security and is fully integrated with all ot national programs. As the President said other day,[5] "The program as it is now outlin represents to us a minimum that is necessary the welfare of the United States in the years come."

I urge that the committee approve the autho ing legislation which is now before it.

Armed Forces Day

Press release 268 dated May 18

Secretary Dulles issued the following sta ment for the observance of Armed Forces Day May 19, 1956.

The ties that bind the members of the Arm Forces and the members of the Foreign Serv and of the Department of State grow increasin close with each passing year. One reason is, f course, the accumulation of tradition since t founding of the Republic. But there is a curr t and compelling reason: We are today insepara joined with the Army and the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marines in the search for a sec peace. This search takes many forms, but its g is a common goal—the just and lasting peace t the collective strength of the free nations of e world can bring into being.

You of the Armed Forces have made a gr t contribution to that strength. I know the d pride that your contribution has brought to and the sense of service and dedication that g s with it.

I salute you on the day that is yours, and I l k forward to the day when strength and partn ship and assistance to those in need will have t last assured peace in full measure to the world.

[5] At his May 4 news conference.

'he Mutual Security Program for the Near East, South Asia, and Africa

Statement by George V. Allen
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs [1]

I would like to discuss with you some of the olitical and economic problems of the Near East nd Africa and the relationship to them of the iutual security program. Specifically, this area ncludes Greece, Turkey, Iran, the Arab States and srael, and the continent of Africa.

The importance of this area to the United States conomically, strategically, politically, morally, nd culturally is too well known to this committee warrant detailing. It is clearly in the interest f the United States to promote peace and stality throughout the area, to achieve and mainin friendly relations, and to assist these counies in their economic development as a means of moving the root causes of discontent and politil instability.

Throughout the area there is a tremendous, irring drive for change and improvement. tandards of living are frequently as low as can found anywhere in the world, yet there is an vareness that improvement can be had and that e material benefits of 20th-century civilization e not unattainable. But just how these changes n come about peacefully and without chaotic isruption of existing situations is not always ear either to the peoples or their governments. Iany of these states achieved their full indeendence only within the last 10 years, others are the process of becoming independent, and still hers have barely started on the road. Yet the olitical ferment and economic aspirations are ndamentally the same among all these peoples nd states.

They require assistance if the changes and improvements in economic status which must come are to be achieved peacefully and with stability. The programs in which we have been engaged have been designed and administered so as to assist in accomplishing these objectives. Much has been accomplished, but much still remains.

Assistance, to be effective, must recognize and respect the drive for the maintenance of independence inherent in the area. The important element in improving living standards and in achieving economic stability is recognition of the problems and consciously directed action toward their solution by the governments of these countries. It is only then that outside assistance can be effective. Favorable developments in this direction have taken place in nearly all the countries.

Need for Collective Security

Coupled with the need for economic development is the necessity for providing for collective security against aggressive forces. The past year has seen the formation of the Baghdad Pact—a collective security arrangement among Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom. This arrangement provides an important link between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the West and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in the East. It is encouraging that the pact nations not only joined in their collective defense but have emphasized the importance of the pact organization in considering mutual problems of economic development. The United States supports and encourages the pact, though we believe that our

[1] Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relaons on May 8.

own interests and those of the area are such that we should not join it at the present time. However, the United States has joined the Economic Committee of the pact, which concentrates on problems of economic development common to countries of the area.[2]

As this committee is well aware, recent events in the area have made doubly difficult the accomplishment of U.S. objectives. Internal pressures are so acute that frequently disruptive forces overtake desires for peaceful evolution and development.

It is this factor which had made recent Soviet-bloc moves so important. Soviet offers of economic assistance in any of several forms are not inherently bad. Directed solely and honestly toward economic development of the area, such offers would be welcome. But viewed in the light of Soviet historical aspirations and examined in terms of the obvious objectives of each offer, these moves pose a very real threat to the peace of the area.

In the past year the Soviet-bloc objective, first, of eliminating all Western influence from the area and, second, of dominating it themselves has remained unchanged. Soviet tactics, however, have changed markedly. The Communist posture in the area used to be one of threat and thinly veiled attempts to subvert Near Eastern governments. The Soviet bloc is currently stressing the line that they stand in the van of the strugglers against "imperialism" and have shown a willingness to support the foreign policies and claims of the governments of those Near East states which are immediate Soviet targets in the area. This "new look" has been accompanied by offers of the use of the Soviet veto in the U.N., declarations of solidarity, offers and deliveries of Soviet-bloc arms, attractive-looking offers of trade agreements, technical assistance, loans and grants for economic development, invitations to visit the U.S.S.R., and cultural missions. It goes without saying that with Soviet aid come Soviet "technicians." In its penetration of the area the Soviet Government makes the effective pretense that no strings are tied, no affiliations or commitments implied, and in fact it encourages "neutralism."

[2] For the final communique issued at the close of the second meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council at Tehran, Apr. 10–20, 1956, together with statements made by U.S. observers before the Council and the Economic Committee, see BULLETIN of May 7, 1956, p. 753.

Israel and the Arab States

The primary vector of the Soviet virus has l the unresolved quarrel remaining from the A Israel hostilities of 1948. Egypt's fear of Isr military superiority motivated the Egypt Czech arms deal of September 1955. The la scale deliveries of Soviet-bloc arms to Eg understandably arouse considerable apprehen in Israel, and pressure mounts to strengthen Israel military forces to counter deliveries to Arabs. The frightening prospects of a de tating arms race or even a resurgence of hostil are thus enhanced. U.S. policy is aimed at achievement of a peaceful and equitable se ment of Arab-Israel differences. Our goal in area is the permanent security of the states th Their future peace and prosperity will not primarily upon arms but upon the internati rule of law and the establishment of frie relations among neighbors.

We are proud of our record of accomplishm in the Arab States and Israel in the fields technical assistance and economic developm Progress has been fostered and the sovereign dependence of the nations of the area has l strengthened as a result of our efforts. P have gone forward for the harnessing of rivers of the area, the Nile, the Jordan, the Lit and the Tigris. New methods of attacking dis and problems of inadequate production have l devised. Roads have been built. We need to tinue and intensify our efforts along these l in order to show the Near Eastern peoples the peaceful economic and social developmen which they aspire may best be obtained thro cooperation with the free world, not the C munist bloc.

The Northern Tier

The northern part of the Near East, consist of Greece, Turkey, and Iran, is a strategic along the Iron Curtain, and all three count are growing in economic strength. Greece Turkey are members of NATO and are also al with Yugoslavia in the Balkan alliance. I and Turkey are members of the Baghdad I along with Iraq, Pakistan, and the United Ki dom. Geographically the members of NATO the Baghdad Pact form an uninterrupted running from above the Arctic Circle in Nor through Pakistan. Greece, Turkey, and Iran

: the center of this collective-defense arc, and ıch of them belongs to one or both of these de-ınsive associations.

Turkey, as a comparatively new republic, has ressed forward rapidly with a program designed) convert it from an underdeveloped country into modern state. It has taken tremendous strides ı accomplishing this transition. A key element ıs been an economic development program which ıs stretched Turkey's own means to the limit ıd which has led to serious internal and exter-ıl financial difficulties. To meet this problem ıe Government has now pledged itself to under-ke a rigorous economic stabilization program. f Turkey's efforts to develop a sound economy are) be successful, and if Turkey is to maintain its rong position on the strategic eastern flank of ATO and its key place in the collective security 'rangements of the area, it must have continued sistance.

Greece's traditional friendship for America, its rategic location, and its important place in the ATO defense structure are key factors in the .S. interest in Greek welfare and stability. The reater part of the large amounts of U.S. aid re-ived in the past was used up immediately in efending the country against armed Communist tack. While Greece is still one of the poorest of ıe NATO countries, it has made remarkable eco-omic progress since the end of the Communist uerrilla war. But its strategic location requires ıe maintenance of defense forces in the NATO ructure beyond the capacity of its own resources f its economic development is to continue.

Iran has abandoned its traditional neutrality y adhering to the Baghdad Pact. This direct articipation in the free-world collective security ystem has called forth unfriendly and even ıreatening reaction from the U.S.S.R., with hich it has a 1,200-mile common frontier.

Iran's large economic development program is roceeding. We have long been interested in help-ıg Iran to carry out its plans for economic and ocial improvement. Partly due to demands laced on it by this program and partly because ıe Iranian economy has not yet fully recovered rom the disruption caused by loss of oil revenues ollowing nationalization, Iran has not been able) balance its ordinary budget despite its reviving il revenues. Various internal reforms now under ay are directed at this problem. The impor-ınce to U.S. objectives of supporting Iranian efforts toward economic development and its continued alinement with the free world in the face of Soviet threats cannot be overemphasized.

Tempo of Change in Africa

Africa is a tremendous continent, four times the size of the United States, rich in mineral resources, and in most of its area far behind in achieving 20th-century development. It is all too clear that the Communist bloc is well aware of the potential of Africa and is making a concerted effort to penetrate the continent.

The tempo of social, economic, and political change has increased tremendously during the past year. The problem of developing policies which further our national interests in Africa is complex indeed; for this is a continent of as great diversity in social, economic, and political features as in climate and topography. Here we must deal with both independent countries and territories in varying stages of political evolution. All of them also are in varying stages of social and economic underdevelopment and are faced with all the usual impediments to progress. With those areas in a dependent status our relationships must fall into a triangular pattern with the colonial powers. This requires that our policies relating to the dependent territories must be reconciled to our national interests in both the metropoles and the territories and to their respective interests, which are at times conflicting.

The United States desires that the peoples of Africa progress and share in the social, economic, and political freedoms and advantages of the West. Beyond this the continent's human and natural resources contribute very significantly to the strength of the Western World. Our interest includes continued access to Africa's important and, in some cases, vital supplies of a number of essential materials including uranium, industrial diamonds, copper, manganese, cobalt, beryl, asbestos, chrome, rubber, zinc, lead, corn, cocoa, and sisal. It includes also strategic air bases and communications facilities, particularly those spotted across the northern part of the continent.

Africa, probably more than anywhere in the world, is a crucial testing ground of the good judgment and leadership of the Western powers. It is essential that the United States, through the mutual security program, strengthen its ties with, and support, the development aspirations of the independent nations of Africa. It is equally

important we work with our allies in recognizing the aspirations for independence and development of dependent peoples. We and our Western European allies are directly involved, and the eyes of the underdeveloped peoples everywhere are upon us. Here we must collaborate in demonstrating conclusively the superior values of free-world ideals.

The bilateral country aid which is proposed in the mutual security program is essential to assist in meeting the problems of the area. But the Soviet economic offensive, the emergence of major economic crises, and the growing awareness within the area of the multilateral nature of some economic problems dictate a new approach in achieving our objectives through the mutual security program. It is for this reason that we are requesting a new, flexible Middle East and Africa authorization of $100 million.

National Goals in South Asia

I should like now to turn to South Asia. The five South Asian countries, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Ceylon, and Nepal, however different in some respects, are profoundly alike in their basic national goals. These goals are the maintenance of political independence and the achievement of economic strength. Our national situation in the early years of our independence was essentially that of the South Asian nations today. But the pace of political and economic developments is more rapid in the world of today, and the ideology of communism offers less developed countries a pattern for economic growth which neglects the cost to individual and, in the end, national liberties. Awareness of the rapidity of economic change adds urgency to the awakened demands of the newly independent peoples of South Asia for improvement of their living standards. Soviet-bloc offers of economic assistance in various forms, while holding dangers known to the governments and peoples, are tempting because they coincide in time with these exigent national aspirations.

As we said last year, economic improvement in the less developed countries is extremely important to us. Vast differences in standards of living constitute a constant source of irritation in international relations at a time when strength and cooperation are essential. The determination that the extension of assistance to the countries of South Asia is in our national interest is equa valid today. What has become even clearer the last year is the nature, the extent, and the dr of the Communist-bloc economic wooing of free nations of Asia. That this activity is in sense a compliment to the effectiveness of our o assistance programs in the area makes it no a danger to the independence of these nations a hence, to our interests.

The importance to us of the freedom and in pendence of the South Asian countries can, p haps, be more keenly appreciated if we think the consequences if they were to become commit to communism or disaffected with the free wo These five countries contain almost one-fifth the world's population. They have some 3, miles of common border with the Asian lands r dominated by the Communists. South Asia i key area linking the Near East and the Far E and dominates the communication lines betw Europe and the Far East. The countries h important amounts of scarce materials. In year, India alone supplied the United States w 41 percent of our manganese imports, 68 perc of our cyanite imports, 57 percent of our m imports, and over 95 percent of our jute-prod imports. Thus, geographical, commercial, a strategic interests reinforce our desire to see th Asian peoples remain free and advance e nomically.

India's 375 million people have made rema able, if modest, advances under India's first Fi Year Plan of economic development. Howe India will have to make even greater efforts if i to reach the development goals of its second Fi Year Plan. This plan, which commences t April, aims at an increase of national income 25 percent by 1961, achieved through expenditu more than double that of the earlier plan. E with new taxes, new borrowings, and large def financing, the plan requires external assistance $1.7 billion if it is to succeed. Before the v last winter of Messrs. Bulganin and Khrushcl the Soviet bloc had made offers of economic sistance to India. These offers have now b substantially increased. The basis for continu our aid to India has, however, not been chan by these events. India wants and intends to p serve the values of freedom and democracy. economic system may become less like our ov we may continue to have different views on best way to preserve peace; but, with our ba

ntity of values, we can with good will compose r differences. Our aid is an important evidence our belief that India will continue to demonate that a free Asian nation can meet the desires its people for progress under a democratic stem.

Pakistan has continued its adherence to the e world's system of collective security. In adion to its membership in the Southeast Asia eaty Organization, it has joined three of its ghbors and the United Kingdom in the Baghd Pact organization. Pakistan also in the last ar established a new constitution and has bene a republic. Although the financial dends of its defense establishment and commitnts are substantial and both East and West have d severe floods this year, Pakistan has continued valiant efforts in the field of economic advancent. Pakistan has also been evolving a new, nprehensive Five-Year Plan of development. kistan looks to its partners in the free world the assistance necessary to supplement its own fense and development efforts.

The impact of the Soviet-bloc offers of assistance the less developed countries of Asia has perhaps n greatest in Afghanistan. The seeds were opped on ground fertilized last spring by the reup of Afghanistan's dispute with neighboring kistan over Pushtunistan. This dispute with kistan and Afghanistan's intense desire for stened economic improvement created a situan of receptivity to massive Soviet aid offers. llowing earlier loans for various projects, the viet Union offered Afghanistan a $100-million e of credit during the Bulganin-Khrushchev it. The terms of the loan, 30 years at 2 percent erest, were appealing, and Afghanistan signed agreement. Although Afghanistan has asned a heavy mortgage on its freedom, the erest of the United States in Afghanistan's ntinued independence has not been changed by se events. To this end, we are also concerned strengthening Afghanistan's ties with its free ghbors and the United States. We have demonated the genuine nature of our interest in Afanistan in many ways, including the extension loans and grants totaling almost $50 million ce 1951.

Nepal has taken further steps to strengthen its itical system and undertake a more comprehsive attack on its economic problems. The ng has announced that Nepal's first elections will be held in October 1957 and has meanwhile appointed a new Prime Minister and Cabinet. Nepal has introduced a new Five-Year Plan of economic development which includes the much needed expansion of its internal and external transportation and communications system. The Prime Minister has expressed particular hopes for aid from traditionally friendly countries.

Ceylon, with whom we have had the friendliest of relations, is an island republic whose continued independence and economic development is extremely important to U.S. objectives. With its great dependence on exports for a substantial part of its national income, Ceylon faces difficult problems of development. Recently national elections resulted in replacement of the former government—one whose officials were most outspoken in the support of free-world objectives. Its electoral defeat was based on internal, domestic considerations rather than on matters of international relations, though some changes in foreign policy are to be expected. Ceylon is an important member of the free world, one whose government and people are dedicated to economic improvement. And from the point of view of U.S. interests, one of the most significant factors is that the governmental change was accomplished through democratic processes.

Our programs of assistance are an essential arm of our foreign policy. They give substance to our support of the aspirations of free people to remain free and to become economically strong. They are of vital importance both to the countries of South Asia and to the objectives of U.S. policy.

Senator George's NATO Mission

White House press release dated May 14

President Eisenhower and Senator George on May 14 discussed the President's letter of May 9 in which the President expressed his desire to appoint Senator George as his personal representative and special ambassador to deal in the first instance with the pending proposal of the NATO Ministers that ways and means should be found to improve and extend NATO cooperation in nonmilitary fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community.[1]

Senator George stated that he would be glad to accept this responsibility and contribute his own

[1] BULLETIN of May 21, 1956, p. 836.

thinking and the benefit of his experience to the development of this project so vital to future peace.

Senator George stated that he plans to retain his present post in the Senate for the time being but would be available after the adjournment of the present session to perform any duty, consistent with his Senatorial responsibilities, that might be requested by the President. In the meantime, the Senator, in cooperation with the Secretary of State, will study the problem of developing the NATO concept and consult with the Foreign Ministers of Canada, Italy, and Norway, who were designated by the NATO Council to study the problem with the governments involved.

Following his retirement from the Senate, Senator George would plan to devote himself actively to advising the President and the Secretary of State with reference to this matter, as well as regards the general development and implementation of bipartisan foreign policy.

President Eisenhower To Attend Panama Meeting

The White House announced on May 11 that President Eisenhower had accepted an invitation extended by President Ricardo M. Arias Espinosa of Panama to attend a meeting at Panamá on June 25–26. Similar invitations have been extended to Presidents of the other American Republics.

Muenster Peace Medal Presented to President Eisenhower

Press release 261 dated May 16

The Peace Medal of the city of Muenster, Germany, was presented on May 16 to White House Presidential Secretary James Hagerty, who accepted for President Eisenhower. The presentation was made by Helmut Mueller, chief reporter of the *Westfaelische Nachrichten*, on behalf of Lord Mayor Busso Peus and the City Council of Muenster.

The medal was established by the city of Muenster to commemorate the Treaty of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years War and which was signed at Muenster in 1648. It has been given only rarely and is being presented to President Eisenhower in recognition of his contributions to world peace and as an expression of thanks f Marshall plan aid, which was partially respon ble for rebuilding the city of Muenster. T medal bears the inscription *Pax Optima Reru* (Peace is the best of all things).

Mr. Mueller has just arrived in the Unit States for a 45-day tour of this country und the International Educational Exchange Pr gram of the Department of State.

Reduction of Soviet Armed Forces

News Conference Statement by Secretary Dull

Press release 254 dated May 15

The United States welcomes the Soviet a nouncement of its intention to reduce its arm forces by 1,200,000 men within the next year, this proves to be evidence of an intent to for the use of force in international affairs. Howev the obvious explanation is a need for greater ma power in industry and agriculture. I pointed th out last week before the House Foreign Affai Committee [1] and forecast that the Soviet Uni would probably shift a considerable body of ma power from the armed forces to the farms a factories.

The United States since World War II has r duced its own forces by more than 9 million, fro a level of 12,300,000 to under 3 million. We ha already proposed at the disarmament discussio in London that an inspection system be establish to provide for immediate reduction of Soviet a United States armaments to a basis of 2,500,0 men each, as part of a disarmament program th would include reductions of armaments and maj restrictions in the nuclear field as well.

It should be noted that there will be no veri cation of actual reduction in the Soviet Uni from the now estimated level of more than 4 m lion men, since there will be no inspection of t proposed reductions. The large forces of Co munist China remain. Moreover, the Soviet r ductions deal largely with men rather th armaments, and there is nothing to prevent t speedy recall and equipping of large units thoroughly trained reserves. In addition, t U. S. S. R. and its allies are free to move the forces throughout their central land territory a bring the threat of armed force to bear at a

[1] For the Secretary's prepared statement on the mutu security program, see p. 871.

oint around the rim of Communist-held terri-
ory. The free world, however, must be prepared
defend the outer edge of this area and depend
shifts of forces along long lines of communica-
on, the maintenance of which requires large
orces.

Despite these factors, the United States has pro-
osed the kind of reductions in manpower and
rmaments, and restrictions in nuclear capabili-
es, which can be taken now under the present
rcumstances, and which go beyond what the
oviet Union has proposed.

A real disarmament program should include a
stem for guarding against great surprise at-
ck. It should provide reductions in weapons,
hich can be more effectively controlled than man-
ower, as trained men can be rapidly shifted back
arms, if arms exist. It should also include an
fective system for verifying these reductions.
e continue to believe that it should comprehend
fective measures to halt the nuclear armaments
ce as proposed by President Eisenhower on
arch 1 to Premier Bulganin.[2]

The United States is always ready to join with
e Soviet Union and other nations in a program
hich allows the world to reduce further the bur-
en of armaments in safety and security, bring
nder control the nuclear threat, minimize the
anger of surprise attack by the President's "open
y" plan as well as by other checks, and release
ore economic resources for peaceful purposes.

ranscript of Secretary Dulles' ews Conference

ess release 255 dated May 15

Secretary Dulles: I want first of all to express
y great gratification that Senator George has
cepted the request of the President that he act
a special representative of the President to
al in the first instance with this problem of try-
g to create greater unity within the Atlantic
ommunity and in upbuilding of the nonmilitary
nctions of NATO.[3] The fact that Senator
eorge is undertaking this task is, I think, evi-
nce to all the world of the great importance
hich we attach to it and the great hopes we have
accomplishing something substantial along
ese lines.

[2] BULLETIN of Mar. 26, 1956, p. 514.
[3] See p. 879.

I have a statement to make on the Soviet announcement with respect to its armed forces.[4] . . . Do you have any questions?

Q. Mr. Secretary, do I understand the burden of what you are saying is that, if the Soviets are serious about reducing weapons, they should reduce nuclear weapons as well as manpower?

A. What I had in mind in that connection was what is illustrated by the Brussels Treaty for Western European Union, which sets up what is today the most effective and embracing system of control of armaments that the world has yet known. Under that treaty the emphasis is placed upon the control of weapons rather than upon the control of men. There is a premise that there shall be in each country a certain number of divisions. Then from that premise it is assumed that would require a certain number of weapons, and then the control and verification relate primarily to the weapons rather than to the men.

Military manpower is the most illusive thing in the world to control. The effectiveness of your manpower depends upon the length of training, which in the Soviet Union is 36 months, so that they have a very thorough training system, and their system of reserves, and the training that is given in schools, and the like. Experience, particularly under the Treaty of Versailles, shows how illusive it is to have an effective control if you think primarily in terms of the numbers of men. Therefore, modern thinking is in terms more of reduction of the weapons which the men could use.

To take a great simplification—if you are thinking only in terms of riflemen, if you only have one million rifles it doesn't do you much good to have two million men who are trained to shoot. But if you have two million men that are trained to shoot and you have two million rifles, and then you say, "I will take one million of these men out of the army and send them into the factories," they can come back on a few days' notice as long as they have two million rifles. But if you cut down on the number of rifles, that is a far more effective control than cutting down ostensibly what is the number of men in the armed forces. I think perhaps that makes clear the point I was trying to make.

[4] This statement was also issued separately as press release 254 (see p. 880).

Q. Is the President's "open sky" proposal a precondition to the negotiations on the disarmament question?

A. It certainly is not a precondition to negotiations because we have been having very intensive negotiations. We have continued to urge that the "open sky" proposal should be accepted because we believe that it is the most effective proposal yet made to dissipate the fear that there could be a massive surprise attack. And we believe that if that fear can be dissipated then there will come about almost automatically a reduction of armaments.

As I said at the United Nations, I think at the opening last fall,[5] it is very difficult to bring about reductions of armaments when people are afraid and think that armaments may be needed for their self-preservation. As the need for armaments seems to diminish, then the possibility for reduction of armaments greatly increases. So we believe that the effect of the President's "open sky" proposal would be to create conditions of greater confidence which would then make it easier to bring about reductions. Indeed, that was the expressed purpose of the proposal when it was made, and we do not believe any good substitute for that has been found.

Q. Mr. Secretary, where do we stand on that proposal now? Does it apply to our overseas bases?

A. We have not in any way sought to limit the scope of our proposal to our own territorial areas. The Soviets have indicated that they might like to have it extended, and we said: We are quite prepared to have it extended in any way.

Q. Does the executive branch of the Government have authority to do that or does it require legislation?

A. It would require negotiation with other countries, but we have no doubt that, as part of a general scheme, their consent would be obtained.

Q. I mean within our own country.

A. I believe that it would probably require a treaty which would be consented to by the Senate. I doubt whether the President would do this entirely by executive action.

[5] BULLETIN of Oct. 3, 1955, p. 523.

Q. Have the Brussels Treaty allies succeeded yet in setting up machinery for carrying out the agreed limitations?

A. They have machinery which is, I think, ad quate to the present state of affairs. Of cour that machinery in considerable part is design to relate to the new forces which would be broug into being as a result of the Federal Republic Germany joining, and those forces have actual not as yet been brought into being in any appı ciable degree; so there is not required the fı measure of control machinery which would be ı quired later on.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you clarify how Senat George can serve in both legislative and executi branches?

A. Well, in much the same way, I suppose, th Senator Vandenberg and Senator Connally di

Q. They did not have an appointment, howev

A. Senator Austin, as I recall, acted for seve months for the President as adviser to our repı sentative on the United Nations Security Counc It is not permissible to take pay from two sourc but there is nothing which inhibits a member the Senate from cooperating with the Executiv The statement that was made last night contain the words "consistent with his Senatorial respon bilities." Now there may be limitations whi would flow from a possible inconsistency. In th case, of course, his duties as Senator would preva

Q. Do you contemplate an actual appointme as ambassador?

A. I would think we would not contemplate a formal appointment as long as he is in the Sena

Challenge to West

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Chairman of the Joi Chiefs of Staff [Adm. Arthur W. Radford] y terday told the Senate Foreign Relations Comm tee that militarily the West is doing all right relation to the Soviet Union but that there w reason to worry about our political and diploma position. Do you care to comment on that?

A. I have not seen his testimony, and I pref not to comment on it until I have seen actual what he said.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there was comment on Capitol Hill after this announcement by the Russians on the arms reduction and the challenge to the West that the United States was in danger of losing initiative. Do you believe this is true, and do you plan positive countermeasures to combat that?

A. Well, we are not going to advocate any reduction of armed forces that we think are essential to the security of the United States merely as a counterpropaganda move. The United States carefully studies all the time what we regard as a minimum safe level of armaments. Our conclusions are arrived at not on the basis of what the Soviets say they are going to do but on the basis of our best estimate of what, in fact, their capabilities are. We have recently had to increase, as you know, our military expenditures and ask for a substantial supplement from Congress—I think nearly a billion dollars this year—to meet what we regard as the increasing threat from Soviet Russia. They are developing intensively new weapons, guided missiles, submarines, and the like; and a shift of men from their standing forces to their factories, where they will be perhaps producing military power in a degree which is more threatening than if they were standing around in the army, does not necessarily create a condition to which we think we should respond by reducing our own forces. Certainly we do not intend to reduce that as a counterpropaganda move.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you implying that this is primarily a propaganda move—the announced reduction?

A. I would say this, that the move is, I think, based upon economic factors. I pointed out in my own testimony that I referred to before the Foreign Affairs Committee that the Soviet Union was in my opinion overextended in a good many respects. It is developing intensively these new weapons which are very, very expensive. It is trying to enlarge its industrial base, which is a heavy strain on the country. It has encountered grave setbacks in its agricultural program and is not getting enough food for its people. It is also trying at the same time to develop the counterpart of our mutual security program. Now it cannot do in all these respects all that it would like to do, and I indicated that in my opinion it would have to cut at some point and I thought the point where it could cut to the greatest advantage to itself would be by taking out of its armed forces a certain number of men and putting them back into factories and on the farms. That is what they have done. They have done it for very solid and compelling economic reasons, in my opinion. Having done it, they are trying to use it as a propaganda weapon and make it appear that they are doing this because of their love of peace. They are hoping undoubtedly that that will lead to a reduction on the part of other nations. If this occurred, it would really weaken these countries militarily, whereas what the Soviet Union is here doing I do not think is calculated appreciably to alter their military power.

Q. Mr. Secretary, yesterday in Moscow Japan and Russia signed a fisheries pact, one agreement of that being that the Japanese resume peace talks with the Russians in July. Would you care to comment on that?

A. The United States hopes that there will be established peace on decent and acceptable terms between the Soviet Union and Japan. I think it is very regrettable that the Soviet Union refused to sign the Japanese Peace Treaty, which nearly 50 of the allied nations signed at San Francisco 5 years ago. It has prolonged a technical state of war now for over 10 years since the surrender terms were signed. So anything which will restore a juridical state of peace between those countries is to be desired as long as it is done on terms that are consistent with the sovereignty and dignity of Japan.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you made a series of criticisms of the Soviet proposal, pointing out the various reasons why we have to be careful. Do you see any merit in the Soviet proposal at all? Do you see that it in any way contributes to a lessening of tensions?

A. Well, the Soviet "proposal," as you put it, is a statement of the Soviets' own intentions, which are no doubt based upon its own estimate of its own interests. I said in my prepared statement that, if this is evidence of a further intention to abstain from the use of violence in the conduct of international affairs, it will be welcomed. And it may contain some ingredients of the disavowal of the use of violence which was the Stalin doctrine that one had to depend upon violence to make the Soviet foreign policy succeed. Now, there has been a disavowal of that, certainly in terms of words. They have disavowed that. And if this

reflects in deeds a further intention along that line, it will be welcomed. I think, however, that what is happening can be explained primarily by economic factors rather than by a shift in foreign-policy intentions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, does this mean you regard this particular move as perhaps a departure from the succession of steps thta constituted the new look rather than a continuation of it?

A. No, I certainly do not treat it as a departure from that. In form it purports to be an accentuation of that. I'm merely warning that I believe what has happened can be explained by economic factors and the desire of the Soviet rulers to strengthen their economy in terms of agriculture and industry—perhaps to have more people in the factories which produce modern weapons rather than to have them standing around doing guard duty or training duty in the army. Therefore, we must not jump to the conclusion that this is any conclusive proof of the reality of the new look. On the other hand, it is entirely consistent with that and it is certainly not a backward step.

Q. Mr. Secretary, last week, as you know, Mr. Churchill made a suggestion that under certain conditions Russia ought to be included in a kind of expanded NATO. And I believe that was the same day that you testified something to the effect that in 10 years or so we might hope to look on the Russians as more respectable citizens. Could you comment first on Winston Churchill's proposal and, second, spell out a little bit more what you meant by your remark?

A. I read quite carefully the full text of what Sir Winston Churchill said, and it seemed to me that he was saying in effect much the same thing which the three Western powers had said last November at the Geneva conference where we met with the Soviet Foreign Minister. At that time we proposed, as part of the European settlement which would bring about the reunification of Germany, that there should be some kind of overall security treaty which would engage the members of NATO, or certain of them, and certain powers on the other side to a comprehensive agreement which would assure that, in the event of armed aggression of any one against the other, we would all stand against the aggressor. That proposal was made by us with the British and the French at the Geneva conference last November. And, as I say, I interpreted Sir Winston Churchill's remarks a being in essence a repetition of the thought an spirit of those remarks.

Chances for Basic Change in Soviet Union

Now, you had a second half to your questio You asked for an elucidation of what I had sai before the Foreign Affairs Committee, I thin last week, to the effect that there was evidenc within the Soviet Union of forces toward greate liberalism which, if they persisted, could brin about a basic change within the Soviet Union an the kind of government which we could welcom as a respected and respectable member of th society of nations. Now, what I meant by that wa that what has been done already is, I think, barometer which records strong underlying basi forces within the Soviet Union which demand fo themselves greater personal security, greater free dom of thought and expression, greater participa tion in the products of their labor than they ar getting at the present time. They are also de manding a government which is more broadl based and which is more responsive to the basi wishes of the people.

Now, the present government is going throug certain motions which we cannot fully apprais at the present time. They may be merely an at tempt to delude the Russian people with th thought that they are getting something differe and without there being the reality of much dif ference. They are certainly going through a lo of motions in terms of demoting Stalin. But th demoting of Stalin and the rehabilitation of pe ple who are dead does not of itself promise muc that is new for the future. Nevertheless, what th Soviet is doing is, I think, a measure of the force within Russia. By that test those forces must b very considerable indeed because the steps whic the Soviet rulers are taking are steps which in volve for them considerable hazards. You do no destroy the reputation of a man who has been demigod for 25 years without taking some risk You do not impair what has been the sacred cree of communism for 25 years and change it in es sential respects without taking certain risks. Yo do not offer hope to people who have aspiration for greater spiritual and material freedoms tha they now have without increasing the volume o the pressure. It is not easy to reverse what is no under way. I said, following the Geneva "sum mit" conference of last July, that the success o

ailure of that conference would largely be judged y whether there is set up within the Soviet Union orces that might become irreversible.

Now, we don't know yet whether these forces re irreversible or not. We probably can't judge hat for quite a little while. And I said it would e very foolish for us to drop our guard on the ssumption that what is now demonstrated asures that danger is removed. But if these forces o on and continue to gather momentum within he Soviet Union, then we can, I think, reasonably ope, I said within a decade or perhaps a generaion, that we would have what is the great goal f our policy, that is, a Russia which is governed y people who are responsive to the wishes of the ussian people, who had given up their predaory worldwide ambitions to rule, and who conorm to the principles of civilized nations and ich principles as are embodied in the charter of e United Nations.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on Wednesday President Suarno will arrive in the United States. What do ou expect will be the result of his visit in ashington?

A. Well, I think that the result of his visit re will be—certainly I hope that it will be—a earer realization of the basic bonds of sympathy d understanding that can exist between a naon like the United States and a nation like Indosia, which has recently won its independence d which is struggling with many of the probms which are inherent in the coming of indendence when it is not or has not been practiced d when many new things have to be learned d many new policies have to be hammered out. do believe there is a basic bond of sympathy tween our two countries, and I think that will developed and better understood as a result his visit here.

rman Reunification

Q. Mr. Secretary, last Sunday German Atomic nergy Minister Strauss said he believes the probn of German reunification is now tied in with e whole problem of Eastern Europe and he felt at it should now be the time that the Russians ould allow elections for the whole area and give edom to the whole area. In other words, he d German unification into the whole problem Eastern Europe. Do you agree with this sition?

A. Well, I agree with it, if I understand right. I said, following the Geneva conference of last October-November, that I felt that the hardening of the Soviet position as regards Eastern Germany was because they felt that, if they allowed free elections in Eastern Germany, that would start a chain reaction within the other countries of Eastern Europe, the satellite countries, and that it would be extremely difficult for the Soviet Union to continue its hold upon those countries if it once permitted free elections and free choice within one of the satellite countries, which East Germany has now become. Certainly, in my opinion, the thinking of the Soviet Union is that these two problems are connected, and, in my opinion, they are connected. And, of course, one of the goals of our policy, and one of the tests which should be applied as to the acceptability of any Soviet Government as a respectable member of the community of nations, is that it will allow genuinely independent governments to exist in these European countries which have, many of them, a very long record of independent existence and many fine historic traditions.

Q. Will the United States discuss with its NATO allies the Soviet manpower reduction announcement and its implications for the West?

A. Well, I have no doubt that this will be discussed very fully at the NATO Council, where the permanent representatives sit. I may say that we already discussed it at the ministerial meeting 2 weeks ago because we anticipated at that time that it was coming.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of that anticipation, was there any thought given in this Government to ways of countering the propaganda advantages such as moves by Moscow might gain?

A. There was set up a group within the Government which has been functioning for the last few weeks to study the implications of this thing and the point of view with which we should respond to it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, isn't it a fair conclusion from what you said this morning that you would prefer to have the Soviet Union keep these men in their armed forces?

A. Well, it's a fair conclusion that I would rather have them standing around doing guard duty than making atomic bombs.

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Q. Mr. Secretary, is it correct to interpret the sense of your comments on Mr. Churchill's remarks as being that at Geneva we proposed to the Soviet Union that she participate in a European collective security or European nonaggression pact, that Churchill was at Aachen repeating that proposition or the sense of it, and that the United States is still backing such an invitation of the Soviet Union, that is, to enter a collective nonaggression pact and to come into NATO?

A. I do not want to say whether or not what Churchill said was consciously based upon what had been said at Geneva. It may have been, quite likely was, his own spontaneous thinking. What I pointed out was that it was quite parallel with what we had done at that time. We had proposed what was called then a Treaty of Assurance to cover all of the essential parts of Europe and containing mutual guaranties, consultations, and the like. The United States is still adhering to that position.

Q. Mr. Secretary, let me clarify that. I want to understand it completely. Churchill, I understood, at Aachen—that is the impression I had—urged that Russia be included in the NATO alliance. Is that the American position? Is that what we are saying?

A. I do not think that Churchill proposed the inclusion of Russia in the NATO alliance. I think that what he proposed was that the Soviet Union should support the principles of the NATO alliance.

Q. Mr. Secretary, coming back to what you said—if there is a beginning of a revolution in Russia, do you think there are, in your opinion, any new ways or possibilities for the world to accelerate this revolution?

A. I believe that there are. And I believe that some of the things we have done have already had an accelerating effect. It is almost impossible to prove that. Also it's impossible to disprove it. But I do believe that, while in the main what has happened has been due to internal forces that are almost inherent in the nature of man and in part also due to the increased education that has gone on within Russia, there have also been contributions from the outside. How you apportion those is anybody's guess. But I do believe there are ways of accelerating those, and I can assure you those are being very intensively studied.

Mr. Sonnabend Named Director of Benjamin Franklin Foundation

The Department of State announced on May 18 (press release 265) that Abraham M. Sonnabend of Boston, Mass., has been named a director of the Benjamin Franklin Foundation. This Foundation, created at the suggestion of the Secretary of State in connection with the U. S. policy to support the security and welfare of Berlin, is a corporate entity in Berlin established under the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The State Department announced the composition of the Board and the purpose of the Foundation on December 12, 1955.[1] The Benjamin Franklin Foundation was created in 1955 to develop a program and construct a building in Berlin to make manifest the American tradition of free speech and free communication. In order to meet the needs of the city of Berlin for a suitable place of assemblage, a Conference Hall designed by an outstanding American architect will be erected and will constitute the participation of the U. S. Government in the Building Exposition of September 1957. The building is being financed jointly by the U. S. Government, the city of Berlin, and the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Foundation is charged not only with carrying through the construction of the Conference Hall but also with developing the program of use during an initial period prior to the turning over of the building to the Germans. Because this program coincides with the celebration of the 250th anniversary of the birth of Benjamin Franklin, the building will be called the Benjamin Franklin Foundation.

Austrian Social Security Benefits To Cover Certain U.S. Residents

Press release 249 dated May 10

A new Austrian social security law recently went into effect which provides that individuals residing in the United States who are entitled to old-age or survivors benefits in accordance with the Austrian social security laws and who were subject to political, religious, or racial persecution during the period from March 4, 1933, to May 9, 1945, are entitled to receive generally such benefits retroactive to May 1, 1945.

[1] BULLETIN of Jan. 1, 1956, p. 15.

Individuals who are entitled to such retroactive benefits should file their claim as soon as possible directly with one of the following offices, depending upon the nature of their former employment in Austria:

1. Pensionsversicherungsanstalt der Angestellten (Employees Retirement Fund), Wien V, Blechturmgasse 11, Austria.
2. Pensionsversicherungsanstalt fuer Arbeiter (Workers Retirement Fund), Wien V, Blechturmgasse 11, Austria.
3. Versicherungsanstalt oesterr. Eisenbahnen (Insurance Association of the Austrian Railroads), Wien VI, Linke Wienzeile 48, Austria.

Persons who were insured with one of the Austrian agricultural and mining associations (Versicherungen der Landerwirtschaft und des Bergbaus) should write for information concerning retroactive benefits directly to the association by which they were insured.

U.S. Sending Foodstuffs to Peru To Meet Emergency

The International Cooperation Administration announced on May 8 that the United States will provide 45,000 tons of wheat, barley, and corn and 2,000 tons of dry milk to Peru as a gift of the American people to help meet an emergency in the South American nation. These foodstuffs, which will be made available under title II of the Agricultural Trade and Development Act, have a U.S. market value of approximately $3.6 million. Title II authorizes the use of American farm commodities for relief purposes.

An unprecedentedly severe drought and unusually early frosts in the Lake Titicaca Plateau region of southern Peru have created a serious food shortage for the 1.5 million people—most of them farmers—who live in the area. School attendance in this region has already dropped 30 percent, an indication that some families have abandoned the area to search for food.

It is estimated that harvests will drop far below normal yields. The potato yield is expected to decline 80 percent, the barley yield 40 percent, and the yield of quinua (a high-protein, cereal-like food) by 30 percent. In addition, a forage loss of close to 2 million dry tons is expected.

Under the supervision of the Government of Peru, the U.S. foodstuffs will be distributed free to needy persons, or sold with the proceeds to be used to help support relief projects set up by Peru to aid destitute people to remain in established communities.

Peru and the United States have worked together in technical cooperation programs since 1942. For fiscal 1956, $2.35 million has been programed for U.S. technical aid there.

The technical cooperation program in Peru emphasizes development of agriculture and natural resources, health and sanitation facilities, industry and mining, and education. Irrigation and community road-building projects are being increasingly stressed in order to get the greatest benefit of these programs to the rural people of Peru.

First Shipment of Streetcars Leaves for Korea

Streetcars that formerly carried Los Angeles residents soon will be ringing their trolley bells thousands of miles away along the streets of Seoul and Pusan.

The International Cooperation Administration announced on May 10 that the first shipment of 15 California streetcars was expected to leave Los Angeles harbor that day for Korea. As many as 75 may be shipped eventually to rehabilitate the public transportation systems of Korea's two largest cities. Most of them will come from a Los Angeles streetcar system that has now converted to buses.

The cars are part of a Korean street-railway rehabilitation project for which the United States is providing $1,080,000 in assistance. Included in this program are motors, generators, car-shop equipment, spare parts, and other supplies needed to bring the Seoul and Pusan traction systems back to their 1950 condition. The lines and equipment were severely damaged in the fighting against the Communist invaders.

Seoul has 30 miles of streetcar track and 135 serviceable streetcars, most of them 30 or 40 years old. This is half the number of cars operated before the Communist invasion of 1950. The number of passengers carried daily averages some 600,000 and is increasing. The street-railway system is the principal means of transportation for Seoul's 2,000,000 population, and block-long queues of men, women, and children stand for long

periods at trolley stops waiting to crowd onto the small and antiquated cars.

Similar conditions exist at Pusan, a city of 1,000,000 people, where 110,000 persons daily ride over 10 miles of track. Only 29 of Pusan's 79 cars are operable on an average day. Seventy percent of Pusan's cars are at least 20 years old.

In both cities, the deteriorated and poorly equipped car shops have not been adequate to the job of rehabilitating the obsolete and war-damaged cars without the additional equipment and supplies which are being provided under the U.S. aid program. At least 50 cars, now unusable, are to be rebuilt and put into use in the two cities. Maintenance will be improved for the newly procured cars.

About two-thirds of the American streetcars are to be sent to Seoul and one-third to Pusan. The Los Angeles cars operate on a track that is narrower than that required by the usual American car. They have a 42-inch gage, the same as the Korean gage. Most American trolleys have a 56½-inch gage.

Export-Import Bank Credit To Japanese Electric Company

An $11 million credit to the Kansai Electric Company for thermal-power development in Japan, where a severe shortage of electrical energy now prevails, was signed at the Export-Import Bank of Washington on May 10.

Samuel C. Waugh, president of Export-Import, signed the loan agreement on behalf of the bank; Shin Hory, chairman of the board of Kansai, signed for the Japanese company; and William E. Knox, president of Westinghouse Electric International Company, signed as the U. S. supplier of materials and equipment to be sold, exported, and installed with technical assistance at the new Kansai plant in Osaka.

The shortage of electrical energy now prevailing in Japan is expected to continue for about 5 years. The Kansai expansion, financed through the Eximbank loan, is part of an extensive effort by all the largest Japanese power companies to overcome the shortage with thermal-power development programs.

Japanese industry has been seriously affected by a seasonal scarcity of electrical energy, Japanese power companies being predominantly hydroelectric. Moreover, land characteristics in Japan have restricted development of large reservoirs, and as a result the country has suffered serious annual curtailment of electrical energy during the dry season, December to March.

World Bank Loans to Norway, Burma, and Haiti

POWER PROJECT IN NORWAY

The World Bank announced on May 3 a loan of $25 million to Norway for hydroelectric power development. The loan will help to finance the Tokke power project, which will add 400,000 kilowatts of generating capacity to the electricity network serving southeastern Norway, including the city of Oslo. This area now consumes 55 percent of all the power produced in Norway.

Despite the rapid expansion of electric-power capacity in Norway, the supply has not kept pace with the demand; power from the Tokke project will help bring the situation into balance. The first 100,000-kilowatt unit will come into operation in 1961, and the other three before the middle of 1963. Projections of the power market in the area show that the additional power can be absorbed quickly; all of it will be sold in bulk to distributing authorities and to industry. Industries to which power from the project will be available include plants manufacturing metals, chemicals, pulp, paper, and mechanical and electrical equipment.

The total cost of the project is estimated at the equivalent of $70 million. The bank's loan will provide $25 million of this amount, and the remainder will be provided by the Norwegian Government partly from appropriations from general revenue and partly by the sale of bonds to counties, municipalities, power companies, and industrial users of power in southern Norway.

One of Norway's most important natural resources is its lakes and rivers which, because of the conformation of the land, can be harnessed for hydroelectric power at low cost. Only one-fifth of the power potential has thus far been developed. Norway's ability to supply power at lower costs than most other areas of the world has attracted investment, both domestic and foreign, in industries where power is a substantial cost factor,

such as the electrochemical and electrometallurgical industries. Prospects for the expansion of these industries are good; further increases in aluminum production, for example, are now under consideration. Such developments would be important to the Norwegian economy since these industries produce largely for export; metals and chemical fertilizers already account for about one-quarter of Norway's exports.

FIRST BANK LOANS TO BURMA

On May 4 the World Bank announced two loans totaling $19,350,000 for the improvement of Burma's transport system. These are the bank's first loans in Burma, and the funds will be used mainly for the reconstruction of installations and properties destroyed during World War II.

One loan of $14 million was made to the Commissioners for the Port of Rangoon and is guaranteed by the Burmese Government. This loan will help to finance the reconstruction of cargo berths and storage facilities at the port of Rangoon and the purchase of floating equipment, such as dredges and tugs, for harbor operations. The second loan of $5,350,000 was made to the Union of Burma. It will pay for freight cars, diesel railcars, and bridge construction materials for a rehabilitation and development program being carried out by the Burma Railways.

Improvement of transport is of high priority in the development plans of the Burmese Government. The port of Rangoon is Burma's chief seaport and handles four-fifths of the country's foreign trade. The project being financed will increase the capacity of the port, facilitate the movement of freight, shorten the turn-around time of vessels, and provide better and safer service to ships calling in port. The railways carry the bulk of Burma's passenger and freight traffic. The program being undertaken will improve the services and efficiency of the railways, especially the movement of rice, timber, and minerals destined for export.

3-YEAR HIGHWAY PROGRAM IN HAITI

A loan of $2.6 million to Haiti to help finance a 3-year highway improvement program was announced by the World Bank on May 7. Under the program a highway maintenance section will be organized, equipped, and staffed to rehabilitate and repair 725 miles of primary and secondary roads and to provide continuing maintenance on all public highways and roads in Haiti. Improved roads will expedite the delivery of agricultural goods from farms to markets and will better serve Haiti's growing tourist industry.

The total cost of the program is estimated at the equivalent of $3,980,000. The bank's loan will pay for the necessary imported equipment, materials, and services; the local currency costs, equivalent to $1,380,000, will be met by the Haitian Government. The Royal Bank of Canada is participating in the loan, without the World Bank's guaranty, to the extent of $413,000, representing the first three maturities which fall due from July 1, 1959, through July 1, 1960. This is the first time that a Canadian bank has participated in a World Bank loan.

Haiti has 1,875 miles of roads, of which all but about 325 miles are dirt roads. Most of the roads were built in the 1920's and because of inadequate maintenance have so deteriorated in places that motor travel is difficult and sometimes unsafe. The most pressing need is to put existing roads in good condition and provide for their routine maintenance; the program being undertaken with the help of the bank loan is directed toward this end.

Roads are the chief means of transport in Haiti. Because the country is predominantly agricultural, an adequate road network is essential if agricultural produce is to be marketed efficiently. At present, difficulties of road transportation greatly handicap Haitian agriculture. For the most part crops are grown by primitive methods on small farms and are carried long distances to market on women's heads and donkeys' backs. Goods are passed from smaller to larger markets in this same way. Even export crops pass through many successive and costly steps before they finally arrive at one of the two major commercial centers, Port-au-Prince or Cap-Haitien.

Remedying the difficulties of highway transport can be expected to give an incentive to increased agricultural production. It should have a beneficial effect on the Haitian economy as a whole by reducing food imports and increasing foreign exchange earnings through larger exports of Haiti's commercial crops.

Implementing the Great Lakes Fisheries Convention With Canada

Statement by Warren F. Looney [1]

The Department of State recommends favorable consideration by your committee of H.R. 9951, H.R. 9958, and H.R. 10001, identic bills to implement the Great Lakes Fisheries Convention between the United States and Canada, which was signed at Washington September 10, 1954.[2] The convention has now been in effect since October 11, 1955. The United States and Canadian commissioners are already appointed [3] and, indeed, held their first meeting at Ottawa last week. Statutory authority such as is provided in these bills is now required in order that the United States may carry out fully the obligations incurred by it under the convention.

The Convention

As the provisions of these bills can best be discussed in terms of the convention and the obligations it places upon the United States, it may be well to describe briefly the purposes and provisions of the convention.

The convention was negotiated to meet two outstanding problems of the Great Lakes fisheries which the United States or Canada acting separately cannot effectively solve. The waters of the Great Lakes are, of course, boundary waters. In the case of stocks of fish freely swimming across the international boundary between the United States and Canada, any rational conservation program requires joint action by the two countries. The two problems of the Great Lakes fisheries are

1. The immediate and pressing problem of th predatory sea lamprey, and
2. The need for coordinated fishery research i the lakes.

Your committee, Mr. Chairman, is well ac quainted, I am sure, with the sea lamprey and it disastrous effects upon the fisheries in the uppe three lakes. The lamprey, a creature about 1 inches long and looking like an eel, lives by affix ing its snout to a fish and subsisting on the bloo and body juices of its host. Originally a salt water species, it acclimated itself eons ago i Lake Ontario. For centuries Niagara Fall blocked its passage westward. It appeared, how ever, in the upper lakes in the 1930's, presumabl having made its way through the Welland Canal which bypasses Niagara Falls. Lake Erie, itsel not congenial for lamprey populations, did, how ever, provide the lamprey with a means of transi to Lakes Huron, Michigan, and Superior.

Unfortunately this predator attacks most read ily the lake trout and whitefish. The history o its westward movement and the proof of its de structive power can be read in a few figures. A lamprey spawning run was first found in Lak Huron in 1934. In 1936 the first lamprey wa taken in Lake Michigan. Here is what happened In 1935 United States fishermen took in Lak Huron 1,743,000 pounds of lake trout; in 194 they took only half as much—842,000 pounds; i 1951 they caught less than 50 pounds. In Lak Michigan the United States catch of lake trout i 1943 was 6,800,000 pounds; in 1946, 3,974,00 pounds; in 1952, 3,000 pounds. The lake trou fisheries in Huron and Michigan have vanished

[1] Made on May 3 before a subcommittee of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the House of Representatives. Mr. Looney is Deputy Special Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife to the Under Secretary.

[2] Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3326.

[3] For list of U.S. commissioners, see BULLETIN of Mar. 5, 1956, p. 374.

The loss in lake trout to American commercial fishermen alone is $3,500,000 per year in these two lakes. A similar depressing story could be told of the whitefish fisheries in those two lakes.

Lake Superior, being to the westward, is now feeling the brunt of the lamprey attack. The average annual United States and Canadian catch of Superior trout in modern times was 4,400,000 pounds. By 1954 this had fallen to 3,472,000 pounds, and the 1955 catch is estimated at less than 3,000,000 pounds. If the Superior trout fishery is also destroyed, the States of Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin will lose a further $1.3 million in catch.

Eleven political entities share research work on the lakes fisheries: the eight Great Lakes States and our Federal Government on one side of the border; the Canadian Federal Government and the Province of Ontario on the other. That this research should be coordinated in order to multiply its benefits without a corresponding increase in costs seems a wise move. Problems in the lakes fisheries, which expanded and coordinated research can attack and probably solve, are numerous. For example, trash fish have, year after year, been supplanting the more desirable species. Again, although year-to-year poundage overall remains fairly constant, radical changes in catch by species occur. Until such trends are accounted for and anticipated, the commercial fisherman must operate on a hit-or-miss basis in planning his year's operations.

Mechanics of the Convention

The convention provides for a bilateral Great Lakes Fishery Commission to be composed of a United States and a Canadian Section, each of not more than three members appointed by the respective parties. Each Section has one vote, and all actions of the Commission require unanimous vote.

The Commission has the following duties:

(a) to formulate research programs designed to determine what, if any, conservation measures are needed;

(b) to coordinate research under such programs;

(c) to recommend measures to the parties; and

(d) to formulate and implement a comprehensive program for the purpose of abating the lamprey population.

The Commission is authorized to conduct investigations and to take measures and install devices in the Great Lakes and the tributaries thereof for lamprey control. In carrying out its duties, the Commission is required, insofar as feasible, to make use of the official agencies of the parties and of their Provinces and States.

No Regulatory Power Granted by Convention

It is to be noted that no regulatory power over fishing operations is vested by the convention in the Commission. While research may well point the way to possible conservation measures, such measures can only be recommended by the Commission to the party Governments.

Provisions of H.R. 9951, H.R. 9958, and H.R. 10001

Section 2 provides definitions which, it is believed, are self-explanatory.

Section 3 provides for the appointment of three United States Commissioners by the President. These are to serve without compensation and at the pleasure of the President. It is required that, of the three Commissioners, one shall be an official of the United States Government and two shall be persons residing in Great Lakes States (but not in the same State), duly qualified by reason of knowledge of the lakes fisheries.

Section 4 provides for the appointment of an advisory committee for each of the Great Lakes, on which each State bordering on the lake shall be represented by not more than four members, and places the power of appointment in the United States Section. Section 4 also provides for certain privileges of the advisory committee members.

In connection with sections 3 and 4, it is to be noted that the procedures of appointment and other provisions follow generally the precedents of our other international fisheries commissions, of which there are six: Halibut, Sockeye Salmon, Whaling, Northwest Atlantic, Inter-American Tropical Tuna, and North Pacific Fisheries Commissions.

Section 5 is a conflict-of-interests provision.

Sections 6 and 7 vest authority in the three United States Commissioners on the one hand, and in the Secretary of the Interior on the other, to carry out the lamprey control program. With reference to the operations of this program, the techniques thus far developed to control the lamprey aim toward preventing their ingress into

spawning streams. This is accomplished by erecting electric or mechanical barriers across the potential spawning streams. The lamprey in the fifth year of life returns from the lake to a stream—not necessarily its natal stream—to spawn and die. Since the lamprey cannot, so far as we know, successfully spawn in the lakes, it is only necessary to deny them access to the streams to prevent future generations.

The control devices are installed in a stream quite near to the mouth. Normally each device (except a barrier dam) will require about 50 linear feet of stream bed, plus a strip 10 feet wide on either bank, plus an acquisition road. Land acquisition powers are required, therefore, and these are vested in the United States Section by section 6(a), whereby the United States Section is authorized to acquire interests in land on behalf of the United States. Sections 6(b) and (c) authorize the United States Section to construct, operate, and maintain any lamprey control project and to contract with any State or other public agency or private agency or individual for such type of work.

As this committee knows, the Fish and Wildlife Service for the past several years has had the sea lamprey under investigation and for this purpose has erected 70-odd devices in streams in the upper lakes. Section 7(a) authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to transfer to the United States Section all such devices. Section 7(b) is a very important provision whereby the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to act for and on behalf of the Section in carrying out the Section's powers. It is intended by this provision to establish the procedure whereby land acquisition, construction, operation, and maintenance of the devices and, where necessary, the contracting out of such work will be performed by the Secretary of the Interior on behalf of the United States Section. This procedure makes use of existing staff and methods and obviates the necessity of establishing an international staff to carry out functions in this country for the accomplishment of which Federal agencies are already well equipped. For any duties so carried out by the Department of the Interior, it will be reimbursed by the International Commission.

Section 8. The electrical devices used to bar entry of lampreys to the streams could, in some circumstances, it is believed, kill or seriously injure a human being. Animals as large as deer have been killed by the present devices. Section 8, which makes the United States Section an agenc of the United States within the meaning of thos provisions of title 28, U.S. Code, relating to to claims and procedures, is designed to utilize pre ent Federal procedures should a claim arise out c the operation of a device. It should be added th all devices will be adequately fenced and othe wise protected and that no claims have thus fa been made against the Fish and Wildlife Servic under its present program. It should also be adde that, while the International Commission itsel has the power under the convention to erect an install barriers in the territories of the Unite States and Canada, it is the Department's inte tion to arrange for such operations to be carrie out in the United States only through the Unite States Section.

Section 9 requires appropriate notice to be give by the United States Section to the States cor cerned before approving a proposal to utilize an lamprey control measure or device in a stream Thirty days' notice is specified. It is felt that thi is sufficient time in which to indicate objection i any exists.

Section 10. As stated above, the convention con fers no authority to regulate fishing operation The Commission is, however, by article IV(c given the duty of recommending to the contractin parties conservation measures on the basis of it research findings. Section 10 places upon the Sec retary of State the duty of transmitting such rec ommendations to the Governor of each Grea Lakes State.

Section 11 authorizes Federal agencies to co operate with the United States Section. In lam prey control activities they may do this on a re imbursable or other basis.

Sections 13 and 14 are standard provisions re lating respectively to appropriations and to th applicability of the remaining provisions of th act in the event any provision is invalid.

Consultation With States and Public

In the summer and fall of 1955 the Departmen consulted with conservation officials of the eigh Great Lakes States, as well as representatives o the fishing industry of the area, concerning im plementing legislation. The proposed legislatio sent by Acting Secretary Hoover to the Speake on March 12, 1956, substantially expressed the pro visions of legislation on which there was genera

greement with the affected interests in the area. As stated in Mr. Hoover's letter to the Speaker, owever:

The proposed legislation is, to the best of the Department's knowledge, non-controversial. With regard to ections 3 and 4, however, it is the Department's understanding that the fishing industry and conservation interests in the Great Lakes States prefer language that ould require (a) that one of the two Commissioners siding in the Great Lakes States be a conservation official of one of the Great Lakes States, and (b) that ppointments from any State to the advisory committees e made by the Governor of that State. The intent of ections 3 and 4 as worded in the proposed legislation is retain in the President and the United States Section exibility in making appointments which experience has roved to be necessary in the administration of Federal rograms.

eed for Early Action on H.R. 9951

The Great Lakes Fishery Commission is already n existence, the United States Commissioners aving been appointed by the President last ebruary and the Canadian Commissioners by the anadian Government some weeks previously. he Commission held its first meeting in Ottawa pril 23 through 25, 1956. It is now ready to unch its program for the rehabilitation of the hitefish and lake-trout fisheries and to build up coordinated and expanded system of research. he necessary Canadian legislation has been assed and Canadian appropriations made available. There only remains the passage of United tates implementing legislation and United tates appropriations for the fiscal year 1957.

The Department believes the passage of H.R. 951 will serve the interests of the United States nd requests the committee's favorable consideraon of the bill.

ongressional Documents elating to Foreign Policy

th Congress, 2d Session

nancing of Aswan High Dam in Egypt. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Appropriations. January 26, 1956. 26 pp.

cope of Soviet Activity in the United States. Hearing Before the Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Part 6, March 6, 1956. 82 pp.

ddress of the Honorable John A. Costello, Prime Minister of Ireland, delivered before the Senate of the United States and distinguished guests March 15, 1956, together with the Fitzpatrick Letters of 1777–1778. S. Doc. 104. 17 pp.

Transportation on Canadian Vessels to and Within Alaska. Report to accompany S. 3269. S. Rept. 1666, March 19, 1956. 3 pp.

Mutual Security Program. Message from the President relative to the mutual security program. H. Doc. 358, March 19, 1956. 8 pp.

Proposed Appropriations for Mutual Security. Communication from the President transmitting proposed appropriations for the fiscal year 1957, in the amount of $4,859,975,000, for mutual security. H. Doc. 360, March 20, 1956. 6 pp.

Extending Greetings to Pakistan. Report to accompany H. Con. Res. 223. H. Rept. 1927, March 20, 1956. 2 pp.

Foreign Service Act Amendments of 1956. Hearing before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on S. 3481, a bill to amend the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended, and for other purposes. March 21, 1956. 42 pp.

Authorizing the Loan of Two Submarines to the Government of Brazil. Report to accompany H. R. 8100. S. Rept. 1708, March 22, 1956. 4 pp.

Inventory Report on Real Property Owned by the United States in United States Territories and Possessions and in Foreign Countries as of June 30, 1955, prepared by General Services Administration at the request of the Senate Committee on Appropriations. S. Doc. 109, March 27, 1956. 99 pp.

Constitutional Amendment Relative to Treaties and Executive Agreements. Report together with individual views to accompany S. J. Res. 1. S. Rept. 1716, March 27, 1956. 31 pp.

Protocol Relating to Certain Amendments to the Convention on International Aviation. Report to accompany Executive F, 84th Congress, 2d Session. S. Exec. Rept. 4, March 28, 1956. 3 pp.

Report on the Tenth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations by Hon. Brooks Hays, Arkansas, and Hon. Chester E. Merrow, New Hampshire, of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs pursuant to H. Res. 91. H. Rept. 1980, March 29, 1956. 111 pp.

United States Technical Assistance in Latin America. Fourteenth Intermediate Report of the House Committee on Government Operations. H. Rept. 1985, March 29, 1956. 36 pp.

Convention Concerning Customs Facilities for Touring and Customs Convention on the Temporary Importation of Private Road Vehicles. Report to accompany Executives A and B, 84th Cong., 2d sess. Exec. Rept. 5, April 11, 1956. 9 pp.

Constitutional Amendment Relative to Treaties and Executive Agreements. Individual views of Mr. Hennings to accompany S. J. Res. 1. S. Rept. 1716, Part 2, April 11, 1956. 5 pp.

Foreign Service Act Amendments of 1956. Report to accompany S. 3481. S. Rept. 1726, April 11, 1956. 22 pp.

Eleventh Semiannual Report of United States Advisory Commission on Information. H. Doc. 376, April 11, 1956. 31 pp.

Extension of Export Control Act of 1949. Report to accompany H. R. 9052. H. Rept. 1998, April 12, 1956. 5 pp.

Control and Reduction of Armaments. Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations pursuant to S. Res. 93 and S. Res. 185. Part 6, April 12, 1956. 37 pp.

The Agreement on the Organization for Trade Cooperation. Report of the House Committee on Ways and Means to accompany H. R. 5550, a bill to amend the Tariff Act of 1930 with respect to the administration of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. H. Rept. 2007, April 18, 1956. 211 pp.

Departments of State and Justice, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, Fiscal Year 1957. Report to accompany H. R. 10721. H. Rept. 2021, April 20, 1956. 23 pp.

Problems Relating to the Economic and Legal Regime of the High Seas

INTER-AMERICAN SPECIALIZED CONFERENCE ON CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCE CONTINENTAL SHELF AND MARINE WATERS, CIUDAD TRUJILLO, MARCH 15–28

The Inter-American Specialized Conference on Conservation of Natural Resources: Continental Shelf and Marine Waters was held at Ciudad Trujillo, Dominican Republic, March 15–28, 1956, in accordance with decisions made by the Tenth Inter-American Conference at Caracas in 1954 and the Council of the Organization of American States earlier this year. At this conference the American Republics for the first time had an opportunity to consider as a whole the problems relating to the economic and legal regime of the high seas in the light of scientific knowledge.

Delegations from 20 American Republics participated, Bolivia being absent. The U.S. delegation was headed by Henry F. Holland, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. Other delegates were: John C. Dreier, U.S. Ambassador to the Organization of American States, vice chairman of the delegation; William C. Herrington, Special Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife to the Under Secretary of State; Ralph L. Miller, U.S. Geological Survey, Department of the Interior; and William Sanders, Counselor of Embassy, Santiago, Chile. Advisers from the Departments of State, Navy, and Interior were likewise included on the U.S. delegation. Delegations from other countries also included diplomats, jurists, and scientists.

The composition of the U.S. delegation represented one measure of the importance which this Government attributed to the Ciudad Trujillo conference. A growing movement among some Latin American countries to extend their territorial waters far out into the high seas had been for some time a major concern of the United States. Disputes with some other American Republics over fishing rights on the high seas fu ther contributed to the significance of the deliber tions at Ciudad Trujillo. Finally, the action take by the Inter-American Council of Jurists regar ing territorial waters and related matters at i third meeting at Mexico City, January 17–Febr ary 4, 1956, had created problems of both a poli ical and a legal character for the United States

Organization of the Conference

Meeting in the attractive new building of th Dominican Congress, now in the midst of the I ternational Fair, the conference was opened b Hector B. Trujillo, President of the Dominica Republic. The Foreign Minister of the Dominica Republic, Porfirio Herrera Báez, was unanimousl selected chairman of the conference.

Three working committees were established Committee I on the continental shelf, Committe II on marine waters, and Committee III to tak up other subjects. It was understood that Com mittees I and II would discuss the technical an economic problems associated with their respectiv subjects. In the meantime, the heads of all dele gations met informally under the chairmanshi of the Foreign Minister to consider ways an means of dealing with the complex and contro versial juridical questions associated with both th continental shelf and marine waters.

In approaching the juridical problems the del egates had before them the several drafts of th

[1] For background on this conference, see BULLETIN o Feb. 20, 1956, p. 296. For an article on the Santiag Negotiations on Fishery Conservation Problems Amon Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and the United States, see *ibid* Dec. 19, 1955, p. 1025.

nternational Law Commission of the United Nations on the Regime of the High Seas and the Regime of the Territorial Sea. The Inter-American Council of Jurists at Mexico City had adopted a resolution[2] which that Council had termed a "preparatory study" for the Ciudad Trujillo conference. Finally, the conference had before it specific draft resolutions submitted by the delegations of Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela, dealing primarily with the continental shelf, while the United States had advanced through its embassies in the Latin American capitals certain suggestions regarding the type of resolution which might be adopted.

In view of the controversial nature of many of these juridical questions, the heads of delegations, adopting the practice often encountered in inter-American meetings, determined to continue informal, private meetings where these problems and the method of treating them could be discussed frankly and fully without the handicaps that would accompany a dramatic public debate. A common understanding was early reached in these conversations to adopt a policy of seeking agreement on all questions which lent themselves to agreement at that time and to define and state important issues on which agreement could not be reached. This decision implied a desire to abstain from forcing through decisions by majority votes on issues of vital importance to all countries, and an intention on the contrary to call for further study and consideration of the issues in disagreement, with a view to seeking an ultimate accommodation of different viewpoints in the traditional spirit of inter-American cooperation.

Resolution of Ciudad Trujillo

After certain preliminary discussion the heads of delegations agreed to take as a working paper the draft of a resolution which had been submitted by the United States to the various Foreign Offices, because this draft was the most comprehensive and was the only one that had been available for study in all the Foreign Offices prior to the conference. Working in daily sessions the heads of delegations developed a resolution which subsequently was introduced in Committee III and adopted by unanimous agreement, under the title of "Resolution of Ciudad Trujillo," as the principal declaration of the conference in the juridical and political field.[3] The resolution deals with three main substantive areas: continental shelf, marine resources, and territorial waters.

The continental shelf represented the least controversial subject dealt with in the resolution. There was no opposition to the principle that the sea bottom and subsoil of the continental shelf belong to the coastal state. In determining the areas which should be recognized as being under the jurisdiction and control of the coastal state, however, the conference adopted as one alternative the principle of exploitability, thus suggesting that states might extend their jurisdiction and control over the shelf even beyond the 200-meter-depth line—the line proposed in the 1953 report of the International Law Commission—if the resources could be practically exploited.

The conference concluded that it was not possible to reach agreement on the juridical regime governing the waters over the submarine areas recognized as being under the jurisdiction of the coastal state. Nor was the issue resolved as to which of the benthonic species go with the sea bottom and which with the superjacent waters.

With respect to the conservation of marine resources, the conference recognized the great desirability of promoting cooperation among states for the achievement of the optimum sustainable yield of living resources of the high seas and stated that this cooperation could best be achieved through agreements among the states directly interested. While the conference agreed on recognizing a "special interest" of the coastal state in the continued productivity of the resources of the seas off its coast and beyond its territorial waters, it was not possible to agree on any definition of this interest or of the rights that might flow therefrom.

The U.S. delegation offered to include in the resolution a statement that the adjacent coastal state should have the right—

> to participate in any programs for the conservation of fishery resources off its coast, and the right, in clearly defined circumstances of urgent necessity, where a conservation agreement with other interested states cannot be reached, to adopt reasonable emergency conservation measures, subject to adequate safeguards for other states against arbitrary or discriminatory action, including procedures for the settlement of differences.

It was urged by some other delegations that the coastal state should be given virtual jurisdic-

[2] *Ibid.*, Feb. 20, 1956, p. 298.

[3] For text, see annex 1.

tion over fisheries to an indeterminate extent off its coast, subject only to certain broad principles of action which would, however, be interpreted unilaterally by each government exercising such control. However, neither of these formulas proved to be generally acceptable.

In attempting to clarify the concept of conservation, the U.S. delegation took a position in support of the definition of the objectives of conservation approved by the U.N. International Technical Conference on the Conservation of the Living Resources of the Sea, held at Rome in 1955.[4] While all other governments represented at Ciudad Trujillo had likewise supported that definition, an effort was made at Ciudad Trujillo to introduce into this essentially scientific concept some inadequately defined social and economic objectives. The impossibility of reaching an agreement on this modification of the Rome conference concept was noted in the resolution.

It was clear that little advantage was to be gained from a debate on the subject of the breadth of the territorial sea. The strongly held differences of view among the various countries were well known. Consequently, the conference merely stated that there existed a diversity of positions among the states on this subject and left it for future consideration. The final paragraph of the resolution calls for continued diligence by the governments in considering the problems on which agreement had not been reached with a view to finding adequate solutions.

Technical Discussions

A large number of technical papers were presented and discussed in the meetings of Committees I and II. In the former, special attention was given to the need for further information regarding the continental shelf and its resources. The relationship of the shelf to the land mass, technical problems involved with the exploitation of its resources, and problems associated with cables and pipelines were among the subjects receiving special consideration. A strong tendency was manifest to adopt the term "terrace" (*zócalo*) for the submarine land areas under discussion, since it included not only the surface of the continental shelf but also the slope and the land mass underneath as well. Great interest was shown in the technical possibilities of exploiting resources of the slope even beyond the depth of 200 meters.

In Committee II papers on oceanography, marine biology, and specific fishery problems were of special importance. The committee rapporteur, in his report, noted particularly the discussion over the "biome" concept, during which differing viewpoints were expressed by the delegations of Chile and the United States. While the Chilean representative supported the concept of the biome as a valid basis for studying the living resources of the sea, the U.S. delegation presented the view that because of the unsuitability of the biome concept to the ocean (unless the ocean as a whole is considered as one biome) and because specific fishery problems are associated with stocks of fish that frequently move through wide areas of the ocean, the biome concept does not serve as a suitable basis for fishery conservation studies.

Committee III, in addition to approving the Resolution of Ciudad Trujillo, also adopted a resolution concerning the establishment of an Inter-American Oceanographic Institute. Based largely on a proposal submitted by the delegation of Mexico, the resolution calls upon the Council of the Organization of American States to continue and accelerate its studies on the possibility of establishing such an institute in accordance with resolution LXXXIV of the Caracas conference. The resolution, moreover, makes various suggestions concerning the scope and nature of the institute, recommending that it consist not only of a central headquarters but also of a number of subregional branches responsible for carrying on extensive programs of research in problems of the living resources of the sea. The conference in this resolution also urged the Pan American Institute of Geography and History to carry forward its work of coordinating oceanographic studies. The practical possibility of actually setting up in the near future an institute of the scope indicated in the resolution, and involving the expense which such an organization would entail, was recognized by many delegations as being extremely limited.

In the final meeting of the conference, various delegations took the opportunity to state the views of their governments on subjects which had been discussed in connection with the Resolution of Ciudad Trujillo and particularly those on which agreement had not been reached. Some delegations advanced the view, directly or indirectly,

[4] For the report of the Rome conference, see U.N. doc. A/Conf. 10/5/Rev. 2.

hat the work of the Ciudad Trujillo conference eft untouched the Resolution of Mexico City on erritorial waters and related matters. In view of these and other expressions of opinion the U.S. lelegation included in the Final Act a brief statenent on these questions, which pointed out, among ther things, that the Resolution of Ciudad Truillo constitutes the latest and most authoritative xpression of the Organization of American States on the subjects referred to therein.[5]

ANNEX 1

Resolution of Ciudad Trujillo

The Inter-American Specialized Conference on "Conservation of Natural Resources: Continental Shelf and Marine Waters",

Considering:

That the Council of the Organization of American States, in fulfillment of Resolution LXXXIV of the Tenth Inter-American Conference held in Caracas in March 1954, convoked this Inter-American Specialized Conference "for the purpose of studying as a whole the different aspects of the juridical and economic system governing the submarine shelf, oceanic waters, and their natural resources in the light of present-day scientific knowledge"; and

That the Conference has carried out the comprehensive study that was assigned to it,

I

Resolves:

To submit for consideration by the American States the following conclusions:

1. The sea-bed and subsoil of the continental shelf, continental and insular terrace, or other submarine areas, adjacent to the coastal state, outside the area of the territorial sea, and to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the sea-bed and subsoil, appertain exclusively to that state and are subject to its jurisdiction and control.

2. Agreement does not exist among the states here represented with respect to the juridical regime of the waters which cover said submarine areas nor with respect to the problem of whether certain living resources belong to the sea-bed or to the superjacent waters.

3. Cooperation among states is of the utmost desirability to achieve the optimum sustainable yield of the living resources of the high seas, bearing in mind the continued productivity of all species.

4. Cooperation in the conservation of the living resources of the high seas may be achieved most effectively through agreements among the states directly interested in such resources.

5. In any event, the coastal state has a special interest in the continued productivity of the living resources of the high seas adjacent to its territorial sea.

6. Agreement does not exist among the states represented at this Conference either with respect to the nature and scope of the special interest of the coastal state or as to how the economic and social factors which such state or other interested states may invoke should be taken into account in evaluating the purposes of conservation programs.

7. There exists a diversity of positions among the states represented at this Conference with respect to the breadth of the territorial sea.

II

Therefore, this Conference does not express an opinion concerning the positions of the various participating states on the matters on which agreement has not been reached and

Recommends:

That the American States continue diligently with the consideration of the matters referred to in paragraphs 2, 6, and 7 of this Resolution with a view to reaching adequate solutions.

ANNEX 2

Statement for Final Act of the Delegation of the United States of America

In view of certain statements made by other Delegations at the final Plenary Session of this Conference on March 27, or inserted in this Final Act, the Delegation of the United States of America wishes to record the following statements:

(a) The Government of the United States does not recognize a right on the part of a coastal state, as claimed by certain Delegations, to exclusive control over the resources of the high seas. The United States maintains that, in accordance with international law, fishery regulations adopted by one state cannot be imposed on nationals of other states on the high seas except by agreement of the governments concerned. Moreover, the United States Delegation also wishes to record the fact that it made a specific proposal for the Conference which would, if adopted, effectively meet the conservation problem that would be posed in the event of failure of the interested states, including the coastal state, to reach agreement on the need for and application of conservation measures.

(b) The Government of the United States does not recognize that a state has competence to determine the breadth of its territorial sea apart from international law.

(c) The Delegation of the United States also wishes to call attention to the fact that broader consideration having been given at this Conference than at any previous inter-American meeting to the various aspects of the subjects on its agenda, the present Resolution of Ciudad Trujillo constitutes the latest and most authoritative expression of the Organization of American States on the subjects discussed therein.

[5] For text of the U.S. statement, see annex 2. Copies of the Final Act of the conference may be obtained from the Pan American Union, Washington 6, D.C.

The Role of the International Atomic Energy Agency

by James J. Wadsworth
Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations[1]

We are now at an auspicious point in the long road of International Atomic Energy Agency negotiations. For the first time we can see clearly a path ahead that leads to the actual establishment of an agency and the beginning of its useful work. The steps which are before us are clear-cut—there will be a world conference opening in late September at United Nations Headquarters in New York, which we hope will conclude by approving a statute and opening it for signature. Then a preparatory commission, composed of the 12-nation negotiating group with 6 other states to be elected by the world conference, will begin advance planning for the agency, at the same time that the statute is being ratified by the signatory nations. By the middle of next year the necessary 18 states may have ratified the statute and a first general conference of the agency can be called to complete election of the first board of governors. Then the agency's work can start in earnest.

The goal is thus to have the agency begin its work a little over a year from now. Each of the steps which I have outlined could, of course, run into difficulties and lead to delays, but the schedule is a feasible one and we intend to bend every effort to seeing that it is met. We could hardly have been so confident last fall, despite the unanimous vote in the United Nations General Assembly in favor of the "atoms-for-peace" resolution.[2] There was then no real agreement as to what the agenc statute should be, and there had been much fran criticism and open expression of suspicion of tl motives of the original negotiating group of eigh as well as a number of general objections voiced b the Soviet Union, the significance of which wa uncertain.

Now we have a draft statute unanimously ap proved by the expanded 12-nation negotiatin group.[3] We have also passed successfully a cru cial test of the sincerity of the desire to reac agreement which was voiced in the General As sembly last fall.

Genuine Desire for Agreement

I believe that the most promising factor of th negotiations just concluded was the spirit of co operation which prevailed among the 12 delega tions representing the major areas and politica viewpoints of the world. There was a general de sire for agreement which was not the syntheti cooperation which pretends that difficulties don' exist and shoves problems to one side. It was th more realistic spirit which frankly recognizes a kinds of opposition and works to reconcile ther in a mutually acceptable solution. If we can con tinue this same effort to reconcile disagreement in the world conference and during the labor o planning and establishing the agency, the hopefu schedule which I have outlined can become reality.

I think that some people lost hope and becam

[1] Address made before the Nuclear Energy Writers Association at New York, N. Y., on May 9 (U.S./U.N. press release 2411 dated May 8). Ambassador Wadsworth represented the United States in the 12-nation group which negotiated the draft statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

[2] BULLETIN of Dec. 19, 1955, p. 1030. For text of resolution, see *ibid.*, Nov. 14, 1955, p. 801.

[3] For text of draft statute, see *ibid.*, May 14, 1956, p. 819 for final communique at conclusion of 12-nation talk see *ibid.*, Apr. 30, 1956, p. 729.

cynical about the proposed agency in the 2½ years since President Eisenhower's speech of December 8, 1953, before the United Nations General Assembly. Those whose hope is weakened are, I believe, those who expected too much. The time that has been taken in these negotiations has not been unreasonable. We are dealing with a new and complex science which is only now moving from the laboratory of the scientists to the drawing boards of the engineers. The first practical application of this new science has been to military purposes, and the new emphasis on peaceful uses has had to proceed cautiously. Furthermore, we have tried to make the establishment of this agency the occasion for a new understanding between the East and the West in our divided world. We have thus undertaken an extremely complex and arduous task with many political and technical aspects. Much careful work, much exploration of the problems and of the varying views of many nations has had to go into laying the foundation for a solid and practicable agency.

What the Agency Will Do

Now that we can foresee an agency coming into existence at a fairly definite time, the natural question is: What will this agency do?

One answer to this question can be found by looking at the functions authorized in the new draft statute published on April 25. The work of the agency will be devoted to accelerating and enlarging "the contribution of atomic energy to the peace, health, and prosperity of the world." Specifically, the agency will have authority to do the following things:

1. To encourage and assist research and development and peaceful application of atomic energy;
2. To perform any operation or service useful in achieving its general purposes;
3. To make provision for atomic materials for atomic research and application;
4. To foster the exchange of scientific and technical information;
5. To encourage the exchange of scientists and experts;
6. To establish and administer safeguards;
7. To establish and apply health and safety standards; and
8. To acquire or establish plants and facilities necessary to carry out these functions.

The potential scope of work of the agency is thus extremely broad—it can do almost anything found useful by its members in the peaceful application of atomic energy. The actual extent of what it does will depend, of course, on the decisions of the members, expressed through the governing organs of the agency, as to just which of these authorized functions should be performed. These decisions will be made on the basis of such practical considerations as the costs the members are willing to bear and the adequacy of available facilities or channels of supply. I will not try to predict in detail the extent to which the agency initially will make use of all its powers. It is particularly difficult to assume that it will be found advantageous to set up agency research facilities and to have the agency perform certain potentially valuable services such as the processing of materials.

It is clear that there are some things which an agency with broad membership can do better than any more informal or bilateral arrangement. These include the systematic exchange of information on a worldwide basis, the establishment of uniform health and safety standards, the exchange of information about research underway to enable nations to avoid costly duplication, the inventorying of available resources, and the authoritative evaluation of the economic aspects of nuclear power.

The field of useful activity is thus very large, and, as I look at the work to be done, I have no doubt that the agency will make an important contribution from the beginning of its work. Indeed the difficulty will be to decide how the resources which the members agree to make available can be apportioned to meet the needs.

Why We Need an Agency To Do This Work

I have said that the agency will find much useful work to do. Some people have asked, however, why we should turn to an international agency to do this work.

I think this is an important question. The establishment of an international agency is a difficult task and the conduct of the work of any large international body is fraught with difficulties. But we can achieve things through an agency which we could not hope to attain in other ways.

The most important of these is indicated by the President's original speech before the United Nations. That speech dealt with the peaceful uses

of atomic energy, but, even more important, it dealt with the reviving of hopes for broad cooperation and relaxation of tension in the world. At that time the President spoke of his proposal as possibly a "new channel for peaceful discussion" which might lead the way out of the frustrations and inertia of other negotiations. If our concern were solely with spreading the benefits of the peaceful uses of atomic energy to other countries, we could perhaps achieve this equally well through expansion of our system of bilateral agreements. By bilateral or regional arrangements, we could make materials or technology available to any friendly country in a position to benefit. Our vision, however, is of cooperation in atomic energy as a bridge and an avenue to peace. To achieve this broader vision, we must build an organization in which we can enlist nations of diverse political views and stages of development.

A second major reason for promoting the peaceful uses of atomic energy through an international agency is the crucial task of safeguarding expanding peaceful atomic energy activities throughout the world. From the first consideration of this problem of control and safeguards, in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in 1946 and 1947, the seriousness and difficulty of the task has been recognized. Put simply, the difficulty is that, at the same time that atomic power is produced, fissionable material usable in weapons is produced by the same reaction. Every atomic power plant is thus a weapons-material producing plant. This duality in the use of atomic energy has led to the conclusion that there must be effective safeguards if the growing peaceful use of atomic energy is not to lead to mutual suspicion and tensions and the development of military stockpiles in many nations. The safeguards must also include careful regulation of health and safety conditions.

If safeguards and controls are to be reliable and thus give reassurance to nations who rely on them, these safeguards must be effective and uniform. Ultimately, there must be a comprehensive system uniformly applied. This has been our objective in the framing of the statute of the Atomic Energy Agency, and this is one of the basic reasons why such an agency is essential as part of our efforts to maintain world peace.

Another important aspect of the control problem is the practical importance of linking control activities with creative work in the promotion of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. An agency which was simply an inspecting organization, an atomic police force, would have a negative role and from the start would be doomed to failure. Nations would understandably resent such supervision. Control and inspection in themselves would be unlikely to be successful if they were applied by men without the technical knowledge and the interest in peaceful programs that will enable them to understand and supervise the dangerous processes. Competent men could never be obtained and kept interested in an organization with only policing functions. They must have the satisfaction of working in an organization where the necessary safeguarding activity is intimately linked up with the achievement of the beneficial goals of a peaceful atomic energy program.

Furthermore, the safeguarding and control measures which are necessary must, to be effective, have the full assent and support of each nation whose atomic energy project is subject to inspection. I believe that this can only be achieved if the safeguards are administered by an international body in which each inspected nation has a voice. The burdens and intrusions of inspection and control will be palatable and can be accepted if a nation has participated in establishing these controls and has voluntarily accepted the intrusions.

Sense of Common Interest

In speaking thus about the importance of a voluntary acceptance of the responsibilities of safeguarding the peaceful development of atomic energy, I have touched on the final reason why an international agency is important. There are other burdens which must be accepted. The peaceful application of atomic energy at present is in good part a burden rather than an economic benefit. Great tasks lie ahead of the world's scientists and engineers before the full benefits of atomic energy are made available to underdeveloped and advanced nations alike. Participation in the agency should do much to create more awareness and appreciation of these difficulties among nations. By a common approach to the solution of the difficult technical and organizing problems, we can hope to draw on the resources of all countries.

In the discussion in the last United Nations General Assembly, there was an undercurrent of enthusiasm which grew out of the general aware-

ness of the importance of this agency for all countries. In this common enthusiasm the differences between the stages of technical development of the various countries lost their importance. The underdeveloped and the industrialized countries alike saw a richer and more prosperous future as a result of atomic energy and saw the agency as an organization in which each could contribute to realize that future.

The word which the spokesmen of the various nations used to describe this sense of common interest was "equality." I can illustrate this by quoting from the remarks of the Indonesian spokesman [Abu Hanifah]. He said—and you will note the unanimity of view with the Netherlands—

> Of at least equal importance for us is that the International Atomic Energy Agency be based on the principle of equality. . . . In this new atomic revolution international cooperation must stand for the narrowing of the ever-widening gap between the industrialized and the under-industrialized countries. It must manifest itself in the full realization and acknowledgment that all nations have something to contribute and to receive in return. Indeed, in warning against placing any undue emphasis upon existing differences between countries which are contributors of technological means and fissionable materials and those which are not, I can do no better than to quote from the excellent statement made on this subject by the representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador Schurmann. He said: "Application of the first principle of real and effective international cooperation demands that the cooperation should take place, so far as possible, on a basis of equality. The Agency should, therefore, be set up in such a way that instead of emphasizing the difference between the countries that have at their disposal the material and technological means for the practical use of atomic science and those which are still deficient in either of these two respects, it should embody the common and equal interest of all countries in this venture."

To us in the United States it may appear paradoxical to say that an atomic energy agency should be established on the basis of equality. We are keenly aware of the tremendous gap in resources and in technical capability among the countries of the world and of how much the success of the agency must initially depend on the support of a relatively few nations. We have, I think rightly, argued that the management of the agency must take advantage of the experience and technical ability of the advanced countries and give them a special voice in decisions.

Yet, I believe that this principle of equality, rightly understood, is fundamentally sound. Our objective is to bring home to every country the importance of atomic energy as a resource for the peace and well-being of humanity; this we can only do if those countries play a positive role, making in each case such contribution as is possible. I believe that all countries can make some contribution to help others in this new program and can join enthusiastically in this work without having to swallow their pride as beneficiaries and dependents solely. I think that national pride is a good and useful trait, and the fact that many countries through such pride insist on assuming the responsibilities of members in this agency rather than simply receiving assistance augurs well for the health of the agency.

Responsibility for Controls

This principle of equality means also that each member must assume responsibility to see that the agency works and, in particular, to see that the agency's safeguards are operated effectively. The problem of controlling atomic energy concerns every nation which hopes to enjoy the benefits, and each member should share responsibility for the administration of adequate IAEA controls. I was interested to see in the last General Assembly how many spokesmen referred to the gravity of the problem of control out of an awareness that the military and the peaceful applications of atomic energy can never be far apart. By administering the necessary safeguards and controls through an agency in which all members have some voice, the charge is avoided that these controls are imposed by the "have" countries on the "have not" countries. Instead, they will be voluntarily undertaken by all countries who benefit from the agency's work. Thus, these safeguards will, as they should, be administered in the mutual interest of all peaceful states.

This spreading realization that the problem of control of atomic energy concerns the security of every nation is a good thing. It is a conviction which the United States has long expressed. It is reflected in our Atomic Energy Act, which forbids export of fissionable materials except under guaranties that such materials will not be used for any military purpose. The act also provides for tight restrictions on the exchange of sensitive atomic energy data until "effective and enforceable international safeguards against the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes have been established by an international arrangement."

These restrictions are not because we wish to withhold atomic materials and technology from other nations. On the contrary, we believe our atomic energy achievements should benefit other countries as well. But we also believe that necessary safeguards must accompany the peaceful development of atomic energy. We have taken just this position in the negotiations for the agency.

You will recall that President Eisenhower in his 1953 address spoke of allocations "to the extent permitted by elementary prudence." More recently, the same policy was restated in the President's announcement that 20,000 kilograms of uranium 235 have been made available for distribution outside the United States.[4] The President's statement emphasized that the United States welcomes progress toward creation of the international agency and will cooperate with it when it comes into existence. He emphasized also that "distribution of special nuclear material will be subject to prudent safeguards against diversion of the materials to nonpeaceful purposes." In this spirit we have urged that adequate safeguards be incorporated in the draft statute for the agency. If the present safeguarding provisions are retained in the final text, and if these provisions are applied effectively by the agency's board of governors, then conditions will be created in which it will be possible for the United States to be as generous in supplying materials for the agency as we would like to be.

The technical and political role of the agency which I have outlined for you in a speculative way is a large and important one. There is one other possibility which we must always bear in mind. This is the President's "atomic pool" proposal whereby the principal atomic powers would make joint contributions to the agency and thus begin to diminish the potential destructive power of the world's atomic stockpiles. The agency statute permits the carrying out of this proposal if agreement among the atomic powers can be reached. The United States continues to seek such agreement. In the President's letter of March 1 to Premier Bulganin,[5] he repeated his proposal of December 8, 1953. Agreement on this pool would do much, as the President said, to "reverse the present trend toward a constant increase in nuclear weapons overhanging the world." It is such stakes as these that make us seek so earnestl and persistently the early establishment of th agency.

[4] *Ibid.*, Mar. 19, 1956, p. 469.
[5] *Ibid.*, Mar. 26, 1956, p. 514.

U.S. Position

In closing, let me quote from a statement whic I made to the 12-nation conference on March last—a statement in which I set forth the guidin principles which governed the United States pos tion in regard to the creation of an agency. said that what we wanted was—

> to create an agency with authority and capability equ to the great purpose we have agreed upon; an agency wit clearly defined functions, with flexible powers to posse and make useful disposition of fissionable materials; a agency, uninhibited by an arbitrary budget ceiling, ab to tap the financial resources of countries willing to len it money; an agency responsive to the opinions of th world as a whole, responsibly arrived at, but with enoug independence in its day-to-day decisions to permit effe tive discharge of its executive duties; an agency whic can win the support of the nations most able to provide i

It is my belief that the statute as now writte provides for such an agency; it is my fervent hop that the conference next fall will approve th statute as it stands in substance. Any materia weakening of the structure, as we see it, woul seriously jeopardize the support which thi agency needs.

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The Problem of Forced Labor

Statement by John C. Baker
U.S. Representative on the U.N. Economic and Social Council[1]

One of the most important functions of the United Nations is the preservation and advancement of human dignity and human rights. It is a field in which the United Nations, to be effective, must exercise ceaseless vigilance and untiring activity.

The charter itself reflects the concern which the founders of the United Nations felt for this important work, since the only commission it mentions is the Commission on Human Rights.

One of the most discouraging of the various aspects of violations of human rights is the existence of forced labor—so much so, in fact, that many people wish we could close our eyes and ignore its existence. There are other abuses of human rights which we do not discuss. That fact could furnish an excuse for the Council to avoid this subject. But unfortunately, the violations of human freedom and dignity in this area have been so extensive that the conscience of the world will not let us ignore them. In fact, it was through the medium of a nongovernmental organization that the problem was first brought to our attention.

New incontrovertible facts on this unhappy subject are set forth in the report before us prepared by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Director-General of the International Labor Office (E/2815). The material in this report has already been investigated by an ILO Forced Labor Committee, composed of three eminent men of unquestioned integrity—Mr. Paul Ruegger of Switzerland, a former president of the International Committee of the Red Cross; Mr. César Charlone, a former minister of foreign affairs of Uruguay; and Mr. T. P. Goonetilleke, former district judge in Ceylon.[2]

After thorough examination of the facts the Committee reached the "firm conviction that there exists in the world today definite systems of forced labour, (a) as a means of political coercion or education, (b) as a regular and normal means of carrying out state plans and projects for economic development." These general conclusions confirmed decisions made by the previous U.N.-ILO *Ad Hoc* Committee on Forced Labor about the existence of forced labor in the Soviet Union and in the countries under its direct influence. This new report is of special importance because it conclusively establishes that the same system also exists under the Communist regime on mainland China and in Albania, two areas which were not covered in the previous report.

It is not our function to go into great detail on the information contained in the bulky document before us. The details are there for all to read. It is our responsibility, however, to appraise and evaluate. Much of the information, it should be noted, came directly from official organs of the two areas concerned. Other information came from victims of the system who have since escaped and have had an opportunity to tell the world about what they experienced.

"Corrective" Labor in Albania

First a few words about Albania. The Albanian Penal Code makes elaborate provisions for "corrective labor" and banishment of citizens to concentration and labor camps. Over the past 10

[1] Made in the Council on Apr. 30 (U.S./U.N. press release 2398 dated Apr. 27).

[2] The text of the ILO Committee's report, dated Mar. 17, 1956, is contained in ILO doc. G.B. 132/4/1.

years some 40 political prisons and concentration camps have been in operation in Albania, at one time or another, in which approximately 16,000 people have perished. Among these are included distinguished persons whose only crime was that of being born into a social group considered hostile by the Communist government. Innocent Albanian women and children have been forced to labor under conditions already well known to this Council.

After examining the material which reflected these conditions, the ILO Forced Labor Committee concluded:

> In view of the declared purpose of the [Albanian] Penal Code and the wide and flexible manner in which the definitions which it contains concerning acts considered contrary to the interests of the State can be interpreted, the legislation in force in Albania could constitute a basis for a system of forced labour for political purposes, aiming at the correction of those who are opposed to the ideology of the Government.
>
> Forced labour for economic purposes appears to have been established in the form of extensive projects based on legislative and administrative provisions which authorise the recruiting, mobilisation and direction of workers for carrying out the economic plans of the State.
>
> The penalties imposed for failure to fulfil the standards set for individual output and the system of labour discipline permit, among other sanctions, the imposition of forced labour as a corrective measure.

Thus the world has once again been brought face to face with oppression of human beings on a systematic and widespread basis. The fact that Albania has but a small population does not diminish the moral reaction we instinctively feel toward such a situation.

"Reform Through Labor" in Red China

It is even more shocking to know that this form of modern slavery has also been introduced to the mainland of China by the Chinese Communist regime. Although information has long been available that the Chinese Communists were employing forced-labor systems and other severe forms of punishment which are contrary to provisions of the United Nations Charter, it was only in 1954 that the Chinese Communists themselves revealed the vast extent and systematic nature of this program by adopting laws and regulations putting forced labor on a permanent basis.

The institution which has been imposed upon the Chinese people is closely patterned after the experience and practice of the U.S.S.R. This is no accident. Lo Jui-ching, Minister of Public S curity and head of the Communist Chinese MV. himself made this clear when he submitted the ne forced-labor law to the Government Administr tion Council in 1954 by stating:

> During the process of preparation, assistance was ceived from Soviet legal experts, and many discussic were held and revisions made.

The report before us contains laws, regulatio and policy statements from Communist Chi which discuss the administration and purpo of their forced-labor system. It includes the fu forced-labor code of Communist China—*Regul tions Governing Reform Through Labor.* It al contains material from eyewitness sources. T information shows that wide segments of the po ulation are considered as class enemies and treat like criminal elements, that a major purpose the system is to compel allegiance to the politic views of the ruling regime, and that the syste is used for economic purposes.

The system is directed, first and foremost, eliminating any shades of opinion and thoug which differ from those of the regime. Tl was made clear as early as 1949 by Mao Ts tung in his essay "On the People's Democrat Dictatorship":

> The reactionaries must be deprived of the right voice their opinions; only the people [and Mao explicit meant that in Communist China only certain types persons are "people"] have that right. Those belongi to reactionary classes or groups would be given a chan to reform themselves through labor into new perso but only on condition that they do not rebel, sabotage, create disturbances.

Mao stated that this could be referred to as "benevolent policy" but that it would be "compu sorily imposed upon those originally from enen classes. . . . If they do not want to work the Pe ple's State will force them to do so."

What this means in forced-labor camps was r vealed in a broadcast from Peiping on October 1 1951, concerning the Ching-ho Forced Lab Camp:

> When Chairman Mao Tse-tung's treatise "On the P ple's Democratic Dictatorship" and the policy of refo through labor were explained to the criminals, th showed signs of violent mental revolt. Some of th burst into tears, some lost their appetite for food, so wrote death notes, and some attempted suicide or esca To meet the situation, responsible officials of the fa made the criminals fully understand that reform throu labor was a liberal measure taken by the people and t State for the sake of giving the counterrevolutionaries

ew life and was therefore their only means of having a ew future.

Mr. Chairman, this process is praised in the hinese Communist press as a significant contriution to the national economy and was adopted ith that end in view. Production figures have een given by the Chinese Communist press which ow that they consider forced labor to be of conderable economic importance. These figures can e found in the documents before us. On Septemer 7, 1954, furthermore, the Peiping *People's aily* revealed that 83 percent of the persons in onfinement in Communist China had been asgned to forced labor and indicated that they ere doing such jobs as cutting timber, constructg buildings, and building water conservation inallations, railways, and highways. Shortly ver a month later it stated, "Production from corective labor . . . has now reached impressive roportions, and is playing a real role in naonal economic reconstruction," a comment simir to that of Lo Jui-ching that "Production under e reformatory labor program has contributed gnificantly to the supply of commodities to meet e requirements of basic national development."

It is thus clear that forced labor is used in ommunist China for both political and economic urposes. The vast extent of the system is realed by the production figures cited by their own urces and by the fact that the *Regulations* make aborate provisions for various types of forced bor institutions, including provisions for camps 3,000 or more prisoners.

The ILO Committee, after examining this extenve material, concluded:

> The guiding principle . . . is that persons hostile to the gime (described usually as "counter-revolutionary eleents, feudal landlords and bureaucrat-capitalists") must deprived of political rights and compelled to reform rough labour.
>
> . . . in application of this principle, the legislation has t up a very highly organised system of forced labour, prisons and labour camps, for the purpose of political ercion and education. . . .
>
> . . . [This] system of forced labour . . . is being used a vast scale for carrying out State programmes of ecomic development [and] . . . the Government is thus nscripting labour on a large scale to further its ecomic plans.
>
> . . [This] legislation . . . does not appear to be of emporary or emergency character or resulting from the ed for reconstruction but is inspired by a definite policy d down by the legislators of the People's Republic.
>
> . . the elaborateness of the machinery set up by the islation and the figures mentioned in . . . newspaper articles . . . convince [the Committee] that forced labour exists on a very large scale, and that the number of persons involved represents a considerable proportion of the total population.
>
> [While] . . . the legislation contains certain provisions which should secure reasonably good treatment for prisoners and persons in forced labour camps, . . . from the other information before it . . . the Committee must have serious doubts as to the extent to which these legislative provisions are actually applied in practice. The many concordant reports of abuses in the procedure for sentence, in the conditions and treatment of prisoners, and in the "disciplinary measures" taken cannot be ignored.

Reported Improvements in U.S.S.R.

It is tragic that such serious revelations should be made at a time when there have been reports of improved conditions in some forced-labor camps in the ideological center of the system—the U.S.S.R. Many reported improvements, for example, apparently followed the dramatic strikes at Vorkuta and elsewhere. In addition, many people were apparently released as a result of the 1953 amnesty, although persons sentenced to forced labor for political reasons were not among them. The September 1955 amnesty may have released many more, although it is impossible to verify this. There have also been reports that the aspects of the Penal Code which were most strongly criticized by the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Forced Labor may be under revision, and there have even been objections recently by Soviet officials against the system of labor direction.

The ILO Forced Labor Committee, perhaps with these reports in mind, recognized that there has been some improvement in the situation in certain countries since 1953 but concluded, "while this in itself is satisfactory, it cannot be considered as a major advance, since the Committee is firmly of the opinion that the systems mentioned above should in any case be completely abolished."

There is as yet absolutely no evidence that the U.S.S.R. has taken steps to abolish its forced-labor system or significantly alter its political and economic role in Soviet society, and we cannot even accurately assess the causes for these changes which have taken place. Nevertheless, it is possible that world opinion, as expressed through this Council, has played its role.

The United Nations can take pride in the fact that our investigations of the forced-labor issue have undoubtedly materially helped to improve the lot of a great number of fellow human beings.

There is no evidence, I repeat, that any steps

are being taken to abolish the system itself. And I am sure that this is the result for which the Economic and Social Council has always striven. The purposes and principles of the United Nations demand that United Nations efforts continue until that end is reached.

Text of Resolution on Forced Labor [1]

U.N. doc. E/Res (XXI)/10

The Economic and Social Council,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General and the Director-General of the International Labour Office on Forced Labour, prepared in response to Council resolution 524 (XVII) and General Assembly resolution 740 (VIII),

Noting with satisfaction that the question of forced labour is to be considered at the forthcoming session of the International Labour Conference in June,

Having received the communication of the Director-General of the ILO transmitting the decision of the Governing Body to establish an *ad hoc* committee of the ILO on forced labour and to seek the collaboration of the United Nations,

Recognizing that the ILO has special responsibilities in this field and is giving particular attention to measures designed to assist in the elimination of forced labour,

1. *Condemns* all forms of forced labour, wherever they exist, which are contrary to the principles of the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and, in particular, all systems of forced labour which are employed as a means of political coercion or punishment for holding or expressing political views, and which are on such a scale as to constitute an important element in the economy of a given country;
2. *Urges* that action be taken towards the elimination of forced labour wherever it may exist;
3. *Commends* the ILO for the action it has taken thus far, and expresses its interest in further action to be taken by the organization;
4. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in response to the communication from the Director-General of the ILO referred to above, to transmit to the Director-General any information which he may receive relating to forced labour, and notwithstanding the provisions of Council resolution 75 (V) as amended;
5. *Invites* the ILO to include henceforth in its annual report to the Council an account of action taken in this field.

[1] Sponsored by Ecuador, France, Netherlands, U.K., U.S.; adopted by the Economic and Social Council on May 1 by a vote of 13–2 (Czechoslovakia, U.S.S.R.), with 3 abstentions (Egypt, Indonesia, Yugoslavia).

Purpose of Resolution

Mr. Chairman, I now turn to the specific actic which we can take at this session. It relates i large measure to the ILO. The Internation Labor Organization has quietly and without fa fare during the past quarter of a century be working toward elimination of various aspects forced labor.

Now it is carrying forward work preparato to consideration by the International Labor Co ference of the broad problems of forced lab as set forth in the U.N.-ILO *Ad Hoc* Committ report of 1953.

The United Nations should be in wholehearte agreement with this work of the ILO. It carri forward on a practical, workaday plane much the same effort we have made in the Econom and Social Council. The ILO, as the internation organization with special competence in lab problems, can confidently be relied upon by us press forward vigorously to eliminate systems forced labor wherever they are found.

Together with the delegations of Ecuador, tl Netherlands, France, and the United Kingdor the United States has cosponsored a resolution d signed to facilitate this. As in the past, it co demns the existence of forced labor for politic and economic purposes. It requests the ILO to co tinue its work in the field and to report on force labor to the Council in its annual report. It al includes a request to the Secretary-General transmit any information he may receive to tl ILO for its information and use, including i formation of a nature which ordinarily would circulated only under the provisions of resolutic 75 (V).[3]

The total effect of this resolution would be place the subject in the hands of a compete group of men in a responsible and experience organization who will press forward to seek eliminate forced labor as rapidly as possible. will be possible for us to review the subject perio ically on the basis of the ILO reports, or if tl situation warrants to take it up as a special agen item in the future. It is our hope that the tren in world thinking and relations have come to tl place where all delegations can support th resolution.

[3] ECOSOC resolution 75 (V) established the princi of not divulging the identity of authors of communic tions on human rights.

TREATY INFORMATION

United States and Costa Rica Sign Atoms-for-Peace Agreement

On May 18 the United States Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State (press release 266) announced that representatives of Costa Rica and the United States had signed on that day a proposed agreement for cooperation in research in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The agreement was negotiated within the framework of President Eisenhower's atoms-for-peace program. The agreement was signed for Costa Rica by Ambassador Fernando Fournier. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Henry F. Holland, and Lewis Strauss, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, signed for the United States.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Agriculture

International plant protection convention. Done at Rome December 6, 1951. Entered into force April 3, 1952.[1]
Adherence deposited: Norway, April 23, 1956.

Trade and Commerce

Fifth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3, 1955.[2]
Signatures: Denmark and Greece, April 19, 1956.

War

Geneva convention relative to treatment of prisoners of war;
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of wounded and sick in armed forces in the field;
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea;
Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian persons in time of war.
Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force October 21, 1950; for the United States February 2, 1956. TIAS 3364, 3362, 3363, 3365, respectively.
Ratifications deposited: Venezuela, February 13, 1956; Peru, February 15, 1956.
Adherences deposited: Panama, February 10, 1956; Iraq, February 14, 1956.

Wheat

International wheat agreement. Open for signature at Washington until and including May 18, 1956.
Signatures: May 14, 1956, Ireland, Israel; May 15, 1956, Belgium,[3] Ecuador,[4] France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Norway; May 16, 1956, Canada, Denmark, El Salvador, New Zealand, Panama, Peru, Portugal, Sweden,[5] Vatican City State; May 17, 1956, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Lebanon, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua; May 18, 1956, Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Federal Republic of Germany, Guatemala, India, Korea, Liberia, Philippines, Switzerland, Union of South Africa,[6] United States, Yugoslavia.

[1] Not in force for the United States.
[2] Not in force.

BILATERAL

Costa Rica

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington May 18, 1956. Enters into force on day on which each government shall receive from the other written notification of compliance with its statutory and constitutional requirements.

Germany

Treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation, with protocol and exchanges of notes. Signed at Washington October 29, 1954.
Ratified by the President: April 30, 1956.

Paraguay

Surplus agricultural commodities agreement pursuant to title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454, 455; 69 Stat. 44, 721). Signed at Asunción May 2, 1956. Enters into force on date of receipt by the United States of notification by Paraguay that it has been approved in accordance with its constitutional procedures.

Turkey

Agreement supplementing the agricultural commodities agreement of March 12, 1956 (TIAS 3517). Signed at Ankara May 11, 1956. Entered into force May 11, 1956.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

State Department Budget for 1957

Statement by Secretary Dulles[7]

The pattern of international relations is being rapidly and drastically transformed. Not many years ago a few Western European countries exerted a dominant influence throughout the world and only a few of our foreign missions had major

[3] Signed for the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union.
[4] Signed *ad referendum.*
[5] Signed subject to ratification.
[6] With reservation.
[7] Made before the Subcommittee for State, Justice, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies of the Senate Appropriations Committee on May 15 (press release 253).

responsibilities. Now the number of sovereign countries is rapidly increasing. Since the end of World War II, 18 new nations have come into being and several other peoples are at the threshold of independence. Furthermore, all countries, large or small, which are not in the grip of international communism have become important in their own right. They are truly independent, and coordination of free-world policies depends not on dictation but on a vast network of negotiation and voluntary adjustment. Also, the struggle with international communism is more and more being intensified in terms of nonmilitary activities which are comprehended within the scope of diplomacy. The United States, too, has ever-increasing responsibilities as materially the strongest of the free nations.

The United States is now associated with 44 other nations under security pacts. Most of these are based on a finding that attack on the treaty area would endanger the peace and safety of the United States. But that peace and safety are not assured merely by treaty words. It is necessary to give these treaties continuing vitality by developing a genuine partnership relationship based upon sympathetic understanding by each of the problems of the other. This is a new and major task of our diplomacy. Not one of these treaties existed 10 years ago, and four of them, relating to 11 Asian countries, were made within the last 2 years.

If the Department of State and the Foreign Service of the United States do not themselves develop in ways which correspond to these worldwide developments, then the foreign policies of the United States will fail and the foreign policies of our enemies will prevail. That is why the State Department has asked this year, as it did last year, for an increased appropriation.

Since being Secretary of State, I have been to 39 foreign posts. Most of these have never before been visited by any Secretary of State, and, indeed, until recently there has been no particular reason why those countries should have been visited by a United States Secretary of State, except as a matter of tourism. But now all these countries are important, and they hold the key to positions of vital importance to peace and security, including that of the United States. They are entitled to be dealt with as equals. Yet 15 of these nations I have visited to confer with the Heads of the Government were not even in existence as sovereign states 11 years ago.

If, at any one of the 78 places where we mainta foreign missions, there were a collapse, that cou set up a chain reaction which could gravely jeo ardize the goal of our foreign policy, which, as have expressed it briefly, is to enable our peop to enjoy in peace the blessings of liberty.

Tribute to Personnel

I want, in this connection, to pay tribute to t personnel of the Department of State and o Foreign Service. They are a dedicated body men and women who are rendering a splend service to our Nation. They are fully aware the responsibility that they carry, and they a carrying it well. There is a patience, a determ nation, and a skill of which we can all be prou

The fruits of diplomacy often require much ca and ripen slowly. It took 8 years and almost 4 four-power meetings before the Austrian Trea finally came into being last year. When it d come, Austria was liberated and the withdraw of Soviet troops marked the first backward st taken by the Red Army in Europe since the end World War II.

It took a year of patient and delicate negoti tion to settle the Iranian oil controversy, with t United States assisting Iran and the United Kin dom. That started the vital oil flowing again t ward the free world and saved Iran from the i minent grip of communism.

It took a year of intensive, new-type negotiati to bring about a Trieste settlement, ending a da gerous dispute between Italy and Yugoslavia th had persisted for many years.

Only a remarkable contribution by our forei missions over the past 2 years helped to preve the French military defeat at Dien-Bien-Phu 1954 from involving the loss of all Indochina militant communism.

I could multiply these illustrations of maj results which were achieved by the patience, ded cation, and skill of our Foreign Service, back by the same qualities found in our personnel he in Washington in the Department of State.

I have, as I say, been in close personal tou with much of this and know whereof I speak. B I have to add that I am shocked at the numb whose health has been undermined by workin too hard and often under very difficult physic conditions. It is almost normal that our peop both in the State Department and abroad, wo

2 or more hours a day, often without respite on Saturdays or Sundays.

I have been associated in my life with a good many business enterprises, but I have never known one where there was the sustained intensity of work which I have found in the Department of State and in the Foreign Service. But we are operating without an adequate margin of safety.

There is imperative need for more qualified personnel and for more facilities for them.

In the past we have not had enough people to bring our Foreign Service officers back home as often as should be, so that they can be refreshed in their home environment and keep in more intimate touch with our policies.

We feel so cramped with respect to funds for cable and code charges that we sometimes have to make close and perhaps now and then even wrong decisions on whether or not the importance of a prospective message justifies the cost of sending it.

There is need to bring our heads of mission together more frequently on a regional basis so that missions in neighboring countries will understand problems which often make neighbors antagonistic.

In many places the working and living conditions of our personnel abroad are subnormal, both in terms of what should be the dignity of a United States embassy and chancellery and also in terms of the health and efficiency of the workers.

Africa is an opening area where today we have few adequate buildings whatsoever or persons trained in the languages and cultures of that continent.

We need to be able to organize quickly for unexpected international gatherings and to be able to provide more adequately for the high officials from other countries who increasingly come to our lands and whose impressions may decisively influence future relations.

It should be noted that, with modern means of rapid transportation, personal diplomacy has more and more become the order of the day and events unfold rapidly. The United States has had within the last 3 years visits from the Heads of Government or Foreign Ministers of over 40 states. It is interesting to note that Bulganin and Khrushchev, during the past year, spent about one-quarter of their time on visits of negotiation or propaganda to foreign countries.

This practice of personal diplomacy, so-called, does not replace the more conventional forms of diplomacy or make our ambassadors and their staffs less important. On the contrary, it merely intensifies the whole process.

These are the kinds of considerations, Mr. Chairman, which led me to ask for the opportunity to appear personally before this subcommittee. I want to go on record in the most positive way possible as regards the need of the funds which we have requested.

It can perhaps be said that some small part of the money that we have had has been spent inefficiently. That is so in every enterprise I know of. It is never possible to get a theoretically perfect result. There are human inadequacies within the State Department and the Foreign Service, as there are everywhere. But I can assure you that there is nowhere any mood of extravagance or wastefulness. The spirit is one of austerity. We are constantly striving, and I believe successfully striving, for the efficient expenditure of each dollar that Congress gives us.

The House of Representatives recognized on the whole the validity of the case for the Department's budget. They have, however, made certain cuts to which I would direct myself because I do not believe that they can be imposed without serious detriment to the best interests of the United States.

Salaries and Expenses

For this, in our budget for fiscal year 1957, we requested $92.2 million in this appropriation. The House of Representatives allowed $90 million, a reduction of $2.2 million from the amount requested. I am convinced that the full amount requested for fiscal year 1957 is required if the Department is to discharge properly its duties in the field of foreign affairs.

Representation Allowances

For this we asked for $1 million, and the House appropriated only $700,000. I am greatly concerned over this $300,000—30 percent—reduction. One of our prime objectives is to strengthen friendly relations through increased personal contact between personnel of our missions and consular offices and foreign officials and other foreign leaders. Never have informal personal relationships counted as much as they do today. We have never had sufficient money appropriated for representation allowances, with the result that those

who can afford to do so have to use personal funds and others who should spend more on this account do not do so.

In the case of junior officers we have been unable to grant more than token representation allowances. This situation should be corrected because many associations with foreign officials established in the early years of an officer's career have effective results on future leaders of foreign countries.

Part of the additional increase requested in this appropriation for fiscal year 1957 is needed to provide for additional posts and additional personnel which have been approved by the House.

Acquisition of Buildings Abroad

The House of Representatives allowed $19 million in this appropriation, a reduwction of $2.9 million from the amount requested. We do not appeal the $2.9 million reduction made by the House because, I am advised, a recent ruling of the Comptroller General makes it possible for the Department to use foreign currency proceeds from the sale of properties overseas for purposes authorized under the Foreign Buildings Program. While the full effect of this ruling is impossible to assess at this time, the Department is confident that this assistance will materially offset the reduction in our 1957 estimates as set forth by the House of Representatives.

Emergencies in the Diplomatic and Consular Service

We are requesting an increase of $1.9 million in this appropriation for fiscal year 1957. This increase was requested to provide the Department with a contingency fund with which to meet international developments which cannot be anticipated and for which we could not otherwise provide in our budget estimates.

Contributions to International Organizations

The House reduced our request for this appropriation by $328,410. $300,000 of this amount is of particular interest to me and to our efforts in redesigning the objectives of NATO, with emphasis on political and cultural aspects as well as military.

International Fisheries Commission

The reduction of $102,725 made by the House in this appropriation will, I understand, make it necessary to reduce the operation of the Inte American Tropical Tuna Commission below th level established by the international conventio

International Educational Exchange Activities

The House reduced our request for this key ap propriation by $1.8 million. This reduction wi eliminate needed increases in educational exchang activities planned for the Far East, Near Eas and Latin America. Even if we should receiv the full amount requested in this appropriatio we would not have sufficient funds to meet man fresh needs for activities of this kind which hav developed during recent months.

Greater understanding between ourselves an other nations is a continuing objective of our fo eign policy. In this area of endeavor the exchang program performs a vital service. The progran operating under the provisions of the Fulbrigh and Smith–Mundt Acts, is now going into its se ond decade. I trust it will be allowed to mov strongly forward.

Other representatives of the State Depart ment—Mr. Henderson, the Deputy Under Secr tary of State for Administration; Mr. Carpente the Assistant Secretary-Controller; and M Crouch, the Director of the Office of Budget— will justify our budget request in detail. My ow particular responsibility to you is:

1. To appraise whether the overall internationa situation calls for expanded diplomatic activity o the part of the United States. That it does so i demonstrable beyond the possibility of doubt.

2. To judge whether or not our existing staf equipment, and funds are adequate or inadequat to meet the expanding needs. I am satisfied tha they are not adequate, and my judgment in thi respect is based not upon conjecture but upon very broad personal familiarity with our foreig posts and their tasks.

3. To make sure that our budget is made up b persons who are competent, hardheaded, and wh do not condone extravagance. That fact I ca vouch for, and it will be demonstrated to you a you inquire further into this matter.

Therefore, in discharging my responsibility a Secretary of State I ask the Congress to grant th funds which we have requested and which ar needed to enable our foreign policies to prevai against the formidable challenge they encounte

rica. The Mutual Security Program for the Near East, South Asia, and Africa (Allen) 875

bania. The Problem of Forced Labor (Baker, text of resolution) 903

merican Republics
ter-American Specialized Conference on Conservation of Natural Resources: Continental Shelf and Marine Waters, Ciudad Trujillo, March 15–28 894
resident Eisenhower To Attend Panama Meeting . . 880

sia. The Mutual Security Program for the Near East, South Asia, and Africa (Allen) 875

tomic Energy
he Role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (Wadsworth) 898
nited States and Costa Rica Sign Atoms-for-Peace Agreement 907

ustria. Austrian Social Security Benefits To Cover Certain U.S. Residents 886

urma. World Bank Loans to Norway, Burma, and Haiti 888

anada. Implementing the Great Lakes Fisheries Convention With Canada (Looney) 890

hina, Communist. The Problem of Forced Labor (Baker, text of resolution) 903

ongress, The
asic Elements of the Mutual Security Program (Dulles) . 871
ongressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy . . 893
mplementing the Great Lakes Fisheries Convention With Canada (Looney) 890
he Mutual Security Program for the Near East, South Asia, and Africa (Allen) 875
tate Department Budget for 1957 (Dulles) 907

osta Rica. United States and Costa Rica Sign Atoms-for-Peace Agreement 907

epartment and Foreign Service. State Department Budget for 1957 (Dulles) 907

isarmament
eduction of Soviet Armed Forces (Dulles) 880
ranscript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . . . 881

conomic Affairs
xport-Import Bank Credit to Japanese Electric Company 888
mplementing the Great Lakes Fisheries Convention With Canada (Looney) 890
nter-American Specialized Conference on Conservation of Natural Resources: Continental Shelf and Marine Waters, Ciudad Trujillo, March 15–28 894
orld Bank Loans to Norway, Burma, and Haiti . . . 888

ermany
uenster Peace Medal Presented to President Eisenhower 880
r. Sonnabend Named Director of Benjamin Franklin Foundation 886
ranscript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . . . 881

aiti. World Bank Loans to Norway, Burma, and Haiti . 888

ealth, Education, and Welfare. The Problem of Forced Labor (Baker, text of resolution) 903

ndonesia. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference 881

nternational Law. Inter-American Specialized Conference on Conservation of Natural Resources: Continental Shelf and Marine Waters, Ciudad Trujillo, March 15–28 894

nternational Organizations and Meetings. Inter-American Specialized Conference on Conservation of Natural Resources: Continental Shelf and Marine Waters, Ciudad Trujillo, March 15–28 894

apan
xport-Import Bank Credit to Japanese Electric Company 888
ranscript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . . . 881

orea. First Shipment of Streetcars Leaves for Korea . 887

ilitary Affairs. Armed Forces Day (Dulles) 874

lutual Security
asic Elements of the Mutual Security Program (Dulles) . 871
irst Shipment of Streetcars Leaves for Korea 887
he Mutual Security Program for the Near East, South Asia, and Africa (Allen) 875
.S. Sending Foodstuffs to Peru To Meet Emergency . . 887

ear East. The Mutual Security Program for the Near East, South Asia, and Africa (Allen) 875

orth Atlantic Treaty Organization. Senator George's NATO Mission 879

Norway. World Bank Loans to Norway, Burma, and Haiti 888

Panama. President Eisenhower To Attend Panama Meeting 880

Peru. U.S. Sending Foodstuffs to Peru To Meet Emergency 887

Treaty Information
Current Actions 907
Implementing the Great Lakes Fisheries Convention With Canada (Looney) 890
United States and Costa Rica Sign Atoms-for-Peace Agreement 907

U.S.S.R.
Reduction of Soviet Armed Forces (Dulles) 880
Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . . . 881

United Nations
Current U.N. Documents 902
The Problem of Forced Labor (Baker, text of resolution) . 903
The Role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (Wadsworth) 898
World Bank Loans to Norway, Burma, and Haiti . . . 888

Name Index

Allen, George V. 875
Baker, John C. 903
Dulles, Secretary 871, 874, 880, 881, 907
Eisenhower, President 880
George, Senator Walter F. 879
Looney, Warren F. 890
Mueller, Helmut 880
Sonnabend, Abraham M. 886
Wadsworth, James J. 898

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: May 14–20

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Press releases issued prior to May 14 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 248 and 249 of May 10.

No.	Date	Subject
†252	5/14	Rubottom appointment (rewrite).
253	5/15	Dulles: State Department budget.
254	5/15	Dulles: reduction of Soviet armed forces.
255	5/15	Dulles: news conference transcript.
*256	5/15	Parsons nominated Ambassador to Laos.
*257	5/15	Dowling nominated Ambassador to Korea.
*258	5/15	Program for Sukarno visit.
*259	5/17	Achilles nominated Ambassador to Peru.
†260	5/16	Revised list of Sukarno party.
261	5/16	Muenster peace medal presented to Eisenhower.
†262	5/16	Nixon and Sukarno arrival statements.
*263	5/17	Briggs nominated Ambassador to Brazil.
*264	5/18	Cecil Lyon sworn in as Ambassador to Chile.
265	5/18	Sonnabend named director of Franklin Foundation (rewrite).
266	5/18	Atomic agreement with Costa Rica (rewrite).
†267	5/18	Technology agreement with Turkey.
268	5/18	Dulles: Armed Forces Day.

*Not printed.
†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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Publication 6301 15 cents

The International Educational Exchange Program is a program which enables citizens of the United States to visit other countries and foreign nationals to come to this country for purposes of study, teaching, lecturing, conducting research, observation, consultation, training, or to gain practical experience.

As authorized by the Congress of the United States, the program has for its chief objective the development of greater mutual understanding between the peoples of the United States and those of other countries. This objective is based on the recognition of the need for such person-to-person understanding in the furtherance of our foreign relations.

This 25-page pamphlet, which supersedes Department of State publication 5484, describes the operation of the program, tells how grantees are selected, and lists the opportunities being offered. It outlines the procedure to be used by a citizen of the United States or another country in applying for a grant under the Fulbright Act.

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The Department of State bulletin

. XXXIV, No. 884

June 4, 1956

WORKING TOGETHER FOR INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING ● *Address by President Eisenhower* . 915

VISIT OF PRESIDENT SUKARNO OF INDONESIA . 927

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO DEVELOP WATER RESOURCES
Statement by John C. Baker 949
Text of ECOSOC Resolution 951

FINANCING THE CONTINUING MOVEMENT OF MIGRANTS FROM EUROPE ● *Article by George L. Warren* 944

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For index see inside back cover

The Department of State bulletin

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June 4, 1956

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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Working Together for International Understanding

Address by President Eisenhower[1]

Members of the graduating class and fellow Texans:

The honor you have conferred on me joins me with a great school, of great traditions, of great chievements, of great goals. Baylor's 10 schools nd colleges are the fruition of seeds planted in 845 at Old Independence. Baylor's graduates in positions of leadership testify to the wisdom and oresight of Baylor's founders. Your magnificent Armstrong Browning Library exemplifies the rowth of Baylor as a principal cultural center of he Southwest.

This university is dedicated to true education; strives to develop wisdom. This implies, over nd beyond mere knowledge, an understanding f men's relationship to their fellow men in a orld created for their stewardship by a God in hose image they are all made. You have been aught here to do justice and to love mercy and to alk humbly before your Maker even as you use very opportunity to better yourselves through ie profession in which you have been here rounded.

Now you enter a new phase of your life exerience—in a world where the principles by hich you live are frequently flouted and ignored. That is your place in this world? What can you o to improve it? Pointedly, what can each one f you as an individual do to promote a world ociety that respects the values in which you, and is school, believe so deeply? The thoughts I ring to you this morning deal primarily—and that sketchily—with the international phases of a suggested answer.

I speak of international affairs for a very simple reason. In the fundamental struggle in which the world is now engaged, world issues create, or at least color, almost every domestic question and problem.

Clear comprehension of the basic factors involved is vitally important to leaders and officials and to every citizen of this country and of the free world. Such understanding, I submit, is especially important to you young people who, perforce, must look at these critical current problems against a horizon of 10, 20, 40 years hence.

Today a militant, aggressive communistic doctrine is dominant over much of the world's surface and over hundreds of millions of the world's people. In the postwar period we have seen it indulge in a particularly cynical type of colonialism, expressed in the Communist subjugation of once free and proud nations in Europe and in Asia. Simultaneously, in the free areas of the world, 600 million people in more than a score of new countries have achieved independence.

Communism denies the spiritual premises on which your education has been based. According to that doctrine, there is no God; there is no soul in man; there is no reward beyond the satisfaction of daily needs. Consequently, toward the human being, communism is cruel, intolerant, atheistic. This doctrine, committed to conquest by lure, intimidation, and force, seeks to destroy the political concepts and institutions that we hold to be dearer than life itself. Thus communism poses a threat from which even this mighty Nation is not wholly immune.

[1] Made at the commencement ceremonies at Baylor University, Waco, Tex. on May 25 (White House press release).

Yet communism is, in deepest sense, a gigantic failure.

Even in the countries it dominates, hundreds of millions who dwell there still cling to their religious faith; still are moved by aspirations for justice and freedom that cannot be answered merely by more steel and bigger bombers; still seek a reward that is beyond money or place or power; still dream of the day that they may walk fearlessly in the fullness of human freedom.

The destiny of man is freedom and justice under his Creator. Any ideology that denies this universal faith will ultimately perish or be recast. This is the first great truth that must underlie all our thinking, all our striving in this struggling world.

Fundamental Principles of Human Liberty

A second truth is that the fundamental principles of human liberty and free government are powerful sources of human energy, loyalty, dedication—and guides to enduring success. They are mightier than armaments and armies.

Americans have recognized those two truths in the historical documents of the Republic. They are repeated in the preamble to the fundamental policy statement in our current series of national security directives. In part that preamble reads:

> The spiritual, moral and material posture of the United States of America rests upon established principles which have been asserted and defended throughout the history of the Republic. The genius, strength and promise of America are founded in the dedication of its people and government to the dignity, equality and freedom of the human being under God.
>
> These concepts and our institutions which nourish and maintain them with justice are the bulwark of our free society and are the basis of the respect and leadership which have been accorded our nation by the peoples of the world.

Much as we are dedicated to this expression of lofty sentiment, it will count for little unless every American, to the extent of his influence and capacity, daily breathes into it the life of his own practice. The test is the readiness of individuals to cleave to principle even at the cost of narrower, more immediate gains.

For you graduates, and for all citizens, opportunities to strengthen our assault on injustice and bigotry will be as numerous as the tasks you undertake and the people you meet each day. Nothing I might add could either quicken your recognition of such opportunities or strengthen your response to them. But certain it is that in this recognitio and this response will be found the measure o America's future safety, progress, and greatnes

The third great truth that must underlie ou thinking on international questions is this: Peopl are what count. A sympathetic understanding o the aspirations, the hopes and fears, the tradition and prides of other peoples and nations is essen tial to the promotion of mutual prosperity an peace. Such understanding is a compulsory re quirement on each of us if, as a people, we ar to discharge our inescapable national responsibil ity to lead the world in the growth of freedom an human dignity.

Communism seeks to dominate or to destroy freedom seeks to cooperate and to help others t build. But these basic differences are not self evident. Therefore, the people of the world ar not necessarily thinking in terms of opposing con cepts of communistic dictatorship and of huma rights and freedom.

Rather, today, the most unyielding expressio of peoples' aspirations seems to be an intense na tionalism. There is nothing to be feared in this— of itself. The right of a people, capable of self government, to their own political institutions i deeply imbedded in American thinking. Amon peoples as among our own citizens we believe th rights of the weak are identical with those of th strong. And in the past we have helped man small nations to independence. We will continu to hail with satisfaction the birth of each ne nation whose people, achieving independence an freedom, become peaceful members of the worl community.

In this day, however, one acute economic prob lem grows more acute as each new nation step forward to an independent place in the interna tional family. New nations, springing up, creat new political boundaries. Far too often these po litical boundaries become serious barriers to th flow of trade.

Such barriers are daily of more importance a increasing industrialization and specializatio critically increase the economic interdependenc of peoples. Specialization in any area—which im plies an unbalanced local economy—is not nece sarily a weakness, provided always that there i free opportunity for exchanging a portion of th products of such specialization for the other thing needed to satisfy the requirements of people.

This means that, where any nation does not pos-ess, within its own boundaries, the major elements f a broadly balanced economy, it is normally andicapped in assuring maximum satisfaction of uman wants and a stable prosperity for its own eople. So we find that the emotional urge for completely independent existence may conflict ith an equal desire for higher living standards.

This conflict, so obvious, is often ignored. But ven the productivity and prosperity of this great ountry would vanish if our States were 48 eparate nations, with economic and political bar-iers at each boundary preventing or impeding the nterflow of goods, people, and information.

We must put to ourselves this question: How can e help answer both the great desire of peoples for separate, independent existence and the need for conomic union or, at least, effective cooperation mong them?

This question is of vital importance to every na-ion. Unhappiness, unrest, and disaffection aused by depressed living standards can be as cute as when caused by political injustice. Dis-ffection, long continued, in any portion of the arth, can bring about political convulsions and rave global crises. In Communist areas the nswer is achieved by compulsion.

But effective cooperation is not easily accom-lished among free nations. Permit me in one il-stration to point up the difficulty, among free eoples, of progress toward this type of union.

ogress Toward European Unity

The statesmen of Western Europe have long en aware that only in broad and effective cooper-ion among the nations of that region can true curity for all be found. They know that real ification of the separate countries there would ake their combined 250 million highly civilized ople a mighty pillar of free strength in the odern world. A free United States of Europe ould be strong in the skills of its people, ade-ately endowed with material resources, and rich i their common cultural and artistic heritage. l would be a highly prosperous community.

Without such unification the history of the past lf century in Europe could go on in dreary repe-tion, possibly to the ultimate destruction of all e values those people hold most dear. With uni-ation, a new sun of hope, security, and confidence ould shine for Europe and for the free world.

Why, then, has this great objective not been at-tained by intelligent peoples? The basic reasons are simply stated. First: it is the great pride of each nation in separate existence. Second: it is the intense fear of losing, in such a union, cher-ished local traditions and cultural and political institutions and of suffering temporary economic dislocations. We, of course, appreciate the weight of such considerations—and are therefore patient—even though the history of this largest of our States refutes the fears that seem to loom so large in Europe.

Another stumbling block to European unity is the failure of populations as a whole to grasp the long-term political, economic, and security advan-tage of union. These are matters that do not make for a soul-stirring address on a national holiday. They can be approached only in thought, in wis-dom—almost, we might say, in prayer.

Nevertheless—and happily—much progress has been made.

Years ago, our European partners began both to study and to act. Our country's help was given wherever possible because our own future secu-rity and prosperity are inescapably linked to those of our European friends. There was established the Brussels Compact, the Organization for Euro-pean Economic Cooperation, the European Pay-ments Union, the European Coal and Steel Com-munity, and the Council of Europe. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, although an organization comprehending much more than Western Europe, nevertheless provides the cooper-ative mechanism for greater security in the area. All these were set up to attack immediate problems in cooperation.

Despite setbacks and difficulties, these have been operating with increasing efficiency. So, Euro-pean Union, one of the greatest dreams of West-ern man, seems nearer today than at any time in centuries, providing bright promise for the future of our European friends and for the growth and strength of liberty.

Developing Nonmilitary Aspects of NATO

On a broader geographical scale, members of the Atlantic Community are working together in many different ways and through many different agencies. But such cooperation can usefully be further developed. At the NATO meeting several weeks ago it was decided that the members of the Atlantic Community should "examine actively

further measures which might be taken at this time to advance more effectively their common interests."[2] They designated a committee of three Foreign Ministers to advise on "ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community."

This effort recognizes the truth that all peoples of the free world must learn to work together more effectively in the solution of our common problems or the battle for human liberty cannot be won. Among equals, attempting to perform a difficult task, there is no substitute for cooperation.

It is gratifying to all of us to know that Senator Walter George has agreed to act as my personal representative and special ambassador in working for this new evolution of the Atlantic Community. Nothing could testify more forcefully to the critical importance of this project than the willingness of Senator George to undertake it.

Patiently but persistently we must work on. We must take into account man's hunger for freedom and for food; all men's dignity as well as some men's power; the eventual triumph of right and justice over expediency and force.

The responsibility for carrying forward America's part in helping improve international cooperation cannot be met through paper work in a governmental bureau. But it can be met through a combined effort by all of us, in and out of government, all trying to develop the necessary understanding that every international problem is in reality a human one. You, the fortunate graduates of this great institution, are in a particularly advantageous position to lead in the development of this kind of thinking and understanding.

You owe it to yourselves and to your country to continue your study and critical analysis of the great international questions of our day. You can join with like-minded men and women in the many voluntary associations that promote people-to-people contact around the world. By means of them, the thorny problems of the time are scrutinized from many viewpoints. Solutions are approached by many avenues. Creative thinking is sparked. Mutual understanding is furthered.

Thus, every thinking person will come to understand that his country's future will be brighter as the lot of mankind improves; that no nation can in the long run prosper except as the world e joys a growing prosperity. We must indeed partners for peace and freedom and prosperi if those words are to record achievement as we as to express a dream.

The foreign policy of this Republic, if it serv the enduring purposes and good of the Unit States, must always be founded on these truth thus expressing the enlightened interests of t whole American people. Certainly the basic fo eign relations measures taken by the United Stat in this century have been so developed. They not belong to any political party—they are Ame ican. These measures range from our support the Organization of American States to our me bership in the United Nations and our prese programs of partnership and assistance.

The United Nations by its very comprehensiv ness is a unique association within which natio of every political complexion and philosophy ha their place. The smaller groupings in which hold membership are bound together by a respe for common values and principles. They confor of course, to the U.N. Charter. But in each orga ization the likeness in background or interest purpose that characterizes the membership a the restricted geographical limits within which operates assures more effective discharge of the functions than is possible in a group as large the U.N.

We shall continue in our loyalty to the Unit Nations. But we should, at the same time, furth expand and strengthen our other internation associations.

Some of them, although only a few years o are already household words, recognized as i mense contributions to the prosperity and the curity of particular areas in the free world—a to our own prosperity and security. Yet no provides a complete answer to any of our int national problems. Again, consider NATO.

A united Western Europe may still be on t far-off horizon. NATO is nevertheless a gre alliance, rich in human and natural resourc But this great array is neither self-sustaining n self-sufficient. Its freedom and prosperity a security are intertwined with the freedom a prosperity and security of many other nations old and new and still to be born—that people even greater portion of the earth. Within t community of freedom, all are more sure of th

[2] BULLETIN of May 21, 1956, p. 836.

dependence and prosperity and security when l join so that:

—Mutual trade is fostered.

—Legitimate political and economic aspirations e advanced.

—Cultural traditions are respected.

—The difficulties and misfortunes of the weaker e met by help from the stronger. To be backard or pennywise in our practice of this truth n lead only to greater risk and greater cost—r greater cost to ourselves.

elping To Build Educational Facilities

The ways in which progress along these four ads can be achieved are legion in number. The st, of which I've spoken at some length, is the ed for the growth and spread of understanding nong our own people. The next is that the oples of other nations must, through similar udy and thought, recognize with us the need for is kind of cooperation.

This, in itself, is not easy. Many nations, ough their cultures are ancient and rich in uman values, do not possess the resources to read the needed education throughout their popations. But they can wisely use help that reects their traditions and ways. For example, e whole free world would be stronger if there isted adequate institutions of modern techniques d sciences in areas of the world where the hunger r knowledge and the ability to use knowledge e unsatisfied because educational facilities are ten not equal to the existing need.

Do we not find here a worthy challenge to Amera's universities and to their graduates? I firmly lieve that, if some or all of our great unirsities, strongly supported by private foundaons that exist in number throughout our land, arked by the zeal and fire of educated Ameriins, would devote themselves to this task, the ospects for a peaceful and prosperous world ould be mightily enhanced.

In no respect should the purpose of these institions be to transplant into a new area the attides, the forms, the procedures of America. The affing, the conduct, the curriculum of each school ould be the responsibility of the people where the hool might be built.

Each school would help each nation develop its uman and natural resources and also provide a great two-way avenue of communication. We would gain new knowledge and wisdom out of the priceless values of another people's traditions and proud heritage. They would gain knowledge in the technical and scientific fields where we have had an earlier start.

Such a voluntary effort in people-to-people partnership would be a dynamic, a fruitful corollary to three elements already effectively at work in our governmental foreign policy:

—To our atoms-for-peace program.

—To our efforts to establish a climate in which universal disarmament can go forward.

—To our long-sustained campaign for the exchange of knowledge and factual information between peoples.

Purposes and projects such as these, formulated by Republicans and Democrats, are parts of a comprehensive effort to meet present and future needs, to solve problems in the enlightened self-interest of the United States. It takes into account our global concerns on all the continents, on all the oceans.

It is not a haphazard, makeshift arrangement to meet day-to-day crises—big or little or imaginary. Instead, it is a platform for the development of a stable, prosperous, peaceful world. Immediately concerned with this year and next year, our foreign policy is a realistic approach to a better world for all in 1966, 1976, and 1996.

Community of Interest

The basic policy objectives I have described are in furtherance of the aspirations of those who founded the Republic. These objectives are plainly advanced if we foster and secure conditions at home and abroad with which this system of freedom can live and under which it can find fertile ground for acceptance and growth. Thus our security and our aspirations are linked with the security and aspirations of liberty-loving people in many other lands. It is idle to talk of community of interest with them in measures for defense without recognizing community of interest with them in that which is to be defended.

Security cannot be achieved by arms alone, no matter how destructive the weapons or how large their accumulation.

So today it is vitally important that we and others detect and pursue the ways in which cultural and economic assistance will mean more to

free-world strength, stability, and solidarity than will purely military measures.

You of this class, like all Americans, must act in terms of today. At the same time, you in particular should think in terms of those years that now seem so distant.

Increasingly, from this day onward, the influence of men and women now of your age will mold our course at home and abroad. It is logical that you should start immediately thinking about the Republic and the world that stretches out ahead. Then you can start working now for the sort of country and world you want as a home for your children and grandchildren.

You have in your heritage the dynamic principles that arouse visions in mankind. You have in your hearts and minds the means to lift the eyes of men and women above the drab and desolate horizon of hate and fear and hopelessness.

For, my friends of Baylor, as Texans, as Americans, believing as you do in the brotherhood of man and in his right to freedom—joined with all the millions of dedicated men and women at home, linked in partnership with hundreds of millions of like-minded people around the globe—you constitute the mightiest temporal force on earth.

Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference

Press release 272 dated May 22

Secretary Dulles: I have no initial statement of my own to make, so I will be glad to receive your questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give us your reaction to Egypt's recognition of Red China?

A. It was an action that we regret. That is the only comment I care to make.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that will improve Red China's chances of getting into the United Nations at the next meeting?

A. Not appreciably.

Q. What is the status, Mr. Secretary, of the Aswan Dam?

A. Well, the status is about as previously reported here, except that the Egyptian Government has, I think, sought to work out some arrangement with the Sudan with reference to the division t the Nile waters before planning to proceed tually with work or expenditures of its own; a that is the present status of that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, will the United States be w ing to put any money into that project if Egyptians accept aid from the Soviets?

A. You say "if"?

Q. There have been a lot of stories out of Eg saying Colonel Nasser possibly will accept Russ Communist help in building the dam. Would t automatically exclude or end our offers to part pate, or would we be willing to join in someth which the Communists might be interested in?

A. That is rather a hypothetical question, bu would say it would be unlikely, I think, that would find it practical or desirable to engage this time in a cooperative effort of this type w the Soviet Union.

Soviet Armed Forces

Q. Mr. Secretary, at your last press confere you gave us as reasons for the Russians cutt down their military manpower as based on inter and economic grounds.[1] *A few hours later S retary Wilson said they were just readjusting th forces to nuclear warfare, the same way we we and on Friday, I think, the Presidential assista Mr. Stassen, said that it was a response to policy. None of these factors exclude the oth I was wondering if you could put this in persp tive for us.*

A. I think it should first perhaps be made cl that there was no disclosure at London by Soviets of their intention to reduce their arm forces. The conclusion was drawn in London, s well as here, that because of the various facto particularly their economic situation and the g eral trend toward emphasizing modern weap s more than men, there would likely be a reduct of Soviet army manpower. That was a matter deduction and not of disclosure.

Now, since the action was taken unilatera without any prior disclosure to the Disarm ment Subcommittee, it is necessarily speculativ to why they did it. And when you get into peop s motivations it is always a difficult thing to be cl about it, particularly when it is the motivation

[1] BULLETIN of May 28, 1956, p. 880.

ople like the Soviet rulers, whose motivations e not influenced by public-opinion considera- ns or parliamentary considerations. Now, it is, oadly speaking, the view, I think, of the admin- tration that the action taken was primarily re- onsive to the two factors alluded to: namely, st, the economic pressures that the Soviet Union under, particularly the need of greater man- wer in agriculture and in industry, and, sec- dly, the fact that the modern trend, as evidenced our own action, is to put more emphasis upon odern weapons and less emphasis upon the mber of men under arms.

The United States, as I think I pointed out last ek, has itself made a considerable aggregate re- ction in the numbers of men under arms. We ve not claimed that that was done as a contribu- n toward disarmament or because we wanted to aken ourselves; indeed, we have felt that we re stronger as a result of our shifts. They did t involve any diminution in our military power, d we have no reason to believe that the action nounced by the Soviet Union will result in a ninution of its military power. Furthermore, re is no system of supervision or verification. e don't really know what will go on and whether fact there will be even the shift of manpower ay from armies that has been forecast.

Now it may be that they also intended, and prob- y hoped, to set in motion a movement toward luction of armaments in the Western countries. rhaps they hoped for a reduction in armaments ich in other cases would actually mean a dim- tion of military strength. Perhaps they also l in mind the possible impact of what they did the situation in the Federal Republic of Ger- ny, where legislation is before the Parliament ling with the question of the establishment of military forces of the Federal Republic and length of their service.

s I say, one can speculate almost indefinitely to the motivations that may have been back of announcement. It is impossible to be certain ut that. I think, however, that it is the safest g to assume that the motivations were prima- of two sources: namely, the trend in all modern ntries which make these new weapons to put re emphasis upon that than upon actual man- ver and, secondly, the economic needs of their iculture and industry at the present time; and haps in the third place the desire to make gains the propaganda front and in terms of bringing about actual disarmament on the part of the Western countries, which they naturally would like to see.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to clarify a point, if I may, on that same subject, it has been published—and I think not until now denied—that Mr. Stassen was told by Khrushchev at his meeting in London that they were indeed going to reduce their armed forces, but it isn't clear whether there was any figure involved, and Mr. Stassen reported this to be true. Now, what you're saying, is that contradicting that? Is that not true?

A. I checked back with Mr. Stassen yesterday. He was in St. Paul. He said to me that their conclusions were from deductions and not disclosure.

Japanese Textiles

Q. Mr. Secretary, the American textile industry has been pushing to obtain some sort of limitation of Japanese imports for some time. Recently, instead of a negotiated agreement, they asked for and received an exchange of notes between the United States Government and the Japanese Embassy on Japanese exports, with a promise that they would get some sort of an export subsidy program, and another promise that they would try to persuade other countries to buy more textiles from Japan to ease the pressure in Japan for export of textiles here.[2] *Can this be interpreted as being a limit to the action which the administration will take in regard to Japanese textiles?*

A. No, I would not say so. The administration has its normal duties under the law to give domestic industries protection against imports which seriously endanger or jeopardize an industry. It is always preferable to see that necessary protec-

[2] In an exchange of notes with the United States on May 16 (not printed), the Japanese Embassy at Washington described the nature of Japanese voluntary textile-export controls and set forth the Japanese intention to continue into 1957 the controls in effect in 1956 and to give 3 months' advance notice of any future increase in export quantities.

On May 21 the U.S. Department of Agriculture announced that, as of Aug. 1, 1956, it would extend the price benefits of its raw-cotton export program, announced on Feb. 28, to cover exports of cotton textiles, cotton yarns, and spinnable cotton waste. Under the export program, Commodity Credit Corporation stocks of upland cotton are made available for sale for export on a competitive bid basis.

tion of American industries brought about by a voluntary action on the part of the nations which are exporting to the United States; that is, it is preferable to do it that way than by unilateral protective action by the United States. But certainly the United States has not forgone its intention, indeed its duty, to take any action that may be called for by the facts. I do not myself know whether the facts are such that that action has been invoked. I don't think it has been invoked as yet by the textile industry. But they are always free to do so.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you aware of any developments which will indicate whether the Soviets meant business when they spoke about cooperation and relaxing tensions in the Middle East? What would be the price of their cooperation in such an effort?

A. Well, there has been no effort that I am aware of to test that in terms of any specific action. There probably will be a resolution of some sort proposed in the Security Council which would be a followup of the first resolution,[3] which was the United States proposal, pursuant to which Mr. Hammarskjold went out to the Near East. I think that is being informally discussed at the present time. And it may be that that followup resolution will afford testing or an opportunity to know more clearly what it is that the Soviets had in mind by their statement.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would the United States Government like to see Mr. Hammarskjold return to the Middle East to carry on—I believe the words you used in your speech at one point—the momentum which he has already achieved?

A. Well, we think it's very important that the momentum should be maintained. We are not clear whether that requires or would be well served by Mr. Hammarskjold himself going back at this particular time. I believe that Mr. Hammarskjold has some doubts as to whether that is the best action to take at the moment. I think he is following up a number of aspects of his work there by communication from time to time with the Heads of the Governments or with the Foreign Ministers concerned. You see, there is a good bit still to be done to implement the agreements that were actually made, particularly in terms of giving mobility, freedom of movement, to the arm stice teams, and things of that sort. Those thin are still being worked out and, I understand, a being actively followed up by Mr. Hammarskjo from this country, and we are not yet clear th the stage has been reached where Mr. Hamm skjold ought to turn and go right back aga. Perhaps not.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your conference Saturd with Japanese Minister Kono,[4] were you able determine that the Soviet Union has establish any new policy or made any new offers towa Japan leading to peaceful relations, and also u the United States help Japan make up this fishi deficit?

A. I don't think that the United States w have to do anything affirmative to help, as you p it, to make up the deficit. I think that there a fishing areas which are available to the Japane, and it would not be necessary to alter, I wou think, the terms of our fishing treaty with Jap, the trilateral treaty to which Canada, the Unit States, and Japan are parties.[5] That treaty, y may recall, was negotiated at the same time tha was negotiating the Japanese Peace Treaty, an had some part in the negotiations of that fishi agreement also. Now, as far as the Soviet at tude toward Japan is concerned, I think that th still want to reestablish more normal relatio with Japan, but the terms and conditions un which that might take place I couldn't report here. That is a matter primarily for considerat between the Japanese Government and the Sov Government.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the House Foreign Affa Committee, in voting on the foreign aid bill, a

[3] BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1956, p. 628.

[4] In a statement to correspondents on May 19, Linc White, Acting Chief of the News Division, said: "Th Japanese Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, Mr. Ichi Kono, visited Washington on May 19 on his way home Tokyo from the Soviet Union. He described to seni officers of the Department of State the fisheries agr ments he has just concluded with the Soviet Union Moscow. State Department officials expressed their a preciation to Mr. Kono for his courtesy in coming to Wa ington to convey this information. . . . Mr. Kono w received informally by the Secretary of State . . . [a discussed with the Secretary matters concerning e strengthening of friendly relations between the Un States and Japan."

[5] BULLETIN of Mar. 3, 1952, p. 340, and May 26, 1 p. 830.

rejected a specific long-term aid commitment and voted a general statement of policy to continue aid as long as the Communist threat persists. Would you tell us whether this meets your and the administration's hopes or falls short of it?

A. I would say that, on net balance, this provisional action fell short of our hopes. Of course, the bill has not yet been finally reported out of the committee, and I think it is premature for me to make assumptions regarding the bill until it is finally reported out, because, as we all know, changes are often made at the last minute and positions are sometimes reversed. But we welcome very much the statement of policy in the so-called Richards amendment, which seems to us to be a very straightforward and sane statement that, as long as there is danger from the Soviet-bloc countries, we will take reasonable measures to meet that danger, including measures to strengthen the position of the free world abroad as well as at home. Now, it does not meet our hope for an indication of congressional approval of specific projects which we had asked for, and we intend to continue to seek that authority when the matter comes up for further consideration perhaps by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did President Sukarno, when he was in Washington, seek from you any statement by this Government on behalf of their position on West New Guinea, and if so what was your reply?

A. As far as I am aware, President Sukarno did not personally bring that matter up. It was raised in a talk which I had with the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Indonesia. The Foreign Minister repeated his well-known hope that the United States would support the Indonesian position with reference to West Irian. I indicated the reasons why we did not feel in a position to support affirmatively their position, and the situation, I would say, was left much as it was before the visit in that respect.

U.S.-Egyptian Relations

Q. Mr. Secretary, have you received any information that would tend to either confirm or discredit the rumor out of Cairo that Communist China might supply arms to Egypt?

A. No, we had no information about that, other than what is in the newspaper accounts.

Q. Still on the subject of Egypt, Mr. Secretary, it has been widely reported that the State Department originally was quite enthusiastic about Mr. Nasser but has taken a much more bearish view of him recently. Your indications in answer to questions this morning—were you wanting to infer that that bearishness is intensified? Is that true? Can you clarify it a little more?

A. Well, I expressed a regret of his action extending recognition to Communist China. I have also indicated that we are sympathetic with whatever action he reasonably takes to emphasize the genuine independence of Egypt, and, to the extent that he is a spokesman for Egyptian independence, we have sympathy with his point of view. But to the extent that he takes action which seems to promote the interests of the Soviet Union and Communist China, we do not look with favor upon such action.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you spoke about the unlikelihood of the United States making a cooperative effort with the Soviet Union in building the Aswan Dam, is that an implication there that the United States also might take another look at economic and technical aid to countries in Asia which are accepting similar aid and offers from Russia?

A. No, the question, as I understood it at least, posed the question whether we are willing to cooperate with the Soviet Union on a specific project. That is something quite different from our assisting on one project, while the country in question is obtaining assistance from the Soviet Union with respect to some other project.

Presidents' Meeting in Panama

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us about the administration's viewpoint toward this meeting in Panama of the Presidents,[6] and whether you propose to go?

A. The meeting is one which was initiated, as you know, by the Government of Panama to celebrate the first Pan American meeting [in 1826], which was called on the initiative of Bolívar. We believe that the developments of unity within the American States which have occurred since that time are tremendously important. They constitute in some respects an example to other areas of the

[6] BULLETIN of May 28, 1956, p. 880.

world, and it is deserving that an occasion like this should be given importance. It does indicate the ability of the Republics of this hemisphere to work together through the Organization of American States in a way which is, I think, of great benefit to them; it enables them to settle disputes between themselves and to create a solidarity as against external threats. It is undoubtedly not only the oldest but the best organized regional association that there is in the whole world, and the opportunity to bring that more to the attention of the world is an opportunity which the President thought was so important that he was willing to accept the invitation from the Republic of Panama and to go to the area.

I think it is likely that I will accompany the President, although there has been no firm decision on that. I normally do go with the President when he makes foreign visits of this character.

Q. Within the week it has been said that the cuts that the Russians propose to make in their armed forces reflected an initiative in the direction in which we want the Russians to go. Would you care to discuss that? Some of your statements seem to be a little at variance with that.

A. No, I prefer not to discuss that particular statement. I think I have already adequately stated my views on the announced reduction of men in arms by the Soviet Union. Perhaps that statement of mine had better stand on its own footing.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the past few days there have been a few developments that have come out on the Near East. I wonder if you could comment on them. One is the trip by the Egyptian correspondent to the Israeli Government and the subsequent permission by the Egyptian Government to publish his dispatches, and secondly, last night a commentator on the Cairo radio stated that he believed that peace was possible between Israel and Egypt. I wonder if you can comment on those two developments.

A. Well, I think both of the developments to which you refer are encouraging, and the United States is very happy that those events can occur —the trip and the announcement that was made. We are not in a very good position ourselves to evaluate these developments, particularly the last one to which you refer. But if there is any kind of rapprochement there between the Israelis and the Arabs in terms of making the settlement mor durable and secure, that of course is in line witl the United States policy.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would the followup resolu tion in the Security Council about which you spok have to do with the armistice itself or going th next step, to the problem of peace?

A. I do not feel at liberty to discuss that, be cause it is being actively discussed at the presen time between the various members of the Securit Council in New York and on an informal basi There has been no crystallization of thinking o just what should be in the resolution, nor, so fa as I am aware, have Mr. Hammarskjold's defini tive views been yet obtained. So I think it woul be premature to conjecture about what the resolu tion would contain, because all the elements tha would contribute to our thinking on that subjec are not known.

Trade With Communist China

Q. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Anthony Nutting said i Parliament about a week ago that the British Go ernment intended to make use of the exceptio clause of the restricted list in trade with Red Chin under the embargo agreement.[7] *Can you sa whether the British Government's attitude on th point is a result of consultations with the Unite States, and what your feeling about this is?*

A. Well, that topic was discussed somewhat b Mr. Selwyn Lloyd and myself when we were i Paris in connection with the NATO ministeri meeting.[8] The British Government through hi did indicate an intention to use perhaps somewh more freely the so-called "exception" procedu which has always been in the CHINCOM[9] mult

[7] As spokesman for the British Government, Mr. Nu ting on May 14 replied to a question in the House Commons concerning Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd talks with Secretary Dulles by stating that the discussio were not yet concluded; "in the meantime, however, mo use will be made of the exceptions procedure to perm reasonable exports in appropriate cases to China of goo which are not on the Soviet list."

[8] See also the joint statement issued on Feb. 1 followi Sir Anthony Eden's talks with President Eisenhow (BULLETIN of Feb. 13, 1956, p. 232).

[9] The China Committee, which coordinates internation security controls over trade with Communist China. F background on strategic trade controls, including a cha of the international organization, see BULLETIN of De 5, 1955, p. 918.

ıteral understandings. We do not know what ıe practical impact of that will be because, until ·e know what may be the items or the quantities) which this "exception" procedure would be so xtended, we can't judge what it means. We do ot now have to conclude that it will lead to a eneral breakdown of the multilateral structure or controlling and checking trade.

You see, in any event, this applies only to items hich are not on the so-called CoCom [Coordinat-ıg Committee] list—that is, the limitations on ıe trade with the Soviet Union—but only upon ems which are not deemed strategic as far as the oviet Union is concerned but are still neverthe-ss on the China list. So it will relate presum-bly to some of those items which are on the China st but not on the Soviet list. This implies at ast that the items are not regarded as high in rategic value, or else they would be on the Soviet st, and they are items which are always procur-ble through the Soviet Union. It could buy them nd ship them to Communist China. That in-olves certain delay, certain additional expense. t involves questions of the availability of space ı the roads and the railroads. There is a moral ıctor. So, the ChinCom list is regarded by us s highly significant. But the items themselves re not considered of prime importance as regards rategic value or else they would be on the CoCom st.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask—I under-and that at a reception in Moscow last night hrushchev told Ambassador Bohlen that he, hrushchev, told Mr. Stassen in London that the oviet Union would reduce its armed forces. Is at a lie?

A. Well, I have already said enough on that bject to indicate my view of what Khrushchev portedly said. I repeat that there was no dis-osure and that the conclusions drawn were eductions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, weren't the deductions strong ough so that you established an interdepartmen-l subcommittee in the Government to study what e reaction of this Government ought to be?

A. Yes, we thought it highly probable that ere would be a reduction coming along. We felt at, however, not by any means exclusively as result of anything that was learned in the talks in London. There were a number of indications from a good many quarters. I repeat again that there was no disclosure by the Soviets at London of what they intended to do. They were deductions drawn.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you spoke about the import restrictions from Japan, you mentioned the normal duties under the law. I presume by that you meant the escape-clause procedures?

A. Yes.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are we going to Panama purely for symbolic reasons, or do you think the President will have some concrete offer to make, some proposal to make to the meeting?

A. No, we do not anticipate that the meeting at Panama will deal with any of what I call items of business. It is more than symbolic, because the importance attached to a meeting of the American States at that place, on that particular date, and with the attendance that will be there, will certainly give an important lift to the whole concept of the Organization of the American Republics.

NATO and the Atlantic Community

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been discussion for many months now that perhaps in the expanded role of NATO and its new position that you are now evaluating, that perhaps in cases like Cyprus that NATO might assume jurisdiction there. Would you say such a move there as this is envisaged in the expanded NATO?

A. Well, that is undoubtedly one of the problems that will be considered by this ministerial committee that is studying this question, that is, whether or not the Atlantic Community should develop more in terms of a regional association and should attempt to settle differences as between its members through some regional process or not. You see, at the present time Nato is not set up as a regional association under the United Nations Charter. It is set up as a collective defense association under article 51.

Now, the charter does encourage the development of regional associations, and it also encourages the settlement of disputes "in the first instance," as it puts it, by various means of the parties' own choosing, including, among other things, by the settlement through regional processes. Now so far, as I say, Nato has not been

organized as a regional association, nor has it any policy or jurisdiction to deal with disputes as between the members. One of the matters which will doubtless be considered in evaluating the desirable evolutionary steps to be taken at this time would be that question of whether or not to make it more of a regional association with a responsibility to settle differences between its members.

Q. Mr. Secretary, insofar as the Cyprus question is a matter between governments, has the United States ever offered to mediate or play a role; I mean as between Turkey and Greece and Britain?

A. No, we have never offered to, nor have we been invited to.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I believe the United States has always been opposed to the maintenance of political standing groups in NATO as opposed to military groups. Is there any change in that position?

A. Well, the question of whether we make the Atlantic Community, through NATO or otherwise, into a body of greater political importance is one of the matters that is being considered. So far there has been no decision by any of the governments concerned to do that. So far, it has been operated primarily as a military alliance, and, while there have been reports from time to time on political matters, those have been primarily for the purpose of keeping the other Ministers informed on matters of interest rather than on the basis of the common duty, you might say, to seek to arrive at a common position on these matters. We are quite prepared to consider, with an open mind and with the other countries, an evolutionary step which would place greater political responsibility upon representatives of the NATO or the Atlantic Community countries.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you draw a distinction between NATO and the Atlantic Community when you or the President use those terms? And, if so, what is it, in your mind?

A. There is a difference, I think, in this respect, that NATO is technically a creature of a treaty and that treaty is primarily a military alliance. As far as the treaty itself goes, the provisions of, let's say, article 2 and article 4, which are the two articles which deal with nonmilitary topics, those provisions are rather narrow and rather sketchy. And it may very well be that, if these broader aspects are to be developed, they could be developed through steps which were additional to, or you might say superimposed upon, the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty. I do not think we need to be limited by the terms of the treaty, because there is within the President an authority to conduct foreign relations, and to negotiate, through persons and by means that he chooses. If he chooses to conduct foreign relations through persons who at the same time are members of the NATO Council, he can do so. In other words, they would in a sense be wearing two hats.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give us your reaction to Russia's reported offer to let Pan American Airways fly into Moscow?

A. Well, the United States has for many years sought for our air companies an opportunity to fly into Russia, and if that facility is to be accorded we would welcome it.

Q. Wouldn't that necessitate our giving them some privileges, such as flying the Atlantic, which might have some military value in training their people?

A. Well, so far there has been no suggestion that this would have to be on a reciprocity basis.

Q. Thank you very much.

Anniversary of the Founding of Buddhism

Statement by Secretary Dulles

Press release 279 dated May 24

The 2,500th anniversary of the founding of Buddhism is being celebrated this year throughout the world. The Sixth Buddhist Synod has reached its culmination in Rangoon, Burma. I should like to take this opportunity to express the importance which our Nation attaches to the recognition of the moral and spiritual values which alone can give significance to our lives and which must be the basis on which will be built the world of peace and justice which we all seek. We feel a sense of brotherhood with all peoples who adhere to such principles and welcome all occasions on which their essential importance is reaffirmed.

'isit of President Sukarno of Indonesia

Following are texts of remarks made on the rrival at Washington on May 16 of President ukarno of the Republic of Indonesia, together ith the two major addresses made by President ukarno during his 3-day State visit in Vashington.

'ELCOME AT NATIONAL AIRPORT, MAY 16

ress release 262 dated May 16

tatement by Vice President Nixon

Mr. President, it is a very great privilege to elcome you to the United States on behalf of resident Eisenhower, the Government of the nited States, and all of the people of our country. recall the very warm welcome that I received on e occasion of my visit to your country 2½ years go. I can assure you that every place you go in e United States you will receive the same kind of elcome here because you, like our own George ashington, led your people to independence from olonialism and now in peace lead the Government f your country and the people to even greater hievements.

We trust that your visit every place will be one at will be of interest to you. We know that your nversations with President Eisenhower, the Sectary of State, and other Government officials ill serve to strengthen the bonds of friendship etween our two peoples.

esponse by President Sukarno

Mr. Vice President, I am very happy to be in ashington today. I am very grateful for the vitation President Eisenhower and the Amerian Government rendered to me. I am also very ateful for the kind reception.

I have come to America to see your country with y own eyes. I have come here to observe the eat achievements of the great American Nation. have come here to confirm or to modify the impressions of your country which I have collected for so many years. Above all, I have come here to America to learn something from America—not in the first place from America merely as a country, merely as a nation, merely as a people, but from America as a state of mind, from America as the center of an idea.

I carry with me the greetings of the Indonesian people to you. I carry with me the thanks of the Indonesian people to you for all the assistance you gave us in our national reconstruction. I hope this visit will lead to a real understanding and to a real friendship between the American Nation and the Indonesian nation.

Thank you.

REMARKS AT WHITE HOUSE LUNCHEON, MAY 16

White House press release dated May 16

President Eisenhower

We are gathered here, of course, to do our part in extending to the President of Indonesia and his party a welcome to this land.

Mr. President, gathered here are many members of the executive branch of our Government, the Chief Justice of the United States, distinguished members of the United States Senate and of the United States House of Representatives, as well as representatives of our industrial and educational life. This representative body, I assure you, expresses the thought of America in saying to you: You are truly welcome and we hope you have a wonderful time in this country.

There are, of course, some parallels between your country and ours. Both of us were colonies. And both of us in our early years of freedom had some difficult problems to solve.

It happens that when we were in our 11th year of independence, as you are now, the man whose portrait is on the far wall over there—John

Adams—was President. One of the stories told about John Adams in this house—he was the first man to live in this house—was that his wife, Abigail, hung her laundry, done by her own hands, in the East Room, where we shall have coffee.

I tell this little story merely to show that in our time, in our 11th year, we were going through a period where it was indeed difficult going. But we had friends on the earth, as you have. And I think it is to the credit of the human race that when they see an individual or a nation working or struggling to go higher in life so that men may realize more of their material and spiritual ambitions, there is always somebody ready to help them. Of course, there's always someone ready to step in our faces, too, but I think friendship is stronger than the jealousies and the hatreds.

At least this is my hope: during your visit here in America you find much of interest that you can carry back and possibly even apply—or find some adaptation—to your own country. Above all, we hope—all of us here—that you will carry back with you a sense that the American people are truly interested in Indonesia and you and your efforts to raise the standards of all your people, to make for them a better life.

Gentlemen, would you rise with me and drink a toast to President Sukarno, the President of Indonesia.

President Sukarno

Mr. President, gentlemen, twice today I have expressed my admiration for the great American Nation, and I hope to have still more opportunities not only during this visit of mine but in my whole life to express again and again my admiration for the great American people.

This lunch, which I feel as an honor rendered to me, gives me an opportunity to express my admiration—my great admiration—for your great President, President Eisenhower.

May I ask you to rise and to join me in drinking a toast to the health of President Eisenhower.

ADDRESS TO THE CONGRESS, MAY 17 [1]

Mr. President and Mr. Speaker, I deem it a great honor and privilege to be able to address this honorable Congress, and I express my gra tude to you for this opportunity.

Standing here before you, Mr. President a Mr. Speaker, and before all the other honorab Members of this Congress, my thoughts, t thoughts of a man born in a cottage and grov up among poor people, go to the homes and hea of the multitudes of the American people fro all strata of your society, for whom you act elected representatives. May I, therefore, conv to you, and through you to the people of Americ the most sincere greetings of the Indonesian pe ple and their thanks for your past generous assis ance, with the hope that this visit to the Unit States of America will foster closer relations b tween our two nations.

In our contemporary world, the impact America is felt more and more. The influence the American with his outlook, his ideas, his tec nical and scientific advances, reaches to almo every corner of Asia and Africa, whilst in Ameri itself, Asia, the Asian and his personality, h ideals, the fruits of his labor, are gradually b coming a living reality. Americans and Indon sians are no longer strangers to each other. W know each other from the films; the beams the radio reach into our very homes; and the mag zines and daily press provoke us to think of eac other. These cultural exchanges, coupled with th products of your industries and the fruits of ou soil, have kept us always much closer togeth than the thousands of sea miles which separa our two countries.

I have come to the United States, as I said ye terday, to see your country with my own eyes an to observe the achievements of the great America Nation. I have come here to confirm or to modif the impressions of your country which I have co lected from a distance over many years. Bu above all, I have come here to learn somethin from America—from America not merely as place, not merely as a nation, but America as state of mind, America as the center of an ide

It was this very America which was in fact th first product of nationalism, of anticolonialism and of the principle of independence. It is th America which, as the hothouse of American tech nology, surpassed the development of older siste nations and became a great power—nay, one of th most powerful nations in the world today. Pre ent-day America as a world phenomenon, with a its impact on the peoples of the earth, was th

[1] Made before a joint meeting of the Senate and the House of Representatives; reprinted from *Cong. Rec.* of May 17, 1956, p. 7524.

child of a marriage between the revolutionary America of Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln and the technological America imbued with the prodigious technical spirit of Edison and Ford.

The shot that was fired at Lexington on the 19th of April 1775 was heard around the world. It echoes still in the hearts of all who have recently won their independence, and it echoes still in the hearts of peoples who still struggle against their colonial bonds.

Over half the world the burning words which fired the American War of Independence have been closely studied as a source of inspiration and a plan of action. Yes, this period is the period of Asian and African resurgence.

If we could see the passage of history as yesterday I saw your country from the windows of an aeroplane, we could have no doubt that the world is passing through the period of Asian and African nationalism.

"Nationalism"

I hesitate at using that word "nationalism," for I know that in many countries and in many nations nationalism is an out-of-date political doctrine. Please remember, Mr. President and Mr. Speaker, that for us of Asia and Africa nationalism is a young and progressive creed. We do not equate nationalism with chauvinism, and we do not interpret nationalism as meaning the superiority of our peoples over others. No. For us, nationalism means the rebuilding of our nations; it means the effort to provide equal esteem for our peoples; it means the determination to take the future into our own hands. For us, nationalism is the love of country and the determination to improve it which, not so very long ago, illumined the actions of the founders of your Nation. Nationalism may be an out-of-date doctrine for many in this world; for us of Asia and Africa, it is the mainspring of our efforts. Understand that, and you have the key to much of postwar history. Fail to understand it, and no amount of thinking, no torrent of words, and no Niagara of dollars will produce anything but bitterness and disillusionment.

We who are living in Asia and Africa during this period of Asian and African nationalism, and particularly those of us who have been called upon to guide the destiny of nations—we ask that the rest of the world should show understanding and sympathy. After all, for what do we struggle? Not for fame; not for conquests; not for territorial aggrandizement; not for domination over other peoples. Our efforts and the sacrifices we have made have been for the release of our people from a colonial tyranny lasting for generations and centuries. It has been a struggle—it is still a struggle—for the simple human demands which the rest of the world has long taken for granted.

We ask you to understand our national struggle, and we ask you to sympathize with it. We ask you to understand and sympathize with the fact that our national struggle is still incomplete. How can it be complete when millions of our people in Asia and Africa are still under colonial domination, are still not free? How can the national struggle in Indonesia be complete when part of our own country and part of our own nation are still unfree?

I recall with the very greatest pleasure that shortly after the first Asian-African Conference last year, this Congress unanimously approved a resolution reaffirming America's traditional anticolonial attitude. That conference in Bandung, in which the leaders of 29 states took part, and which represented far more than half the population of the world, was a clear indication of history's direction. Practically all shades of the political spectrum were represented there, and almost all were but recently emancipated from colonialism. They were united by many things but chiefly by their abhorrence of colonialism. They produced a declaration which explicitly stated their continuing opposition to colonialism in all its forms. This Congress, noting that conference and its declaration, then unanimously restated, for all the world to know, its own longstanding opposition to colonialism. By that action, this Congress demonstrated its sympathy with our efforts. In the scales of history, your weight was placed resoundingly onto the side of the future.

Indonesian Independence

It is now almost 11 years since, on the 17th of August 1945, the Indonesian people proclaimed themselves independent. Note: I said the Indonesian people. Not those of Java alone, nor Sumatra alone, nor Celebes alone, but all of them, from the north of Sumatra to the southernmost corner of West New Guinea, which we call Irian Barat.

That Declaration of Independence covered every

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part of what was once called the Netherlands East Indies, which constituted the vast colonial empire in Asia of a small European country. We had no quarrel with the Dutch as a people; we had no quarrel with the Government of the Netherlands as a government. Our quarrel, and the quarrel of our forefathers, was with colonialism: we had a quarrel with the colonial attitudes of some Dutch people; we had a quarrel with the colonial attitudes and actions of the Netherlands Government.

Four and a half years of fighting and negotiation followed. Four and a half years in which our colonially impoverished country, suffering already from the torments of Japanese occupation, suffered more from the attempts forcibly to reimpose the colonialism we had rejected. Finally, due in no small part to the efforts of the United Nations and its bodies in which America was prominent, the Netherlands made formal recognition of complete and unconditional sovereignty to Indonesia.

But our struggle was not yet at an end. One part of our country, one section of our brothers, were not free—and even today are not free. The territory of Irian Barat, West New Guinea, is still a colonial outpost on Indonesian soil. Our Declaration of Independence had covered all of the Netherlands East Indies. The agreements by which Holland recognized that independence and that sovereignty had made reference to the whole territory of the Netherlands East Indies. But part of our land, a part of the territories covered by those agreements, is still a colonial cancer in the body politic of our motherland.

We are told that the people of West Irian are not our brothers and that they come from a different racial stock and therefore West Irian is not Indonesian. Where—again, where—is the country whose citizens are ethnically pure? In fact, for many hundreds of years past, West Irian has been recognized as being part of the Indonesian archipelago. Before colonial days, West Irian was part of the Indonesian national state of Modjopahit, one of the glories of the Hindu-Javanese civilization. West Irian was part of the Dutch Empire in Asia and was administered and recognized without question as being a unit of the Netherlands East Indies. In all ways, and by ties of common colonial experience, West Irian has been, and still is, an essential part of Indonesia.

We are told that the people of West Irian are not ready for a change from their colonial status, and that they need the continued guidance of th West to train them for the transition to liberty

We know this "guidance." We have had experi ence of this "training." It left us, after 350 year with an illiteracy rate of 94 percent. It left u without sufficient doctors to treat even those wh are sick unto death. It left us with a typicall colonial economic and social structure.

Progress Since Independence

I tell you this in all solemnity. In the 11 year of our independence, the Indonesian nation ha made more human progress, and has been the scen of greater human happiness, than in all the ten of generations of colonialism that went before Our people are free, and in freedom they hav found their soul—just as the people of West Iria will do when they too are free. They can do wha we have done. The figures are available: the list of schools built, of recurrent epidemics abated, o diets improved, of infant mortality decreased Forgive me if I seem to boast. I do not intend t boast. I wish to give you a factual account. Le me cite just one item in the field of education Illiteracy before the war was 94 percent; today i is 40 percent. That is what the ending of colonial ism will mean in West Irian.

The return of West Irian is for us the remaining part of our national political aspiration. It is th final installment on the colonial debt. We see ou brothers still in chains, who joined with us in pro claiming our common independence, and so ou own freedom is not yet complete. The salt o liberty cannot have its full savor for us until all o Indonesia is again united under the freedom whic is the birthright of all men.

Permit me to remind you, sir, of one of Ameri ca's greatest sons, who said that this Nation coul not exist half slave and half free. That father o the American tradition was not speaking then o colonial slavery, but his words apply in all thei moving strength to this case.

Mr. President and Mr. Speaker, although some what belatedly, we of Indonesia are now in th stage of national turmoil through which yo passed before us some 150 years ago. We are anti colonialists, for the sweat of our labor has been ex torted by other nations, leaving us poverty-stricke with the sorrow of our hearts. We are nationalist for it is our right to win back the worthy place i the family of nations torn from our forefather three and a half centuries ago. In all of this, w

do not claim to have discovered novel principles. No, but like your forefathers, we regard our findings as universal values, as the common property of all mankind.

Present-day Indonesia has so much in common with the growth of the United States of America in the past. You are now reaping the fruits of your pioneering struggle, while we are still busy sowing the seeds from which our future national life will spring. You achieved your material and cultural prosperity based upon the principles of the democracy which is one of your proudest boasts today. Democracy is part of our principles too, part of our Pantja Sila, an instrument to build national prosperity and stability. But we Indonesians are well aware that, however noble the aim, practical democracy is not always easily attainable.

First Steps Toward Democracy

Last year we twice faced the test of the free and secret ballot, one of the fundamentals of political democracy. The conduct of these elections, one for the House of Representatives and the other for the Constituent Assembly, showed that Indonesia is capable, as the international press reported, of taking the first steps along the road to democracy. Although the elections are not compulsory, about 80 percent of the electors, numbering some 35 million souls and scattered over thousands of miles in thousands of islands in our great archipelago, came to the polls and fulfilled their duties as responsible citizens. As a result of these elections, it has been possible to form a coalition government between the largest political parties. The PNI (Nationalist Party), the Masjumi and the Nahdatul Ulama (both Moslem parties) with the support of some of the smaller parties, have formed a coalition cabinet. I trust that this coalition, with more than ample support from Parliament, will be stable enough to maintain itself throughout the entire 4 years of its mandate, so that the national process of growth will not be interrupted by intermittent changes of government.

Although these first elections have been successfully accomplished, I shall be modest, Mr. President and Mr. Speaker, in my claims for the establishment of democracy. For who has absolute democracy? We have our feet on the road to democracy, and we have made a good start. But we will not deceive ourselves with the false illusion that we have traversed the full extent of the road to democracy, if indeed any end there be. The secret ballot, the free press, the freedom of belief, the voting in parliaments—these are all merely expressions of democracy. Freedom of expression has a guardian in a certain measure of prosperity, the achievement of freedom from want. For us, then, democratic principles are not simply an aim, the expression of desires inherent in human nature; they are also a means of providing our people with a reasonable standard of living. The freedom of expression and the freedom from want are indivisibles, two interdependent souls in one body. As with all other freedoms, freedom of expression is no absolute; its indiscriminate and unrestrained exercise could hamper the harmonious growth of other freedoms, could hamper the harmonious growth from want, and thus sow the seed for the destruction of the fundamentals of human freedom itself.

Your Nation began your struggle for liberty, equality, fraternity, and prosperity at a period in history when there was no great gap between the standards of nations. There was no great gap between haves and have-nots, there were no nations of abject poverty and extreme wealth, there were no nations of super technical development and utter technical backwardness, there was not so great a gap between the fortunates possessing full-fledged democracy and the sufferers living under complete tyranny. The contrasts today are great. The contrast between the joy of life cherished by some nations and the burden of suffering imposed upon more than one half of the human race has outstripped all proportions. Such conditions do not stimulate normal growth toward emancipation, especially when the less-privileged are subjected to the competition of the privileged and the powerful in their daily human activities. But if the development of the newly independent countries in the direction of their prosperity be regarded as indispensable for the preservation of civilized man, there certainly will be no need for regrets over the world's wealth and the almost unlimited resources for the further development of man's technological civilization.

Mr. President and Mr. Speaker, the impact of your revolution has not always been of the same kind upon all countries of the globe. We in Indonesia attach great importance to the freedom of expression, to be preserved even in the Herculean task of firmly founding our national economy. Other revolutions have aimed immediately upon building heavy industry as the basis for freedom

from want in the future, if necessary even at the sacrifice of some aspects of freedom of expression for the time being. These are rival conceptions, and they constitute a challenge to Indonesia which she must answer in translating ideals into practice.

The development of Indonesia in particular and of certain other countries of Asia in general will be the test case of the success or failure of the modern world's application of democratic principles. The solvency of less technically developed countries, the solution of the social and economic problems of newly independent peoples at a pace which can keep up with their consciousness of their own worth as equal members of the human family—these are all questions to measure the success of our democracy. In Indonesia, apart from the wealth of nature, our main capital is the sweat and tears of our population, the sacrifices even to the death of those who have gone before. It has been, and it still is, an investment of voluntary human cooperation and sacrifice which is needed for the development of our country. There is no imposition upon the people to save part of their meager income as a means of accumulating badly needed national capital, neither would we introduce forced labor for national undertakings, nor the expropriation of existing big companies which are run mainly on the basis of profit motives.

Moreover, the present situation in the world is, as I have already mentioned, such that even we the economically weak nations have to compete in order to grow—compete with the forces of powerful and experienced nations in order to survive the drives and thrusts of the current of elimination. Democracy, when all is said and done, is the introduction of equal opportunity in human activities amongst the indigenous people themselves, and, next to that, some degree of opportunity for foreign competitors to insure the best performance. This sometimes leads toward the presence of an anachronism in which colonial vestiges become strengthened at the expense of national growth. Taking all this into consideration, the question arises: Will democracy succeed in Indonesia? Will democracy really bring prosperity and happiness in Indonesia? What is the reason for Indonesia's firm belief in the democratic process and progress? These are questions, Mr. President and Mr. Speaker, which have long occupied the minds of many Indonesian leaders. These problems, I think, also raise doubts—or hopes—among the statesmen and politicians of a number of Western countries about the ability of the Indonesian people to outlive the shock of national responsibility in this turbulent world.

My answer, Mr. President and Mr. Speaker i Have no doubt about that.

Five Principles

Immediately we had proclaimed our indepen ence in August 1945, we attached as preamble our Constitution the Pantja Sila, the five guidin principles of our national life. Perhaps you kno already what our Pantja Sila is. It gives us th five principles of our State. These are:

First, belief in God.

Second, nationalism.

Third, humanity.

Fourth, democracy.

Fifth, social justice.

These five principles are the combined reflectio of Indonesia's natural climate and the personalit of its inhabitants. They were also partly form lated by President Eisenhower in his speech b fore the American Society of Newspaper Edito on the 21st of April last, when he spoke of certai principles:[2]

First, "They believe deeply in the right of sel government";

Second, "They believe deeply in the dignity c man";

Third, "They aspire to improve the welfare c the individual, as a basic aim of organize society."

So again, have no doubts about democracy i Indonesia. Even in the most difficult years im mediately after the recognition of sovereignty, w were able to guard the unity of our countr through another democratic concept, expressed i the motto of the State, "Bhinneka Tunggal Ika"- Unity in Diversity. Voluntary loyalty to the In donesian motherland as a whole has been settle in our country without compulsion, without th process of civil war, despite subversive action by people who do not want to see us free, despit provocation at home and abroad.

Having survived the early, most critical yea of our national existence, more attention can b paid to upbuilding and rehabilitation, and esp cially to the investment of human skill. Just b fore I left Indonesia, we inaugurated a campaig for village community development, and Parli

[2] BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1956, p. 699.

ent is soon to discuss the first national 5-year plan, with a total allocation of 11 billion rupiahs, or $1 billion.

However important they may be, our own national efforts on their own will not suffice to achieve steady progress toward viability for our country against the impact of economic or political competition from overseas. It is in this field that we ask your understanding and your cooperation for our mutual benefit. America is known the world over for generosity; if I am not mistaken the American taxpayer has already spent more than $50 billion in foreign aid. But that all has brought variable results. An example of good results is the recovery of Western Europe after World War II; other results are still prospective in other parts of the world, whereas elsewhere American aid is regarded as of doubtful benefit for national progress.

Technical Assistance

Indonesia is indeed grateful for the technical assistance she has received to date from America, and in acknowledging my gratitude I want to express myself with the frankness of a friend. Am I allowed to be frank, Mr. President and Mr. Speaker? For the furtherance of their function as defenders of freedom, America and Indonesia need to realize how to obtain lasting results, and these depend upon the specific conditions of Asian countries and the development of the national aspirations of the Asian people, which, indeed, America cannot be expected immediately to know or to understand. The approach to the question of foreign aid should be based upon different principles in different countries. Without adequate knowledge of those countries, and even if your motives in granting aid were solely the stability of this region, the results could be adverse, and the few of even billions of dollars could lead only to strained relations. Certainly military aid is no substitute for Asian stability. It will only serve to make countries accepting it more dependent upon America, and their worth as genuine partners in the universal struggle for liberty, peace, and prosperity will consequently decline. The main aim should be for the people of Asia, like the Western nations, to become economically stable but also politically stable and thus be able to defend their freedom against all assaults. Political stability comes only with the stability of the political heart. And this heart of ours is now still an unsatisfied heart. The Asian people must soon be brought to the stage of development where they are capable of cherishing their hard-won freedom.

This two-sided struggle is a longer and a harder struggle, but until it is won, the process of emancipation of our people will not be complete. The Republic of Indonesia is a democracy which has leaned heavily upon the experience of the West, and particularly of your great Union, for its national ideals. We know that is not enough. To the famished man, democracy can never be more than a slogan. What can a vote mean to a woman worn out by toil, whose children fret and ail with the fever of malaria? Democracy is not merely government by the people; democracy is also government for the people.

The fight for the emancipation of our people is our fight, and, believe me, we shall not shirk it. We ask for your understanding of it and your sympathy with it. We will accept with the greatest appreciation any assistance that may come to us, from whatever quarter it may come, for that assistance will lighten our burdens and shorten our struggle. Such assistance is not one-sided but is of mutual benefit. Out of it comes a greater measure of good will, and—perhaps more important—out of it comes a greater volume of production in the world. But, from whatever quarter of this divided globe that assistance comes, we are determined that no material advantage will buy from us any part of our hard-won freedom, for that freedom is more dear to us than the products which any country can give or sell. We welcome assistance on terms of mutual benefit. We reject the idea of exchanging intellectual and spiritual independence or physical liberty for momentary advantage.

And now, Mr. President and Mr. Speaker, finally, may I say this:

We live in a troubled world, in which man cannot rest and cannot give his whole thought and effort to the welfare of mankind. A shadow, pregnant with horror, hangs over the future. It is a man-made shadow, and its mushroom shape colors all our thoughts and all our dreams. In their technical and scientific skill, men have created something whose potentiality for good or evil is so great that the imagination of the same men is overpowered.

So far, the full horror of this latest of mankind's achievements has not burst on the world. So far

only small samples of this victory over nature have been used for their designed purpose. And what is that purpose? May God forbid that man should ever take upon himself the responsibility for the use of this weapon. The destruction of this world is not the prerogative of man.

There is irony in the fact that, for the first time ever, man has it within his power to make the desert bloom like a garden, to banish poverty and want from the world, to open up a new era of brotherhood, and yet, at the same time, no man can look with confidence into the future. The rivers and the tides obey our command; we bestride the skies and pluck wealth from under the earth and the sea; we conquer the age-old plagues of humanity and even fight a winning battle against death. At the same time, we dig ourselves shelters in the rocks and prepare to sit and die in them, as man did during the dawn of the world. Have we then made so little progress? Have we learned nothing?

It may be that war is a natural function of man and that his combative feelings prevent his living in peace with his neighbors. It may be so, but I do not believe it.

In any case, should the new weapons begin to fall, the question would be academic, for then we would have not war but universal death and the end of mankind's brief civilization. It is true that repeatedly throughout history man has crucified himself, only to rise again. Let there be no mistake about it. After an atomic war there would be no resurrection. Certainly we cannot let things slide and trust to luck that no megalomaniac will press the fateful trigger.

Mr. President and Mr. Speaker, in saying these things to you, I am well aware that I am saying nothing you do not already know, for this Congress of the United States of America has given anxious thought to this matter. We who have not got the atom bomb, we will watch every move you take in this matter. With hope in our hearts but fear in our breasts, we will applaud everything which helps to make the future safe for our children. We will support every action taken by you, or the responsible leaders of any country, to remove the shadow of the atom bomb from this world.

May God give men the will to avert calamity.

And may He give us, America and Indonesia, the best friendship which has ever existed between two nations.

ADDRESS TO THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB MAY 18

It is a rather overpowering experience to mee at one time so many men and women of the press It is overpowering and in some ways rather fright ening, for indeed the press of the world is a mighty implement for good or evil. I recall the words o Mark Twain who was also impressed by the powe of this tool. Mark Twain once wrote, "There ar only two forces that can carry light into all th corners of the world—only two: the sun in th heavens, and the Associated Press down here. With all of Mark Twain's experiences, he neve faced 600 journalists, not only of the Associate Press but of all parts of the world. Moreover, was always glad to note that he put the sun first This at least must impress upon all journalists— and all of us—a proper and due sense of humility

I am expected to talk to you, presumably t talk about Indonesia, but talking to experts is difficult matter. Nevertheless, this is an oppo tunity for which I am profoundly grateful becaus it not only allows me to renew many old ac quaintanceships but to make many new ones.

One of the most far-reaching effects of technica progress has surely been in the sphere of communi cations between the nations of the world. What i done in one country today is known to all the worl tomorrow. It is known, and it is praised or crit cized. This has the great advantage that the ac tions of all governments are bathed in the light c day—and presumably in the light of the press. I means that public opinion is in truth a factor c international affairs, and one which can be ignore by no government, whatever its political color. I means, too, that what happens in one country ha its effects the world over. If one man suffers unde tyranny, the stature of all men is lessened; if or man reaches a little further toward justice, the the chains of all men are weakened. The historic task of the press is to seek out the facts, to publis the facts, and to analyze the facts. The degree c success in that task influences in large measure tl opinions, and thus the actions, of all states. It a heavy responsibility to bear, but I think tl Fourth Estate is not afraid of responsibility.

As a matter of fact, that willingness to acce responsibility is a characteristic of men in this 20t century. The world would be in a sorry state if were not so. And yet those responsibilities have i many cases been heavier than anything previousl

posed upon man. Which of us would exchange r position in life for that of the President of the nited States who had to decide whether or not atomic bomb should be dropped? Who ongst us would take the burden of deciding beeen guns and butter for our people?

The irony is that we could all have both guns l butter. Furthermore, if we all had butter, rhaps we would not want guns. We have ined produced a strange world, one in which the ghest ideals of human brotherhood are prouced, while at the same time we prepare to troy those same human brothers. We know w to overcome the problems of nature; we have learned how to overcome the problems in our n minds and hearts.

And yet we have made progress. What was once ilver thread in the works of a visionary is now eality in the world. The ideal of human felship has advanced and the ideal of each man ng his brother's keeper is generally accepted, n if not yet generally implemented. We of ia and now of Africa know this well.

uggle Toward National Fulfillment

Our struggle toward national fulfillment has n eased by the assistance given by people of er countries and continents. The wheels of tory have been oiled for us by understanding l sympathy. We have taken courage from the mple and the burning words of others, and the ght has been made radiant by the truth and high als so often expressed and so sincerely struggled .

In truth this is one world, and the actions of all ve an effect upon all. A little time ago I picked quite casually, a history book used in schools my country. It was a book for children of 10 12 years old and is also used widely by adults o have, in their maturity, learned the art of ding.

That history book contained stories from all r the world of national heroes who had fought the freedom of their country. It told of Washgton and of Jefferson, of Garibaldi and of Mazi, of Cromwell and of Ireton. Furthermore, told of others in other countries. It spoke of mes familiar to us, and beloved by us, but perps strange to you—of those in Egypt, in Turkey, Morocco, in India, in Burma, in Japan, and in ina. All of those great men struggled that their nations might be free. Many died before that ideal could be realized, but the lamp they lit has never been, and will never be, extinguished. And all of those men were related one to the other by bonds of common action and common faith.

For what did they struggle? Yes, for their nations. But what is a nation? Many great thinkers have applied their minds to this. Many answers have been given, often conflicting, and usually confusing. One of the truest and most moving descriptions I know was contained in a short essay by a little-known professor of Ohio University. About 40 years ago, Professor Taylor wrote:

> Where and what is the nation? Is there such a thing? You would answer that the nation exists only in the minds and hearts of men. It is an idea. It is therefore more real than its courts and armies; more real than its cities, its railroads, its mines, its cattle; more real than you and I are, for it existed in our fathers and will exist in our children. It is an idea, it is an imagination, it is a spirit, it is human art. Who will deny that the nation lives?

Yes, who will deny, who can deny, that the nation lives, even if all the political scientists fail to define it?

Effects of Colonialism

We of Asia are told that the troubles of our continent are due to nationalism. That is as wrong as saying that the world's troubles are due to atomic energy. It is true that there is turbulence in Asia, but that turbulence is the result and aftermath of colonialism and is not due to the liberating effects of nationalism. I say "the liberating effects of nationalism." I do not mean only that nations are again free of colonial bonds, but I mean that men feel themselves free. You who have never known colonialism can never appreciate what it does to man. The agrarian effects, the economic effects, the political effects can be measured. The effect on man's mind and spirit cannot. Regard it only in this simple light. For generations the political leaders of colonies work and aim for the destruction of the colonial governments. Perhaps the leaders understand the dangers inherent in cultivating a destructive mentality, but the mass of people know only their misery under colonialism and seek only the destruction of colonialism. Then, by one means or another, there comes independence. Immediately

that already weakened nation—weakened by colonialism and by the struggle against colonialism—immediately that nation must begin to seek a reorientation. Not destruction, but construction; not opposition, but support; not conflict, but cooperation. Is it surprising that sometimes independence proves to be a heady wine?

In any case, whether all the world approves or not, the fact is that nationalism and the liberation of nations are realities. They are the reality of international life. What we must do is learn to adjust international relations to this reality. We cannot afford the attempt to distort the reality to make it fit old patterns. In that way would lie disruption, and particularly disruption of the few precious world organizations we already have. The new nations of Asia and Africa are recent additions to an adult family. The older members of that family must not be jealous of the new arrivals.

The chief factor that these nations have in common is their nationalism and the concomitant release from colonialism. *To understand Asia and Africa, we must understand nationalism.* For us, it is the mainspring of action. This cannot be surprising to Western peoples, for the love of country, the spirit of patriotism, is a great element in life here also. There would have been no American War of Independence if nationalism had not burned with a hard and fierce flame in the breasts of the men of '76. Nearer home, it was nationalism which supported the Allied nations during their battles against the horrors of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, or Imperial Japan.

I know that nationalism is today in many circles a suspect word and that it conveys ideas of chauvinism, of racial supremacy, and a dozen other ideologies that we reject. Those evil things are not nationalism, but distortions of nationalism. Do not confuse the distortions with the sound fruit. How foolish it would be to reject democracy because in some places and at some times democracy has been bent into shapes which are a perversion of the democratic ideal. Equally, how foolish it is to reject nationalism because it has sometimes been perverted.

This I know: We of Indonesia and the citizens of many countries of Asia and Africa have seen our dearest and best suffer and die, struggle and fail, and rise again to struggle and fail again—and again be resurrected from the very earth and finally achieve their goal. Something burned in them; something inspired them. They called it nationalism. We who have followed and have seen what they built, but what they destroyed themselves in building—we, too, call their inspiration, and our inspiration, nationalism. For us there is nothing ignoble in that word. On the contrary, it contains for us all that is best in mankind and all that is noblest.

Nationalism and Internationalism

Perhaps the future belongs to greater organizations than mere nations. Certainly the increasing trend toward internationalism is an encouraging sign of man's growing maturity. Perhaps the future will see the growth of international, supernational, and supranational bodies. That may be so. In any case, those bodies cannot be built until nations are built first. You cannot establish international bodies until nations have established their national identities. You cannot build supernational and supranational bodies without using nations as the foundations and the brick and the keystones.

Therefore I say: Do not denigrate our nationalism. Try to understand and sympathize with it. It is at least a positive creed, an active belief and has none of the cynicism and lassitude of other less virile outlooks.

Whatever can be said of my nation, no one can accuse it of being static. It is on the move, and the revolutionary impetus of 11 years ago is still strong. In fact, that impetus received new strength as we moved, after our first nationwide general election, into a new phase of activity. Today we have a Parliament elected by the people and closely reflecting the political views of the people. We have a Government supported by that Parliament and responsible to it. We have, in fact, all the trappings of political democracy. That is progress. In 11 years we have passed through stages of political development that older nations encompassed in generations. We have even gone beyond the stage of political democracy reached by some states established for centuries. I say that in no spirit of boasting, but as a record of fact. With us, voting is universal and secret and some democratic states have not yet accepted such methods.

Of course, we make mistakes; of course, we are sometimes too eager for the immediate result. Of course, we sometimes seem to carry things beyond

heir logical conclusion. But please remember his. Ours is still a revolutionary nation and a nation which, only 11 years ago, was 350 years out of date. We are in a hurry because the world has no intention of standing still while we catch up. We must cram the experience of centuries into a generation, and it is important for us that the revolutionary spirit of self-sacrifice and solidarity should be maintained. That is our driving force.

Rejection of Colonialism

One misunderstanding should be eliminated immediately. *We are not anti-West.* We may, in fact we do, sometimes oppose what is called the West. But that is not dictated by a feeling of being anti-West. In our relations with the world, we seek always what we believe to be the best road for humanity as a whole. Sometimes, no doubt, we are wrong. At other times, I have equally no doubt, we are right. It is true that there is one manifestation of the West which we—and all of Asia—completely reject and will continue to reject. That manifestation is colonialism. We are told that we see only one sort of colonialism, and that sort is dead. Well, we have experienced only one sort of colonialism, and that came to us from the West. However, I would like to recall to your minds that the Bandung conference last year unanimously expressed its opposition to colonialism in all its forms—yes, in all its forms, whether it is economic colonialism, physical colonialism, classical colonialism, or the colonialism of a small, alien body within a nation.

As I said, we are told that colonialism is dead and that we are whipping a dead horse. My reply to that is a simple one. Come to Asia and see for yourselves. Travel to Africa and see for yourselves. Colonialism, even in its classical form, is *not dead* so long as one nation is unfree, so long as the vision of the United Nations Charter is not applied to one territory, so long as brother is divided from brother by a colonial barrier. Colonialism will not be dead until the domination of one people by another is ended. Colonialism will not be dead until nations—including my nation—are reunited in that freedom which is the birthright of all men. Rationalization of these facts is dangerous. There is no such thing as a beneficent colonialism, just as there is no such thing as a beneficent disease. Colonialism, the history of the postwar years shows, does not train for self-government; it trains only for hatred, and that hatred can be directed against the quarter from which colonialism comes, as well as against colonialism itself.

In America, I know it is not necessary for anyone to defend or apologize for a policy of anticolonialism. It is often necessary, however, to defend the fruits and results of such a policy, particularly if, on occasion, that policy appears to run counter to the policy of this country and its associated countries. Let us try to look at the very basic facts of the policy followed by this country. What is the real object of it? The object is not the defeat of communism in the world. In your view that is a most desirable thing. But it is not the object of your policy. No. I think you would agree, and the leaders of your Nation would agree, that you are seeking a larger freedom for mankind. Communism appears to you to stand in the way of that object; therefore you oppose communism. To see the defeat of communism as the end of policy is to confuse military victory with the aims of war.

Now, what is the object of our policy? What is the object of Indonesia's policy? It is to seek a larger freedom for mankind. In doing so, we seek to shake off the final bonds and effects of colonialism. Thus the object of our policy is the same as the object of your policy. We differ in tactics because our immediate problems are different, but we have the same basic aim.

Accepting this, I think it can be agreed that there may well be more than one road to final consummation of a policy. We are not concerned with a problem in geometry, where the shortest distance between what we have and what we want is a straight line. In international affairs, a straight line can lead directly into the ruinous heart of a megaton explosion. We are dealing, not with mathematical postulates, we are dealing with men.

None of us, I feel sure, have the whole truth in our understanding. Perfect understanding is an attribute of God, not of man. It is, however, certain that we must continue searching for understanding. I know that the United States is the country where sociological research is taken most seriously. Much of that research is into the factors that divide humanity. I would like to see similar research into the factors that unite humanity. And there are many. I would like to see research, not into the cultural differentiation of man, but

into the cultural unity of man, into the factors which make men brothers and not just points on a statistician's graph. From Iceland to New Zealand, from Japan to New York, man is the same in his humanity. When we come to realize that and realize that the man is not the same as his personal iron curtain of prejudices, we are more than halfway to the fulfillment of our ideals.

Technological Indigestion

This is a very strange world we have inherited. In moments of frustration, I sometimes feel that man has reached for the stars and smeared his hands with primeval mud. We have pencillin and —the wonders of bacteriological warfare. We have rocket-powered bombing aircraft and—ox-drawn ploughs. We have atom bombs and—half the world lit by flickering oil lamps. We have television and—soap opera. Is it possible that our technical skill is surpassing our mental stature? I do not believe so, for I have a profound faith in the potentiality of man. What seems obvious is that we have a bad dose of technological indigestion and should really take greater care with our diet. It needs, I think, a better balance. It lacks a spiritual and moral content. In international affairs, we move—or stagger—from expedient to expedient and never quite catch up with the reality. In national affairs, we find it difficult to follow the basic principle of doing the greatest good for the greatest number of people because we do not know what is the greatest good. Yes, it is a puzzling world, a disturbing world, but a supremely challenging world.

Sometimes people have sympathized with me because long years of my life were spent in jail and in exile. Well, these years of jail and exile were a mixed experience. I hated them because they separated me from the dearest thing in the world, the struggle of my people for rebirth. At the same time, they were a blessing, because I had what is so rare in this world, the opportunity of thinking about basic issues, the opportunity of examining afresh the beliefs I held.

Since 1942, since the Japanese who occupied my country released me from exile, I have again been engaged in those things which surely provide the fullest and most beneficial use of the powers God has granted to any person. If I may say so without seeming to boast: I know my people; I know them up and down, inside and out. And now I will tell you this about them.

To all Indonesians, their country and their na tion come first. They have fought for their land it is theirs. They have fought for independence it is theirs. They have fought for their nationa identity: it is theirs. They have fought for these things before and will fight again if anythin openly threatens them or undermines them.

We are called "neutralist." We are not neutra and will never be neutral until man the world ove is free. It is said we are sitting on the fence, bu we have no intention of being trampled to deat in the corral. It is said we have bitten the han that fed us. I don't know about that, but we ce tainly had to bite the hand that starved us befor we got rid of the colonial harness.

Plea for Understanding

In all seriousness, let me ask this of you: See to understand us. Give us, if you can, your syn pathy, as I am sure you give your sympathy t what we are trying to do. Give us, if you ca your *active* sympathy and understanding. Th will help us. It will also help the people of th great Nation and the whole world!

We have won our national independence, an we are trying to give that independence a genuin and worthwhile content for every hungry ma every weary woman, every unlettered child in ou vast archipelago. A hungry man cannot eat voting paper. We believe in methods and idea of democracy, but it must be an economic an social democracy as well as a political democrac In the midst of want, social inequality, and pove ty, democracy cannot exist for long.

We seek the unity of our nation and are worl ing, and will work, for the reinclusion of We Irian into the fold of that nation. We do th because it is a sore tribulation to us that any par of our country should still suffer colonialism, an no outpouring of words can disguise the fact th colonialism still rules there. We feel incomplet and unprotected without Irian, and we feel th the battle for even the most elementary stages o liberty is not yet won.

Understand that we are in the era of Asian an African nationalism. That, for Asia and Afric is primary. No torrent of dollars, no cascade o rubles will change that. Equally, dollars an rubles will mean nothing unless they respe the national aspirations of the people of tho continents.

Finally, let me assure you of this: Our ind

endence is not complete yet, but we value what e have, above all things. That independence is ot for sale, and no currency will buy one scrap f it. Certainly, we will take assistance wher-ver it comes from because that assistance may stop child crying from hunger or a man from being riven early to his grave, wornout by toil. But e will labor at our land and jungles with bare ands rather than exchange any part of our free-om for any sort of aid.

You have been very patient with me. Thank ou all very much for that and for the opportunity f meeting you today.

"Merdeka"—that is Indonesia's greetings to ou!

IEMBERS OF THE OFFICIAL PARTY [3]

ress release 260 dated May 16

ndonesian Members

r. Sukarno,
President of the Republic of Indonesia
oeslan Abdulgani,
Minister for Foreign Affairs
loekarto Notowidigdo,
Ambassador to the United States
ainul Arifin,
First Deputy Chairman of the Parliament
r. Wirjono Prodjodikoro,
Chief Justice
r. Abdul Karim Pringgodigdo,
Director of the Cabinet
anusi Hardjadinata,
Governor of West Java
r. Sukiman Wirjosandjojo,
Member of Parliament
ice Air Marshal Suryadarma,
Chief of Staff, Air Force
Ir. Suwirjo,
President Director of the Indonesian Industrial Bank
r. Johannes Leimena,
Member of Parliament
utarto Hadisudibjo,
Member of Parliament
olonel Nazir,
Commander of Naval Bases in Java
olonel J. F. Warrouw,
Commander, Seventh Army Division
r. Ouw Eng Liang,
Physician to the President
ieutenant Colonel Sugandhy,
Aide-de-Camp to the President

[3] Revised list; original list and program were announced n press releases 251 of May 11 and 258 of May 15 (not rinted).

U.S. Members

Hugh S. Cumming, Jr.,
Ambassador to the Republic of Indonesia
John F. Simmons,
Chief of Protocol, Department of State
Maj. Gen. Gordon R. Rogers, U. S. A.,
American Aide to President Sukarno
Clement E. Conger,
Assistant Chief of Protocol, Department of State
Jameson Parker,
Press Officer, Department of State

U.S. Policy on Right of Asylum

White House press release dated May 24

The Soviet Government and its satellites in Eastern Europe have shown unusual interest in inducing the return of refugees from these countries, particularly those resident in Western Europe and more recently those in the United States. The formation of repatriation committees, proclamations by the various governments of amnesties for citizens who have escaped, and personal contact on the part of official Soviet-bloc representatives abroad are manifestations of this concern.

The objects of this activity are to induce the return of those who have fled from Communist oppression and to sow fear and dissension among those who choose to remain in the West. Any means at hand—such as alleged appeals from relatives—are employed in the campaign.

Refugees from Communist countries have displayed great steadfastness in the face of the strong pressures exerted upon them to return to their homelands. The number of those who have gone back is insignificant in comparison with those who seek freedom and security in the West. And the continued flow of refugees to the free world, despite all the efforts of the Communist authorities to prevent it, is the best answer to the propaganda offering illusory prospects to those who are prepared to give up their freedom for life under a dictatorship.

The West as a whole has shown a deep sense of responsibility for those who have sought haven in its territories from Communist tyranny and regimentation. The receiving countries have already taken in more than one million refugees since 1945 and, despite the many problems connected with resettlement, have done their best to provide homes and jobs and the opportunity to become productive and respected citizens in a free

society. Those who have not yet been provided for continue to be objects of concern and sympathy. The United States has been happy to contribute its share to this mass resettlement operation, which is continuing because it is in accord with American traditions to protect and assist those fleeing from persecution.

It is likewise U.S. policy that any person in this country, including those who have sought asylum here, shall have a free choice to leave the United States. It is also the right of this Government to satisfy itself through its responsible agencies that the individual is leaving this country only of his own free will.

The United States is taking action against instances of improper and irregular pressure by officials of foreign governments seeking to influence persons who have sought asylum in this country. The United States has already taken steps which make clear its determination to extend the full protection of American laws to all aliens residing here.

The right of asylum is one of the treasured traditions of free peoples. The United States intends to continue firmly to adhere to and uphold this principle.

U.S. and Canada To Examine Subject of Boundary Waters

Press release 275 dated May 23

The Canadian and United States Governments have decided to examine together the subject of waters which flow across the international boundary between the two countries.

The last time both Governments examined this matter thoroughly together was before the conclusion of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909. During the 46 years which have elapsed since its ratification, the International Joint Commission, which was established by the treaty, has worked with outstanding success in solving water problems within the framework of this treaty.

It has recently appeared, however, that the development of the resources of such basins as the St. John, the Columbia, and the Yukon requires, among other things, the solution of various complicated legal, economic, and engineering questions. In agreeing to examine the matter of waters which cross the boundary, the two Governments realize that there may be no easy or quick ansv to the problems which are arising today in st areas and that the studies may reveal that Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 is sufficien broad to meet present problems. The two G ernments believe, however, that a full and co dential exchange of views may contribute to resolution of these problems, and it is in this sp that the discussions have been agreed to. At same time, the two Governments desire that International Joint Commission shall press f ward its studies under the Columbia River Ba Reference of 1944 and the other similar Referen which it has under consideration.

Visa Applications Cut Off for Certain Polish Refugees

Press release 278 dated May 24

Because of heavy oversubscription of the 2,(visas allotted by the Refugee Relief Act to re gees who were members of the armed forces of Republic of Poland during World War II, w honorably discharged, and resided in the Brit Isles when the Refugee Act was enacted, the I partment of State announced on May 24 that would accept no new applications for such vi after midnight, June 4, 1956. As of May 1,448 visas have been issued to such Polish r ugees. For the remaining 552 visas, there w pending 1,722 applications.

In instructions to the consulates, Pierce Gerety, Deputy Administrator of the Refu Relief Program, emphasized that:

(1) The cutoff would not apply to orphan ap cants residing in Great Britain who are proces under another section of the act.

(2) Although assurances received after cutoff date will not be processed under the Refu Relief Act, such assurances will be sent to the propriate consular authorities to permit the ap cant to establish a priority registration date un the normal annual quota of the Immigration a Nationality Act.

(3) The cutoff does not apply to Poles who n be eligible under the refugee program to come the United States from other countries than Gr Britain.

As of May 18, the total worldwide issuance visas under the Refugee Relief Act was 108,819

orld Bank Reports $21.2 Million et Income for 9-Month Period

The International Bank for Reconstruction and velopment on May 7 reported a net income $21.2 million for the 9-month period ending arch 31, 1956, compared with $18.6 million for e corresponding period in 1955. This income s placed in the supplemental reserve against ses on loans and guaranties, and raised the erve to $142.7 million. Loan commissions ounted to $10.9 million and were credited to e bank's special reserve, increasing that reserve $73.2 million. Total reserves on March 31, 56, were $215.9 million.

Gross income, exclusive of loans commissions, s $47.3 million, compared with $43.8 million in 55. Expenses, which included $20.6 million for erest on bank bonds and other financial exnses, totaled $26.1 million for the period.

During the third quarter of this fiscal year, the nk made two loans totaling $13.1 million in pan and Ecuador. This brought the total num- of loans to 141 in 41 countries and raised the oss total of commitments to $2,483.5 million. sbursements on loans for the 9-month period re $215.6 million, bringing total disbursements $1,895.3 million.

S. Signs GATT Protocol Supplementary Concessions

s release 274 dated May 23

On May 23 Herbert V. Prochnow, Deputy der Secretary for Economic Affairs, signed at neva on behalf of the United States the Protocol Supplementary Concessions embodying the re- ts of the tariff negotiations begun on January under the auspices of the Contracting Parties the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ATT). The opening of this protocol for signa- e formally marks the end of the 1956 tariff nference.

The United States successfully concluded nego- tions with all the 21 other countries partici- ing in the conference. An analysis of the re- ts of the negotiations completed by the United tes will be issued on June 7, and a Presidential oclamation giving effect on June 30 to the con- sions granted by the United States will be is- d about the same time.

The conference included not only 22 countries which are Contracting Parties to the GATT but also the High Authority acting on behalf of the member states of the European Coal and Steel Community.

The parties engaged in some 60 intergovernmental negotiations for the stabilization or reduction of tariff barriers. The results will be incorporated in the tariff schedules of the GATT. The import trade of the negotiating countries in the items affected by concessions granted in the negotiations is estimated at about $2.5 billion a year.

The 1956 tariff conference is the latest in a series of multilateral negotiations carried out by the Contracting Parties to the GATT. The first negotiating conference was held at Geneva in 1947, and subsequent conferences were held at Annecy, France, in 1949 and at Torquay, England, in 1950–51. Further negotiations were conducted at Geneva in 1955 in connection with the accession of Japan to the GATT.

The following Contracting Parties completed negotiations:

Australia
Austria
Benelux Customs Union
(a) Belgium
(b) Luxembourg
(c) Kingdom of the Netherlands
Canada
Chile
Cuba
Denmark
Dominican Republic
Finland
France
Federal Republic of Germany
Haiti
Italy
Japan
Norway
Peru
Sweden
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States

The United States participated in the negotiations under the authority of the Trade Agreements Act, which authorizes the President, within limits and under prescribed procedures, to make concessions in U.S. tariff treatment in exchange for reciprocal concessions from other countries which will promote U.S. foreign trade.

The Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955 authorizes the President to reduce tariffs to rates 15 percent below rates existing on January 1, 1955. The act also authorizes the President to reduce rates that are above 50 percent ad valorem to 50 percent. The reductions are to be put into effect by stages pursuant to the law, the first stage in most cases to be put into effect by June 30, 1956.

Calendar of Meetings [1]

Adjourned During May 1956

GATT Contracting Parties: 1956 Tariff Negotiations	Geneva	Jan. 18–May 23
U.N. Disarmament Commission: Subcommittee of Five (reconvened).	London	Mar. 19–May 4
U.N. ECOSOC Statistical Commission: 9th Session	New York	Apr. 16–May 4
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 21st Session	New York	Apr. 17–May 4
UNESCO Conference on Asian–U.S. Cultural Relations	San Francisco, Minneapolis, Boston, Louisville, Ann Arbor, Washington.	Apr. 19–May 19
ITU Administrative Council: 11th Session	Geneva	Apr. 21–May 19
UNESCO Conference on Free and Compulsory Education in Latin America.	Lima	Apr. 23–May 5
South Pacific Conference: 3d Session	Suva (Fiji)	Apr. 23–May 6
9th International Film Festival	Cannes	Apr. 23–May 10
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 11th Session	Geneva	Apr. 23–May 19
Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference	San José	Apr. 25–May 3
U.N. Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories: 7th Session.	New York	Apr. 27–May 18
5th International Philatelic Exhibition (FIPEX)	New York	Apr. 28–May 6
ILO Coal Mines Committee: 6th Session	Istanbul	Apr. 30–May 12
UPU Executive and Liaison Committee	Bern	Apr. 30–May 12
Inter-American Indian Institute: Governing Board	México, D. F	May 3 (1 day)
U.N. Exploratory Meeting on International Trade in Cocoa	New York	May 3–4
2d Inter-American Meeting of Ministers of Education	Lima	May 3–9
Inter-American Cultural Council: 2d Meeting	Lima	May 3–12
NATO: Ministerial Meeting of the Council	Paris	May 4–6
South Pacific Commission: 15th Session	Suva (Fiji)	May 4–9
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade: 3d Session.	New York	May 7–18
U.N. *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Establishment of SUNFED: 1st Meeting.	New York	May 7–23
International Tin Study Group: Management Committee	London	May 8 (1 day)
International Cotton Advisory Committee: 15th Meeting	Washington	May 8–17
9th World Health Assembly	Geneva	May 8–25
UNESCO Regional Seminar on Primary School Curriculum for Latin America.	Lima	May 9–22
U.N. ECLA Committee of the Whole: 5th Meeting	Santiago	May 14–15
U.N. ECE Housing Committee and Working Parties: 12th Session	Geneva	May 14–16
ILO Building, Civil Engineering, and Public Works Committee: 5th Session.	Geneva	May 14–26
Inter-American Technical Cacao Committee: 6th Meeting	Salvador (Brazil)	May 20–27
U.N. ECE Working Group on Indicators of Short-Term Economic Changes: 1st Session.	Geneva	May 22–26
UNREF Standing Program Subcommittee: 3d Session	Geneva	May 23–25
UNESCO Meeting of Experts on Radioisotopes	Paris	May 25–28

In Session as of May 31, 1956

North Pacific Fur Seal Conference	Washington	Nov. 28 (1955)
U.N. International Law Commission: 8th Session	Geneva	Apr. 23–
U.N. Committee of Experts To Review the Salaries, Allowances, and Benefits System.	New York	May 10–
U.N. International Sugar Conference	New York	May 21–
WMO: 2d World Comparison of Radiosondes	Payerne (Switzerland)	May 23–
Caribbean Commission: 22d Meeting	Cayenne (French Guiana)	May 24–
FAO Joint Subcommission on Mediterranean Forestry Problems	Nice	May 27–
PAIGH Directing Council: 1st Meeting	México, D.F.	May 28–
ILO Governing Body: 132d Session	Geneva	May 28–
UNREF Executive Committee: 3d Session	Geneva	May 28–
WHO Executive Board: 18th Session	Geneva	May 28–
U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on Maintenance Obligations	New York	May 29–
16th International Conference on Large Electric High-Tension Systems (CIGRE).	Paris	May 30–

alendar of Meetings—*Continued*

heduled June 1–August 31, 1956

er-American Commission of Women: 11th General Assembly	Ciudad Trujillo	June 1–
ernational Seed Testing Association: 11th Congress (Executive Committee Meetings June 1 and 10).	Paris	June 4–
SO Executive Committee: 28th Meeting	Washington	June 5–
ernational Meeting of Tonnage Measurement Experts	Copenhagen	June 5–
N. ECAFE Working Party of Senior Geologists on the Preparation of a Regional Geological Map for Asia and the Far East: 2d Meeting.	Tokyo	June 5–
ternational Labor Conference (ILO): 39th Session	Geneva	June 6–
ternational Commission for Criminal Police: 25th General Meeting.	Vienna	June 7–
N. Trusteeship Council: 18th Session	New York	June 7–
ternational Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: 6th Annual Meeting.	Halifax	June 11–
NESCO Intergovernmental Copyright Committee	Paris	June 11–
N. ECAFE Subcommittee on Minerals Resources Development: 2d Meeting.	Tokyo	June 12–
ternational Rubber Study Group: Management Committee	Paris	June 14–
n World Power Conference	Vienna	June 17–
AO Council: 24th Session	Rome	June 18–
AO Committee on Commodity Problems: 27th Session	Rome	June 18–
AO Assembly: 10th Session	Caracas	June 19–
AO Committee on Relations with International Organizations	Rome	June 21–
mmemorative Meeting of Presidents of American Republics	Panama	June 24–
n International Congress on Bridge and Structural Engineering	Lisbon	June 25–
AO Meeting of Fish Processing Technologists	Rotterdam	June 25–
N. ECE Coal Trade Subcommittee	Geneva	June 25–
N. ECE Coal Classification Working Party	Geneva	June 26–
N. ECE Coal Utilization Working Party	Geneva	June 29–
AO Technical Advisory Committee on Desert Locust Control: 6th Session.	Tehran	July 3–
N. Economic and Social Council: 22d Session	Geneva	July 3–
AO International Union of Forest Research Organizations: 12th Congress.	Oxford (England)	July 7–
AO Desert Locust Control Committee: 3d Session	Tehran	July 8
h International Conference on Public Education (Joint IBE/UNESCO).	Geneva	July 9–
NESCO Executive Board: 44th Session	Paris	July 11–
AO Technical Panel on Forestry Education: 1st *Ad Hoc* Meeting	Oxford (England)	July 13–
ternational Whaling Commission: 8th Meeting	London	July 16–
ternational Congress on Housing and Town Planning	Vienna	July 22–
AO Meeting on Control of Tick-Borne Diseases of Livestock	Rome	July 23–
ternational Association of Theoretical and Applied Limnology: 13th Congress.	Helsinki	July 27–
th International Physiological Congress	Brussels	July 30–
N. ECAFE Working Party on Housing and Building Materials: 4th Meeting.	Bangkok	July 30–
uth Pacific Commission: Technical Conference on Community Development.	Hollandia (New Guinea)	July or August
N. ECOSOC Technical Assistance Committee	Geneva	July
n International Conference of Social Work	Munich	Aug. 5–
N. European Regional Consultative Group on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders: 3d Session.	Geneva	Aug. 6–
th International Geographical Congress	Rio de Janeiro	Aug. 9–
ternational Geographical Union: 9th General Assembly	Rio de Janeiro	Aug. 9–
U International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR): 8th Plenary Session.	Warsaw	Aug. 9–
ternational Exhibition of Cinematographic Art	Venice	Aug. 16–
h International Congress of Entomology	Montreal	Aug. 17–
linburgh Film Festival	Edinburgh	Aug. 19–
nerican International Institute for the Protection of Childhood: Directing Council.	Montevideo	Aug. 27–
ternational Congress of Soil Science: 6th Congress	Paris	Aug. 29–

[1] Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, May 23, 1956. Following is a list of abbreviations: GATT, neral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; U.N., United Nations; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; UNESCO, ited Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; ILO, ternational Labor Organization; UPU, Universal Postal Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; NFED, Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development; ECLA, Economic Commission for Latin America; E, Economic Commission for Europe; UNREF, United Nations Refugee Fund; WMO, World Meteorological Organtion; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; PAIGH, Pan American Institute of Geography and History; WHO, orld Health Organization; CIGRE, Conférence internationale des grands reseaux électriques; PASO, Pan American nitary Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ICAO, International Civil Aviation ganization; IBE, International Bureau of Education; CCIR, Comité consultatif international des radiocommunicaons.

Financing the Continuing Movement of Migrants From Europe

THIRD AND FOURTH SESSIONS OF COUNCIL AND EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE FOR EUROPEAN MIGRATION

by George L. Warren

The Council and Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) met at Geneva, Switzerland, in their third session from October 6 through October 22, 1955, and in their fourth session from February 14 through February 24, 1956.[1] The chief subject under discussion at both sessions was the problem of financing the operational activities of the Committee during 1956.

At the third session the Council adopted a budget for 1956 based on an estimated movement of 125,900 migrants and refugees out of Europe and calling for a total of $43,759,342: $2,690,366 for administrative expenditure and $41,068,976 for operational expenditure. However, the total of contributions which government members were prepared to offer at the third session fell short of the amount called for in the budget by $2,700,000. As the cash resources of the Committee had been exhausted by the movement of 120,422 persons out of Europe during 1955, the Council was under the necessity of convening the fourth session early in 1956 in order that the Director of the Committee might have precise knowledge of the income available for operations before such operations were too far advanced in 1956. Th problem was satisfactorily resolved at the fourt session.

The Migration Committee was organized o United States initiative at Brussels in 1951. I now includes 26 member governments. The Com mittee is engaged in securing increased movemen of migrants and refugees who would not otherwis emigrate out of the overcrowded countries of Eu rope to overseas countries of immigration. Unde a constitution which came into force in Octobe 1954 and has been accepted by 24 member govern ments, the Council is composed of all membe governments and the Executive Committee o nine.

The following 23 governments were represente at the third and fourth sessions:

Argentina	Greece
Australia [2]	Israel
Austria	Italy [2]
Belgium	Netherlands [2]
Brazil [2]	New Zealand
Canada [2]	Norway
Chile [2]	Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
Colombia	Sweden
Costa Rica	Switzerland
Denmark	United States [2]
France [2]	Venezuela
Federal Republic of Germany [2]	

[1] For an article on the second session of the Counc and the Executive Committee, see BULLETIN of Aug. 2 1955, p. 308. For announcements of the U.S. delegation to the third and fourth sessions, see *ibid.*, Oct. 17, 195 p. 634, and Feb. 27, 1956, p. 355.

[2] Member of the Executive Committee.

• *Mr. Warren is Adviser on Refugees and Displaced Persons, Department of State. He served as principal adviser to the U.S. delegation at the third session of the ICEM Council and Executive Committee, and alternate U.S. representative at the fourth session.*

The Government of Paraguay was not repre-nted at either session. Uruguay was not rep-sented at the third session and accepted observer atus at the fourth session, pending formal ac-ptance of the constitution. Luxembourg was presented at the third but not at the fourth ssion.

The Holy See, the Governments of the Domini-n Republic, Spain, the United Kingdom, and e Union of South Africa were represented at th sessions as observers. The representatives of pain and the Union of South Africa indicated at negotiations concerning membership in the ommittee were about to be concluded. The nited Nations, the International Labor Organi-tion, the United Nations Educational, Scientific d Cultural Organization, the Office of the United ations High Commissioner for Refugees, the ouncil of Europe, the Organization for European conomic Cooperation, and nongovernmental or-anizations interested in migration were also rep-esented as observers.

The Executive Committee met in advance of ch session of the Council under the chairman-ip of Eric O. van Boetzelaer (Netherlands) and repared recommendations for action by the ouncil. At the third session, the Council adopted aff regulations for employees that had been rafted by the Executive Committee and thus mpleted the final step in the organization of the igration Committee and the determination of its gulations and procedures.

igration Services

The Council also gave considerable attention the question of migration services supplied by e Committee. These services consist of informa-on to migrants concerning opportunities in the ountries of immigration, language training, rientation instructions, vocational training, the reselection of migrants and processing for emi-ration, embarkation services, reception in the mmigration country, and the placement of mi-rants in employment after arrival in the receiving ountry. All services are supplied at the direct equest of the governments concerned. The costs f the services are shared with the governments nder arrangements which envisage the eventual ssumption by the governments of the full costs f the services supplied.

Assistance in the preselection of migrants, in processing them for emigration, in embarkation, and in reception is an integral part of the process of movement. The other services are aimed at improving the qualifications of migrants and assisting their successful adjustment in the country of immigration. Vocational training is provided only for those who have already been selected for emigration by the recruiting missions of the receiving countries.

While expressions of support for the provision of migration services by the Migration Committee reflected the direct benefits received from the services by individual government members, all agreed that those services directly connected with movement were essential and should be continued. Some governments expressed concern that more might be attempted in the field of vocational training than the resources of the Migration Committee could support. The Director, Harold H. Tittmann, Jr., assured the Council, however, that most of the expenditures for vocational training were borne by the interested governments and that the role of the Migration Committee was restricted to the planning of training and the provision of experts when required. He also explained that the Committee tried only to supply the minimum of basic training to assist the migrant in securing employment after emigration. No final decisions were taken with respect to migration services, and the Director was requested to report further on developing experience at a later session.

Differences of views, which were not resolved at the session, were expressed with respect to the Migrant Contribution Plan presented by the Director. Most governments, including Italy and the United States, expressed strong support for encouraging the migrant to contribute as much as he could to the cost of his transportation. Australia, New Zealand, and the Netherlands expressed equally strong convictions that, although the migrant might be required to make prepayment in advance of his movement, he should not be burdened with the necessity of making installment payments after arrival in the country of immigration because such a burden would hinder his readjustment in the new country.

The Council learned during the discussion that approximately 93 percent of the migrants presently moved contribute in some manner to the costs of their transportation and that complete application of the Migrant Contribution Plan

might increase the Committee's resources by as much as one million dollars annually in later years. Under the revolving funds administered by the voluntary agencies, to which both the Migration Committee and the voluntary agencies have contributed, over 50,000 migrants were assisted by loans in 1952, 1953, and 1954 to meet a substantial part of their transportation costs. The extent of repayment on these loans has been most creditable. Of the loans made in 1952, more than 64 percent was repaid by 1955, and of those made in 1953, more than 41 percent.

Problem of Financing 1956 Operations

The main preoccupation of the Council at the third session was with the problem of financing operations for 1956. The budget of movement adopted called for $2,700,000 more in income than current contributions of governments would produce. This situation resulted from the fact that the contributions of individual member governments are based in the main on per capita rates applied to persons actually moved to or from their particular countries. The totals of the contributions thus related to specific movements do not in most instances cover the actual costs of these movements, and the Migration Committee must in consequence subsidize the deficit movements from its own resources. Movements to certain destinations like Australia call for larger subsidies than others, while some movements earn sufficient income to cover the costs involved. During 1954 and 1955 the Migration Committee had been able to provide the subsidies required from the funds carried over from the operations of previous years and from increased contributions of member governments. It was not anticipated, however, that there would be any substantial funds carried over into 1956.

As the government members were not prepared in October to pledge the additional income of $2,700,000 required, the Council decided to establish a Working Party of five member governments, Argentina, Australia, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United States, to explore the problem further and to make recommendations well in advance of the fourth session to be convened in February 1956.

During the course of the third session, Viscount Malvern, Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, J. G. Suurhoff, Minister of Social Affairs and Public Health of the Netherlands, Dino Del Bo, Under Secretary of State o the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy, an Pierre Schneiter, Chairman of the French Na tional Assembly and Special Representative of th Council of Europe, made important statements t the Council concerning their governments' view on the problems of migration. Pierre Miche (Switzerland) presided as chairman at the thir session. Victor Montoya (Venezuela) served a vice chairman, Tyge Haarlov (Denmark) as sec ond vice chairman, and Ralph Harry (Australia as rapporteur.

The Working Party met at Washington in De cember 1955. After a thorough study of the finan cial problem which had been created in part b the fact that a larger proportion of the total an nual movement—over 40 percent—was to go t Australia in 1956, the Working Party recom mended that a Special Fund of $3,000,000 b created. All additional contributions of govern ment members resulting from increased rates o per capita payments or otherwise which constitut new income for the Committee for operations i 1956 would be credited to the Special Fund.

The Council on convening the fourth session i February elected Scott McLeod (United States as chairman, Alzate Avendano (Colombia) a vice chairman, Tyge Haarlov (Denmark) as sec ond vice chairman, and Kurt Seidler (Austria) a rapporteur. Before relinquishing the chair to M McLeod, the retiring chairman, Pierre Miche (Switzerland) paid a tribute to the late Congres man Chauncey W. Reed, who played a major ro as a member of a number of U.S. delegations t Icem in the creation and development of the M gration Committee, particularly in the drafting o the constitution. At M. Micheli's suggestion th Council passed a resolution requesting the U.S representative to transmit to the United State Congress the expression of the Council's deep r gret and sympathy at the death of Mr. Reed.

Recommendation of Working Party

The recommendation of the Working Part with respect to the creation of a Special Fund o $3,000,000 was accepted by the Director, approve by the Executive Committee, and adopted by th Council. Thereupon, the chairman called for ad ditional pledges to the Special Fund and succeede in securing firm promises of contributions tota ing over $2,600,000, which, with a carryover o

85,000 from 1955, approximately met the addi-onal income requirements of the 1956 budget. ncluded in the additional contributions pledged ere $546,000 by Australia, $164,500 by Austria, 20,000 by the Federal Republic of Germany, 81,850 by Italy, $236,500 by the Netherlands, 16,822 by Switzerland, and $939,600, subject to rtain conditions, by the United States. Thir-en governments made definite pledges of addi-onal contributions, and three reported that such ntributions were still under consideration.

The Director, in reporting on progress since e third session and problems facing the Com-ittee in 1956, made reference to the improved onomic situation in many of the emigration untries in Europe and to the fact that many of e emigrants available for movement would re-ire at least a minimum of vocational training they were to qualify for the opportunities open immigrants in the receiving countries. The .S. representative pointed out that the Commit-e had failed to date to interpret its migration rvices sufficiently to insure the receipt of income lequate to cover the expenditures and that the ommittee's assistance in the movement of refu-es should win wider support, particularly from e member governments not directly concerned ith emigration.

Of the total number of migrants moved by the ommittee during 1955, 29,323 were refugees; ,919 of these came under the terms of reference the United Nations High Commissioner for efugees. The corresponding figures for the year period ending on December 31, 1955, were 9,189 and 83,188. The total number of all igrants moved in this 4-year period was 406,867.

scussion of Director's Report

In the discussion of the Director's report many presentatives pointed out that the need for igration from Europe will persist irrespective the current high level of economic activity in urope. In appraising the need for migration, ey felt that consideration should be given to ch factors as the density of population, the lack living space, the increasing encroachment of uropean cities on agricultural land, the need for more rational distribution of manpower, and e requirements of developing countries overseas r a continuing flow of migrants. The Australian presentative pointed out that, if the more favorable opportunities for migrants in receiving countries are not exploited during periods of high business activity, it will prove difficult, if not impossible, to reestablish the flow of migration during periods of lower economic activity; in other words, that the continuity of migration is of importance to both emigration and immigration countries and contributes to the strength of the free world. In this discussion several representatives drew attention to the achievements of ICEM to date in providing shipping on many migrant routes where commercial shipping is unavailable or inadequate, in establishing cooperative services between emigration and immigration countries, and in building up, in the selection, processing, and reception of migrants, standards of performance that have reduced waste, confusion, and costs in this field.

Kurt Seidler, the Austrian representative, made a special plea during the course of the session for the assistance of other governments and ICEM in facilitating the emigration of increasing numbers of refugees arriving in Austria from Eastern European countries. Some 3,000 such refugees had arrived during 1955, and more were expected in 1956 because of easier access to Austria since the withdrawal of the Soviet forces under the provisions of the Austrian State Treaty. Dr. Seidler expressed the hope that other governments of the free world would assist Austria in providing asylum for the refugees whom Austria, because of her geographical position, receives in the first instance.

The Council adjourned the fourth session on February 24, 1956, confident that the activities of the Migration Committee for 1956 had gotten off to an auspicious start and resolved to convene the fifth session about October 1, 1956.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

U.N. Sugar Conference

The Department of State announced on May 21 (press release 269) that the U.S. Government will be represented at the U.N. Sugar Conference, to be convened at U.N. Headquarters at New York on that day, by the following delegation:

United States Representative

Marvin L. McLain, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture

Alternate United States Representatives

Earl M. Hughes, Administrator, Commodity Stabilization Service, Department of Agriculture

Lawrence Myers, Director, Sugar Division, Commodity Stabilization Service, Department of Agriculture

Advisers

Thomas H. Allen, Commodity Stabilization Service, Department of Agriculture

Malcolm Baldridge, General Counsel, U.S. Cane Sugar Refiners Association, Washington, D. C.

Richard M. Blake, Secretary, National Beet Growers Federation, Greeley, Colo.

William M. Case, Commodity Stabilization Service, Department of Agriculture

Paul E. Callanan, International Resources Division, Department of State

John J. Czyzak, Assistant to the Legal Adviser, Department of State

Eric Englund, Agricultural Attaché, American Embassy, London

Josiah Ferris, Vice President, American Sugar Cane League, Washington, D.C.

Ernest Greene, Washington Representative, Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association, Washington, D.C.

Hans G. Hirsch, Commodity Stabilization Service, Department of Agriculture

Wallace Kemper, President, Southdown Sugars, Inc., New Orleans, La.

Nat B. King, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, New York

Gordon Lyons, Executive Manager, California Beet Growers Association, Stockton, Calif.

Stanley D. Metzger, Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic Affairs, Department of State

Slater Miller, Washington Representative, Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association, Washington, D.C.

Thomas O. Murphy, Commodity Stabilization Service, Department of Agriculture

P. K. Norris, Foreign Agricultural Service, Department of Agriculture

Robert H. Shields, President and General Counsel, U.S. Beet Sugar Association, Washington, D.C.

Luis Rivera-Santos, Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, San Juan

Dudley Smith, President, Association of Sugar Producers of Puerto Rico, Washington, D.C.

Harry R. Turkel, Office of Regional American Affairs, Department of State

The present International Sugar Agreement, which was negotiated at a U.N. Sugar Conference at London in 1953, came into force at the beginning of 1954.[1] Article 42 provides that the duration of this agreement shall be for 5 years from January 1, 1954, and that in the third year of this agreement the International Sugar Council (the administrative body of the agreement) shall examine the entire working of the agreement, especially in regard to quotas and prices. The Council, at its meeting at London, November 28–December 1, 1955, requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene an international conference under the auspices of the United Nations in order to make possible an examination on a wider basis than is possible within the Council. Accordingly, the Secretary-General of the United Nations announced in March 1956 that a U.N. Sugar Conference would be convened on May 21, 1956.

The agenda of the conference, prepared by the Interim Coordinating Committee for International Commodity Arrangements (a body of the United Nations), will provide an opportunity to review the operation of the present agreement and to consider whether any changes should be made in the light of this review and the current situation in international trade in sugar.

[1] For background, see BULLETIN of Oct. 26, 1953, p. 542; Dec. 14, 1953, p. 823; and Mar. 29, 1954, p. 493.

U.N. Refugee Fund Executive Committee

The Department of State announced on May 24 (press release 277) that Christopher H. Phillips, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs and U.S. representative on the United Nations Refugee Fund Executive Committee, will attend the 3d session of the Committee convening at Geneva, Switzerland, on May 28. He will be assisted by Henry F. Nichol, conference officer, U.S. Resident Delegation for International Organizations at Geneva.

In a resolution of October 21, 1954, the General Assembly of the United Nations authorized the establishment of a United Nations Refugee Fund to enable the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to undertake a program designed to achieve permanent solutions of certain refugee problems by December 31, 1958. Under the program it was planned to take action to stimulate the integration of refugees into agriculture; to provide for their establishment in trades, small businesses, and professions; to plan the construction of housing for refugees; to provide vocational and other training for refugees to facilitate their integration or resettlement; to aid university students; to create community centers; to promote resettlement programs overseas; and to establish resettlement counseling services for refugees.

The Executive Committee was established by

e Economic and Social Council of the United ıtions to provide necessary guidance to the High ›mmissioner in carrying out the program of rmanent solutions. The Executive Committee termines the general policies under which the ›eration of the fund shall be planned, developed, d administered; determines the annual financial an for the fund; adopts administrative regula- ›ns for the fund; reviews expenses incurred ıder the fund; and insures the taking of all cessary steps to provide for continuing super- sion of approved projects.

The members of the Executive Committee are ıstralia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Colombia, ›nmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, reece, Iran, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, vitzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United ates, Venezuela, and the Vatican.

2d Session, ILO Governing Body

The Department of State announced on May (press release 282) that J. Ernest Wilkins, As- stant Secretary of Labor and U.S. Government presentative on the Governing Body of the ternational Labor Office, will attend the 132d ssion of the Governing Body at Geneva, Switzer- nd, on June 1 and 2, prior to the opening of the th session of the International Labor Confer- ce, which convenes on June 6. Meetings of rious committees of the Governing Body will gin on May 28.

Mr. Wilkins will be assisted by the substitute .S. representative, Arnold L. Zempel, Executive irector, Office of International Labor Affairs, ›partment of Labor, and four advisers: Otis E. ulliken, Officer in Charge, Social Affairs, Office International Economic and Social Affairs, De- ırtment of State; Stuart Rothman, Solicitor, ›partment of Labor; B. Allen Rowland, Special ssistant to the Secretary, Department of Com- erce; and George Tobias, Labor Attaché, Ameri- n Consulate General, Geneva.

The Governing Body usually meets three times year to receive reports on activities of the Inter- ıional Labor Office, outline future work of the ffice, examine and recommend the annual budget, d prepare agendas for the annual sessions of the ıternational Labor Conference. It is responsible r establishing all ILO committees, setting their eetings, reviewing their work, and determining e action to be taken on their recommendations.

International Cooperation To Develop Water Resources

STATEMENT BY JOHN C. BAKER U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ON ECOSOC [1]

The problem of managing national water resources for the greatest benefit of their citizens is common to all governments. Those nations whose territories are subject to floods from great rivers or whose lands lie in arid zones face the more urgent problems. But, as increasing population and economic development result in rising demands for water, all countries will have to take steps to assure the best possible use of their water resources. Where two or more countries share those resources, as in the case of many river systems, their beneficial use for the good of all is of international concern.

Because effective use of water resources is of great importance to economic development, my delegation attaches great significance to this area of the work of the United Nations and the specialized agencies. We have, therefore, been glad to join with the delegation of France in sponsoring the draft resolution contained in document E/L.721. I should like to make a brief statement concerning this resolution and the report of the Secretary-General (E/2827).

Past resolutions of the Council have stressed the importance of the multiple-purpose approach to the development of water resources. They have also emphasized the necessity for interagency coordination, if international organizations are to make their most effective contribution to the solution of national and international water problems. The resolution before us would reaffirm our support of these policies.

The development of sound policies for the use of water resources is, of course, largely a matter of national responsibility. It is true that in the case of those important water resources which are shared by two or more countries, some form of bilateral or multilateral cooperation is desirable. Even in these cases, however, each national government concerned has the final responsibility for planning and carrying out any development of those resources within its territories.

As to water resources located entirely within

[1] Made in the U.N. Economic and Social Council on May 2 (U.S./U.N. press release 2403).

one country, the most that any international agency can do is to help make the world's knowledge and experience more readily available to governments, to help stimulate the development of new knowledge, and to demonstrate new or improved techniques.

Some of the specialized agencies of the United Nations have, from the very beginning, developed active programs in certain phases of water resources development. For example, WHO [World Health Organization] has for some time been especially concerned with environmental sanitation and the problem of providing safe water for human consumption; FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization] with the conservation and use of water for agriculture and fisheries; UNESCO [U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization] with scientific research on many aspects of water, especially for the improvement of arid zones; and WMO [World Meteorological Organization] with meteorology.

But beginning in 1952, and more particularly since 1954, there has been an important change in their activities as a result of the Council's recommendations. Since then, these agencies, together with the Secretary-General and the executive secretaries of the several regional economic commissions, have consulted with each other on a regular and systematic basis, with a view to preventing duplication. These consultations have served to highlight the interrelationships between all phases of the development of water resources and particularly the advantages of multipurpose development. We commend all the agencies involved in these cooperative arrangements.

Since this question was last on our agenda, considerable progress has been made in such specific fields as the assembly of data and the exchange of views and technical information among the interested agencies. We are pleased to note that, as a result of these interagency consultations, FAO is assuming responsibility for the study of watershed management in all its aspects and expects to complete a handbook on this subject by 1957.

We hope that, as these interagency consultations continue on a regular basis, all the agencies—and through them, governments—will acquire a better understanding of the interrelationships of all aspects of water-resource development. Each agency should constantly keep in mind that what it does in its own field may well have an impact on the activities of other agencies. It cannot adequately plan its own program without taking into account the relationship of such program to the programs of other agencies. For example, a watershed project by FAO may have a direct bearing on a health project of WHO, or on an industrial or power project being undertaken in the same area.

The Secretary-General reports that the interagency group with which he has consulted with respect to work in this field has recommended that two types of activity be given especial attention by the appropriate agencies. We assume that this would be in addition to the approved work programs already underway. These are, first, remedying deficiencies in hydrologic data, and second, examining the implications of integrated river-basin development. We agree that these projects should be given high priority.

So far as the first of these two projects is concerned, it is our understanding that WMO will not collect, compile, and publish hydrologic data but will help in establishing standards for their collection and compilation. Also, we assume that the hydrologic activities of WMO will be coordinated with those of such regional activities as the ECAFE [Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East] Bureau of Flood Control and Water Resources. The need for coordination in this field emphasizes strongly the desirability of filling the position of Water Resources Adviser to the United Nations.

As far as integrated river-basin development is concerned, it is clear that a single form of river valley authority is not necessarily the answer for dealing with the problems of all river valleys. The important objective is to develop the water of a river valley for the benefit of the people concerned. Different forms of political and administrative organization may be suitable for achieving this objective in different places.

There is another point that nontechnical administrators sometimes do not fully take into account. That is the long period required for the collection of basic data and for the economic and engineering analysis essential to successful river-basin programs. While the Council may feel that the water program has not proceeded at the rate or on the scale it had hoped for, a program of this character will never move very rapidly. The capacity of countries to assemble, analyze, and use the basic data for planning an integrated river-basin development is often limited. Moreover, the ability to

ınce, construct, administer, and operate even ıtively small and simple projects is frequently king. More than money, machinery, and expert ·ice is required. A long period of education and ient training at all levels is needed, from the n on the land who applies the irrigation water, top officials who must administer policies and ıds with integrity and foresight.

International agencies can usefully explore hniques for the exchange of information con-ning developments on selected problems of com-n interest among administrators, engineers, l scientists. We note that the Secretary-Gen-l and other agencies have suggested the possi-ity of convening a world conference of water ources for this purpose. While such a confer-e may eventually prove to be desirable, we stion whether such a conference would be of lue at the present time. The world's water prob-ıs are of great diversity and complexity, and re are great differences in the interests of var-ıs regions of the world in those water problems. We would suggest, instead, that the Secretary-neral seek the assistance of a standing panel recognized experts which he could constitute this purpose. The flexible use of such a panel ould enable the United Nations, its regional eco-nic commissions, the specialized agencies, and vernments to take action in the light of a thor-gh consideration of the technical, admin-rative, policy, and educational phases of ter-resource development.

We suggest that the Secretary-General include his next report information on progress in these rious fields, together with his recommendations further action.

Mr. President, this whole field of water-re-ırce development is of utmost importance to the ıeral economic progress of all member coun-es. Here, the leadership and coordination pro-led by the United Nations can be of great istance to all. We hope that the Secretary-neral, in planning his budget for submission the General Assembly, will accord this activity ufficiently high priority so that the important st of Water Resources Adviser can soon be filled th an expert of stature and experience. My vernment will cooperate with the Secretary-neral in every possible way to make this impor-ıt program a success.

. . . . . .

TEXT OF RESOLUTION[2]

U.N. doc. E/Res. (XXI)/15

The Economic and Social Council,

Having noted the Secretary-General's report on "International Co-operation with respect to Water Resource Development",

Recognizing with appreciation the progress already achieved in strengthening international co-operation as a result of periodic inter-agency meetings on water resources,

Endorsing the recommendation of the Secretary-General that high priority be given to remedying deficiencies in hydrology data and to assisting in integrated river basin development,

Considering that the general subject of international co-operation with respect to water resource development and the study of arid regions has been of increasing concern to the United Nations,

Considering the growing importance of the utilization of brackish and saline water, either unprocessed or demineralized, for the economic development of areas where fresh water supplies are becoming insufficient,

Believing that there is a growing economic and social need for the most effective utilization and development of these water resources in view of the progressive increase in the world's population, the need for raising the standard of living of the peoples of the world, and rapidly increasing industrialization,

1. *Reaffirms* its support of Council resolutions 417 (XIV) and 533 (XVIII);

2. *Commends* the Secretary-General and the specialized agencies for the co-operation evidenced in the series of consultations on water resources already held;

3. *Urges* the Secretary-General and the specialized agencies to continue such consultations to the end that in so far as possible the activities of the United Nations organizations be carried on with full regard to the inter-relationships involved;

4. *Calls to the attention* of Governments the importance of demineralization of saline water and utilization of subsoil water and urges them to exchange information on the findings of research concerned with a solution of these problems;

5. *Draws to the attention* of Governments the desirability of an increased use of the available technical assistance facilities, especially in the training of personnel in this field;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General:

(*a*) To make appropriate arrangements for ensuring the collection, analysis and dissemination of information on current development of water projects, research programmes and related activities;

(*b*) To initiate, in co-operation with competent specialized agencies and with the Governments concerned, a preliminary inquiry on existing hydrologic services, plans for their extension and conditions for the execution of these plans;

(*c*) To constitute a panel of world known experts for

[2] Adopted unanimously on May 3.

reviewing, with the assistance of the United Nations Secretariat, the administrative, economic and social implications of integrated river basin development, and for advising on the proper action (including, if they deem it advisable, the convening of an international conference) to be taken in order to ensure world-wide exchange of experience and data in related domains;

(*d*) To report to the Council, not later than its twenty-fifth session, on progress in these fields and to formulate recommendations on further action that might be taken by the United Nations organizations.

TREATY INFORMATION

U.S. Signs Agreement With Turkey on Defense Use of Technology

The Department of State announced on May 18 (press release 267) the signing of an agreement with Turkey to facilitate the exchange of patent rights and technical information for defense purposes. The agreement was signed at Ankara, May 18, 1956, by Muharrem Nuri Birgi, Secretary General of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Foy David Kohler, American Chargé d'Affaires.

The agreement is expected to foster the exchange of technology for defense purposes between the two Governments and between the private industries of the two countries. Thus it should be of reciprocal benefit in providing for national defense and in contributing to the mutual defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area.

The agreement with Turkey is the latest to be signed of a series being negotiated with the NATO countries and with Japan. Other agreements of this nature have been signed with Italy, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Norway, the Netherlands, Greece, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Japan.

The agreements recognize that, wherever practicable, privately owned technology should generally be exchanged through commercial agreements between owners and users. They also note that rights of private owners of patents and technical information should be fully recognized and protected in accordance with laws applicable to such rights. The agreements are also intended to assure fair treatment of private owners when they deal directly with a foreign government. In addition, the agreements provide for the protection technical information communicated through g ernment channels and for the establishment of rangements by which owners of patentable inv tions placed under secrecy by one government n obtain comparable protection in the other count The agreements further provide as a general r that, when government-owned inventions are terchanged for defense purposes, this interchai will take place on a royalty-free basis.

Each of the agreements provides for the est lishment of a Technical Property Committee to composed of a representative of each governme These committees are charged with general sponsibility for considering and making reco mendations on any matters relating to the agr ments brought before them by either governme on their own behalf or on behalf of their nation One of the specific functions of the committee is make recommendations to the governments, eitl in particular cases or in general, concerning d parities in their laws affecting the compensati of owners of patents and technical informatic

The United States representative to the Tech cal Property Committees in Europe is assigned the staff of the Defense Adviser, United Sta Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organizati and European Regional Organizations (USR 2 Rue St. Florentin, Paris.

Policy guidance for the U. S. representatives the Technical Property Committees is provided the Interagency Technical Property Commit for Defense, chaired by the Department of I fense. Representatives of the Departments State, Justice, and Commerce, the Internatior Cooperation Administration, and the Governme Patents Board are included. This committee assisted by an industry advisory group represei ing major sectors of American industry concern with defense production.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Cultural Property

Convention for protection of cultural property in t event of armed conflict, and regulations of executi Done at The Hague May 14, 1954.[1]
Ratification deposited: Mexico, May 7, 1956.

Extradition

Convention on extradition. Signed at Montevideo Dece

[1] Not in force.

er 26, 1933. Entered into force January 25, 1935. 49 tat. 3111.
atification deposited: Argentina, April 19, 1956.

de and Commerce

ocès verbal of rectification concerning the protocol[1] mending part I and articles XXIX and XXX of the eneral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the protocol[1] mending the preamble and parts II and III of the eneral Agreement, and the protocol[1] of organizational mendments to the General Agreement. Done at Geneva ecember 3, 1955.
ignatures: Haiti and New Zealand, December 3, 1955; Canada, February 9, 1956; Netherlands, February 13, 1956; Belgium, February 16, 1956; Australia, March 2, 1956; India, April 16, 1956; Greece, April 19, 1956; United States, May 11, 1956.

BILATERAL

rkey

eement to facilitate interchange of patent rights and echnical information for purposes of defense. Signed t Ankara May 18, 1956. Enters into force on the ate of receipt by the United States of notification of onstitutional approval by Turkey.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

anklin Medal Presented Department of State

ss release 271 dated May 22

The Franklin Medal, commemorating the 250th niversary of the birth of Benjamin Franklin, s presented to the Department of State on May by Clarence L. Jordan, chairman of the 250th niversary Committee, and accepted for the Dertment by Deputy Under Secretary for Adminration Loy W. Henderson.

Mr. Jordan made the presentation on behalf of e Secretary of the Treasury and the United ates Congress. Public Law 259, 84th Congress, thorized the Secretary of the Treasury to have uck 71 bronze medals commemorating the 250th niversary of Benjamin Franklin's birth and, in operation with the Franklin Institute of the mmonwealth of Pennsylvania, "to provide for e presentation of" these medals. Twenty-one ipients are named in the act as institutions, terprises, and societies of which Franklin was member, founder, or sponsor. Fifty other reoients have been chosen as representative of anklin's ideals in the broad fields of knowledge and the service of man. The Department of State and the United States Information Agency have been acting for the Department of the Treasury in the presentation of the Franklin Medal to recipients outside the borders of the United States.[1]

The face of the bronze medal shows Franklin's profile in relief with the inscription "Benjamin Franklin—1706–1956—Medal of the Congress—United States of America." The reverse of the medal bears the inscription: "Wise and Good Men Are the Strength of a Nation." Laura Gardin Fraser, sculptor of the Franklin Medal, also designed the medal commemorating the 200th anniversary of the United States Military Academy and the medals presented by the Congress to Gen. George C. Marshall and Col. Charles A. Lindbergh. Her husband, the late James Earle Fraser, created the memorial statue at the Franklin Institute in Philadelphia.

First Meeting of Foreign Service Advisory Committee

Press release 270 dated May 21

The Advisory Committee for the Foreign Service Institute of the Department of State held its first meeting at Washington on May 21. Nine members from private and academic life were invited by Secretary Dulles to form this group. They are:

Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Editor, *Foreign Affairs*
Mrs. Frances P. Bolton, U.S. House of Representatives
Ellsworth Bunker, President, The American National Red Cross
Robert D. Calkins, President, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C.
Robert Cutler, Chairman, Board of Directors, Old Colony Trust Co., Boston, Mass.
Clyde K. Kluckhohn, Director, Laboratory of Social Sciences, Harvard University
William L. Langer, Chairman, Committee on Regional Studies, Harvard University
Charles E. Saltzman, Henry Sears & Co., New York, N.Y.
Henry M. Wriston, Director, The American Assembly, Graduate School of Business, Columbia University

The Institute, under the direction of Harold B. Hoskins, conducts a continuous training program for the U.S. Foreign Service, the Department, and other agencies of government engaged in foreign affairs. Courses include orientation, language in-

[1] For texts of statements made at previous presentations, see BULLETIN of Feb. 13, 1956, p. 249, and May 14, 1956, p. 800.

struction, modern management training, and international studies.

During its 1-day session the new committee met briefly with the Secretary, was greeted by Under Secretary Loy W. Henderson, and reviewed with Director Hoskins the Institute's progress and future plans. Their agenda also included a tour of the Institute's present quarters, 2115 C St. NW., and a luncheon at Blair-Lee House.

Designations

E. Allan Lightner, Jr., as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, effective May 14.

Roy R. Rubottom, Jr., as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, effective May 16 (press release 252 dated May 14).

Jack D. Neal, as Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs, effective May 16.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3503. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Egypt—Modifying agreement of December 14, 1955, as supplemented. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington February 17, 1956. Entered into force February 17, 1956.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3505. 16 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Austria—Signed at Vienna February 7, 1956. Entered into force February 7, 1956.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3506. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Iran—Signed at Tehran February 20, 1956. Entered into force February 20, 1956.

Mutual Defense Assistance—Japanese Financial Contributions. TIAS 3507. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Japan—Modifying agreement of July 12, 1955. Exchange of notes Signed at Tokyo February 3, 1956. Entered into for February 3, 1956.

German Foreign Policy Documents

The Department of State announced on M 24 (press release 276) the release of another v ume of the series entitled *Documents on Germ Foreign Policy, 1918–1945*. This is series D, v ume IX, *The War Years, March 18, 1940–Ju 22, 1940*. The volumes are published cooper tively by the United States, Great Britain, a France from archives of the German Foreign C fice captured by Allied forces at the close of Wor War II.

The volume opens with the minutes of the me ing at the Brenner Pass on March 18, 1940, b tween Hitler and Mussolini. The documents through the period to June 1940.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: May 21-27

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

Press releases issued prior to May 21 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 252 of May 14, 260 and 262 of May 16, and 267 of May 18.

No.	Date	Subject
269	5/21	U.N. Sugar Conference delegation (rewrite).
270	5/21	Foreign Service Advisory Committee.
271	5/22	Franklin Medal presented to Department.
272	5/22	Dulles: news conference.
*273	5/23	Nebraska editor to tour Germany under NATO.
274	5/23	Signing of GATT protocol.
275	5/23	U.S. and Canada to study boundary waters.
276	5/24	*Documents on Germany Foreign Policy.*
277	5/24	U.N. Refugee Fund Executive Committee delegation (rewrite).
278	5/24	Cutoff on Polish visa applications.
279	5/24	Dulles: anniversary of founding of Buddhism.
*280	5/25	Snow retirement.
†281	5/25	Holmes appointment.
282	5/25	ILO delegation (rewrite).
†283	5/25	Pan American Institute of Geography and History delegation (rewrite).

*Not printed.
†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

riculture. U.N. Sugar Conference 947

nerican Principles
S. Policy on Right of Asylum 939
orking Together for International Understanding (Eisenhower) 915

nerican Republics. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference 920

ia. Anniversary of the Founding of Buddhism (Dulles) 926

nada. U.S. and Canada To Examine Subject of Boundary Waters 940

ngress, The. Visit of President Sukarno of Indonesia 927

partment and Foreign Service
signations (Lightner, Neal, Rubottom) . . . 954
rst Meeting of Foreign Service Advisory Committee 953
anklin Medal Presented to Department of State . 953

isarmament. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference 920

conomic Affairs
ternational Cooperation To Develop Water Resources (Baker, text of resolution) 949
ranscript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . 920
N. Sugar Conference 947
S. and Canada To Examine Subject of Boundary Waters 940
S. Signs GATT Protocol of Supplementary Concessions 941
orld Bank Reports $21.2 Million Net Income for 9-Month Period 941

gypt. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference 920

urope
inancing the Continuing Movement of Migrants From Europe (Warren) 944
U.S. Policy on Right of Asylum 939

ermany. German Foreign Policy Documents . . 954

ealth, Education, and Welfare. Working Together for International Understanding (Eisenhower) . 915

ndonesia
ranscript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . 920
isit of President Sukarno of Indonesia 927

nternational Organizations and Meetings
alendar of Meetings 942
inancing the Continuing Movement of Migrants From Europe (Warren) 944
overning Body, ILO 949
N. Refugee Fund Executive Committee 948
U.N. Sugar Conference 947

Japan. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference 920

Near East. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference 920

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference 920

Poland. Visa Applications Cut Off for Certain Polish Refugees 940

Presidential Documents. Working Together for International Understanding 915

Publications
German Foreign Policy Documents 954
Recent Releases 954

Refugees and Displaced Persons
Financing the Continuing Movement of Migrants From Europe (Warren) 944
U.N. Refugee Fund Executive Committee 948
U.S. Policy on Right of Asylum 939
Visa Applications Cut Off for Certain Polish Refugees 940

Treaty Information
Current Treaty Actions 952
U.S. Signs Agreement With Turkey on Defense Use of Technology 952
U.S. Signs GATT Protocol of Supplementary Concessions 941

Turkey. U.S. Signs Agreement With Turkey on Defense Use of Technology 952

U.S.S.R. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference 920

United Nations
Governing Body, ILO 949
International Cooperation To Develop Water Resources (Baker, text of resolution) 949
U.N. Refugee Fund Executive Committee . . . 948
U.N. Sugar Conference 947

World Bank Reports $21.2 Million Net Income for 9-Month Period 941

Name Index

Baker, John C. 949
Dulles, Secretary 920, 926
Eisenhower, President 915, 927
Lightner, E. Allan, Jr. 954
Neal, Jack D. 954
Nixon, Richard M. 927
Rubottom, Roy R., Jr. 954
Sukarno, Dr. 927, 928
Warren, George L. 944

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1956

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the Department of State

U.S. Policy in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa—1955

The year 1955 witnessed no lessening of American interest in the countries and peoples of the Near East, South Asia, and Africa, and it brought no end to the difficult and complicated problems which have come to the United States from this vital part of the world. On the contrary, the old, basic issues, involving the resurgent and often strident nationalism of the peoples of the area, the problem of self-determination or "colonialism," and questions of the economic development of underdeveloped countries still persisted 10 years after the end of the Second World War. In addition, important individual problems such as the Arab-Israel controversy, Cyprus, and French North Africa have also remained as matters of American concern, whether directly or otherwise, because of the position of the United States as one of the leaders of the free world.

This 63-page booklet surveys significant political issues, problems of regional security, mutual security programs and U.S. technical and economic assistance, and the outlook in U.S. policy.

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The Department of State bulletin

XXXIV, No. 885

June 11, 1956

PETROLEUM IMPORTS • *by Under Secretary Hoover* . . 959

MAINTAINING THE STRENGTH OF THE FREE WORLD THROUGH MUTUAL SECURITY • *Statement by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy* 963

PROGRESS IN FREE VIET-NAM • *by Assistant Secretary Robertson* 972

WORLD TRADE—OPPORTUNITY AND CHALLENGE • *by Under Secretary of Commerce Walter Williams* . . . 977

WITHDRAWAL OF NNSC TEAMS FROM SOUTH KOREA
U.N. Command Statement 967
Exchange of Notes With Chinese Communists 970

THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION MOVES AHEAD • *Article by Mrs. Oswald B. Lord* 984

For index see inside back cover

The Department of State bulletin

VOL. XXXIV, No. 885 • PUBLICATION 6354

June 11, 1956

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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etroleum Imports

by Under Secretary Hoover[1]

We, as members of the various State and Fed-
l agencies, in our regulatory or advisory ca-
cities must share many problems and responsi-
ities in common. For the policies and actions
opted in one field may well have far-reaching
ects in many others. One of these problems is
troleum imports.

The entire petroleum situation, and imports in
rticular, have been a matter of serious and con-
uing consideration in both the Department of
ate and in the President's Advisory Committee
Energy Supplies and Resources Policy. I am
ateful for the opportunity to review this situa-
n with you and also to examine in a broad way
e effectiveness of the existing import program
d to explore some of the longer-run problems.

As we review the problems that are before us
this time and endeavor to look beyond them into
e future, many questions come to mind. We
y ask, for example:

(1) Whether oil imports are a temporary phe-
menon, or are they a permanent one? Are they
ely to increase with time?

(2) What is their actual impact upon the do-
estic fuels industries and upon the broad prob-
n of our national security?

(3) Should such imports be controlled? And
the answer is yes, how can they be controlled?

(4) What is the proper function of the Federal
overnment in relation to the oil import problem?

In the serious discussion of the oil import prob-
n during the past few years, everyone has agreed
one basic fact: the necessity of maintaining
thin our borders vigorous and progressive fuels industries which have the capacity of rising to the required output levels should a national emergency arise. President Eisenhower, in establishing the Committee on Energy Supplies and Resources Policy in July 1954,[2] directed the committee to study and evaluate all factors pertaining to the continued development of energy supplies and resources in the United States "with the aim of strengthening the national defense, providing orderly industrial growth, and assuring supplies for our expanding national economy and for any future emergency."

From the standpoint of the national welfare, this requires the maximum practical reserves, coupled with the ability to produce, transport, refine, and distribute the required quantities of petroleum products wherever needed both for the civilian economy and for military use. It also requires that, if such supplies are not available within our own continental limits, they should be readily obtainable from other friendly nations. Obviously, only a small part of this can be done by government. Hard work, know-how, and the initiative of all members of the industry must be relied upon to do the job. It involves a very large and continuing investment of capital, together with a venturesome willingness to assume correspondingly large risks. It is here that our competitive free-enterprise system excels all others. The industry, on a voluntary basis, has met every emergency in the past, and we trust that it will continue to do so in the future.

Stated briefly, the U.S. petroleum situation today involves the balancing of rapidly increasing consumption against available production and reserves. And yet domestic reserves are increasing

[1] Address made before the Interstate Oil Compact Com-
ssion at Dallas, Tex., on June 1 (press release 290 dated
y 31).

[2] BULLETIN of Aug. 9, 1954, p. 199.

at a relatively slow rate. Therefore, it is vital that our import policy must be one that will actively encourage the maximum practicable effort toward oil exploration here at home through the use of constantly improving techniques in discovery and production. At the same time we must not forget that in the years to come we will probably require appreciable quantities of petroleum from friendly countries elsewhere.

In many respects 1955 represented a peak year for the crude-oil producing industry. Domestic production was at the alltime high of 6.8 million barrels per day. Domestic demand was more than 7.5 million barrels per day. The balance of somewhat less than 800 thousand barrels per day was made up by imports.

The total number of wells drilled in 1955 was 56,682, an increase of 5.1 percent over the previous alltime high of 1954. Wildcats drilled were 12,605, or almost 9 percent above the previous alltime high of 1954. The number of active drilling rigs on December 31, 1955, was 4,987, or almost 7 percent above the number active at the end of 1954. United States proved crude-oil reserves at the end of 1955, according to the A.P.I., were also at their alltime high of over 30 billion barrels.

On the other hand, we must face the fact that costs of discovery and development in the United States are rising. New fields are more difficult to find, wells must be drilled deeper, and costs of materials, equipment, and labor are higher than ever before. Net additions to proved crude-oil reserves in 1955, according to the A.P.I., amounted to only 451 million barrels. The average gross increase in proved oil reserves in 1955 per well drilled was only 60,500 barrels, or only two-thirds of the amount during 1951–53.

Military authorities tell us that, if a war emergency should be thrust upon us, we would need oil wherever we can obtain it, in both the Western and Eastern Hemispheres. In times of peace our oil imports help to maintain vigorous petroleum industries and strong economies abroad, which in turn increase the strength of the free world and strongly resist the efforts of those who would destroy the institutions we believe in.

We must at the same time face the fact that today flush, low-cost oil from some areas of the world can be laid down in the United States more cheaply than it can be found and produced domestically.

Need for Oil Imports

The need to draw on foreign sources of supp to meet our expanding demand is recognized inevitable by many authorities. Many other dustrial countries are required to do likewise though few of them, like ourselves, are in fortunate position of having at the same tim strong domestic oil industry to supply the bulk their requirements. It is difficult for a country achieve and maintain a sound industrial econor with increased productivity to meet the needs its population, unless it has a fully dependa source of relatively low-cost energy. Our ch problem in the United States in this connect is that of maintaining a proper balance betw imports and domestic oil production.

Turning briefly to residual fuel oil, impo have gradually increased over the years and h compensated for the decreased yield in our o refinery operations. The domestic production residuals, plus imports, has remained practica unchanged. In 1955 some reduction of stocks curred because of the tight supply situation, wh should be corrected by a moderate increase of ports prior to the next winter season.

Imports of crude and residual fuel oil do affect the domestic petroleum industry alo They have an impact on other fuels, such as co

The coal industry is making an excellent covery from the low level of 1954. Product increased from 419 million tons in 1954 to alm 500 million tons in 1955. Production of bitu nous coal thus far in 1956 is almost 20 perc higher than in 1955. Coal exports are much lar than in 1955 and seem to be taking on a perman character not anticipated even a few years ag

The facts indicate, therefore, that the dome coal industry is progressing rapidly, and it pears to be affected little, if at all, by the increa volume of residual fuel oil imports. Such ports at present appear not to constitute a th to the national security.

Maintaining Appropriate Balance

Considerations such as the ones I have outli have been the focus of attention of the Preside Advisory Committee since it first met. The pr lem of whether or not action should be ta to maintain an appropriate balance between ports and domestic crude-oil production was swered in the affirmative when the committee

ued its report on February 26, 1955.[3] This ap-
peared to be a sound conclusion in the light of
he conditions in our fuels industries at that time.

The problem of what measures should be taken
vas perhaps an even more difficult and significant
ne to solve. There were several methods from
which to choose. All had been used at one time
r another in our country's past dealings with in-
ernational trade questions and were urged upon
he committee by the various parties at interest.

The first of these methods was to increase our
uties or taxes on oil imports. This method was
ot acceptable for several reasons. To raise such
uties sufficiently to restrain imports would have
esulted in barring imports from certain relatively
igh-cost producing areas which are particularly
nportant to our national defense and with which
e have long enjoyed excellent trade relationships.
t would have imposed especial hardship on sev-
ral of our close neighbors in the Western Hemi-
here. Even if we had wanted to, this situation
uld not be corrected by imposing tariffs of
arying levels to different countries, depending
pon their geographical location or upon their
lative costs of production. To do so would
ave violated our policy of nondiscrimination,
hich is almost as old as the Republic itself and
hich is embodied as an obligation in virtually all
f our commercial treaties with countries around
e world.

The second of these proposed methods was to
pose quota limitations on oil imports. This
ethod was also not acceptable for a number of
asons, some of which were equally applicable
the imposition of higher import duties. From
e practical standpoint, quotas are extraordinar-
difficult to administer. They can—and usually
—become a source of continuing international
ictions, misunderstandings, and pressures. It
ould have been necessary to set up some adminis-
ative agency to determine how much oil should
imported and from what countries it might
me. Each of these countries would then have
determine what amounts might be imported
each company. Country and company quotas,
turn, would have to be based on historical aver-
es. This would have the effect of denying ac-
ss to countries and importers who might not
ready have been included in the historical base
period. Such a method would have placed shackles on an industry whose dynamic qualities should be fostered rather than hampered. Sources of production would tend to be frozen, and progress and flexibility to meet changing circumstances would be defeated.

Within the United States, quotas would inevitably lead to governmental price fixing and ultimately to further controls and regimentation. It would be an open invitation to controversies between the producing countries as to quotas to be assigned, conflicts between domestic producing and consuming interests, and a rigidity covering the entire industry at a time when flexibility is required to meet rapidly changing conditions. I do not believe that any of you in the petroleum industry wants to be placed in this sort of straitjacket.

Voluntary Restraints

The only alternative method, and the one which was adopted by the President's Advisory Committee, is that of individual, voluntary restraint by the oil-importing companies. The committee believed that every effort should be made to avoid the necessity of governmental intervention. It has been the purpose of the present administration to provide leadership along this course, believing as it does in the fundamental soundness of our competitive free-enterprise system and in the need of flexibility of action to enable industry to meet new or changing circumstances. This policy provides the flexibility that is essential to technical and economic progress and to the overall interests of the consuming public and of our national defense.

Examples of this flexibility are evident in the letters which the chairman of the committee [Arthur S. Flemming] sent to the importing companies on October 29, 1955, and May 11, 1956.

In his letter of October 29, 1955, Dr. Flemming indicated that the committee had reached certain conclusions regarding the application of its formula. Specifically, the committee recognized the desirability of placing in a separate category crude-oil imports from Canada and Venezuela. Among other considerations, national defense was one of the basic factors affecting this decision. In the event of a national emergency, oil from Western Hemisphere countries will always be recognized as our safest supplemental source of petro-

[3] For text, see *ibid.*, Mar. 21, 1955, p. 487.

leum. Moreover, in the case of Canada, the United States had encouraged the building of the Trans-Mountain Pipeline from Alberta to the Pacific Coast in order to provide that rapidly growing and strategically important area with an assured source of crude. Also in the case of Canada an additional factor underlying the committee's conclusion was the fact that most of Canada's crude-oil exports to the United States come to areas where they are needed to supplement domestic sources and where the detrimental effects on the domestic industry are at a minimum. The light Canadian crudes are especially needed on the west coast.

In his letter of May 11, 1956, Dr. Flemming indicated that the committee had made further modifications in the application of its formula. It recognized the special character of the demand-supply situation on the west coast, which from the oil standpoint is a separate geographic area. A larger proportion of imports, particularly from Canada, will be required in order to meet increasing demands for petroleum products. The west coast and the area east of the Rockies are distinct and separate problems and therefore will be treated separately. At the present time, in order to keep supply and demand in balance, the west coast needs a larger supplemental supply of petroleum, proportionately, than does the rest of the country. To lump together figures for the United States as a whole, as has been done on some occasions, tends to create a distortion of the true facts.

As indicated by the letter, the committee will continue to follow closely all aspects of the situation, in both regions, to avoid threats to the national security which might arise from excessive imports. The subject is under constant and intensive review, and action will be taken whenever circumstances indicate that it may be desirable.

The committee also believed, as stated in the letter of May 11, that industrial expansion and changing economic and national-defense requirements might make it advisable to take another look at the import formula which the committee set forth in its February 1955 recommendations.

By providing flexibility in the application of the import formula and by relying on the individual, voluntary cooperation of the importing companies, rather than on rigid formulas, I believe that we have thus far experienced a large measure of success in handling the problems which were so urgent at the time the President appoi the committee in July 1954. There was init grave doubt in many quarters that a progra voluntary restraint could be successful. W not all elements of the situation are satisfac particularly the relative slowness with w United States crude-oil reserves are increasir spite of the high level of exploration and dri the feeling on the part of many persons was j fied that the industry as a whole would coop if effective guidance could be provided. The mittee has endeavored to provide that leade to the best of its ability, and I believe that s it has been successful.

Dr. Flemming, as Director of the Office of fense Mobilization, has the responsibility, ever, under the Trade Agreements Extension of 1955, to advise the President if he has re to believe that any article is being imported the United States in such quantities as to thre to impair the national security. In such event President would determine what steps woul taken.

While the industry as a whole appears to cooperated wholeheartedly in the attempt to r a solution of the oil import problem, there been some exceptions. They may, in fact jeopardizing the very foundations of a free o dustry. A careful analysis shows that in instances these organizations are the ones would be hurt the most by governmental cont It is hoped that their actions may not make n sary the very type of controls and regiment which I feel sure that the overwhelming maj of the industry deeply desires to avoid.

Formula To Be Reexamined

The many developments that have occu since the date of the committee's original r have led the committee to recommend, as s in Dr. Flemming's letter of May 11, 1956, t reexamination of the import formula be u taken and completed by September 1, 1956. recommendation relates to the imports of crude and residual oils. It is in conformity the committee's recommendation in February that "the desirable proportionate relationshi tween imports and domestic production b viewed from time to time in the light of indu expansion and changing economic and nat defense requirements."

Following this reexamination the committe

ain review the oil import situation. If it finds it import programs are threatening to impair e national security, the committee has stated that will recommend the scheduling of a public hear- g not later than October 1, 1956, under the pro- ions of section 7 of the Trade Agreements tension Act of 1955.

It is probable that the rapid increase of demand ll require that the United States import appre- ble quantities of oil in the years to come. I be- e that this can be done without endangering the ic prosperity of our domestic fuels industries. This does not mean, however, that there will be many complex and difficult problems ahead. maintaining flexibility to meet changing cir- nstances, and a willingness to work through the untary, individual methods of free enterprise, elieve that they can be surmounted. This will uire statesmanship on the part of the industry and the full cooperation of all of the State and Federal agencies, of which the State regulatory commissions and the Interstate Oil Compact Commission can play a major part.

Our country has been built upon the foundation of a competitive and voluntary system of free enterprise. Controls often seem like an easy panacea for our problems, but once started they are hard to stop. Freedom from unnecessary regimentation is the American way, and the fact that the problems ahead are complex and difficult is no reason why we should be unwilling to tackle them in the American way. Rather, it becomes a challenge to our best efforts in Washington, in the several States, and in the industry. This approach has proved to be so far superior to regimentation in the past that I am encouraged, and I hope you are, about our ability to make it work in the future.

aintaining the Strength of the Free World Through Mutual Security

Statement by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy [1]

Nearly a decade ago the United States embarked on a program which is quite unique in the tory of the world. We then decided that in der to protect and maintain our way of life would devote a part of our resources to help- other nations build the economic health and litary strength necessary for the preservation their freedom. This program, with its vari- related parts, has become known as the mu- l security program. An authorizing bill to tinue this program for fiscal year 1957 has re- tly been reported out by the Foreign Affairs mmittee.

The origin of this program lay in the situa- n which we faced in Western Europe imme- tely following the last World War. The coun- es in that area had been devastated by the r. Their industries and transportation sys- ns were destroyed. Their trade had been dis- rupted and their foreign exchange liquidated. Following the withdrawal and demobilization of the Allied forces, Western Europe was left without the resources to rebuild their economies and maintain an adequate standard of living and without the strength to resist the vast forces still poised in Eastern Europe to take advantage, directly or through internal subversion, of the chaos and devastation to the west.

In the face of this situation the then Secretary of State, General George C. Marshall, announced in the spring of 1947 that the United States stood ready to assist those countries which joined together in a cooperative effort to rebuild their economies. Subsequent to the original formulation of the Marshall plan, in the face of overt Communist hostilities in North Korea, we decided to supplement our original economic aid with direct military assistance to some of our friends and allies who felt with us that it was essential to build a defensive shield against the threat of the Communist powers. A substantial part of our mutual security program has been furnished to

[1] Made before the Subcommittee on International Rela- ns of the House Committee on Government Operations May 31 (press release 287).

the nations of free Europe in the subsequent years. The best measure of the success of this program has been the remarkable growth of economic vitality, political stability, and military strength among these nations. NATO is a going concern; European unity has progressed; production, trade, and living standards have risen.

Europe still faces many difficult problems, and our interest in finding a successful solution of these problems remains. But through our mutual security program we have substantially helped in raising the level of European economic activity from the distressing low of the postwar years to a point higher than it was before the war. This year we are giving no economic assistance to our European NATO allies, and none is envisaged for next year. We have, as General Marshall foresaw, assisted them in getting their own house in order and maintaining their own economies. In addition, these countries have raised large forces which stand with ours in Western Europe as a shield to maintain and protect our way of life. We continue, through the mutual security program, to assist these nations to maintain these forces by supplying certain items of military equipment.

I believe, Mr. Chairman, that that illustration of the use of the mutual security program perhaps will clarify as much as anything the way in which it supports our foreign policy. The goal of our foreign policy is an enduring peace with justice. So long as there remain forces hostile to freedom, we must maintain adequate and coordinated military power. So long as there are peoples who aspire to sustain their freedom but face economic obstacles which may endanger this freedom, it is in our own interest to render them assistance.

Three Guidelines

In addressing the American Society of Newspaper Editors last April,[2] the President outlined three main guidelines which we should follow to sustain and advance the great cause of freedom in the world today.

First, he said, "We must maintain a collective shield against aggression to allow the free peoples to seek their valued goals in safety."

Second, "Within the free community, we must be a helpful and considerate partner in creating conditions where freedom will flourish."

Third, "We must seek, by every peaceful m to induce the Soviet bloc to correct existing i tices and genuinely to pursue peaceful purpo its relations with other nations."

To carry out this program we must use a the instruments and techniques available t We must maintain our military and econ strength at home. We must seek the expa of trade and investment in the free world. must work with other nations to assist in dev ing a society marked by human welfare, indiv liberty, and a rising standard of living. We continue to provide technical knowledge an sistance and to work with our friends to de the peaceful uses of the atom. We should tinue our information programs and our e tional and cultural exchange programs in to expand mutual knowledge and understan

The mutual security program remains o our most essential instruments for carrying o three guidelines laid down by the Presi Through it we give military assistance to countries willing to stand with us in maintai a defensive shield against aggression. Throu we give assistance to those who are facing serious economic problems that, without som sistance, they might lose the liberty and indep ence they cherish. Through it we have devel a strength and firmness which has forced Communists to change their tactics and whic maintained with equal firmness today, gives p ise of a brighter future for us all in years to c

World Situation Today

Mr. Chairman, let me review briefly the situ we find in the world today as the Secretar State outlined it in presenting the mutual sec program to the Foreign Affairs Committee.[3]

In Korea we have an armistice but no fo peace. In Taiwan there are almost daily mili engagements between the forces of the Repub China and the Chinese Communists. In Viet- there is an armistice but no formal peace. Ea these countries is covered by a security treaty the United States. In this area where the da of aggression is still real, a total of approxim 50 million free people are confronted by C munists who are using the 600 million people rule on the Chinese mainland to build a vast tary establishment.

[2] BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1956, p. 699.

[3] *Ibid.*, May 28, 1956, p. 871.

In the Middle East we find Pakistan, Iran, and urkey with long common borders with the Soviet nion, and Iraq close to it. All four of these untries are subject to Soviet threats and to the oximity of Soviet power. Pakistan is an ally ours under the Southeast Asia Treaty. Turkey an ally of ours under the North Atlantic Treaty, d all four of these countries have united for llective security under the Baghdad Pact.

In Western Europe the military forces of NATO nd guard over the greatest industrial and mili- ry power there is in the free world except for e United States itself. We also support the mili- ry position and independence of Spain and ugoslavia.

To all of these countries the United States is rrently giving military assistance in the form equipment and matériel and, in some instances, ilitary training. This assistance, as the Secre- ry stated in his testimony, "is an essential part our overall security program." It is not a ratuity but is an investment in our own self- terest. Admiral Radford has testified that this ilitary assistance is fully integrated with our wn defense plans and that, without the mutual curity program, it would cost us four to five times much money in our defense budget to achieve e same degree of security for the United States.

Many of the countries which I have mentioned not have the economic strength to maintain the rces which they are willing to put into the field d which our military advisers consider neces- ry to an adequate defense. To these countries e also render a form of economic assistance which called defense support, in order to assist them carry the burden of these military forces.

In addition to the military part of the program hich I have just mentioned, we also render rough the mutual security program some eco- omic aid to countries which do not have mili- ry assistance agreements with us. In his state- ent before the House Foreign Affairs Commit- e on May 10, Secretary Dulles said this part f our program is to "help areas in the world hich are threatened by Communist subversion nd which contain people, resources, and strategic cations which, in our own interests as well as eirs, should be secure from hostile domination."

Speaking in Philadelphia last February, Secre- ry Dulles also pointed out that "by these pro- rams we too hope to advance our legitimate na- onal interests. We have never pretended other- wise. . . . Our interests will be fully served if other nations maintain their independence and strengthen their free institutions. We have no further aims than these. We want a world environment of freedom. We have shown this, time after time, by electing to give freedom where we could have had conquest."

Economic Aid to Less Developed Areas

Our economic assistance is given to those less developed countries, many of which have only recently won their independence, in cases where they do not have the resources or independent ability to develop their standards of living. In many of these countries the average annual income is only about $100 a year, compared with over $2,000 in the United States. The leaders of these countries are desirous of maintaining their independence, but they may be unable to do so in the face of the strong competitive forces at work today.

We must recognize, as the Secretary said in his Philadelphia talk, that the Soviet Communist experiment has won for itself a considerable popular prestige in the less developed countries. Industrialization is a magic word. It is a slogan the people have come to believe will solve all domestic economic and political problems. These people do not like to be dependent upon the industrialized West for their manufactured goods. They have, for the most part, their political independence, but they have not yet achieved what they would consider adequate economic independence.

The economic assistance which we give under the mutual security program is designed to meet this situation. We give this assistance in many different forms: in surplus agricultural commodities, in modern farm and industrial equipment, in loans to assist in the industrial development of the country, in assistance for transportation and irrigation projects, and in some instances for straight budgetary support where the finances of the country concerned are in such bad shape that disaster might rapidly follow if there were not immediate assistance.

This is a task which, under our system, we would normally expect private capital to do. Indeed, much private capital today does flow into the less developed countries, but only in cases where the economic and political risks make it attractive. In many parts of the world the risks

are such that private capital is not ready to take them, but we as a nation still have a strong security interest in those areas. If capital is to be provided, therefore, a substantial part must be provided on a public basis, which spreads the risk so that it is not appreciable in terms of any single individual.

Importance of Flexibility

Mr. Chairman, before closing I would like to say a word about what is commonly referred to as flexibility under this program. We are already engaged today, at the request of the Bureau of the Budget, in preparing a program to be submitted for fiscal year 1958. This program will be refined during the summer months, included in the President's budget message next January, and later submitted to the Congress. After the Congress has acted, perhaps 14 months from now, this program will have to be readjusted to reflect the congressional action. Only at that time can the task of implementing the plans be commenced, approximately 18 months after their first formulation, and this process will continue in some cases for another 6 to 12 months.

Now there is not one of us in the Department of State, the International Cooperation Administration, or the Department of Defense who will come before you and claim that we are able to predict precisely what will happen 2 years from now or what special problems we will then face. In fact, I think all of us will agree that some things are certain to happen then that we cannot predict now.

In this type of a program, unlike the normal budget for an executive department, we must face sudden problems in the external world which we cannot fully predict in advance. At such times we can hardly come back to Congress and develop new legislation to meet the special case which has arisen. There must be a degree of flexibility in this program. We request funds to carry out certain types of activity in certain countries, some of it for military and some of it for economic purposes, but we cannot assure the Congress that illustrative projects which we submit in justification of the program will necessarily be carried out 2 years later in exactly the form in which tl are submitted.

The mutual security program is our ammu tion in the cold war. No committee of Congr votes ammunition in a hot war to be used o particular hill at a particular time. That wo be as much as to tell the commanding officer tl in case that enemy had moved to his flank by time he reached the hill, he could only fire tow the hill and not to his right or to his left. Si larly with our mutual security ammunition in cold war. We can tell you in advance the p poses for which we will use it, but we can identify the exact hill on which it may be pended.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, may I say t I am not myself an expert on all the details our mutual security program. But I do h a judgment as to the value to the United St of these programs as a whole. In my opin the mutual security programs have achieved, are achieving, measurable success in bring about the conditions which in my opinion the best guaranty of peace and freedom in world. As President Eisenhower stated in s mitting the 1957 program to the Congress: "' mutual security program is an indispensable p of our national effort to meet affirmatively challenge of all the forces which threaten the dependence of the free world and to overc the conditions which make peace insecure progress difficult." This program remains to he said, "as indispensable to the security of ev American citizen and to the building of an enc ing peace as on the day it began 9 years ago."

In conclusion, and as Secretary Du has stated in testifying before Congress,[4] our sential task is to continue "the policies which l produced this strength and, with it, added sa and new opportunities. . . . Whatever successe failures we encounter in our immediate relat with the international Communist bloc, we be sure that our chances for peace and free will continue to depend, for many years to c upon the total strength which free peoples able to create and maintain."

[4] *Ibid.*, May 23, 1955, p. 854.

/ithdrawal of NNSC Teams From South Korea

.N. COMMAND STATEMENT

ess release 288 dated May 31

The United Nations Command representative ade the following statement at the 70th meeting the Military Armistice Commission at Panmun-m, Korea, on May 31.

I must return to an important matter frequently scussed here in the past and discussed also in the)th session of the United Nations General As-mbly with no satisfactory result.[1]

The Korean Armistice Agreement has been in fect for almost 3 years, and its primary objective, stop the hostilities in Korea and prevent them om being renewed, continues to be met. The anger of general war in the Far East has been eatly diminished as a result.

At the same time, there has been a notable and ersistent failure of certain arrangements set up the armistice agreement which were intended contribute to the stability of the cease-fire. mong these are those arrangements concerning e Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and e reporting and inspection of introduction of ilitary personnel and equipment into Korea. hese arrangements were intended to assure that oth sides would comply with the agreed limita-ons, which are set forth in paragraphs 13 (c) d (d) of the armistice agreement, on such in-oductions.[2] In short, the primary object in tablishing the NNSC was to prevent violations of e armistice agreement by providing a super-isory mechanism which would be enabled to make ll and adequate inspections and which would us be able to insure accurate reporting and mpliance.

At previous meetings of the Military Armistice Commission, the Senior Member of the United Nations Command delegation has protested at length actions and delinquencies of your side which have prevented these inspection arrangements from operating successfully.[3] I shall therefore only summarize the situation today.

Failure To Report Introductions of Personnel and Equipment

From the time the armistice agreement was concluded, your side has continuously made illegal introductions without reporting them to the NNSC. When the United Nations Command has called for an inspection of these illegal introductions, the Czech and Polish members on the NNSC have either vetoed such inspections or have cooperated with your side in obstructing the efforts of the Swiss and Swedish members of the Commission so as to render effective inspections, and thus disclosure, of these illegal introductions impossible. You have used the continued existence of the NNSC as a blind behind which to hide these illegal introductions, since you have effectively prevented it from performing in North Korea the task which under the armistice agreement it was created to do. The United Nations Command, on the other hand, has faithfully observed the provisions of the armistice agreement and has fully cooperated in the inspections made by the NNSC teams in the territory under United Nations Command control.

As a specific example, note the contrast between your performance in reporting to the NNSC and that of the United Nations Command. The armistice agreement requires both sides to make detailed and prompt reports of all introductions of military personnel and equipment. During approximately the first 6 months following the beginning of the armistice, the period during which your side made most of its illegal introductions, your side

[1] For statements in Committee I by Jacob Blaustein, S. Representative to the General Assembly, see BULLE-N of Dec. 26, 1955, p. 1074.

[2] For text of armistice agreement, see *ibid.*, Aug. 3, 1953, 132.

[3] For a statement made on July 5, 1955, see *ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1955, p. 191.

made only 11 combat matériel reports to the NNSC, reporting the implausibly low number of 40 rounds of replacement ammunition and no aircraft. During the same period, the United Nations Command submitted 598 reports, covering introduction of approximately 13,000,000 rounds of replacement ammunition, and 2,434 replacement aircraft. In the entire period since the armistice agreement went into effect until June 1955, you submitted a somewhat larger number of combat matériel reports, totaling 162. However, these still notably omit all reference to aircraft and compare unfavorably with the 1,969 reports submitted by the United Nations Command during the same period. The failure of your side to report introductions of combat aircraft is particularly conspicuous since your side now maintains in North Korea between 400 and 500 such aircraft, more than half of which are jet fighters or bombers, whereas you had none in that area at the time the armistice agreement was signed.

At the same time, Poland and Czechoslovakia, nominated by your side to participate in the NNSC, have refused to agree to inspections in North Korea which your side opposed or have delayed inspection until evidence of the violations could be removed. By virtue of constituting one-half of the membership of the Commission, the Czech and Polish officers on the Commission have enjoyed an unqualified veto power over any proposal laid before it. The members of the NNSC nominated by the United Nations Command, Sweden and Switzerland, have been truly neutrals in the accepted sense of the word. Their officers on the NNSC have examined and decided each proposal or charge on its merits.

Other Obstructing Tactics

Besides this fundamental perversion of the NNSC through actions of the Czech and Polish officers which allow significant inspections only in the territory under the control of the United Nations Command, your side has employed additional tactics designed to frustrate the operations of the NNSC in the territory under your control.

Your side has made introductions through other than approved ports of entry; in at least one place you constructed a railway bypass around a port of entry and introduced material and personnel over it. Your side has also restricted the activities of NNSC teams stationed in the ports of entry under your control so as to prevent them from carryin out their duties, as when you scheduled inspectior of trains at unreasonable hours in the middle c the night and when you failed to give the tean sufficient notice to permit them to appear to inspec a train passing through a port of entry.

Mobile team inspections in the north have als been frustrated. As the Swiss and Swedish mem bers of Team #7 concluded after attempting t carry out an inspection of airfields there, ". . the team was not in a position to conduct the in vestigation in a sufficiently thorough manne which would have allowed [it] to reach a con vincing judgment. . . ." They explained this con clusion in detail by pointing out *inter alia* tha your side had refused to make your records c aircraft movements available and that their r peated requests to inspect even the nearest su roundings of airfields whose alleged boundarie they doubted were denied.

Cooperation of U.N. Command With Inspectic Teams

The United Nations Command, in contrast t the obstruction of your side, cooperated fully wit the inspection teams sent to investigate your all gations of armistice violations. Teams #9 an #10 were shown records of aircraft movemen pertinent to their investigation and were allowe to inspect aircraft on the field. As the Swiss an Swedish members of Team #10 concluded o April 26, 1955:

> No justified complaint can be made against the Unite Nations Command side that it did not render the Tea such assistance as could be deemed necessary for the fu fillment of the investigation. Further there is n ground for suspicions that the side did intentionally wit hold information relevant to the investigation. The i vestigations and the inspections were carried out in a the places especially indicated by the KPA/CPV [Kore People's Army/Chinese People's Volunteers] side. Ho ever, not one single piece could be found of the ma different items of combat material . . . enumerated the charge. . . .

The cooperation of the United Nations Con mand in the investigations of Teams #9 and #- in the south and the difficulties expressed by Tea #7 in the north reflect a continuation of the situ tion described in a memorandum submitted to th Commission on May 7, 1954, by the Swiss a Swedish representatives on the NNSC. At th time, after nearly a year's experience, they sai

he United Nations Command side, . . . took from the nning a broad view of its obligations and threw itself n to full control by the Neutral Nations Inspection ms stationed at the ports of entry in the territory er its military control. Partly on its own initiative partly on request, it put at the disposal of the in- ction teams all documents . . . relating to incoming outgoing matériel. . . . The inspection teams were efore in a position to inspect and to report on any ériel they felt to be interested in. . . .

he Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Volun- s' side, on the other hand . . . never submitted any er documents for inspection than prior notification re- ts . . . the Inspection teams were unable to check iently on other movements and this because of the id taken by their Czechoslovak and Polish members in the territory under the military control of the ean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers Czechoslovak and Polish members of the inspection ns, thanks to their "veto" power, have kept those spot ck controls to a bare minimum . . . they have merely ome a face saving device devoid of any real significance. inspection teams in the north have therefore never ied the insight in movements of matériel as have the ection teams in the south.[4]

quent Protests by U.N. Command

The United Nations Command has made fre- ent formal requests in the Military Armistice mmission during these almost 3 years, most re- tly on February 25, 1956, that your side amend behavior and comply with those provisions of Korean Armistice Agreement regulating the roduction of combat matériel and equipment. ur side has failed to meet these demands and s given no indication of any intention to do so. must therefore be concluded that your side in- ds to continue in default on its reporting obli- ions. It must be further concluded that your e intends to continue its practice of exploiting unneutral conduct of the Czech and Polish mbers of vetoing embarrassing inspections, and t the NNSC will continue to be unable to detect d disclose the illegal introductions by your side. The Governments of Sweden and Switzerland ve proposed repeatedly during recent months appropriate Czech, Polish, and Chinese Com- nist authorities the withdrawal of the inspec- n teams to the Demilitarized Zone, where both es would continue to report to the Commission. is reasonable proposal has been rejected re- atedly by your side. Most recently, in its note of April 9, 1956, to the nations represented in the United Nations Command, the Chinese Communist regime took the position that this problem could not be solved until the problems of unification of Korea and withdrawal of troops are solved. Consequently, it has become necessary to invoke the remedies available to the United Nations side to meet the situation created by the defaults to which I have referred. Your side, and also the Czech and Polish members of the NNSC, have failed to carry out faithfully important provisions of the armistice agreement. Therefore, the United Nations side, as a party to that agreement, is entitled to take steps necessary to protect itself from the consequences of such unwarranted conduct. Accordingly, you are no longer privileged to take advantage of those provisions of the armistice agreement which have been violated and frustrated by your conduct and that of the Czech and Polish members of the NNSC. The United Nations side has exhibited the greatest caution and forbearance in this matter. We have pursued every other practicable alternative course to redress the situation. The course we must now adopt is carefully adjusted to the violations and frustrations and to the burdens and injury involved and is the least we must do to protect our legitimate interests under the armistice agreement by lawful, peaceful, and reasonable steps.

Because of these obstructions and violations of your side and the conduct of the Czech and Polish members of the NNSC and Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, the United Nations Command is now notifying your side and the NNSC and its subordinate teams at Inchon, Pusan, and Kunsan that the United Nations Command will provisionally suspend, during the time that your side continues in default, performance on its part of those provisions of the armistice agreement governing the operations in the area under the control of the United Nations Command of the NNSC and NNIT's. You are informed that this suspension will be put into effect in about one week and the United Nations Command will expect withdrawal of the teams from the area to be effected at that time. The United Nations Command is taking only such steps as are indispensable to protection of its rights under the armistice agreement. The United Nations Command continues to regard the armistice agreement as in force and limits its action to the particular suspensions described above. Finally,

For excerpts from another memorandum by the Swiss i Swedish representatives, dated May 4, 1954, see LLETIN of June 21, 1954, p. 944.

since for the reasons above stated the NNSC teams in the north have not been able to accomplish their purpose, we see no purpose in their remaining there.

EXCHANGE OF NOTES WITH CHINESE COMMUNISTS

Chinese Communist Note of April 9

Following is the text of a note received by the British Chargé d'Affaires at Peiping from the Chinese Communists on April 9, 1956.

1. The Governments of Sweden and Switzerland have, on many occasions, stated to the Chinese Government the practical difficulties which they have encountered in their work in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea and have expressed the hope that a settlement could be reached. The Chinese Government sympathizes strongly with the position of the Governments of Sweden and Switzerland and have endeavoured unceasingly to try to mitigate their difficulties. Recently the Swedish Government proposed that the whole of the six neutral observation teams, which are at present stationed in designated ports in South and North Korea, should be withdrawn for the time being and that observation teams should be despatched temporarily only when the need arose, while the Swiss Government proposed that the existing neutral observation teams in the six designated ports should be eliminated and that mobile observation teams only should be retained. The Chinese Government hold that a fundamental solution to the practical difficulties which the Governments of Sweden and Switzerland have repeatedly raised, can only be reached when a solution has been reached on the question of peaceful unification of Korea and first of all on the question of withdrawing all foreign forces from Korea.

2. Since the Geneva Conference on Korea in 1954, Korean and Chinese sides have consistently advocated that a conference of the Nations concerned should be called to discuss the question of withdrawal from Korea of all foreign forces and the peaceful unification of Korea. The Chinese Government are, moreover, convinced that if all parties concerned are genuinely desirous of seeking a settlement a reasonable solution to those questions could be reached.

3. In the light of the above considerations, the Chinese Government, both in their own name a by authorization of the Government of the Der cratic People's Republic of Korea, propose to Government of the United Kingdom and throu the Government of the United Kingdom to other Governments of the United Nations Co mand, to call a conference of the nations concer to discuss the question of the withdrawal fr Korea of all foreign forces and of the peace unification of Korea. The Governments of Ko and China request the Government of the Uni Kingdom to transmit this proposal to all ot Governments of the United Nations Comma The Governments of Korea and China hope t the Government of the United Kingdom and the other Governments of the United Nati Command will give active consideration to t proposal and that they will reply as soon possible.

Reply of May 28

Following is the text of a note delivered by British Chargé d'Affaires to the Chinese Co munists at Peiping on May 28, 1956.

1. On instructions from Her Majesty's Pri pal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I h to refer to Your Excellency's Note of the 9th April concerning the difficulties of the Neutral tions Supervisory Commission in Korea and p posing a conference on withdrawal of fore forces from Korea and the unification of Kore

2. Her Majesty's Government in the Uni Kingdom, in accordance with the request in Y Excellency's Note of the 9th of April, has tra mitted that Note to the other Governments of United Nations Command, who, after consu tion, have requested Her Majesty's Governmen reply on their behalf.

3. The Governments of the United Nati Command have long regarded the frustratio the hopes of the Korean people for unificatio their country as the basic problem in Korea. Geneva they set forth in detail their position regard to a just settlement of this problem in formity with the objectives of the United tions. This position was reiterated at the two sessions of the General Assembly, where it endorsed by an overwhelming majority of members of the United Nations.

4. With regard to the proposal of the Peo Republic of China and the North Korean reg

r a conference on the withdrawal of foreign oops and the unification of Korea, the Governents of the United Nations Command are not vare of any change in the position of the People's epublic of China and the North Korean regime hich would render such a conference fruitful. ie Governments of the United Nations Comnnd remain ready to discuss unification on the sis of the United Nations objectives. If the ople's Republic of China and the North Korean gime have concrete proposals for a settlement of e Korean question in conformity with the obctives of the United Nations, they are prepared give such proposals every consideration.

5. In the absence of willingness of the People's epublic of China and the North Korean regime negotiate on the basis of the United Nations obctives, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Comission problem can and should be separated from e problem of unification. Pending agreement unification, the Armistice Agreement remains force in Korea, and all parties concerned should deavour to maintain the effectiveness of the rmistice and to correct problems that arise rerding it. The Governments of the United Naons Command wish to reaffirm their support of e Armistice Agreement and their intention to ntribute to peace in the area.

6. The Governments of the United Nations ommand cannot accept the statement in the Note April 9, 1956, that the People's Republic of hina and the North Korean regime have "enavored unceasingly to try to mitigate" the diffilties encountered by the Governments of veden and Switzerland in their work in the Neual Nations Supervisory Commission, since these fficulties have in fact been created by the conduct the Chinese–North Korean side itself. The oposals of the Swiss and Swedish Governments ferred to in the Note of April 9 (which the Govnments of the United Nations Command regard reasonable and which have their full support) were made necessary by the policy of systematic frustration of the functions of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission which the Chinese–North Korean side has followed ever since the Armistice Agreement was first signed. The Chinese–North Korean side has persisted in introducing military personnel and supplies into Korea through other points of entry than those provided for in the Armistice Agreement, and has failed to report these introductions to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Through the obstruction of the Czech and Polish members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, the United Nations Command has been effectively prevented from having its charges of such introductions investigated. In short, the Chinese–North Korean side has completely frustrated any effective supervision by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in the area north of the Demilitarized Zone. Under these circumstances, the activities of the Czech and Polish components of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission south of the Demilitarized Zone are an inequitable burden on the United Nations side. The United Nations Command will announce its position on this matter fully in the Military Armistice Commission.

7. In the light of the foregoing and having regard to the attitude of the Chinese–North Korean side with respect to its obligations toward the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, as shown by its conduct in practice, the Governments of the United Nations Command believe that no evidence has been shown of the good faith which alone could enable any new conference to serve a useful purpose. Until the Chinese–North Korean side is prepared to negotiate sincerely on the basis of United Nations objectives, the Governments of the United Nations Command believe that another conference would only bring about a repetition of the deadlock which resulted at Geneva in 1954.

Progress in Free Viet-Nam

by Walter S. Robertson
Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs[1]

This past March, I had the pleasure of accompanying the Secretary of State on his visit to Saigon, where we conversed with President Diem on the present and future problems of Viet-Nam. I was struck, as so many other recent observers have been, at the progress Free Viet-Nam has made in a few short months toward stability, security, and strength. President Diem seemed to reflect this progress in his own person. On the occasion of our earlier visit some 15 months ago, he seemed tense and gravely concerned about the problems facing Viet-Nam. This time he was reposed, poised, and appeared confident of the future of his country.

Among the factors that explain the remarkable rise of Free Viet-Nam from the shambles created by 8 years of murderous civil and international war, the division of the country at Geneva, and the continuing menace of predatory communism, there is in the first place the dedication, courage, and resourcefulness of President Diem himself. In him, his country has found a truly worthy leader whose integrity and devotion to his country's welfare have become generally recognized among his people. Asia has given us in President Diem another great figure, and the entire free world has become the richer for his example of determination and moral fortitude. There is no more dramatic example of this fortitude than President Diem's decisions during the tense and vital days of the battle against the parasitic politico-religious sects in the city of Saigon in the spring of 1955. These decisions were to resist the multiple pressures to compromise that were building up around him and to struggle to the victo- ous end for the sake of a just cause. The f world owes him a debt of gratitude for his det- mined stand at that fateful hour.

Consider Viet-Nam at three stages in its rec t history:

First, in mid-1954, partitioned by fiat of e great powers against the will of the Vietnam e people, devoid of governmental machinery or m - itary strength, drifting without leadership a l without hope in the backwash of the defeat adm - istered by the combined weight of Communi - impressed infantry and of Chinese and Russ n arms;

Secondly, in early 1955, faced with the milit y and subversive threat of the Communists no n of the 17th parallel, confronted with inter l strife, its Government challenged by the arm , self-seeking politico-religious sects, its ar y barely reformed and of uncertain loyalty, assai l from within by the most difficult problems, inch - ing that of having to absorb the sudden influx f three-quarters of a million refugees who wo l rather leave their ancestral lands and homes th n suffer life under Communist tyranny;

And finally Viet-Nam today, in mid-1956, p - gressing rapidly to the establishment of der - cratic institutions by elective processes, its peo e resuming peaceful pursuits, its army growing n effectiveness, sense of mission, and morale, e puppet Vietnamese politicians discredited, e refugees well on the way to permanent reset - ment, the countryside generally orderly and ca n, the predatory sects eliminated and their ve l leaders exiled or destroyed.

Perhaps no more eloquent testimony to e new state of affairs in Viet-Nam could be ci d

[1] Address made before the American Friends of Viet-Nam at Washington, D.C., on June 1 (press release 289 dated May 31).

ıan the voice of the people themselves as ex-
ressed in their free election of last March. At
ıat time the last possible question as to the feel-
ıg of the people was erased by an overwhelming
ıajority for President Diem's leadership. The
ıct that the Viet Minh was unable to carry out
s open threats to sabotage these elections is im-
ressive evidence of the stability and prestige of
ıe Government.

The United States is proud to be on the side of
ıe effort of the Vietnamese people under Presi-
ent Diem to establish freedom, peace, and the
ood life. The United States wishes to continue
assist and to be a loyal and trusted friend of
iet-Nam.

.S. Policies in Viet-Nam

Our policies in Viet-Nam may be simply stated
s follows:

To support a friendly non-Communist govern-
ıent in Viet-Nam and to help it diminish and
ventually eradicate Communist subversion and
ıfluence.

To help the Government of Viet-Nam establish
he forces necessary for internal security.

To encourage support for Free Viet-Nam by
he non-Communist world.

To aid in the rehabilitation and reconstruction
f a country and people ravaged by 8 ruinous
ears of civil and international war.

Our efforts are directed first of all toward help-
ng to sustain the internal security forces con-
isting of a regular army of about 150,000 men,
mobile civil guard of some 45,000, and local de-
ense units which are being formed to give pro-
ection against subversion on the village level.
Ve are providing budgetary support and equip-
ıent for these forces and have a mission assist-
ng the training of the army. We are also help-
ng to organize, train, and equip the Vietnamese
olice force. The refugees who have fled to South
iet-Nam to escape the Viet Minh are being re-
ettled on productive lands with the assistance
f funds made available by our aid program. In
arious ways our aid program also provides as-
istance to the Vietnamese Government designed
o strengthen the economy and provide a better
uture for the common people of the country. The
ietnamese are increasingly giving attention to
he basic development of the Vietnamese economy
nd to projects that may contribute directly to
that goal. We give our aid and counsel to this program only as freely invited.

I do not wish to minimize the magnitude of the task that still remains and of the problems that still confront this stanch and valiant member of the free world fighting for its independence on the threshold of the Communist heartland of Asia.

Communist Conspiracy

The Communist conspiracy continues to threaten Free Viet-Nam. With monstrous effrontery the Communist conspirators at Hanoi accuse Free Viet-Nam and its friends of violating the armistice provisions which the Vietnamese and their friends, including ourselves, have scrupulously respected despite the fact that neither the Vietnamese nor ourselves signed the Geneva Accords while they, the Communists, who have solemnly undertaken to be bound by these provisions, have violated them in the most blatant fashion.

The facts are that, while, on the one hand, the military potential of Free Viet-Nam has been drastically reduced by the withdrawal of nearly 200,000 members of the French Expeditionary Corps and by the reduction of the Vietnamese Army by more than 50,000 from the time of the armistice to the present as well as by the outshipment from Viet-Nam since the cessation of hostilities of over $200 million worth of war equipment, we have, on the other hand, reports of steady, constant growth of the warmaking potential of the Communists north of the 17th parallel.

Our reports reveal that, in complete disregard of its obligations, the Viet Minh have imported voluminous quantities of arms across the Sino–Viet Minh border and have imported a constant stream of Chinese Communist military personnel to work on railroads, to rebuild roads, to establish airports, and to work on other projects contributing to the growth of the military potential of the zone under Communist occupation.

As so eloquently stated by the British Government in a diplomatic note released to the press and sent to Moscow in April of this year,

> The Viet Minh army has been so greatly strengthened by the embodiment and re-equipment of irregular forces that instead of the 7 Viet Minh divisions in existence in July 1954 there are now no less than 20. This striking contrast between massive military expansion in the North and the withdrawal and reduction of military forces in the South speaks for itself.

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By lies, propaganda, force, and deceit the Communists in Hanoi would undermine Free Viet-Nam, whose fall they have been unable to secure by their maneuverings on the diplomatic front. These people, whose crimes against suffering humanity are so vividly described in the book by Lieutenant Dooley,[2] who addressed you this morning, have sold their country to Peiping. They have shamelessly followed all the devious zigzags of the Communist-bloc line so that their alliance with Communist China and the Soviet Union is firmly consolidated. These are the people who are now inviting President Diem to join them in a coalition government to be set up through so-called "free elections."

U. S. Support for Reunification

President Diem and the Government of Free Viet-Nam reaffirmed on April 6 of this year and on other occasions their desire to seek the reunification of Viet-Nam by peaceful means. In this goal we support them fully. We hope and pray that the partition of Viet-Nam, imposed against the will of the Vietnamese people, will speedily come to an end. For our part we believe in free elections, and we support President Diem fully in his position that, if elections are to be held, there first must be conditions which preclude intimidation or coercion of the electorate. Unless such conditions exist there can be no free choice.

May those leaders of the north in whom the spirit of true patriotism still survives realize the futility of the Communist effort to subvert Free Viet-Nam by force or guile. May they force the abandonment of these efforts and bring about the peaceful demobilization of the large standing armies of the Viet Minh. May they, above all, return to the just cause of all those who want to reunify their country in peace and independence and for the good of all the people of Viet-Nam.

Ladies and gentlemen, I wish the greatest success in the efforts of the American Friends of Viet-Nam to seek ways and means further to strengthen the relations between our two peoples. The United States will be helped by your efforts, and I can assure you of the determination of this Government that there shall be no weakening in our support for Free Viet-Nam.

[2] *Deliver Us From Evil*, by Thomas A. Dooley (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Cudahy, 1956).

U.S. Trade Mission to Japan, March 10–April 22, 1956 [1]

The 1956 U.S. Trade Mission to Japan learn soon after its arrival in Tokyo that one basic pr lem overshadows all other questions now affe ing trade relations between the United States a Japan.

Japan must import approximately 20 percent its food supply and most of the raw materi which go into the finished products needed by almost 90 million people. Considerable impo of machinery and other manufactured goods a are necessary.

To get the money to buy these things Japan m export and it has been rapidly increasing its s to all parts of the world.

Much of the food, raw materials, and manu tured products which Japan buys comes from United States. In each of the past 3 years Ja has been among our four top customers. Ja is our best customer for raw cotton, and imp large quantities of U.S. wheat, soybeans, coal, other commodities. The postwar modernizat of Japan's industries has also provided a g market for all types of American machinery tools.

According to official Japanese statistics, J anese imports in 1955 amounted to $772 mil worth of business for American producers. the same year, American buyers took $449 mil worth of Japanese products. While Japanese ports to the United States were substantially ab the 1954 total, they still left Japan with an port excess of well over $300 million. Japan st therefore continue to strive to sell more good to the United States.

Many of the products we buy from Japan, h ever—such as cotton textiles and clothing, wood, and tunafish—are also produced in United States, and large-scale imports have undeniable effect on American producers' sale

Members of Mission Specially Selected

Japan therefore faces this problem: How to tinue and to increase its sales to the Un States—and its imports from the United St as well—and at the same time minimize the d-

[1] Reprinted from the *Foreign Commerce Weekly* of ay 21, 1956.

rse effects of those sales on American producers, nce it is feared that such adverse effects might ltimately induce the United States to limit imorts from Japan.

Members of the trade mission to Japan were ecially chosen for the task of exploring this roblem. The chief of the mission, Eugene M. raderman, Director of the Far Eastern Division, ureau of Foreign Commerce, U.S. Department f Commerce, has dealt with problems concerning apan for a number of years. Charles A. Keough, resident of the Ballthrall Trading Co., Philadelhia, lived in Japan from 1927 to 1931, and has een actively engaged in foreign trade during his hole business career. Egil E. Krogh, president nd general manager of Sibley, Lindsay & Curr o., Rochester, N. Y., has devoted many years to etail merchandising, and has also served as presient of the Washington State Third International rade Fair. Vergil D. Reed, vice president and ssociate director of research of the J. Walter hompson Co., is an expert on marketing, market esearch, and advertising, and is the author of everal books on those subjects which are widely ead in Japan. In Japan the mission was joined y J. Owen Zurhellen, Jr., Second Secretary of he American Embassy in Tokyo, who has spent he past 8 years in Japan at several U.S. Foreign ervice posts.

Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks sent the rade mission to Japan in connection with U.S. articipation in the Third Japan International rade Fair, held at Osaka, April 8–22. Before nd during the fair, however, the trade mission isited 15 other major industrial and commercial ities in Japan. In each city, the mission met in ound-table discussions with manufacturers, busiess leaders, Japanese Government officials, and thers concerned with foreign trade. Time was et aside also for individual consultations with usinessmen who had specific problems concerning heir own companies, and who wanted the private dvice of mission members.

These programs, arranged through the Ameri-an consulates and American cultural centers serv-ng the areas visited, received enthusiastic cooperation from Japanese prefectural and municipal government officials and local chambers of commerce and industry. A total of 1,300 businessmen met with the mission in these prefair discussions and individual consultations.

Arrangements Made for Individual Meetings

The trade mission arrived in Osaka several days before the fair opened and set up its offices in the Trade Information Center, located within the American pavilion at the fair. While on tour the trade mission had invited businessmen to call at the Trade Information Center at the fair, and the American consulates had sent letters of invitation to thousands of business firms, advising them of the center's facilities. By the time the fair opened, therefore, many businessmen had already requested appointments for individual consultations with mission members.

Since the Trade Information Center occupied an excellent location near the entrance to the American pavilion, many other visitors to the pavilion introduced themselves and took advantage of the center's facilities. In all, 482 persons called at the Trade Information Center. During the trade fair, members of the mission made additional visits to other cities, where they met with about 300 Japanese officials and businessmen in group discussions.

The group discussions and individual consultations held by the trade mission throughout Japan and at the International Trade Fair in Osaka gave mission members a broad basis on which to form a judgment concerning Japan's major trade problems. One point immediately became apparent. Whenever an item begins to sell well in the United States, Japanese producers and exporters tend to "jump on the bandwagon" and concentrate their efforts on that one item. The result is frequently a phenomenal increase in shipments of that item to the United States, and a consequent reaction by American firms producing similar items.

Export Diversification Explained to Japanese

This has been true of the so-called "dollar" blouses, which increased more than twentyfold between 1954 and 1955. In advising Japanese businessmen on this point, the mission pointed out that while imports of Japanese cotton textiles and clothing amounted in the aggregate to 2 percent of American consumption, particular items, such as blouses, corduroy, gingham, and velveteen, so far exceeded this average figure as to constitute a serious threat to the existence of the American industries concerned. It was explained to the Japanese that if exports, not only of cotton goods but of all types of products, could be diversified,

so that the impact would be distributed throughout the numerous items and price levels which find acceptance in the United States, then it should be possible for Japanese exports to grow steadily with the natural increase of the American market and at the same time avoid undue pressure on American-made products.

The value of knowledge of the American market, and of market research, was stressed by the trade mission. Many medium- and small-sized Japanese manufacturers sell their products through export and import agents without knowing the ultimate disposition and use of the products by the American consumer. Designs, quality standards, and other factors are frequently set by the American firm placing the order, and the Japanese manufacturer follows them without gaining a real appreciation of the reasons involved.

While these practices sometimes appear to make it possible for large amounts of acceptable merchandise to be produced and shipped to the United States in a short time, the trade mission suggested that it was in the long-range interests of both partners in trade for the Japanese to learn more about American consumer needs, the types of designs which appeal to our taste, and, above all, to strive for business in higher quality and higher priced lines, where competition is more dependent on style and quality and less on price and where equivalent dollar returns can be had with less physical volume. Distribution outlets, the mission stressed, should be chosen carefully, in keeping with the type of product and the class of customers to be reached.

Advice Sought on Wide Range of Subjects

In their search for wider markets, Japanese businessmen asked the trade mission for information and advice on a wide range of subjects. Among these was the question of the exemption of lightweight silk scarves from the provisions of the Flammable Fabrics Act on the grounds that scarves are not a potentially dangerous apparel item. While some segments of the Japanese scarf industry have successfully converted to heavier weight scarves, a number of producers apparently have not been able to develop other business and have been in dire circumstances since their exports of scarves were stopped.

A large number of questions were raised on other subjects, including the market for Japanese silk, hardwood, plywood, and tunafish; eradication of the citrus canker disease, which prever U. S. import of Japanese mandarin orang adaption of Japanese designs and handicraft ite for the American market; the role which Am ican investment could play in the further develo ment of Japan; reciprocal tariff reductions unc the General Agreement on Tariffs and Tra (GATT); and coal versus atomic energy as a sou of electricity generation. These questions prov to the mission that Japanese businessmen have wide-awake interest in all aspects of foreign tra

Japan Prepared To Cooperate With U.S.

The invariable friendliness and warmth wi which the mission was received throughout Jap convinced the members that the United States h a firm and dependable friend in Japan. T frankness and goodwill with which mutual pr lems were discussed was further evidence that t Japanese were prepared to cooperate with t United States in reasonable measures to perm the healthy growth of Japan-United States co mercial relations and to minimize adverse effe on either side.

Japan is more than a market for U.S. produ and a source of U.S. imports. It is also a bulwa of democracy and free enterprise in Asia. In t 10½ years since the end of World War II, Jap has rebuilt its cities and its industries, and is n giving its citizens a per capita real income hig than the prewar average.

This accomplishment is a tribute to both t American and the Japanese people. The forwa looking policies of the United States towa Japan, including the extension of considera amounts of aid during the immediate postw years, stand out among our most important acco plishments in Asia. But the degree and rapidi of the progress made is due largely to the sk and hard work of the Japanese people.

The maintenance and continued development Japan as a prosperous and dependable member the democratic free world is important to the curity of the United States and therefore mer the close attention of the American people. T necessity for direct economic aid has given pl to the necessity for the Japanese people to car on their own development with their own ener and intelligence, albeit with friendly cooperati from the United States.

As one Japanese businessman put it in a disc sion with the trade mission, "We Japanese do r

w pray to the United States, 'Give us this day r daily bread,' but 'Give us this day an oppority to earn our livelihood.'" This spirit is e which should be welcome to the American ople, and one which we should encourage.

The trade mission feels that there is still ample om both in Japan and in the United States for reased understanding and appreciation of the uation and point of view of the other country. e problems which our two nations face in expanding their trade on a mutually satisfactory and mutually profitable basis may be difficult, but they are not insoluble.

What is needed on both sides is goodwill and commonsense, and continued devotion to the principles of fair play and free enterprise which have made the American economy the greatest in the world. The members of the 1956 U.S. Trade Mission to Japan feel that their work in Japan has contributed significantly to this purpose.

orld Trade—Opportunity and Challenge

by Walter Williams
Under Secretary of Commerce[1]

Surely there is no more appropriate place in this untry to talk about opportunities and challenges an here in California. Your dramatic growth population and industry during the past 15 ars seems only the dynamic beginning of a delopment which may in the next quarter-century ace your State in the very forefront of economic tivity in this country. Many experts confidently edict that by 1975 California's population will more than 25 million, with almost half of that mber living in the Los Angeles area.

The industrial expansion which will accompany is growth must aggressively seek markets for production, and, fast as is our national populaon growth, our rate of productivity is growing en faster. Where will the goods be sold which ur 25 million and the 200-odd million other mericans who will then be living produce?

Certainly our biggest market will always be thin our own boundaries. But there are comlling reasons why our factories must find ineasing markets abroad for a part of their proction. Not to do so would mean incomplete e of our plant capacity, weakening of our emoyment structure, and softening of our domestic arket.

There is also a factor in our economy about which we have thought very little for the past 30 or 40 years. As our industrial productivity increases, our need for raw materials grows also. For reasons of strategy—both military and economic—it is in our interest to import a greater amount of these goods than we have up to now. In the long run our ability to obtain such raw materials abroad is determined by our volume of exports. Steadily increasing sales volume in foreign markets is therefore a "must" if we are to maintain a strong economy at home. But exports are equally important in their own right. For one of the outstanding lessons of industrial development in this country is the constantly proven fact that mass markets make possible low unit cost of production with consequently lower prices to the consumer and a broad-based rich standard of living for all of our 167 million fellow citizens. Foreign markets frequently offer just the additional outlets for American production which make possible such savings in costs and reductions in price in the market at home.

This "multiplier" function of foreign trade is also evident in imports. The effect of our importing manganese, for example, is far greater in terms of our steel production for domestic use, as well as for export, than the dollar value of such imports would of itself indicate. In the consumer field, imports of French perfume or Italian-designed dresses, since they create interest and demand for these types of goods, are often used by

[1] Address made before the World Trade Luncheon the Foreign Trade Association of Southern California Los Angeles on May 24 (Commerce Department press lease).

alert merchandisers of domestically produced women's dresses and perfume as a means of selling their American goods to customers whose only contact with the foreign-produced article is through the advertising pages of magazines and newspapers.

Since our foreign trade, both export and import, is so closely woven together with our domestic commerce, our foreign economic policy must be closely related to our policies with respect to industry and distribution at home. In fact, it becomes increasingly apparent that our commerce with other nations and the whole sum of business activity within the United States are two parts of one whole.

What is our economic policy? It is and must be the continuous expansion of business, the increase of production, and the continuous development of additional markets for our products. This is the economic creed under which we have prospered for 180 years. It is the philosophy whose value is vividly shown in our present enjoyment of unprecedented national prosperity with record highs in employment and business activity.

The foreign-trade aspect of this philosophy is simply stated. Our policy is to encourage the continuous expansion of multilateral trade, which means the increased exportation of American products accompanied by substantial imports of those foreign-made goods which merge with and strengthen our own economy. It means the encouragement of travel by residents of this country going abroad and the welcoming of visitors from foreign lands to our shores. It means fostering sound investment abroad of our capital and of our know-how in industries and enterprises which not only strengthen the economy of friendly nations but also do much to create and maintain a demand for American-made parts and accessories and other products whose use follows in the wake of the economic development abroad which our investment has made possible.

In this respect, our foreign economic policy not only encourages increased business for the United States; it also strengthens our friends and allies throughout the world, making them economically more vigorous and militarily more secure against the inroads of antagonistic economic and political beliefs.

But a policy is only as good as the operations which are carried on under it. What have we done to make our economic policy effective in the fi d of foreign trade? I think the record of r achievements is clear evidence of the sincerity f our will toward international commercial exp. sion and the ever-increasing interchange of go and services among the peoples of the earth.

Implementing Foreign Economic Policy

First, we are steadily active, in cooperation v h our trading partners, to reduce unreasonable l r riers to trade. Continuing to work under e reciprocal trade agreements program, and recent years making this work more effec e through our participation in the internati agreement created for this purpose, GATT— General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade— e have reduced the average level of our own ta well under that of 1930. This reduction, I n happy to say, has not been one-sided. As a re lt of our negotiations with individual nations an o our cooperation with the 34 other nations tal g part in GATT, we have secured some 60,000 re c tions in foreign tariffs on a wide range of comm li ties. Yesterday, May 23, witnessed the signin i Geneva of new protocols embodying the re t of the recent negotiations for tariff reductions

Second, recognizing that tariffs are not the l barriers to trade, indeed in many respects re among the least important of such barriers. e have urged our friends in other areas of the w l to abandon, or at least to diminish, such hindra e to the flow of commerce as quotas and un ly rigorous exchange controls. We have also ot hesitated to reduce barriers of our own mak g. such as the unduly complicated procedures r merly demanded by our laws for customs adi n istration. Although much remains to be do in this field in order to effectuate our belief that he Government's job is to remove every pos le hurdle from the path of business, we have n de substantial progress in that direction.

A third encouragement to international t de development is our program to encourage gr ter participation by American business in inte a tional trade fairs throughout the world. In directing that this activity be undertaken, he President said: [2]

> International trade fairs have been of major impor nce to foreign countries for many years, and most o the trading nations have strengthened the promotion as-

[2] BULLETIN of Jan. 24, 1955, p. 122.

cts of their industrial displays in many fairs with a ntral exhibit designed to emphasize the industrial prog- ss and achievement of the nation.

Soviet and satellite exhibits, for example, have been stly, well-planned, and housed in expensive structures signed to convey the impression that the U.S.S.R. is oducing on a large scale for peace and is creating a radise for workers.

The United States, which has a larger volume of inter- tional trade than any other nation, until recently has en conspicuous by its absence at these trade fairs. nerican visitors and participants have pointed out the ilure of their Government to tell adequately the story our free-enterprise system and to provide effective ternational trade promotion cooperation. . . .

Since the inception of this program in 1954, the epartment of Commerce, with the enthusiastic nd highly valued cooperation of the American anufacturer, has organized central exhibits in 33 irs in Europe and the Far East. These exhibits ave accomplished several things. Perhaps the ost far-reaching effect they have had is that they ave presented to peoples of other nations a true icture of the American economy and its achieve- ents in the service of man, denying the Com- unist libel of us as the exploiter of the people. ertainly also, however, they have served as a emonstration and advertisement of American roduction. In many instances, they have rengthened the privately organized displays of merican manufacturers at the fairs in which the entral exhibits were presented and have increased e audience attraction of these private exhibits, ith consequent increase in the volume of business one by American exhibitors as a result of their xhibition.

We are vigorously continuing this program be- use of its success in presenting the American ory abroad and also because we have evidence at it is effective in encouraging American rivate enterprise to undertake this responsibility n its own, both as institutional advertising of the merican industrial system and as a fruitful eans of developing sales volume.

rade Missions

A fourth activity for the encouragement of in- ernational trade which is closely allied with our rade fair activities is our program of sending rade missions to countries throughout the world o assist businessmen both at home and abroad to enerate increased export and import trade. These missions, which usually maintain a trade nformation office as part of the officially organized central exhibit at a trade fair, differ from the trade missions sent abroad by many other countries in at least one important respect. Whereas the trade missions of other countries usually have as their chief objective the conclusion of government-to-government trade agreements, which in most cases are mainly arrangements for large-scale barter, our missions have as their sole objective assisting private enterprisers in the United States and in foreign countries to do increased business with each other on a straight sale-for-profit basis without any encumbering barter requirements.

The membership of these missions is recruited from the ranks of businessmen in the United States, who serve for periods of 6 weeks to 3 months without compensation. They operate while abroad under the chairmanship of an official of the Department of Commerce, but it is the business representatives who carry the load of consultation and advice as to methods of concluding business arrangements, channels for trading, sources of information on pricing, and other matters pertinent to the development of business connections between a business concern in the United States and its customer or supplier abroad. An important part of the activities of the missions is the visits they make to the chief industrial centers of the country in which a fair is being held. In this way, and by their attendance at a fair, they are enabled to make contact with hundreds of active businessmen in each country that a mission visits. Since January 1955, 26 trade missions have visited 18 countries and have made contact with at least 60,000 businessmen.

These are some of the things which your Government is doing to promote sound increases in international trade volume. The major achievements, of course, belong to business itself. The energetic activities of American exporters and importers have pushed our foreign-trade total volume to the highest level in history. Our exports, exclusive of military shipments, are now running at a rate of $15 billion per year, exceeded only by the immediate postwar rehabilitation shipments of 1947. Our imports have reached a $12 billion annual rate.

Surely these notable achievements should be sources of satisfaction not only to the businessmen who have made the sales but also to each of us who enjoys our present level of prosperity, to which this volume of foreign trade has signifi-

cantly contributed. Perhaps the most encouraging aspect of this bright picture is that there are strong indications that in the coming years these totals will continue to rise.

In many of the countries with whom we do substantial business, gold and dollar balances are increasing. This is a good omen for the American exporter for two reasons. It increases his opportunities for sales since it means that the dollar shortage in many areas of the world will no longer be as serious a deterrent to the sale of American products as it formerly was. Second—and I think all of us who understand the United States will agree that this is good—more availability of gold and dollar exchange abroad makes many markets more competitive. Gold and dollars may be spent anywhere, whereas their former substitute, United States Government grants, gave United States producers a virtual monopoly on the market. Therefore, producers in many other countries are now free to compete with United States exporters in foreign markets. It has been our consistent experience that increased competition means increased trade for us. It brings out the mettle of our traders and usually increases the efficiency of their operation while stimulating them to more aggressive selling and greater responsiveness to the needs of customers.

Benefits of Increased Imports

On the import side, the prospects for long-term increases are also good. The national income is rising and the demand for consumer and industrial goods may therefore be expected to rise also. Such a rise in import volume will be healthy for the United States for many reasons. Let me cite three.

The first is that by increasing our purchases from free nations abroad we increase their ability to earn the dollars to pay for our exports and therefore we widen the market for our industries.

Secondly, we strengthen the manufacturing and raw-materials producing industries of our friends in other lands and thereby make employment of their citizens surer and prosperity for them more abundant, which makes them, as nations and as individuals, less susceptible to the blandishments of antagonistic ideologies which are counsels of despair and attractive only to people in fear of hunger and of misery.

The third benefit of increased imports is that we obtain for our industries greater supplies of necessary raw materials to permit production within this country, with consequent rise, even above our present high levels, in employment in the producing industries, to say nothing of the increased employment and business volume which increased imports will make possible in our distributive trades.

I am talking about steady, sound increase in trade volume. I am not talking about booms with their inevitable busts. Continual expansion of business, which means steadily increasing production and increasing needs for it to satisfy, is the heartbeat of our economy. It is the reason why we may look to the future with hope; it is the reason why our high birthrate is a blessing rather than a dilemma.

Our international trade is just one factor contributing to our national income. Large as it is in billions of dollars, it is a relatively small component of our total business activity. But because of its effect on our ability to produce in high volume and to maintain prices within the reach of our consumers, it is vital that our international trade must continue in a direction compatible with our national interests. Its success or failure, and the shape that it takes, intimately concerns each of us. Private business has, of course, the main responsibility for the development of our trade. The role of the Government is to foster and encourage the development of commerce by providing a favorable climate for its expansion and by assuring to private traders freedom of opportunity to develop profitable business.

The items on the immediate agenda for Government action to achieve these results are of several kinds. They include:

Encouraging increased investment of American capital and know-how in sound enterprises abroad. There is a proposal now before Congress to provide a tax incentive for foreign investment by granting a 14-point reduction in the tax on incomes derived from such sources. The administration supports this proposal and we, in the Commerce Department, join in that support.

We also look forward to the activation of the new International Finance Corporation, which the United States has already joined. This organization will be equipped to provide relatively small amounts of ownership capital to international business ventures and will thus, we believe, act as a catalyst to spark private investment in such ventures.

The achievements attained through our work in ATT in the field of tariff and other trade-restric-on removal are substantial. The procedure ıder GATT, however, is somewhat cumbersome, nce its business can usually be transacted only in ınual general meetings. The proposed Organi-ıtion for Trade Cooperation, which would be an lministrative body organized for year-round tivity in furtherance of GATT's objectives, would, e believe, be a forward step. It would be of par-cular benefit to the United States, by the way, nce we are the country which would benefit most om an improvement in GATT's administrative rocedure. It would greatly expedite work for ıe elimination of barriers and we strongly sup-ort its creation and the membership of the United tates in it.

The simplification of customs administration ıd procedure has been the subject of many legis-tive proposals. Legislation has been passed hich did much to eliminate or simplify outworn dministrative requirements and thereby to ease ıe burden of the American importer in entering is goods for consumption in the United States. he method of determining value for duty pur-oses, however, was not covered in this legislation ıd it continues to be a source of great uncertainty ıd costly delays in assessing proper duty. A pro-osal now awaits action by the Senate, having ıssed the House, which would provide a simple ıd easily understood method of determining such ılue. We, in the Department of Commerce, are opeful such legislation may be passed by this ongress.

Stimulation of travel abroad by residents of the nited States is an important part of our program ır the encouragement of increased foreign trade. xpenditures by such travelers in 1955 approxi-ıated $1.5 billion. The consequent increase in the ollar resources of our customers abroad expanded ıe market for American exports. In addition, .S. tourism also fosters better understanding mong peoples and warmer ties of international iendship. It is, therefore, a stanch rock in our ortress against the encroachment of militant ommunism.

This is the unfinished business with respect to oreign trade upon which we are presently work-ıg. We believe that these actions by Government ill encourage and make easier the work of the merican foreign trader and investor abroad. he major responsibility for the creation of international business is theirs. With the energetic co-operation of the businessman directly concerned, and of the Government, which is all of the people, we shall continue to press forward for the high levels of international commerce which so closely merge with and support our business activities at home.

St. Lawrence Seaway Discussions With Canada

Press release 285 dated May 28

Intergovernmental discussions between the United States and Canada will be held on May 29 in Ottawa regarding a question which has arisen on the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Projects. The question relates to the responsibility for dredging north and south of Cornwall Island, which is one of the principal matters concerning the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Projects still to be resolved.

The Canadian representative will be George C. Marler, Minister of Transport, to be assisted by Lionel Chevrier, President of the Canadian St. Lawrence Seaway Authority, and officials of related Canadian Government departments. The U.S. representative will be Wilber M. Brucker, Secretary of the Army, whose advisers will include Lewis G. Castle, Administrator of the U.S. Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, and other U.S. officials.

U.S.-U.K. Discussions on Telegraph Services

Press release 286 dated May 29

During the period May 16 through May 25, 1956, informal discussions were held in Washington between officials of the United States and the United Kingdom Governments concerned with telecommunications. Representatives of the interested private companies of both countries and of the interested committee of the United States Senate attended the later stages of the discussions.

The purpose of these meetings was to exchange views on questions relating to U.S.-U.K. telegraph services and not to arrive at any treaty or formal agreement. During the course of these discussions a wide variety of views were exchanged which covered the aspects of modernization of existing plant, the utilization of new fa-

cilities and techniques, and ways and means of utilizing communications facilities to serve the close mutual interests of the United Kingdom and the United States.

Mr. R. J. P. Harvey, Deputy Director General of the British General Post Office, was Chairman of the United Kingdom Delegation. Mr. J. Paul Barringer, Director of the Office of Transport and Communications of the Department of State, and Commissioner E. M. Webster of the Federal Communications Commission, and Commissioner Richard Mack, Alternate to Commissioner Webster, acted as co-spokesmen for the United States.

It was felt that much useful work had been done and that the discussions had served to bring into focus and proper perspective many of the problems which had been facing both countries. It was also felt that it would be desirable to maintain a continued close liaison between the United Kingdom and the United States in this field.

The meeting concluded with a feeling of mutual satisfaction that the exchange of views pointed the way toward common objectives and aims.

President Approves Farm Bill

Statement by President Eisenhower

White House press release dated May 28

I have today approved the farm bill, H. R. 10875.

The heart of the bill is the soil bank. Its acreage reserve will help bring production of certain crops into balance with their markets. It will check current additions to our price-depressing, market-destroying surplus stocks of farm products. It is a concept rich with promise for improving our agricultural situation.

The conservation reserve feature of the soil bank can be the most significant advance in the conservation field in many years. It will result in improved use of our soil and water resources for the benefit of this and future generations. Together with the forestry provisions of the bill, it will increase our supply of much-needed forest products. It will help hold rain and snow where they fall and will heal with grass and trees the scars of erosion which now mar our countryside. It will make for better land use in those areas of the Great Plains which have experienced dust storms. It will reduce the stimulus to livestock production induced by feed-grain output on acres diverted from wheat and cotton.

The delay in the bill's enactment, however, mal it virtually impossible to put the soil bank pr erly into effect in 1956, and I am disappointed th advance payments to farmers are not provid for.

Most of the harmful provisions of the previ farm bill have been deleted or have been subst tially modified. Some of them still remain, ho ever, and some new ones have been added.

Sections 202 and 203, which apply to cotton, a particularly unfortunate.[1] This administratio committed to a policy of orderly disposal of ag cultural surpluses abroad and a healthy expansi of international trade. This policy is in c national interest and serves to promote strength of the free world. These two sectio call for measures which could result in a seri setback to this policy.

Section 203 requires the Government to foll an inflexible program of cotton export sales w little regard to costs and without adequate reg to the far-reaching economic consequences at ho and abroad. In order to avoid seriously disr tive effects, this section of the bill will have to administered with extreme caution.

Section 202 intensifies further the restricti already applied on imports of long-staple cot at a time when domestic cotton of this type is fu competitive with foreign growths and dome consumption is rising. The same section of legislation requires the Government to exp Commodity Credit Corporation stocks of ex

[1] Following is the text of sections 202, 203, and 204

EXTRA-LONG STAPLE COTTON

SEC. 202. (a) Hereafter the quota for cotton havin staple length of one and one-eighth inches or more, es lished September 20, 1939, pursuant to section 22 of Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, as amended, s apply to the same grades and staple lengths include the quota when such quota was initially establis Such quota shall provide for cotton having a staple le of one and eleven-sixteenths inches and longer, and s establish dates for the quota year which will reco and permit entry to conform to normal marketing p tices and requirements for such cotton.

(b) Beginning not later than August 1, 1956, the C modity Credit Corporation is directed to sell for ex at competitive world prices its stocks of domestic produced extra long staple cotton on hand on the of enactment of this Act. The amount offered and the accepted by the Commodity Credit Corporation sha such as to dispose of such quantity in an orderly ma and within a reasonable period of time.

Footnote continued on next page

ng-staple cotton, a type which we normally do ot sell abroad in significant quantities.

Section 204 authorizes the President to nego- ate agreements to limit certain imports outside e procedures established by our trade-agree- ents legislation. This section represents an un- esirable complication in the field of foreign trade.

The effective operation of a two-price plan for ce is faced with several serious problems, which ust be carefully evaluated before a decision is ade as to whether to institute such a plan.

In freezing acreage allotments for rice and cot- n for the next 2 years at the 1956 level the bill ns counter to the adjustment principle which nderlies our basic agricultural legislation.

Despite the shortcomings of the bill, its advan- ges outweigh its harmful provisions. I am atified with the constructive features it con- ins, and I am hopeful that the Congress will view and repair its shortcomings.

ongressional Documents elating to Foreign Policy

th Congress, 1st and 2d Sessions

ewsprint Study. Hearings before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. March 15, 1955, January 10 and 25, 1956. 217 pp.

United States Information and Educational Exchange Act Amendments of 1956. Hearings before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on S. 631, S. 2410, and S. 3638. July 20, 1955, and April 17, 1956. 113 pp.

84th Congress, 2d Session

East-West Trade. Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operationa. Part 2, March 7, 8, 9, 26, and 29, 1956. 263 pp.

Reorganization of the Passport Office. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Government Operations on S. 3340, a bill to transfer the functions of the Passport Office to a new agency of the Department of State to be known as the "United States Passport Service," to establish a Passport Service fund to finance the operations of the United States Passport Service, and for other purposes. April 13, 1956. 50 pp.

Disarmament, a Selected Chronology, January 1, 1918–March 19, 1956. Staff Study No. 2 of the Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, April 20, 1956. 33 pp. Committee print.

Review of the United Nations Charter. Final Report of the Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations pursuant to the provisions of S. Res. 126, 83d Cong., as amended by S. Res. 193, 83d Cong., and S. Res. 36 and S. Res. 83, 84th Cong. S. Rept. 1797, April 23, 1956. 37 pp.

Great Lakes Fishery Act of 1956. Report to accompany S. 3524. S. Rept. 1858, April 25, 1956. 3 pp.

Extending Greetings to the Sudan. Report to accompany H. Con. Res. 210. H. Rept. 2053, April 25, 1956. 1 p.

Crude and Calcined Bauxite. Report to accompany H. R. 8228. H. Rept. 2064, April 25, 1956. 3 pp.

International Air Agreements. Report of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. S. Rept. 1875, April 30, 1956. 30 pp.

Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program for the Six Months Ended December 31, 1955. H. Doc. 369, May 3, 1956 37 pp.

Personnel Programs and Policies of the Federal Government in Overseas Operations. Report of the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. H. Rept. 2109, May 3, 1956. 59 pp.

EXPORT SALES PROGRAM FOR COTTON

Sec. 203. In furtherance of the current policy of the ommodity Credit Corporation of offering surplus agri- ultural commodities for sale for export at competitive orld prices, the Commodity Credit Corporation is directed use its existing powers and authorities immediately pon the enactment of this Act to encourage the export f cotton by offering to make cotton available at prices ot in excess of the level of prices at which cottons of omparable qualities are being offered in substantial quan- ity by other exporting countries and, in any event, for e cotton marketing year beginning August 1, 1956, at rices not in excess of the minimum prices (plus carrying harges, beginning October 1, 1956, as established pur- uant to Section 407 of the Agricultural Act of 1949) at hich cottons of comparable qualities were sold under the xport program announced by the United States Depart- ent of Agriculture on August 12, 1955. The Commodity redit Corporation may accept bids in excess of the aximum prices specified herein but shall not reject bids t such maximum prices unless a higher bid is received or the same cotton. Cottons of qualities not comparable to those of cottons sold under the program announced on August 12, 1955, shall be offered at prices not in excess of the maximum prices prescribed hereunder for cottons of qualities comparable to those of cottons sold under such program, with appropriate adjustment for differences in quality. Such quantities of cotton shall be sold as will reestablish and maintain the fair historical share of the world market for United States cotton, said volume to be determined by the Secretary of Agriculture.

AGREEMENTS LIMITING IMPORTS

Sec. 204. The President may, whenever he determines such action appropriate, negotiate with representatives of foreign governments in an effort to obtain agreements limiting the export from such countries and the importation into the United States of any agricultural commodity or product manufactured therefrom or textiles or textile products, and the President is authorized to issue regulations governing the entry or withdrawal from warehouse of any such commodity, product, textiles, or textile products to carry out any such agreement. Nothing herein shall affect the authority provided under section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act (of 1933) as amended.

The Human Rights Commission Moves Ahead

TWELFTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, MARCH 5–29

by Mrs. Oswald B. Lord

Programs for annual reports on human rights and for studies of specific rights were inaugurated by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights at its 12th session, held at New York from March 5 to 29, 1956. The first program provides that the Commission each year shall consider general developments, progress achieved, and difficulties encountered in the field of human rights. Its work will be based upon annual reports by member governments and on information furnished by them for the *Yearbook on Human Rights.* Under the second program the Commission established a committee of four of its members to study "the right of everyone to be free from arbitrary arrest, detention and exile." This study will be based on information from member governments, the Secretary-General, the specialized agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and the writings of recognized scholars and scientists. With the adoption of these two programs the Commission completed action on the three-point action program introduced by our delegation at the 1953 session. The third part, advisory services in the field of human rights, was adopted by the Commission last year and later approved by the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly.[1]

The Commission on Human Rights consists of the representatives of 18 member states, elected by the Economic and Social Council: Austra Chile, China, France, Greece, India, Iraq, I anon, Mexico, Norway, Pakistan, the Philippi Poland, Turkey, Ukrainian S.S.R., the U.S.S the United Kingdom, and the United Sta Only one new state was represented this year, I having replaced Egypt.

The Commission unanimously elected the lowing officers: René Cassin (France), chairm Felixberto M. Serrano (Philippines), first chairman; Rudecindo Ortega (Chile), second chairman; and Abdul Waheed (Pakistan), r porteur. These were the same officers as last y except that Mr. Serrano replaced Salvador López (Philippines).

The U.S. delegation was composed of the lowing: representative, Mrs. Oswald B. Lo principal adviser, Philip Halpern, associate jus of the Appellate Division of the New York S Supreme Court, Third Department; advis James Frederick Green, deputy director, Offic International Economic and Social Affairs, partment of State, and Richard F. Pedersen, I nomic and Social Affairs, U.S. Mission to United Nations.

Annual Reports

The first of the three proposals introduced the U.S. delegation in 1953 provided for the mission of annual reports by governments on

• *Mrs. Lord is U.S. Representative on the U.N. Commission on Human Rights.*

[1] BULLETIN of June 15, 1953, p. 842; Aug. 17, 1953, p. and Aug. 15, 1955, p. 277.

nt developments and progress achieved in the ld of human rights and for consideration of ese reports by the Commission each year. The mmission at its 1953 and 1954 sessions, being eoccupied with the draft covenants, took no tion on this proposal but at its 1955 session cepted it in principle as part of the work program for future sessions.

The delegations of China, Lebanon, Pakistan, d the Philippines jointly proposed that the preable of our draft resolution include a new paraaph stating that positive steps to promote respect r human rights "can be taken without prejudice the adoption and ratification of the covenants human rights, including the measures of immentation provided herein, it being understood at this resolution shall be subject to review upon coming into force of the covenants together th measures of implementation." This amendnt was adopted by 17–0–1 (United States).

The Soviet delegation, in an obvious effort to barrass the United States by references to the aft covenants, racial discrimination, and selfternination, introduced an amendment to the st operative paragraph to provide that states uld also report on measures "taken to imple nt the rights enumerated in the Universal claration of Human Rights and the draft inrnational covenants on human rights, including e legislative and other measures adopted by ates to combat discrimination based on race, tional origin, sex or language, and also the ps taken by States responsible for the ministration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust rritories to implement the right of self-determition." This amendment was rejected by 4 in vor (Soviet bloc–India), 11 against, with 3 tentions (Greece, Iraq, Lebanon).

The Lebanese delegation, desiring to include a ference to self-determination without any refence to the draft covenants, proposed an amendnt to include references in the first and second erative paragraphs to "rights enumerated in the niversal Declaration of Human Rights and to e right of self-determination." The two refences to the Universal Declaration were adopted 15–0–3 (Australia, United Kingdom, United ates), and the two references to the right of lf-determination were accepted by 11 in favor to against (Australia, China, France, Norway, rkey, United Kingdom), with 1 abstention nited States).

The resolution as amended was adopted by 13 to 4 (Australia, France, Turkey, United Kingdom), with 1 abstention (Norway). (For text, see annex I.) This impressive vote was most gratifying to our delegation. It resulted in part from the fact that we had made every possible effort, during the course of four sessions of the Commission and between sessions, to accommodate the views of other governments, the specialized agencies, the nongovernmental organizations, and the Secretariat. We had earnestly endeavored to have the final text—the seventh version submitted by our delegation—reflect the views of all concerned. Thanks to these extensive consultations and debates, all the Latin American and Arab-Asian delegations were able to vote for the resolution. In fact, we succeeded in meeting the technical objections of the Soviet-bloc delegations so that even they could apparently find no plausible reason for voting against the resolution. We regretted that four of the Western delegations felt obliged to vote negatively, primarily because of their strong opposition to the reference to the right of self-determination, which they felt was inappropriate and, indeed, unacceptable for the purpose of this new reporting system.

Studies of Specific Rights

At the 1953 session the U.S. delegation introduced, as the second part of its three-point action program, a draft resolution on studies of specific rights or groups of rights, to be undertaken by an expert adviser appointed by the Secretary-General. As in the case of the draft resolution on annual reports, the Commission at its 1953 and 1954 sessions did not take action on this draft resolution, but at the 1955 session it included the principle of studies in the work program for future sessions.

At this session our delegation introduced a fourth version of its draft resolution, which was considerably shortened and condensed. In particular, this draft omitted the previous detailed list of sources of information to be drawn upon by the expert adviser. This draft, like the version introduced in 1955, proposed as the first subject for study the right of everyone to be free from arbitrary arrest, detention, and exile. This right, taken from article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, seemed to our delegation to be particularly important and suitable for study at this time.

The streamlined draft resolution submitted at this session provided merely that the expert adviser should utilize "published material and written statements necessary for the study." Representatives of Lebanon, Pakistan, and the Philippines questioned this general provision and urged us to return to the more specific listing of sources that had appeared in the earlier drafts. To accommodate their views our delegation revised the text to provide that material should be drawn from the following sources: (i) governments of states members of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies, (ii) the Secretary-General, (iii) specialized agencies, (iv) nongovernmental organizations, and (v) writings of recognized scholars and scientists. The specific reference to governments of states members of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies was designed to avoid any future controversy over the question whether communications should be sent to the Communist regimes controlling areas outside the United Nations system.

With regard to the method for conducting the study, our delegation argued continually, as it had in previous sessions, in favor of an independent expert adviser appointed by the Secretary-General. It became obvious, however, that even some who supported the proposal had misgivings over this procedure. They feared that an independent person, serving in his personal capacity and utilizing unofficial materials, might be unduly critical of governments. Lebanon, India, and others suggested that the study be undertaken by a committee of four members of the Commission.

Our delegation offered a compromise formula (in the form of a corrigendum to the resolution) by which the study would be undertaken by an expert adviser in consultation with the four officers of the Commission. This compromise did not satisfy other delegations, and an amendment submitted by Greece, India, Pakistan, and the Philippines, providing for a Committee of Four to be elected by the Commission, was adopted by 9 in favor, 2 against (United Kingdom, United States), with 7 abstentions.

The Commission also adopted an amendment—proposed by Chile, China, Lebanon, Pakistan, and the Philippines—to add to the preamble a paragraph stating that certain positive steps to promote human rights can be taken without prejudice to the adoption and ratification of the Covenants on Human Rights, including the measures of i- plementation provided therein. This paragra was adopted by 14–0–4 (United States, Sov bloc). To make this draft resolution confo to the one on annual reports in another respe our delegation revised the text to state that a comments resulting from studies should be "of objective and general character."

During the course of this debate our delegati submitted four revisions (including the corrig- dum mentioned earlier) of its draft resoluti which was the fourth version of the text ori- nally introduced in 1953. Thus, the final text adopted was the eighth in this series, incorpor- ing a wide variety of amendments, comments, a suggestions over the past 3 years. The resolut was adopted by a vote of 11 in favor, 3 agai (Soviet bloc), with 4 abstentions (Austra France, Mexico, United Kingdom). (For te see annex II.)

Toward the end of the session the Commiss elected the representatives of the following f states to form the Committee of Four: Chile, N way, Pakistan, and the Philippines. Althou this first study still requires the approval of e Economic and Social Council at its session July–August, the Committee held an organi- tional meeting and elected Mr. Serrano (Phil- pines) as chairman-rapporteur.

Advisory Services

Last year the Commission adopted a resolut on advisory services, which constituted one p of the U.S. action program. This resolution subsequently approved by the Economic Social Council and the General Assembly, wh consolidated all of the previous resolutions advisory services with regard to freedom of in- mation, status of women, and discrimination minorities. The resolution provided that Secretary-General should report regularly to Commission, and his first report was before Commission at this session. Meanwhile the s- commission had transmitted to the Commissio a draft resolution requesting the Secretary-Gen to consult with governments about the possibi y of arranging for seminars in the field of discri i- nation and minorities.

Mr. Serrano, with my support, suggested t the Commission could save time by dealing w both aspects of the question of advisory servi s. A draft resolution was circulated by Mexico, I k-

tan, the Philippines, and the United States, hich noted that the General Assembly had uthorized three kinds of assistance—advisory rvices, fellowships and scholarships, and semars—and noted the emphasis given to seminars y reports of both the Secretary-General and the ubcommission. The resolution requested the ecretary-General to explore, in consultation with overnments and specialized agencies and in acordance with the General Assembly resolution, ith a reference to a paragraph dealing with nonovernmental organizations, the desirability of olding seminars in the field of human rights, specially with regard to the prevention of disrimination and protection of minorities. This raft resolution, which incorporated a number of ubjects made during the debate, provoked little ontroversy. In introducing the resolution I read telegram received from our delegation to the ommission on the Status of Women, meeting at eneva, which quoted a resolution on advisory rvices just adopted by that Commission on the e of seminars in the field of political rights; and ur joint draft resolution made reference to that solution.

The joint draft resolution was adopted by 4–0–4 (Australia, Chile, China, United Kingom).[2] Australia and the United Kingdom abained because of their continuing skepticism out this subject; Chile, because it considered at the Commission had not yet given adequate tention to the report of the subcommission; and hina, because it felt that special emphasis on the e of seminars was premature at this time.

Other Questions"

When the Commission rearranged the provional agenda, P. D. Morosov (U.S.S.R.) sugested that under item 3, "Development of the ork of the United Nations," there be added a ubitem, "(d) Other questions." Mr. Morosov ubsequently introduced two draft resolutions, one roposing that the Commission add the Draft eclaration on the Rights of the Child to the enda for the next session and the other inviting e subcommission to prepare at its 1957 session "a raft international convention prohibiting disimination in education on grounds of race, lour, sex, language, religion, political or other beliefs, nationality or social origin, property or other status."

Mr. Morosov stressed the importance of preventing discrimination in education, the need for a separate convention on this subject, and the desirability of speeding up the preparation of such a convention. Our delegation and others argued that the report on this subject was still before the subcommission, which had yet to submit recommendations to the Commission. In the light of these objections Mr. Morosov withdrew his draft resolutions.

The Soviet draft resolution proposing that the Draft Declaration on the Rights of the Child be added to the agenda for next year was adopted by 18–0–0. A French resolution proposing that the right of asylum be added to the agenda was adopted by 15–0–2 (Australia, United Kingdom), with Lebanon absent. The Australian and United Kingdom delegations abstained because they doubted whether it would be useful to debate this subject in view of the widely differing positions taken by member governments.

Our delegation and the Mexican delegation joined in sponsoring a draft resolution concerning the 10th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Our two delegations pointed out that this anniversary would fall on December 10, 1958, and that early preparation would be required if the date were to be properly celebrated. Our joint draft resolution proposed that the Commission appoint a committee consisting of its four officers to prepare the necessary plans, in consultation with the Secretary-General, the appropriate authorities of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and other specialized agencies, and interested nongovernmental organizations.

The resolution was adopted by 16–0–1 (Iraq).[3] The Iraqi representative explained that he had abstained because of the fact that human rights were being flagrantly violated in the Near East.

Membership of the Subcommission

The Commission was required to take a decision on the membership of the Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, as the 3-year terms of the present 12 members would expire at the end of 1956. There

[2] U.N. doc. E/CN. 4/728.

[3] U. N. doc. E/CN. 4/729.

appeared to be a consensus that the present membership would be reelected for another 3-year term. I pointed out, however, the importance of eventually including in the subcommission nationals from some of the 16 new member states. In view of the fact that Max Sorensen (Denmark) had stated that he could no longer serve in the subcommission, the Commission extended the term of office of the other 11 members to December 31, 1959, and later elected Vieno Voitto Saario (Finland) to fill the vacancy.

Mr. Ortega (Chile) introduced a draft resolution proposing that the membership of the subcommission be increased from 12 to 15 to provide for experts from some of the 16 new member states. Our delegation and others, while agreeing that such experts should at some time be included in the subcommission, urged that no action be taken until a decision had been reached about the future size of the Economic and Social Council and of its functional commissions. An Australian motion to adjourn the debate on the Chilean resolution was adopted by 13 to 3 (Chile, Greece, India), with 1 abstention (Pakistan).

Report of the Subcommission

Many aspects of the report of the eighth session of the subcommission were discussed, but action was taken on only two specific points—the geographic scope of the studies being undertaken by the subcommission and the calling of another conference of nongovernmental organizations.

Serious controversy had developed in the subcommission in January 1956 over the geographic scope of the projected studies in discrimination. The terms of reference, approved by the Commission, provided that these studies should be "on a global basis." The special rapporteur on discrimination in education had requested the Secretary-General to send a communication to the Chinese Communists requesting information. The Secretary-General initially declined to send such a communication, but later in the session of the subcommission he indicated that he would transmit a communication on request from the special rapporteur. Similar questions had already arisen with regard to communications to East Germany and might arise in connection with North Korea, North Viet-Nam, and Outer Mongolia.

In order to solve this problem our delegation, together with China and the Philippines, submitted a draft resolution specifying that the studies of the subcommission should relate to states member of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies. The resolution also dealt with other aspects of the subcommission's report and provided tha the Commission would take note of it "with appreciation." The resolution was adopted by 1 in favor, 3 against (Soviet bloc), with 4 absten tions (Australia, India, Iraq, Lebanon).

In the spring of 1955 a Conference of Non Governmental Organizations Interested in th Eradication of Prejudice and Discrimination wa held at Geneva under United Nations auspices The conference was attended by representative of 97 nongovernmental organizations and chaire by a former President of France, Vincent Auriol The conference was widely regarded as a usefu undertaking, and its recommendations were con sidered by the subcommission last January. A proposal that a second conference be held was sub mitted to the Commission by 18 of the nongovern mental organizations.

The French delegation introduced a draft reso lution calling the attention of the Economic an Social Council to the recommendation of the con ference that a second conference on discriminatio be convened, if possible, within 2 years. The draf resolution was subsequently revised to request tha the nongovernmental organizations state thei views on the date, duration, program, objective and methods of this second conference, so that th subcommission and the Commission might conside these views at their 1957 sessions. The recom mendations of these two organs would then b considered by the Council. This revised text wa adopted by 15–0–1 (Pakistan), with Iraq an Lebanon absent.[4]

Significance of Session

This session was in many ways the most suc cessful of the four I have attended as Unite States representative. There seemed to be a ge eral desire for cooperation and for reconciliatio of differing views. In contrast to their cold-wa tactics in the past, the three Soviet-bloc deleg tions refrained from making propaganda attac against the West. Most important, the Commi sion agreed to move ahead along lines of practic action—to consider each year the progress achieve in the field of human rights, based upon repor from governments, to make a thorough study

[4] U.N. doc. E/CN. 4/730.

ne right or group of rights at a time, and to pro-
ide for advisory services upon request of govern-
ents. The Commission agreed, in effect, that
ese activities were supplementary to the draft
venants, on which it had devoted so much time
the past, and should go forward while the draft
venants are still before the General Assembly.
As I stated during one of the debates at this
ssion:[5] "The United States views with concern
e violations of human rights in many parts of
e world—violations that are accepted by some
untries as part of their political and social sys-
ms. We feel, as many other delegations do, that
is Commission has a responsibility to do all it can
further human rights throughout the world, to
e every means possible—education, exchange of
formation, public opinion—to further human
ghts. We also realize that many countries are
ruggling under difficulties and would benefit by
exchange of ideas and discussions with other
untries. It is in this spirit of sincerely wishing
see progress in the field of human rights that
e United States has put forward its action pro-
am. This is a practical program designed
nply to establish a wider observance of and
spect for human rights and fundamental free-
ms throughout the world. . . .

"There is absolutely no doubt in my mind that
matter how modestly we start in this program
advisory services, objective reporting, and
ecial studies, it will be a program welcomed
roughout the world, a program that can grow
th time and be progressively helpful to all of
r countries."

NEX I—RESOLUTION ON ANNUAL REPORTS

. doc. E/CN. 4/726

he Commission on Human Rights,

onsidering that by Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter
Members of the United Nations have pledged them-
es to take joint and separate action to promote uni-
sal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
damental freedoms for all without distinction as to
e, sex, language or religion,

onsidering that the Universal Declaration of Human
hts sets forth the goals toward which all Member
tes of the United Nations should strive, both by
ir own efforts and through international co-operation,
he promotion of human rights,

esiring to advance as rapidly as possible respect for,
observance of, human rights and fundamental free-
is and to stimulate Governments of Member States
to press forward toward attaining the goals set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Convinced that certain positive steps to promote respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms can be taken without prejudice to the adoption and ratification of the covenants on human rights, including the measures of implementation provided therein, it being understood that this resolution shall be subject to review upon the coming into force of the covenants together with measures of implementation,

Desiring to obtain from each Member State of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies information on developments and progress achieved in the field of human rights and measures taken to safeguard human liberty in its metropolitan area and trust and non-self-governing territories, with a view to learning the results obtained and difficulties encountered in their work for the wider observance of, and respect for, human rights and fundamental freedoms throughout the world,

Having adopted as part of its programme of future work the consideration of general developments and progress achieved in the field of human rights and measures taken to safeguard human liberty, taking into account information furnished for publication in the Yearbook on Human Rights, and additional reports from Member States and from specialized agencies pursuant to the terms of any further specific resolution with respect to reports adopted by the Commission,

Bearing in mind the special responsibilities of other organs of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies in the promotion of human rights and the facilities the latter may have for obtaining necessary information from their Member States,

1. *Decides* to consider general developments and progress achieved in the field of human rights and measures taken to safeguard human liberty in States Members of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies relating to the rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to the right of peoples to self-determination, taking into account information furnished for publication in the Yearbook on Human Rights and the additional reports from Member States and from specialized agencies referred to hereinafter; and to transmit to the Economic and Social Council such comments, conclusions and recommendations of an objective and general character, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the information and reports, as it deems appropriate;

2. *Recommends* that the Economic and Social Council request that each Member State of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies transmit annually to the Secretary-General a report describing developments and progress achieved in the field of human rights and measures taken to safeguard human liberty in its metropolitan area and trust and non-self-governing territories, such report to deal with the rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and with the right of peoples to self-determination and to supplement the information furnished for publication in the Yearbook on Human Rights and to make reference to any relevant portions of reports already submitted to another organ of the United Nations or to a specialized agency;

[5] U.S./U.N. press release 2367 dated Mar. 8, 1956.

3. *Requests* the Economic and Social Council to call the attention of each Member State to the advisability of setting up an advisory body, composed of experienced and competent persons, to assist their Government in the preparation of its report;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to prepare a brief summary of the reports upon a topical basis;

5. *Requests* the Economic and Social Council to invite the specialized agencies, in respect of rights coming within their purview, to transmit annually to the Secretary-General a report on a topical basis summarizing the information which they receive from their Member States, and to co-operate in the full realization of the aim set forth in this resolution.

ANNEX II—RESOLUTION ON STUDIES OF SPECIFIC RIGHTS

U.N. doc. E/CN. 4/727

The Commission on Human Rights,

Considering that by Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter the Members of the United Nations have pledged themselves to take joint and separate action to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion,

Considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights sets forth goals toward which all States Members of the United Nations should strive, both by their own efforts and through international co-operation, in the promotion of human rights,

Desiring to strengthen the work of the United Nations for wider observance of, and respect for, human rights and fundamental freedoms,

Convinced that certain positive steps to promote respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms can be taken without prejudice to the adoption and ratification of the covenants on human rights, including the measures of implementation provided therein,

Having adopted as a part of its programme of future work, the undertaking of studies of specific rights or groups of rights, stressing general developments, progress achieved, and measures taken to safeguard human liberty, with such recommendations as may be necessary,

Recognizing that such studies are necessary for the purpose of ascertaining the existing conditions, the results obtained, and the difficulties encountered in the work of States Members of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies for the wider observance of, and respect for, human rights and fundamental freedoms,

Bearing in mind the special responsibilities of the specialized agencies as regards certain human rights,

1. *Decides*

(a) To undertake studies of specific rights or groups of rights in States Members of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies and to stress in these studies general developments, progress achieved and measures taken to safeguard human liberty, with such recommendations of an objective and general character as may be necessary; and

(b) To select, subject to the approval of the Econo and Social Council, specific subjects for study, provid that no subject shall be selected which can more app priately be studied by another organ of the United N tions or by a specialized agency;

2. *Decides* to appoint a committee of the Commiss consisting of four members to be elected by the Comm sion, which shall,

(a) Prepare the study, bearing in mind the terms sub-paragraph (a) of operative paragraph 1 hereof, w such assistance from the Secretariat as it may requ utilizing published material and written statements nec sary for the study, such material to be drawn from following sources: (i) governments of States Members the United Nations and of the specialized agencies, (the Secretary-General, (iii) specialized agencies, (non-governmental organizations in consultative relati ship with the Economic and Social Council, and (v) w ings of recognized scholars and scientists;

(b) Proceed with the work of the study with a v to submitting a preliminary report at the session of Commission following its appointment and, if possible complete report at the succeeding session;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to assist the c mittee in the study;

4. *Requests* the Economic and Social Council to in e the States Members of the United Nations and of the s cialized agencies, in transmitting the reports reques under the resolution on annual reports, to deal in p ticular with the right or groups of rights currently selec for study under the terms of this resolution;

5. *Requests* the Economic and Social Council to in e the specialized agencies and the non-governmental ganizations in consultative relationship with the Econo and Social Council to co-operate in carrying out s resolution; and

6. *Decides* to select, subject to the approval of the E nomic and Social Council, as its first subject for st y the right of everyone to be free from arbitrary arr t, detention and exile.

Teaching About the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies

Statement by Richard F. Pedersen[1]

The importance of an informed world opin n about the United Nations cannot be underei mated. The distinguished delegate from Indo sia [Aris Munandar] brought out in his open g remarks the significance which was attached to is informed world opinion by the founding fat rs of this organization. We can be pleased that s h a large number of countries have replied to e

[1] Made in the U.N. Economic and Social Council on r. 26 (U.S./U.N. press release 2407 dated May 3). r. Pedersen was adviser on the U.S. delegation to the Cou il.

quiry from the Secretary-General and the Di-ctor-General of UNESCO on the work being done their own countries in spreading information out the United Nations. Over 40 countries ve replied. If our significant role as a world rum is to be understood by the peoples of the orld, and if we are to have their support, they ust have the greatest amount of knowledge pos-ble.

The reports, of course, do not reveal as great an nount of information as we would have desired, d we hope that by the time the next report is ade there will be further significant progress in e knowledge of United Nations documents and the discussion of the United Nations among ople around the world.

Like the United Kingdom, the United States has decentralized school system. Responsibility for rricula, for direction of the schools, and for fi-ncing school operations is in the hands of State d local authorities. There is also a great deal of ivate education in the United States and a great al of voluntary effort, both at the adult level and extracurricular activities in schools, through hich knowledge about the United Nations is ade available. This has been one of the rengths of our own school system, inasmuch as it lies upon local initiative and educated interest great importance among the people them-lves. The significant amount of interest in the hool systems of the United States about the nited Nations does not stem from Government rection or from pressure by the Government but ems out of the desires of the people of the United tates to learn and understand the United ations.

This decentralization, of course, does cause some fficulties when we attempt to obtain information report to the United Nations on what is being ne in our schools. Accordingly, when we were quested to prepare the report reflected in the cument before us,[2] the Office of Education in ashington had to make a special effort to collect e information. The time available for the prep-ation of the material was very short, but in-iries were addressed to the chief school officers in all of our States and territories, asking their cooperation in gathering information from schools at all levels of instruction. Similar letters were sent to private institutions, and approximately a thousand additional inquiries were issued from Washington, while some States, county and district superintendents distributed inquiries to schools under their authority. Furthermore, contact was made by letter or personal interview with the United States National Commission for UNESCO, officers of national organizations such as the Foreign Policy Association, 56 local Councils on World Affairs, the American Association for the United Nations, the National Education Association, and the United States Committee for the United Nations. We received a very large response, which was enormously gratifying, both in substance and as evidence that people in every part of the United States feel responsibility for their children learning the facts about the United Nations system.

Evidence of Growing Interest

One of the most significant results of the compilation of material was evidence of the growing understanding and interest in the United Nations. A few examples may suffice to demonstrate this. In 1955, 49 Governors appointed a State or territorial chairman for commemoration of United Nations Day. In 1952, there were 12. In 1955, there were 1,500 local committees appointed for United Nations Day, whereas in 1952 there were only 297. In 1955, there were United Nations Day observances of some kind in 10,000 communities, whereas in 1952 there were observances in slightly over 5,000. Even in requests for literature which have been addressed to the United States Committee for the United Nations there has been a similar increase, reaching, in 1955, 41,000 requests from a total in 1952 of 18,000. This indicates the growing awareness of the activities of the United Nations and interest in learning about them throughout the country.

Another interesting result which came out of the inquiries was that a great deal of the interest in teaching and learning about the United Nations centers around special days. United Nations Day and Week, Human Rights Day, and the "tricks or treats" program of UNICEF are particularly mentioned as events around which educational and voluntary organization authorities direct their efforts in learning about the United Nations.

[2] *Teaching of the Purposes and Principles, the Struc-re and Activities of the United Nations and the Special-ed Agencies in Schools and Educational Institutions of ember States: Report by the Secretary-General of the nited Nations and the Director-General of UNESCO,* N. doc. E/2837 dated Mar. 16, 1956.

A great number of techniques are utilized in educational efforts about the United Nations, and they have been developed at all levels of the educational process—in the elementary schools, in the secondary schools, in the universities, in adult education, and even in preschool education. I would like to give just one example of the types of programs available, based on the report from the State of New York: While interdependence of peoples and nations is stressed in each year of the elementary school program, special attention to the United Nations as an organization for world peace is accorded it in the programs of the fifth and sixth grades in New York State. A number of techniques are employed to make the study effective: (1) Panel discussions are held in classes on "The United Nations—Success or Failure"; (2) pupils make reports on such subjects as the control of nuclear weapons; (3) schematic charts are made; (4) pupils write "who's who" accounts of personalities in the United Nations (perhaps about someone sitting at this table); (5) charts are drawn showing the similarities and differences of the League of Nations and the United Nations; (6) films telling of the work of the United Nations in resolving disputes are shown to help drive home points in the study; (7) classes consider conflicting statements made about the United Nations and the role of the organization.

A great many other techniques have been used. One of the most significant of these is the system of model General Assemblies, which has been very widely used in the United States. The United Nations Public Information Department assists approximately 40 such Assemblies every year in the United States by providing materials and information about United Nations activities. Many other special events are also held. Frequently classes study other countries to learn about their systems of government, their habits, their mores, and their position in the world. The approach often used is an historical approach or a problem approach on questions with which the United Nations is dealing. One of the most significant programs, which has been carried forward over a period of years, has been the essay contest on the United Nations. In 1955, over 3,280 schools participated in this program, the winners of which received free trips to the United Nations to see it in operation. I should not close this part of our comments without mentioning the fact that as part of the 1954 conference of the National Education Association, which brings together outstand teachers from all over the United States, over 4, teachers spent several days at the United Nati Headquarters learning about the United Nati program.

Availability of Materials

One of the matters which is covered by the jo resolution presented by Ecuador, the Netherlan the United Kingdom, and the United States,[3] a which has been an important aspect of the Co cil's discussions, is the question of availability materials for use in schools and in nongove mental organizations and otherwise. Americ educational authorities, as reflected in their ports to the Federal Government, have revea that a number of useful information materials already available.

Various publications in the United States used in schools, among which were mentioned *Weekly Reader*, *Our Times*, and *Junior and Sen Scholastic* as being magazines which carry ma rials on the United Nations and in October f quently carry full issues specifically dealing w United Nations activities. Other materials interest were the *United Nations Review*, *Handbook on the United Nations*, and *UNESCO Courier*.

At the same time, it was demonstrated th there is a need for further materials graded various age levels for appropriate use by lo authorities. Anecdotal material, folklore, film and other matters were mentioned. There we a number of specific suggestions about the ty of material that would be welcome. Not on teachers, but Scout leaders, Sunday Sch teachers, librarians, and other youth leaders a constantly in search of inexpensive and attracti pamphlets written specifically for children in t elementary grades. At the elementary and int mediate levels, there is a need for graphically lustrated, informative, simply worded books a booklets. They should be of a size convenient handle and colorful in design. Concise, accura and lively presentations of the basic facts abo the United Nations and the specialized agenci written with the average teen-ager in mind, al would be useful. This was the type of comme which was received on the availability materials.

Now, if I may turn to the role which the Unit

[3] U.N. doc. E/L.708 dated Apr. 25.

ions might play. It has already been brought by the distinguished representative of the ted Kingdom [R. D. J. Scott Fox] that, inas-h as responsibility for education rests with l authorities in many countries and not with central government, it is obvious that we ıld not and could not seek to pass any respon-lity to deal with educational problems to inter-onal organizations. This, indeed, has already ı made clear in paragraph 315 of the Secretary-ıeral's report, i. e., that the writing, publica-, and distribution of teaching materials in the l form in which they are to be used in schools domestic responsibility and that neither the ted Nations nor UNESCO has the authority the desire to interfere in any way with the edu-onal systems of member states.

)n the other hand, there is a need for material ected to various age levels that can be used by governmental organizations, educational au-rities, teachers, or other youth leaders, insofar hey may find it possible and desirable. There-e, this resolution, as has been brought out by distinguished representative of the United ıgdom, suggests that this type of material on ited Nations work might be prepared by the ited Nations.

phasis on Study

would also like to comment briefly, if I may, the paragraph of the resolution which invites ernments of member states to encourage in ir educational institutions, through appro-ate means, the study of the United Nations and cialized agencies and the participation of their ntry therein. I would like to stress two things: st, the *study* of the United Nations. In spite the fact that it is desirable to have as much ormation on the United Nations system avail-e as possible, it is not our purpose here, and uld not be our purpose, to indoctrinate or to pagandize children, adults, or anyone for the ited Nations. It is the feeling of the United ıtes that the greater the amount of information ıt can be made available, good or bad, about cesses or failures, the greater will be the pos-ility of further developing an educated public nion which will adequately support United tions activities. The resolution, therefore, asks *study* of the United Nations.

Second, the resolution also brings out that the ouragement which governments should give to this education should be *as appropriate* according to the constitutional arrangements of each government. This is done to accommodate to the various systems of government and particularly those of countries which have a decentralized system. There are definite limitations on the action which a federal government such as that of the United States can take in connection with educational activities.

The role of nongovernmental organizations is also mentioned in the resolution because they are so significant in the United Nations. Here again we would agree with the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom that perhaps the main role of the nongovernmental organizations, particularly those in consultative status, is to establish contact between the United Nations and the public and to spread information about the activities of our organization. We look in particular to the role which the World Federation of United Nations Associations can play in disseminating information about United Nations activities around the world.

Finally, one brief comment about the new report which the resolution suggests for consideration in 1960, and this is a technical comment. The United States Government would appreciate, in such a report, if the cutoff date on the period to be covered could be established somewhat earlier than was the case in connection with the present report. If we are to consider this report in 1960, for instance, it might be possible to have a final date of coverage of the report set in the middle of 1959, so that governments could have the request to prepare material earlier and would have a fuller opportunity to consult appropriate educational authorities to obtain material.

The report before us is an important advance, but it is only a step on the way. Four years from now we hope that every member of the United Nations can be represented in the report and that the scope of activity will expand as more and more people learn about the United Nations and share their information with others.[4]

[4] On Apr. 26 the Council unanimously adopted L.708 as amended (E/Res(XXI)/9 dated May 3) noting the increased interest reported from all areas in learning about the United Nations; commending the nongovernmental organizations for their valuable contribution to disseminating such information; inviting member governments to encourage the study of the U.N. and the specialized agencies; and requesting the Secretary-General, in collaboration with UNESCO, to compile a similar report on the subject for consideration by the Council in 1960.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Directing Council, Pan American Institute of Geography and History

The Department of State announced on May 25 (press release 283) that Robert H. Randall, Assistant on Cartography, Resources and Civil Works Division, Bureau of the Budget, who is also U.S. representative on the Commission of Cartography of the Pan American Institute of Geography and History, will represent the U.S. Government at the first meeting of the Directing Council of the Institute at Mexico City, May 28–June 4, 1956.

The Directing Council, which has been established pursuant to a decision of the 6th General Assembly of the PAIGH (Mexico City, June 25–August 6, 1955), is responsible for the administrative aspects of the work of the Institute during the periods between the quadrennial sessions of the General Assembly and for formulation of the annual program and approval of the budget. It is composed of representatives of all the American Republics.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Protocol relating to certain amendments to the convention on international civil aviation. Done at Montreal June 14, 1954.[1]
Ratification deposited: United States, May 22, 1956.

North Atlantic Treaty

Agreement on status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, national representatives and international staff. Done at Ottawa September 20, 1951. Entered into force May 18, 1954. TIAS 2992.
Signature: Federal Republic of Germany, May 29, 1956.

Postal Services

Universal postal convention, with final protocol, annex, regulations of execution, and provisions regarding airmail and final protocol thereto. Signed at Brus July 11, 1952. Entered into force July 1, 1953. TI 2800.
Ratification deposited: Syria, May 4, 1956.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention. Signed Buenos Aires December 22, 1952. Entered into fo January 1, 1954. TIAS 3266.
Ratifications deposited: Czechoslovakia (with reser tion), April 17, 1956; Austria, April 20, 1956.

BILATERAL

China

Agreement for disposition of equipment and materials f nished by the United States and no longer requi by the Republic of China. Effected by exchange notes at Taipei April 3, 1956. Entered into force A 3, 1956.

Honduras

Agreement for performance by members of Army and Force Missions of duties specified in article V of military assistance agreement of May 20, 1954 (TI 2975). Effected by exchange of notes at Teguciga April 17 and 25, 1956. Entered into force April 26, 1

Peru

Surplus agricultural commodities agreement pursuant o title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and sistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454, 455 Stat. 44, 721). Signed at Lima May 7, 1956. Ente into force May 7, 1956.

Uruguay

Agreement for disposition of equipment and mater furnished by the United States under the milit assistance agreement of June 30, 1952 (TIAS 27 and no longer required by Uruguay. Effected by change of notes at Montevideo June 1 and Septem 16, 1955. Entered into force September 16, 1955.

Yugoslavia

Agreement providing for reciprocal customs privileges consular officers. Effected by exchange of notes Washington May 21, 1956. Enters into force 2 w following date of a written notification from the G ernment of Yugoslavia that it has been ratified.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on May 29 confirmed Theodore C. Ach to be Ambassador to Peru.

The Senate on May 29 confirmed Ellis O. Briggs t Ambassador to Brazil.

The Senate on May 29 confirmed Walter C. Dow to be Ambassador to the Republic of Korea.

The Senate on May 29 confirmed J. Graham Par to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Laos.

[1] Not in force.

riculture. President Approves Farm Bill . . . 982
erican Republics. Directing Council, Pan American Institute of Geography and History . . . 994
azil. Briggs confirmed as ambassador 994
nada. St. Lawrence Seaway Discussions With Canada 981
ina, Communist. Withdrawal of NNSC Teams From South Korea (statement, exchange of notes) 967
ngress, The
ngressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy 983
aintaining the Strength of the Free World Through Mutual Security (Murphy) 963
partment and Foreign Service. Confirmations (Achilles, Briggs, Dowling, Parsons) 994
onomic Affairs
troleum Imports (Hoover) 959
Lawrence Seaway Discussions With Canada . 981
S. Trade Mission to Japan, March 10–April 22, 1956 974
S.–U.K. Discussions on Telegraph Services . . 981
orld Trade—Opportunity and Challenge (Williams) 977
rope. Maintaining the Strength of the Free World Through Mutual Security (Murphy) . . 963
alth, Education, and Welfare
e Human Rights Commission Moves Ahead (Lord, text of resolutions) 984
aching About the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies (Pedersen) 990
ternational Organizations and Meetings. Directing Council, Pan American Institute of Geography and History 994
pan. U.S. Trade Mission to Japan, March 10–April 22, 1956 974
orea
wling confirmed as ambassador 994
ithdrawal of NNSC Teams From South Korea (statement, exchange of notes) 967
os. Parsons confirmed as ambassador 994
utual Security. Maintaining the Strength of the Free World Through Mutual Security (Murphy) . 963
orth Atlantic Treaty Organization. Maintaining the Strength of the Free World Through Mutual Security (Murphy) 963
ru. Achilles confirmed as ambassador 994
Presidential Documents. President Approves Farm Bill 982
Treaty Information. Current Actions 994
United Kingdom. U.S.-U.K. Discussions on Telegraph Services 981
United Nations
The Human Rights Commission Moves Ahead (Lord, text of resolutions) 984
Teaching About the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies (Pedersen) 990
Withdrawal of NNSC Teams From South Korea (statement, exchange of notes) 967
Viet-Nam. Progress in Free Viet-Nam (Robertson) 972

Name Index

Achilles, Theodore C. 994
Briggs, Ellis O. 994
Dowling, Walter C. 994
Eisenhower, President 982
Hoover, Herbert, Jr. 959
Lord, Mrs. Oswald B. 984
Murphy, Robert 963
Parsons, J. Graham 994
Pedersen, Richard F. 990
Robertson, Walter S. 972
Williams, Walter 977

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: May 28–June 3

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Press release issued prior to May 28 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 283 of May 25.

No.	Date	Subject
†284	5/28	Delegation to Conference on Large Electric High-Tension Systems (rewrite).
285	5/28	U.S.–Canadian St. Lawrence Seaway discussions.
286	5/29	Discussions on U.S.–U.K. telegraph services.
287	5/31	Murphy: testimony on mutual security.
288	5/31	U.N. Command statement in Korean Military Armistice Commission.
289	5/31	Robertson: Progress in Free Viet-Nam.
290	5/31	Hoover: Petroleum Imports.
*291	5/31	Educational exchange.
*292	6/1	Educational exchange.

*Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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U.S. Policy in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa—1955

The year 1955 witnessed no lessening of American interest in the countries and peoples of the Near East, South Asia, and Africa, and it brought no end to the difficult and complicated problems which have come to the United States from this vital part of the world. On the contrary, the old, basic issues, involving the resurgent and often strident nationalism of the peoples of the area, the problem of self-determination or "colonialism," and questions of the economic development of underdeveloped countries still persisted 10 years after the end of the Second World War. In addition, important individual problems such as the Arab-Israel controversy, Cyprus, and French North Africa have also remained as matters of American concern, whether directly or otherwise, because of the position of the United States as one of the leaders of the free world.

This 63-page booklet surveys significant political issues, problems of regional security, mutual security programs and U.S. technical and economic assistance, and the outlook in U.S. policy.

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The Department of State bulletin

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XXXIV, No. 886

June 18, 1956

THE COST OF PEACE • *Address by Secretary Dulles* . . . 999

U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL CONTINUES SECRETARY-GENERAL'S ROLE IN PALESTINE QUESTION
Statements by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., and Ambassador James J. Wadsworth 1025
Text of Resolution 1028

EVALUATION OF U.S. ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA • *by Assistant Secretary Holland* 1006

THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY AND FOREIGN TRADE POLICY • *by Thorsten V. Kalijarvi* 1014

PROSPECTS OF FOREIGN DISPOSAL OF DOMESTIC AGRICULTURAL SURPLUSES • *Excerpt From Baughman Report* 1019

ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES FOR WOMEN • *Article by Mrs. Lorena B. Hahn* 1033

COOPERATING TO SOLVE WESTERN HEMISPHERE TRAVEL PROBLEMS • *Article by H. H. Kelly* 1029

For index see inside back cover

The Department of State bulletin

VOL. XXXIV, NO. 886 • PUBLICATION 6357

June 18, 1956

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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The Cost of Peace

Address by Secretary Dulles [1]

Each one of you is going out into a world where you hope to enjoy in peace the blessings of liberty. That is the kind of a world which United States foreign policy tries to provide.

Today we have peace; no nation is at war with the United States.

Also, we have many blessings. We have good relations with most of the nations of the world. We do not fear them nor do they fear us. We trade with each other and our peoples visit back and forth, all to our mutual profit and enjoyment.

For that peace, and for those blessings that we enjoy, we can be profoundly grateful.

But all of this is not to be had for nothing. Others before you have gone out into the world with eager hopes. But those hopes ended on the field of battle. And those at home were heavy of heart. And the means for economic well-being were dissipated in the wastages of war.

That kind of a price, paid in the coin of war, will always be paid unless men are willing, in time of peace, to pay to preserve peace.

That lesson seems never to be learned. The illusion constantly persists that peace is to be had merely by wanting it. If that were true, war would have been abolished many centuries ago. The fact is that to keep peace is as hard, indeed harder, than to win a war. Wars have been won. But lasting peace has never yet been won. To win final victory over war will take planning and action that is farsighted, well calculated, courageous, and at times sacrificial. Such sacrifice will be required under conditions less dramatic and apparently less urgent than those of war. But peace will never be enduring as long as men reserve for war their finest qualities of mind and spirit. Peace, too, has its price.

[1] Made at commencement exercises at Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa June 9 (press release 307 dated June 8).

I want to illustrate that in terms of one phase of the peace effort our Nation is now making. It could be described as a peace insurance policy, and it costs about $40 billion a year.

Our Peace Insurance Policy

The basic elements of this peace insurance policy are drawn from early and successful American foreign policy. We go back to the Monroe Doctrine.

In 1823 President Monroe proclaimed to the despotic alliance then headed by Czarist Russia that "we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety" and that we would not "behold such interposition in any form with indifference."

It was indeed farsighted and bold for our young Nation thus to identify its own self-interest with the fate of freedom thousands of miles away. Yet the pronouncement of that principle, Webster recorded, was greeted with "one general glow of exultation."

That principle has now been extended. Its broadest application is found in the United Nations Charter. But because veto power makes United Nations action undependable, many nations have made with each other treaties which embody the principle of the Monroe Doctrine. Within the last 10 years the United States, always acting in a bipartisan manner, has made such treaties with 42 countries of America, Europe, and Asia.

These treaties abolish, as between the parties, the principle of neutrality, which pretends that a nation can best gain safety for itself by being indifferent to the fate of others. This has increasingly become an obsolete conception, and, except under very exceptional circumstances, it

is an immoral and shortsighted conception. The free world today is stronger, and peace is more secure, because so many free nations courageously recognize the now demonstrated fact that their own peace and safety would be endangered by assault on freedom elsewhere.

However, it is not enough under present conditions for the free nations merely to proclaim their purpose to stand together. There is need for forces-in-being to give authority to those words.

At the outset of World War I and World War II, the United States had little military strength in being. In the case of the Korean War, our initial strength was inadequate. But on these past occasions the conditions of warfare gave us time within which to build up our strength.

But since then, man's capacity to destroy has suddenly expanded to a degree that passes comprehension. Today, a single bomb can release destructive power equal to that used in the 5 years of World War II. Potential enemies could destroy so much, so quickly, if initially unopposed, that we dare not gamble on developing military power after an attack has occurred. To deter aggression, to prevent miscalculation, we need not only to warn but to back that warning by forces-in-being which include retaliatory striking power. That is why our peace insurance policy is so expensive.

The cost of our United States military establishment, at home and abroad, is about $36 billion a year. That is about 90 percent of the total of a little over $40 billion a year which our peace insurance policy costs.

The other 10 percent, roughly $4 billion, goes to promote strength in other lands under our mutual security program. I want to discuss that program and explain why it is part of our total peace insurance policy.

I shall be speaking in terms of expected expenditures. But to keep going at this rate we shall for next year need an appropriation larger than expected expenditures, because the appropriation for this year is less than current expenditures by about $1 billion.

The Far East

The largest expenditures under our mutual security program are in the Pacific and Far East. They help strengthen countries with which we have collective defense treaties. This area is today under obvious hostile pressure.

In Korea there is an armistice. But the Chine Communists have never been willing to make peace which would unify Korea through free el tions held under the auspices of the United N tions. So hostile armed forces face each oth across an armistice line.

In Taiwan (Formosa), where the Republic China now has its home, there is the consta menace of war. The Chinese Communist regi persistently refuses to make a meaningful renun ation of force covering this area.

Then there is Viet-Nam, where again there is armistice but no formal peace.

I have already pointed out that we have, treaties, solemnly recognized that an armed tack in these areas would be dangerous to our o peace and security. And Congress, with on four dissenting votes, has authorized the Pre dent to use United States forces to defend Taiw (Formosa) if he deems it necessary. But we not want it to be necessary to fight to save freed in these areas. Our purpose is to deter war. we give military and financial aid to enable t free governments there to maintain their o armed forces to an extent which we and th judge reasonably related to the threat of aggr sion and our coordinated plans to prevent it.

We expect next year to spend about $1.5 b lion for military aid and defense-support assi ance in this area. It goes mostly to the Repu lics of Korea and China and to the three natic of Indochina. There are lesser amounts for oth area allies—the Philippines, Thailand, and Jap

The Middle East

Let me turn now to the Middle East. This ar produces the oil required for the industry of We ern Europe and for the military establishment NATO. If this were unavailable, it would invo tragedy for the producing countries, which largely dependent upon the oil royalties. Also would require us to share with Europe the oil sources of this hemisphere, and there would scarcity instead of plenty.

So we assist those four Middle East countr which hold the gateway to the south where the reserves are located; and just beyond is the ga way to Africa.

The estimate of expenditure for military and defense support for these countries in the n year is in the neighborhood of $800 million.

ATO

I turn next to Western Europe. There the mili-y forces of NATO stand guard over the greatest lustrial and military treasure that there is with-the free world except for the United States elf. So important do we consider this area that arly six divisions of the United States Armed rces are stationed in Western Europe for its fense. The European members of NATO them-ves make a large contribution to the defense of area. However, we help by supplying them th certain types of weapons, the cost of which in our mutual security budget.

We help to support West Berlin as a symbol of edom behind the Iron Curtain. We are develop-bases in Spain, and this involves substantial ts. We also think it prudent to help Yugo-via, so long as it remains determined to main-n genuine independence. It does not have the m of society that we like. But Marshal Tito fied Moscow and won out. And even though t struggle is today calmed, Yugoslavia provides notable example of national independence in stern Europe.

This European aspect of the mutual security gram involves an estimated cost for next year approximately $1 billion.

The expenditures I have described are designed make secure, at minimum cost to us, countries ose safety is part of our own safety. The result-widespread, interlocking system of security vides, as a valuable byproduct, diversified loca-ns around the globe from which we and our ies could strike back at an aggressor if he struck of us. Diversification, in this respect, is im-nsely valuable; for launching facilities limited a single area could be wiped out by an initial ault. Also, the present system enables less ex-nsive planes with shorter range to carry out ssions which otherwise would require far more tly planes.

Thus, these expenditures serve our peace and safety.

Economic Aid

There remains about $700 million to be accounted , or about 2 percent of our total peace insurance t. This is so-called economic aid. The primary pose is to help newly independent nations and developed countries to maintain their inde-pidence, as against the plotting of international mmunism.

As the Caracas Resolution pointed out in relation to this hemisphere, if international communism obtains control of the political institutions of any nation, that endangers peace and security elsewhere. This portion of the mutual security program offsets efforts by hostile forces to expand their power by gaining new human and material resources and new strategic locations. But it has a broader justification.

The United States has far and away the most highly developed economy of any nation in the world. Our productivity almost equals that of all the rest of the world put together.

Always the economically developed nations have helped less developed countries to develop. We were helped from Europe when we were beginning to develop this continent. That is a law of social life and we cannot violate it except at our peril.

The burden on us is lessened by the fact that a considerable part of our economic assistance goes in the form of surplus agricultural products. Also, upwards of $200 million takes the form of repayable loans, not gifts.

The importance of this economic part of our peace insurance policy is emphasized by the fact that the Soviet Union is now pushing its own interests by means of credits extended to other countries.

The new Communist tactics make it more than ever imperative that we should continue, and perhaps enlarge, the economic phase of our mutual security program. It would indeed be ironical if we should drop out of that field just at the time when the Soviet Union is moving into it.

These programs which I have described—$36 billion, plus $3.3 billion, plus $700 million—make up the grand total of about $40 billion, which is the annual cost of our peace insurance policy. As to the $36 billion spent on our own military establishment, there are differences of opinion as to *how* it shall be spent. But few deny that this much money should be spent. There is more controversy about the $4 billion which is used, in ways I have described, under our mutual security program.

I should like now to answer some questions about that.

No "Give Away"

First of all, is this a "give away" program, whereby Americans are taxed merely to aid foreigners?

Emphatically no. I hope what I have said al-

ready makes that clear. It is quite true that the mutual security money does help others. But no program can properly be labeled "give away" merely because it helps others. Often by helping others we help ourselves more effectively than we could do in any other way. That is the case with our mutual security program. It makes our freedom safer by creating an environment of freedom. The decisive reason for each item of expense is our own enlightened self-interest.

Let me be specific and emphatic on this point of motivation: not a single dollar is sought for this program for any reason other than an American reason. Our Nation has recognized, since its infancy, that liberty elsewhere was vital to our own peace and safety. When that liberty has been jeopardized by war, we have gone into war to save it. That is the most costly way to protect ourselves. We hope now to protect ourselves in less costly ways. That is the reason for our mutual security program.

Not Buying Gratitude

Is our foreign aid wasted because the recipients are not grateful enough or not subservient to our views? No, because we do not seek either gratitude or subservience. We know that gratitude can never be bought, and we do not spend taxpayers' money on the folly of such an effort. Neither do we seek or want subservience. Our policies command wide respect abroad because of their intrinsic merit. But the success of our foreign aid program is to be tested not by gratitude, not by subservience, but by whether it makes more vigorous the freedoms elsewhere that buttress the freedom of ourselves. By that test, our program works.

Amounts Closely Calculated

Another question is whether, assuming the need for a mutual security program, the amounts requested are reasonable. We believe they are reasonable. Of course no one can prove in advance that any given expenditure spells decisively the difference between increased peril and increased security, or between war and peace. If we gain security and peace, it can always be alleged that we could have got them more cheaply. And no one can prove the contrary. Only if there is failure can it be seen that we did not spend enough. But then it is too late.

I can assure you that all of us who work on the program are patriotically striving to serve t country and to keep the expenditures down to lowest level consistent with our national inter Our judgments are based on farflung worldw sources of information, which help us to ju the capability and intentions of hostile eleme throughout the world and the resistant qua of friendly elements. There may be mistake judgment, and there is room for honest differe of opinion. But the operation is carefully c ducted and reviewed by many agencies of gov ment, and the final result, as submitted to Congress, reflects the best judgment of the Pr dent and the National Security Council. W dealing with the peace and security of this tion, it is risky to seek bargain-counter pri Cut prices may not save money—except by creasing the risk of war.

Is Administration Efficient?

Again it may be asked, is this money being sp efficiently? Does our outlay for peace and sa always make the target? The answer must that there is a certain amount of wastage. I much, I wonder, of the ammunition used in W War II hit its appointed target? Only a sm percentage. But we did not on that account e fuse to supply our fighting men with amm tion. A part of every program goes for nau That is the price we pay for human frailties. constantly strive for increased efficiency. lack of perfect marksmanship is no reason o denying the dollar ammunition needed to win peace.

Are Local Forces Needed?

Another question sometimes asked is, Does o the deterrent striking power of the United St make local forces unnecessary, so that their could be saved? Certainly our strategic po reduces the need for local forces. It would in be impractical to have local forces all around orbit of the Soviet world sufficient to stop a la scale attack wherever it might be mounted. we cannot rely wholly on centrally located st gic power. Nations that are menaced feel an pelling need to be able to fight in their owr fense. Indeed, if they did not feel that way, port from us might not be merited or effec Also, there needs to be loyal local strength to vent subversion backed by international co nism.

'he deterrent to aggression is found not only ›ur strategic power but in the knowledge that version cannot be easily achieved and that an n armed attack would be met at once by brave competent resistance. This, when reinforced treaty pledges of collective action, will assure sequences which no aggressor could control or it. That knowledge is the great deterrent.

'his problem of balance between the strategic ver of the U.S.A. and local power is admittedly icult. Equally difficult is the problem of bal-e between military and economic effort. These ›blems are constantly receiving the closest at-tion of the National Security Council. In each e, the balance is subject to adjustment in the ıt of changing conditions.

'here an End?

'inally, it will be asked, Will this cost go on ever? Can we see no end to this gigantic ex-ıditure, totaling about $40 billion a year, as cost of our peace insurance policy?

'he answer is that, so long as the danger per-s, for so long must we pay to combat that ıger.

'he Soviet rulers are engaged in a gigantic ef-t to build up their military establishment and extend the area of their dominance. They intain a military establishment approximately nparable to our own and spare no cost in striv-to excel us. They give military aid to Com-nist China and to their Eastern European satel-allies. This is measured in terms of billions dollars. They now woo free nations by offers credit for economic and military goods. edits totaling nearly $500 million have already n concluded, and several hundred more million ve been offered. They devote about $500 mil-n a year to foreign propaganda.

'he Soviet Union is spending, for military and eign-policy purposes hostile to us, about 20 per-ıt of the gross product of the Soviet nation. So ıg as this is going on, we may have to expend out 10 percent of our gross national product, we are now doing, for peace insurance purposes. We can do so while at the same time raising our ing standards. The demonstration of that fact s had a potent influence on the international ne.

Never will a responsible administration put its ith in protestations of peace and good will that ve no dependable foundation, or expose the Na-

President Urges Congress To Restore Funds Cut From Mutual Security Program

Following is the text of a letter from President Eisenhower to Representative Joseph W. Martin, Jr., which the latter read to the House of Representatives on June 7.[1]

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, June 7, 1956.

DEAR JOE: No doubt you and other House leaders on both sides of the aisle realize full well, from our discussions in the White House and from my remarks yesterday to the press, the importance I attach to the pending mutual-security legislation. Nevertheless, to remove any possible doubt as to my feelings, I am sending you this letter. You may, if you wish, bring it to the attention of the entire House membership, so strongly do I believe that the pending issue concerns the security of our country.

Great consequences are involved in this legislation. In the present international situation, the free world can ill afford to move hesitatingly and uncertainly. The United States—the most powerful of the free nations—can afford least of all to take a backward step in this constant battle all of us are waging for a just and enduring peace.

I am deeply convinced that our Nation's security and our partnership with like-minded nations in the world will be seriously impaired by the extent of the proposed cut in the funds requested this year for the mutual-security program. I, therefore, hope most earnestly that the large majority of these funds can be restored. If we fail to do so, we must either eliminate essential programs or so reduce them as to cripple our entire effort.

I know that many conscientious people are of the opinion that there will be no serious results if a severe reduction in mutual-security funds is made at this time. Yet I personally, the Secretary of State, the Director of the International Cooperation Administration, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are united in the conviction that the proposed cut will be hurtful to the best interests of our own people and to the well-being of our friends throughout the world. I do, therefore, urge that you and your colleagues in the Congress vigorously carry forward your efforts to restore to this legislation the funds needed to maintain the pace of our battle to win a lasting peace throughout the world.

With warm regard,

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

The Honorable JOSEPH W. MARTIN, JR.,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

[1] Reprinted from *Cong. Rec.* of June 7, 1956, p. 8836.

tion to being isolated in the world, or deny it the retaliatory facilities needed to deter surprise attack.

But there are signs that a new day may be dawning. The Soviet rulers now profess to renounce the doctrine that violence is a necessary part of their foreign policy. They are debasing Stalin, who for 25 years was treated as a demigod. Writings of his, which for 25 years formed the Communist creed, are now withdrawn from circulation. This year, for the first time since the Bolshevik revolution, the Christian Bible is being printed and sold in Russia. The Russian people are getting more personal security, and labor is getting increased freedom of choice.

Obviously, there is a rising demand on the part of the captive nations to have more independence and on the part of the subject people, within and without Russia, to have more freedom from fear and to enjoy more of the fruits of their labor instead of having those fruits diverted to serve policies of aggrandizement. This popular demand must be broad in scope and intense in degree. Only that can explain the extraordinary exertions being made by the Soviet rulers to make it seem that they are offering a change. Out of all of this there may come—not this year, or next year, but some year—a government which is responsive to the just aspirations of the people and which renounces expansionist goals.

Enough is happening to make us confident that if we remain strong, if we support freedom and make evident the blessings of liberty, that policy will prevail.

The time will never come when we can safely stop planning and working for peace and making sacrifices for peace. But we can see that, if we remain steadfast, the time may come when the danger will be much less and when the cost can be correspondingly reduced. Until that time is here, the clear course of patriotic duty is to hold fast that which has proved good.

Letters of Credence

China

The newly appointed Chinese Ambassador, Hollington K. Tong, presented his credentials to President Eisenhower on June 6. For the text of the Ambassador's remarks and the text of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 296.

President Eisenhower's Views on Neutrality

White House press release dated June 7

The President has authorized the following statement supplementing his informal press conference remarks of yesterday with reference to neutrality.

Questions have been presented to the White House concerning the exact meaning of expressions in the President's press conference yesterday defending the rights of certain nations to a neutral position. He particularly referred to neutrality as a refusal to take sides in any military line-up of world powers.

It is obvious that in some countries of the world there are certain ideological, geographical, or other reasons making military alliances impractical. Such nations may declare themselves to be neutral, hoping thus to secure the support of world opinion against attack from any quarter. Neutrality does not mean either disarmament or immunity from attack. We have had historical examples of this kind of neutrality for many decades.

The President believes in the principle of collective security whereby the nations associate themselves together for each other's protection. This is the modern and enlightened way of obtaining security. The United Nations was designed to provide collective security for all. In view, however, of the veto power in the Security Council it has proved necessary to organize for collective defense under the provisions of article 51 of the charter. The United States has such collective defense arrangements with 42 other nations, and it believes that, under present conditions, these treaties represent the best and most effective means of preserving world order within the framework of the United Nations Charter. Our mutual security program is primarily designed to reinforce that world order. The President does believe that there are special conditions which justify political neutrality but that no nation has the right to be indifferent to the fate of another or, as he put it, to be "neutral as between right and wrong or decency or indecency."

The President does not believe that association for mutual security with the United States will involve any country in added danger but, on the contrary, will provide added security on the basis of mutuality and scrupulous respect for the independence of each. As the President pointed out,

United States is not going to attack anybody; t some great powers have shown an aggressive position, and military association with such a wer could lead to difficulties.

parture of President Sukarno

The White House on June 5 made public the folring exchange between President Eisenhower d Dr. Sukarno, President of the Republic of lonesia.

sident Eisenhower to President Sukarno

JUNE 5, 1956

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Your gracious and heartrming message written on the eve of your derture from the United States reached me this rning. I am deeply gratified that you and the mbers of your party have enjoyed your brief it to our shores, and I bid you farewell and Goded with the hope that you found what you ight in America as a state of mind and as the ter of an idea. The mastery of time and disce which modern science has given us makes it atively easy for a visitor to travel among us. find what is in men's hearts is a much more ficult task. Your message leads me to believe at you have succeeded.

You have taken something of America with you. the same time you have left with us a feeling of endship, warmth and sympathy, and a deeper derstanding of the common hopes and aspirans shared by all mankind. By your frankness d eloquence you have given us a greater insight o the aims and aspirations of your new nation d have strengthened the ties of sympathy, reect, and understanding between our peoples.

Assalamu 'alaikum, selamat djalan,

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

s Excellency
DR. SUKARNO
President of the Republic of Indonesia
c/o Indonesian Embassy
Ottawa, Canada

esident Sukarno to President Eisenhower

MR. PRESIDENT: When I accepted with such easure your invitation to visit America I sought lvice on what I should bring with me and on hat I might expect to find there. I discovered that one visitor to these hospitable shores was advised in these words: "He may bring with him a feather bed, bolster, pillow, blankets, a rug and three pairs of sheets. Many households in Virginia are so well provided as to entertain a stranger with all things necessary for the inner man, yet few or none are provided for the back". That, Mr. President, was advice given to an immigrant in 1634.

I didn't follow that advice.

You have provided me with all things necessary for the inner man, the back and the mind. Your other guests and I are taking back with us much more than we brought. We are taking back a widened knowledge of your country and people; a deeper appreciation of what America means in the world. Shortly after we arrived you did me the honour of referring to me as a frontier man, a compliment which I value highly.

I have read of your frontier and the hard men who pushed it westwards until the American Nation faced the Pacific and became in fact the neighbour of Indonesia. Pioneers, explorers, men of intrepid mind and stout body, are needed the world over to push forward the frontiers of knowledge, the frontiers of liberty.

Mr. President, by your hospitality, I have seen a little of how this great nation under your guidance is attacking those problems—how mans' knowledge is being increased and how the burden of hard physical labor is being reduced. We have learned much from our visit. We have gathered many impressions and those impressions will take some time to fall into a pattern.

This is certain however: We have benefited greatly from your kindness and hospitality. Apart from whatever your guest has learned, the strong ties of friendship between our peoples have been drawn closer.

President Eisenhower, the Indonesian Nation has long owed a debt of gratitude to the American Nation during our struggle for the recognition of our independence and sovereignty. The United Nations played a great and conciliatory role and the United States was foremost in the activities of the United Nations, which eventually brought peace and relief to the weary people of the Indonesian Archipelago.

Since those days you have given us technical assistance. You have sent us experts in various fields. You have helped us to defeat some of the old and evil things which hampered the develop-

ment and progress of that reborn nation. Those things have provided a bond between us just as the fact that you are a great market for our natural wealth provides a bond between us. Those bonds are not enshrined in formal words or treaties; they exist most strongly in the friendship, the understanding, the sympathy between the two nations.

I recall from my reading of American history that William Penn once made an agreement with the Indians in a place called Shackamaxon which means "The Place of The King". In Shackamaxon under the elm trees, there William Penn and the Indians made an agreement which was not signed. They formulated perhaps the only treaty without signature and which has been forever respected. Perhaps such agreements as that are more binding, are more real, than form documents. I would like to think, Mr. Preside that the relations between our two peoples w remain always strong, always friendly, alwa relations of sympathy and understanding, alwa relations of equal esteem.

President Eisenhower, in taking leave of you wish to express my personal thanks and of all yo other guests for the warmth of your reception a kindness extended bountifully during our visit your country.

Thank you, sir. Goodbye and may God ke you.

SUKARNO

THE PRESIDENT
THE WHITE HOUSE.

Evaluation of U.S. Economic Relations With Latin America

by Henry F. Holland
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs[1]

In my talk tonight I should like to analyze our economic relations with Latin America and make these points: first, a realistic evaluation of the present state of our economic relations with Latin America; second, an analysis of the present trend of those relations, with particular emphasis on the 3½ years of President Eisenhower's administration; lastly, a consideration of what we, as well as the governments and peoples of Latin America, can do to strengthen and improve our economic relations.

First, a word as to the importance to you of the area to which my remarks will relate. I do not have to be very extensive on the subject. We speak of the Republics of this hemisphere as a family, the American family of states. We feel a kinship which unites us strongly. We believe that our futures will follow a common path.

If we need to speak of economic reasons for the importance of Latin America, we can remember that the largest trade that the United States conducts with any area of the world is that which we conduct with Latin America—larger than trade with Europe, larger than our trade with As larger than our trade with any other ar Thirty percent of all imports into the Unit States come from Latin America. Twenty-fe percent of all exports from the United States o there. Thirty-seven percent of all United Sta s investments outside the territorial limits of r country reside in Latin America. Surely, inso r as economic factors determine the importance f an area of the world, this is to you and to me tod y the most important of the world. And yet its i portance today in no wise represents that wh h surely and inevitably it will have for us in the n r future. Do our peoples and our governme s throughout the hemisphere understand this? I believe we are coming to do so. Such unpre dented meetings of Chiefs of State as that recen y held in White Sulphur and that which will be h d later this month in Panama are a measure of day's feeling. Are you aware that during the ½ years of President Eisenhower's administrat n six Latin American Presidents have visited us—s many as during the 6 years preceding?

[1] Address made at the University of the South, Sewanee, Tenn., on June 9 (press release 304 dated June 8).

What is the objective of our economic policy in tin America? It is a very simple one, one tated by what we conceive to be the legitimate st interest of the people of the United States. is to make the most constructive, effective con- bution that we can to the efforts of the govern- nts and peoples of our sister republics to create their territories for their people the strongest ssible national economies. It is to the interest each of you that there be to the north of us and the south of us strong, progressive, prosperous oples—peoples whose national economies are f-reliant and sturdy, able to withstand the ocks and strains of normal life. We think, too, at economic progress, here or abroad, means little less it is the kind that raises the standards of e of the men, women, and children who com- ise our peoples. We believe that an enterprise not an asset to its owner or to its community to its nation unless it pays its employees salaries at enable them to live with dignity, responsi- lity, and hope. Throughout this hemisphere en must look forward to better lives for their milies, better homes and educations for their ildren. If that is the objective we have in com- on with the Latin American countries, how are going about helping them achieve it?

I conceive that all contributions by the United ates to economic progress in our sister republics n be divided into two categories. First, every- ing that puts dollars into the economy of another untry. That is the essential common benefit at any foreign country derives from the United ates, whether through trade, investments, loans, urism, or grant aid. It is the common denomi- tor by which other countries can compare the ccess of their economic relations with the United ates. Those relations provide dollars which can translated into capital equipment, goods for nsumption, expert services—all the things that ntribute to economic development and progress.

Our second contribution to economic progress road is to help spread through the hemisphere e technical knowledge and experience that we ve all accumulated. There is little that our ivate enterprise and Government can do in the onomic field whose significance to our sister re- blics cannot be measured by one of these two ndards.

Let me talk first about dollars. How successful e we in supplying them to Latin America?

Again, we can measure that success in two ways. First, how many dollars does Latin America receive each year from the United States? Second, how sound and dependable are the sources from which those dollars come? We want our economic relations in this hemisphere to be the kind that will produce for our sister republics a volume of dollars that will make a real contribution to their development. We and they are very much interested in seeing that these dollars reach their destination by wholesome channels, the kind that contribute most to real progress.

Let us apply the first measure. How many dollars does Latin America derive from the United States? The figures that I shall give you are interesting. They represent dollar income from the United States alone and through all channels except military expenditures.

In 1940, fifteen years ago, Latin America received from transactions with the United States a billion dollars. This was the total received through trade, investments, tourism, loans—all nonmilitary sources of dollars. Last year Latin America received from these same sources—and from the United States—$4,959,000,000, an increase of almost five times since 1940. That is encouraging, but how does it compare with other areas of the world? Until 1953 Western Europe received more dollars from the United States through nonmilitary channels than any other area in the world; but in that year Latin America moved into first place with the largest nonmilitary dollar income of any area of the world, $4,441,000,000. Western Europe dropped to second place, with $4,168,000,000. In 1954 Latin America was again first, and with a bigger dollar income of $4,884,000,000. Once more Western Europe was in second place. In 1955 Latin America's dollar income rose again, this time $4,959,000,000, approaching the $5 billion mark. This time Western Europe achieved an even greater increase and closed the year with a total nonmilitary dollar income of $5,200,000,000. For the 3 years of President Eisenhower's administration the totals are: Latin America, $14,284,000,000; Western Europe, $13,993,000,000. Other major areas of the world fall considerably short of these figures.

Let us consider the quality of the sources from which that income was derived. There again the facts are interesting. We believe that the soundness of a country's economic relations with the United States can be judged by the degree to which

it increases its independence of governmental sources of dollars. Every country would prefer that the sources of its dollar income be free from government control. We understand and support this desire. Therefore, we try to help other countries channel their dollar incomes more and more into private trade and investment and other sources not identified with governments.

We attribute more importance to trade than any other source of dollars. Why? I think the answer is obvious. Trade is the source of income which can be expanded more than any other. Trade is a source of dollars that renews itself year after year. Trade provides dollars on which neither interest nor dividends are paid. Trade is a self-generating source of income.

Increasing Private Investment

Next, we try to increase the income of our friendly allies from private investment. Why? First, a loan draws interest whether the investment earns a profit or not. Not so with private investment. To withdraw a dividend the investor must first earn it. Second, investments, like trade, can be increased regardless of the dollar-borrowing capacity of the other country. A country, like an individual, can reach the limit of its dollar-borrowing capacity. Even then it can often receive and sustain more sound private dollar investment. Dividends on those new dollars invested are usually not a drain on the dollar reserves of the host country. They represent only a small part of the new dollars which those investments bring into the economy of the host country, dollars that would not have otherwise been there. A sound investment produces and pays a dollar dividend to the economy of the host country before it sends a dividend to its owners. Finally, private investment is important because it brings with it technical knowledge and skills, which are perhaps its most important contribution.

How does Latin America compare with other areas of the world as regards the soundness, the independence of its sources of dollars? Our most sound economic relations, judged by this standard, are those with Canada. Why? Canada receives almost as many dollars annually from the United States as all of Western Europe or as all of Latin America. Yet it receives every dollar of that income from trade and private investment. It receives no money from grant aid or government loans.

Who comes second as regards the quality of it sources of dollars? Latin America. Latin Ame ica is less dependent on United States Goverr ment aid than any other area of the world, wit the single exception of Canada. Less than 8 pe cent of Latin America's huge dollar income is d rived either from United States government loans or grant assistance.

Therefore we have this encouraging spectacl As regards volume of nonmilitary dollar incom our sister republics occupy first place in the worl As regards the quality of that income, the ind pendence of its sources, they occupy second plac with Canada in first. This means that the mo stable, mature economic relations that we ha anywhere in the world are those with the countri of this hemisphere.

Now let us look a bit, if you will, at today trends. Again I would like to consider partic larly the 3 years of President Eisenhowe administration.

Let us take trade first. Our trade with Lat America, as you probably know, is a $7 billic business. Each year we buy about $3½ billic of their goods and services. They use those dc lars to buy about the same amount from us. I ha already told you that this is the largest trade th we conduct with any area of the world. Howeve in my judgment, it can be expanded considerabl

What is the current trend? In the past 20 yea the value of our imports from Latin America h increased almost seven times. They were $5 million 20 years ago. Today the average is almo $3½ billion, and they are still growing. 1955 w larger than 1954, and it exceeded 1953. An ir portant feature of this import business is that percent of the increase in Latin America's doll earnings from exports to the United States com from increases in the prices that we pay for the products. Only 30 percent comes from increas volume of exports. That is particularly signi cant if you consider another factor. In the pa 15 years the prices of Latin America's exports the United States have increased twice as mu as the prices of her imports from us. This is fact that is not generally known.

Now let us take a look at the trends in priva investment. Our latest information indicat that United States direct private investment Latin America is increasing at an average rate about $400 million a year. Its total is about $6 billion today, larger, as I've told you, than in a

r area of the world, 37 percent of our entire ate investment abroad. I am confident that present flow of private capital can be subtially increased.

n the whole, United States investors in Latin erica have taken their places among those who working sincerely for progress. They are curly reinvesting about half of all their profits he local economies. On income taxes alone pay about $250 million a year to local govnents. They account for 10 percent of all ls produced in Latin America and 30 percent its exports to this country. Those exports luce over a billion dollars a year. Exports to r areas earn additional income in dollars and r currencies. Goods produced for local conption save hundreds of millions of dollars ch would have been spent abroad had it been ssary to import those goods. Yet their age remittance of profits to the United States nly about $380 million.

rism

et us take a look at tourism, another very imtant source of dollars, a source far more imtant than most of us realize. Did you know t last year United States tourists spent $387 lion in Latin America? That is a large figure, here is another that will startle you. Of those 7 million, $260 million were spent in Mexico. rism is the biggest single source of dollars in economy of that great country. An estimated 7 million were spent in the West Indies and tral America, and $20 million in South Amer- The estimate for Western Europe was $427 lion; that for Canada was $308 million. Now se figures give you an indication of what the rist business can mean in this hemisphere. If xico can earn $260 million a year from United tes tourists, and Canada $308 million, what are potentialities for the rest of the hemisphere? et us pass to another source of dollars for in America—government loans. We realize t, as important as private investors are, they not going to furnish all the development capour sister republics need. There are essenprojects that are not attractive to private ital—roads, port works, irrigation systems, jects of that character. We have attempted erously to meet the need for the kind of develnent capital that is not forthcoming from pri- e investors.

As regards local currencies our sales of agricultural reserves offer an important source of financing for both governments and private enterprise. As you know, a large part of the proceeds of sales of agricultural reserves are lent to the local governments for use in economic development. During the current fiscal year, sales for the equivalent in local currencies of $125 million will be negotiated in Latin America.

Export-Import Bank

During the past 2 years we have undertaken to expand very substantially the activities of the Export-Import Bank as a source of dollar loans, particularly in the field of economic development. What has been the result of that policy?

During the 12 months before the policy was announced, the Export-Import Bank authorized new credits in Latin America of $52 million. During the 12 months following the announcement of that policy, the Export-Import Bank authorized new credits in Latin America of $284 million—more than five times as much as before, 58 percent of all new loans authorized. During that same year, 30 percent of all new loans authorized by the World Bank were authorized in Latin America—$123 million.

Here is the trend in Export-Import Bank operations. During the 3-year period of President Eisenhower's administration, new credits authorized by the Export-Import Bank in Latin America have averaged $210 million a year. In the entire previous history of the bank there has been only one year when this record was even equaled.

These are encouraging figures. But we feel that the Export-Import Bank can be playing an even more positive role in the development of Latin America. Through the bank we hope to insure that no economically sound developmental project fails for lack of access to capital from other sources to cover dollar needs. The only limit on the sound loans that the bank is willing to make in Latin America is the limit of the bank's capacity and the borrower's ability to repay in dollars. Today the bank's capacity very considerably exceeds the aggregate of all applications pending. It is prepared to receive and consider more applications than it is currently receiving for sound development projects in Latin America. That causes us concern. During the past year representatives of the bank have visited 19 Latin American countries to explain the availability of

its service. Yet during the first 5 months of the present calendar year fewer than a dozen applications for economic development projects were received. An institution which could be one of the greatest factors for economic development in the area is not being fully utilized.

Why are there so few applications for development loans? It is because sound projects are not being planned in which capital can be used. The industrialists and businessmen who comprise the private enterprise of Latin America are the best source of such projects there, just as our own are here.

I have heard of two approaches to the need for development capital. One begins with an estimate of an amount of capital which, if usefully invested, would produce a desired rate of economic growth. Usually no attempt is made to identify the project or even countries into which that amount of capital would go if it were available. The other approach begins with a search for sound developmental projects in which capital can be usefully employed. The total needs of those sound projects become the total to be invested. We feel that the second is the only sound approach.

Regardless of how much capital is available, it will contribute nothing to economic progress until it is invested in sound projects. Capital by itself cannot employ people and pay them salaries. The first move is to seek out sound developmental projects into which capital can go profitably and constructively; the second is to approach investors or lending institutions for that capital. One thing is certain: The funds of the Export-Import Bank will not produce progress anywhere so long as they remain in the bank. Even after they leave the bank, they cannot become a force for good in our hemisphere until they are converted into sound new enterprises and developmental projects that supply employment and improve standards of living. The computation in round figures of total needs of capital for the development of Latin America is a sterile exercise. The only constructive approach is to identify sound projects which, if completed, will produce economic development and then seek the capital needed to carry them out.

Technical Aid

Let us pass to technical aid, another important component of our economic relations. At the Rio economic conference our Government promised to strengthen and diversify United States participation in technical aid projects throughout the hem sphere. During the 3 years of President Eis hower's administration, the average contribut of the United States to technical aid programs Latin America has been $27.7 million each ye Since these programs were begun in 1941, th has been only one year in which this record been equaled. That was accounted for by our c tribution in 1948 to the control of hoof-and-mo disease in Mexico.

The last source of dollar income which we sho consider is nonmilitary grant aid. Our sister publics prefer not to receive grant aid from United States. They would rather stand on th own feet. That is consistent with the proud t dition of proud people. They would rather ceive their dollars through trade, investments, sound loans. Therefore, United States polic to extend grant aid only where it is needed to m temporary emergencies. During the past 3 ye our average contribution in the form of grant within this policy has been $36.4 million. In preceding 20 years there has been only one y when United States grant aid in Latin Ame reached the level of this average figure. Ag it was in 1948 and represents our contributio the eradication of the hoof-and-mouth diseas Mexico.

Here is a contribution which you might grant aid and which, I think, should cause us happiness. That is United States participatio the completion of the Inter-American Highw which will run from the northern frontier of M ico through Central America to the Panama Ca Mexico completed alone the portion in her te tory. Last year Congress granted the Preside request for an appropriation of $62,800,00 complete the remainder of the highway in 3 ye This represents two-thirds of the cost of com tion. The other third will be contributed by countries involved. It will be a wonderful th for all of us when it becomes possible to get car anywhere in the United States and driv the Panama Canal.

I have tried to give you a picture of what is ing on in the fields of trade, investments, lo technical assistance, and aid. You will war know whether from it we can draw any conclus regarding overall economic progress in L America. I think we can, and they are go Perhaps the best measure of a country's econ progress is the increase in its gross national

tion—the total of all goods and services pro-
ed. The average annual increase in gross na-
ıal production since the last war in Latin Amer-
has been 5½ percent a year. That in Western
rope has been 5 percent, in the United States
ercent. So this great area is developing more
idly than any other area of the world today.
at should be a source of satisfaction to each
you.

'an we be complacent about this encouraging
ture that we see to the south of us? Can we
d our arms and say that we and they are doing
rything we should to insure the progress of our
nisphere? My answer is no. There is much
resourceful and energetic men still to do. Why
I say that? There are many answers. So long
substantial sectors in every one of our countries
e in poverty and illiteracy, our job in this hemi-
ıere is not done. Stated in these terms our task
great. But we can face it with confidence.
ok at Canada. There is a country that has less
ın one-third of the area of Latin America and
s than one-twelfth of its population. Its natural
ources, large as they are, are considerably
aller than those of Latin America. Yet our
de with Canada and her total dollar income
m the United States are almost as great as those
Latin America. What does that mean? It
ans to me that economic relations between the
ited States and Latin America are at the
eshold of their development. When they have
n developed to a degree even approaching the
el of Canada, then the position of Latin Amer-
will be even more important than it is today.

reasing Trade

How are we going to achieve this? There are
eral things that must be done. First, we must
rease trade. How can we make this $7 billion
nual inter-American trade into a $10 billion
siness? By buying more from Latin America.
ey cannot buy more from us unless they have the
llars with which to do it. They will not have
se dollars unless we buy more from them. The
S. has to increase its imports from the rest of
hemisphere. Yet, if we propose to increase
r imports, we must first protect their existing
el. Do you think that is easy? Let me assure
u, after 2½ years in Washington, that it is a
y hard thing to do.

Our special-interest groups are understandably
xious to reduce the access of competitive Latin American products to U.S. markets. We must find within ourselves the courage and intelligence to resist the understandable attempts of our own special-interest groups to eliminate their Latin American competitors. The greater national interest requires that we defend the existing access of Latin American products to our markets. We know that this policy will occasionally cause some domestic business to lose new sales it would make if its foreign competitor's product were eliminated from our market. But remember that the dollars that a foreign competitor earns here are spent with other U.S. producers. There is an overall gain for our producers. It is not in the national interest to cut down our imports from Latin America when to do so hurts our own exporters as well as our sister republics.

What has been the record of our Government in defending this policy? Until the past month it was perfect. Until that time not one piece of legislation was passed during President Eisenhower's administration, not one governmental regulation was adopted, that reduced the access of one Latin American product to the market of the United States. We have fought to maintain that record. I have said that, sooner or later, we would lose some round in that fight. We have just lost one. When he signed the farm bill last week, the President pointed out how two of its provisions conflict with his policy of protecting our two-way international trade.[2] He expressed the hope that Congress will review and repair the shortcomings of the law. The Congress has tightened restrictions already applied on imports of long-staple cotton. This comes at a time when our domestic long-staple cotton is fully competitive with foreign growths and when our domestic consumption is rising.

The Congress has also required the Government to follow an inflexible program of cotton export sales. It would require us to sell with little regard to costs and without adequate regard for the far-reaching economic consequences which our sales may have, both at home and abroad. President Eisenhower has stated that this provision will be administered with extreme caution. Otherwise, damage could be caused to the economies of our friends and to our own export trade as a whole.

We have lost one round in the fight to protect inter-American trade. We have won a good many. The fight will go on. We are confident that, more

[2] BULLETIN of June 11, 1956, p. 982.

and more, our people understand that, if the United States is to be strong itself and if it is to lead a strong free world, our international trade must grow. When we limit our commerce to give an advantage to one small domestic group, we hurt the economy of the Nation as a whole. We undermine confidence abroad in our leadership.

As hard as it sometimes is to protect the existing levels of our inter-American trade, we cannot stop there. We have to increase that trade. We must not let it remain a $7 billion business. It must grow. The way to make it grow is to increase our imports from the other Republics. Each new dollar of imports means a new dollar of exports. Three ways to increase our imports from Latin America are apparent.

First, their exporters and our importers can cooperate to increase our consumption of products which they can supply in greater volume.

Second, we can find products which we have not traditionally imported from Latin America but for which a demand exists in the United States. A recent contract to import natural gas from Mexico is an example of how our imports can be increased in this way. We have never imported gas from Mexico. There is a demand for it here, and our next-door neighbor has a surplus supply. The contract can substantially increase the dollar earnings that Mexico uses to buy our exports.

Finally, there are a number of Latin American products which our U. S. markets could absorb in greater quantity. Copper and iron ore are examples. Our governments and businessmen here and abroad are cooperating to increase production in Latin America. Increased U. S. imports will mean more dollars available in Latin America to buy our exports.

I have discussed trends in the field of private investment and have expressed the opinion that it could be increased. The most important source of new investment capital in Latin America is, as should be, their own investors. They command very substantial resources, both in dollars and in local currencies. In the United States alone these amount today to more than $1½ billion.

Clearly, it is in the interest of every country of the hemisphere for its government to establish those local conditions that will inspire confidence in its own private investors. Unless those conditions exist, there is little hope for a strong economy. Unless local investors have confidence, foreign investors will not enter. No government of the hemisphere, including our own, can prov more than a fraction of the development cap needed. There is little need to consider spe measures to attract foreign investors if foreign vestors will come. The only additional assurar they seek are nondiscriminatory treatment an reasonable opportunity to repatriate profits.

Conditions To Encourage Investors

What are the conditions that encourage fore and domestic investors alike? They are rat well known. They lie largely within the powe the local government, and they are usually ach able. Happily, they benefit the whole econo not just investors.

First I would put the adoption of vigor measures to combat inflation. No investor, don tic or foreign, is going to risk his capital if he fe that the value of his investment will be eroded inflation. Over the years we have watched w admiration the courage and determination w which many of the Latin American governme have checked inflationary tendencies in their ec omies. Peru is a notable example. The m recent, perhaps, is that of Chile. By the appl tion of tried and tested remedies the Governm of Chile has arrested a 25-year inflationary tre In a matter of weeks the value of the Chilean p was brought from a low of 840 to the dollar to present level of about 490 to the dollar.

Another great incentive to investors of every tionality is reasonable taxation. We have all s how reasonable taxes have been an important tor in bringing over $2 billion of investment i petroleum, mining, and other industries in Ve zuela. There is no better way to measure what has meant than to point out that the average nual income of a Venezuelan citizen is almost tw that in any of the other Republics.

The adoption of sound and reasonable tax m ures is producing impressive results elsewher the hemisphere. About a year ago the Gov ment of Chile revised its taxes on the productio copper. The industry immediately embarked $100-million expansion program. In the s way modernization of the nitrate tax laws is p ducing almost $50 million of new investm Similar examples can be pointed out in P Costa Rica, Guatemala, and other parts of hemisphere.

Fair government regulation of utilities another important factor in encouraging new

estment. In many parts of Latin America indus-ial development is retarded by the inadequacy of ectric power. In many states private utilities are ole and willing to invest the millions of dollars eeded to satisfy the increasing demand for elec-icity. In almost every case the first step is for e government to adopt rate regulations which ill bring stability and progress to the industry. n the one hand the consumer must be assured an iequate supply of power and at reasonable prices. he company on the other hand must be sure of a ir rate on its investment; otherwise it cannot ise the capital for plant expansion. Govern-ents have it within their power to give consumer d producer alike the assurance that he needs. here it does so, the results are immediately pparent.

In 1949 the Government of Mexico modernized s regulations of the electrical industry to permit asonable rate adjustments. The result has been n investment of about $100 million throughout e country. Definitely projected investment for e years 1956–58 amounts to an additional $81 illion. Mexico City is today the only major atin American city where there is no curtail-ent of electric-power consumption. It is gen-rally anticipated that, if the present plans of e Government of Chile to revise its regulations overning the electrical industry prove successful, ver $100 million will immediately start into plant xpansion.

I have said that, so far as the foreign investor concerned, he asks for no favored treatment as n incentive to come into a country. He is, as a ule, entirely satisfied to take his place beside the ocal businessman in all respects. He is, however, esitant to risk his capital in any country where oreign investors are subjected to discriminatory reatment. No one questions for a moment the overeign right of every government to determine hether it wants foreign investors and, if so, nder what conditions. At the same time we must ecognize that every measure discriminating gainst one foreign investor is a cause for concern o every other. Each fears that, though he is ot affected today, once the principle of discrim-nation is established it may eventually be ex-ended to prejudice his investment.

Government Competition

I cannot leave this summary of factors influencing investors without mentioning the one which, more than any other perhaps, determines the climate for private investment, both domestic and foreign. That is the question of government competition. No investor wants to risk his capital if there is basis for fearing that tomorrow he may find himself in competition with a government. The best possible encouragement that government can give to private enterprise is assurance that private businessmen will be given the opportunity to build strong economies without government competition. And where that assurance is given, it is only fair that the government should require private enterprise to discharge fully and fairly its social obligation to establish working conditions and terms of employment that are generous and healthful.

In these remarks I have undertaken to outline briefly the rapidly ascending curves of our economic relations with Latin America. They indicate that Latin America's position in comparison with other areas of the world is favorable. They indicate steady improvement in each of the principal sectors of our relationships—trade, investment, and loans. The conclusion seems justified that our governments and peoples have it within their power to achieve very considerable expansion of activity in each of these fields. There are dangers which could prevent this. From the side of the United States they lie in nationalistic trade restrictions to benefit special groups at the expense of the national economy. On the side of Latin America they relate to policies and programs which will determine whether the unlimited energies and resources of private enterprise, particularly their own, will flow into the innumerable opportunities for economic progress which exist there.

The one conclusion that I would leave with you is this. If our governments follow reasonably enlightened policies, if the men and women who make up our private enterprise work with a full consciousness of their responsibilities to society, then, without a shadow of doubt, we shall enter into a period of development and prosperity that will profoundly affect the lives of all of us.

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The Aircraft Industry and Foreign Trade Policy

by Thorsten V. Kalijarvi
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs [1]

The Department of State is extremely interested in particular industries—their needs, desires, and problems—for it would not be realistic for government to try to deal with policy problems apart from problems in private life. At the same time, as you of course know, we must always be governed by the best interests of the Nation as a whole as we understand them. Therefore, in reaching decisions on foreign economic policy we have to fit individual interests, claims, and points of view of specific American industries, including your own, into the broader pattern of United States foreign relations.

It has been suggested that you would like to hear about the work of the Economic Bureau of the Department of State. The "E" area, as we call it, is that part of the Department which is concerned on a continuing basis with the economic aspects of United States foreign policy. Among other things it deals with such matters as the negotiation of air transport agreements, protection of American investments abroad, the negotiation of trade agreements, the removal of foreign barriers to American exports, and the protection of copyrights and patents, to mention only a few of the many responsibilities with which we are charged.

Neither time nor normal human patience would permit even a summary of our work and operation at this time. Instead, with your permission, I should like to explore briefly some phases of foreign trade with which we are mutually concerned. I know that this will have an immediate and practical appeal to you because yours is an export industry. About one-third of your civil transport production is sold abroad. Inevitably each of yo has a special interest in the Government's foreig trade policy.

An important element in that policy is the fu ture of the Organization for Trade Cooperatio (the OTC). As a part of his program of encourag ing a higher level of trade, the President ha strongly recommended to the Congress the enac ment of H. R. 5550, the bill which would authoriz United States membership in that body.

The Organization for Trade Cooperation woul be an essentially administrative body for the Ge eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the trad agreement to which the United States and 34 othe countries adhere. The principles of internation fair trade included in the general agreement a of direct interest to the members of your industr because they provide protection against arbitra and unnecessary restrictions on imports by oth countries from the United States. Through t General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, we ha been able to obtain the substantial relaxation a elimination of numerous foreign import restri tions adversely affecting our commerce.

If the Organization for Trade Cooperation we established, we believe that it would improve t facilities which now exist in the general agreeme for obtaining a review and examination of trade r strictions imposed for financial reasons. It wou permit the United States to maintain and contin the substantial progress it has made in reopeni world markets to American products as the wor financial situation has improved. Both the O ganization for Trade Cooperation and new tar concessions, of which I shall speak in a mome are very important in an individual as well as in institutional sense.

[1] Address made before the Wings Club at New York, N.Y., on June 7 (press release 299 dated June 6).

ut for you there is no more important element oreign trade than the future the American air- ft industry faces abroad. During the past few rs many of you have experienced a sharp in- ıse in competition from the foreign producers ircraft equipment.

hat competition promises to grow. Today the ited States still retains its advantageous posi- ı with regard to production capacities, methods, ts, and volume of output of aircraft of all types. ere is every reason to believe that with effort industry can continue to hold this position and neet effectively foreign competition in foreign ort markets. But, if it is to do so, it will be essary for the industry to keep three basic rules nind and to follow them with care and vigor.

eloping the Market

he first rule is that sales simply do not "just pen." They must be vigorously developed.

he market for aircraft, like that for many of other products, is changing. It is not the same it was shortly after the war. It is becoming re and more competitive as some of the Euro- n manufacturers develop transport as well as er types of aircraft and equipment that can ised by foreign airlines and foreign companies, ng schools, and the like. I am sure you agree t our manufacturers cannot afford to wait for ers but must expend vigorous efforts in secur- them. The days of the order taker are num- ed, and the salesman is called for. It will be essary to station representatives abroad who experienced not only with specifications and formance of products but who also know how sell in foreign markets. The mere sending of nted material, specifications, and performance a is no longer enough. You have good prod- s, and I am sure you will continue to maintain h standards. But continued sales in a highly ıpetitive market require more of you than pos- sion of good products.

ur principal foreign competitors have sta- ıed representatives permanently abroad in er to promote sales. They are willing to work tfully, slowly, and patiently with prospective chasers, to study the prospect's needs, to ex- in how the equipment will work out in opera- ı, to answer many questions, and to show a sin- e interest in the prospect's equipment problems. at, in many instances, is how your competitors e managed to introduce their new aircraft in competition with your own. Unless you put forth increased efforts, it may be expected that your competitors will succeed in placing additional aircraft in preference to yours.

It goes without saying that we in the Departments of State and Commerce will do our best to help you develop your markets. I understand our Aviation Division has close liaison with your association. We want that to continue. Reporting on matters of interest to your industry by our missions abroad is steadily improving, and special efforts will be made to continue the improvement. However, it is only fair to point out that under our system of government the identification and exploitation of potential markets abroad is basically an industry responsibility and there is a limit beyond which government should not go.

It has been said that some of the European governments give their aircraft manufacturers more favorable assistance than does the United States by providing or by guaranteeing export credits on sales of equipment. Since practices differ so widely from country to country, I am not prepared to say whether this assertion is true or not. However, I do wish to say that the assistance available through the Export-Import Bank has not been fully utilized or appreciated. I urge you to look into this matter more carefully with a view to making greater use of the Export-Import Bank. We shall be glad to help back you up as far as we can.

Maintaining a Two-Way Street

The second rule for winning foreign markets is that international trade is a two-way street. Many governments still husband their precious foreign-exchange earnings with great care. In spite of their limited amount of American dollars, these same governments are anxious that their people buy American products. This is especially true of American aircraft equipment because of its well-deserved reputation.

It is, of course, axiomatic that foreign governments cannot permit their people to buy from us unless they are also able to sell to us. It is sales here that earn dollars the American exporters seek for their products. One way in which foreign countries can earn dollars is through their own airline operations to the United States. It seems self-evident that undue restrictions on foreign airline operations in the United States can adversely affect the sale of American transport aircraft and

other American products to foreign countries.

To harmonize the interests of the air transport and aircraft industries, the United States must maintain a transport policy free of unnecessary and arbitrary restrictions.

I do not have to tell you there is much at stake. As you know, a comparison of United States exports and imports of aircraft and aircraft equipment shows a tremendous balance in our favor. In 1955 this country exported goods valued at a grand total of more than $15.3 billion. Of these exports, shipments abroad of all aeronautical products, including military, totaled about $728 million. Within this category of $728 million about one-third to one-quarter consisted of civil aircraft. In 1954, 86.6 percent of the aircraft equipment used by all airlines throughout the world was of American manufacture.

This large stake of the aviation equipment industry in foreign trade is convincing proof of the need for the United States to maintain a foreign trade policy that will permit other countries to continue to buy our products. We cannot erect over-high walls around the vast American market and at the same time expect to win foreign markets.

Cooperation Between Governments

The third rule for winning foreign markets is that a high level of international trade requires international cooperation between governments. The principal means used by the United States for more than 8 years to obtain that cooperation has been its active participation in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

That is why the administration now seeks the establishment of the Organization for Trade Cooperation and congressional action on H. R. 5550. The success of the policy just enunciated is indicated by the increasing liberalization of foreign trade controls by the partners in the general agreement.

One of the most important steps in this trade liberalization program has been in the making over the past few months. Today we are announcing in Washington the detailed results of the tariff negotiations recently completed at Geneva. You will undoubtedly see stories about this in the evening papers.

These tariff negotiations led to a mutually satisfactory balance of concessions with the 21 other countries participating in the conference. In terms of the amount of trade covered, which is not the only significant factor in judging the va of tariff concessions, the United States obtai concessions directly on $400 million worth of export trade. In addition, United States exp will enjoy more favorable customs treatment substantial volume of trade in products on wl the other countries exchange concessions am themselves.

Of special interest to you will be the tariff cessions which foreign countries granted United States exports of aviation equipm The exports of items on which these concess were made amounted to more than $19 millio 1954. The United States also granted some cessions to other countries on aviation equipm Our concessions were on items which in 1954 imported into this country in the amount of al $5 million.

These negotiations were carried out under authority given to the President in the 1955 ex sion of the Trade Agreements Act. The succ ful conclusion of the negotiations is another portant step toward the administration's goa promoting a higher two-way trade between American people and their friends abroad.

In conclusion, permit me to remark that foreign economic policies of the United St have an immediate and personal consequence you. The wisdom with which they are develo and pursued may determine your well-being success. On the other side, let me also remind that every businessman who engages in an nomic enterprise abroad is in a sense an infor ambassador of the United States. On your ac ties in substantial measure depends the good of other peoples toward the United States.

Bill Amending and Extending Sugar Act Signed

Statement by President Eisenhower

White House press release dated May 29

I have today approved H.R. 7030 to amend extend the Sugar Act of 1948, as amended, for other purposes.

In addition to extending the Sugar Act years, the bill restores to the domestic areas right to supply 55 percent of this country's in creased requirements of sugar. The amendm also permit foreign countries to supply as m as they have been, plus 45 percent of the incr

our requirements. These increases will be most ıportant relatively for the countries that hereto-re have been minor suppliers.

It was not considered feasible to recommend ı increase in the Philippine quota at this time. believe, therefore, that when new amendments e being prepared at the conclusion of the present t, consideration should be given to allowing the hilippines to share in increased consumption, as now provided for other foreign countries by is bill.[1]

djusting World Sugar Production nd Consumption

atement by Marvin L. McLain ssistant Secretary of Agriculture[2]

It is a privilege and a pleasure to welcome this stinguished group to the United States, and I ing you a warm welcome and the best wishes of e Secretary of Agriculture and all of his staff. ou have a big job cut out for you at this nference.

I do not know how much time I can spend with ɔu at this conference, but Mr. Earl Hughes, Ad-inistrator of the Commodity Stabilization Serv-e of the Department of Agriculture, also plans spend some time here; and, of course, Larry yers, Director of our Sugar Division, whom any of you know, and members of his staff will here continuously. Mr. Hughes and myself ill be within reach should an occasion arise when e may be needed.

The United States is very much interested in the ırposes and objectives of this conference. Sugar an important commodity. We are, I guess, the rgest sugar-consuming nation in the world, with ı annual consumption of about 8½ million tons. owever, we are also a large sugar-producing na-on, producing about 2½ million tons on the nited States mainland and well over 2 million ɔns in our other domestic areas—Hawaii, Puerto ico, and the Virgin Islands. Altogether the omestic areas produce about 4½ million tons. The remainder of our needs, about 4 million tons, comes from foreign areas, of which Cuba and the Philippines supply by far the greater part. Our present consumption is about 103 pounds per capita, which, in light of our other sweeteners, appears to be about the saturation point, but we anticipate an increase in consumption of about 135,000 tons a year based upon our very rapidly expanding population.

We have just completed rather lengthy negotiations in amending our own Sugar Act, which was passed by the Congress just last week.[3]

When I think about the problem we had in trying to arrive at a fair and equitable distribution of our sugar market, I think that problem was quite parallel with the one confronting this conference in trying to adjust sugar production and sugar consumption for the world as a whole. Both of us are interested, I think, not alone in our own individual welfare but in the welfare of others and in the hope of stimulating greater commerce between nations. You might be interested in the program we have worked out, to see what kind of answers we found in our own little sphere.

Objectives of U.S. Sugar Legislation

The United States has had special sugar legislation since the 1930's. Mr. True D. Morse, Under Secretary of Agriculture, when he appeared before the Senate Finance Committee in support of the Sugar Act amendments, stated that the fourfold objective of our specialized sugar legislation was:

> 1. to maintain and protect the domestic sugar-production industry,
> 2. to avoid undue burden on domestic consumers,
> 3. to increase our imports of sugar and thereby to benefit our general export trade, and
> 4. to insure that the benefits of the system would be passed on to farmers and laborers. . . .

These were the objectives we were trying to obtain in our deliberations. They are a great deal like the objectives of the International Sugar Agreement as stated in article 1. Certainly all of us wish to assure ample supplies of sugar at reasonable prices to consumers. Certainly all of us wish to have reasonable prices to producers. Like any other industry, all of us should be interested in expanding consumption and certainly all of us should be interested in stimulating greater commerce between nations, which should result in

[1] For a statement by Assistant Secretary Holland be-ɔre the Senate Finance Committee regarding H.R. 7030, e BULLETIN of Jan. 30, 1956, p. 172.

[2] Made before the U.N. International Sugar Conference New York, N.Y., on May 22. Mr. McLain is U.S. repre-ntative to the conference.

[3] See p. 1016.

a greater degree of prosperity for everyone. In our own plan to reach these objectives we have attempted to divide, equitably, our sugar market. This was no easy job since everyone, domestic producers and foreign nations, wanted a larger share. Anyone who has ever tried to divide four pieces of candy among six children can appreciate the problem. No one got everything he wanted. It had to be a give-and-take proposition that would result in the greatest good for the greatest number.

In our program we have deliberately restricted the production in our own domestic areas in order to provide part of our market for foreign areas. This was done deliberately to stimulate export trade and to show some responsibility toward the welfare of our neighbors. We have divided the increase in consumption from here on on a basis of 55 percent to the domestic areas and 45 percent to the foreign areas. We have recognized, as you do, that some countries are quite restricted in the variety of crops that they can produce and therefore production and sale of sugar are of paramount importance to them if they are going to acquire the necessary foreign exchange to make them good customers for the commodities they need and to improve their standard of living.

I hope you will not think that we here in the United States feel that we have all the answers. We would be the first to admit that we do not. I am merely citing to you the answers we came up with in our own deliberations. You are welcome to them for whatever they are worth.

Increasing World Consumption of Sugar

I do hope, however, that in the deliberations of this conference you will not devote all of your attention to seeking a magic formula through which to manipulate quotas and prices, as the only means of adjusting production and consumption. Every successful business in the world that has reached the saturation point starts bending its efforts for a greater outlet for its product. One of your stated objectives is to increase the world consumption of sugar, which I am informed now averages about 30 pounds per capita. I fully appreciate the many factors that are involved in trying to do this job. Nevertheless, it is a challenge to the producers of sugar everywhere. Certainly, I am not competent to tell you how to do it, but I am sure that, if there is an answer, that answer will come from a gathering of world sugar experts such as are here present. This problem is probably one of education and promot and of serious study of the various factors t are holding consumption down.

You are fortunate in that you have a commod with a universal appetite appeal. The people all of the low sugar-consuming nations of world would like to have more sugar. How get it to them, at prices they can afford to pay one of the problems which should receive v serious consideration here.

In conclusion, might I say I have only triec reemphasize the importance of the objectives t you already have incorporated in your agreem and I do hope that I have stimulated a little thi ing along lines other than control measures. think you should take advantage of this opport ity, when you have a great number of the su experts of the world together, to consider s of the broader objectives of what an internatic organization might hope to accomplish.[4]

Eximbank Loan to Brazil

The Export-Import Bank announced on Ju that a $35 million loan agreement with the I zilian National Steel Company was signec Washington on that day by Samuel C. Wa president of the Export-Import Bank, and (Edmundo de Macedo Soares e Silva, presi of the company. The signing puts into effect Export-Import Bank loan authorized in Febr and announced by Vice President Richard Nixon while he was attending the inaugura of President Juscelino Kubitschek.[1]

The Brazilian company was founded in 194 with the assistance of an Eximbank credit of million. Further credits of $20 million and million were approved by the bank in and 1950. The new loan, which brings the t amount authorized to $105 million, will er the Brazilian industry to expand its opera and to continue to contribute substantially to zil's steady progress toward a higher standa living.

The $35 million will be used for the pur in the United States of materials, equipment engineering services for export to Brazil.

[4] After consideration of possible amendments t International Sugar Agreement and preliminary d sion of quotas, the conference on June 12 agreed to June 20. It is expected to reconvene in October.

[1] BULLETIN of Feb. 27, 1956, p. 336.

›spects of Foreign Disposal of Domestic Agricultural Surpluses

'he following is an excerpt from a staff study, ed October 1955, which was circulated to inter- d Government agencies by the Interagency nmittee on Agricultural Surplus Disposal on y 22, 1956.[1] *The study group which prepared as headed by Ernest T. Baughman, Assistant e President of the Federal Reserve Bank of icago. In an introduction, the Interagency nmittee states that the study is "a staff docu- nt, not one representing the position of the ASD. Its conclusions correspond to the views the Chairman of the ICASD [Clarence ncis]. It has not been approved by any ncy and its conclusions and analysis do not nec- rily reflect the views of the Administration."*

NCLUSIONS

'Special" export programs initiated or ex- nded in 1954–55 apparently have achieved some rease in United States exports and a further derate increase is indicated for 1955–56. How- r, only in the event of widespread and repeated p failures in important producing countries uld a large enough increase in exports be ieved to make substantial reductions in current ublesome surpluses, particularly wheat, cotton, l rice in the next few years.

'he best opportunities for increasing exports hout risking substantial displacement of ited States exports for dollars or of "usual" orts of friendly countries exist in the low- ome, low-consumption areas. Agricultural plus commodities can make an important con- bution to programs designed specifically to elerate capital development and increase con- nption in such areas. Special attention should be given, therefore, to using United States surpluses in support of investment programs, especially in the less developed countries. However, the financial return to the United States of such use of the surpluses would be small. Over the long term, an increase in productivity in the low-income areas could result in the development of expanded export markets for United States commodities. Since capital development programs require several years for completion, it would be necessary to commit supplies of surplus commodities in support of such programs for periods up to possibly 3 to 5 years.

[1] For background on the Interagency Committee, estab- ed to coordinate activities under the Agricultural de Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (P. L. , 83d Cong.), see BULLETIN of Oct. 4, 1954, p. 498.

SUMMARY

The Size and Nature of Agricultural Surpluses

1. The amount of agricultural surplus commodities as reflected by CCC [Commodity Credit Corporation] loans and inventories has increased about $6 billion in the three years ending June 30, 1955 and may show some further increase in 1955–56. The rapid increase in surplus stocks in recent years has resulted from a volume of exports somewhat below the high level reached in earlier postwar years, high levels of price support relative to market prices, and rising output of farm commodities. Total agricultural output has tended to rise although output of certain crops has been curtailed by acreage and marketing controls.

2. Aggregate surpluses of a number of commodities available for export or other disposition outside usual domestic uses in 1955–56 are very large. Even with additional exports equivalent to 50 percent of the 1954–55 volume, it would require five years or more to liquidate the surpluses of wheat, cotton and feed grains and about four years to liquidate the surpluses of rice and tobacco. Exports normally provide outlets for only relatively small amounts of the dairy products and feed grains.

3. Large amounts of the less desired qualities of some commodities make the disposal of the surpluses more difficult. This applies especially to stocks of cotton, wheat and rice.

Trends in International Trade in Agricultural Commodities

1. The proportion of the world's agricultural output moving in international trade is now on the order of 15 percent, whereas it was about 20 percent prewar. Despite substantial increases over prewar in population and world output of agricultural commodities, and in international trade as a whole, world trade in agricultural commodities regained its prewar 1934–38 level only in 1950 and in succeeding years has shown little change. A strong move toward a greater degree of national self-sufficiency in agricultural products is evident throughout most of the world.

2. United States exports of agricultural commodities have been well above the low prewar volume throughout the postwar years and in 1954 exceeded prewar by about 50 percent. The United States in 1934–38 provided 11.5 percent of world exports of commodities. At its postwar peak in 1949, it accounted for 24 percent. In 1953–54 the percentage was 16.5. Compared with prewar, United States exports now account for larger proportions of total world exports of wheat, feed grains, rice, dairy products and edible fats and oil and oilseeds; for tobacco the proportion holds about the same as prewar; cotton is the only major surplus commodity in which the United States now supplies a smaller proportion of world exports than in prewar years.

3. United States exports of agricultural commodities have tended to decline as the amount of exports financed by aid programs has tapered off.

The Authorities

1. The Congress has provided a comprehensive framework of authorities to facilitate the export of agricultural surplus commodities. Export subsidies, barter, sale for foreign currencies, donations to avoid waste, and grants for famine relief and other purposes are authorized.

2. Since disposal of agricultural surpluses is not the major purpose of all of the authorities, it perhaps is inevitable that there should be some overlapping and duplication. To the extent that the authorities attempt to achieve several objectives simultaneously, and where a program may qualify under two or more of the authorities, some confusion results. Nevertheless, the authorities do fall into somewhat of a pattern, and it does not appear that a major modification or consolidation of the authorities would help materially at this time.

Accomplishments Under Existing Authorities

1. Over two-fifths of United States exports of agricultural commodities in 1954–55 were aided by one or another government program. The distribution of total agricultural exports by type of program was as follows:

	Million dollars			
Exports for dollars, not aided by government sales at reduced prices [1]				1,80
"Special" export programs:				
Barter		125		
Sale for foreign currency, P.L. 480, Title I		63		
Sale for foreign currency, MSP Aid, Sec. 550, 402		281		
U.S. Government grants:				
MSP economic aid	175			
Donations, P.L. 439, Sec. 416	130			
Relief, P.L. 480, Title II, etc.	83	388	[2] 857	
Subsidized exports sold for dollars, Sec. 32			36	
Other subsidized exports for dollars			450	
Total "special" and subsidized exports				1,34
Total agricultural exports				3,14

[1] Includes $70 million of loans, largely to finance sal of cotton to Japan.

[2] Export subsidies incurred on about $340 million o this total.

2. The amount of commodities included in P.L 480, Title I agreements signed in 1954–55 and th amount of authorizations issued under Mutual Se curity aid programs both were substantiall in excess of the amount of commodities shippe under these programs. Shipments in 1955–5 should be appreciably larger due to the completio of shipments under the previous year's agreement and the anticipated shipments of a larger propor tion of current year agreements which are ex pected to be signed somewhat earlier than wa the experience last year. Wheat, cotton and fee grains accounted for most of the exports for for eign currency under P.L. 480, Title I. Whea and cotton accounted for the major part of sale for foreign currencies under aid programs. To bacco, feed grains and fats and oils were also in cluded in significant amounts.

3. Barter transactions showed a large gain compared with only $34 million in the previou

. Grants pursuant to FOA economic aid pro-
ns have shown a decline each year since 1948–
Donations "to avoid waste," under Section
in 1954–55 were approximately double the
–54 amount. Shipments for emergency relief
er P.L. 480, Title II, and similar programs
materially smaller than in 1953–54 but some-
t larger than in the preceding two years.

Shipments pursuant to "special" export pro-
ns in 1954–55 showed a gain of about $275
ion over the 1953–54 amount. Increases were
rn for all the major surplus commodities ex-
tobacco and resulted in gains in total ex-
s of wheat, cottonseed oil and the major dairy
lucts—butter, cheese and dry milk. However,
l exports of cotton, feed grains and rice de-
d despite increases in exports under special
rams.

acles to Greater Accomplishments

The United States exports surplus agricul-
l commodities under a number of programs
even if prices were made fully competitive,
is subject to certain limitations:

Sale for dollars is limited by the amount of
rs available to foreign purchasers, their will-
ess to spend dollars for agricultural commodi-
relative to other commodities and discrimina-
against commodities supplied from the dollar
;

Barter shipments are limited by the kinds
amounts of materials we are willing to im-
in exchange for surplus agricultural com-
ities and the willingness of foreign owners of
materials to exchange them for surplus com-
ities;

Sales for foreign currencies pursuant to Mu-
Security programs are limited by the amounts
gricultural commodities which can be used
tively within the purposes of that Act;

Sales for foreign currencies pursuant to P.L.
Title I are limited somewhat by the provisions
he Act, that such sales should not displace
al marketings of the United States" or "un-
disrupt world prices" of agricultural com-
ities, by the amounts of commodities countries
villing to purchase, and by the extent to which
gn currencies can be made to serve purposes
ptable to the United States;

Grants and gifts of agricultural commodi-
are limited in the first instance to the require-
ments of famine situations and relief programs, and secondly by the willingness of the United States to provide commodities on these terms.

Export Potential for Surplus Agricultural Commodities

1. The principal commercial foreign markets for United States agricultural commodities have been Canada, Cuba and the densely populated industrialized countries of Western Europe and Japan. Commercial exports of cotton, citrus fruits and winter vegetables to Canada should continue to show a gradual increase as population growth continues and industrial development proceeds in that country. Exports to Europe will be limited by a relatively slow rate of population growth, low income elasticity of demand for food, and strong tendencies toward a high degree of agricultural self-sufficiency. European markets and possibly the Japanese market for our surplus products will be strengthened if international programs to secure freer and less discriminatory trade are successful.

2. It will be difficult to achieve any substantial increase in exports above the rates indicated for 1955–56 to countries in which consumers already enjoy relatively high levels of consumption without incurring serious adverse reactions from other friendly countries. Possible exceptions include programs designed specifically to: maintain consumption following crop failures, achieve increased consumption by certain groups, provide more adequate inventories, support expanded livestock production in such areas.

3. Exports to low-income, low-consumption areas can be expanded above present levels, possibly by several hundred million dollars annually if the United States is willing to make the commodities available to these areas on very favorable terms, i. e., terms which will net very little financial return to the United States. Major objectives of such exports would be to increase consumption and accelerate the rate of capital investment in such areas.

4. It is possible that some amounts of wheat, cotton, tobacco and butter and other fats and oils might be disposed of to the European Soviet Bloc nations in the next year or two if such sales are determined at some future time to be consistent with U.S. foreign policy.

5. Special export programs initiated or expanded in 1954–55 are achieving some increase in

United States exports of agricultural commodities. A further moderate increase is indicated for 1955–56. Dollar exports undoubtedly are being displaced to some extent as are exports of other suppliers. It is doubtful that these programs can make any more than a gradual inroad on current surpluses unless there should be widespread crop failures in important producing countries. Programs for accelerating capital development and increasing consumption in low-income, low-consumption areas provide the best prospects for increased exports without risking displacement of United States exports for dollars or "usual" exports of friendly countries.

6. Export prospects for major surplus commodities:

Wheat: We probably will be able to maintain something approximating the level of exports achieved in 1954–55; we are unlikely to increase exports materially except in the event of crop failures in important producing areas and, possibly, through programs to increase stocks in some importing countries.

Cotton: Export prospects are uncertain. Some increase in exports can be achieved if our cotton could be priced competitively with other sources of supply. Due in part to the "umbrella effects" of the domestic support price the United States share of world exports has declined despite economic aid and surplus disposal programs.

Rice: A major question is whether or not Asia will again supply its own rice needs, and, if not, whether international political conditions and domestic price policy will permit the United States to supply rice to that region. In prewar years Asia was a substantial exporter of rice but in recent years has been a net importer. If Asia's production increases materially, United States exports to that area will probably decline and offset any possible increases in exports to other parts of the world. United States prices will have to be competitive with prices in other surplus-producing areas if the current level of exports is to be maintained.

Tobacco: Exports are expected to show a substantial increase in 1955–56 as shipments under special export programs rise. Commercial exports may decline if prices are maintained at current levels, production in other areas continues to expand, and import restrictions continue to severely limit trade.

Fats, oils and oilseeds: The long-term outlook for world demand and United States exports of cottonseed and soybean oil and of soybeans is considered good. It will be very difficult and perhaps impossible to develop a substantial export market for butter in the next few years. Exports of lard probably can be increased but the commodity is expected to be available domestically in large supply.

Cheese and dry milk: The United States has been an important exporter of dairy products only in periods of abnormal supply or demand. Exports in recent years have been largely as a result of donations for distribution to low-income consumers and for special uses outside commercial channels. It will be very difficult if not impossible to develop a substantial commercial export market for cheese and the prospects for dry milk are uncertain.

POLICY ISSUES

1. Should the United States attempt to make a maximum use of agricultural surpluses to raise consumption and accelerate capital development in low-income areas? It would be possible to increase exports under such a program without incurring serious displacement of commercial exports for the United States and other friendly countries. If such a policy is adopted, careful consideration should be given to (1) the desirability of authorizing commitments of agricultural surpluses under such programs up to periods of three to five years and (2) to specifying in the legislative authority that the use of surpluses for this purpose is one of the major objectives of agricultural surplus disposal programs especially as it pertains to resource development in low-income countries. The programs should be handled primarily on the basis of sale for local currencies with most of the currency made available to the recipient country as grants or loans for use in specified capital development projects which clearly would accelerate investment and increase income and consumption. Little would be gained unless investment was in fact accelerated. It should be recognized at the outset that the immediate financial return to the United States would be small. Over a period of years the increased production capacity could result in the development of some additional commercial export markets for United States goods.

2. Should exports to Soviet Bloc countries be

nded? A potential market for some addi-
al amount of agricultural surplus commodities
rently exists in the European Soviet Bloc
tries, if the commodities are offered at world
s. Present legislation permits exports of gov-
ent stocks through barter to friendly nations
. As a result, sales for dollars have also been
held as not being in line with the declared
y of Congress. Opportunities clearly in the
ests of the U.S. may develop in the future to
or barter to countries excluded by this legis-
n. Therefore, consideration might be given
odifications in legislative authority to permit
President to exploit at his discretion such op-
unities as may be deemed appropriate.

Should export subsidies be used to increase
rts of additional amounts of surplus agricul-
l commodities? Subsidies have proved effec-
n bridging the gap between supported domes-
rices and world prices of wheat, which is
rted in large volume and for which there is
ternational agreement, and a number of other
nodities exported in relatively small amounts.
idies for commodities exported in large vol-
incur high costs to the Treasury. If used to
n more than the "customary" share of mar-
normally served or to export substantial
nts to other than usual markets, subsidies
ikely to incur retaliation by other countries.
idies have been used also to offset the effects
liscriminatory trade restrictions imposed
st United States exports.

Should barter programs be expanded? If
rement of strategic materials for the stock-
or Ccc inventory were to be expanded or if
rement of other materials and services were
ned to barter to the maximum extent pos-
, barter programs could be expanded and
ably would result in some moderate additional
rt of agricultural surplus commodities. How-
barter transactions in which the government
ides the commodities to be exported and pro-
the market for the commodities imported
lmost certain to tend toward bilateralism if
continued. This represents a trading practice
h the United States generally has opposed
inciple and which may work to our disad-
ge if used more generally by other coun-
An important policy question, therefore,
hether we should encourage a more wide-
d use of this practice for purposes of agri-
ral surplus disposal.

5. What policy *re* use of foreign currency? Making effective use of the foreign currency generated under P.L. 480, Title I will become an increasingly important consideration as shipments under that program are continued. Sales for foreign currencies necessarily have the effect of grants or loans until such time that the currencies can be substituted for dollar expenditures or converted into dollars. Only then is it possible to make financial recovery for the United States. Usually sales are quite limited if we insist on use of the currency in lieu of dollar expenditures and much less limited if the currency is loaned or granted to the agreement country. Thus, planned uses of foreign currencies offset the volume and terms of sales. Those currencies allocated for use by the United States in lieu of dollar expenditures must be used to the maximum extent practicable by Departments which can use them effectively if a maximum financial return is to be realized.

6. Aid to shipping or maximum export of surpluses? The legislative requirement that at least 50 percent of surplus commodities disposed of pursuant to P.L. 480 be shipped in United States bottoms has, in certain instances, inhibited the disposal of surplus commodities under this Act.

7. Cooperation vs. competition? Considering the large amount of our surpluses and the tremendous financial strength of the United States, it is not surprising that friendly countries have expressed concern about our intentions to boost exports of agricultural surplus commodities and about the possible effects of "special" export programs on world markets and on their country's exports. Since it is a policy of the United States to give due consideration to usual exports of friendly countries in developing agreements with importing countries and to avoid undue disruption of world prices, it would appear advisable for the United States and interested friendly countries to keep each other mutually informed on general trade policies and objectives. Joint discussion of international trade developments and prospects among representatives of countries vitally interested in particular commodities important to the United States may prove helpful in promoting mutual understanding of trade problems and minimizing friction between friendly but competing exporters.

8. What alternatives? Since foreign disposal does not appear to offer outlets adequate for the

disposition of current surpluses of agricultural commodities in the next few years, the situation strongly suggests that domestic production, price support and sales policies be carefully reviewed. It would appear that current output of supported commodities should be brought within the bounds of prospective dispositions; that all opportunities for decreasing production and marketing costs as well as for increasing domestic utilization be thoroughly explored; that legislative provisions that prohibit domestic sales except at levels materially above current prices should be reexamined; and that rigid domestic support prices for some commodities that cause the United States to be a residual supplier to world markets should be adjusted. The United States need not make the adjustments alone. Policies which result in competitive prices and permit substantial supplies to move readily into export markets will bring pressures on other countries, both importers and exporters, to share in the needed adjustments. Further success in efforts to achieve currency convertibility, reduce trade barriers and eliminate discriminatory trading practices will have a similar effect.[2]

. . . . .

Visa Applications Cut Off for Certain Escapees

Press release 298 dated June 6

In view of the large number of applications for visas under section 4(a)(3) of the Refugee Relief Act which have been received from escapees residing within the European continental limits of the NATO countries and in Turkey, Sweden, and Iran, the Department of State announced on June 6 that it would not accept new applications for such visas after June 11, 1956. The Refugee Relief Act allotted 10,000 visas for such escapees. As of June 1, 6,288 visas had been issued and more than 10,000 applications covered by assurances were on file in the Department for the remaining 3,712 visas.

In making this announcement, Pierce J. Gerety, Deputy Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs for Refugee Programs, emphasized that:

(1) The cutoff of applications does not apply to escapees residing in Germany and Austria, for whom section 4(a)(2) of the Refugee Relief Act allots 35,000 visas. Of this allotment only 10,000 visas had been issued by June 1 but, because of the limitations contained in the act, these visas cannot be used for escapees residing in other countries.

(2) Many of the escapees potentially eligible under 4(a)(3) are also registered with the United States Escapee Program. The United States Escapee Program, which is also under the supervision of Mr. Gerety, will continue its efforts to effect the successful resettlement of escapees in countries throughout the free world or to work out a local solution for those who prove unable to emigrate.

(3) Although applications for visas under section 4(a)(3) of the Refugee Relief Act will no longer be available, a limited number of visas will continue to be available for escapees under the regular quotas of the Immigration and Naturalization Act.

[2] The remaining sections of the staff study are entitled: "The Size and Nature of Agricultural Surpluses," "Trends in International Trade in Agricultural Commodities," "Nature and Purpose of Existing Authorities and Programs for Disposal of Agricultural Surpluses Abroad," "Accomplishments Under Existing Authorities," "Barriers or Limitations on Greater Accomplishments," and "Export Potential for Surplus Agricultural Commodities." Also included are three supplements dealing with wheat, cotton, and rice.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

84th Congress, 2d Session

Departments of State, Justice, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations, 1957. Hearings before the subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations on H.R. 10721. January 12–May 16, 1956. 713 pp.

Organization for Trade Cooperation. Hearings before the House Committee on Ways and Means on H.R. 5[illegible]0, a bill to amend the Tariff Act of 1930 with respect to the administration of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. March 1–16, 1956. 1444 pp.

Mutual Security Act of 1956. Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 10082, a bill to amend further the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, and for other purposes. March 20–May 10, 1956. 1094 pp.

Report on the Operations of the Department of State under Public Law 584. H. Doc. 374, March 30, 1956. 105 pp.

Extension of Export Control Act of 1949. Hearings before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 3238, a bill to provide for continuation of authority for regulation of exports, and for other purposes. April 19 and 30, 1956. 148 pp.

Suspension of Duties and Import Taxes on Metal Scrap. Report to accompany H. R. 8636. H. Rept. 2107, May 3, 1956. 4 pp.

Amending the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948. Report to accompany H.R. 9606. H. Rept. 2110, May 3, 1956. 5 pp.

U.N. Security Council Continues Secretary-General's Role in Palestine Question

Following are texts of statements made in the Security Council by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. Representative to the United Nations, and by James J. Wadsworth, Deputy U.S. Representative, together with the Security Council's resolution of June 4 requesting Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold to continue his good offices in connection with the Palestine question.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR LODGE, MAY 29

U.S./U.N. press release 2414

The United States supports the resolution now before the Council sponsored by the United Kingdom,[1] and we do so because we think it is the logical outgrowth of the Security Council's resolution of April 4 [2] and of the mission undertaken by the Secretary-General pursuant to that resolution—a mission which we think has done much good.

The resolution of April 4 was adopted unanimously. There was at that time an ominous drift toward hostilities in Palestine. Prompt action was required. To halt this drift and to restore tranquillity in the area the Secretary-General was requested as a matter of urgency to undertake his mission to the Near East. In this the Secretary-General has, we think, met with significant success. Conditions in the area are measurably different from what they were on April 4. Dangerous tensions have been reduced, and the prospect for full and effective operation of the armistice machinery is good.

As the sponsor of the resolution of April 4, which requested the Secretary-General to undertake his mission, the United States continually emphasized the importance of full compliance with the armistice agreements as the essential first step in restoring peaceful conditions in the Near East. We stated on March 26 that:[3]

> in the first instance United Nations efforts should be concentrated on full compliance with the armistice agreements by Israel and the Arab States and on the carrying out in detail of the Security Council's resolutions of 30 March 1955, 8 September 1955, and 19 January 1956.

I went on to say that:

> we therefore propose in the draft resolution before the Council that the Secretary-General undertake as a matter of urgency discussions with the parties and the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, General Burns, to find ways and means to put these resolutions and the proposals which they embody into immediate effect.

Then on Wednesday, March 28, I summarized the United States position this way:[4]

> We wanted two things: To act promptly in the face of a gravely worsening situation, and, in acting promptly, to indicate, with the Security Council's endorsement, certain steps which the Secretary-General and the parties might take to carry out the provisions of the armistice agreements. These are not new purposes; the unanimous resolutions of the Security Council, to which our draft resolution refers, likewise had as their purpose the effective functioning of the armistice. That is our sole purpose. Surely no one would deny that, unless the armistice agreements can be effectively carried out, a grave threat to the peace may result.

I mention those two quotations, Mr. President, because I think it will help us to see clearly where we are going if we have clearly in mind what it was that we thought when we undertook this present program.

Now, this remains the United States position. The Secretary-General's mission pursuant to the

[1] U.N. doc. S/3600/Rev. 1.
[2] BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1956, p. 628.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 628.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 629.

resolution of April 4 has contributed greatly to the effective functioning of the armistice agreements and has thus diminished appreciably the likelihood of a threat to the peace in the area.

The report of the Secretary-General [5] shows that progress can be made toward the full functioning of the armistice agreements. Much has been accomplished of a practical nature along the lines of the measures previously proposed by the Chief of Staff and endorsed by the Security Council. The speedy carrying out of the proposal so far agreed upon will provide the basis for extending agreement on remaining practical measures proposed to the parties, thus solidifying the gains already made.

Now, Mr. President, the resolution sponsored by the representative of the United Kingdom has a basic purpose, which is to emphasize the Security Council's wish that (1) the agreements already arrived at are speedily put into effect and (2) that remaining measures called for in the Security Council's resolutions not yet fully agreed upon are adopted without delay. I think that is an accurate summation.

And it remains true today, as it did in April, that the practical measures which the Council has endorsed are the key to the full functioning of the armistice agreements and to peaceful conditions in the area. Where they have been agreed upon, therefore, there should be no delay in putting them fully into effect. Where they are still to be agreed upon, we hope to see the continuation of the Secretary-General's efforts to reach such agreement.

A prime feature in all these arrangements is that of freedom of movement for the United Nations Truce Supervision Observers. If they are to perform their task effectively, they must be given ready access to the area along the armistice demarcation lines, to the demilitarized zones, and the defensive areas as defined in the armistice agreements. The United Nations observers will thus be in a position to be the very eyes and ears of the United Nations Security Council and should be a strong deterrent to any possible aggressive action from any source.

Another important aspect of the draft resolution sponsored by the United Kingdom is the provision in operative paragraph 5 that, in carrying out his observation of the cease-fire, pursuant to the Security Council resolution of 11 August 1949, the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Or ganization should report to the Security Counci whenever any action undertaken by one party t the armistice agreement constitutes a serious vio lation of that agreement or of the cease-fire whicl in his opinion requires immediate consideratio by the Security Council. And this, too, should b a strong deterrent to any possible aggressive actio from any quarter, and this too has the full suppor of the United States.

Thus the task before the Security Council toda is to consolidate the gains made by the Secretary General in the agreement he has reached with th parties to prevent a recurrence of a situation sucl as prevailed earlier in the year. It seems fitting— in fact, it seems wise—to call upon the Secretary General to make further efforts with the parties t that end.

If the Security Council agrees, as I am confiden that it will, that the Secretary-General should con tinue to act in its behalf in accordance with th resolutions previously adopted, we will all be abl to feel renewed confidence in the prospect of peaceful solution of the Palestine problem in ful accord with the principles and purposes of th United Nations Charter.

[5] U.N. doc. S/3596 dated May 9.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR WADSWORTH JUNE 1

U.S./U.N. press release 2415

In the statements we have heard from represent atives of the parties to the various armistice agree ments and from some members of this Counci certain misgivings have been expressed, with vary ing degrees of concern, relating to four para graphs of the United Kingdom draft resolution the sixth paragraph of the preamble, the thir operative paragraph, the fourth operative para graph, and the seventh operative paragraph.

With respect to the sixth paragraph of the pre amble,[6] concern has been expressed that the ref erence to conditions for a peaceful settlement "o a mutually acceptable basis" derogates from pas resolutions of the United Nations on the Palestin question and thus is meant to encourage a settl ment which disregards the expressed views of th majority of the United Nations.

[6] "*Conscious* of the need to create conditions in which peaceful settlement on a mutually acceptable basis the dispute between the parties can be made;"

With respect to the third operative paragraph,[7] he question has been raised as to the reason for he inclusion of certain words not appearing in he comparable paragraph in the resolution of April 4, these words in question being "in all areas."

With respect to the fourth operative paragraph,[8] concern has been expressed similar to that concerning the sixth preambular paragraph.

With respect to the seventh operative paragraph,[9] it has been suggested that the request of he Secretary-General to continue his good offices with the parties should be made more precise to make it clear that it is intended that the Secretary-General's efforts should be within the framework of the resolution of April 4.

Mr. President, it was a matter of great satisfaction to the United States delegation that its initiative embodied in the resolution of April 4 met with such general approval and resulted in the successful mission of the Secretary-General to the Near East. It is a matter of continuing gratification to us that in the present debate general approval of the resolution of April 4 and of the results achieved by the Secretary-General has again been expressed.

It seems pertinent, therefore, Mr. President, in connection with the questions raised in this debate, for me to recall the statement of the United States representative here last Tuesday [May 29]. Mr. Lodge said at that time that the United Kingdom draft resolution was the logical outgrowth of the resolution of April 4 and of the Secretary-General's mission pursuant to that resolution. In that connection he recalled what it was the United States, as sponsor of the resolution of April 4, had hoped to accomplish and referred to his earlier statements before the Council. He pointed out on Tuesday, in quoting from his earlier statements, that he did so because he felt that this would help to see clearly where we were going if we had clearly in mind what it was we thought when we undertook the present program. He reiterated that the position of the United States remains unchanged.

I should like to state again today, Mr. President, that the United States position remains unchanged and that we regret that some concern has arisen over what may have been a misconception of the purpose of some of the language contained in the present draft resolution. I feel sure that our view of the present draft resolution, namely that it is fully in accord with and consistent with the resolution of April 4, is also the view of the sponsor of the resolution, the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom [Sir Pierson Dixon]. It seems to me that he has made this quite clear today. The reference in the draft resolution to the need for conditions in which a peaceful settlement on a mutually acceptable basis can be made seems to us to state the obvious. Any agreed solution, that is, agreed between the parties, in contrast to an imposed solution, is bound to be one which is "mutually acceptable." This certainly does not mean in our view that the Security Council is by its actions derogating from the authority and validity of resolutions of the General Assembly. The emphasis in this sixth preambular paragraph is on the necessity for conditions which would be propitious for a settlement of outstanding problems. The conditions with which this Council is concerned are the same conditions with which we were concerned when we adopted the resolution of April 4. Those conditions are the absence of incidents, the reduction of tensions, and the full operation of the armistice machinery. These are the things which we around this table have been seeking to establish.

Now the reference to all areas along the armistice demarcation lines in the third operative paragraph is, in the opinion of the U.S. delegation, merely for purposes of emphasis. By referring to all areas along the armistice demarcation lines we would be taking note of the fact that so far freedom of movement in these areas is not fully unrestricted. The representative of the United Kingdom has, however, amended his draft resolution by taking out those words in order to dispel any further concern on this point.

The reference to the continuation of the Secretary-General's good offices with the parties in

[7] "3. *Declares* that full freedom of movement of United Nations observers must be respected in all areas along the Armistice Demarcation Lines, in the Demilitarized Zones and in the Defensive Areas as defined in the Armistice Agreements, to enable them to fulfil their functions;"

[8] "4. *Endorses* the Secretary-General's view that the re-establishment of full compliance with the Armistice Agreements represents a stage which has to be passed in order to make progress possible on the main issues between the parties;"

[9] "7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his good offices with the parties, and to report to the Security Council as appropriate."

the seventh and last operative paragraph means, in our opinion, simply the continuation of those efforts which the Secretary-General has already undertaken on behalf of the Security Council pursuant to the resolution of April 4. Again, however, the representative of the United Kingdom has amended his draft resolution to make this crystal clear.

Mr. President, I hope that this explanation of the understanding of the United States concerning the draft resolution will reenforce the statements already made here by the representative of the United Kingdom and that the concern which some of the parties have expressed on the matters I have mentioned will be dispelled. It is in the light of this understanding of the draft resolution that we have welcomed the initiative of the United Kingdom and that we fully support the draft resolution as amended.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR WADSWORTH, JUNE 4

U.S./U.N. press release 2416

The United States delegation will vote in favor of the United Kingdom resolution as further amended by the deletion of the sixth preambular paragraph and the consequential change in the seventh preambular paragraph.

As I explained last Friday, my delegation feels that the paragraph in question does not derogate from the resolutions of the General Assembly, that it merely states the obvious, and that the fears expressed concerning it are not justified. For that reason we have a certain amount of regret that it has been found necessary to delete the paragraph. However, Mr. President, the amended resolution remains an important step toward solidifying the gains made as a result of the Secretary-General's mission in spite of the differences of opinion that have arisen here.

We sincerely trust that the unanimity which we hope will now be achieved by the Security Council on this matter will be translated into further cooperative action in the area and will continue to develop the conditions for which we have been working from the beginning.

If the Security Council agrees, as I am now sure that it will, that the Secretary-General should continue to act in its behalf in accordance with the resolutions previously adopted, we will all be able to feel renewed confidence in the prospect of a peaceful solution of the Palestine problem in ful accord with the principles and purposes of th United Nations Charter.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION [10]

U.N. doc. S/3605

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions of 4 April 1956 (S/3575) an 11 August 1949 (S/1376–II);

Having received the report of the Secretary-General o his recent mission on behalf of the Security Counci (S/3596);

Noting those passages of the report (Section III an Annexes I–IV) which refer to the assurances given to th Secretary-General by all the parties to the Armistic Agreements unconditionally to observe the cease-fire

Noting also that progress has been made towards th adoption of the specific measures set out in the thir operative paragraph of the Security Council's resolutio of 4 April 1956;

Noting, however, that full compliance with the Ger eral Armistice Agreements and with the Council's resolu tions of 30 March 1955, 8 September 1955 and 19 Janu ary 1956, is not yet effected, and that the measures calle for in the third operative paragraph of its resolution o 4 April 1956 have been neither completely agreed upo nor put fully into effect;

Believing that further progress should now be mad in consolidating the gains resulting from the Secretary General's misison and towards full implementation b the parties of the Armistice Agreements;

1. *Commends* the Secretary-General and the parties o the progress already achieved;

2. *Declares* that the parties to the Armistice Agreement should speedily carry out the measures already agree upon with the Secretary-General, and should cooperat with the Secretary-General and the Chief of Staff of th Truce Supervision Organization to put into effect thei further practical proposals, pursuant to the resolution o 4 April, with a view to full implementation of tha resolution and full compliance with the Armistice Agree ments;

3. *Declares* that full freedom of movement of Unite Nations observers must be respected along the Armistic Demarcation Lines, in the Demilitarized Zones and in th Defensive Areas, as defined in the Armistice Agree ments, to enable them to fulfil their functions;

4. *Endorses* the Secretary-General's view that the re establishment of full compliance with the Armistic Agreements represents a stage which has to be passe in order to make progress possible on the main issue between the parties;

5. *Requests* the Chief of Staff to continue to carry out hi observation of the cease-fire pursuant to the Securit Council's resolution of 11 August 1949 and to report t the Security Council whenever any action undertake by one party to an Armistice Agreement constitutes serious violation of that Agreement or of the cease-fir

[10] Adopted unanimously on June 4.

which in his opinion requires immediate consideration by the Security Council;

6. *Calls* upon the parties to the Armistice Agreements to take the steps necessary to carry out this resolution, thereby increasing confidence and demonstrating their wish for peaceful conditions;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his good offices with the parties, with a view to full implementation of the Council's resolution of 4 April 1956 and full compliance with the Armistice Agreements, and to report to the Security Council as appropriate.

Cooperating To Solve Western Hemisphere Travel Problems

SIXTH INTER-AMERICAN TRAVEL CONGRESS SAN JOSÉ, COSTA RICA, APRIL 14–21, 1956

by H. H. Kelly

Since 1939, a series of Inter-American Travel Congresses has been held under the auspices of the Organization of American States. These official conferences were useful in focusing attention upon the many problems involved in the development of international travel in the Western Hemisphere, but observers noted a lack of continuity between the periodic meetings and therefore a lesser accomplishment of effective results than had been hoped for.

In 1954, at the Fifth Congress at Panamá, agreement was reached upon a new and improved form of organization, with a Permanent Executive Committee and four technical committees designed to insure careful study of travel problems in the intervals between the periodic congresses and the preparation of detailed reports and recommendations.

This effective forward planning came to fruition at the Sixth Inter-American Travel Congress held at San José, Costa Rica, April 14–21, 1956. All of the optimistic expectations for a new and aggressive attack upon travel problems in the Western Hemisphere, with close cooperation between government and private industry, were fully justified at San José. The present report summarizes the principal accomplishments of the meeting and indicates the future lines of work which are now definitely mapped.

• *Mr. Kelly, who is Director of the International Travel Division, U.S. Department of Commerce, was chairman of the U.S. delegation to the Sixth Inter-American Travel Congress.*

Agenda

The agenda for the San José meeting was built largely upon the recent energetic work of the Permanent Executive Committee and the four technical committees. These committees were concerned respectively with research and organization, facilitation, travel plant (physical facilities for tourists), and promotion. In addition, there was a chapter in the agenda on policy and planning. The San José Congress was organized with working sessions on each of these five main topics, and the various delegations participated in discussions of many detailed items under each of them.

The Executive Committee and all of the technical committees had held meetings in preparation for the San José Congress,[1] and their reports supplied the basis for practical discussions. In fact, the entire body of documentation for the Congress, prepared by the Permanent Secretariat in the Pan American Union, Washington, D. C., was the most comprehensive ever available at a meet-

[1] For an account of the meeting of the Technical Committee on Travel Plant at Washington in December 1955, see BULLETIN of Feb. 6, 1956, p. 223.

ing of this kind and contributed in essential measure to the success of the Congress.

Participation

Nineteen of the 21 American Republics were represented by official delegations at San José. The total number of government delegates registered was approximately 90. Special observers were also in attendance from the United Nations, Inter-American Hotel Association, Inter-American Radio Association, Inter-American Council of Commerce and Production, Inter-American Federation of Automobile Clubs, International Air Transport Association, and International Road Federation. In addition, observers were registered from more than 40 industrial and commercial associations and companies.

The 19 countries represented by official delegations (only Paraguay and Venezuela being absent) were: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, United States, and Uruguay.

U.S. Delegation

The U.S. delegation, which in itself typified the close cooperation existing between government and private industry in this field, was composed of the following persons:

Henry H. Kelly, *Chairman*, Special Assistant on International Travel, Bureau of Foreign Commerce, U.S. Department of Commerce

Charles P. Nolan, *Vice Chairman*, Officer in Charge, Transportation and Communications, Office of Regional American Affairs, Department of State

Malcolm C. Hope, Chief, General Engineering Program, Division of Sanitary Engineering Services, U.S. Public Health Service

William F. McGrath, Executive Vice President, American Society of Travel Agents, New York, N. Y.

Godfrey Macdonald, Vice President, Grace Lines, Inc., for the American Merchant Marine Institute, New York, N. Y.

Parks B. Pedrick, Vice President, Mississippi Shipping Co., for the American Merchant Marine Institute, Inc., New York, N.Y.

Norman J. Philion, Air Transport Association of America, Washington, D.C.

Dr. Knud Stowman, Special Consultant, Division of Sanitation, Bureau of State Services, U.S. Public Health Service

Each member of the U.S. delegation was assigned to one or more of the working committees, and in this manner the U.S. position for the Co gress, prepared in advance at Washington wit clearances by the Interdepartmental Committe on Foreign Travel, was ably presented and th delegation's instructions were fully carried out.

Organization of Conference

All preparations for the meeting were handle by an organizing committee of Costa Rican Go ernment officials and consultants. The chairma of the Congress was Mario A. Esquivel, Ministe of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica, and the secretar general was Mario Hernandez, member of th Board of Directors, Costa Rican Institute c Tourism. The Permanent Secretary of the Inte American Travel Congresses, Francisco J. He nandez of the Pan American Union, also playe an important part in the conduct of the meetin

At the inaugural session on April 14, a notabl address on the broad economic and social aspec of travel development was made by the Preside of Costa Rica, José Figueres. Speaking only fro notes, the President of the Republic gave his a dress alternately in Spanish and faultless Englis The content of his remarks, in the opinion of man of those present, will be of permanent value in th field.

Sessions of the working committees began o April 14 and continued through the followin week. Plenary sessions were held to consolida and approve the work of the committees. T closing session was held on April 21, with the cer mony of signature of the Final Act containing a of the resolutions adopted.

Conclusions

The Final Act of the San José Congress co tains 57 resolutions, all adopted unanimousl They cover the entire field of travel developme in the Western Hemisphere and establish a patter of constructive operation which will be of val not only in that area but throughout the worl

The following is a summary of the princip resolutions which were adopted by the Congre and which will be transmitted to the Governmen of the American Republics for action.

Chapter I—Policy and Planning: The Counc of the Organization of American States was r quested to approve an increase in the membersh of the Permanent Executive Committee from fi to seven, in order to insure fuller representation i this important steering body. The new membe

ship would include the present five members—Argentina, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru, and the United States—with the addition of Panama and Uruguay. A similar request was made regarding recognition of regional congresses of tourism, a new chapter on which is to be inserted in the organization plan of the congress.

Negotiations were authorized with the International Union of Official Travel Organizations, whose headquarters is at Geneva, Switzerland, to ascertain if an official relationship could be established on the basis of a single collective membership for the official travel offices of the American Republics. This question will probably be discussed with IUOTO at its next annual assembly at Vienna in October 1956.

Montevideo, Uruguay, was designated as the site of the Seventh Inter-American Travel Congress in 1958. Cuba also made a strong bid for the 1958 meeting, but, when preference was shown by a large majority for Uruguay, the decision was made to have the Permanent Executive Committee hold one of its early sessions in Habana. The membership of the four technical committees was continued as at present, with all of the 21 American Republics holding representation on one or more. Chairmanship of these committees is as follows: Research and Organization, Peru; Elimination of Travel Barriers, Argentina; Travel Plant, United States; Promotion, Mexico.

Chapter II—Research and Organization: The Permanent Executive Committee was charged with studying present governmental methods of compiling statistics on tourism, with the objective of preparing recommendations for clarification and greater uniformity. Cooperation with the Inter-American Statistical Institute and the Statistical Commission of the United Nations was indicated as desirable. The importance of accurate definitions was emphasized.

The Permanent Executive Committee was charged with studying the structure and functions of the national tourist offices in America, and also those of nonprofit organizations, with special reference to methods of obtaining full cooperation. Recommendation was made that the governments establish national tourist offices, where these do not already exist, and that these offices consult with private industry in order to obtain needed coordination in travel development.

The Permanent Executive Committee was charged with making an investigation of means of exchanging technical personnel in the travel field.

The Congress defined the objectives of "tourist education" in America and recommended inclusion of appropriate instruction in primary, secondary, college, and professional courses.

The Permanent Secretariat was requested to assemble a bibliography of scientific and technical studies on tourism and to ask the Columbus Commemorative Library of the Pan American Union to study the classification and cataloging of published works in cooperation with other institutions.

Chapter III—Facilitation: The Congress approved recommendations which had been made by the Permanent Executive Committee at its first meeting, in June 1955, on the basic problems of personal documentation for international travelers. The important items covered included the complete elimination of police certificates, special entry and exit permits, and transit visas and the unilateral elimination of visas, tourist cards, and similar documents wherever possible. It also established the objective of limiting documentary requirements as soon as possible to a minimum of three—proof of identity and nationality, a simple embarkation/debarkation form for statistical and other record purposes, and the international certificate of vaccination.

Ratification by all governments of the two 1954 United Nations conventions on customs facilities for tourists and for private automobiles was also recommended. (The U.S. Senate on April 19, 1956, while the San José conference was in session, gave its consent to ratification of both of these conventions by the U.S. Government.)[2] A special study was authorized on the problem of availability of foreign exchange for international travelers.

Governments were urged to simplify to the maximum extent possible the documentary requirements applicable to civil aviation, in conformity with annex 9 of the International Civil Aviation Convention (Chicago, 1944).

Proposed excursion fares for air travel to South America on routes originating or terminating in the United States or Canada were pronounced an effective means of promoting tourism, and their extension to all countries of the Americas was favored.

The Congress recommended to all governments that their documentary requirements for passengers on ships should be the same as for those on

[2] For texts, see S. Execs. A and B, 84th Cong., 2d sess.

aircraft, together with elimination of consular visas on documents required for the entry or departure of passenger ships.

Support was given to the ratification by all governments of the Convention on Road Traffic of 1949 [3] and the Convention on Inter-American Automotive Traffic of 1943.[4] Both of these agreements provide, among other things, for reciprocal recognition of drivers' licenses and registration plates in international travel by private automobiles.

Study was authorized of international railway transport of passengers as it relates to the development of tourism.

Chapter IV—Travel Plant: In a resolution of special interest to private industry, the Congress pointed out the urgent need for construction and expansion of hotels and similar establishments in Latin America. It established a series of provisions for a model law for use by any country which sincerely desires to establish favorable conditions for attracting private capital. These provisions include designation of the hotel industry as an essential industry from the standpoint of national interest, providing of national hotel credit, government guaranties on principal and interest payments, customs exemptions on importation of materials and equipment, and admission of expert personnel from other countries for reasonable periods.

The providing of accommodations for motorists on the route of the Inter-American Highway, which is expected to be opened for through traffic from the Mexico-Guatemala border to the Panama Canal by 1959, was found to be an especially urgent problem. A special resolution envisaged a chain of 16 modern motels at approximately 100-mile intervals, basic cost of which was estimated at $2,500,000; joint action of the governments of the six Republics directly affected, in cooperation with private industry, was recommended.

A new attack was launched upon a problem of fundamental importance to all travelers—that of improved sanitation. The Congress requested the Pan American Sanitary Bureau to appoint a committee of experts to cooperate with the Inter-American Travel Congresses in establishing minimum standards of sanitation for tourist accommodations, including hotels and restaurants. The Secretariat was instructed to make wide distrib tion of a report prepared for the Congress by t U.S. Public Health Service on "Sanitation A pects of Travel." It was recognized that agr ment upon minimum standards on an intergo ernmental level—with special reference to wat supply, food, plumbing, kitchen facilities, and t like—would mark a long step forward in this i portant phase of travelers' safety and would of value throughout the world.

Attention was given to the improvement of rel tions between hotels and travel agencies, usi the experience of the United States industry a guide.

The Secretariat was requested to compile inf mation on hotel schools now functioning in t Americas, for the purpose of promoting creati of more schools of this type and greater unifor ity in their programs and administration. T Congress recommended that national hotel as ciations be organized in countries which do n have them at present and that these affiliate the selves with the Inter-American Hotel Associati

Chapter V—Promotion: On the direct prom tion of tourist volume, the Congress agreed up a series of fundamental principles for advertisi and publicity. It also instructed the Secretar to give wide distribution to a report showing h Latin American countries could obtain a larg share of the U.S. travel market, which was p pared for the Congress by the Air Transport As ciation of America with the assistance of the Walter Thompson Company of New York. Pr entation of this report, illustrated with slides, t a combined session of the technical commissi of the Congress proved to be one of the outstar ing events of the meeting.

A set of principles relating to cooperation b tween official agencies and private enterprise w also adopted. Study was authorized of coope tive publicity campaigns, continental or regio in scope.

Authorization was given for the conducting f prize essay contests on tourism topics. In t connection, the U.S. delegation announced t the initial contest of this nature would be offe for the next Congress with three prizes of $1,0 $500, and $250, respectively, the funds to be c tributed by leading U.S. transportation assoc tions and the administration of the contest to e handled by the Pan American Union.

Appreciative recognition was given to the G

[3] Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2487.
[4] TIAS 1567.

ernment of the United States for its offer of technical assistance projects in the field of tourism. Publication of a technical manual by the Pan American Union, on the basis of the wealth of material submitted to the Sixth Congress and with a complete index, was authorized. An editing committee will be appointed by the Permanent Executive Committee for this purpose.

Economic Opportunities for Women

TENTH SESSION OF THE U.N. COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN

by Mrs. Lorena B. Hahn

The U.N. Commission on the Status of Women t its 10th session, which met at Geneva from Iarch 12 to 29, 1956, stressed the economic items n its agenda, particularly economic opportunities or women. In addition, it reviewed the political ghts of women, the access of women to education, nd discrimination practices in the field of family nd property law. The Commission praised the esolution on advisory services in the field of uman rights adopted by the U.N. General Asembly last year[1] and urged that the facilities eing provided by this new program be utilized the promotion of the status of women.

Mrs. Agda Rossel of Sweden was elected chairan of the Commission; Begum Anwar Ahmed Pakistan, first vice chairman; Mrs. Mitra itrovic of Yugoslavia, second vice chairman; nd Miss Uldarica Manas of Cuba, rapporteur.

Two countries, Belgium and Israel, served on e Commission on the Status of Women for the st time at its 1956 session. The other 16 untries represented on the Commission were rgentina, Australia, Byelorussia, China, Cuba, ominican Republic, France, Indonesia, Pakistan, oland, Sweden, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, nited States, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. Four these countries sent new representatives, so that of the delegates were attending a session of e Commission for the first time.

The Soviet Union had a new representative on e Commission this year, Mrs. Nina S. Spirinova. In the first few days of the session she vigorously attacked the Western countries, and the United Kingdom representative and I replied sharply to these attacks. Thereafter, the U.S.S.R. representative shifted to an attitude of cooperation and carefully avoided attacking the Western countries. During the second week of the session the U.S.S.R. representative invited the members of the Commission to attend a 2-week seminar in Moscow during July or August 1956. The Soviet Union offered to pay the expenses of members of the Commission from their countries to the Soviet Union and within the Soviet Union during the seminar. The chairman acknowledged the invitation, but no other response was made to it by the members of the Commission.

Resolutions Relating to Employment

The Commission adopted five resolutions in the economic field and called upon the U.N. Secretary-General and the International Labor Office to prepare background material for the further consideration of these subjects at the 1957 session of the Commission. The five resolutions concerned equal pay, the occupational outlook for women, cottage industries and handicrafts, working women with family responsibilities, and the removal of economic discrimination against women.

In the resolution on occupational outlook for

• *Mrs. Hahn is U.S. Representative on the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women.*

[1] BULLETIN of Dec. 19, 1955, p. 1034.

women the Commission asked the United Nations to prepare lists and descriptions on principal professional and technical fields of training and opportunities which are already available to women or which may in the future become available to them. The Commission decided that it would undertake a long-term study of this subject.

The United States joined with Pakistan in submitting a resolution on cottage industries and handicrafts which was adopted by the Commission. This resolution directed special attention to methods for placing handicraft production and sale on a sound basis, including adequate safeguards for workers against the abuses of industrial homework.

The Commission decided to undertake a study of working women with family responsibilities. The Soviet-bloc members on the Commission sought to focus attention on the protection of "mother and child." The United States and a number of other delegations, however, urged that it would be preferable for the Commission to emphasize the employment situation of women with family responsibilities, and this emphasis was approved by the Commission. The United Nations and the ILO will accordingly prepare reports for the 1957 session of the Commission on activities in various countries for improving employment conditions for working women with family responsibilities.

The U.S.S.R. and several other delegations urged further implementation of a resolution adopted in 1955 by the Economic and Social Council which called for the removal of economic discrimination against women. They proposed a comprehensive report for the 1957 session of the Commission. The United States and several other delegations pointed out that it would be impractical to ask for such a report next year, and unanimous agreement was finally reached on a resolution which asked the United Nations and the ILO to prepare for 1957 and for later sessions of the Commission a series of reports concerning steps being taken by member states to remove economic discrimination against women.

The Commission had a general discussion on problems relating to part-time work for women and older women workers and decided to consider this subject further at its next session. One aspect of the situation of older women workers which was of universal interest to the Commission was the age for voluntary retirement under social insur- ance systems.

In the discussion of the subject of equal pay fo equal work, and in the resolution finally adopted the Commission stressed the importance of collec tive-bargaining procedures as one of the most ef fective ways to insure equal rates of pay to wome workers. On further information to be obtaine on this subject the Commission asked that par ticular attention be given to procedures found use ful for achieving equal pay through collectiv bargaining, such as by encouraging greater par ticipation by women in unions. The Commissio was also interested in taxation policies in relatio to employed married women.

There was considerable interest on the part o nongovernmental organizations in the agend items in the economic field, and a number of ther participated in the discussions. These organiza tions were the International Confederation o Free Trade Unions, the International Federatio of Christian Trade Unions, the World Federatio of Trade Unions, the International Alliance o Women, the International Council of Women, th International Federation of Business and Profe sional Women, the International Federation c University Women, the International Federatio of Women Lawyers, the Pan-Pacific South-Ea Asia Women's Association, the World Movemer of Mothers, the World Union of Catholic Women Organizations, the Open Door International, an the St. Joan's International Social and Politic Alliance.

Equal Suffrage and Equality in Education

On the political rights of women I joined oth members of the Commission in congratulatin four countries where women have recently wc full suffrage rights—Colombia, Honduras, Nic ragua, and Peru. There are now only 15 countri which deny women the right to vote. In 1945, the time the U.N. Charter was signed, only countries provided women with full politic rights; the number has now increased to 65.

Members of the Commission stressed the ir portance of increasing citizenship training f women who have recently received the right vote in order that there will be greater particip tion by these women in the political life of the countries.

On access of women to education, the Comm

sion requested an analytical summary of information on discrimination against women in education for review by the Commission at its 1957 session. The Commission discussed that section of the draft report of the special rapporteur appointed by the U.N. Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities concerning discrimination on the basis of sex. The Commission was of the opinion that the discussion of discriminatory practices against women in this draft report was inadequate and that the Commission itself should undertake the preparation of a comprehensive statement on this subject.

As a followup of resolutions adopted by the Commission at earlier sessions concerning family law and the property rights of women, the Commission at this session decided to undertake a more detailed study of laws, practices, and customs relating to polygamy, child marriage, bride-price, and the right of the mother to exercise parental authority and to have custody and guardianship of the children during marriage and after its dissolution. Considerable concern was expressed in the Commission concerning laws, practices, and customs which adversely affect the dignity of women and are inconsistent with the principles of the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Technical Assistance

To implement the resolution on advisory services in the field of human rights adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1955 the Commission expressed the hope that the three forms of assistance provided in this resolution would be utilized in the promotion of the status of women. The three forms of assistance provided are (a) advisory services of experts, (b) fellowships and scholarships, and (c) seminars.

The Commission expressed the view that the organization of seminars should be a particularly fruitful method for the promotion of the rights of women and the improvement of their status through the exchange of information and experience in this field. The Commission asked the U.N. Secretary-General to consult particularly with governments and specialized agencies concerning the possibility of holding regional seminars to assist women who have recently acquired political rights, or do not yet fully exercise them, in developing their understanding of civic responsibilities and increasing their participation in the public life of their countries.

Recommendations for action adopted by the 10th session of the Commission on the Status of Women will be considered by the Economic and Social Council at its 22d session in July 1956.

Special Studies and Future Plans

The documentation prepared for the Commission this year included special studies in both the political and economic fields. A report on "Opportunities for Girls in Vocational and Technical Education," developed jointly by UNESCO and the ILO, will be considered at next year's session of the Commission. Another document described briefly over a hundred different technical-assistance projects which affected the status of women directly or indirectly and listed U.N. materials which might be useful to technical experts in countries where changes are taking place in the status of women. Two of the other documents considered by the Commission were based principally on information from women's nongovernmental organizations, one being an analysis of methods for the promotion of equal pay and the other of activities directed toward the recognition and exercise of women's political rights.

The increasing interest of the Commission in equal pay and equal employment opportunities for women reflects the increasing responsibilities women in almost all countries are undertaking in the economic field. That this is true in our own country is evidenced by the growing proportion of women in the labor force, with married women and older women accounting for much of this expansion. The ILO and UNESCO have regularly made their resources available to the Commission, and plans for next year will continue to draw on these agencies in cooperation with the United Nations. Since interchange with nongovernmental organizations is basic to the Commission's understanding of problems and the development of recommendations in this field, I hope their members will continue to make use of the records of the Commission and give thought to its program.[2]

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[2] Information on the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women is contained in various sales documents published by the United Nations. A list of these may be obtained from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N.Y.

U. S. Delegations to International Conferences

Intergovernmental Copyright Committee

The Department of State announced on June 7 (press release 301) that Arthur Fisher, Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office, Library of Congress, and U.S. representative on the Intergovernmental Copyright Committee, will represent the U.S. Government at the first session of the Committee, which will meet at Paris June 11–16.

The UNESCO-sponsored Universal Copyright Convention, which became effective on September 16, 1955,[1] provides for the Intergovernmental Copyright Committee to study the problems concerning the application and operation of the convention, prepare for its periodic revision, and study other problems of international copyright protection in consultation with interested intergovernmental organizations. The United States adheres to the convention and is a member of the Committee.

The first session of the Committee will have the task of adopting rules of procedure and of establishing precedents for its future activities. The Committee will also discuss questions pertaining to (1) international protection of performing artists, record manufacturers, and broadcasting organizations and (2) protection granted to news and other press information on current events by national copyright laws and international treaties and conventions.

There are now 18 parties to the Universal Copyright Convention: Andorra, Cambodia, Chile, Costa Rica, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Haiti, Holy See, Israel, Japan, Laos, Liberia, Luxembourg, Monaco, Pakistan, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States.

International Labor Conference

The Department of State announced on June 5 (press release 294) that the United States will be represented at the 39th session of the International Labor Conference at Geneva, June 6–28, by the following delegation:

REPRESENTING THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Delegates

J. Ernest Wilkins, Assistant Secretary of Labor, *Chairman*

David W. Wainhouse, Deputy Assistant Secretary o State for International Organization Affairs

Alternate Delegate

B. Allen Rowland, Special Assistant to the Secretary o Commerce

Congressional Advisers

Augustine B. Kelley, House of Representatives
Samuel K. McConnell, Jr., House of Representatives

Advisers

John T. Fishburn, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, De partment of State
Selene Gifford, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Department o the Interior
Paul Gurske, Director, Bureau of Labor Standards, De partment of Labor
Alice K. Leopold, Special Assistant to the Secretary o Labor for Women's Affairs
Otis E. Mulliken, Office of United Nations Economic an Social Affairs, Department of State
James H. Pearson, Office of Education, Department o Health, Education, and Welfare
Stuart Rothman, Solicitor, Department of Labor
George Tobias, Labor Attaché, U.S. Resident Delegatio and Consulate General, Geneva
Arnold Zempel, Executive Director, Office of Interna tional Labor Affairs, Department of Labor

REPRESENTING THE EMPLOYERS OF THE UNITED STATES

Delegate

Charles H. Smith, Jr., President, Steel Improvement an Forge Co., Cleveland, Ohio

Advisers

Virgil B. Day, Manager, Union Relations Service, Publi and Employee Relations Services, General Electric Co. New York, N.Y.
G. Gordon Mitchell, Manager, Industrial Relations Divi sion, E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., Wilmington Del.
Carl E. Schneider, Vice President, Industrial Relations Burroughs Corporation, Detroit, Mich.
Frank H. Terrell, 500 Fairfax Building, Kansas City, Mo
William G. Van Meter, Attorney, Labor Relations an Legal Department, Chamber of Commerce of the Unite States, Washington, D.C.

REPRESENTING THE WORKERS OF THE UNITED STATES

Delegate

George P. Delaney, International Representative, Ameri can Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Or ganizations, Washington, D.C.

Advisers

James B. Carey, President, International Union of Elec trical, Radio, and Machine Workers, Washington, D.C
C. J. Haggerty, Secretary-Treasurer, California Stat Federation of Labor, San Francisco, Calif.
Thomas Murphy, Treasurer, Bricklayers, Masons, an Plasterers International Union of America, Washing ton, D.C.
Harry Pollak, Department of International Affairs, Amer

[1] BULLETIN of Aug. 22, 1955, p. 326. For text of convention and protocols, see S. Exec. M, 83d Cong., 1st sess.

ican Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, Washington, D.C.
George J. Richardson, Secretary-Treasurer, International Association of Fire Fighters, Washington, D.C.
Harry Sayre, President, United Paperworkers of America, Washington, D.C.

The International Labor Conference, which meets yearly, is a forum in which representatives of employers and workers as well as governments for the 73 member countries formulate, through consultation and debate, suggested standards looking to the improvement of working and living conditions around the world. The other principal organs of the International Labor Organization (ILO) are the Governing Body, which is the executive council, and the International Labor Office, which is the secretariat of the organization.

The report of the Director General of the International Labor Office, which will be discussed at the Conference, will include a factual review and analysis of developments in the social field of particular concern to the ILO, the problems of rural and urban employment and their interrelationship in the social field, and an account of ILO activities during the year under review with specific reference to the main emphases in its work and to new developments in its program. Other items on the agenda include vocational training in agriculture; welfare facilities for workers; weekly rest in commerce and offices; and forced labor.

International Conference on Large Electric High-Tension Systems

The Department of State announced on May 28 (press release 284) that the U.S. Government will be represented by the following delegates at the 16th session of the International Conference on Large Electric High-Tension Systems (CIGRE) at Paris May 30–June 9, 1956:

Donald S. Campbell, Chief, Division of Power, Bureau of Reclamation, Department of the Interior
George A. Grimm, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Properties and Installations, Department of Defense
Ellsworth J. Hand, Deputy Director, Power Equipment Division, Business and Defense Services, Department of Commerce
Leslie N. McClellan, Assistant Commissioner and Chief Engineer, Bureau of Reclamation, Department of the Interior

Founded at Paris in 1921 under the auspices of the International Electrotechnical Commission, CIGRE serves as a focal point for the acquisition and dissemination of technical knowledge on an international scale in the fields of power generation and transmission. At the forthcoming conference, consideration will be given to technical questions on alternators, cables, transformers, towers, circuit breakers, and overhead lines. It is expected that there will also be reports on the advances made in Europe in recent years in the design and construction of ultra-high-voltage transmission lines and in particular on an extensive 380-kv transmission system which is now in operation in France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland, and Italy.

CIGRE membership is composed of 1,800 individuals and collective members (industrial and scientific societies, organizations dealing with high-tension electrical systems) in Algeria, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Rumania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Security Council

Letter dated 8 March 1956 from the Representative of Syria addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/3555, March 8, 1956. 2 pp. mimeo.

Letter dated 13 March 1956 from the Permanent Representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/3559, March 14, 1956. 3 pp. mimeo.

Letter dated 6 April 1956 from the Permanent Representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/3577, April 6, 1956. 3 pp. mimeo.

Letter dated 9 April 1956 from the Permanent Representative of Egypt addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/3579/Rev. 1, April 13, 1956. 4 pp. mimeo.

Letter dated 12 April 1956 from the Permanent Representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/3585, April 12, 1956. 2 pp. mimeo.

Communications circulated by the President of the Security Council at the request of the Secretary-General. 1. Text of message from the Secretary-General to the Prime Minister of Israel, dated 11 April 1956 from Cairo, Egypt. 2. Letter dated 12 April 1956 from the Prime Minister of Israel to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, at Cairo, Egypt. 3. Text of message from the Secretary-General to the Prime Minister of Israel, dated 13 April 1956 from Cairo, Egypt. S/3586, April 13, 1956. 7 pp. mimeo.

Communications circulated by the President of the Security Council at the request of the Secretary-General.

1. Message from the Prime Minister of Israel to the Secretary-General dated 13 April 1956. 2. Message from the Secretary-General to the Prime Minister of Israel dated 13 April 1956. 3. Message from the Foreign Minister of Israel to the Secretary-General delivered personally at Lydda airport on 14 April. S/3587, April 16, 1956. 4 pp. mimeo.

TREATY INFORMATION

United States and Austria Sign Atoms-for-Peace Agreement

On June 8 the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State (press release 306) announced that representatives of Austria and the United States had signed on that day a proposed agreement for cooperation in research in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The agreement was negotiated within the framework of President Eisenhower's atoms-for-peace program.

The agreement was signed for Austria by Ambassador Karl Gruber and for the United States by Lewis Strauss, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Protocol amending articles 48 (a), 49 (e), and 61 of the convention on international civil aviation (TIAS 1581) by providing that sessions of the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization shall be held not less than once in 3 years instead of annually. Done at Montreal June 14, 1954.[1]
Ratifications deposited: Mexico, May 13, 1955; Netherlands, May 31, 1955; Honduras, June 1, 1955; Denmark, June 4, 1955; Spain, June 6, 1955; Iceland, July 5, 1955; Sweden, July 8, 1955; Philippines, July 27, 1955; Portugal, September 20, 1955; Indonesia, October 18, 1955; Pakistan, October 21, 1955; Turkey, December 23, 1955; China, February 16, 1956; Syria, March 8, 1956; Afghanistan, March 15, 1956; Austria, April 13, 1956; Switzerland, April 17, 1956; Norway, April 18, 1956; Bolivia, May 23, 1956; Union of South Africa, May 24, 1956.

Federal Republic of Germany

Agreement on German external debts. Signed at London February 27, 1953. Entered into force September 1(1953. TIAS 2792.
Ratification deposited: Greece, April 21, 1956.

Health

Constitution of the World Health Organization. Done a New York July 22, 1946. Entered into force April ' 1948. TIAS 1808.
Acceptances deposited: Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisi May 14, 1956.

Safety at Sea

Regulations for preventing collisions at sea. Done a London June 10, 1948. Entered into force January 1954. TIAS 2899.
Acceptances deposited: Thailand, December 8, 195 Viet-Nam, March 15, 1956.

Trade and Commerce

International convention to facilitate the importation (commercial samples and advertising material. Date at Geneva November 7, 1952. Entered into force N vember 20, 1955.[2]
Accession deposited: Federation of Rhodesia and Nya aland, April 30, 1956.

BILATERAL

Netherlands

Agreement relating to certificates of airworthiness for ir ported aircraft. Effected by exchange of notes at Tl Hague September 19 and November 4, 1955.
Entered into force: May 22, 1956 (date of receipt by tl United States of a notification from the Netherlan that the agreement has been constitutionally a proved).

Pakistan

Construction agreement pursuant to article I, paragra 1, of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of M 19, 1954 (TIAS 2976). Signed at Karachi May 2 1956. Entered into force May 28, 1956.

Panama

Reciprocal agreement for gratis nonimmigrant visa Effected by exchange of notes at Panamá March 27, M 22 and 25, 1956. Entered into force June 1, 1956.

Portugal

Surplus agricultural commodities agreement pursuant title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and A sistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454, 45 69 Stat. 44, 721). Signed at Lisbon May 24, 1956. E tered into force May 24, 1956.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Resignations

R. Douglas Stuart as Ambassador to Canada, effecti May 6.

[1] Not in force.

[2] Not in force for the United States.

Agriculture
Adjusting World Sugar Production and Consumption (McLain) 1017
Bill Amending and Extending Sugar Act Signed (Eisenhower) 1016
Prospects of Foreign Disposal of Domestic Agricultural Surpluses (Baughman Report) 1019

American Principles
The Cost of Peace (Dulles) 999
President Eisenhower's Views on Neutrality . . . 1004

American Republics
Cooperating To Solve Western Hemisphere Travel Problems (Kelly) 1029
Evaluation of U.S. Economic Relations With Latin America (Holland) 1006

Asia. The Cost of Peace (Dulles) 999

Atomic Energy. United States and Austria Sign Atoms-for-Peace Agreement 1038

Austria. United States and Austria Sign Atoms-for-Peace Agreement 1038

Brazil. Eximbank Loan to Brazil 1018

Canada. Resignation of Ambassador Stuart . . . 1038

China. Letters of Credence 1004

Congress, The
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy 1024
President Eisenhower Urges Congress To Restore Funds Cut From Mutual Security Program . . 1003

Department and Foreign Service. Resignation of Ambassador Stuart 1038

Economic Affairs
Adjusting World Sugar Production and Consumption (McLain) 1017
The Aircraft Industry and Foreign Trade Policy (Kalijarvi) 1014
Bill Amending and Extending Sugar Act Signed (Eisenhower) 1016
Cooperating To Solve Western Hemisphere Travel Problems (Kelly) 1029
Economic Opportunities for Women (Hahn) . . 1033
Evaluation of U.S. Economic Relations With Latin America (Holland) 1006
Eximbank Loan to Brazil 1018
Intergovernmental Copyright Committee 1036
International Conference on Large Electric High-Tension Systems 1037
International Labor Conference 1036
Prospects of Foreign Disposal of Domestic Agricultural Surpluses (Baughman Report) 1019

Europe. Visa Applications Cut Off for Certain Escapees 1024

Health, Education, and Welfare. Economic Opportunities for Women (Hahn) 1033

Indonesia. Departure of President Sukarno (Eisenhower, Sukarno) 1005

International Organizations and Meetings
Cooperating To Solve Western Hemisphere Travel Problems (Kelly) 1029
Intergovernmental Copyright Committee 1036
International Conference on Large Electric High-Tension Systems 1037
International Labor Conference 1036

Mutual Security
The Cost of Peace (Dulles) 999
President Eisenhower Urges Congress To Restore Funds Cut From Mutual Security Program . . 1003

Near East
The Cost of Peace (Dulles) 999
U.N. Security Council Continues Secretary-General's Role in Palestine Question (Lodge, Wadsworth, text of resolution) 1025

Presidential Documents
Bill Amending and Extending Sugar Act Signed (Eisenhower) 1016
Departure of President Sukarno 1005
President Eisenhower Urges Congress To Restore Funds Cut From Mutual Security Program . . 1003
President Eisenhower's Views on Neutrality . . 1004

Refugees and Displaced Persons. Visa applications Cut Off for Certain Escapees 1024

Treaty Information
Current Actions 1038
United States and Austria Sign Atoms-for-Peace Agreement 1038

U.S.S.R. The Cost of Peace (Dulles) 999

United Nations
Adjusting World Sugar Production and Consumption (McLain) 1017
Current U.N. Documents 1037
Economic Opportunities for Women (Hahn) . . 1033
Intergovernmental Copyright Committee 1036
U.N. Security Council Continues Secretary-General's Role in Palestine Question (Lodge, Wadsworth, text of resolution) 1025

Name Index

Baughman, Ernest T. 1019
Dulles, Secretary 999
Eisenhower, President 1003, 1004, 1005, 1016
Hahn, Mrs. Lorena B. 1033
Holland, Henry F. 1006
Kalijarvi, Thorsten V. 1014
Kelly, H. H. 1029
Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr. 1025
McLain, Marvin L. 1017
Stuart, R. Douglas 1038
Sukarno, Dr. 1005
Tong, Hollington K. 1004
Wadsworth, James J. 1026, 1028

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: June 4–10

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Press release issued prior to June 4 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 284 of May 28.

No.	Date	Subject
*293	6/5	Program for Adenauer visit.
294	6/5	Delegation to International Labor Conference (rewrite).
*295	6/5	Nufer sworn in as Ambassador to Philippines.
296	6/6	China credentials (rewrite).
†297	6/6	Results of 1956 tariff negotiations.
298	6/6	Cutoff date on visas for escapees.
299	6/6	Kalijarvi: "The Aircraft Industry and Foreign Trade Policy."
*300	6/7	Educational exchange.
301	6/7	Intergovernmental Copyright Committee.
*302	6/7	Conant: American Chemical Society.
†303	6/8	Delegation to World Power Conference (rewrite).
304	6/8	Holland: "Evaluation of U.S. Economic Relations With Latin America."
*305	6/8	Educational exchange.
306	6/8	Atoms-for-peace agreement with Austria (rewrite).
307	6/8	Dulles: "The Cost of Peace."

*Not printed.
†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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The Department of State

bulletin

Vol. XXXIV, No. 887

June 25, 1956

A PEACEFUL CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM • *by Vice President Nixon* 1043

AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST • *by Under Secretary Hoover* 1049

TALKS WITH CHANCELLOR ADENAUER OF GERMANY • *Text of Joint Communique* 1047

THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES ON EUROPE • *by Eleanor Dulles* 1072

U. S. CONCERN FOR REFUGEES • *Statement by Christopher H. Phillips* 1077

RESULTS OF 1956 TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS
Department Announcement 1054
Proclamation Giving Effect to 1956 Tariff Concessions 1057

For index see inside back cover

The Department of State bulletin

Vol. XXXIV, No. 887 • Publication 6360

June 25, 1956

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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A Peaceful Crusade for Freedom

by Vice President Nixon[1]

I was tempted in preparing my remarks for this occasion to discuss at length the economic prospects for the years ahead. We are fortunate to be living in a period when for the first time in quarter of a century we have had 3 consecutive years of unparalleled prosperity. The college graduates of 1956 will find available to them the most jobs at the highest wages in the Nation's history. And it would be fascinating indeed to explore the almost limitless possibilities for expansion of the American economy during the years ahead as we begin to harness the new sources of energy which our scientists have tapped.

Tonight, however, I believe there is a subject of greater importance to this graduating class and to the Nation. I refer to the titanic struggle between two opposing concepts of life in which we are engaged. The next few years will determine whether we can live in peace and at the same time avoid surrender. And that question will be answered by how well we are able to meet and defeat the changing tactics of the dictatorial forces which threaten the free world.

From the end of World War II to the death of Stalin in 1953, our problem was a relatively simple one. Communist leaders all over the world used open threats of force coupled with thinly veiled support of revolutionary and subversive movements in countries designed for conquest. These actions of bluster and abuse inevitably drove the free world together in self-defense.

Then came the death of Stalin and the "new look" in Communist foreign relations. The leaders of the Soviet Union invited the rest of the world to a period of peaceful coexistence. In doing so they seemed to abandon their previous tough line, and they have even repudiated some of the excesses of past regimes.

This change of tactics has understandably created considerable confusion in the non-Communist world.

I think there will be little dissent from the conclusion that, in view of the record of the men in the Kremlin, the lines of military and diplomatic policy that we have hammered out over the past 10 years must continue to govern our conduct at this time.

But is this the whole answer? Do we stand pat and leave all the initiative to the other camp? Do we act as if nothing has happened in the 3 years since Stalin died?

I answer these questions by saying that we could make no greater mistake than to rest on our oars and to ignore the "new look" in Soviet diplomacy.

If it is made to appear that our primary concern is military hardware, we may find ourselves isolated in a world that has been convinced by the traveling salesmen of the Soviet Union selling other products.

What we face today is a new line which could be far more dangerous in the long run than the Stalin line of bluster and brute force. It is basically a war for men's minds, a struggle for their allegiance, an effort to win them peacefully to the Soviet camp.

In this struggle, ideas—not guns or aircraft—are the weapons. In this war, our armies wear the university cap and gown—not the uniform of the soldier. Books and pamphlets, rather than tanks and battleships, will be decisive in this contest.

One of the major reasons for the change in Soviet policy now becomes apparent. It was obvious to the successors of Stalin that they could not sell their new line so long as people remem-

[1] Address made at commencement exercises at Lafayette College, Easton, Pa., on June 7.

bered slave-labor camps, mass purges, and the ever-present terror of the secret police. Yet, to the outside world, there would appear to be a break with the past and a writing off of the handicaps derived from more than 30 years of terror. And the "new look" was sufficiently appealing in contrast to the old that there was every chance of selling this policy to uncommitted nations and of breaking off one by one those who had allied together in a common policy of defense.

In the cold light of history it seems fantastic that a nation with the Soviet record of terror and aggression could hope to make widespread gains by announcing a simple change of policy. At the least, one would expect that all non-Communist countries would adopt a policy of watchful waiting and not make any shift of program until the "new look" had been tried for 5 to 10 years. Unfortunately, this is not the case.

We must recognize that there are powerful assets which work to the benefit of the Soviet in this contest. Unless we examine them and face them realistically, we may well lose out in the battle for men's minds.

The Uncommitted Nations

First, let us see what is at stake. Approximately 600 million people live in the so-called uncommitted or neutral nations. It is easy to see that the world struggle will be determined by what happens to these people.

On the basis of my travels through most of this part of the world, may I tell you what I believe the people in the uncommitted nations want and contrast the Communist appeal with our own?

First, there is the desire for peace throughout the world, a desire which is particularly strong in the nations newly freed from colonial ties. This is not merely negative in the sense of war weariness or fear. It is often something much more positive. They wish the time and freedom to build their countries economically, politically, and culturally. To such nations the Communist world talks and promises peace. It appears to respect their desire for neutrality.

By contrast we often seem to be talking war and military alliances. I do not say that these impressions are correct, but they are more widespread and sincerely held than we often realize.

Second, there is the understandable desire for economic progress in nations less developed than those in the West. To these nations, the Sovi Union holds up the example of its own dramat industrial progress under communism.

On the other hand, the almost unbelievable pro perity of the United States appears to many these nations as a goal impossible of attainmen

Third, there is the desire for recognition, pre tige, and independence. In much of Asia ar Africa, strong resentments have been built against Western nations because of past or prese colonial and imperialistic policies. Often there the deep hurt that springs from real or imagin racial discrimination.

Here we find that there is a fear of what th term cultural imperialism, an effort by the We to dominate the thinking of other nations rath than to respect their cultures and religions on equal basis with ours.

And here again the Soviet has been adroit recognizing this desire. Compare, for examp the tactics of Bulganin and Khrushchev in deali with the peoples of the Far East and their tacti in Great Britain.

A *fourth* point to note is the attitude of ma peoples toward material things in contrast to t intellectual and the spiritual. This is difficult express accurately. In one sense, all peoples a concerned with economic and material problem They must produce to live. Yet, at the same tim there are often profound differences in the relati place assigned to these activities.

In many areas of the world a place of honor given to leaders in the arts and intellectual fiel and in religious activities. The intellectual is n dismissed as an egghead. The artist is not call a long-hair. The minister of religion is not co sidered an impractical idealist.

Here again we find that many peoples thi that we in America are too materialistic to ha such ideals. We are considered anti-intellectu deficient in culture, superficial in religion.

Again, I am not passing judgment on the tru or falsity of these charges. The important poi is that they are widely believed.

And what is truly amazing is this—that t apostles of communism can parade as expone of the very ideals that they accuse us of neglecti when their own philosophy is the ultimate in m terialism and the antithesis of religion.

But we find again how cleverly they pres their case. They point out that the scientist a the intellectual are held in high esteem in t

Soviet Union. Artists and writers are among the highest paid and most honored citizens in their regime. Even the persecution of religion is played down by the claim that worship is free and that only political activities of the churches are suppressed.

mplications for U.S. Policy

We now come to the basic question: What should our policy be in the light of the new Soviet actics?

We must, of course, continue to maintain adequate military strength at home, and we must try o keep alive our vital alliances abroad.

We must continue our programs of economic assistance and avoid if we can the possibility that ess developed nations will be forced to become economic satellites of the Soviet Union.

But our military and economic programs, essential as they are, may not prove to be the most mportant elements in this battle. Of this we an be sure. The uncommitted nations are not going to be frightened into alliances with the West y military power, nor can their allegiance be purchased by dollars. What will probably be decisive in this struggle is not how much each side does but how it is done. That is why we must, at whatever cost, place additional emphasis on developing the kind of ideological program which s designed to win the minds and hearts of men.

Need for Tact, Humility, Friendliness

Before I discuss details of such a program, may suggest one fundamental condition that can make the difference between success and failure. Whatever we do, we must deal with other people as our moral and spiritual equals.

Nothing is more infuriating or more likely to make our program fail than a boastful or condescending attitude on our part. It is dangerous o parade our material wealth or economic achievement. This may merely create envy, rather han admiration, on the part of other peoples.

In a sense, we must deal with other nations with the tact, humility, and friendliness of missionaries. Indeed, we could learn a great deal in our foreign relations by studying the attitudes and methods of the Christian missionaries who have won friends throughout the world. They came to help the nations to which they were sent. They learned their languages and customs. By taking literally the truth that all men are brothers under God, they were accepted into families and homes of distant peoples.

Once we have this attitude, our task is to convince others that democracy and freedom and all the rights and privileges we hold sacred are better for them than is the Soviet way of life. It is not enough to denounce or expose communism. We must show that we have a better alternative. We do not do this by parading our superior material standard of living. It is the total pattern of life that must prevail—not merely one phase of it.

May I make one point clear at this time: There is no question but that we have the better case to sell. Because basically we are on the right side—the side of freedom and justice, of belief in God, against the forces of slavery, injustice, and atheistic materialism. Ours is the truly revolutionary, dynamic idea. It is the Communist idea which is repressive and reactionary.

Getting Our Message Across

How do we get our message across?

I believe that often too much reliance is placed upon the effectiveness of bombarding the uncommitted countries with radio broadcasts, motion pictures, and press releases which present the American viewpoint. These programs are important and necessary, but, in the long run, I believe there are others which are more effective.

May I emphasize first the overwhelming importance of expanding our program for exchange of persons. This includes high school youngsters who spend a year living with American families and going to our schools, college and university students who get their degrees in American schools, and the leader program under which each week 50 or more foreign visitors—leaders in business, government, labor, and education—come to the United States as guests of our Government to talk with Americans who are in the same field as theirs. In this way our guests learn about us firsthand, correcting false impressions they may have had about us.

It is particularly important that we expand this program in countries newly released from colonial status. Here the need for trained leaders is often the greatest. Many times students will graduate from a university and almost immediately take a high political position in their native lands.

From a long-range point of view, we can gain immensely by programs of this nature. For the cost of one large bomber we can make friendships that will benefit the free world for generations to come. President Eisenhower's brilliant proposal that American educational institutions and foundations aid in expanding educational opportunities throughout the world is in line with this approach.[2]

If the free world can teach the leaders of tomorrow in areas that may well dominate tomorrow's world, we need not fear the contest between communism and freedom.

There are those, of course, who may point out the fact that many of those who today oppose Western policies were trained in Western universities. But they oppose us because we taught them ideals of freedom while we were keeping their lands in colonial bondage. Now that great areas of the world are free from colonialism, we have a good chance to win back the friendship and loyalty of leaders of these lands.

Responsibility of Individual American

In addition to government-sponsored activities, it is important that every American who goes abroad or who deals with foreign guests in our own land realize that he is an ambassador representing our Nation. All of us must try to be sensitive, understanding, and helpful. Arrogance and boastfulness make enemies—not friends.

And particularly we must appreciate the high place given to intellectual and spiritual values in many areas of the world. This places a tremendous responsibility upon our tourists and business visitors, upon the exporters of motion pictures and books—indeed, upon anyone who is likely to be taken as a representative of our way of life.

I was reading an article the other day that showed the importance of these attitudes. It concerned the great atomic scientist, Bruno Pontecorvo, who left Great Britain to devote his genius to Soviet atomic research. One of the important reasons for his defection, according to his colleagues, was the fact that he thought he would have more honor, prestige, and even greater freedom of research in the Soviet Union. Likewise, many of the scientists who got caught in the Soviet espionage network in the United States, Canada, and Great Britain were partially influenced at least by the feeling that they were not sufficiently appreciated in the free world. The world of tomorrow belongs to the nations that lead in scientific research and technical skill. We shall pay a great price if we fall behind in this contest.

Possibility of East-West Contacts

In discussing our need to win the war for men's minds, I have said little about direct contacts with the people behind the Iron Curtain. Today we can have such contacts almost for the asking. If the present trend continues in the Soviet Union and in many satellite countries, it will be possible to meet broadly with these peoples, to exchange ideas, to compare our respective ways of life.

Many of my fellow Americans are rather skeptical about this new move. They suspect, with some justification, a hidden trick—possibly a device to make communism respectable and to discourage the peoples held in submission by Red armies.

I do not fully share this point of view. I think that the explosive power of freedom is greater than the combined effect of all the atomic and hydrogen weapons in the world today. Whatever be the motives behind these new moves, I think that in the long run the cause of freedom will be served by breaking through the Iron Curtain wherever an opportunity is presented.

A Task for All Americans

The task ahead of us is a task for all the American people and not government alone.

In time of war we are prepared to risk our lives serving with the armed forces of our country. But the war for men's minds is a real war and just as important as the struggle of armies, navies and air forces.

You in the academic world are particularly fitted to serve in this contest. May I suggest that you graduates and you of the faculty give thought to the part that you can play.

On an even broader sphere, I hope that the learned societies of the United States with their counterparts in other free nations will devote time and energy to extend their study to this great struggle for allegiance.

Jointly, you should embark upon a peaceful crusade for freedom. Some should volunteer for

[2] For text of the President's address of May 25, see BULLETIN of June 4, 1956, p. 915.

vice abroad, just as soldiers volunteer for spe-
l missions. The best thought of our best minds
ould be given to this burning problem.

It was once said that "you shall know the truth
d the truth shall make you free." This chal-
ge has echoed through the ages. It is as valid
lay as it was when it was uttered more than 19
nturies ago.

We believe in truth and in the power of truth.
e believe in such basic truths as man's equality
der God, the dignity of man, the rights of each
dividual to live his life in peace, the sacredness
law, the benefits of political freedom, including
e freedoms guaranteed in our Bill of Rights.

These truths are the great heritage of mankind.
e are confident that they will prevail. And
is the task of this generation to make sure that
r confidence is not misplaced and that all Amer-
ns will rise to the challenge that faces us.

alks With Chancellor Adenauer Germany

Following is the text of a joint communique ued on June 13 at the conclusion of the 2-day eeting between Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of e Federal Republic of Germany and Secretary ulles.

ess release 322 dated June 13

The visit of Chancellor Adenauer to Washing-
n has afforded an opportunity for a full ex-
ange of views between him and Secretary of
ate Dulles. This has permitted the Chancellor
d the Secretary of State to undertake a broad
view of the world situation and of problems
nfronting their governments in the interna-
nal field. The Chancellor was accompanied by
ate Secretary Hallstein.

Foremost among the matters discussed were the
estion of German reunification, the most recent
ents in the Soviet Union, and the further devel-
ment and strengthening of the Atlantic
mmunity.

Secretary of State Dulles and Chancellor
denauer emphasized German reunification as
major objective of the West and the conviction
at the attitude of the West toward the Soviet
nion should be determined by the endeavor to
omote the reunification of Germany in freedom.

In connection with developments within the Soviet Union, they exchanged views regarding the letters recently addressed to their respective Governments by Chairman Bulganin transmitting the Soviet Government's statement of May 14 regarding its armed forces. They noted that other North Atlantic Governments had received similar communications and they agreed on the desirability of consultation with their NATO partners regarding this development.

They noted that the Soviet Government has professed a desire to find a basis for peaceful coexistence with the nations of the free world. They agreed that one test of the sincerity of this profession will be the willingness of the Soviet Government to respect its international obligations and to refrain from endeavoring to impose its system upon other peoples. They recalled that at Geneva nearly a year ago the heads of government of France, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R. and the United States recognized their common responsibility for the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany, and agreed that the reunification of Germany should take place by means of free elections and should be carried out in conformity with the national interest of the German people and the interest of European security. The Chancellor and the Secretary of State considered that, until the Soviet Government had taken action to discharge that responsibility and to put an end to the brutal and unnatural division which it has imposed on Germany, it will be difficult to place credence in promises and pledges of the Soviet Government.

The Chancellor and the Secretary of State reaffirmed the desire of their governments to work out with the Soviet Union and with nations of the North Atlantic area arrangements which would ensure European security in conjunction with the reunification of Germany in freedom.

The Chancellor and the Secretary of State agreed on the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which constitutes an essential contribution to the security of the free world. They agreed on the need for strengthening and developing further the relationships among the members of the North Atlantic Treaty and for harmonizing their policies and actions with respect to major problems affecting the treaty objectives. They pledged the support of their governments to the work being carried on in this regard under

the decision taken at the recent meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Paris.

The Secretary of State informed the Chancellor of the satisfaction with which the United States Government has learned of the recent Franco-German agreement on the Saar. He expressed also the interest of the United States in the results of the Venice meeting regarding new steps toward European integration and especially in the prospects for the early negotiation and establishment of a European organization with common authority and responsibility in the field of nuclear energy. He indicated that the establishment of such a common organization would make possible a particularly close relationship with the United States in this field. The Secretary also expressed the interest of the United States in the creation of a European common market and the promise which such a market would hold for the future economic development of Europe.

The Chancellor and the Secretary of State noted with satisfaction the continued development of close relations between Germany and the United States. The Chancellor raised the question of war-vested German assets in the United States. The Secretary of State expressed the hope that there would be early United States legislative action on this subject.

The Secretary expressed the satisfaction of the United States Government with the action just taken by the Federal Republic of Germany to remove the quota restrictions on imports from the dollar area, in accordance with the provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The Chancellor and the Secretary agreed on the importance of the free world continuing to cooperate in measures to expand the flow of trade on a mutually advantageous basis.

Germany Frees Many Imports From United States

Press release 316 dated June 13

The freeing of over 90 percent of Germany's private imports from the dollar area, referred to in the communique issued in connection with the talks between Chancellor Adenauer and Secretary Dulles, is regarded as a further major ste toward eliminating quota restrictions on impor of goods from the dollar area.

The German action means that almost 93 pe cent of Germany's private imports from tl United States and Canada will be free of impo quotas. Almost 600 individual items are affect by the action. These items include raw materia and agricultural and manufactured product American exporters can now sell U.S. goods c the dollar-liberalization list without Germa Government restriction and solely on the basis c commercial considerations, such as price ar quality.

The Department of State believes that th action will be welcomed by the American busine community as further evidence of the desire c the Federal Republic to remove its restrictions c imports in accordance with its commitments und the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. I 1954 the United States exported $483 millic worth of goods to the Federal Republic and in ported from that country $278 million. In 19 exports were $587 million and imports were $3 million.

The U.S. Government views the dollar-liberal zation measure taken by the Federal Republic a significant move to place international trade c a freer basis in accordance with the principles c the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. is believed that there will be advantages to tl German economy as well as to U.S. trade from th action. The U.S. Government looks forward t the elimination by the German Government of tl remaining quota restrictions on imports from tl dollar area.

The list of items will be issued by the Germa Government in about 10 days. When it becom available, it will be published by the Departme of Commerce in the *Foreign Commerce Weekl*

The extent to which other Western Europea countries have significantly freed imports fro the dollar area from quantitative restrictions a as follows: Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg-87 percent; Denmark—55 percent; Greece— percent; Italy—40 percent; Portugal—53 percen Sweden—58 percent; Switzerland—98 percen and the United Kingdom—56 percent.

ımerican Business Abroad and the National Interest

by Under Secretary Hoover[1]

It is indeed a great honor to be asked to address ıe closing session of the 26th National Business 'onference this evening, and I am delighted to ave the opportunity to be with you.

Since I left these same buildings, almost 30 ears ago, there have been extraordinary changes ı the world situation. A great war has taken lace, and the entire structure of relationships broad has altered radically. In the midst of this ıanging scene, it seems most fitting that the theme f this year's conference should be devoted to the ıture of American business abroad.

One of the major factors affecting the future is ıe unpredictable character of Soviet economic olicy, controlling as it does the lives of hundreds f millions of people. We have heard a great deal ı the past year, for instance, about the new Soviet conomic offensive. What is it, and where is it oing?

Is it a genuine movement toward peaceful conomic expansion? Or are its objectives to ɔread Communist political domination over new reas in the free world?

Is the American system capable of coping with ıis development? What are the opportunities nd responsibilities of American business as we ok ahead into the future?

These and many other questions arise as we atch the pattern unfold in the far corners of ıe world. I would like to explore with you the nswers to some of these questions this evening, ecause our conclusions may have much to do with ıe shaping of our governmental and commercial olicies for many years to come.

As we look back in history, we find that in the 25 years prior to Stalin's death in 1953, through outright military power and aggression, and aided by subversion from within, the Communists expanded their domination over many parts of the world. Repeated threats to the independence of many countries culminated in open warfare in a number of instances. Our persistent attempts to arrive at peaceful solutions were rebuffed on countless occasions.

During Stalin's regime it was repeatedly announced that the Communist objective was the ultimate domination of the world. Khrushchev has subsequently reiterated this aim on several occasions.

The effect on the free world was to draw together many nations for purposes of self-defense. As a reaction to this military aggression and threats to the peace of the world, 43 countries joined together in the Rio Pact, NATO, ANZUS, SEATO, the Balkan Alliance, and the Baghdad Pact. The result was that the free world became stronger and more resolved than ever to resist Communist threats of violence and subversion.

Although it had been obvious for some years that the old policies were no longer succeeding, it was not until after Stalin's death that new tactics and a new approach could be adopted. Peace and competitive coexistence became the order of the day. While the ultimate Communist objectives remained the same, the problems for the free world have taken on new aspects.

Our Economic Traditions

I have outlined here, in only the broadest terms, the problems that we face today. Let us turn for a moment to the American economic system and

[1] Address made before the 26th National Business Con-rence of the Harvard Business School Association at oston, Mass., on June 16 (press release 329).

evaluate our own ability to cope with this change of tactics.

We know that the Soviets regard our own American system of free competitive enterprise as a vastly greater impediment to their own designs of world domination than that of any other country. It is upon us, therefore, that they concentrate their efforts and their strategy.

It is strange how unfamiliar our system is to many people abroad. As a matter of fact, one of the major efforts of the Communists is to spread an image of the American system as one which embodies the most extreme form of exploitation.

The American system has evolved over the past 50 years in directions which were totally unforeseen when Marx and Engels were belaboring capitalism a century ago. Not only does the American system bear little resemblance to the classical Marxist concept of capitalism; it also differs significantly from the systems which prevail in other countries conventionally regarded as capitalistic.

When we talk about individual liberty in the United States, we have in mind something which goes beyond the freedom expressed in political institutions. A representative form of government, the right to vote, the secret ballot—these are all part of our heritage. But in this country individual freedom has assumed new and significant dimensions, many of which can be found in few other places in the world.

One such attribute is what has aptly been called the freedom of opportunity—the opportunity to choose one's job or profession and the opportunity to rise to one's fullest capabilities. Furthermore, there is no other country in the world where educational opportunities are as accessible as they are in the United States, or where there are equal opportunities available for economic success.

It is no accident that the American system, with its freedom and incentive for the individual and with its stress on individual worth, has attained the highest standard of living for its people. Moral and spiritual values have provided the driving force for this achievement. And it is all our people who are the beneficiaries of this progress—not a chosen few. In fact, the difference in income between our factory workers, on the one hand, and management personnel, on the other, is smaller in the United States than in any other major industrial nation in the world, even including the Soviet Union.

I should like to cite a few figures which illustrat as well as anything I know the difference betwee the American system of today and the outmode Marxist image of capitalism as a ruthless exploite of the individual.

In recent years the average American family ir come has increased over 50 percent in real term But the lowest fifth of income recipients have ex perienced an even larger increase than the averag Their incomes rose 125 percent. Of all the gre industrial nations, the one that relies most heavil on individual initiative and private enterpris has come closest to providing abundance for al

There are other dimensions of individual fre dom in the United States which have grown i importance as this country has matured.

The American worker's freedom of organizatio is traditional in our system, and responsible trac unions have an accepted place in our national lif

Property ownership in America is widely di fused. About 8 million people are stockholders i American corporations. Almost 4 million farme own the farms which they work. About 3 millic small business enterprises belong to individu owners. No small clique owns America. The r sponsibilities and the profits are widely shared.

There are many essential ingredients in our e vironment. But one above all is relevant to o discussion tonight. That is the tradition of i dependence and free competition that has existe in America. It is a tradition that goes far bac in our history. It is the very foundation upc which our system has been built.

How has this tradition of independence and i dividual responsibility affected our approach foreign economic relations?

I think the answer is that we instinctively co duct our relations with other countries in a w which will strengthen their integrity, sovereignt and independence. This is the natural reacti of Americans to their own history of indepen ence and freedom. We want other countries be strong, independent, and free; and the mo they are so, the better we like to do business wi them.

Under our system, international trade and i vestment are commercial operations carried by widely dispersed interests, competing again each other as well as against those from oth countries. With us, political control is irreleva to normal commercial relationships.

There are no political strings attached to Amer-:an business operating abroad.

'he World Trade Picture

What are the economic facts of life that face ımerican business in the world today?

World trade, as measured by exports, was at n alltime high in 1955—$92 billion. Trade be-ween the free-world countries in 1955 was $80 illion, or 86 percent of the total. Trade be-ween the Soviet bloc and the free world was $4.4 illion, or less than 5 percent of the total. In ddition there was trade among countries inside he bloc of $7.8 billion, or 9 percent of the total.

The significant point of these figures is the great reponderance of world trade which took place mong the non-Communist countries. The United tates alone generates almost 20 percent of all ıternational trade. A substantial portion of this rade, amounting to $11 billion of imports and xports, was with Latin America, Asia, and frica. These are the newly developing areas hich are among the prime targets of the Soviet conomic drive.

By contrast, the trade of the Communist coun-ries with these areas amounted to about $1 billion.

The low level of Communist trade with the rest f the world is mainly due to a deliberate policy f self-sufficiency. The leaders in the Kremlin ant to build a self-contained economic unit. heir recent trade offers to the newly develop-ıg countries are politically inspired. Khrush-hev himself said: "We value trade least for eco-omic reasons and most for political purposes."

The United States does not direct its trade for olitical ends. It is important that other coun-ies should understand this fundamental differ-nce between the American and the Soviet rea-ons for international trade.

Our approach carries substantial advantages in ealing with other nations. For under our system ompanies and industries are constantly vying ith one another to create new products, new proc-sses, and new services. Another advantage in-erent in our system is that it offers relative stabil-y of markets. Demand cannot be turned on and ff for political purposes. This is particularly nportant for the newly developing countries hich depend largely on a few export products to earn the foreign exchange to finance their external requirements.

The Soviet trade offensive to date consists mainly of offers to buy or sell raw materials or to deliver specified types and quantities of capital goods, often on a direct barter basis. This is necessarily a cumbersome and limited method of trading. Furthermore, it does not give any assurance of large or continuous markets. Soviet trade practices are unpredictable. They may be a large buyer or seller one year and disappear from the market the next. Such in-and-out behavior may be related to their domestic difficulties, to needs of satellite countries, or to political objectives elsewhere. Moreover, the history of Soviet trade suggests that the renewal of a transaction may well be attended by political demands, even though the first deal did not appear to be based upon such a consideration.

Sustained economic progress must come from stable trade conditions, from expanding and diversified markets, and from trade activated by commercial and not political considerations. This is the kind of trade the American system offers.

Government Programs

While American business must shoulder the largest part of the responsibility for our own economic activity abroad, it cannot be expected to do so without adequate support and encouragement from our own Government.

Physical security is indispensable to economic progress. Hence the need for our collective security arrangements and military assistance programs.

Certain types of investment, such as roads and port facilities, cannot be financed on a wholly private basis. Hence the role of the International Bank and the Export-Import Bank in helping to finance basic development projects abroad.

Many types of technical assistance, such as education and public health, require government organization to recruit and channel skilled personnel. Hence the various technical assistance programs.

Nations that have recently achieved their independence and newly developing countries need assistance to strengthen their economies and to maintain their liberty. Hence our programs of economic aid.

Such programs are vital and indispensable if the challenge of communism is to be met and if we are to preserve freedom in many areas of the world.

These governmental programs are complementary to the potentially far larger role of normal commercial activity. American industry, with its many centers of initiative and ingenuity, with its ability to combine capital, technical know-how, and managerial skill, is eminently qualified to play a major role in accelerating economic development overseas.

It is true, of course, that, although much attention has been given to the problem of private investment abroad, especially in newly developing countries, the need for foreign capital remains great.

There are a variety of reasons why private capital has not moved abroad in even larger volume than at present. Indeed, a good part of the discussion at your meeting today has been concerned with this problem. The reasons are partly political conditions overseas; partly inadequate knowledge of opportunities; and partly a reflection of the fact that the major interests of the American business community have traditionally been at home.

The Government has taken a variety of steps to encourage a larger flow of capital abroad.

The commercial and tax treaty programs have long been an integral part of the effort of our Government to develop on a reciprocal basis standards of fair treatment. Since World War II, 15 commercial treaties, with modernized provisions relating to investments, have been negotiated. Similar treaty proposals are under negotiation or consideration with more than half a dozen other governments. At home and abroad, our Department of Commerce and our foreign missions perform a variety of services, largely of an information and trade-promotion nature, for American business interested in foreign trade and investment.

American investors can insure themselves against the inability to transfer their profits and capital, and against expropriation, in countries with which we have negotiated agreements to that effect. The problem of more favorable tax treatment for income earned from foreign investment has also been the subject of much attention. In fact, measures in this field are now before the Congress.

In cooperation with other free-world countries we are continuing our efforts to encourage the expansion of private investment. If we succeed, the American system can play its full role in making the world a better place to live in—both here and abroad.

Opportunities and Responsibilities of American Businessman

Let us take a closer look at the opportunities that exist abroad and the responsibilities of the American businessman in the present world situation.

American business today may easily be affected by what happens in far corners of the globe. A measure of our own foreign interests is the fact that direct private American investment abroad now exceeds $18 billion and the value of American merchandise exports and imports in 1955 alone was over $25 billion.

Today, science and technology promise ever new attainments in human satisfactions and welfare for our people. At the same time, however, the greater part of mankind is still living in areas where industrial production and living standards are both extremely low. Most of these people are now making great efforts to speed up their industrial development and raise their standards of living. In fact, this effort constitutes one of the most far-reaching economic and social changes in history. In this setting, American business abroad faces great opportunities and heavy responsibilities.

The opportunities exist both in a strictly business sense and in terms of the general interest of our country. With production and incomes increasing in many areas and with a steady reduction of restrictions hampering international trade, new opportunities constantly present themselves for developing foreign markets. With American industry becoming more dependent upon basic materials from abroad, we are constantly developing new sources of supply. As newly developing countries move rapidly into the mainstream of the world economy, foreign investment opportunities of all kinds will increase on an expanding scale.

I know from many years of personal experience that one area of American business activity abroad of great potential importance is in providing engineering, construction, and other services. The

ervices are required on a large scale by countries n Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East hich are just beginning to develop modern industries. Their impact often goes far beyond the mmediate projects that may be involved.

In purely individual terms, too, there will be nany challenging occasions for Americans to participate in the worldwide process of constructive hange and to foster healthy economic growth broad complementary to our own.

Through increased trade and expanded investment abroad, American business can support not nly the continued growth of our own economy ut the accelerated development of other freeorld countries. By helping to impart to the eoples of the other areas of the world a sense of rogress, of achievement, and of purpose in life, he American businessman will be helping to ssure that their aspirations and their strivings re channeled along sound and constructive lines.

As I have already indicated, while American usiness is faced with challenging opportunities broad, it must also be prepared to shoulder coresponding responsibilities. After all, the Ameriin businessman abroad is the representative of he American system to many people who have no ther basis upon which to judge it. To carry vith him the spirit of responsibility that is the allmark of American industry at home should be is constant aim.

Our effective businessman abroad respects the ttitudes of other nations. He takes an interest n training his foreign personnel with a view to aising them to positions of responsibility. He nakes them feel an integral part of the enterprise. Ie is alert to present the true image of the Ameriin system.

In short, he strives to develop a mutuality of nterest with the country in which his enterprise s located. In the largest sense of the word, the American businessman is an ambassador of his ountry.

I have discussed some of the elements which ccount for the strength of the American system, he challenge it faces in the Communist economic ffensive, and the way it is responding to this hallenge. I have also touched upon the great opportunities that exist for American business to nake increasing contributions toward strengthening the free world.

Great as is our faith in the American system, we do not content ourselves merely with a passive belief in it. The initiative and resourcefulness which have been concentrated on solving our own problems are now serving the broader interests of the free world. Thus we are taking a long step toward solving the overriding question of this century—whether in vast areas men will continue to enjoy the opportunities of freedom.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

84th Congress, 2d Session

Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures. Report of the Joint Committee on Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures pursuant to Section 601 of the Revenue Act of 1941 on Unexpended Balances: Foreign Aid. S. Rept. 1958, May 7, 1956. 9 pp.

Technical Assistance and Related Programs. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. S. Rept. 1956, May 7, 1956. 30 pp.

Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Message from the President transmitting a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation between the United States of America and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, together with a protocol and an exchange of notes relating thereto, signed at The Hague on March 27, 1956. S. Exec. H, May 7, 1956. 22 pp.

1956 Amendments to the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948. Report to accompany S. 3638. S. Rept. 1959, May 9, 1956. 22 pp.

Considering Residence in American Samoa or the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands by Certain Employees of the Governments Thereof, and Their Dependents, as Residence in the United States for Naturalization Purposes. Report to accompany H. R. 4031. H. Rept. 2131, May 9, 1956. 11 pp.

Report of the Special Study Mission to the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, and the Western Pacific of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, pursuant to H. Res. 91, a resolution authorizing the Committee on Foreign Affairs to conduct a full and complete investigation of matters relating to the laws, regulations, directives, and policies including personnel pertaining to the Department of State and such other departments and agencies engaged primarily in the implementation of United States foreign policy and the overseas operations, personnel, and facilities of departments and agencies of the United States which participate in the development and execution of such policy. H. Rept. 2147, May 10, 1956. 213 pp.

Disposal of World War I Assets. Report to accompany S. 2226. S. Rept. 1971, May 14, 1956. 10 pp.

Foreign Agents Registration Act. Report to accompany S. 1273. S. Rept. 1996, May 14, 1956. 4 pp.

Narcotic Control Act of 1956. Report to accompany S. 3760. S. Rept. 1997, May 14, 1956. 36 pp.

Giving Effect to the Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries Signed at Washington September 10, 1954. Report to accompany S. 3524. H. Rept. 2154, May 14, 1956. 10 pp.

Extension of Sugar Act of 1948. Conference report to accompany H. R. 7030. H. Rept. 2174, May 16, 1956. 9 pp.

Administrative Management of the Department of State. Sixteenth Intermediate Report of the House Committee on Government Operations. H. Rept. 2172, May 16, 1956. 35 pp.

Results of 1956 Tariff Negotiations

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Press release 297 dated June 6

The tariff concessions which the United States has obtained and granted in 4 months of tariff bargaining with 21 other countries at Geneva, Switzerland, were announced on June 7.[1] The first stage of the concessions granted by the United States will become effective June 30.

Twenty-two of the 35 governments that are parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) completed negotiations at this conference. The negotiations began January 18, and the results were signed on May 23 by representatives of all 22 governments.

Herbert V. Prochnow, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, signed on behalf of President Eisenhower, who has the authority under the Trade Agreements Act to enter into trade agreements.

A "concession" is usually either a reduction of a tariff rate or a commitment not to raise an existing rate.

The United States and each of the other 21 governments struck a mutually satisfactory balance of concessions on products which figure importantly in their two-way trade. In the bargaining, weight was given to many factors, including the amount of the existing trade in the commodities affected; the amount of trade expansion which the concessions are likely to stimulate; the depth of each country's tariff cuts, which for some foreign countries ranges from a few percentage points to complete elimination of the tariff (100 percent); and the question of how soon the concessions will go into effect.

The 21 countries granted concessions to the United States applying to $400 million of our exports to them in 1954 (the latest year for which complete figures are available). Under GATT rules U.S. exporters will benefit not only from these concessions but also from concessions which the other countries granted to one another. No dollar estimate of the existing trade coverage of these added benefits is available.

In the direct tariff negotiations, concessions were obtained for a wide range of U.S. export commodities, including, for example, citrus fruit and other citrus products exported to eight countries including Canada, Benelux, and the Federal Republic of Germany; animal tallow and lard to Germany, Austria, and Chile; beer, shrimp, and oysters to Canada. Sixteen countries gave concessions on one or more of a wide variety of chemical products including plastic resins, antibiotics insecticides, photographic film, and synthetic textile fibers. Canada, Finland, Germany, Italy Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom gave concessions on some or all machine tools and attachments; concessions on various iron and steel products were obtained from Canada, France Germany, Italy, Japan, Peru, and the United Kingdom. Concessions were also obtained from Benelux, Chile, the Dominican Republic, and Germany on tobacco or tobacco products. Other important groups of concessions obtained for export to various destinations are heavy machinery, refrigerating and air-conditioning equipment, office machinery, motor vehicles, airplanes, electrical equipment, other canned fruits and vegetables, and petroleum products.

Substantial additional benefits for U.S. exports will result from the other countries' negotiations with each other. For example, in a multilateral negotiation the United Kingdom, Germany, and

[1] The complete lists of commodities, the changes in tariff rates, and a detailed analysis are given in a 311-page report which may be purchased for $1 from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. The report is Department of State publication 6348, Commercial Policy Series 158, entitled *General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Analysis of United States Negotiations—Sixth Protocol (Including Schedules) of Supplementary Concessions, Negotiated at Geneva, Switzerland, January–May 1956.*

Benelux agreed to substantial reductions in their duties on paper and paper products in return for concessions on textiles and other manufactured products from Norway, Sweden, and Finland. These reduced duties will also be available to U.S. exporters. Canada gave Cuba a concession on cigar leaf tobacco which should bring substantial benefits to U.S. exporters of that commodity to Canada.

The United States granted concessions, in terms of tariff rates actually effective at the present time, which would apply to $519 million worth of our 1954 imports from the country with which each concession was initially negotiated. Imports of these same items from other participating countries amounted to an additional $134 million, so that the total trade of all participating countries covered by the concessions comes to $653 million.

The United States also granted a potential concession on one item—copper—which could affect $158 million of imports on the basis of 1954 statistics, if it were to become effective. However, the import tax of 2 cents a pound is now suspended by U.S. domestic law, and, even if the tax were reimposed, the reduction would not operate if the price of copper fell below 24 cents a pound.

Nearly all of the U.S. concessions, which were made under the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955 (known before passage as H.R. 1), were made under the provision which authorizes the President to reduce tariffs by no more than 15 percent below the rates existing January 1, 1955, normally in three annual stages.

Although other countries' concessions vary widely in depth, many are deeper than the 15 percent which was the maximum limit governing almost all U.S. concessions. For example, almost 80 percent of the trade coverage of Germany's concessions to us are tariff reductions of 25 percent or more. Half of the trade coverage of Canada's concessions to us are cuts of more than 21 percent, and the Canadians are also benefiting U.S. exporters by removing on certain commodities the preferential treatment which they have been giving to British Commonwealth members.

Also, with few exceptions, other countries will put their concessions into effect all at once, within the next few months.

Among the concessions granted by the United States there are several which have but little likelihood of affecting trade volume, even though they may help the other countries concerned earn more dollars. For example, the United States made a concession to the United Kingdom on Scotch whisky. Our imports of Scotch whisky in 1954 were valued at more than $60 million, and it is doubtful whether the tariff, even now, is a significant restrictive factor. Thus, while our tariff reduction may make trade in Scotch whisky more profitable, it is doubtful whether the concession has much trade-expansion potential.

What the United States gave in these negotiations included not only a *quid pro quo* for new concessions but also compensation for various past U.S. tariff increases, including our escape-clause action on bicycles.

The total trade coverage of concessions granted by the United States in all of the GATT negotiations up to now about equals the total trade coverage of concessions which have been obtained by the United States in GATT to improve the tariff treatment of American exports; and the figure remains at about $7 billion a year each way.

Neither these figures nor the estimate of 60,000 items covered by GATT is much changed by this year's negotiations, since most of the commodities had already been the subject of past concessions at Geneva in 1947; at Annecy, France, in 1947; at Torquay, England, in 1950–51; or at the 1955 conference in Geneva at which Japan was brought into full GATT participation. The contribution of the new negotiations is to have brought about further tariff reductions and preference eliminations on a portion of the trade already covered.

The tariff concessions granted by the United States involve a variety of tariff categories and include Scotch whisky, vermouth, certain chemicals, aluminum, steel bars and tubes, automobiles and parts, airplanes and parts, unsweetened chocolate, oriental-type cigarette leaf tobacco, smoked sardines, sheet and plate glass, calculating machines, wrapping paper, carpets and rugs, fish oils, woven silk fabrics, piano accordions, synthetic rubber.

The Participating Countries

In terms of trade coverage, the largest negotiation which the United States carried on at Geneva was with the United Kingdom. Next largest were those with Canada, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Benelux.

Following are the 22 countries that completed

negotiations: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Haiti, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

In addition, the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community participated for the first time in a GATT tariff conference. Acting as agent for the six member states, the High Authority negotiated reductions in the tariff rates of France, Germany, and Italy on certain iron and steel products. It did not negotiate reductions in the rates of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg (Benelux), because their rates are generally lower than those of the other three.

The total trade coverage of all the concessions made by the whole group in these negotiations is estimated at about $2.5 billion in 1954.

Application of U.S. Tariff Concessions to Other Countries of the Free World

The tariff reductions granted by the United States will apply to imports into the United States from all free-world countries. This is in accordance with the policy established by Congress in the trade-agreements legislation. The reductions will not, however, apply to imports from the Soviet-dominated bloc. Tariff reductions granted by the United States under the trade-agreements program are required to be withheld from the Soviet-dominated countries by section 5 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, as amended.

Total imports into the United States from all foreign countries of products to which the tariff concessions granted by the United States will apply amounted to $911 million in 1954. Of this amount the countries which negotiated at Geneva supplied 89 percent, or $811 million.

Most of the other governments which took part in the Geneva conference will also extend widely the concessions they have granted in the negotiations. Thus, even though the greatest advantages resulting from the Geneva negotiations will accrue to the negotiating countries, free-world trade in general will be better off for their having taken place.

Comparison of U.S. Concessions With "Public List"

U.S. participation in the conference was carried out on behalf of the President in accordance with regular procedures. Recommendations as to item to be listed, offers to be made, and concessions t be sought were made to him by the Interdepart mental Committee on Trade Agreements, consist ing of representatives of the Departments of Agri culture, Commerce, Defense, Interior, Labor State, and Treasury; the International Coopera tion Administration; and a member of the Unite States Tariff Commission. The President ap proved these recommendations and the results o the negotiations.

On September 21, 1955, the executive branc published a list of items on which U.S. concession would be considered.[2] This "public list" wa supplemented on December 9, 1955.[3] Public hear ings were held on all these items.

All of the products on which concessions wer granted by the United States were selected fron that list. The United States, however, did no make concessions on the whole list.

No duty was reduced below a "peril point" rat found by the Tariff Commission.

The entire public list covered trade from al countries of about $1,630,000,000. The conces sions actually granted were on products with trade coverage of about $911 million from al countries.

Tariff Increases

The United States negotiated two increases i its tariff rates—on liquid sugar and certain fur felt hats and hat bodies. The object of the liquid sugar renegotiation was to bring the tariff rate on liquid sugar up to the existing level of the tarif on dry crystalline sugar.

In the case of the hats and hat bodies, th principal object was to achieve the approximat level of protection which had been intended in th escape-clause action taken by the United States i 1950. A 1955 judicial determination held tha the escape-clause rates did not apply to most o the hat bodies to which the escape-clause actio had been directed, so that without some ne action the domestic industry stood to lose th intended protection.

In its "peril point" report in connection wit the 1956 Geneva negotiations, the Tariff Commis sion found that tariff increases were necessary t prevent serious injury to the domestic industrie

[2] BULLETIN of Sept. 26, 1955, p. 507.
[3] *Ibid.*, Dec. 19, 1955, p. 1020.

ducing tungsten alloys and violins and violas. both of these cases, however, it developed that advantages of negotiating the increases would e been outweighed by attendant disadvantages ich made it undesirable to accomplish the inases by this means. Also, in the case of tungn alloys, since some but not all alloys were cified in the public list, negotiating the increase some but not others would have unduly comcated our tariff structure without adequate nomic justification.

As required by law, the President on June 7 t a message to Congress concerning his reasons not negotiating these increases. The conerations entering into this decision would not a bar to applications by domestic producers of se products for escape-clause action.

of the "50 Percent" Authority

The Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955, ides authorizing reductions of 15 percent, also thorizes the President, in cases where rates now more than 50 percent of the value of the imrted goods, to reduce such rates to 50 percent, rmally in three stages. This "50 percent" thority was used in relatively few of the U.S. ncessions. The trade coverage of these concesns was quite small, possibly because the very gh rates have held down imports.

Of the total trade coverage of the U.S. concesns, only $3.5 million involved use of the "50 rcent" provision. About half of this $3.5 miln is a single item, silk handkerchiefs and mufrs, on which a concession to Japan will reduce rate from 60 percent to 50. On several minor ndries items, mostly ornamented wearing aprel and fabrics, the rates were reduced from 90 rcent to 50.

mple of Tariff Cut in Three Stages

Here is an illustration of how the U.S. threege reductions will be put into effect: The presnt U.S. tariff on candied orange peel is 4 cents a und. The United States granted a 15 percent luction in this rate. This is a reduction of .6 nts per pound. Thus the ultimate new rate will 3.4 cents. But the cut will be made in three ps—to 3.8 cents on June 30, 1956, to 3.6 cents a ar later, and to 3.4 cents 2 years later.

Simplification of Rates

When U.S. duties are reduced, either under the 15-percent authority or the authority to reduce duties to 50 percent, the law permits minor additional reductions on items which are reduced in order to simplify tariff rates. This applies to intermediate stages as well as to the ultimate new rates. Thus the reductions in the three stages are not always identical in amount.

The rules for applying these additional reductions—or "roundings"—are complex, but such reductions may never exceed one-half of one percent ad valorem (or its equivalent if the tariff is in such terms as cents per pound).

PROCLAMATION GIVING EFFECT TO 1956 TARIFF CONCESSIONS

Press release 320 dated June 13

The President on June 13, 1956, signed a proclamation giving effect to the concessions negotiated by the United States at the 1956 tariff negotiations held at Geneva, Switzerland, by contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Pursuant to the provisions of the Trade Agreements Act, most of these U.S. concessions will be made effective in three annual stages, and the proclamation provides that the first of these stages will enter into force on June 30, 1956. The proclamation also makes effective on the same date an increase in duty on certain hat bodies negotiated by the United States and, to the extent possible under the trade agreements authority, an increase on liquid sugar. It contains a number of adjustments regarding prior proclamations resulting from the recent negotiations, principally relating to the preferential treatment of certain Cuban products.

Text of Proclamation [4]

1. WHEREAS, pursuant to the authority vested in the President by the Constitution and the statutes, including section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (48 Stat. (pt. 1) 943, ch. 474, 57 Stat. (pt. 1) 125, ch. 118, 59 Stat. (pt. 1) 410, ch. 269), on October 30, 1947, he entered into a trade agreement with certain foreign countries, which trade agreement consists of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter referred to as "the General Agreement"), including a schedule of United States concessions (hereinafter referred to as "Schedule XX

[4] No. 3140; 21 *Fed. Reg.* 4237.

(Geneva—1947)"), and the Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, together with a Final Act (61 Stat. (pts. 5 and 6) A7, A11, and A2050);

2. WHEREAS the trade agreement specified in the first recital of this proclamation has been supplemented by several subsequent agreements, including:

(a) The Protocol Modifying Part I and Article XXIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, of September 14, 1948, (3 UST (pt. 4) 5355),

(b) The Annecy Protocol of Terms of Accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, of October 10, 1949, (64 Stat. (pt. 3) B139), including a supplemental schedule of United States concessions (hereinafter referred to as "Schedule XX (Annecy—1949)"),

(c) The Torquay Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, of April 21, 1951, (3 UST (pts. 1 and 2) 615 and 1841), including a supplemental schedule of United States concessions (hereinafter referred to as "Schedule XX (Torquay—1951)"),

(d) The Declaration on the Continued Application of Schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, of March 10, 1955, (TIAS 3437), and

(e) The Protocol of Terms of Accession of Japan to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, of June 7, 1955, (TIAS 3438), including a supplemental schedule of United States concessions;

3. WHEREAS by the following proclamations the President has proclaimed such modifications of existing duties and other import restrictions of the United States, or such continuance of existing customs or excise treatment of articles imported into the United States as were found to be required or appropriate to carry out the trade agreement specified in the first recital of this proclamation or agreements supplemental thereto, or has terminated in whole or in part proclamations specified in this recital:

Proclamation 2761A, of December 16, 1947, (61 Stat. (pt. 2) 1103), Proclamation 2769, of January 30, 1948, (62 Stat. (pt. 2) 1479), Proclamation 2782, of April 22, 1948, (62 Stat. (pt. 2) 1500), Proclamation 2784, of May 4, 1948, (62 Stat. (pt. 2) 1505), Proclamation 2790, of June 11, 1948, (62 Stat. (pt. 2) 1515), Proclamation 2791, of June 12, 1948, (62 Stat. (pt. 2) 1519), Proclamation 2792, of June 25, 1948, (62 Stat. (pt. 2) 1520), Proclamation 2798, of July 15, 1948, (62 Stat. (pt. 2) 1528), Proclamation 2809, of September 7, 1948, (62 Stat. (pt. 2) 1553), Proclamation 2829, of March 8, 1949, (63 Stat. (pt. 1) 1261), Proclamation 2865, of November 30, 1949, (64 Stat. (pt. 2) A376), Proclamation 2867, of December 22, 1949, (64 Stat. (pt. 2) A380), Proclamation 2874, of March 1, 1950, (64 Stat. (pt. 2) A390), Proclamation 2884, of April 27, 1950, (64 Stat. (pt. 2) A399), Proclamation 2888, of May 13, 1950, (64 Stat. (pt. 2) A405), Proclamation 2895, of June 17, 1950, (64 Stat. (pt. 2) A416), Proclamation 2901, of September 6, 1950, (64 Stat. (pt. 2) A427), Proclamation 2908, of October 12, 1950, (64 Stat. (pt. 2) A443), Proclamation 2912, of October 30, 1950, (64 Stat. (pt. 2) A450), Proclamation 2916, of December 29, 1950, (64 Stat. (pt. 2) A456), Proclamation 2929, of June 2, 1951, (65 Stat. C12), Proclamation 2935, of August 1, 1951, (65 Stat. C25), Proclamation 2949, of October 19, 1951 (65 Stat. C44), Proclamation 2954, of November 26, 1951 (66 Stat. C6), Proclamation 2959, of January 5, 1952 (66 Stat. C15), Proclamation 2960, of January 5, 1952 (66 Stat. C16), Proclamation 2986, of August 16, 1952, (6 Stat. C7), Proclamation 3007, of March 2, 1953, (67 Stat C35), Proclamation 3040, of December 24, 1953, (68 Stat (pt. 2) C26), Proclamation 3059, of June 30, 1954, (6 Stat. (pt. 2) C44), Proclamation 3100, of June 29, 195 (69 Stat. C38), Proclamation 3105, of July 22, 1955, (6 Stat. C44), Proclamation 3108, of August 18, 1955, (3CFI 1955 SUPP., p. 42), and Proclamation 3128, of March 1 1956 (21 F. R. 1793);

4. WHEREAS I have found as a fact that certain existin duties and other import restrictions of the United State of America and of Australia, the Republic of Austri the Kingdom of Belgium, Canada, the Republic of Chil the Republic of Cuba, the Kingdom of Denmark, th Dominican Republic, the Republic of Finland, the Frenc Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republi of Haiti, the Republic of Italy, Japan, the Grand Duch of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, th Kingdom of Norway, Peru, the Kingdom of Sweden, th Republic of Turkey, and the United Kingdom of Grea Britain and Northern Ireland, all being contracting partie to the General Agreement, are unduly burdening and r stricting the foreign trade of the United States of Americ and that the purposes declared in section 350 of the Tari Act of 1930, as amended, will be promoted by a trad agreement between the Government of the United State of America and the Governments of some or all of th other countries referred to in this recital;

5. WHEREAS, pursuant to section 3 (a) of the Trad Agreements Extension Act of 1951 (65 Stat. 72, ch. 141 I transmitted to the United States Tariff Commissio for investigation and report lists of all articles importe into the United States of America to be considered f possible modification of duties and other import restri tions, imposition of additional import restrictions, continuance of existing customs or excise treatment i the trade agreement negotiations with the governmen of the foreign countries referred to in the fourth recit of this proclamation, and the Tariff Commission mad an investigation in accordance with section 3 of t said Trade Agreements Extension Act and thereaft reported to me its determinations made pursuant the said section within the time period specified in t said section 3;

6. WHEREAS reasonable public notice of the intenti to conduct trade agreement negotiations was given, t views presented by persons interested in such negoti tions were received and considered, and informatio and advice with respect to such negotiations were soug and obtained from the Departments of State, Agric ture, Commerce, and Defense, and from other source

7. WHEREAS, the period for the exercise of the authori of the President to enter into foreign trade agreemen under section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amende having been extended by section 2 of the Trade Agre ments Extension Act of 1955 (69 Stat. 162, ch. 169) fro June 12, 1955, until the close of June 30, 1958, on M

3, 1956, as a result of the finding specified in the fourth ecital of this proclamation, I entered, through my ly empowered plenipotentiary, into a trade agreement roviding for the application of the relevant provisions the General Agreement to additional schedules of tariff ncessions relating to the countries named in the said urth recital of this proclamation, which trade agreeent consists of the Sixth Protocol of Supplementary oncessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and rade, dated May 23, 1956, including the Annex thereto ntaining a supplemental schedule of United States ncessions (hereinafter referred to as "Schedule XX Geneva—1956)"), and which trade agreement is authen- in the English and French languages as indicated erein, and a copy of which in the English language is nexed to this proclamation;[5]

8. WHEREAS, the protocol of Supplementary Concessions ecified in the seventh recital of this proclamation hav- g been signed on behalf of the Government of the nited States of America on May 23, 1956, and the notifi- tion of the intention to apply the concessions provided r in Schedule XX (Geneva—1956) having been given May 31, 1956, to the Executive Secretary to the Con- acting Parties to the General Agreement pursuant to ragraph 2 of the said Protocol of Supplementary Con- ssions, the said Schedule XX (Geneva—1956) will be- me a schedule to the said General Agreement relating the United States of America on June 30, 1956, and the ncessions provided for in the said Schedule XX (Ge- va—1956) shall then enter into force as specified erein;

9. WHEREAS, under the authority of subsection (a) (3)) of section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, d of subsection (b) (2) thereof by reference to that bsection, I have determined, in the case of those modi- ations of existing duties proclaimed in Parts I (a) and (a) of this proclamation which reflect decreases in ties exceeding the limitations specified in subsection) (2) (D) or (a) (3) (B) of the said section 350, or subsection (b) (2) thereof by reference to those sub- ctions, that such decreases will simplify the computa- n of the amount of duty imposed with respect to the ticles concerned;

10. WHEREAS I have made the determinations regard- g the ad valorem equivalent of specific rates of duty nd combinations of rates including a specific rate) and regarding representative periods, under the authority of subsection (a) (2) (D) (ii) of section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, and of subsections (a) (3) (D) and (b) (2) thereof by reference, directly or indirectly, to the said subsection (a) (2) (D) (ii), in the case of each modification of existing duties proclaimed in this proclamation for which such a determination was relevant, using, to the maximum extent practicable, the standards of valuation contained in section 402 of the said Tariff Act of 1930;

11. WHEREAS I find that each modification of existing duties and other import restrictions of the United States of America and each continuance of existing customs or excise treatment of articles imported into the United States of America which is proclaimed in Part I (a) of this proclamation will be required or appropriate, on and after the date specified in the said Part, to carry out the trade agreement specified in the seventh recital of this proclamation;

12. WHEREAS, pursuant to the authority vested in the President by the Constitution and the statutes, including section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended in the manner referred to in the first recital of this proclamation, on October 30, 1947, he entered into an exclusive trade agreement with the Government of the Republic of Cuba (61 Stat. (pt. 4) 3699), which exclusive trade agreement includes certain portions of other documents made a part thereof and provides for the treatment in respect of ordinary customs duties of products of the Republic of Cuba imported into the United States of America;

13. WHEREAS by the following proclamations the President has proclaimed, in respect of products of the Republic of Cuba, such modifications of existing duties and other import restrictions of the United States, or such additional import restrictions of the United States, or such continuance of existing customs or excise treatment of articles imported into the United States as were found to be required or appropriate to carry out the exclusive trade agreement specified in the twelfth recital of this proclamation, or has terminated in whole or in part proclamations specified in this recital: Proclamation 2764, of January 1, 1948, (62 Stat. (pt. 2) 1465), Proclamation 2946, of October 4, 1951, (65 Stat. C39), Proclamation 3099, of June 25, 1955, (69 Stat. C36), and the proclamations of January 30, 1948, April 22, 1948, May 4, 1948, June 11, 1948, June 25, 1948, July 15, 1948, March 8, 1949, November 30, 1949, December 22, 1949, March 1, 1950, April 27, 1950, May 13, 1950, September 6, 1950, October 12, 1950, June 2, 1951, December 24, 1953, and July 22, 1955, specified in the third recital of this proclamation;

14. WHEREAS Part II of Schedule XX (Geneva—1947), which was made a part of the exclusive trade agreement specified in the twelfth recital of this proclamation, is supplemented by Part II of the Schedule XX (Geneva—1956), and I determine that it is required or appropriate, on and after the date specified in Part II (a) of this proclamation, to carry out the said exclusive trade agreement that Part II of the said Schedule XX (Geneva—1947) be applied as supplemented by the said Part II of Schedule XX (Geneva—1956);

15. WHEREAS I determine that, in view of the finding set

[5] Not printed in the FEDERAL REGISTER. The text of the otocol is being published at Geneva, Switzerland, by e Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on rlffs and Trade, in separate volumes in English and ench. The title of the English volume is "General greement on Tariffs and Trade: Sixth Protocol of Sup- ementary Concessions". The English text of Schedule X (United States of America) is being reproduced in easury Decisions (Customs). The text in languages which authentic, together with an English transla- n of those portions authentic in French only, will be blished in Treaties and Other International Acts Series d in the bound volumes of United States Treaties d Other International Agreements. [Footnote in the DERAL REGISTER]

forth in the eleventh recital of this proclamation, it will not be required or appropriate to carry out the exclusive trade agreement specified in the twelfth recital of this proclamation on and after June 30, 1956, to include the items identified below in this recital in the list set forth in the sixteenth recital of the proclamation of July 22, 1955, specified in the third recital of this proclamation:

Items in the 16th recital of the Proclamation of July 22, 1955 to be deleted effective June 30, 1956

411	802
717 (c)	1530 (e)
772	1541 (a);
778	

16. WHEREAS, in view of the amendment of Article I of the General Agreement by section A (iii) of paragraph 1 of the Protocol Modifying Part I and Article XXIX of the said General Agreement specified in the second recital of this proclamation, of the inclusion of certain products in Part I of Schedule XX (Torquay—1951) and in Part I of Schedule XX (Geneva—1956), and of the inclusion of item 774 in Part II of Schedule XX (Geneva—1956), it is required or appropriate that, effective June 30, 1956, the references to Article I of the said General Agreement in the sixth and seventh recitals of the proclamation of January 30, 1948, specified in the third recital of this proclamation be amended to refer to the fourth instead of the third paragraph of the said Article I, and that the list set forth in the seventh recital of the said proclamation of January 30, 1948, as amended, be further amended to read as follows:

Tariff Act of 1930, paragraph	Description of Products	Rate of Duty
408	Boxes, barrels, and other articles containing oranges, lemons, limes, grapefruit, shaddocks or pomelos.	12½% ad val.
743	Grapefruit:	
	When entered during the period from August 1 to September 30, inclusive in any year.	1⅕¢ per lb.
	When entered during the month of October in any year.	9/10¢ per lb.
743	Limes, in their natural state, or in brine . .	1¢ per lb.
747	Pineapples, not in crates and not in bulk. .	27¢ per crate of 2.45 cu. ft.
752	Watermelons, in their natural state, not specially provided for.	20% ad val.
765	Beans, not specially provided for:	
	Green or unripe:	
	Lima beans:	
	When entered during the period from December 1 in any year to the following May 31, inclusive.	2⅕¢ per lb.
	When entered during the month of November in any year.	2 1/10¢ per lb.
772	Tomatoes in their natural state:	
	When entered during the period from March 1 to July 14, inclusive, or during the period from September 1 to November 14, inclusive, in any year.	2.1¢ per lb.
	When entered during the period from November 15, in any year, to the last day of the following February, inclusive.	1⅕¢ per lb.
774	Vegetables in their natural state:	
	Cucumbers, when entered during the period from December 1, in any year, to the last day of the following February, inclusive.	2⅕¢ per lb.
	Squash	1 1/10¢ per lb.
774	Eggplant in their natural state, when entered during the period from December 1 in any year to the following March 31, inclusive:	
	When the rate applied to the product of Cuba is 0.57 cent per pound.	1.17¢ per lb.
	When the rate applied to the product of Cuba is 0.54 cent per pound.	1.14¢ per lb.
	When the rate applied to the product of Cuba is 0.5 cent per pound.	1.1¢ per lb.
775	Pimentos, packed in brine or in oil, or prepared or preserved in any manner.	4⅘¢ per lb.
802	Ethyl alcohol for beverage purposes	$2.25 per pr gal.
1005 (a) (1)	Cordage, including cables, tarred or untarred, composed of three or more strands, each strand composed of two or more yarns:	
	Wholly or in chief value of henequen:	
	Smaller than ¾ inch in diameter . . .	1¢ per lb. a 7½% ad va
	Other	1¢ per lb.
1406	Labels, flaps, and cigar bands, composed wholly or in chief value of paper lithographically printed in whole or in part from stone, gelatin, metal, or other material, but not printed in whole or in part in metal leaf and not specially provided for (except labels and flaps not exceeding 10 square inches cutting size in dimensions, if embossed or die-cut):	
	Printed in less than eight colors (bronze printing to be counted as two colors):	
	Labels and flaps	21¢ per lb.
	Cigar bands	31¢ per lb.
	Printed in eight or more colors (bronze printing to be counted as two colors):	
	Labels and flaps	28¢ per lb.
	Cigar bands	35¢ per lb.
1558	Banana flour and plantain flour	14% ad val.

17. WHEREAS, agreement for such withdrawal and mo fications having been reached pursuant to Article XXV of the General Agreement, and pursuant to the procedu provided for in paragraph 1 (b) of the Declaration the Continued Application of the Schedules to the s General Agreement specified in the second recital of t proclamation, I determine that it is required or app priate to carry out the trade agreement specified in first recital of this proclamation that Part I of Sched XX (Annecy—1949) be applied as though item 502 [fir were withdrawn therefrom, and that the value-brac subclassifications preceding the subclassification for ticles valued at more than $30 per dozen in item 1526 in Part I of Schedule XX (Geneva—1947), item 502 [fir in Part II of the said Schedule XX (Geneva—1947), item 502 in Part I of Schedule XX (Torquay—1951) applied as though the said subclassifications and it read as follows:

PART I OF SCHEDULE XX (GENEVA—1947)

Tariff Act of 1930, paragraph	Description of Products	Rates of D
1526(a)	Valued at not more than $9 per dozen	55% ad val. u not less a $1.25 per
	Valued at more than $9 and not more than $12 per dozen:	
	If for men or boys.	55% ad val.
	Other	65% ad val.
	Valued at more than $12 and not more than $18 per dozen:	
	If for men or boys.	47½% ad va
	Other	65% ad val.
	Valued at more than $18 and not more than $24 per dozen:	
	If for men or boys.	40% ad val.
	Other	65% ad val.
	Valued at more than $24 and not more than $30 per dozen.	40% ad val.

PART II OF SCHEDULE XX (GENEVA—1947)

ariff Act of 1930, ragraph	Description of Products	Rate of Duty
502	Molasses and sugar sirups, not specially provided for and not containing soluble non-sugar solids (excluding any foreign substance that may have been added or developed in the products) equal to more than 6% of the total soluble solids.	0.53 cents per pound of total sugars.

PART I OF SCHEDULE XX (TORQUAY—1951)

ariff Act of 1930, ragraph	Description of Products	Rate of Duty
502	Molasses and sugar sirups, not specially provided for and not containing soluble non-sugar solids (excluding any foreign substance that may have been added or developed in the product) equal to more than 6% of the total soluble solids. NOTE: This item shall be effective only during such time as Title II of the Sugar Act of 1948 or substantially equivalent legislation is in effect in the United States, whether or not the quotas, or any of them, authorized by such legislation, are being applied or are suspended.	0.6625 cents per pound of total sugars.

18. WHEREAS I determine that, upon the effectiveness of e modification of the concession provided for in item 26 (a) in Part I of Schedule XX (Geneva—1947) set rth in the seventeenth recital of this proclamation, the rmination of the proclamation of December 16, 1947 ecified in the third recital of this proclamation insofar it related to a part of the said item 1526 (a), by the oclamation of October 30, 1950, specified in the said ird recital of this proclamation, will no longer be in the blic interest;

19. AND WHEREAS the following item was inadvertently itted from the list set forth in the sixteenth recital of e proclamation of July 22, 1955, specified in the third cital of this proclamation, and I determine that the dition of the said item to the said list in its correct merical order is required or appropriate to carry out e exclusive trade agreement specified in the twelfth cital of this proclamation on and after September 10, 55:

ariff Act of 1930, ragraph	Description of Products	Rate of Duty
397	Articles or wares not specially provided for, if composed wholly or in chief value of gold, or if plated with gold, or colored with gold lacquer, whether partly or wholly manufactured.	52½% ad val.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, resident of the United States of America, acting under d by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Con- itution and the statutes, including section 350 of the ariff Act of 1930, as amended, do proclaim as follows:

Part I

To the end that the trade agreement specified in the seventh recital of this proclamation may be carried out:

(a) Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b) of this Part, such modifications of existing duties and other import restrictions of the United States of America and such continuance of existing customs or excise treatment of articles imported into the United States as are specified or provided for in paragraphs 1 to 6, inclusive, of the Protocol of Supplementary Concessions specified in the said seventh recital of this proclamation and in Part I of Schedule XX (Geneva–1956) contained in the Annex thereto shall be effective as follows:

(1) The rates of duty and import tax specified in column A at the right of the respective descriptions of products in Part I of the said Schedule XX (Geneva–1956), on and after June 30, 1956;

(2) The rates of duty and import tax specified in columns B and C, respectively, at the right of the respective descriptions of products in Part I of said Schedule XX (Geneva–1956), on and after the appropriate dates determined in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of the "General Notes" at the end of the said Schedule XX (Geneva–1956):

Provided, That in the case of a product which is described in both Part I and Part II of the said Schedule XX (Geneva–1956), the rate in Part I, when lower, shall be applied to the product of the Republic of Cuba.

(b) The application of the provisions of subdivision (a) of this Part and of subdivision (a) of Part II of this proclamation shall be subject to the right of withdrawal of concessions and to the other applicable terms, conditions, and qualifications set forth in paragraphs 1 to 6, inclusive, of the said Protocol of Supplementary Concessions, in Schedule XX (Geneva—1956), including the General Notes, contained in the Annex thereto, in Parts I, II, and III of the General Agreement, including any applicable amendments and rectifications thereof, and in the Protocol of Provisional Application specified in the first recital of this proclamation, and the application of the provisions of subdivision (a) of this Part and of subdivision (a) of Part II of this proclamation shall also be subject to the exception that no rate of duty or import tax shall be applied to a particular article by virtue of this proclamation if, when the article is entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption more favorable customs treatment is prescribed for the article by any of the following then in effect:

(1) A proclamation pursuant to section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, but the application of such more favorable treatment shall be subject to the qualifications set forth in the third paragraph of the general notes in Schedule XX (Geneva–1956);

(2) Any other proclamation, a statute, or an executive order, which proclamation, statute, or order either provides for an exemption from duty or import tax or became effective subsequent to May 23, 1956.

Part II

To the end that the exclusive trade agreement specified in the twelfth recital of this proclamation may be carried out:

(a) Subject to the qualifications and exceptions provided for in subdivision (b) of Part I of this proclamation and to the qualifications set forth in the exclusive trade agreement with the Republic of Cuba specified in the twelfth recital of this proclamation, such modifications of existing duties and other import restrictions of the United States of America in respect of products of the Republic of Cuba and such continuance of existing customs or excise treatment of products of the Republic of Cuba imported into the United States as are specified or provided for in paragraphs 1 to 6, inclusive, of the Protocol of Supplementary Concessions specified in the seventh recital of this proclamation and in Part II of Schedule XX (Geneva—1956) contained in the Annex thereto shall be effective as follows:

(1) The rates of duty and import tax specified in column A at the right of the respective descriptions of products in Part II of the said Schedule XX (Geneva—1956), on and after June 30, 1956;

(2) The rates of duty and import tax specified in columns B and C, respectively, at the right of the respective descriptions of products in Part II of said Schedule XX (Geneva—1956), on and after the appropriate dates determined in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of the "General Notes" at the end of the said Schedule XX (Geneva—1956):

Provided, That in the case of a product which is described in both Part I and Part II of the said Schedule XX (Geneva—1956), the rate in Part I, when lower, shall be applied to the product of the Republic of Cuba.

(b) The list set forth in the sixteenth recital of the proclamation of July 22, 1955, specified in the third recital of this proclamation shall be amended (i) as provided in the fifteenth recital of this proclamation, effective June 30, 1956, and (ii) as provided in the nineteenth recital of this proclamation, effective September 10, 1955.

Part III

To the end that the trade agreement specified in the first recital of this proclamation may be carried out, effective June 30, 1956:

(a) The reference to Article I of the General Agreement in the sixth and seventh recitals of the proclamation of January 30, 1948, specified in the third recital of this proclamation, and the list set forth in the seventh recital of the said proclamation of January 30, 1948, shall be amended as provided in the sixteenth recital of this proclamation.

(b) The value-bracket subclassifications preceding the subclassification for articles valued at more than $30 per dozen in item 1526 (a) in Part I of Schedule XX (Geneva—1947) shall be applied as though the said subclassifications read as set forth in the said seventeenth recital of this proclamation.

(c) Item 502 [first] in Part II of Schedule XX (Geneva—1947) shall be applied as though the said item read as set forth in the seventeenth recital of this proclamation:

Provided, That pending further proclamation by the President, the rate of duty for products described in this item testing less than 74.6 per centum total sugars shall be 0.15 cents per gallon plus 0.165 cents additional for each 1 per centum of total sugars over 48 per centum and fractions of 1 per centum in proportion.

(d) Item 502 in Part I of Schedule XX (Torquay—1951) shall be applied as though the said item read as set forth in the seventeenth recital of this proclamation: *Provided*, That pending further proclamation by the President, the rate of duty for products described in this item testing less than 56.8 per centum total sugars shall be 0.375 cents per gallon plus 0.4125 cents additional for each 1 per centum of total sugars over 48 per centum and fractions of 1 per centum in proportion.

Part IV

So much of the proclamations of December 22, 1949 and May 13, 1950, specified in the third recital of this proclamation, and of any other proclamations specified therein, which give effect to the concession provided for in item 502 [first] in Part I of Schedule XX (Annecy—1949) specified in the seventeenth recital of this proclamation, and the proclamation of October 30, 1950, specified in the third and eighteenth recitals of this proclamation are terminated, effective at the close of business June 29, 1956.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this thirteenth day of June in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and fifty-six, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eightieth.

[SEAL]

Dwight D. Eisenhower

By the President:
JOHN FOSTER DULLES,
Secretary of State

President Reports to Congress on Certain Tariff Increases

The White House announced on June 7 that the President had sent the following message to the Congress, as required by section 4 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951.

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

This message is submitted pursuant to the provisions of Section 4 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, as amended.

Under the authority of the trade agreements

gislation, the United States entered into a trade greement at Geneva, Switzerland on May 23, 956 with other contracting parties to the General greement on Tariffs and Trade. A copy of that greement is submitted herewith. The United tates received tariff concessions from other coun-ies on various products exported by the United tates in return for tariff concessions by the nited States.

On two products the United States by separate ction negotiated increases in the existing rates f duty. In one case, involving certain fur-felt at bodies, a court decision had in effect nullified riff increases which were proclaimed a few years go as the result of an escape clause investigation. n its peril point investigation on these hat bodies, e Tariff Commission found that the lower rates sulting from the court decision should be in-eased. The negotiated increases raise the rates f duty to the peril points found by the Tariff ommission, and in general restore the rates which d been applicable under the escape clause proc-mation prior to the court decision. In the other se, involving liquid sugar, there had been no eril point finding that an increase was necessary; e objective was to equalize the rates applicable dry and liquid sugar.

In the other two cases—certain tungsten alloys d violins and violas—in which the Tariff Com-ission reported that increases in existing rates of uty were required, it was found that the advan-ges of negotiating the increases would have been utweighed by attendant disadvantages which ade it undesirable to accomplish the increases by is means. Also, in the case of tungsten alloys, nly one group was listed for negotiation while hers, including ferro-tungsten, the most impor-nt in terms of imports, was not listed. Increas-g the duty on the listed alloys would thus have nduly complicated our tariff structure without dequate economic justification. For these rea-ns, increased rates on tungsten alloys and violins nd violas were not included in the trade agree-ent. These considerations would not be a bar applications by domestic producers of these roducts for escape clause action under the pro-isions of Section 7 of the Trade Agreements Ex-nsion Act of 1951.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

THE WHITE HOUSE,
June 7, 1956.

Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference

Press release 314 dated June 12

Secretary Dulles: Since I met with you the last time, several important things have occurred. There has been the release by the State Department of what we believe to be an authentic version of Khrushchev's speech. There has been the adoption of an important resolution on Palestine by the United Nations Security Council.[1] There has been the visit here this week of Foreign Minister Pearson to discuss the possible evolution of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and we have here Chancellor Adenauer, who arrived yesterday.

I have two prepared statements to make, copies of which will be available at the close of this conference. The first relates to the Refugee Relief Program.[2]

Visa Allotments in Refugee Relief Act

I wish to call to your attention an action which the Refugee Relief Program was required to take last week,[3] and which points up in a forceful but unfortunate way the merit of the President's repeated requests that there be a reallocation of visa allotments contained in the Refugee Relief Act.

We were compelled to announce that, effective midnight last night, no more applications for visas could be accepted for Iron Curtain escapees residing in the NATO countries of continental Europe, plus Sweden, Turkey, and Iran—but not including Germany and Austria. Ten thousand visas were authorized for this group of escapees. About 6,000 have been issued. We now have in process over 10,000 escapee applicants for the remaining 4,000 visas. At the same time, we have thousands more visas authorized for Iron Curtain escapees residing in Germany and Austria than we have escapee applicants in those two countries.

One of the President's proposals was to reallocate visas from places where they are not needed to places where they are needed.[4] Over a month ago, I also testified before a Senate subcommittee urging congressional action to amend the Refugee

[1] BULLETIN of June 18, 1956, p. 1025.

[2] The following three paragraphs were also released separately as press release 313 dated June 12.

[3] BULLETIN of June 18, 1956, p. 1024.

[4] *Ibid.*, June 13, 1955, p. 951.

Relief Act.[5] The present situation confirms that need.

The second statement which I have relates to the version of the Khrushchev speech on Stalin as issued here last week.[6]

Khrushchev Speech

It reveals a period of horror, but nothing unexpected. I recall that over 6 years ago, in *War or Peace*, I said about the Soviet Communist police state:

> Dictatorships usually present a formidable exterior. They seem, on the outside, to be hard, glittering, and irresistible. Within, they are full of rottenness. They "are like unto whited sepulchres, which indeed appear beautiful outward, but are within full of dead men's bones, and of all uncleanness."

That appraisal was challenged by many at the time, particularly by the Soviet regime itself. Now Khrushchev confirms, in detail, the abuses to which the Soviet-type dictatorship leads.

But the evils which Khrushchev exposes and condemns are not merely due to the personality of Stalin but due to a system which implements a philosophy which considers human beings as tools of the state, to be exploited for the glorification of the state.

We can hope that Khrushchev's revelations will mark the beginning of a change away from that system of dictatorship. But that, I fear, may not be his purpose. The purpose may be merely to persuade the subject peoples that the present dictatorship is good because it condemns the past dictatorship.

There is only one cure for the evils of the imposed Soviet dictatorship—that is, government which derives its powers from the consent of the governed. This is a lesson that history teaches, that Khrushchev confirms, and which needs to be applied if we are to have a world society of peace and justice.

Now if you have any questions.

Neutrality

Q. Mr. Secretary, there seems to be a great deal of confusion as concerns the statement you made in your speech the other day about neutrality being "immoral"[7] *and the President's statement almost simultaneously that he wouldn't be at all surprised that some nations preferred to, in view of the risks involved in becoming members of an alliance—how do you reconcile those two points of view?*

A. In the first place, I point out that the quoted language you attribute to me is not complete or accurate. In the second place, I would point out that there is no difference whatever between the President and myself on this subject. I had a long discussion with him in the course of other matters on Thursday afternoon [June 7], and I can assure you that there is no difference whatever in our points of view. As far as language differences are concerned, I think you can probably find I have expressed my own view on this subject a good many times over the last decade, perhaps 50 times, and I doubt if on any two of those 50 occasions I used precisely the same language. You can find a difference in my expression on every one of those 50 occasions. But I do not think that my views have changed. As the President said, it is a complicated subject and it is not possible to find a precise formula of identical words to deal with the subject as it comes up in different contexts.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you explain the circumstances under which the clarifying statement on neutrality[8] *was issued by the White House on Thursday?*

A. No, the White House would issue its own statement if it thought fit to do so.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your speech in which you said that the concept of neutrality was increasingly obsolete except under very exceptional circumstances, would you tell us what kind of circumstances you consider would not render it obsolete?

A. Well, the outstanding example of neutrality is, of course, Switzerland. Switzerland has declined to join the United Nations because it recognizes that the United Nations Charter is incompatible with strict neutrality.

Q. Well, would you apply that exceptional term to states like India and Indonesia, for example?

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[5] *Ibid.*, May 7, 1956, p. 773.

[6] The following six paragraphs were also released separately as press release 312 dated June 12. For text of Khrushchev speech, see *Cong. Rec.* of June 4, 1956, p. 8465.

[7] BULLETIN of June 18, 1956, p. 999.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 1004.

A. I don't care at this time to get into naming ıtes and passing judgment upon the course of tion of other governments.

Q. Could we put the question this way then, sir? it your feeling that those states which have ined alliances with the United States and other 'estern countries as of today should remain in em but you have no objection to those which do ɔt at the moment have such alliances remaining ıtside them? Is it the status quo on that problem at you were approving?

A. I am afraid that, if I tried to answer that ıestion, you would find in the answer a fifth ver-ɔn, which you would then compare with the 'eceding fourth or third or second or first. I lieve enough has been said on that subject to ake quite clear the views of the administration ith reference to neutrality.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it fair then for us to infer om what you said this morning that there is no fference within this administration, and all the porting on this subject is misleading the people to the position of this Government?

A. Well, I don't want to pass judgment upon the porting. I can say, and repeat what I said, hich is that I had a discussion on this subject ith the President on Thursday afternoon, and ım satisfied that there is no difference of opinion tween the President and myself on that subject.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you talk to the President fore his Wednesday press conference on the bject? He gave his remarks on neutrality as volunteered statement, not in answer to a ques-ɔn.

A. I prefer not to answer that. I think that e details of the personal relations between the resident and myself don't lend themselves to ıblic exposition.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you agree with what the resident said on this subject?

A. I have said that there is no difference that can detect between the views of the President ıd myself on this subject.

Q. In that same speech you made a reference to ır treaty with Formosa, and in it I believe you ıid that the President had the authority to use 'nited States forces to defend Formosa if he deemed it necessary. May I ask, isn't he "required" to use American forces to defend Formosa and only has the authority to use them to defend the offshore islands if that is necessary in his judgment?

A. I do not believe that the act of Congress, as I recall it, did purport to or, indeed, that it constitutionally could "require" the President to use the Armed Forces of the United States in any particular respect. The act said "authorized." I do not, of course, want to leave any question or doubt but what the President has the full intention of using the forces of the United States, if need be, to defend Taiwan. I am merely addressing myself to the constitutional question of whether or not the Congress could impose any particular obligation on the President in that respect.

Talks With Chancellor Adenauer

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you hopeful that your talks with Chancellor Adenauer this afternoon will produce a new Western approach to German reunification, especially in view of what Mr. Khrushchev said recently about his preferring the status quo in Germany to a unified Germany?

A. I have no doubt that we shall discuss that question of German unification, particularly as against the background of the statement which Bulganin and Khrushchev made at the summit conference in Geneva. Then they said that the Four Powers had a responsibility for the reunification of Germany and agreed that Germany should be reunified by means of free elections. There is an apparent disparity between that assurance and the more recent statements attributed to the Soviet leaders. That would certainly be a subject that we will discuss. I would not want now to forecast a result of that discussion because that would be to anticipate the views of Chancellor Adenauer, which I have not yet obtained.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Turkish Government has within the last 10 days, I believe, put through its parliament a very strict new press-control law. Do you feel that this is in the interest of progress among our allies?

A. Well, the views of the United States about freedom of the press are well known. What the impact of that law will be, I suppose, is to be determined not necessarily by speculation as to what could be done under the law but in the terms of

what actually is done. We hope and trust it will not impair the basic rights of the press to free exchange of information.

Q. It has been widely reported that the Soviet Union suggested a proposal to cosponsor the British resolution on Mr. Hammarskjold's visit and that the United States opposed the Soviet cosponsorship. Is this report correct, and, if so, what was the reason for the American opposition?

A. That particular matter took place, as I recall, when I was away, and I am not aware myself that there was any definite proposal of Soviet cosponsorship. There was a question, I recall, as to whether the resolution should be put in by the United States, which had introduced the prior resolution, or by the United Kingdom, which thought it would be useful for it to do it, and we acquiesced in the view of the United Kingdom. I do not recall the other matter.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I have two questions with regard to the atoms-for-peace agreement which we signed with the Austrian Government last week.[9] *Was there any period or term included for the duration of that agreement; and, secondly, is it the first agreement of its kind that we have signed, or are there others under consideration?*

A. Excuse me, which agreement?

Q. The atoms-for-peace agreement that we signed with Austria last week.

A. Well, we have signed agreements for nuclear research plants with a good many countries. I am not aware there is anything different in what we did with Austria than with other countries. If there is a difference, it has not been brought to my attention.

Developing NATO

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us the outcome of your conversations with Mr. Pearson on the NATO problem? Did you make any progress?

A. I can only say that the talks, in my opinion, were extremely useful. They were, of course, quite preliminary. Mr. Pearson has not yet met with his colleagues; so they have not had an opportunity to exchange views. But they are independently checking on some of the points of view of the NATO countries. They plan to come together in Paris—I think early next month or perhaps the latter part of this month—and begin mapping out formally their plan of work.

We had a good talk of a preliminary nature which was, I hope, constructive. Of course, the views of the United States are only the views of one country, and our own views are still at a formative and tentative stage. But I would think it was a useful and important talk.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think it would be useful for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make a visit to the Soviet Union?

A. That is primarily a matter for military judgment, and I have no independent views of my own as to what the military value of that would be. I would assume the thinking in the military area was reflected pretty well by the decision of the President which was reported by Mr. Hagerty yesterday.[10]

Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you could just review for us how far you have gone in your own writings in expressing how you think NATO could be developed?

A. The views that I have in that respect were pretty well set forth, I think, in the speech which I made in New York before the Associated Press prior to going to the last NATO ministerial meeting.[11] But I would not care at this time to develop my thinking more fully than is indicated by that speech. The studies have gone forward. We have a very able group of officers within the Department of State who are studying the problem from a technical standpoint.

You may recall that in that speech I indicated objectives to be served in harmonizing the policies of the member states, particularly in relation to the treaty area. I also pointed to certain problems involved and that we did not want to get into a procedural bind which would enmesh us so as to deprive the member countries of all capacity for quick and decisive action. And I pointed out that the United States was not only an Atlantic country but also a country of the Americas, also a Pacific country, and that all those things had to be weighed.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 1038.

[10] At a press briefing on June 11, James C. Hagerty, White House press secretary, announced the President's decision not to entertain a Soviet invitation for all members of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to visit the Soviet Union.

[11] BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1956, p. 706.

Now the study group which we have which is orking within the Department, and with which enator George is in close contact, is taking those ropositions which I enunciated in that New York peech and attempting to develop them in terms of eing where they would come out in terms of tual new procedures that might be adopted. It ould be premature to indicate the thinking going n there, but I would say it is closely along the nes I outlined in my New York speech.

he SEATO Alliance

Q. Mr. Secretary, while you have been discussing NATO at some length, there has been increased criticism, especially from the Philippines, f what they describe as the continued weakness f the SEATO alliance. Does the United States ave plans to strengthen that alliance militarily r bringing in other countries? What will be the tuation of SEATO in view of this criticism in sia?

A. I am not aware that there is any general sing criticism in Asia. We had, for example, arlier this year the joint operation which was iven, I think, the name of "Firm Link," and hich made a very strong impression upon the sian members. It showed the capacity of carrying out quickly and effectively an operation which ould bring a great power to bear in those areas. he particular area then selected was the area of angkok in Thailand. The same could have been one elsewhere.

I think you know what certainly all the treaty embers know—that we agreed and that it was nderstood from the very beginning that we ould not attempt to establish a force-in-being in EATO comparable to the force-in-being which is ssigned to NATO. We have to depend primarily pon an appropriate cooperation of local forces-n-being with the mobile striking power of the nited States which is available in the Western acific and which is available to be used wherever needs to be used. It may have to be used in orea; it may have to be used in Taiwan; or it ay have to be used in Viet-Nam or other places hich cannot now be known.

Pinning down particular forces to particular reas would not be to increase the strength genrally of the position in the Far East but actually ould be to weaken it. The Philippines is as dependent upon the maintenance of the integrity of the armistice in Korea and the independence of Taiwan (Formosa) and of Japan as it is in Southeast Asia. And to take forces and tie them down in Southeast Asia would not be to strengthen in fact the position of any one of the SEATO treaty powers.

Now, what we are working on is the exercises and planning which will indicate how the forces available, which are ample, can be brought to bear on the areas of possible danger. I do not believe there is any weakening of SEATO. I think it is developing very effectively along the lines that were forecast, and I am not officially aware of the particular criticisms which you refer to. I have seen some reference to them in the press, but I think there is a good understanding and good working relationship as far as SEATO is concerned.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the British have decided to permit the shipment of rubber to Communist China. Can you tell us if that is done with American concurrence and, if not, what the United States view about it is?

A. The action wasn't taken with any agreement on the part of the United States. As you probably are aware, the so-called Chinese list—the CHINCOM [China Committee] list—differs from the COCOM [Coordinating Committee] list, which applies to the Soviet-bloc countries, and is considerably enlarged beyond the COCOM list. At the time that list was established it was agreed that there could be exceptional action taken with respect to items which were not on the COCOM list, in other words, items which could be bought by the Soviet-bloc countries but which were on the enlarged list as against the Chinese Communists. That provision for exceptional procedures has always been in that list and has from time to time been availed of. We do not know to what extent the rubber-producing countries intend to avail of that exception. They said they do intend to avail of it to some extent. The extent is unknown to us. The procedure is agreed and has been ever since the beginning, and we don't form any judgment about it until we know in fact what is likely to happen.

Foreign Aid Program

Q. Mr. Secretary, you just came from a meeting of Democratic and Republican Senators on the

foreign aid program. Can you tell us what happened?

A. We expressed to them the administration's viewpoint with reference to the cut which the House made in authorizing the funds for the mutual security program and the conditions attached to the use of those funds in certain respects, and we had an exchange of views. A good many questions were asked. No commitments were sought or given.

Q. In that connection, Mr. Secretary, in part, have you had any direct contact with the President since his illness—either in person or by telephone—and in view of his enormous personal prestige in this matter of foreign policy and, in particular, the subject of foreign aid, how much, if any, do you think it may impair your foreign aid program by his being limited in action for some time because of this illness?

A. I do not think it will impair the situation. The President's views are fully known. No Member of the Congress this morning in conference had any doubts about what the President's views are, or his reasons for them. You may recall that he expressed them quite directly and forcefully in a letter which he wrote to Minority Leader Martin [12] before the matter was debated by the House. And I do not look toward any impairment of the administration's case because of the present indisposition of the President.

Q. Does one infer from that, sir, that you not only hope but expect that the Senate will restore the House cut?

A. Well, you can say that I hope it. I don't indulge at the moment in the realm of speculation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the head of the Greek Orthodox Church in London was deported today to Greece. I wonder if you have any comment on that?

A. I don't know about that. I'm sorry. I haven't heard of it and have no comment to make.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give us your thinking on the implications of the visit of Mr. Shepilov, the new Foreign Minister, to Cairo?

A. Well, it emphasizes the fact which I have called attention to a good many times: that nowadays, with the present means of communication, foreign ministers travel a good bit instead of depending upon written communications. He seems to be following that example.

Q. Tit-for-tat policy, sir?

Q. Mr. Secretary, have you any comment to make about the last Bulganin message on disarmament? [13] *Are we now in a complete deadlock on this matter?*

A. Well, I would not say that we were at a complete deadlock by any means. Of course, the message from Bulganin was, in essence, the transmittal of the statement which had previously been issued by the Soviet Government, on May 14. And the main body of the communication was merely a transmittal of what we had already read in the newspapers. Now there was some accompanying comment which will receive attention in due course. It is being studied by the State Department, being studied by the Defense Department. It is being studied by Mr. Stassen, the President's Special Adviser, and, no doubt, we will have some talks with friendly governments that are concerned. Particularly, I suppose that would be one of the subjects which Chancellor Adenauer and I would talk about because it alludes, as you will recall, to the possible withdrawal of foreign troops from Germany. We have not yet come to any conclusions as to what kind of answer to make.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect to have any discussions with Mr. Adenauer pertaining to the return of vested alien property, such as aniline film, to the German nationals?

A. I don't know whether Chancellor Adenauer will bring up that subject or not. If he does, I will, of course, tell him the state of the legislation on that topic.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have you made any change in your plan to go to the meeting in Panama on June 25?

A. Well, I don't know that the meeting will actually be held on June 25. There seems to be some uncertainty about that in view of the probable inability of the President to attend at that time.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you tell the foreign-aid meeting this morning your view on the House

[12] *Ibid.*, June 18, 1956, p. 1003.

[13] For text of Bulganin message of June 6, see White House press release dated June 8.

guage on aid to Yugoslavia—as to whether that ıcceptable to the administration?

A. No. I did not go into that particular ques- n of the language of that bill. We did discuss general question of Yugoslavia.

Q. Another point on the same subject, Mr. Sec- ary. Have you received the slightest indica- n at all from Senator Russell that he will not ahead with his announced intention over the ekend of seeking an additional billion cut in the l?

A. No. I've had no communication with Sena- Russell that covered that point. He was at meeting this morning, but that did not ne up.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the NATO business, could u say whether you have reached any opinion on ether the NATO treaty, as it now stands, has isdiction over political questions, if member ıntries are willing to commit such questions to ATO for consideration?

A. Well, the NATO Council which exists is not ly in the form of occasional meetings by the reign Ministers but, also, in the form of a rmanent Council and does now discuss from ne to time political matters. The question is ether or not it is important and desirable and reeable to all concerned to develop that func- n. It is a function which to some extent is now ed. You may recall that prior to the summit eting, for example, there was a meeting of the inisters that was especially called for that rpose. And then, prior to the meeting of e Foreign Ministers that was held at Geneva in ctober–November, there was a meeting. There ve been other meetings which have discussed litical problems. So that, if we develop this, would not be really breaking new ground. It ould be developing further the ground that has ready been broken.

Q. Is it clear, sir, that the whole idea, as now nsidered in developing NATO, is entirely in e political field and not in the economic field? our remarks would indicate that.

A. Well, I cannot speak except for the United ates in that respect. Certainly consideration is ing given to development in the economic field, ıd there are certain respects in which it is hard draw a clear line between what is political and what is economic. Economic policies are often part of your political machinery; and, to that extent, if there was to be a more full discussion of political policies, that would also embrace, I would assume, the economic policies of the member countries insofar as they concern the treaty area.

Now, as far as being an operating mechanism in the economic field is concerned, it is the view of the United States that there are enough operating mechanisms there. We have the OEEC [Organization for European Economic Cooperation], the EPU [European Payments Union], the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], the International Monetary Fund—all of which are operating agencies in the economic or related financial fields. And there would not seem to be much room or occasion to create a new operating agency. As I say, insofar as economic policies are involved as a part of the policies of the member states, those would be embraced within political exchanges of views.

I want to emphasize that those are just the views of the United States that I am expressing. I don't know what the views of the other members will be.

Q. Have you had any indication from Prime Minister Nehru about his forthcoming trip, in view of the President's illness?

A. I believe that there has been an inquiry with reference to the trip. I have not actually seen it, nor has any reply been made.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do I understand the implication of your statement on the Khrushchev speech to be that Stalinism was the result of a system which continues to exist in the Soviet Union?

A. We have not yet seen any evidence of a change from a system which, historically, has always produced the kind of evils which are portrayed in the Khrushchev speech. What is going on behind the scenes, I don't know. I expressed the hope that there was a movement toward government which would, to a greater degree, derive its powers from the consent of the governed. I expressed the fear that it might be that the Soviet rulers were trying to hold on to their dictatorial power by claiming virtue from having attacked the past fruits of their system. But those evil fruits of the past are implicit in the system; and, if the system is continued, we are fearful that the same evil fruits will again develop from it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do the increasing reports of the liquidation of labor camps, and the rehabilitation of the prisoners, and so forth—how do you interpret that, or do you regard these reports as reliable?

A. I think that the reports are reliable. I discussed them last month with President Meany, for example. He was inclined to think that the report was reliable—that they were offering labor a greater freedom of choice as to the work and jobs that the laborers would undertake. However, he pointed out that the effectiveness of that freedom was considerably impaired by the housing restrictions, which meant that, if you moved away, maybe you wouldn't get any house in which to live. Nevertheless, there are encouraging developments which indicate that there is a growing demand within the Soviet Union for greater freedom and for a government which will be more responsive to the wishes of the governed and which will be primarily concerned with advancing their legitimate aspirations. It is hard to judge yet, I say, which way it is going to go; but, as I said in my speech at Ames, it is quite obvious that there are very strong pressures in that direction. We hope very much that there will be more than lip service given to those pressures and that the trend may be toward a government which is really responsive to, and which derives its power from, the consent of the governed.

Q. Thank you.

Ambassadorial Talks at Geneva With Chinese Communists

Press release 315 dated June 12

The Chinese Communists on June 12 issued another public statement regarding the Geneva discussions which calls for a reply.[1]

I

In their statement they quote a draft of an announcement proposed by the United States on April 19, 1956, reading as follows:

1. Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, on behalf of the Government of the United States of America, and Ambassador Wang Ping-nan, on behalf of the Government o the People's Republic of China, agree, without prejudic to the pursuit by each side of its policies by peacefu means or its inherent right of individual or collectiv self-defense, to announce:

2. The United States of America and the People's Re public of China are determined that they should settl disputes between their two countries through peacefu negotiations without resorting to the threat or use o force in the Taiwan area or elsewhere.

3. The two ambassadors should continue their talk to seek practical and feasible means for the realizatio of this common desire.

This draft, the Communists state, was rejecte by them on the ground that it represents a deman by the United States that the Communists "accep the present state of the U.S. interference i China's internal affairs and its occupation o Taiwan," and that the United States "has refuse to take a positive stand on the question of holdin a Sino-American conference of the Foreig Ministers."

What the Communists fail to point out is tha the above-quoted U.S. proposal is identical wit the Communist proposal of December 1, 1955, except for the addition of the words which ar underlined above, viz.:

1. The addition to paragraph 1 of the Com munist proposal of the words "without prejudic to the pursuit by each side of its policies by peace ful means or its inherent right of individua or collective self-defense."

2. The addition to paragraph 2 of the Com munist proposal of the words "in the Taiwan are or elsewhere."[2]

The United States believed that there could b no further excuse for the Communists' refusin to join in a meaningful renunciation of force i the United States accepted the Communist pro posal of December 1, 1955, with the addition o words to make clear that by the announcement:

(1) neither party was agreeing to abandon th pursuit of its policies by peaceful means;

(2) each party reserved the right of self-de fense if the other by breach of the renunciatio of force did engage in armed attack; and

(3) the renunciation of force applied bot generally and specifically to the Taiwan area.

But these reasonable hopes of the United State were met by a Communist rejection of wha

[1] For an account of the earlier course of the Geneva negotiations, see BULLETIN of Jan. 30, 1956, p. 164; also available as Department of State publication 6280, entitled *Renunciation of Force.*

[2] For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 30, 1956, p. 167.

ıounted to its own proposal. In addition, the ɔmmunists advanced the requirement that only months were to be allowed the Ambassadors to ach an agreement satisfactory to the Commusts or the renunciation of force would no longer effective.

How there can be any possible objection to e words which the United States proposed to ld to the Chinese draft is not understandable ıless the Communists are determined either not join in a meaningful renunciation of force or tend to reserve to themselves the use of armed ɔrce if they are not assured in advance that they ill gain their goals.

The principle of the renunciation of the use of ɔrce is neither the abandonment of the right to ırsue the attainment of objectives by peaceful eans, or the right of self-defense. Nor does ıe principle of renunciation of force expire when ıe believes that he can better attain his objecves by the use of force.

II

The Communists make no mention of the fact ıat, although on September 10, 1955, they underok that they would adopt measures to permit mericans in China to return to the United tates,[3] 13 Americans are still held in Communist risons. We continue to seek the fulfillment by ıe Chinese Communists of their undertaking, ɔt only for humanitarian reasons but because ·spect for international undertakings lies at the ɔundation of a stable international order.

We shall continue to seek a meaningful renunation of force.

.S. and U.K. Agree To Extend ooperation in Atomic Energy

The Atomic Energy Commission and the Deartment of State (press release 326) announced ı June 14 that the Governments of the United tates and the United Kingdom on June 13 had ɔncluded an agreement further extending their cooperation in the field of atomic energy. British Ambassador Sir Roger Makins, representing Great Britain, and Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Lewis L. Strauss and Acting Assistant Secretary of State C. Burke Elbrick, on behalf of the United States, signed an agreement amending the U.S.–U.K. agreement on peaceful uses of atomic energy which has been in effect since July 21, 1955.[1]

The effect of this amendment is to broaden the scope within which exchanges may take place in two respects: (a) as regards materials utilized in the atomic energy programs of the two countries, and (b) information regarding military package power reactors and other military reactors for the propulsion of naval vessels, aircraft, and land vehicles.

Under the provisions of the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954, there must be a 30-day period during which the agreement lies before the Congress before the amendment becomes effective.

Atoms-for-Peace Agreements With New Zealand, Dominican Republic

The Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State (press release 318) announced on June 13 that representatives of New Zealand and the United States had signed on that day a proposed agreement for cooperation in research in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Signing of a similar agreement with the Dominican Republic took place on June 15 (press release 328). Both agreements were negotiated within the framework of President Eisenhower's atoms-for-peace program.

The agreement with New Zealand was signed by Ambassador Sir Leslie Munro and, for the United States, by Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, and Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. The agreement with the Dominican Republic was signed by Ambassador Joaquin E. Salazar, Mr. Strauss, and Henry F. Holland, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.

[3] *Ibid.*, Sept. 19, 1955, p. 456.

[1] For background, see BULLETIN of July 11, 1955, p. 58.

The Impact of the United States on Europe

by Eleanor Dulles
Special Assistant to the Director, Office of German Affairs [1]

Two centuries ago there was transplanted to this land a society and a culture which continued to be nourished and enriched from abroad. We, the heirs of this society, have always been ready to acknowledge our debt. We are grateful for our heritage. We have received so much in value over the years that we have been preoccupied with our youth as a nation. We have not recognized the full significance of the changes that have taken place in recent times. The fact is that for more than a decade of war and reconstruction this country has been giving substantial and critically important support to those lands from which we came.

Thus, the passage of time and the change in our destinies have brought to you and to me new opportunities and new tasks. We are so accustomed to thinking of ourselves as the junior partners in efforts to maintain the values of civilization that we hesitate to acknowledge the new role we have assumed.

It is important now, at this stage of international recovery, and also in this phase of your personal lives, to turn our attention to some of these facts. Consideration is worth while since, in a very deep sense, this new situation will affect the world you live in and will determine the claims which will be made upon you. It is important, therefore, that you now take stock of where you stand and what your country has done in relation to Europe. Such an appraisal as you may make will almost certainly give you a sense of the scope of the problem and a new excitement over the part you will be asked to play.

The best way in which I can acknowledge the privilege of being here is to give you a summary of what I have seen and what I believe. When I look at the past and the future, I am impressed with the cause for pride in what we have accomplished in war and peace.

In the period of armed conflict and years of reconstruction, we have as a Nation gained new stature. Thus, during a brief span of 15 or 20 years, this country has made good a considerable portion of its obligation to the civilizations to which it has been so deeply in debt. It has assumed a large share of the burden of leadership in renewing and expanding our human heritage.

Of course, this giving back of resources, material and spiritual, has not been without a strong motive of self-interest. In the past few years it has become widely realized that the success of efforts to preserve those influences and values which can make possible a richer and more secure life requires a broader partnership between nations. Thus the contributions we have been able to make to restore the economic and spiritual life have been with a clear purpose. They have been designed to save the cultures and peoples of those countries so important to all of us.

The new element in our relations with Europe over the past 15 years has been the energy with which they have been conducted, the scope of the imagination, and the extent of material support. Moreover, without the elements of common origin in our political and economic institutions, in tradition and custom, the success achieved would have been less impressive. These common origins have made possible a working together in relief and reconstruction, a shared effort to win financial stability by using familiar techniques, well-tried and well-known methods. Because of our common understanding of law and of literature, of

[1] Address made at commencement exercises at Hunter College, New York, N. Y., on June 14 (press release 317 dated June 13).

lucation and industry, we have been able to work ›gether.

Thus, the Atlantic Community is a real com- ıunity. In contributing to it in this time of need, e have indeed been supporting those institutions nd those cultures which we so long have prized.

One of the difficulties which surrounds any at- ›mpt to appraise the influence of this country on Europe is that such an appraisal raises in many eoples' minds questions of modesty on our part nd pride on their part. If one looks at the facts bjectively, there is no serious doubt that this ›untry has made an enormous contribution. Be- ıuse the United States has been able to offer aid f various sorts to European nations, there is a etter chance for the survival of the world as we now it.

Whether in fact this world can continue to grow ı strength and in richness of expression is not matter which can be demonstrated now. The ıain point which I wish to make as I review the uestion is that Europe and the world have been iven a new chance. The importance of this new hance for peace and security can scarcely be ex- ggerated. We have gained years in which our rinciples can be further applied, in which young ıen and women can be educated to new horizons nd broader concepts.

›ur Main Aspects

My analysis of the impact of the United States n Europe leads me to emphasize four main as- ects. These are all closely related and have com- lemented each other.

The first to command attention is the mate- ıal support through relief and reconstruction hich this country was able to render Europe.

The second was the new organizations, the ructures of working cooperation whose develop- ıent we have done so much to assist—organiza- ons designed to serve new communities of na- ons not only in Europe but also in the Middle ast and Asia.

The third aspect is the series of alliances and ›mmitments which bind us together with the ıture of Europe.

The fourth, our role in developing new aspects f personal liberty and individual freedom to en- ich the heritage of the past.

I have seen the workings of all these four cate- ories of influence in France, England, Austria, Germany, and elsewhere; and it is from these personal observations that I want to speak today. For instance, I went into Austria in the early summer of 1945 and shared the difficult struggles for recovery in Austria and in Germany. I had a small part in the efforts of the Western allies to maintain the security and welfare of the city of Berlin, hard pressed by the Communist tyranny. I have been close to the formulation of early plans for a number of European organizations. In the course of this work, I have talked with hundreds of students and exchangees and have sat in many meetings where the values of a good society have been discussed and where the efforts for true international understanding have been frankly and fully debated.

Perhaps this intimate experience which has been my privilege leads to a special point of view, but, in any case, it forms the basis for strong convictions. As the result of participating in the struggles and seeing the results, I am convinced that our influence has been to make possible, and even probable, a close and enduring cooperation for freedom.

Relief and Reconstruction

The time which has been won was first at the cost of human lives during the war, then by virtue of a great financial expenditure in the postwar period.

This phase of history and the revival in Western Europe has been one in which we as Americans can be proud, since it justifies our early traditions and our inheritance from the great men of Europe.

There is a tendency now to underestimate and even to forget the material importance of the early aid to Europe and the later more integrated accomplishments of the European recovery plan. Americans at times feel almost apologetic about grants and loans; but, if they had not been extended, the chaos of much of Europe might have prevented the recovery of the world from the Second World War.

When I went into Austria in 1945, I lived in a hotel which had been torn wide open by bombs. There was virtually no light in the city at night. Frequently we saw persons drop from hunger in the streets. We saw professors and bankers, as well as workers and the unemployed, picking up cigarette butts from the gutters. We saw misery

and fear, weakness and disease, confusion and despair.

Conditions in France and England were slightly better. In Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, perhaps they were worse.

The first task facing the United States, consistent with our aims to bring a real recovery, was obviously to bring in food, clothes, medicines, and fuel. This alone, however, would have been of little worth. The basic job was to put the people to work, to give them tools, to restore light, fuel, machinery, transport, and the financial systems. It is easy now to forget the complexity of the task. Many do not even remember how great the need, how long the road to recovery was.

In the case of Austria there was, in 1945 and 1946, virtually no coal. Fuel had to be shipped in from outside. There was need for passenger transport, trucks, and rolling stock. These were loaned from the Army, later bought, and finally rebuilt.

The electric-power systems had great potential, and in the short space of 5 years a large part of the plant had been put back into operation. In 10 years the capacity has been expanded way beyond prewar levels.

One of the most vital of the economic contributions to Austria was, however, the measures taken jointly with the other Western occupying powers to accomplish the stabilization of the currency. This was done not on the basis of financial reserves, which were nonexistent, but on the basis of techniques and confidence. Austria after the war was a poor country. The capital position destroyed by the *Anschluss* with Germany was at the lowest possible level. There was little basis for stabilization except the firmness of the Austrian political and financial leaders and the help of the American Government. In spite of obstacles raised by the Communists, who also occupied Austria, the monetary reform was carried through; and, since 1947, the cigarette money characteristic of the postwar years ceased to function. National bank money became the general standard and the accepted means of payment. Sooner than anyone expected, the exports climbed to a point where they virtually balanced imports.

The United States influence in Austria, as in other Western European countries, was also notable in the restoration of the democratic machinery and the strengthening of the institutions of freedom. The Americans, first in Austria, and working often closely with their English and French allies, helped plan the first informal meeting of political leaders. They stood back of the Austrian elections which were held a few weeks after the shooting stopped. They safeguarded the principles and assisted in the process of free, secret, and orderly choosing of the first government since the *Anschluss* in 1938.

I have taken Austria as a typical example of the economic impact of the United States on Europe. The cases of Belgium and France, of Germany and Italy, and the other countries receiving U.S. aid could, perhaps, have been used with equal validity.

Organizations for Cooperation

The methods used and the institutions created in recent years were more than short-run accomplishments. They transcend in time and scope the initial purpose for which they were formed. They succeeded in bringing together 16 nations in a continuing association for mutual support. The cooperating agencies in Europe, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and the European Payments Union, have not only been vehicles for increasing the effectiveness of U.S. aid but also for bringing together the economists and statesmen of Europe in a long-range endeavor. In particular the OEEC and the EPU were trailblazers in the world of ever closer contacts and cooperation and may well constitute a turning point in moving from European conflict to sound and lasting community of interests. They may be counted among the major contributions of the United States to growing world prosperity.

Both institutions, centered on Paris, were simple in structure and relatively free of redtape. Both tended to act to smooth the relations and increase the commerce between European nations. The participation of the United States has been close and intimate through its continuing advice and efforts to bring about cooperative understanding on trade liberalization, financial adjustments, and effective use of material resources. Thus, in a noncontroversial manner, these 16 countries, some of them recently engaged in mortal combat, worked in a joint endeavor to raise the standard of living of their people and to remove causes of economic friction.

In 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ollowed soon on the first phase of recovery to rovide urgently needed security measures. The oal and Steel Community was developed to make ossible a rational production and marketing of al and steel as a basis for coordinating the heavy dustries.

It is not possible to describe the various organi- tions that have been set up at the instigation and ıder the inspiration of United States leadership ıd with the cooperation of this country's allies the Western World. They all, whatever their ıaracter, have merit in that they develop the ills required for working together and develop ıe habit of cooperation. They break down the ırriers of unfamiliarity and cross over the gaps hich have formerly been raised by national dif- rences of language and custom.

Europe, thus, has had not only a time span in hich to develop economic and political strength ut also new tools and a new knowledge that the nited States is working alongside with shared ıms, trying to make these tools effective.

If one were to select an institution which, ıough still in the making, may have the most itical importance on the fate of Europe, and of ıankind, that institution would be EURATOM. his organization is designed to bring within the operative framework of joint control the uses nd further exploration of the development of tomic power for peace. It is designed to bring nder joint control, for mutual benefit, almost nimaginable developments in that area.

All must recognize how important it is that no ation go its way completely alone. If, for in- ance, in the field of atomic power nations were act separately, the whole world could be the ictim of the least responsible and the least dis- iplined of such nations. It is perhaps in this rea that our deepest concern and our greatest ope for essential integration will lie. This gency could be the major instrument for fulfilling he hopes and plans sketched out by President isenhower in his speech on the atom for peace.

lliances To Safeguard Security

Of major importance as a cornerstone of the ontribution of the United States to the hope of eace for the future of Europe has been the series f alliances designed to safeguard the security of urope and the peace of the world. The organizations already mentioned have been the outward expression of these alliances, but they are not as yet fully representative of the intentions and the meaning of strength which come with the joining together for security and against aggression.

The full meaning of this new form of America's participation in the fate of Europe and its readiness to stand with other free nations against aggression is best understood when one considers the pleas for a similar kind of security effort after the First World War. It was not possible for the United States to make a commitment in Europe in the 1920's. Apparently, with a few notable exceptions such as Woodrow Wilson, neither the people of the country nor the leadership were convinced of the necessity. Now almost everyone knows isolation is not possible. A significant share of this country's effort is devoted to making mutual security a reality.

These facts are known and appreciated in Europe. Those who talk about whether we are liked or disliked abroad are looking at superficial aspects of the situation and ignoring the basic facts. The United States shouldered many responsibilities and made serious commitments. There is no European leader who does not know that in this situation there is great strength. There is no leader in the Kremlin who does not recognize that these facts are of major importance.

Because of this notable extension of our influence and of our activities, policy in every European country has changed in significant ways in recent years. The policy in Russia has changed. One of the aspects of the present situation which is being watched most carefully in Moscow is undoubtedly the new, unpredicted, and, to a large extent, unexpected willingness of the Germans and the French to work together. Such a situation could not have been anticipated 50 years ago. These are major developments not only for Europe but for the world in general. These are results of patient, continuous, and imaginative efforts on the part of the United States.

The Berlin story is the prime illustration of the execution of a joint effort to protect an area to which we are committed. It was a practical realization of our will to support those who stand for democratic principles.

The action of this country together with its Western allies in mounting the airlift, and thus standing with Berlin in time of trial to frustrate

the Communist blockade, is evidence of our new participation in the affairs and destinies of Europe and our new ability to assist our friends. The United States was and is committed to Berlin along with the other occupying powers. Immediately upon the imposition of the blockade, it acted to supply the city. It showed by word and deed that it would stand with the free Berlin population.

The Berliners, for their part, made their memorable decision to reject the lures of the East, to refuse the bribes of dictatorships, and to assume the risks of maintaining their freedoms. They did not know, when they made their choice, whether or not the trickle of food and fuel coming into the city would ever increase to sufficient volume to maintain their life. They knew the risks which they were taking, but they also knew that they had support from outside. If the United States and the allies had not mounted an airlift in Berlin, the Communist dictatorship would probably have reached the Rhine. There would be now no shining light, no freedom bell in this city in the center of Europe, far behind the Iron Curtain. Perhaps the newly won sovereignty of Germany would have been impossible. The strategic potential of NATO might not exist. Who knows whether France and Italy could have held firm?

The dramatic circle and descent of planes over the apartment houses of Berlin, the thousands of tons of fuel and food unloaded at Tempelhof made possible the strength to refuse the lures of the Communists. They made possible the choice of Berliners to stand with the West and to make their stand unmistakably clear to the East. Now, as a result of this choice, a short distance from Warsaw, 150 miles east of the Rhine, the Berliners maintain an island of democracy. Thus, the United States reached out with aid, with planes, with courage and foresight to hold this outpost of freedom. All Europe must acknowledge the deep significance of these policies and the foundations they laid for dependable alliance.

New Concepts of Personal Liberty

The concepts of freedom and the urge to let thought and speech range over wider and wider spaces, the attempts to reconcile the stability that comes with tradition with the sense of opportunity which nourishes our society date back beyond to the beginning of recorded time. The United States in this generation, in our relation to Europe, has added more than a footnote to this long history, however. We have written the beginning of a new chapter.

The form which our influence has taken is in line with our early philosophy and our more recent technical development. It is the almost limitless mobility of the individual between places, between classes, between professions. He can choose his way of life. If necessary he can change it. This new extension of the choice of the individual is typical of this country. In our relations with Europe it has been revealed in our breaking down of cartels and professional monopolies. It has been of revolutionary importance in introducing a new type of partnership between management and labor. Europe has recently been turning its attention to our education and culture in relation to the opportunity of the individual.

Like all new liberties and all modifications in the established order, these changes have not been fully understood and have been overlooked completely by some observers. There is little doubt that they are altering the nature of European society.

Since the aim of this country, in its efforts to reconstruct the best in the old system and build new structures on the foundations of the past, was to make other countries strong, its influence in this field is in fact self-limiting. Those elements in Europe to which we gave the most aid are now most independent. Thus, the success of the program to increase democracy, to widen the areas of free choice and cooperation was, by its very nature, a transitional phase in world progress.

Some wonder at the meaning of the expressions of initiative or even of disagreement that now occur more frequently as sovereign nations express their increasing independence and their national will. This development is in the truest sense a sign of success and not of failure. Healthy nations do not want to be led. They wish to exert leadership. As long as they are acting for the peace and security of the group, they are, by showing initiative, carrying forward the new concepts and increasing the strength of the mutual enterprise.

In every foreign post and in the work at home for these ends, the work of this country has been accomplished by people like you. From our great

ɔlleges they and you have gained a clear view of ıe importance of these tasks. They and you have ıined pride in a willingness to accept responsi-ılity, a respect for the high standards of work-ıanship. In sharing in the education of our reat institutions, the lessons have been clear. ou have learned to fear the disaster which might ertake us all if you fail. You have known the ɔpe for a world of peace. Above all, you have ecome aware of the great opportunities which ɔu have in science, education, art, and business.

The impact of the United States on Europe has een crucial to the future of mankind. The re-ɔnstruction of these countries has saved some of ıe world's most precious values. Such recon-ruction would not have been possible if there ıd not been a resurgence of the political vitality the countries which created most of the demo-atic institutions governing mankind. The new stitutions for working together have opened up ɔssibilities for a widening and ever more signifi-ınt cooperation. The alliance in compacts and eaties has given substance to the will for peace. nd finally, the expanding of the borders of per-nal freedom and opportunity has added to our eritage of freedom and dignity.

This work has been carried on in large measure the men and women who graduated from col-ge in the last 30 years. A not inconsiderable ırt has been the work of those who graduated in e last 10 years. As the task increases in variety ıd urgency, the need for you is greater.

You can take pride in the accomplishments of ɔur country, its work and its ideals. You can solve to seize the present opportunity and con-ıue the work already begun.

As Carl Schurz said, in April 1859:

"Ideals are like stars; you will not succeed in uching them with your hands. But like the sea-ring man on the desert of waters, you choose em as your guides, and following them you will ach your destiny."

.S. Concern for Refugees

tatement by Christopher H. Phillips[1]

All of us here share in common a deep aversion systems of political and religious persecution, hich are the cause of most of the tragic human oblems for which we are trying to find solutions through the work of this Committee and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

No matter what other difficulties may exist between them, free peoples are united in their determination to preserve and foster conditions of religious and political freedom and respect for the worth and dignity of the individual human being.

The people of the United States share deeply these sentiments. Their concern for the plight of the victims of political and religious oppression is reflected in the large amount of refugee work carried on under private auspices as well as varied governmental efforts made through national and international programs.

We support and participate in programs for the overseas resettlement of as many refugees as resettlement opportunities permit. We also support and participate in programs for the local integration of those refugees for whom overseas resettlement is impracticable or impossible. We consider both approaches as important ways to achieve solutions for the problems of refugees.

The United States recognizes the valuable contribution which the present UNREF program can make to solve the difficult problems of residual refugees in Europe. Given adequate support by governments, we have confidence in the High Commissioner's ability to achieve these solutions.

In these days, Communist governments under the guise of "voluntary repatriation" are seeking through intimidation and threat the forceable return of refugees to their former homelands, where they are certain to face even greater perils than those from which they fled. We therefore look especially to the High Commissioner to exercise that alertness and vigilance necessary to protect the refugees against these efforts. We are confident that he will do so.

As an indication of the importance the United States attaches to this program and especially to its efforts on behalf of the foreign-speaking refugees, I am pleased to announce that my Government is prepared to make a supplementary contribution of $194,000 to be used as a special effort on

[1] Made before the United Nations Refugee Fund Executive Committee at Geneva, Switzerland, on May 28. Mr. Phillips, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, is U.S. representative on the UNREF Executive Committee.

behalf of non-German-speaking refugees in Austria. We propose that this contribution be used primarily for handicapped refugees and difficult cases amongst the foreign refugee population of Austria. It is to be considered a one-time contribution which bears no implication, direct or indirect, that a further U.S. contribution for this purpose will be made in future years. Furthermore, it is expected that the High Commissioner will negotiate an agreement with the Austrian Government whereby Austria will make appropriate contributions for the same purposes for which the special United States grant is made.

Mr. Chairman, this additional effort through UNREF is being undertaken simultaneously with a special effort on behalf of refugees in Austria through the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration. My Government has announced its intention to make an extra contribution of $250,000 to ICEM for a special resettlement program on behalf of foreign-speaking refugees in Austria.

These acts constitute a further indication of the deep concern which the United States has for refugees and more specifically for the particularly urgent refugee situation in Austria. I am confident that, through the joint efforts of the Austrian Government and the High Commissioner, this special grant to UNREF will make a significant contribution to a most pressing human problem.

Report on Atomic Radiation Transmitted to U.N.

Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. Representative to the United Nations, on June 12 transmitted to Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold copies of a study made by the National Academy of Sciences on "The Biological Effects of Atomic Radiation." Following is the text of the letter of transmittal.

U.S./U.N. press release 2420 dated June 12

I have the honor to transmit herewith the first report submitted by the United States pursuant to the request of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation for national reports on subjects relevant to its work. Enclosed are 16 copies of the publication "The Biological Effects of Atomic Radiation, Summary Reports, from a Study by the National Academy of Sciences," and 10 copies of the accompanyin forty-page "layman's" summary of the Report entitled "The Biological Effects of Atomic Radia tion, A Report to the Public."

It is requested that one copy of each documen be transmitted to the other members of the Radia tion Committee. The remaining two copies ar for the use of the Secretariat. Additional copie of the report will be transmitted as soon as the become available from the printer.

The National Academy of Sciences, an inde pendent non-governmental body of scientists, cor ducted this comprehensive study through the wor of six committees, concentrating in the followin fields: (1) genetics; (2) pathology; (3) agricu ture and food supplies; (4) meteorology; (5 oceanography and fisheries; and (6) disposal o radioactive wastes. The findings and recommen dations contained in the Report are those of th Committees themselves.

As additional studies relevant to the Commit tee's work are completed, they will be transmitte to the United Nations.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

World Power Conference

The Department of State announced on June (press release 303) that Gail A. Hathaway, Spe cial Assistant to the Chief of Engineers, Depar ment of the Army, will be the U.S. delegate t the fifth meeting of the World Power Conferenc which will meet at Vienna, Austria, June 17–2 Mr. Hathaway is also chairman of the U.S. Na tional Committee of the World Power Conferenc and a vice chairman of the International Execu tive Council of the World Power Conference.

Mr. Hathaway will be assisted at the meetin by the following members of the delegation:

R. L. Brown, Staff Adviser, Bituminous Coal Divisio Bureau of Mines, Department of the Interior

Donald S. Campbell, Chief, Division of Power, Depar ment of the Interior

W. Kenneth Davis, Director, Division of Reactor Develo ment, Atomic Energy Commission

W. A. Dexheimer, Commissioner of Reclamation, Depar ment of the Interior

John E. Flaherty, Manager, Chicago Operations Offic Atomic Energy Commission

Arthur E. Gorman, Division of Reactor Developmen Atomic Energy Commission

ge A. Grimm, Chief, Utilization Division, Office of the sistant Secretary for Properties and Installations, partment of Defense
nd A. Kampmeier, Assistant Manager of Power Sup-, Tennessee Valley Authority
les W. Kinney, Office of the Assistant Chief of Engi-ers and Civil Works, Department of the Army
. McClellan, Assistant Commissioner and Chief Engi-er, Department of the Interior
Carroll T. Newton, Chief, Engineer Research and De-lopment Division, Office of the Chief of Engineers, partment of the Army
ge P. Palo, Head Structural Engineer, Tennessee Val-Authority
iam A. Pearl, Administrator, Bonneville Power Ad-nistration, Department of the Interior
k H. Speding, Director, Ames Laboratory, Iowa State llege
Rabi, Department of Physics, Columbia University, d Chairman, General Advisory Committee to the omic Energy Commission
ses Staebler, Chief, Civilian Power Reactors Branch, vision of Reactor Development, Atomic Energy Com-ssion
k L. Weaver, Chief, Division of River Basins, Bureau Power, Federal Power Commission
Zook, Assistant Administrator, Rural Electrification lministration, Department of Agriculture

he World Power Conference is a private inter-onal organization founded at London in 1924 ring together scientists, engineers, economists, administrators who are primarily concerned the development and utilization of the ld's power resources. It is the principal inter-onal agency engaged in collecting world power istics, including data on the world's hydraulic er and coal resources. The plenary meetings he World Power Conference are normally held y 6 years, the fourth meeting having been held London in 1950.

he theme selected for the fifth meeting is orld Energy Resources in the Light of Recent hnical Economic Developments." In this con-ion, approximately 300 papers will be dealt under the following divisions: (1) the present us and development of power production and ization in individual countries; (2) the prep-ion and conversion of fuels; (3) the utilization rimary sources of energy; (4) the purification aste water and exhaust gas in the production use of energy; and (5) international coopera- in the production and use of energy. This be the first in the series of plenary meetings of World Power Conference to give extensive con-ration to questions relating to atomic energy. he World Power Conference has national committees or representatives in the following countries and areas: Algeria, Argentine Republic, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Saar, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.

ECE Coal Committee

The Department of State announced on June 14 (press release 323) that Albert L. Lynn, vice president of the Island Creek Coal Company, Huntington, W. Va., has been designated the U.S. delegate to the series of meetings to be held at Geneva, Switzerland, under the auspices of the Coal Committee of the Economic Commission for Europe, during the week of June 25, 1956. This Committee is one of the principal subsidiary organs established by the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, which is concerned with the demand, supply, and consumption of coal in the European market. The Coal Trade Subcommittee, which convenes on June 25, will be followed by meetings of the Classification Working Party, June 26–28, and the Utilization Working Party, June 29–30.

Mr. Lynn will be assisted at these meetings by T. Reed Scollon, Chief, Division of Bituminous Coal, U.S. Bureau of Mines, Department of the Interior, and by a member of the U.S. resident delegation at Geneva.

International Civil Aviation Organization

The Department of State announced on June 14 (press release 325) that the U.S. Government will be represented by the following delegation at the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), which will convene its 10th session at Caracas, Venezuela, on June 19, 1956:

Delegates

Thomas B. Wilson, *chairman*, Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce for Transportation

Joseph H. FitzGerald, Director, Bureau of Air Operations, Civil Aeronautics Board

Harold A. Jones, U.S. Representative on the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization

Claude H. Smith, Chief ICAO Officer, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Henry T. Snowdon, Assistant Chief, Aviation Division, Department of State

Alternate Delegates

H. Alberta Colclaser, Chief, Air Transport Relations, Aviation Division, Department of State

Godfrey H. Summ, Office of International Administration, Department of State

Members of Delegation

William B. Becker, Director of Operations, Air Transport Association of America, Inc.

Robert L. Froman, Associate Director, Bureau of Safety Regulations, Civil Aeronautics Board

Joan Stacy Gravatte, Aviation Division, Department of State

Alfred Hand, Chief, ICAO Division, International Region, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Mary C. Hillyer, Assistant Chief, Foreign Air Division, Civil Aeronautics Board

Paul Reiber, Assistant to the General Counsel, Air Transport Association of America, Inc.

Frederick L. Smith, Colonel, USAF, Assistant Chief, Civil Air Branch, Department of the Air Force

John H. Wanner, Associate General Counsel, Civil Aeronautics Board

Secretary of Delegation

Hampton Davis, Office of International Conferences, Department of State

The forthcoming session, which will be the first meeting of the Assembly to be held in Latin America, will undertake a comprehensive review of all matters (technical, economic, legal, administrative, budgetary) pertaining to the past and future work of the organization. It is anticipated that special attention will be given to the problem of providing air-navigation facilities and services to meet the needs of international civil air transport, which is developing rapidly both in volume and type of planes used.

The Assembly is the supreme body of ICAO, in which all member states (69 at present) are entitled to be represented. As provided in article 48 (a) of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, the Assembly has met annually since ICAO came into existence in 1947. In accordance with the established policy of holding major sessions of the Assembly every 3 years and confining intervening sessions mainly to consideration of ac ministrative, budgetary, and financial matter this will be a major session for the examination c all phases of the organization's work.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Agriculture

International plant protection convention. Done at Rom December 6, 1951. Entered into force April 3, 1952
Adherence deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist Repul lics, April 24, 1956.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention. Signed a Buenos Aires December 22, 1952. Entered into forc January 1, 1954. TIAS 3266.
Ratification deposited (with a declaration): Albani May 16, 1956.

Trade and Commerce

Fourth protocol of rectifications and modifications t annexes and to texts of schedules to the General Agre ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 1955.[2]
Signatures: Czechoslovakia, March 1, 1956; Franc May 23, 1956.
Declaration deposited (recognizing signature as bin ing): Federal Republic of Germany, June 5, 1956.

Declaration on continued application of schedules to th General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done a Geneva March 10, 1955. Entered into force March 1 1955. TIAS 3437.
Signature: Greece, February 23, 1956.
Declaration deposited (recognizing signature as bin ing): Federal Republic of Germany, May 30, 1956.

Protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Don at Geneva March 10, 1955.[2]
Signatures: Luxembourg, February 22, 1956[3]; Czech slovakia, March 1, 1956; Pakistan, May 24, 1956.

Protocol amending preamble and parts II and III of th General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done a Geneva March 10, 1955.[2]
Signatures: Luxembourg, February 22, 1956[3]; Czech slovakia, March 1, 1956; Pakistan, May 24, 1956.

Protocol of organizational amendments to the Gener Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Genev March 10, 1955.[2]
Signatures: Luxembourg, February 22, 1956[3]; Pakista May 24, 1956.

Agreement on Organization for Trade Cooperation. Don at Geneva March 10, 1955.[2]
Signatures: Luxembourg, February 22, 1956[3]; Pakista May 24, 1956.

[1] Not in force for the United States.
[2] Not in force.
[3] Subject to ratification.

tocol of rectification to French text of the General greement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva June 5, 1955.[2]
ignatures: Luxembourg, February 22, 1956[3]; Czechoslovakia, March 1, 1956.
h protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts f schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and rade. Done at Geneva December 3, 1955.[2]
ignatures: France, May 23, 1956; Pakistan, May 24, 1956.
cès verbal of rectification concerning the protocol[2] mending part I and articles XXIX and XXX of the eneral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the protocol[2] mending the preamble and parts II and III of the general agreement, and the protocol[2] of organizational mendments to the general agreement. Done at Geneva ecember 3, 1955.
ignatures: Luxembourg and Union of South Africa, February 22, 1956; United Kingdom, March 1, 1956; Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, May 23, 1956; Pakistan, May 24, 1956.
th protocol of supplementary concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and annexed chedules. Done at Geneva May 23, 1956.[2] Schedule f each contracting party enters into force on the thirieth day following day of notification of intention to pply concessions, or on such earlier date as the conracting party may specify in notification.
ignatures: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Haiti, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.

BILATERAL

stria

reement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic nergy. Signed at Washington June 8, 1956. Enters nto force on the day on which each Government shall eceive from the other Government written notification hat it has complied with all statutory and constituional requirements.

ile

rplus commodity agreement pursuant to title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act f 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454, 455; 69 Stat. 44, 721). Signed at Santiago March 13, 1956.
Entered into force: June 2, 1956 (date of Chilean notification of approval in accordance with its constitutional procedures).

land

reement providing for reciprocal extension of the vaidity period of visas for certain nonimmigrants. Effected by exchange of notes at Reykjavik June 4, 1956. Entered into force: June 4, 1956.

q

reement providing for the reciprocal issuance of nonimmigrant passport visas. Effected by exchange of notes at Baghdad June 6, 1956. Entered into force June 6, 1956.

w Zealand

reement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 13, 1956. Enters into force on the day on which each Government shall receive from the other Government written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements.

Paraguay

Agreement for reciprocal import privileges for nondiplomatic personnel. Effected by exchange of notes at Asunción May 9 and 11, 1956. Entered into force May 11, 1956.

United Kingdom

Agreement for the sale of tobacco to the United Kingdom and the construction of military dependents' housing and community facilities for use of the United States Air Force in the United Kingdom. Effected by exchange of notes at London June 5, 1956. Entered into force June 5, 1956.

Agreement amending the agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy of June 15, 1955 (TIAS 3321). Signed at Washington June 13, 1956. Enters into force on the date on which each Government shall receive from the other Government written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1955. Pub. 6243. International Organization and Conference Series III, 111. 202 pp. 70¢.

This report, covering fiscal year 1955, is the eighth annual report by the United States to the United Nations, pursuant to article 88 of the United Nations Charter, on the administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Previous reports in the series were published by the Department of the Navy, 1948–1951 and the Department of the Interior, 1952 and 1953. Material for the 1954 report and the present report was furnished by the Department of the Interior and the Department of the Navy.

New Opportunities in the U.S. Foreign Service. Pub. 6284. Department and Foreign Service Series 51. 20 pp. 15¢.

A revised pamphlet describing the increasing opportunities in a wide variety of assignments both at home and abroad.

The International Educational Exchange Program—Fifteenth Semiannual Report to Congress, January 1–June 30, 1955. Pub. 6293. International Information and Cultural Series 44. 57 pp. 20¢.

The report reviews the activities carried out by the International Educational Exchange Service of the Department of State during the period January 1–June 30, 1955, together with an appraisal of their effectiveness.

Educational Exchange Grants. Pub. 6301. International Organization and Cultural Series 45. 25 pp. 15¢.

A pamphlet which gives the full story of the International Educational Exchange Program, opportunities offered, selection of grantees, etc.

You and the United Nations, 1956. Pub. 6302. International Organization and Conference Series III, 113. 27 pp. 15¢.

An illustrated revised pamphlet in which Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. Representative to the U.N., answers typical citizens' questions about the United Nations.

Human Values in Social Change—in South and Southeast Asia and in the United States. Pub. 6328. International Organization and Conference Series IV, UNESCO 31. 33 pp. Limited distribution.

A work paper, prepared under the auspices of the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, for the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, for the Conference on Asian-American Cultural Relations held April 19–May 19, 1956, in Ann Arbor, Boston, Louisville, Minneapolis, San Francisco and Washington.

Whaling. TIAS 3198. Pub. 5899. 10 pp. 10¢.

Amendments to the schedule to the international whaling convention—Signed at Washington on December 2, 1946. Adopted at the Sixth Meeting of the International Whaling Commission, Tokyo, July 19–23, 1954. Entered into force November 8, 1954, and February 17 and 24, 1955.

Certificates of Airworthiness for Imported Aircraft. TIAS 3200. Pub. 5901. 7 pp. 10¢.

Arrangement between the United States and the Union of South Africa. Exchange of notes—Signed at Pretoria October 29, 1954, and February 22, 1955. Entered into force February 22, 1955.

Guaranty of Private Investments. TIAS 3202. Pub. 5944. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Guatemala. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington March 23, 1955. Entered into force March 23, 1955.

Guaranty of Private Investments. TIAS 3203. Pub. 5945. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Peru. Exchange of notes—Signed at Lima March 14 and 16, 1955. Entered into force March 16, 1955.

Economic Cooperation—Informational Media Guaranty Program. TIAS 3206. Pub. 5905. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Egypt. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington March 3 and 7, 1955. Entered into force March 7, 1955.

United States Military Mission With the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie. TIAS 3207. Pub. 5906. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Iran—Extending agreement of November 27, 1943, as amended and extended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tehran March 15 and 19, 1955. Entered into force March 19, 1955.

Cooperative Agricultural Program in Peru. TIAS 3208. Pub. 5919. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Peru—Extending agreement of September 15 and 21, 1950. Exchange of notes—Signed at Lima February 23 and March 9, 1955. Entered into force March 10, 1955.

Technical Cooperation—Community Welfare Program. TIAS 3209. Pub. 5920. 16 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Iraq—Signed at Baghdad March 2, 1955. Entered into force March 2, 1955.

Relief Supplies and Equipment—Duty-Free Entry and Exemption from Internal Taxation. TIAS 3210. Pub. 5921. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Chile. E change of notes—Signed at Santiago April 5, 1 Entered into force April 5, 1955.

Agriculture—Cooperative Program in Bolivia. TIAS 3 Pub. 5924. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Bolivia— tending agreement of June 13 and 18, 1952. Excha of notes—Signed at La Paz February 25 and March 1955. Entered into force March 18, 1955.

Defense—Loan of Vessels and Small Craft to Chi TIAS 3215. Pub. 6143. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and China—Ame ing agreement of May 14, 1954. Exchange of note Signed at Taipei March 22 and 31, 1955. Entered i force March 31, 1955.

Naval Mission to Ecuador. TIAS 3220. Pub. 5934. 4 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Ecuador— tending agreement of December 12, 1940, as modified a extended. Exchange of notes—Dated at Washing August 30 and December 6, 1954. Entered into force cember 6, 1954.

Establishment and Operation of SHAPE Air Defe Technical Center. TIAS 3236. Pub. 6011. 39 pp. 2

Agreement between the United States and the Netherlan Exchange of notes—Signed at The Hague December 1954. Entered into force December 14, 1954. And Neth lands note—Dated January 15, 1955.

Military Assistance. TIAS 3240. Pub. 6263. 12 pp. 1

Agreement between the United States and Cambod Exchange of notes—Signed at Phnom Penh May 16, 19 Entered into force May 16, 1955.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3248. P 6063. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Finland Signed at Helsinki May 6, 1955. Entered into force M 6, 1955. With related exchange of notes—Dated at H sinki May 6, 1955.

Mutual Defense Assistance—Japanese Financial Co tributions. TIAS 3314. Pub. 6154. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Japan. E change of notes—Signed at Tokyo July 12, 1955. E tered into force July 12, 1955.

Mutual Defense. TIAS 3283. Pub. 5935. 12 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Guatemala Signed at Guatemala City June 18, 1955. Entered in force June 18, 1955.

Establishment of Mexican-United States Commission f Prevention of Foot-and-Mouth Disease. TIAS 33 Pub. 5996. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Mexico. E change of notes—Signed at Washington August 26, 19 Entered into force August 26, 1952.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. TIAS 34 Pub. 6282. 6 pp. 5¢.

Procès-Verbal extending the validity of the Declarati Regulating Commercial Relations between certain co tracting parties and Japan, pursuant to paragraph 1 (of that Declaration—Done at Geneva February 1, 195 Entered into force with respect to the United Stat March 21, 1955.

merican Principles. A Peaceful Crusade for Freedom (Nixon) 1043

tomic Energy
toms-for-Peace Agreements With New Zealand, Dominican Republic 1071
eport on Atomic Radiation Transmitted to U.N. (Lodge) 1078
.S. and U.K. Agree To Extend Cooperation in Atomic Energy 1071

ustria. U.S. Concern for Refugees (Phillips) . . 1077

hina, Communist
mbassadorial Talks at Geneva With Chinese Communists 1070
ranscript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . 1063

ongress, The
ongressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy 1053
resident Reports to Congress on Certain Tariff Increases 1062

uba. Results of 1956 Tariff Negotiations . . . 1054

ominican Republic. Atoms-for-Peace Agreements With New Zealand, Dominican Republic . . . 1071

conomic Affairs
merican Business Abroad and the National Interest (Hoover) 1049
CE Coal Committee 1079
ermany Frees Many Imports From United States . 1048
nternational Civil Aviation Organization . . . 1079
resident Reports to Congress on Certain Tariff Increases 1062
esults of 1956 Tariff Negotiations 1054
Vorld Power Conference 1078

ducational Exchange. A Peaceful Crusade for Freedom (Nixon) 1043

urope
CE Coal Committee 1079
he Impact of the United States on Europe (Eleanor Dulles) 1072
ranscript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . 1063

ermany
ermany Frees Many Imports From United States . 1048
alks With Chancellor Adenauer of Germany (text of joint communique) 1047

nternational Organizations and Meetings
CE Coal Committee 1079
nternational Civil Aviation Organization 1079
.S. Concern for Refugees (Phillips) 1077
Vorld Power Conference 1078

lutual Security. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference 1063

ew Zealand. Atoms-for-Peace Agreements With New Zealand, Dominican Republic 1071

orth Atlantic Treaty Organization. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference 1063

residential Documents
President Reports to Congress on Certain Tariff Increases 1062
Results of 1956 Tariff Negotiations 1057

Protection of Nationals. Ambassadorial Talks at Geneva With Chinese Communists 1070

Publications. Recent Releases 1081

Refugees and Displaced Persons
Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . 1063
U.S. Concern for Refugees (Phillips) 1077

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference 1063

Treaty Information
Atoms-for-Peace Agreements With New Zealand, Dominican Republic 1071
Current Actions 1080
U.S. and U.K. Agree To Extend Cooperation in Atomic Energy 1071

U.S.S.R. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference 1063

United Kingdom. U.S. and U.K. Agree To Extend Cooperation in Atomic Energy 1071

United Nations
ECE Coal Committee 1079
International Civil Aviation Organization 1079
Report on Atomic Radiation Transmitted to U.N. (Lodge) 1078

Name Index

Adenauer, Konrad 1047
Dulles, Eleanor 1072
Dulles, Secretary 1047, 1063
Eisenhower, President 1057, 1062
Hoover, Herbert, Jr. 1049
Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr. 1078
Nixon, Vice President 1043
Phillips, Christopher H. 1077

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: June 11–17

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Press release issued prior to June 11 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 297 of June 6 and 303 of June 6 and 8.

No.	Date	Subject
*308	6/11	Hill: "The Importance of Patriotism."
*309	6/11	Educational exchange.
*310	6/11	Educational exchange.
*311	6/11	Dowling sworn in as Ambassador to Korea.
312	6/12	Dulles: Khrushchev speech (combined with No. 314).
313	6/12	Dulles: visa allotments in Refugee Relief Act (combined with No. 314).
314	6/12	Dulles: news conference transcript.
315	6/12	Reply to Communist statement on Geneva talks.
316	6/13	Germany frees imports from U.S.
317	6/13	Eleanor Dulles: "The Impact of the U.S. on Europe."
318	6/13	Atomic agreement with New Zealand (rewrite).
†319	6/14	Strong: Norway in the Postwar Era."
320	6/13	Proclamation on 1956 tariff negotiations.
*321	6/13	Educational exchange.
322	6/13	Joint communique on Adenauer-Dulles talks.
323	6/14	ECE delegation (rewrite).
*324	6/14	Educational exchange.
325	6/14	ICAO delegation (rewrite).
326	6/14	Atomic agreement with U.K.
*327	6/14	Program for Pineau visit.
328	6/15	Atomic agreement with Dominican Republic (rewrite).
329	6/16	Hoover: "American Business Abroad and the National Interest."
†330	6/16	Murphy: statement on arrival of Pineau.

*Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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A recent release in the popular Background series . . .

Thailand

Thailand is a predominantly agricultural country of small rural communities and relatively few cities and large towns. The agricultural economy is based almost entirely on small-scale, peasant-type family operations, with a majority of the farm operators holding title to their land.

Long known to the world as Siam, this southeastern country of magnificent scenery, of great fertility, and of a largely homogeneous population has never been a colony, even though in the past her neighbors on every side have fallen under foreign rule.

Today, true to its historical tradition, Thailand is determined to resist all Communist imperialist efforts to infiltrate and subvert it, and to impose upon it the new colonialism of world communism.

This 15-page illustrated pamphlet tells about the land, the people, and the industries of this nation that is a little smaller than Texas with a population of approximately 20 million, and discusses briefly the role of Thailand in world affairs.

Copies of this publication may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C.

Publication 6296 **10 cents**

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B
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NDEX

VOLUME XXXIV: Numbers 862–887

January 2–June 25, 1956

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Corrections in Volume XXXIV

The Editor of the BULLETIN wishes to call attention to the following errors:

January 30, page 180, "Extension of U.S.–Ecuadoran Trade Agreement": The date in the second line should be July 17 rather than July 18.

February 13, page 264, "Department Announcement": The second sentence should begin: "M. M. Philip signed for the Government of India . . . ."

March 19, page 452, left-hand column, fifth line from the top: "United Nations" should read "United States."

INDEX

Volume XXXIV, Numbers 862–887, January 2–June 25, 1956

Achilles, Theodore C., 994
Acid-grade fluorspar, escape-clause relief held unnecessary, 569
Adenauer, Konrad, 210, 583, 586, 1047, 1065, 1068
Administrative Tribunal, U.N., General Assembly approval of judicial review of judgments of, 99
Advertising material and commerical samples, international convention to facilitate importation of, 181, 226, 440, 1038
AEC. *See* Atomic Energy Commission
Aerial inspection and exchange of military blueprints. *See under* Disarmament
Afghanistan:
Civil aviation convention, international, protocol amending, 1038
Economic development, 878, 879
Export-Import Bank loan, 795
Genocide, convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of (1948), 622
U.S. aid, 599
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 658
Africa (*see also individual countries*):
U.S. mutual security program:
President's recommendations to Congress, 547, 548
Statements: Allen, 875, 877; Hollister, 609
U.S. policy in, address, article, and statement: Allen, 716; Dulles, 449; Howard, 452, 593
Visit of Assistant Secretary of State Allen, 803
Agricultural Institute, Inter-American, functions and U.S. members of Technical Advisory Council, 28
Agricultural Surplus Disposal, Interagency Committee on, excerpt from report by study group, 1019
Agricultural surpluses, U.S., use in overseas programs:
Address and statement: Benson, 53; Dulles, 541
Agreements with—
Argentina, 27, 74; Austria, 308, 398, 680; Burma, 308, 317; Chile, 532, 533, 694, 1081; Colombia, 27, 74; Egypt, 356, 398; Finland, 270, 658, 865; Germany, Federal Republic of, 28; Greece, 533; Indonesia, 469, 487, 541; Iran, 441; Israel, 317, 356; Italy, 181, 622, 680; Japan, 488; Korea, 532, 533; Pakistan, 488, 578; Paraguay, 804, 907; Peru, 847, 994; Portugal, 1038; Spain, 317, 533, 622; Turkey, 534, 907; U. K., 1081; Yugoslavia, 317
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act:
Address (Armstrong), 304
President's 3d semiannual report to Congress (July 1–Dec. 31, 1955), 130
Disposal problems, 301, 390, 394, 431, 1019
Mutual security program, U.S.:
President's recommendations to Congress, 549
Statement (Hollister), 617
Agricultural surpluses—Continued
Sales to—
Bolivia, 300; Brazil, 337; France, 839; Germany, Federal Republic of, 772; Latin America, 1009; Spain, 46, 47; Yugoslavia, 348
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act. *See under* Agricultural surpluses
Agriculture:
Cooperative program agreement with Dominican Republic, notice of intention to terminate, 441
Farm legislation, approval of, statement (Eisenhower), 982
Plant protection convention, international, 311, 907, 1080
Radioisotopes, use in agriculture, 519
World agriculture, problems in:
FAO Conference, 8th, article (Butz), 434
President's report to Congress, 258
Aid to foreign countries. *See* Economic and technical aid *and* Military assistance
Air Coordinating Committee, Executive order on functions of, 341
Air navigation and transport. *See* Aviation
Aircraft. *See* Aviation
Albania:
Forced labor in, use of, statement (Baker), 903
Telecommunication convention, international, 1080
Aldrich, Winthrop, 798
Algeria, U.S. and French policies in, address and article: Dillon, 553, 554, 555; Howard, 454
Aliens:
Admittance to U.S., proposed legislative changes concerning, 276
Residence in U.S., protection under American laws, 802
Allen, George V., 460, 716, 803, 875
Allison, Ellis K., 398
Allyn, Stanley C., 592
Ambassadorial talks, U.S.-Communist China. *See* Geneva ambassadorial talks
America, The Message of, address (Eisenhower), 633
American Business Abroad and the National Interest, address (Hoover), 1049
American Institute of Architects, 15, 16
American Red Cross, 469
American Republics. *See* Latin America *and individual countries*
American States, Organization of. *See* Organization of American States
Amerika, proposed distribution in U.S.S.R., texts of notes, 18

431265—57——1

Amerikahaus, Munich, 10th anniversary, address (Conant), 327
Amini, Ali, 207
Arab-Israeli dispute:
Address and article: Bergus, 502; Dorsey, 793
Arab refugee problem. *See under* Refugees and displaced persons
Arms supply to Middle East. *See* Arms supply
Egyptian-Israeli observance of armistice agreement, statement (Lodge), 722
Israeli military actions against Syria, 103, 121, 182, 183, 463
U.N. actions:
Security Council resolutions, 628, 1028
Statements: Dulles, 711; Lodge, 627, 1025; Wadsworth, 1025
U.S. position:
Address, article, and statements: Allen, 876; Dulles, 282, 283, 368, 711; Heath, 203; Howard, 458, 461, 603, 604
Exchange of correspondence (Dulles, Members of House of Representatives), 285, 286
U.S.-British views on settlement of, joint statement (Eisenhower, Eden), 233
Arab States:
Arms supply policy. *See* Arms supply
Policy of Spain toward, 45
U.S. mutual security program (1957), statement (Hollister), 611
Arbitral Commission on property rights and interests in Germany, charter of, 106
Argentina:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 7
Poliomyelitis epidemic, U.S. aid, 469, 527
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Agricultural surpluses, agreements with U.S., 27, 28, 74
Extradition, convention on, 953
Organization of American States, charter of the, 782
Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, convention with final protocols, regulations of execution, and parcel post and money orders agreements, 398
Wheat agreement, international, 907
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 865
U.S. relations with, address (Nufer), 839
Armaments (*see also* Disarmament):
Advanced weapons systems, President's recommendation to Congress for mutual security program, 547
Near East. *See* Arms supply
Reduction of:
Address (Dulles), 740, 745
General Assembly resolution, 63
U.S.-Soviet positions, address and statements: Dulles, 880, 881, 882, 883; Lodge, 58, 59, 62, 68; Wilcox, 115
Soviet armed strength, 332
U.S. weapons, delivery to Federal Republic of Germany under mutual defense assistance agreement, 162
Armed forces:
Canadian forces in Germany, agreement between U.S. and Canada regarding application of forces and finance conventions and tax agreement, 356
Germany, East, creation of "People's" Army, 245
Armed forces—Continued
Germany, Federal Republic of, training by U.S., 162
Prisoners of war, Geneva convention relative to treatment of, 907
Reduction of, proposed, Soviet-U.S. positions, address and statements: Dulles, 880, 881, 883, 885, 920; Lodge, 58, 59, 64, 68; Wilcox, 115
Soviet increase in strength of, 546
Spanish forces, training of, 46
Armed forces, U.S.:
American war graves, agreement with Netherlands extending 1947 agreement, 658
Military missions, U.S., agreements with—
Honduras, 994; Iran, 533; Peru, 578
Personnel strength, excerpt from President's message to Congress, 149
Question of removal from Iceland, statement (Dulles), 639
Armed Forces Day, statement (Dulles), 874
Arms supply to the Middle East:
Israel, question of arms shipments to, statements (Dulles), 285, 287, 369, 640, 641, 642, 643, 713
Saudi Arabia, U.S. sale of tanks to, 326
Suspension of U.S. export licenses, 325
U.S. policy, statements and article: Dulles, 196, 197, 604; Eisenhower, 604; Howard, 460, 603, 604
Armstrong, Hamilton Fish, 953
Armstrong, Willis C., 301
Artibonite Valley project, Haiti, agreement with U.S. providing assistance for, 106
Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia (*see also individual countries*):
Economic situation, statements (Jones, Kotschnig), 388, 392, 394, 395
Free Asia's importance, chart, 614
Importance to U.S. national security, statement (Dulles), 787
Report on, address (Dulles), 539
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. *See* Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
U.N. technical assistance, statement (Bell), 486
U.S. aid, 448, 792
U.S. mutual security program:
Address and statements: Allen, 875, 878; Dulles, 541, 787; Hollister, 609, 611, 612; Robertson, 723
President's recommendations to Congress, 547, 548
U. S. policy, article and statement: Dulles, 449; Howard, 452, 593
Visit of Secretary Dulles, itinerary, 241
Asian Nuclear Center, choice of site for, 544
Aswan Dam, status of, article and statements: Dulles, 11, 642, 920; Howard, 596
Asylum, U.S. policy on right of, 939
Atlantic Community (*see also* North Atlantic Council *and* North Atlantic Treaty Organization):
Development of:
Address and statement (Dulles), letter (Eisenhower), and NAC communique, 831
Joint communique (Adenauer, Dulles), 1048
Distinction between NATO and Atlantic Community, statement (Dulles), 1048

tomic energy, cooperation regarding atomic information:
North Atlantic Treaty, agreement between parties for cooperation, 73, 106, 226, 622, 668
U.S. and Britain, joint statement (Eisenhower, Eden), 234
tomic energy, nuclear explosions:
Pacific nuclear tests:
Marshall Islands petition requesting cessation of, 689
U.S. note to Japanese Government, 566
U.S. views on, statement (Gerig), 576
Soviet bomb test, and U.S. position on proposed suspension of hydrogen bomb tests, statement (Dulles), 122
tomic energy, peaceful uses of:
Addresses: Dillon, 518; Wilcox, 114
Agreements with—
Austria, 1038, 1066, 1081; Costa Rica, 907; Dominican Republic, 1071; Germany, Federal Republic of, 92, 326, 356, 782; Greece, 594; Ireland, 564, 578; Israel, 594; Japan, 106; Korea, 270, 317; Lebanon, 594; Netherlands, 106; New Zealand, 1071, 1081; Pakistan, 594; Peru, 226; Sweden, 181; Thailand, 534, 590, 622; Turkey, 594; U.K., 1071, 1081; Uruguay, 141, 142
Asia, economic progress through use of the atom, statement (Jones), 390
Asian Nuclear Center, choice of site for, 544
Atomic energy libraries, presentation by U.S. to U.N. and other nations, 656
Brookhaven National Laboratory, 544*n*
Distribution of nuclear materials, foreign and domestic:
Heavy water, sale by U.S., 592
Isotopes, stable, and rare earths, 385
Radioisotopes, revised regulations, 208
Uranium 235, statements (Eisenhower, Strauss), 469, 470
ECOSOC study on economic development factors of atomic energy, 657, 816, 819
Foreign atomic energy activity, AEC regulation concerning, 309
German Federal Minister for Atomic Affairs, visit to U.S., 797
International Atomic Energy Agency. *See* Atomic Energy Agency
Nuclear-powered ship, President's request to Congress for funds for, 150
U.K. assistance to Baghdad Pact countries in development of, 18
U.S. aid to Spain, address (John Lodge), 127
U.S. atomic experts, visits to Japan, Thailand, Pakistan, and Turkey, 509
U.S. efforts for, excerpts from President's message to Congress, 147, 150
omic energy, radiation effects on human health:
General Assembly action, 98
Report to U.N., transmission letter (Lodge), 1078
U.N. Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, 1st meeting, article (Warren) and U.S. delegates, 533, 860
U.S. note to Japanese Government re nuclear tests in the Pacific, 567
Atomic Energy Agency, International:
Draft statute:
Appointment of U.S. representative to negotiations on, 210
Working-level meeting on, 438
12-nation talks, conclusion of, final communique and adopted text, 729
Text and letter of transmittal (Wadsworth), 852
Establishment of:
Progress report on negotiations, letters (Eisenhower, Patterson), 4
U.N. action, 97
U.S. views, statement (Dulles), 161
Functions and U.S. position on, address (Wadsworth), 898
Relationship to U.N., 114,115
Atomic Energy Commission, 309, 470, 471
Atomic Energy Community, European:
Discussions concerning, statement (Dulles), 282
Importance of, address (Eleanor Dulles), 1075
Atomic weapons, international control of. *See under* Disarmament
Atoms-for-peace. *See* Atomic energy, peaceful uses of
Australia:
Heavy water, purchase from U.S., 592
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Commercial samples and advertising material, international convention to facilitate importation of, 226, 440
GATT, procès verbal, and amending protocols, 441, 658, 953, 1081
Wheat agreement, international, 907
U.S. Ambassador, resignation (Peaslee), 186; confirmation (Moffat), 398
Austria:
Claims for property seized during the German occupation, deadline for filing extended, 49
Director of Administration, American Embassy, Vienna, delegation of authority, public notice, 142
Postwar development of, address (Eleanor Dulles), 1073, 1074
Social security benefits, coverage of U.S. residents, 886
Tariff concessions to U.S., renegotiation of, 350
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Agricultural surpluses, agreement with U.S., 308, 398, 680
Atomic energy, agreement with U.S., 1038, 1066, 1081
Civil aviation convention, international, protocol amending, 1038
GATT, 5th protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules, 733
GATT, 6th protocol of supplementary concessions, 1081
IFC, articles of agreement, 73
Nitrogenous fertilizer, agreement with U.S. for financing delivery to Spain, 658
Private road vehicles, customs convention on temporary importation of, 658
Telecommunication convention, international, 994
Touring, convention concerning customs facilities for, 658
Wheat agreement, international, 907

Austria—Continued
U.S. contributions to refugees located in, 1077, 1078
U.S. visa applications for escapees residing in, 1024
Auto travel, international. *See* Travel
Aviation:
Aerial inspection and exchange of military blueprints. *See under* Disarmament
Air Force, German, training by U.S. under mutual defense assistance agreement, 163
Aircraft industry, relationship to U.S. foreign trade policy, address (Kalijarvi), 1014
Civil aviation, U.S.-U.K. discussions on 374, 528
Civil Aviation Organization, International. *See* International Civil Aviation Organization
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Air navigation equipment, agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany relating to lease of, 181
Air services transit agreement, international, 823 (status list), 864
Air transport agreement, international, status list, 823
Air transport agreements with—
Canada, 142; Germany, Federal Republic of, 733; India, 264, 317; Netherlands, negotiations, 378, 650
Aircraft, imported, agreement with Netherlands relating to certificates of airworthiness, 1038
Aircraft, rights in, convention on international recognition of, 141
Aircraft assembly or manufacture in Japan, agreement with Japan for program of, 782
Civil aviation, agreement with Colombia for technical cooperation activities in, 865
Civil aviation, international, convention on, and amending protocol, 181, 782, 822 (status list), 864, 865, 994, 1038
Transportation by air, convention and protocol for unification of rules relating to, 73
U.S. claims for destruction of aircraft. *See under* Claims

Baghdad Pact:
Development and functions, article (Howard), 510
Importance to Middle East security, joint statement (Eisenhower, Eden), 233
Pakistani membership, evaluation of, statement (Dulles), 282
U.S. support of, address and statements: Aldrich, 800; Allen, 875; Dulles, 119, 121
Baghdad Pact Council:
1st meeting: text of communique, 16
2d meeting: U.S. delegation, 637; statements (Henderson, Seager) and text of final communique, 753, 754
Baker, John C., 657, 816, 903, 949
Balas, Cornel, 247
Ball, M. Margaret, 649
Balloons, meteorological and propaganda, use of:
Letter and statements: Dulles, 280, 281, 283, 284; Lodge, 428
U.S.-Soviet positions, texts of notes and Department of Defense announcement, 293, 426
Baltic peoples, U.S. attitude toward plight of, statement (Dulles), 331
Bandung conference, impact on 10th General Assembly, 111, 112
Bank for Reconstruction and Development. *See* International Bank
Barco, James W., 732
Barnes, Robert G., 488
Barringer, J. Paul, 982
Baughman, Ernest T., 1019
Beach, Arthur E., 85, 356
Beans, dry, distribution of surpluses for use in domestic and overseas programs, 53
Beaulac, Willard L., 865
Belgian Congo, extension of international telecommunication convention to, 782
Belgium:
Imports from dollar area, removal of restrictions on, 1048
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
GATT, procès verbal and amending protocols, 441, 622, 953, 1081
Ice patrol, North Atlantic, agreement regarding financial support, 533
OTC, agreement on, 441
Patent rights and technical information for defense purposes, agreement with U.S. for exchange of, 104, 577
Telecommunication convention, international, notification of extension to Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, 782
Wheat agreement, international, 907
Bell, Elliott V., 96
Bell, Laird, 98, 100, 117*n*, 486
Belton, William, 270
Benjamin Franklin Foundation (*see also* Franklin, Benjamin), membership and director, 15, 886
Bennett, Henry Garland, 792
Benson, Ezra Taft, 53, 435
Bergus, Donald C., 502
Bering Sea, Soviet attack on U.S. aircraft in, U.S. and Soviet notes concerning payment of damages, 94, 96, 559
Berlin:
Addresses concerning: Conant, 669, 671, 673; Hoover, 242
Conference Hall, construction of, 15, 886
Debts of City of Berlin and public utility enterprises, negotiations and agreement, 93, 651, 865
4-power status, statements (Dulles), 8, 12
Herbert Hoover School, remarks and message (Hoover) on dedication of, 243
Mutual security program, U.S.:
President's report to Congress, excerpt, 548
Statements: Elbrick, 679; Hollister, 609
Soviet sector, development of para-military activities, U.S. note of protest, 293
U.S. assistance during Berlin blockade, address (Eleanor Dulles), 1075
U.S.-British views concerning, joint statement (Eisenhower, Eden), 233

ls of lading, international convention (1924) for unification of certain rules relating to, 694
partisanship in foreign policy, statement (Dulles), 199
shop, Max W., 208, 226
ssonette, Father Georges, 19, 20
usteln, Jacob, 99, 117*n*
livia:
Civil aviation convention, international, protocol amending, 1038
Economic aid to, 300
nformational media guaranty program, agreement with U.S., 578
Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, convention, final protocols, regulations of execution, and parcel post and money orders agreements, 398
Wheat agreement, international, 907
lton, Rep. Frances P., 651, 953
mbing range near Cuxhaven, Germany, agreement with the Federal Republic amending agreement relating to the use of, 142
ris, Archbishop, 19
undary waters, U.S.–Canadian, joint study proposed, 940
wie, Robert R., 196, 356
wman, Raymond T., 440
ady, Frederick J., 210
azil:
Export-Import Bank loans, 299, 1018
ndustrial progress and expansion, address (Nixon), 336
President-elect, visit to U.S., remarks and addresses (Dulles, Kubitschek), 86,87
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, convention, final protocols, regulations of execution, and parcel post agreement, 398
Safety of life at sea, convention on (1948), 622
Wheat agreement, international, 907
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 994
U.S.–Brazilian friendship, address (Nixon), 335
Vice President, visit to U.S., announcements and remarks (Goulart, Hoover, Nixon), 681, 756, 803, 804
ggs, Ellis O., 994
nkley, Homer L., 96
okenburr, Robert L., 100, 117*n*
ookhaven National Laboratory, 544*n*
ican, Silviu, 791
icker, Wilber M., 981
ies, Austin Moore, 98
issels Treaty, 881, 882
hanan, Wiley T., Jr., 226
ldhism, anniversary of founding, statement (Dulles), 926
lget, U.S.:
Formulation of, statement (Dulles), 160
President's message to Congress, excerpts, 147
lding, Civil Engineering, and Public Works Committee (ILO), 5th session, U.S. delegation, 864
lganin, Nikolai, exchanges of correspondence with President Eisenhower:
Disarmament and U.S.-Soviet relations, text and statement (Dulles), 515, 1068
Bulganin, Nikolai—Continued
Treaty of friendship between U.S.S.R. and U.S., proposed, text and statements (Dulles), 193, 279, 280
Bulgaria, convention (1946) for partial revision of conventions adopted by the ILO General Conference, 622
Bunker, Ellsworth, 651, 953
Buraimi, U.S.–Saudi Arabian dispute concerning, 465
Burma:
Communist aggression in, 725
International Bank loan, 889
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Agricultural surpluses, agreement with U.S., 308, 317
Cultural property, convention (1954) for protection in event of armed conflict, regulations of execution and protocol, 694
Genocide, convention (1948) for prevention and punishment of crime of, 694
Slavery convention (1926), protocol amending and annex, 658
U.S. aid, proposed, 569
Burns, Maj. Gen. E. L. M., 182*n*, 183, 282, 462, 463
Butterworth, Walton W., 441
Butz, Earl L., 434
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (*see also* Soviet Union), international telecommunication convention (1952), 658
Byroade, Henry A., 124

Cabot, John Moors, 800
Caffery, Jefferson, 565
Calendar of international meetings, 29, 220, 386, 571, 776, 942
Calkins, Robert D., 651, 953
Cambodia:
Civil aviation, international, convention on, 181
Economic progress in, 447
Mekong River, request for ICA survey, 52
Touring, convention concerning customs facilities for, 73
U.S. aid, 726
U.S. policy, 727
Cameroons, French, progress in, statement (Gerig), 730
Canada:
Boundary waters, U.S.–Canadian, joint study proposed, 940
Disarmament, 4-power (U.S., Canada, France, U.K.) declaration of principles relating to, 838
Heads of Government meeting (U.S., Canada, Mexico). *See* Heads of Government meeting
International Joint Commission, U.S.–Canada:
Functions, 940
Lake Ontario, levels of, discussions and U.S. approval of recommendations, 89, 91, 92
St. Lawrence Seaway. *See* St. Lawrence Seaway
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Air transport agreement with U.S. (1949), agreement amending schedule 2 relating to routes, 142
Canadian forces in Germany, agreement with U.S. regarding application of forces and finance conventions and tax agreement, 356

Canada—Continued
Treaties, agreements, etc.—Continued
Family housing units at Pepperrell Air Force Base, agreement with U.S. relating to construction of, 865
GATT, procès verbal and amending protocol, 953, 1081
Great Lakes fisheries convention with U.S., implementation of, statement (Looney), 890
IFC, articles of agreement, 73
Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, convention, final protocols, regulations of execution, and parcel post agreement, 398
Radar stations in Canada, agreements with U.S. providing for establishment and operation of, 74
Wheat agreement, international, 907
U.S. Ambassador, resignation (Stuart), 1038; confirmation (Merchant), 865
Canada, Royal Bank of, participation in loan to Haiti, 889
Captive peoples, U.S. policy on liberation of, statements (Eisenhower, Hagerty), 84
Captured files and archives of the former German Foreign Office at present in U.K. territory, agreement relating to return of, 865
Caracas Declaration of *1954*, 200, 712, 713, 839
Caribbean Commission–FAO Technical Conference on Cooperatives, agenda of 2d conference and U.S. delegation, 224
Carpenter, I. W., Jr., 142, 226
Cassady, John H., 16
Cauca Valley region, agreement with Colombia for interchange of technical knowledge and skills for development, 106
Cemeteries, military. *See* Military cemeteries
Central Intelligence Agency, appointment of board of consultants for review of foreign intelligence activities, announcement and letters (Eisenhower), 161
Ceylon:
Development assistance program, agreement with U.S. providing for, 821
Economic development, problem of, statement (Allen), 878, 879
Private road vehicles, customs convention on temporary importation of, 73
Tariff concessions to U.S., GATT, renegotiation of, 350, 351
Touring, convention concerning customs facilities for, 73
Charlone, César, 903
Charter of the United Nations. *See* United Nations Charter
Chile:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 295
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Agricultural surpluses, agreements with U.S., 532, 533, 694, 1081
GATT, 6th protocol of supplementary concessions, 1081
IFC, articles of agreement, 73
Postal convention, universal, with final protocol, annex, regulations of execution, and provisions regarding airmail and final protocol, 141
Chile—Continued
Treaties, agreements, etc.—Continued
Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, convention, final protocols, regulations of execution, and parcel post and money orders agreements, 398
Rights in aircraft, international recognition of, convention, 141
Uranium resources, agreement with U.S. for cooperative program of investigations of, 865
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 865
China, Communist:
Economic development, question of, statements (Jones), 388, 393
Forced labor, use of, statement (Baker), 904
Geneva ambassadorial talks. *See* Geneva ambassadorial talks
Recognition by Egypt, statements (Dulles), 920, 923
Student at University of Missouri, complaint concerning alleged prevention from leaving U.S., 52
Subversive tactics in the free world, 789
Trade with, statements (Dulles), 924, 1067
U.N. Command protests of Korean armistice violations, and withdrawal of NNSC from South Korea, statement and exchange of notes, 967, 970
U.N. representation, question of, address (Wilcox), 113
China, Republic of:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 1004
Taiwan. *See* Taiwan
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Civil aviation convention, international, protocol amending, 1038
Mutual defense assistance, agreement with U.S. for disposition of equipment and materials, 994
Passport visas and visa fees, agreement with U.S., 694
Slavery convention (1926), amending protocol and annex, 141
United Nations, veto of membership of Outer Mongolia, 97
U.N. membership, address (Wilcox), 113
U.S. visa applications for refugees of Chinese ethnic origin, cutoff date announced, 810
Chowdhury, Hamidul Haq, 447, 451
Churchill, Winston, 837, 884, 886
CIA. *See* Central Intelligence Agency
Ciudad Trujillo, resolution of, 895, 897 (text)
Civil aviation. *See* Aviation
Civil Aviation Organization, International. *See* International Civil Aviation Organization
Civil defense. *See* National defense and security
Civilian persons, Geneva convention relative to protection in time of war, 907
Civilians, U.S., detention and release by Communist China. *See* Geneva ambassadorial talks
Claims:
Austria, for property seized during German occupation, deadline for filing extended, 49
U.S. claims against—
Czechoslovakia and Soviet Union for destruction of aircaft, action by ICJ, 513
Soviet Union for destruction of aircraft over Bering Sea, texts of notes, 94, 96, 559

ergymen, U.S.-Soviet exchange of notes on issuance of visas to, 19
al and Steel Community, European:
Functions, 833, 1075
U.S. Mission established in Luxembourg, 441
U.S. support of, statement (Dulles), 282
Visit of High Authority President to U. S.:
Announcement, 15
Delegation, 241
Results, announcement and text of communique, 288, 289
oal Committee (ECE), meeting and U.S. delegation, 1079
oal Mines Committee (ILO), 6th session, U.S. delegation, 821
oe, Robert D., 429, 467
Cold war," definition of, statement (Dulles), 749
ollective security (*see also* Mutual defense, Mutual security *and* National defense):
Asia. *See* Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
Development of, address, message, and statement: Dulles, 450; Eisenhower, 79, 80; Wilcox, 842
Europe. *See* European security *and* North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Near and Middle East. *See* Baghdad Pact
Principle of, addresses and statement: Eisenhower, 1004; Gruenther, 334; Murphy, 646
Treaties and agreements, address and statement: Dulles, 908; Murphy, 169
U.N. Charter, collective security under, address (Wilcox), 845, 847
U.S. and free world policy of, addresses and statement: Allen, 875; Eisenhower, 702; Hoover, 323
ollisions at sea, regulations for preventing, 263, 1038
olombia:
Agricultural surpluses, agreement with U.S., 27, 74
Civil aviation, agreement with U.S. for technical cooperation activities in, 865
IFC, articles of agreement, 73
Military assistance, agreement with U.S. providing for disposition of equipment and materials, 694
Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, convention, final protocols, regulations of execution, and parcel post and money orders agreements, 398
Rawinsonde observation station, agreement with U.S. for establishment and operation on island of San Andrés, 782
Technical cooperation, agreement with U.S., 106, 142
olonialism (*see also* Self-determination *and* Trust territories):
Asian countries' rejection of, addresses: Dulles, 539, 540; Sukarno, 935, 937; Wilcox, 111
Communist colonialism, addresses (Murphy), 168, 559
U.S. views on, address and statement: Allen, 717; Gerig, 575
olor television, demonstrations for visitors to U.S., 428
ommerce. *See* Trade
ommercial relations, U.S. and other countries. *See* Economic policy and relations, U.S.; Tariff policy, U.S.; Tariffs and trade, general agreement on; *and* Trade
ommercial samples and advertising material, international convention to facilitate importation of, 181, 226, 440, 1038
Commercial treaties. *See* Trade: Treaties *and* Trade agreements
Communications. *See* Telecommunications
Communism (*see also* China, Communist; Propaganda; and Soviet Union):
Communist Party, 20th Congress of, 556, 557, 558
Forced labor, use in Communist countries, statement (Baker), 903
International communism, problem of, addresses: Allen Dulles, 758; Eisenhower, 915; Murphy, 168, 169, 645, 648; Nufer, 839
National vs. international communism, statement (Dulles), 752
Soviet-Chinese policy of aggression, statements (Dulles), 450, 789
Subversive activities in—
Africa, address (Allen), 716
Asia, addresses and statement: Dulles, 540; Robertson, 723, 972, 973, 974; SEATO communique, 447, 448
East Germany, addresses: Conant, 584, 585; Hoover, 242, 290
Latin America, address and statements: Dulles, 200, 712, 713; Kubitschek, 88
Middle East, address (Heath), 203
Spain, address (John Lodge), 45, 48
U.S. and free-world efforts to combat:
Addresses and statements: Dulles, 872, 873, 1001, 1002; Eden, 236, 238, 240; Murphy, 371, 556; Nixon, 1043; Wilcox, 484, 842, 843
Declaration of Washington, 231, 232
State of the Union message, excerpts, 80, 81, 82
Conant, James B., 48, 210, 293, 327, 583, 669
Conference Hall, Berlin, construction of, 15, 886
Conferences and organizations, international (*see also subject*), calendar of meetings, 29, 220, 386, 571, 776, 942
Congress, Library of:
Fitzpatrick letters, presentation by Irish Prime Minister, 562, 563
Franklin Commemorative Medal, presentation, 249
Congress, U. S.:
Addresses by: President-elect of Brazil, 86; Prime Minister of Great Britain, 235, 237; President of Indonesia, 928; Prime Minister of Ireland, 561, 562; President of Italy, 419
Legislation:
Farm legislation, approval of, statement (Eisenhower), 982
Foreign policy, listed, 138, 252, 353, 370, 471, 570, 673, 775, 983
Sugar Act of 1948, amendment and extension, statement (Eisenhower), 1016
Sugar legislation, U. S., objectives of, statement (McLain), 1017
Legislation, proposed:
Great Lakes fisheries convention with Canada, implementation of, 890
Immigration and Nationality Act, revision of, President's message to Congress and statement (Dulles), 275, 773

Congress, U. S.—Continued
Legislation, proposed—Continued
Sugar legislation, statement (Holland), 172
U.S. mutual security program, statements: Dulles, 871; Hollister, 605
Middle East, U.S. policy in, correspondence with Secretary Dulles, 285, 286
Presidential messages, reports, etc. *See* Eisenhower: Messages, letters, and reports to Congress
State Department relations with Congress, statement (Dulles), 411
Consular service, U.S. *See* Foreign Service
Continental shelf and marine waters. *See* Territorial waters
Control posts for mutual inspection (*see also* Disarmament), Soviet proposals and U.S. position, statements (Lodge), 59, 60, 61, 62, 69
Cooper, John Sherman, 205, 265, 412
Cooperatives, FAO–Caribbean Commission Technical Conference on, agenda of 2d conference and U. S. delegation, 224
Copyright:
American copyrights abroad, protection of, address (Thibodeaux), 24
Universal copyright convention, 141, 263, 865, 1036
Copyright Committee, Intergovernmental, meeting and U. S. delegate, 1036
Corn, distribution of surpluses for use in overseas and domestic programs, 53
Corse, Carl D., 185
Costa Rica:
Atomic energy, agreement with U.S., 907
Friendship agreements with Nicaragua, 339
IFC, articles of agreement, 73
Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, convention, final protocols, regulations of execution, and parcel post and money orders agreements, 398
Wheat agreement, international, 907
Costello, John A., 290, 467, 560, 562
Cotton:
Farm legislation, sections applicable to cotton, 982
Surplus disposal problem, address (Armstrong), 308
U.S. export prospects, 1019, 1020, 1021, 1022
Cotton Advisory Committee, International, 15th plenary meeting, U.S. delegation, 863
Council of Ministers, SEATO. *See under* Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
Creutz, Gustav Philip, 801
Cribbett, Sir George, 528
Crusade for Freedom, importance in combating Communist propaganda, letter (Eisenhower), 636
Cuba:
Sugar legislation, U.S., effects of proposed revision of Sugar Act on Cuban economy, statement (Holland), 172, 173, 174
Tariff concessions to U.S., renegotiation of, 350, 351
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
GATT, amending protocols, 38, 1081
IFC, articles of agreement, 73
Naval vessels, agreement with U.S., for furnishing supplies and services, 226
Cuba—Continued
Treaties, agreements, etc.—Continued
Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, convention, final protocols, regulations of execution, and parcel post and money orders agreements, 398
U. S. preferential tariff treatment of certain Cuban products, 1057, 1059, 1062
Culbertson, Nancy F., 521
Cultural Council, Inter-American, 2d meeting, U.S. delegation, 820
Cultural property, convention (1954) for protection in event of armed conflict, 440, 694, 952
Cultural relations, Inter-American convention on, transmittal message (Eisenhower), report (Hoover), summary of provisions, and text, 175, 219
Cultural studies, UNESCO grants for, 342
Customs:
Consular officers, agreement with Yugoslavia for reciprocal privileges, 994
Customs tariffs, creation of international union for publication of, protocol modifying 1890 convention, 270, 355, 487
Private road vehicles, convention on temporary importation of, 73, 440, 658, 782, 864
Touring, convention concerning facilities for, 73, 440, 658, 782, 864
U.S. efforts to simplify customs regulations, address (Coe) and President's report to Congress, 255, 430
Cutler, Robert, 651, 953
Cuxhaven, Germany, agreement with Federal Republic amending agreement relating to use of practice bombing range, 142
Cyprus:
NATO administration of, question of, statement (Dulles), 713
U.S. position, statements (White), 505
Czechoslovakia:
Arms arrangements with Egypt, 196, 197, 460
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Collisions at sea, regulations for preventing, 263
Commercial samples and advertising material, international convention to facilitate importation, 181
GATT, amending protocols, 1080, 1081
Telecommunication convention, international (1952), 994
U.S. claim for destruction of aircraft, action by ICJ 513

Dairy products:
Proclamation limiting imports of, question of amending, 653
U.S. export prospects, 1020, 1021, 1022
Darden, Colgate Whitehead, Jr., 98, 117*n*
Davis, Bainbridge C., 270
Debts, German external, agreement on, 226, 733, 1038
Debts of City of Berlin and public utility enterprises, negotiations and agreement, 93, 651, 865
Declaration of Washington:
Addresses and article: Eden, 236, 237, 239, 240; Howard, 604
Text, 231

Defense, Department of, budget estimates for fiscal year 1957, excerpts from President's message to Congress, 148
Defense support. *See under* Mutual security
Denmark:
Imports from dollar area, removal of restrictions on, 1048
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Civil aviation convention, international, protocol amending, 1038
Educational exchange programs, agreement with U.S. extending and amending 1951 agreement, 467, 487
GATT, 5th protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules, 907
GATT, 6th protocol of supplementary concessions, 1081
Ice Patrol, North Atlantic, agreement regarding financial support, 181
Road traffic convention, with annexes, 355
Wheat agreement, international, 907
U.S.–Danish trade relations, address (Coe), 429
U.S. mutual security aid, continuation of, 214
Deportation of aliens, proposed legislative changes concerning, 275, 277, 278
Dillon, C. Douglas, 518
Dion, Father Louis, 19
Diplomacy (*see also* Foreign Service), personal diplomacy, statement (Dulles), 909
Diplomatic career of Benjamin Franklin, 51
Diplomatic representatives, U.S., abroad. *See under* Foreign Service
Diplomatic representatives in the U.S., presentation of credentials: Argentina, 7; Chile, 295; China, Republic of, 1004; Haiti, 163; Iran, 207; Japan, 467; Liberia, 637; Rumania, 791
Disarmament (*see also* Armaments, Armed forces, *and* United Nations Disarmament Commission):
Aerial inspection and exchange of military blueprints:
Excerpt from state of the Union message, 81
Exchange of correspondence (Eisenhower, Bulganin), 192, 514, 515
Statement (Dulles), 882
U.N. actions, 55, 63, 97, 115
Atomic weapons, international control of:
General Assembly resolution, 63
Soviet proposals and U.S. position, 57, 58, 64, 67, 68
Statements (Dulles), 198, 201
U.S. note to Japanese Government, text, 566
Control posts for mutual inspection, Soviet proposals and U.S. position, statements (Lodge), 59, 60, 61, 62, 69
4-power (U.S., Canada, France, U.K.) declaration of principles relating to, 838
Soviet proposals and U.S. position, statements (Lodge), 56, 57, 58, 59, 61
U.S. policy, addresses and statements: Dulles, 415, 542, 880; Eisenhower, 702; Hoover, 324; Lodge, 222
U.S.–British efforts for, joint declaration (Eisenhower, Eden), 232
Disarmament Commission, U.N. *See* United Nations Disarmament Commission
Discus-Thrower, presentation of statue to U.S. by President of Italy, 418
Displaced persons. *See* Refugees and displaced persons
Disputes, peaceful settlement of (*see also* "Renunciation of force"):
Addresses: Hoover, 324; Phleger, 664; Wilcox, 843, 844, 847
Joint declaration (Eisenhower, Eden), 232
U.S. and Soviet views on, letters (Eisenhower, Bulganin) and draft of Soviet treaty with U.S., 191, 193, 194, 195
Domestic jurisdiction, problem facing the U.N., 845, 846
Dominican Republic:
Tariff concessions to U.S., 687
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Agriculture, cooperative program agreement with U.S., notice of intention to terminate, 441
Atomic energy, agreement with U.S. for cooperation in research, 1071
GATT, amending protocols, 356, 658, 1081
IFC, articles of agreement, 73
Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, convention, final protocols, regulations of execution, and parcel post and money orders agreements, 398
Visas, nonimmigrant, agreement with U.S. concerning period of validity and fees, 270
Wheat agreement, international, 907
Dorsey, Stephen P., 792
Dowling, Walter C., 994
Dreier, John C., 126
Drugs, narcotic:
Illicit traffic in, arrangements with Federal Republic of Germany concerning exchange of information relating to, 578
Opium, protocol (1953) regulating the production, trade, and use of, 865
Protocol amending certain international agreements concerning narcotic drugs, 181
Dulles, Allen, 758
Dulles, Eleanor L., 15, 1072
Dulles, John Foster:
Addresses, statements, etc.:
Armaments and armed forces, U.S. and Soviet, proposed reductions in 880, 881, 883, 885, 920
Armed Forces Day, 874
Asia, report on, 539
Aswan Dam, 11, 920
Atlantic Community, development of, 831
Atomic energy, agreements with Austria and Thailand, 590, 1066
Atomic energy, testing of nuclear weapons, 122, 198, 201
Baghdad Pact, U.S. position regarding, 119, 121
Balloons, meteorological and propaganda, 280, 283, 284
Baltic peoples, 331
Berlin, 4-power status, 8, 12
Bipartisanship in foreign policy, 199
Bowie, Robert R., nomination as Assistant Secretary of State, 196
Brazilian President-elect, visit to U.S., 86
Bricker amendment, 638, 639
British trade with Communist China, 924
Buddhism, anniversary of founding, 926
Budget, U.S., formulation of, 160

Dulles, John Foster—Continued
Addresses, statements, etc.—Continued
Coal and Steel Community, European, U.S. support of, 282
"Cold war," definition of, 749
Communism, international, 712, 713, 752, 789
Cyprus, question of NATO administration of, 713
Disarmament, 415, 542, 882, 1068
Egyptian recognition of Communist China, 920, 923
Egyptian-U.S. relations, 923
Foreign aid, proposed advisory board on, 751
Foreign aid program, long-range, 9, 14, 119, 159, 161, 197, 410, 411, 414, 715, 923, 1067, 1068
Foreign economic policy, 120
Foreign Service, tasks and responsibilities, 588
Franco-Tunisian agreement, 455
Freedom's New Task, 363
French Foreign Minister, visit to U.S., 638
Geneva ambassadorial talks with Communist China, 125, 195, 198, 279
Geophysical year, 284
George, Sen. Walter, special representative of the President, 881, 882
German financial contributions to NATO forces in Germany, question of, 280
German reunification, 714, 833, 885, 1065
Goa, dispute between India and Portugal concerning, 465
Heads of Government meeting (U.S., Canada, Mexico), 414
Honor awards ceremony, 6th annual, 811
ICA, functions, organizational structure, and relationship to State Department, 211
Immigration and Nationality Act, proposed revision, 773
India, U.S. policy, 412, 413
Indochina settlement, 123, 156, 157
Indonesia, U.S. policy, 643
Indonesian President, visit to U.S., 885
International Atomic Energy Agency, proposals concerning, 161
Japanese textile exports to U.S., 14, 638, 712, 921
Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S., invitation to visit Soviet Union, 1066
Kilgore, Sen. Harley M., death of, 409
Latin America, multilateral defense against communism, 200
Mutual security programs, U.S., 9, 14, 541, 594, 603, 787, 793, 871
NATO, development of, 413, 706, 747, 925, 926, 1066, 1069
NATO, question of Soviet support of principles of, 884, 886
Near and Middle East:
Arab-Israeli dispute, 12, 282, 283, 458, 462, 710, 749, 922, 924
Arms supply policy, 196, 197, 460, 604, 640, 641, 642, 643, 713
Economic development, 122
Israel, U.N. responsibility toward, 639
Israeli action against Syria, 121
Relationship to Atlantic Community, 831
U.S. aid, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 788

Dulles, John Foster—Continued
Addresses, statements, etc.—Continued
Near and Middle East—Continued
U.S. policy, 368, 412, 639, 641, 643, 714
Neutrality, question of, 999, 1064
North Atlantic Council meeting, 791
OAS, development of, 835
OTC, functions and U.S. membership, 472
Pakistan, evaluation as member of SEATO and Baghdad Pact, 282
Panama meeting of Presidents of American Republics, 923, 925
Peace, 84, 155, 542, 739, 999
Peace talks between Japan and Soviet Union, 883
Philippines, U.S. relations with, 750
Prime Minister Eden, arrival in U.S., 234
Public Committee on Personnel, report released, 248
Quemoy and Matsu Islands, defense of, 155, 156
Relations with Congress, 411
Saar, elections in, 13
Satellite nations, Soviet relations with, 751
SEATO, development of, 413, 1067
SEATO Council, 2d meeting, 408, 409, 449, 451
Soviet Union:
Economic aid programs, 8, 11, 714
Friendship treaty with U.S., proposed, 279, 280
Industrial development, 159, 161
Khrushchev, Nikita, speeches by, 124, 1064, 1069
"New look" policy, 363, 366, 409, 410, 411, 637, 641, 642, 643, 707, 749, 790, 871, 873, 884, 886, 1003, 1004, 1070
Radio broadcasts to, 284
Soviet-Japanese relations, 922
Threat of aggression, 834
U.S. policy, 751
Spanish Foreign Minister, visit to U. S., 666
State Department budget for fiscal year 1957, proposed, 907
Taiwan, defense of, 1065
Talks with Konrad Adenauer, proposed topics, 1065, 1068
Turkish press-control law, 1065
Underdeveloped countries, 118, 122, 159
U.N. membership, 12
U.N. technical assistance program, 120
U.S.-British talks, proposed subjects, 196, 201, 202
U.S. forces in Iceland, question of removal of, 639
U.S. foreign policy, 639
Visa allotments under Refugee Relief Act, 1063
Yugoslavia, status of U.S. military aid program, 199
Administrative action, Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, delegation of authority with respect to duties and functions, public notice, 74
Correspondence, messages, etc.:
Berlin Conference Hall, 15
Cambodia, U.S. policy, 727
Cyprus question, 456
Middle East, U.S. policy, 285
Pakistan, Republic Day, 566
Plant protection convention, international, report to the President, 311
U.S.-French cooperation, 241

Dulles, John Foster—Continued
Discussions and meetings (*see also subject*):
German Federal Republic, Chancellor of the, joint communique, 1047
Heads of Government meeting (U.S., Canada, Mexico), 590
SEATO Council, 2d meeting, 84, 408, 449, 451
News conferences, transcripts of, 8, 118, 155, 195, 279, 409, 638, 710, 747, 881, 920, 1063
Visit to Asia, 241
Visit to Spain, 48
Dunn, James Clement, 335, 694

Earthquake disaster in Lebanon, texts of messages (Eisenhower, Hoover), 565
East-West contacts:
Exchanges of correspondence (Eisenhower, Bulganin), 192, 194, 517
Need for increasing, address (Nixon), 1046
East-West trade:
Agricultural commodities, question of U.S. exports to Soviet-bloc countries, 1021
Control problems:
Addresses and statement: Hoover, 619, 1051; Weeks, 769, 770, 771
U.S. exports to Soviet-bloc countries, regulations, 209, 766
Industrial commodities, shipments by Denmark, Italy, and U.K. to Soviet-bloc countries, 214
Eban, Abba, 459, 464*n*
ECE. *See* Economic Commission for Europe
Economic and Social Council, U.N.:
Documents, lists of, 181, 225, 310, 440, 693
Economic development factors of atomic energy, study of, 657, 816, 819
Resolutions:
Forced labor, 906
Water resources, international development of, 951
Statistical Commission, 9th session, U.S. representative, 440
Economic and technical aid to foreign countries (*see also* Agricultural surpluses, Export-Import Bank, International Bank, International Cooperation Administration, Mutual security, Underdeveloped countries, *and* United Nations: Technical assistance program):
Addresses, articles, and statements: Dorsey, 792; Dulles, 9, 14, 119, 159, 161, 197, 365, 410, 411, 414, 715, 923, 1001, 1067, 1068; Eden, 237, 238, 240; Hoover, 324, 1051; Howard, 593; Murphy, 169, 965; Nixon, 338; Thibodeaux, 23; Wilcox, 115, 497
Aid to: Argentina, 469; Asia, 52, 389, 393, 448, 541, 792; Austria, 1074; Berlin, 679; Bolivia, 300; Burma, proposed, 569; Ceylon, 821; Colombia, 106, 142; Denmark, 214; Europe, 367, 1073; Haiti, 106; Hungary, 680; India, 204, 205, 288, 349, 393, 598; Indonesia, 643, 933; Italy, 214; Korea, 887; Latin America, 1009, 1010; Liberia, 356; Libya, 680; Near and Middle East, 202, 203, 367; Nepal, 348; Pakistan, 53, 384, 569; Peru, 887; Philippines, 568, 750, 772; Spain, 126, 127, 380, 381; Thailand, 381; Turkey, 681; U.K., 214; Uruguay, 694; Viet-Nam, 208, 694; Yugoslavia, 317
Soviet program of. *See under* Soviet Union
Economic and technical aid to foreign countries—Con.
U.S. policy, letters (Dulles, Members of Congress), 286, 287
U.S.–British policy, joint declaration (Eisenhower, Eden), 231
Economic Commission for Europe, U.N.:
Coal Committee, meeting and U. S. delegation, 1079
U.S. representative to 11th session, confirmation, 592
Economic opportunities for women, article (Hahn), 1033
Economic policy and relations, U.S. (*see also individual countries*):
Aid to foreign countries. *See* Agricultural surpluses, Economic and technical aid, Export-Import Bank, *and* Mutual security
Domestic economy, statement (Jones), 391
East-West trade. *See* East-West trade
Foreign atomic energy activity, AEC regulation concerning, 309
Foreign economic policy:
American business abroad, addresses: Hoover, 1049; Thibodeaux, 22
Implementation of, address (Williams), 978
Relationship to State Department and ICA in program planning, 120
Role of U.S. in international economic affairs, excerpts from President's report to Congress, 253
Views of U.S. delegation to 10th General Assembly, 117, 118
OTC. *See* Trade Cooperation, Organization for
Tariff policy. *See* Tariff policy, U.S.
Economic situation, U.S. and world, address (Prochnow) and excerpt from President's report to Congress, 257, 529
ECOSOC. *See* Economic and Social Council, U.N.
Ecuador:
IFC, articles of agreement, 73
Peace treaty with Japan, 106
Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, convention, final protocols, regulations of execution, and parcel post and money orders agreements, 398
Trade agreement with U.S. (1938), extension, 180, 181
Wheat agreement, international, 907
Eden, Sir Anthony:
Statements on Middle East problems, 460, 461, 462
Visit to U.S.:
Arrival remarks, 234
Addresses before Congress and on radio-TV, 235, 237, 239
Texts of joint declaration and statement (Eisenhower, Eden), 231, 232
Education (*see also* Educational exchange program):
Facilities for, address (Eisenhower), 919
Free-world and Communist systems, comparison of, address (Murphy), 556
French Togoland, need for education in, statement (Gerig), 575
Herbert Hoover School, Berlin, dedication of, remarks and message (Hoover), 243
NATO fellowship awarded, 649
Soviet challenge, need for education to meet the, address (Wilcox), 498
Teacher development workshop at University of Puerto Rico, article (Russell), 778

Education—Continued
U.N. and specialized agencies, teaching about the, statement (Pedersen), 990
U.S. service academies, designation of foreign students, Executive order delegating authority, 528
UNESCO conference on education in Latin America, U.S. delegation, 781
UNESCO grants to research specialists, 342
Education, 2d Inter-American Meeting of Ministers of, U.S. delegation, 820
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, U. N.:
Conference on education in Latin America, U.S. delegation, 781
Establishment and functions, 481, 483
Grants to research specialists, 342
Spanish membership, 45
Educational exchange program, international (*see also* Education):
Address (Nixon), 1045, 1046
Agreements with—
Denmark, amending and extending 1951 agreement, 467, 487
Peru, 815, 865
Budget request for fiscal year 1957, excerpt from President's message to Congress and statement (Dulles), 154, 910
Inter-American cultural relations, convention on, transmittal message (Eisenhower), report (Hoover), summary of provisions, and text, 175, 219
Teacher development workshop at University of Puerto Rico, article (Russell), 778
Egypt:
Arab-Israeli dispute. *See* Arab-Israeli dispute
Arms supply policy. *See* Arms supply
Aswan Dam, status of, article and statements: Dulles, 11, 642, 920; Howard, 596
Economic situation, address (Seager), 508
International Bank loan, proposed, 795
Recognition of Communist China, statements (Dulles), 920, 923
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Agricultural surpluses, agreements with U.S. modifying 1955 agreement, 356, 398
Transportation by air, convention and additional protocol for unification of rules relating to, 73
Wheat agreement, international, 907
U.S. aid, 595
U.S. relations with, statements: Dulles, 923; Hollister, 611
Eisenbud, Merril, 98
Eisenhower, Dwight D.:
Addresses and statements:
Atomic energy, U.S. distribution of U-235 for peaceful uses, 469, 902
Captive peoples, liberation of, 84
Disarmament, aerial inspection plan, 55, 56, 58
Economic aid to Europe, 367
Farm legislation, approval of, 982
Indonesian President, visit to U.S., 927
International understanding, 915, 633
Italian President, visit to U.S., 417, 418
Mutual security program, U.S., 603
NATO, 378
Eisenhower, Dwight D.—Continued
Addresses and statements—Continued
Near and Middle East, U.S. policy, 103, 461, 604
Neutrality, views on, 1004, 1064
Peace, 3, 373, 699
Sugar Act of 1948, amendment and extension, 1016
Correspondence and messages:
Crusade for freedom, 636
Earthquake disaster in Lebanon, 565
Foreign intelligence activities, U.S., appointment of board of consultants for review of, 162
George, Sen. Walter, appointment as personal representative and special ambassador, 836
Heads of Government meeting (U.S., Canada, Mexico), 636
Indonesian President, visit to U.S., 1005
International Atomic Energy Agency negotiations, 4, 5
Mutual security operations, transfer to State Department, 211
NATO, retirement and appointment of Supreme Allied Commander, 757, 758
Pakistan, Republic Day, 565
Sudan, U.S. recognition of independence, 85
U.S.-Soviet relations, exchanges of correspondence with Premier Bulganin, statement (Dulles) and texts, 191, 279, 280, 514
U.S. tariff concessions to Sweden, GATT, 289
Executive orders. *See* Executive orders
Meetings and discussions:
European Coal and Steel Community, President of, announcement and text of communique, 288
Heads of Government meeting (U.S., Canada, Mexico). *See* Heads of Government meeting
Presidents of American Republics, Panama meeting of, invitation, 880
Messages, letters, and reports to Congress:
Acid-grade fluorspar, escape-clause relief held unnecessary, 570
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, 3d semiannual report (July 1–Dec. 31, 1955), 130
Budget message for fiscal year 1957, excerpts, 147
Economic report to Congress, 253
ICA, functions and responsibilities, excerpt, 211
Immigration legislation, proposed changes, 275
Inter-American cultural relations, convention on, transmittal to Senate, 175
Lighter-flints, escape-clause case deferred, 353
Mutual security program for *1957*, 545, 1003
Plant protection convention, international, 311
St. Lawrence Seaway, status and progress of, 215
State of the Union message, 79
Tariff increases negotiated at Geneva, 1062
Muenster Peace Medal, presentation, 880
Proclamations. *See* Proclamations by the President
Eisenhower, Milton S., 682
Elbrick, C. Burke, 674
Electric High-Tension Systems, International Conference on Large, U. S. delegation to 16th session, 1037
El Salvador:
Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, convention, final protocols, regulations of execution, and parcel post and money orders agreements, 398

l Salvador—Continued
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 226
Wheat agreement, international, 907
scapee program, U.S., 650, 1024
spinosa Prieto, Eduardo, 102
ssick, Bryant, 96
thiopia, U.S. aid, 597
URATOM. *See* Atomic Energy Community, European
urope (*see also individual countries*):
Collective security. *See* European security *and* North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Eastern Europe:
Balloon flights over, text of letter (Lodge), 428
Satellite countries, U.S. position, address (Wilcox), 113
Relationship to reunification of Germany, statement (Dulles), 885
Impact of U.S. on, address (Eleanor Dulles), 1072
Refugees. *See* Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration *and* Refugees and displaced persons
U.S. economic aid, offer of, statements (Eisenhower, White), 367
U.S. mutual security program:
President's recommendations to Congress, 548
Statements: Dulles, 788, 1001; Elbrick, 674; Hollister, 608
Unity, address (Eisenhower), 917
Western Europe:
Imports from dollar areas, increases in, 686
Soviet efforts at subversion, 558
U.S. dollar receipts, 1007
uropean Atomic Energy Community:
Discussions concerning, statement (Dulles), 282
Importance of, address (Eleanor Dulles), 1075
uropean Coal and Steel Community. *See* Coal and Steel Community
uropean Economic Cooperation, Organization for:
European stability, OEEC contribution to, joint statement (Eisenhower, Eden), 232
Functions, 232, 833, 1074
uropean Migration, Intergovernmental Committee for. *See* Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration
uropean Payments Union, functions, 1074
uropean security (*see also* North Atlantic Treaty Organization):
Defense of Europe, address (Gruenther), 333
Joint communique (Adenauer, Dulles), 1047
Soviet views on, letter (Bulganin), 517
"Treaty of assurance" proposed by U.S., U.K., and France at Geneva, Department's views on address by Winston Churchill, 837
U.S. participation in European security arrangements, address (Eleanor Dulles), 1075
xamination, Foreign Service, announced, 342
xchange of information. *See* Information, exchange of
xchange of persons. *See* East-West contacts *and* Educational exchange
xecutive orders:
Air Coordinating Committee, functions of, 341
Escapee program, U.S., transfer of functions to State Department, 651
Executive orders—Continued
President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, establishment and functions, 340
U.S. service academies, designation of foreign students, delegation of authority, 528
Export-Import Bank:
Lending activities, excerpt from President's message to Congress, 152, 153
Lending authority, need for extension, excerpt from President's report to Congress, 256
Loans to: Afghanistan, 795; Brazil, 299, 336, 1018; Iran, 795; Israel, 795; Japan, 888; Latin America, 685, 1009; Near East and Africa, 600; Philippines, 568; Syria, 597*n*
Exports, U.S. (*see also* Tariffs and trade, general agreement on; *and* Trade):
Agricultural surpluses, foreign disposal of, 1019
Aircraft, 1014, 1015, 1016
Arms shipments to Near East, suspension of export licenses, 325
Atomic materials, regulations concerning, 208, 209, 385
Cotton, export sales program, 982, 983*n*
Free Asia, chart, 614
Fruit, 848, 850
Latin America, article (Culbertson, Lederer), 525, 527
President's economic report to Congress, excerpts, 259, 261
Soviet-bloc countries, simplification of controls, 766
Statements: Weeks, 477; Wilcox, 484
External debts, German, agreement on, 226, 733, 1038
External debts of City of Berlin and public utility enterprises, negotiations and agreement, 93, 651, 865
Extradition, convention on, 952
Extraterritorial rights in Morocco, U.S. policy, 204

Family housing units at Pepperrell Air Force Base, agreement with Canada relating to construction of, 865
FAO. *See* Food and Agriculture Organization
Far East (*see also individual countries*):
Refugees indigenous to the, visa applications for, cutoff date announced, 568
U.S. aid, address and statement (Dulles), 9, 11, 1000
U.S.–British policies in, joint statement (Eisenhower, Eden), 234
U.S. chiefs of mission, meeting, announcement and text of communique, 278, 543
U.S.–Far Eastern relations, accessibility of materials relating to, article (Spielman), 343
Farley, John L., 374
Fats, oils, and oilseeds, U.S. export prospects, 1020, 1022
Feeding program, emergency, agreement with Italy relating to, 865
Ferguson, Homer, 733
Ferris, Benjamin G., 527
Figueres, José, 1030
Finance Corporation, International. *See* International Finance Corporation
Fingerprinting requirement under Immigration and Nationality Act, proposed revision, 277, 773, 775
Finland:
Agricultural surpluses, agreement with U.S., 270, 658, 865

Finland—Continued
GATT, procès verbal and amending protocols, 622, 782, 1081
Tariff concessions to U.S., GATT, 687
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 226
Fish and fisheries:
Fishing rights on the high seas. 894
Great Lakes fisheries convention with Canada, implementation of, state (Looney), 890
Fisher, Arthur, 1036
Fisheries Commission, International, appropriations requested for U.S. participation, 910
Fishery Commission, Great Lakes, appointment of members of U.S. section, 374
Fitzpatrick, Richard, presentation of letters to Library of Congress, 562, 563
Flemming, Arthur S., 961, 962
Flood relief, U.S. aid to Pakistan, 53
Fluorspar, acid-grade, escape-clause relief held unnecessary, 569
Food and Agriculture Organization, U.N.:
Establishment and functions, 481, 483
8th conference, article (Butz), 434
FAO–Caribbean Commission Technical Conference on Cooperatives, agenda of 2d conference and U.S. delegation, 224
Tunisia, membership, 437
"Force, renunciation of," discussions at Geneva ambassadorial talks on principle of, 164, 165, 166, 167, 451, 1070
Forced labor, problem of, statement (Baker) and text of ECOSOC resolution, 903, 906
Foreign aid. *See* Agricultural surpluses, Economic and technical aid, Mutual security, Refugees and displaced persons, Underdeveloped countries, United Nations: Technical assistance program, *and individual countries*
Foreign economic policy, U.S. *See* Economic policy and relations, U.S.
Foreign Intelligence Activities, President's Board of Consultants on:
Appointment of board, announcement and letters (Eisenhower), 161
Establishment and functions, Executive order, 340
Foreign Ministers, U.S.-Communist China, Communist proposal at Geneva ambassadorial talks for meeting of, announcement and draft proposal, 164, 165, 167
Foreign policy, U.S.:
Bipartisanship in, statement (Dulles), 199
Coordination with British policy, address (Aldrich), 798
Development of, addresses and statement: Dulles, 639; Murphy, 168; Robertson, 805
Legislation. *See under* Congress
Middle East, historical development of U.S. policy in, address (Heath), 202
Near East, South Asia, and Africa, development of U.S. policy during 1955, article (Howard), 452, 510, 593
Objective of, address (Murphy), 721
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1938, Vol. V., The American Republics, published, 733
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1939, Vol. I, General, published, 441
Foreign Relations volumes, publication process, 344, 346
Foreign Service (*see also* State Department):
Ambassadors, career, 694
Ambassadors and minister, confirmations and resignations, 186, 226, 398, 441, 488, 658, 694, 733, 865, 994, 1038
Austria, Director of Administration, American Embassy, Vienna, delegation of authority, public notice, 142
Budget for fiscal year 1957, proposed, statement (Dulles), 908, 909
Chiefs of missions in Far East, meeting, announcement and text of communique, 278, 543
Consular officers, agreement with Yugoslavia for reciprocal customs privileges, 994
Diplomatic and consular establishments abroad, assistance to American business, address (Thibodeaux), 26
European Coal and Steel Community, U.S. Mission established in Luxembourg, 441
Examination announced, 342
Foreign Service Institute, advisory committee to the, appointment and 1st meeting, 651, 953
Germany, Federal Republic of, Executive Director, American Embassy, Bonn, delegation of authority, public notice, 142
Honor awards ceremony, 6th annual, remarks (Dulles, Nixon), 811, 812
Legation in Hungary, text of U.S. note protesting harassment of employees of, 246
Public Committee on Personnel, report released, 248
Staff Corps Review Panels, 7th, meeting and functions, 488
Sudan, Elevation of U.S. Liaison Office to status of Embassy, 356
Tasks and responsibilities, remarks (Dulles), 588
Foreign trade. *See* Trade
Formosa. *See* Taiwan
France:
Algeria, U.S. and French policies, address and article: Dillon, 553, 554, 555; Howard, 454
Cameroons, French, progress in, statements (Gerig), 730
Disarmament, 4-power (U.S., Canada, France, U.K.) declaration of principles relating to, 838
Foreign Minister, visit to U.S., statement (Dulles), 638
French-Moroccan declaration (*see also* Morocco), U.S. messages, and Sultan's reply, 466, 467, 501
French North Africa, U.S. support of French policy in, address (Dillon), 553
French-Tunisian protocol (*see also* Tunisia), texts of messages on signing of, 552
Heavy water, purchase from U.S., 592
Middle East situation, tripartite (U.S., U.K., France) discussions on, 233, 286
Quay d'Orsay records, access policy, 344
Tariff concessions to U.S., GATT, 687
Togoland, French. *See* Togoland
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Agricultural surpluses, agreement with U.S. for purchase of, 838
Aircraft carrier, loan of, agreement with U.S. extending 1953 agreement, 356
External debts of the City of Berlin and public utility enterprises, agreement with U.S., U.K., and Federal Republic of Germany, 93, 651, 865

France—Continued
Treaties, agreements, etc.—Continued
GATT, procès verbal and amending protocols, 38, 1080, 1081
Ice Patrol, North Atlantic, agreement regarding financial support, 181
Loadline convention, international (1930), extension to Overseas France, 733
Military cemeteries or war memorials, agreement with U.S. relating to grants of land located in France, 694
Moroccan independence, joint declaration and protocol with Morocco, text, 466, 467
Rawinsonde observation station, agreement with U.S. for establishment and operation on Guadeloupe, 733
War criminals, penal administrative agreement, 658
Wheat agreement, international, 907
U.S.-French cooperation, letters (Dulles, Pineau), 241
Francis, Clarence, 1019
Franco, Gen. Francisco, 128
Franklin, Benjamin (*see also* Benjamin Franklin Foundation), 51, 249, 800
Franklin Commemorative Medal, 249, 800, 953
Franks, Sir Oliver, 126
Fraser, Mrs. Laura Gardin, 249, 251, 953
Freedom, A Peaceful Crusade for, address (Nixon), 1043
Freedom, Our Quest for Peace and, address (Eisenhower), 699
Freedom of the press, Brazilian policy toward, address (Kubitschek), 87, 88
Freedom's New Task, address (Dulles), 363
Friendship, commerce and navigation treaties:
Importance to American business abroad, address (Thibodeaux), 23
Treaties with: Germany, Federal Republic of, 907; Netherlands, 621, 622; Nicaragua, 174, 181
Friendship agreements between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, signature, 339
Fruit, U.S. exports, address (Thibodeaux), 848, 850
Fulbright Act. *See* Educational exchange program
Fur, hatters', continuation of U.S. duty on, 688
Fur-felt hat bodies, U.S. tariff increase on imports, 1056, 1057, 1062

Galbreath, C. Edward, 171
Gallman, Waldemar, 16*n*, 512
Gamma globulin, U.S. gift to India to combat hepatitis epidemic, 288
Gardner, Kelsey Beeler, 224
GATT. *See* Tariffs and trade, general agreement on
General agreement on tariffs and trade (GATT). *See* Tariffs and trade, general agreement on
General Assembly, U.N. (*see also* United Nations):
Atomic Energy Agency, International. *See* Atomic Energy Agency
Documents, lists of, 71, 310, 693
Growth during 1st decade of U.N., address (Wilcox), 843, 844, 845
Near East, Asia, and Africa, consideration of problems concerning, article (Howard), 453, 454, 455, 456, 457
Resolutions:
Charter Review Conference, 98
General Assembly, U.N.—Continued
Resolutions—Continued
Disarmament, 63, 66, 222
Palestine refugees, assistance to, 33
Togoland, unification problem and future of Togoland under British and French administrations, 102
Underdeveloped countries, economic aid to, 99
South Africa, Union of, withdrawal of delegation over racial question, 112
10th session, accomplishments, 97
11th session, question of opening date, texts of notes, 819
General Langfitt, transportation of refugees to U.S., 468
Geneva ambassadorial talks, U.S.-Communist China:
Negotiations concerning detention and release of U.S. civilians, "renunciation of force" principle, and proposed meeting of Foreign Ministers, 164, 165, 166, 167, 451, 1070
Progress of negotiations, statements: Dulles, 125, 195, 198, 279; Johnson, 165
Geneva conventions (1949) on treatment of prisoners of war, wounded and sick, and civilians, current actions, 907
Geneva Heads of Government Conference, impact on 10th General Assembly, 111, 112
Genocide, convention (1948) on the prevention and punishment of the crime of, 622, 694
Geography and History, Pan American Institute of, U.S. delegate to 1st meeting of Directing Council, 994
Geophysical Year, statement (Dulles), 284
George, Sen. Walter, appointment as personal representative and special ambassador of President to NATO, 836, 879, 881, 882
Gerety, Pierce J., 16, 468, 568, 810, 940, 1024
Gerig, Benjamin, statements:
Colonialism, U.S. views on, 575
French Cameroons, progress in, 730
French Togoland, progress in, 573
Nuclear tests in trust territories, 576, 689
Ruanda-Urundi, political and economic development in, 438
Germany:
Berlin. *See* Berlin
Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, 9th volume, released by State Department, 954
4-power status:
U.S. position on Soviet obligations, statement and letters (Conant, Pushkin), 48
Western position, statements (Dulles), 8, 12
Mixed Board, appointment of U.S. member, 210
Postwar progress in, addresses: Conant, 583, 669; Hoover, 243, 244
Reunification:
Addresses, letter, and statements: Conant, 670, 672; Dulles, 714, 833, 837, 885, 1065; Eisenhower, 192; Hoover, 246, 290, 292
Joint communique (Adenauer, Dulles), 1047
Joint statement (Eisenhower, Eden), 232
Soviet position, address, letter, and statement: Bulganin, 517; Hoover, 243, 244; Lodge, 65
State Department's views on address by Winston Churchill, 837

431265—57——3

Germany—Continued
Visit of Under Secretary Hoover to Berlin and Bonn, 210
Germany, East:
Admittance to Warsaw Pact, 334
Soviet domination of, addresses: Conant, 583, 669, 672; Hoover, 242, 291
Germany, Federal Republic of:
Armed forces, training by U.S. under mutual defense assistance agreement, 162
Executive Director, American Embassy, Bonn, delegation of authority, public notice, 142
Imports from dollar area, freed, 1048
Minister for Atomic Energy Affairs, visit to U.S., 797
NATO forces stationed in Germany, question of German financial contributions to, statement (Dulles), 280
Postwar progress in, addresses: Conant, 583, 669; Hoover, 243, 244, 291
Talks between Chancellor Adenauer and Secretary Dulles, text of joint communique, 1047
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Agricultural surpluses, agreements with U.S. for purchase, 28, 772
Air navigation equipment, agreement with U.S. relating to lease of, 181
Air services transit agreement, international, 865
Air transport, agreement with U.S., 733
Atomic energy, civil uses of, agreement with U.S., 92, 326, 356, 782
Captured files and archives of the former German Foreign Office at present in the territory of the U.K., agreement relating to return of, 865
Civil aviation, international convention, 864
External debts, agreement on, 226, 733, 1038
External debts of the City of Berlin and public utility enterprises, agreement relating to, 93, 651, 865
Friendship, commerce and navigation, treaty with U.S., 907
GATT, amending protocols, 1080, 1081
Motion picture films, agreement with U.S. regarding tariff concession, text, 814
Mutual defense assistance, agreement with U.S., 73, 74
Narcotics, arrangement with U.S. concerning exchange of information relating to illicit traffic in, 578
NATO, agreement on status of national representatives and international staff, 994
Patent rights and technical information for defense purposes, agreements with U.S. for exchange of, 104, 142, 577
Practice bombing range near Cuxhaven, agreement with U.S. amending agreement relating to use of, 142
Property, rights and interests in Germany, charter of Arbitral Commission on, 106
Telecommunication convention, international (1952), extension to Land Berlin, 658
War criminals, penal administrative agreement, 658
Wheat agreement, international, 907
U.S. Information Center, Munich, 10th anniversary, address (Conant), 327
Germany, Federal Republic of—Continued
U.S. visa applications for escapees residing in, 1024
Gimma, Joseph, 679
Goa, U. S. position on Portuguese-Indian dispute concerning, statement (Dulles), 465
Gold Coast, future status of:
General Assembly resolution concerning, 102
Statements: Bell, 100, 101; Gerig, 37
Goodman, Clark, D., 509
Goodykoontz, Bess, 782
Goonetilleke, T. P., 903
Goulart, João, 756, 803, 804
Grant-aid. *See* Economic and technical aid
Great Lakes Fishery Commission, appointment of members of U.S. section, 374
Greece:
Cyprus. *See* Cyprus
Economic situation, address and statement: Allen, 876, 877; Seager, 506
Imports from dollar area, removal of restrictions on, 1048
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Agricultural surpluses, agreement with U.S. amending 1955 agreement, 533
Atomic energy, agreement with U.S., 594
GATT, amending protocols, 356, 907, 953, 1080
German external debts, agreement on, 1038
Ice Patrol, North Atlantic, financial support of, 398
IFC, articles of agreement, 73
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, convention on, 733
Patent rights and technical information for defense purposes, agreement with U.S. for exchange of, 104, 577
Property, rights and interests in Germany, charter of Arbitral Commission on, 106
Slavery convention (1926), protocol amending, and annex, 141
Sugar agreement, international, 74
Telecommunication convention, international (1952), and final protocol, 106
Wheat agreement, international, 907
U.S. aid, 594
U.S. visa applications for refugees in, cutoff date announced, 16
Greene, William A., 636
Gronchi, Giovanni, 16, 331, 417
Gruenther, Gen. Alfred M., 332, 756
Gurney, Chan, 528
Guryanov, Aleksandr, 765, 766
Guatemala:
IFC, articles of agreement, 73
Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, convention, final protocols, regulations of execution, and parcel post and money orders agreements, 398
Wheat agreement, international, 907

Hagerty, James C., 84, 668, 1066
Hahn, Mrs. Lorena B., 1033
Haiti:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 163
International Bank loan for highway improvement program, 889

Haiti—Continued
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Artibonite Valley project, agreement with U.S. providing assistance for, 106
GATT, procès verbal and amending protocols, 38, 356, 622, 953, 1081
IFC, articles of agreement, 73
OTC, agreement on, 38
Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, convention, final protocols, regulations of execution, and parcel post and money orders agreements, 398
Hammarskjold, Dag:
Mission to the Middle East:
Statements and addresses: Dulles, 711, 832, 922, 1066; Lodge, 627, 629, 630, 632, 633, 1025; Wadsworth, 1026, 1028; Wilcox, 846
U.N. resolutions concerning, 628, 1028
Note to U.N. members concerning opening date of 11th session of General Assembly, 819
Statements, 453, 459, 465
Hanifah, Abu, 901
Hansen, H. C., 468
Harbor conference, inter-American port and, U.S. delegation, 688
Harvey, R. J. P., 982
Hasnic, S. A., 437
Hat bodies, fur-felt, U.S. tariff increase on imports, 1056, 1057, 1062
Hathaway, Gail A., 1078
Hays, Rep. Brooks, 99, 117*n*
Heads of Government meeting (U.S., Canada, Mexico):
Preliminary statement (Dulles), 414
Delegations, 590
Exchange of messages following meeting (Eisenhower, Ruiz Cortines, St. Laurent), 636, 637
Health and sanitation, progress in French Togoland, statement (Gerig), 575
Health Assembly, World (*see also* World Health Organization), 9th meeting and U.S. delegation, 862
Health Organization, World. *See* World Health Organization
Heath, Donald R., 202
Henderson, Loy W., 129, 637, 694, 753, 754, 953
Hepatitis epidemic, India, U.S. aid in combating, 288
Herbert Hoover School, Berlin, dedication of, remarks and message (Hoover), 243
Herter, Christian A., Jr., 658
Hickerson, John D., 226
Hickok, Ray T., 732
High seas, juridical regime of. *See* Territorial waters
Highway, Inter-American, U.S. aid in completion of, address (Holland), 1010
Highway improvement programs, International Bank loans to: Haiti, 889; Honduras, 54
Hildreth, Horace A., 565
Hill, Robert C., 488
History and Geography, Pan American Institute of, U.S. delegate to 1st meeting of Directing Council, 994
Holland, Henry F., 172, 335, 487, 894, 1006
Holleran, Mary P., 820
Hollister, John B., 335, 605, 686
Honduras:
Army and Air Force Missions, agreement with U.S. for performance of duties by members of, 994
Civil aviation convention, international, protocol amending, 1038
IFC, articles of agreement, 73
International Bank loan for highway construction, 54
Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, convention, final protocols, regulations of execution, and parcel post and money orders agreements, 398
Honor awards ceremony, 6th annual, remarks (Dulles, Nixon), 811, 812
Hoover, Herbert, Jr.:
Addresses and statements:
American Business Abroad and the National Interest, 1049
Brazilian Vice President, visit to U.S., 804
Communist Imperialism in East Germany, Record of, 242
East-West trade, problem of control of, 619
Germany, situation in, 290
Herbert Hoover School, Berlin, dedication of, 243
Petroleum imports, 959
U.S. mutual security program, 550
World Peace, Efforts Toward, 323
Correspondence and message:
Earthquake disaster in Lebanon, 565
Inter-American cultural relations, convention on, report to President, 176, 219
Lake Ontario, approval of recommendations for controlling levels of, 91, 92
Visit to Germany, announcement, 210
Hoover, Herbert, Sr., message on dedication of Herbert Hoover School, Berlin, 243
Horn, Claud L., 28
Hotel facilities in the Western Hemisphere, improvement of, 223, 1032
Howard, Harry N., 452, 510, 593
Howard, Mrs. Katherine G., 375
Howe, Fisher, 488
Hull, Cordell, 200
Human rights, advisory services in the field of, article, report, and statement: Hahn, 1035; Lord, 99, 986
Human Rights, U.N. Commission on, 12th session, report (Lord) and resolutions on annual reports and studies on specific rights, 984, 989, 990
Human Rights Covenants, U.S. position on self-determination, drafts of article 1 and statement (Lord), 70
Hungary:
Emergency food aid, acceptance of U.S. offer, 680
Narcotic drugs, protocol amending certain international agreements concerning, 181
U.S. Legation employees and correspondents in Budapest, harassment of, text of U.S. note of protest, 246
Hydroelectric power development in Norway, International Bank loan, 888

Iberian defense pact, Spain-Portugal, 45
ICA. *See* International Cooperation Administration
ICAO. *See* International Civil Aviation Organization
Ice Patrol, North Atlantic, agreement regarding financial support, 105, 106, 181, 317, 398, 533

Iceland:
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Atomic information, agreement between parties to NAT for cooperation, 226
Civil aviation convention, international, protocol amending, 1038
Customs tariffs, protocol modifying 1890 convention creating international union for publication of, 487
IFC, articles of agreement, 73
Trade agreement with U.S., agreement amending 1943 agreement, 578
Visas, nonimmigrant, agreement with U.S. providing for reciprocal extension of validity period, 1081
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 226
U.S. forces in, question of removal of, statement (Dulles), 639
ICEM. *See* Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration
ICJ. *See* International Court of Justice
IFC. *See* International Finance Corporation
ILO. *See* Labor Organization, International
Immigration and Nationality Act, proposed revision of, President's messages to Congress and statement (Dulles), 83, 275, 773
Imports (*see also* Trade):
Commercial samples and advertising material, international convention to facilitate importation of, 181, 226, 440, 1038
Germany, Federal Republic of, removal of restrictions on imports from dollar area, 1048
Import privileges for nondiplomatic personnel, reciprocal, agreement with Paraguay, 1081
Private road vehicles, customs convention on temporary importation of, 864
U.S. (*see also* Tariff policy, U.S.):
Agricultural commodities, 982, 983
Asian, chart, 614
Benefits from increased imports, address (Wilcox), 980
Brazilian, importance of, 337
Dairy products, question of amending proclamation limiting, 653
Import quotas, address (Coe), 432
Japanese textiles, 14, 638, 712, 728, 921
Latin American, increase in, 523
Petroleum, address (Hoover), 959
President's economic report to Congress, excerpts, 259, 261
Strategic materials, U.S. import certificate, 378
Western Europe, increases from dollar area, 686, 1048
India:
Economic development, statements: Allen, 878; Dorsey, 795
Goa, dispute with Portugal concerning, statements (Dulles), 465
Heavy water, purchase from U.S., 592
International Bank loan, 795
Tariff concessions, GATT, renegotiation with U.S., 26
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Air transport, agreement with U.S., announcement, text, statement (Cooper), and exchange of notes, 264, 269, 317
India—Continued
Treaties, agreements, etc.—Continued
GATT, procès verbal and amending protocols, 38, 953
IFC, articles of agreement, 73
International Court of Justice, statute of the, termination of declaration recognizing compulsory jurisdiction deposited, 317
OTC, agreement on, 38
Wheat agreement, international, 907
U.S. aid, 204, 205, 288, 349, 393, 598, 612
U.S. policy, statement (Dulles), 412
Visit of Prime Minister to U.S., 565
Indian Institute, Inter-American, meeting and U.S. delegate, 862
Indochina, U.S. position on Geneva settlement, statements (Dulles), 123, 156, 157
Indonesia:
Communist aggression in, 725
Treaties, agreement, etc.:
Agricultural commodities, agreement with U.S., 469, 487, 541
Civil aviation convention, international, protocol amending, 1038
GATT, amending protocols, 356, 622
U.S. policy, statement (Dulles), 643
Visit of President to U.S.:
Announcement and statement (Dulles), 803, 885
Addresses, statements, remarks (Eisenhower, Nixon, Sukarno), and official party, 927, 928, 934, 939
Departure letter (Sukarno), 1005
West New Guinea, dispute with Netherlands concerning, address (Sukarno), 930
Industrial property, convention (1934) for the protection of, 440, 733
Information, exchange of:
International organizations, exchange of information by, statement (Wilcox), 483
Turkish press-control law, statement (Dulles), 1065
U.S.–Soviet publications, reciprocal distribution of, 18
Views of Benjamin Franklin on, 250, 251, 252
Information activities, U.S., budget estimates for fiscal year 1957, excerpts from President's message to Congress, 148, 152, 154
Information activities of Hungarian Legation in U.S., suspension by U.S., 246
Information Center, U.S., Munich, 10th anniversary of Amerikahaus, address (Conant), 327
Informational media guaranty program, agreements with—
Bolivia, 578; Israel, 207
Inspection proposals, mutual. *See under* Disarmament
Institute of Agricultural Sciences, Inter-American, functions and U.S. members of Technical Advisory Council, 28
Intelligence Activities, President's Board of Consultants on Foreign:
Appointment of board, announcement and letters (Eisenhower), 161
Establishment and functions, Executive order, 340
Interagency Committee on Agricultural Surplus Disposal, excerpt from report by study group, 1019
Interagency Technical Property Committee for Defense, 577

ıter-American convention on granting of political rights to women, 865
ıter-American Council of Jurists, 3d meeting on territorial waters and related matters, U.S. delegation and action taken, 224, 296
ıter-American Cultural Council, 2d meeting, U.S. delegation, 820
ıter-American cultural relations, convention on, transmittal message (Eisenhower), report (Hoover), summary of provisions, and text, 175, 219
ıter-American Highway, U.S. aid in completion of, address (Holland), 1010
ıter-American Indian Institute, meeting and U.S. delegate, 862
ıter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences, functions and U.S. members of Technical Advisory Council, 28
ter-American Ministers of Education, 2d meeting of, U.S. delegation, 820
ter-American Oceanographic Institute, proposed establishment of, 896
ıter-American port and harbor conference, U.S. delegation, 688
ıter-American problems. *See* Latin America
ıter-American specialized conference on conservation of natural resources: the continental shelf and marine waters, U.S. delegation and action taken, 487, 894
ıter-American Travel Congress, 6th meeting, U.S. delegation and article (Kelly), 657, 1029
ıter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, 910
ıtergovernmental Committee for European Migration:
Council and Executive Committee, 3d and 4th sessions, U.S. delegation and article (Warren), 355, 944
Transportation of refugees to U.S., 468
U.S. contribution, 1078
ıtergovernmental Copyright Committee, meeting and U.S. delegate, 1036
ıtergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, convention on the, 733
ıternational Atomic Energy Agency. *See* Atomic Energy Agency
ıternational Bank for Reconstruction and Development (*see also* International Finance Corporation):
Loans to—
Burma, 889; Egypt, proposed, 795; Haiti, 889; Honduras, 54; India, Iraq, Lebanon, 795; Near East, South Asia, and Africa, 602; Norway, 888; Pakistan, 795
Reports on financial activities, 300, 941
ıternational Civil Aviation Organization:
Establishment and functions, 481, 483
Meeting of Assembly, U.S. delegation, 1079
Protocol concerning meetings of Assembly, 1038
ıternational Conference on Large Electric High-Tension Systems, 16th session, U.S. delegation, 1037
ıternational Cooperation Administration (*see also* Economic and technical aid *and* Mutual security):
Escapee program, U.S., transfer of functions from ICA, announcement and Executive order, 650
Functions and relationship to State Department, statements (Dulles), 120, 211
General counsel, resignation, 658
International Cotton Advisory Committee, 15th plenary meeting, U.S. delegation, 863
International Court of Justice:
Record of opinions delivered in past 10 years, 742
Statute of, declarations recognizing compulsory jurisdiction deposited, 317
U.S. claims against Czechoslovakia and Soviet Union for destruction of aircraft, removal of applications, 513
International Finance Corporation (*see also* International Bank):
Articles of agreement, signatures, 73
Establishment and functions, 92, 256
Membership, 54, 98, 601
International Fisheries Commission, appropriations requested for U.S. participation in fiscal year *1957*, 910
International Ice Patrol. *See* North Atlantic Ice Patrol
International Joint Commission, U.S.–Canada:
Functions, 940
Lake Ontario, levels of, discussions and U.S. approval of recommendations, 89, 91, 92
International Labor Conference, 39th session, U.S. delegation, 1036
International Labor Organization. *See* Labor Organization, International
International Law Commission, 100
International military headquarters (NAT), protocol on status of, 73
International Monetary Fund, establishment and functions, 481, 483
International organizations, protocol concerning application of universal copyright convention to works of, 263
International Telecommunication Union (*see also* Telecommunications), establishment and functions, 481, 483
International Understanding, Working Together for, address (Eisenhower), 915
International Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs, protocol modifying 1890 convention relating to creation of, 270, 355, 487
Investment of private capital abroad:
Addresses: Hoover, 1053; Thibodeaux, 22, 23, 24
Asia, statement (Jones), 391
Brazilian policy, address (Kubitschek), 88
Latin America, address and article: Culbertson, Lederer, 522, 524, 526; Holland, 1006, 1007, 1008, 1012
Need for, excerpt from President's economic report to Congress, 253, 255, 256, 257, 259, 262
Spain, obstacles to U.S. investments in, address (John Lodge), 128
Iran:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 207
Economic development program, address and statement: Allen, 876, 877; Seager, 507
Export-Import Bank loan, 795
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Agricultural commodities, agreement with U.S., 441
Baghdad Pact. *See* Baghdad Pact
Military missions, agreements with U.S., 533
U.S. economic assistance, 595

Iran—Continued
U.S. mutual security program, statement (Hollister), 611
U.S. visa applications cut off for escapees residing in, 1024, 1063
Iraq:
Economic situation, address (Seager), 507
International Bank loan, 795
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Agreement with U.K. under the Baghdad Pact, 17
Baghdad Pact. *See* Baghdad Pact
Geneva conventions (1949), 907
Visas, nonimmigrant passport, agreement with U.S. for reciprocal issuance of, 1081
U.S. aid, 596
Ireland:
Atomic energy, civil uses of, agreements with U.S., 564, 578
Prime Minister, visit to U.S., 290, 467, 560
Wheat agreement, international, 907
Irian Barat. *See* West New Guinea.
Isarabhakdi, Vadhana, 406
Ismay, Lord, 126, 375, 376, 377
Israel:
Arab-Israeli dispute. *See* Arab-Israeli dispute
Arms supply policy. *See* Arms supply
Economic situation, address (Seager), 508
Export-Import Bank loan, 795
Local currencies acquired by the U.S. in Israel, appointment of special consultant on the use of, 207
Military action against Syria. *See under* Near and Middle East
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Agricultural surpluses, agreement with U.S. amending 1955 agreement, 317, 356
Atomic energy, agreement with U.S., 594
Universal postal convention, 398
Wheat agreement, international, 907
U.N. responsibility toward, address and statement (Dulles), 639, 832
U.S. aid, 597
U.S. mutual security program, statement (Hollister), 611
U. S. policy, address and letter: Dulles, 285; Heath, 203
Italy:
Heavy water, purchase from U.S., 592
Imports from dollar area, removal of restrictions on, 1048
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Agricultural surpluses, agreements with U.S., 181, 622, 680
Emergency feeding program, agreement with U.S., 865
GATT, amending protocols, 622, 1081
Ice Patrol, North Atlantic, agreement regarding financial support, 533
International military headquarters (NAT), protocol on status of, 73
Patent rights and technical information for defense purposes, agreement with U.S. for exchange of, 104, 577
Status of forces agreement (NAT), 73
Wheat agreement, international, 907
U.S. mutual security aid, continuation of, 214
Italy—Continued
U.S. visa applications for refugees in, cutoff date announced, 16
Visit of President to U.S., 16, 331, 417

Jacome, Alexander G., 862
Jackson, William H., 248
Japan:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 467
Communist aggression in, and U.S. efforts to combat, 724, 726
Export-Import Bank credit for thermal-power development, 888
Nuclear explosions in the Pacific, text of U.S. note concerning, 566
Soviet relations with Japan, statements (Dulles), 883, 922
Textile exports to U.S., question of protective restrictions by U.S., statements (Dulles), 14, 638, 712, 921; texts of notes, 728
Trade problems, address (Eisenhower), 704
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Agricultural surpluses, agreements with U.S., 488
Aircraft assembly or manufacture, agreement with U.S. for program of, 782
Atomic energy, civil uses, agreement with U.S. for cooperation, 106
Contributions for U.S. services and supplies in Japan, agreement with U.S. relating to reduction of, 821
Copyright convention, universal, and protocols *1*, *2*, and *3*, 263
GATT, protocol on terms of accession of Japan, 38, 106, 270, 356, 782
GATT, 6th protocol of supplementary concessions, 1081
Mutual defense assistance, agreements with U.S. for Japanese contributions for U.S. administrative expenses, 356, 782
Patent rights and technical information for defense purposes, agreement with U.S. for exchange of, 577 578
Peace treaty, 106
Wheat agreement, international, 907
U.N. membership, U.S. and Soviet positions on question of, 13, 97, 113, 354
U.S. atomic expert, visit to Japan, 509
Jerusalem, U.S. representations against mob violence in Jordan-occupied sector, 85
Johnson, U. Alexis, 164, 165, 451
Johnston, Eric, 121
Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S., invitation to visit Soviet Union, statement (Dulles), 1066
Jones, Howard P., 388, 392
Jordan:
Economic situation, address (Seager), 31, 507
Palestine refugees, assistance to, 33, 34
Telecommunication convention, international (1952), 658
U.S. aid, 596
U.S. representations against mob violence in Amman and Jordan-occupied sector in Jerusalem, 85
Jordan, Clarence L., 953
Jordan, Len, 90, 91

ıngschlaeger, Leon, 640
ırists, Inter-American Council of, 3d meeting on territorial waters and related matters, U.S. delegation and action taken, 224, 296
ıstice, International Court of. *See* International Court of Justice

alijarvi, Thorsten V., 1014
apotsy, Bela, 247
atzen, Bernard, 207
ellogg-Briand Pact of *1928*, 664
elly, Henry H., 223*n*, 657, 1029
elly, Isabel T., 862
elly, Sir David, 126
halidy, Awni, 512*n*
hrushchev, Nikita, 84, 364, 365, 450, 496, 1064, 1069
ilgore, Sen. Harley Martin, 409
luckhohn, Clyde K., 651, 953
ono, Ichiro, 922
orea:
Communist aggression in, U.S. efforts to combat, 724, 725, 787, 788
U.N. Command protests of Chinese Communist violations of armistice agreement and withdrawal of NNSC teams from South Korea, texts of statement and exchange of notes, 967, 970
orea, Republic of:
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Agricultural surpluses, agreement with U.S., 532, 533
Atomic energy, civil uses, agreement with U.S., 270, 317
Naval vessels, agreement with U.S. for loan, 226
Wheat agreement, international, 907
World Meteorological Organization, convention of the, 398
U.N. membership, question of, U.S. position, 113
U.S. aid, 887
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 994
otschnig, Walter M., 394, 395
rishna Menon, V. K., 457
ubitschek de Oliveira, Juscelino, 86, 335, 338
uznetsov, Vasily V., 57, 59, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66

abor, forced, problem of, statement (Baker) and text of ECOSOC resolution, 903, 906
abor, migratory, agreement with Mexico extending 1951 agreement, as amended, 142
abor Conference, International, 39th session, U.S. delegation, 1036
abor Organization, International:
Building, Civil Engineering, and Public Works Committee, 5th session, U.S. delegation, 864
Coal Mines Committee, 6th session, U.S. delegation, 821
Convention (1946) for partial revision of conventions adopted by the General Conference, 622
Establishment and functions, 481, 482, 483, 485
Forced Labor Committee, statement (Baker) concerning report of the, 903
Governing Body, 132d session, U.S. delegation, 949
abouisse, Henry R., 31, 32
ake Ontario, controlling levels of:
Discussions by International Joint Commission, U.S.-Canada, 92
Lake Ontario, controlling levels of—Continued
Recommendations, approval of, letters (Jordan, Hoover), 89, 91
Lange, Halvard, 835
Langer, William L., 651, 953
Laos:
Communist aggression in, 724
Economic progress in, 447
Mekong River, request for ICA survey, 52
Telecommunication convention, international (1952), 782
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 994
Latin America (*see also* Inter-American *and individual countries*):
Communist subversion in, efforts to overcome, address and statements: Dulles, 200, 712, 713; Nufer, 839
Economic and trade relations with U.S., addresses, article, and statement: Culbertson and Lederer, 521; Holland, 174, 1006
Foreign Relations, volume on, published, 733
Hotel development, problems of, 223
Inter-American cooperation, address (Milton Eisenhower), 682
Pan American Day and Pan American Week, 1956, proclamation, 544, 683
Panama meeting of Presidents of American Republics, 880, 923, 925
Spanish policy toward, 45
U.N. technical assistance, statement (Bell), 486
UNESCO conference on education in Latin America, U.S. delegation, 781
U.S. mutual security program, statement (Hollister) and President's recommendations to Congress, 548 613
Law, international, development of, addresses: Dulles, 741, 743; Phleger, 663; Wilcox, 847
Law Commission, International, 100
Lawrence, Edward W., 225
Lawrence, John, 509
League of Nations, 740, 809
Lebanon:
Atomic energy, agreement with U.S., 594
Earthquake disaster in, texts of messages (Eisenhower, Hoover), 565
Economic situation, address (Seager), 508
International Bank loan, 795
U.S. aid, 596
Wheat agreement, international, 907
Lederer, Walther, 521
Legislation. *See under* Congress
Legislation, State, concerning Japanese textile imports to U.S., 712, 728
Leninism, Problems of, statements (Dulles), 642, 643
Less developed countries. *See* Underdeveloped countries
Libby, Willard F., 209
Liberia:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 637
Technical assistance and cooperation, agreement with U.S., 356
Universal copyright convention and protocols *1* and *2*, 865
U.S. aid, 597
Wheat agreement, international, 907

Library of Congress:
Fitzpatrick letters, presentation by Irish Prime Minister, 562, 563
Franklin Commemorative Medal, presentation, 249
Libya:
Customs tariffs, convention creating international union for publication of, regulations of execution, final declarations, and protocol, 355
Relief supplies and packages, agreement with U.S. providing for duty-free entry and tax exemption, 142
U.S. aid, 598, 680
World Meteorological Organization, convention of the, 141
Lighter-flints escape-clause case, deferment, 353
Lightner, E. Allan, Jr., 954
Literary and artistic works, protection of. *See* Copyright
Liu Yung-ming, 52
Lloyd, Selwyn, 234, 235
Lo Jui-ching, 904
Loans, U.N. *See* International Bank
Loans, U.S. (*see also* Export-Import Bank), reduction during 1954, excerpt from President's economic report to Congress, 262
Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr.:
Correspondence:
Atomic energy, radiation effects on human health, transmission of report to U.N., 1078
Balloon flights over Eastern Europe, 428
General Assembly, note concerning opening date of 11th session, 819
Palestine question, 627
U.S. foreign economic policy, 117*n*
Statements:
Atomic energy as a factor in economic development, 816
Atomic energy library, presentation to U.N., 656
Cyprus question, 457
Disarmament, U.S. and U.N. positions, 55, 61, 66, 69, 97, 222
Israeli military action against Syria, U.S. position, 103, 182
Moroccan question, 454
Palestine question, 627, 722, 1025
United Nations, admission of new members, 97, 354
Lodge, John, 43, 126, 379
Looney, Warren F., 890
Lord, Mrs. Oswald B., 70, 99, 117*n*, 984
Luxembourg:
GATT, procès verbal and amending protocols, 733, 1080, 1081
Imports from dollar area, removal of restrictions on, 1048
Trade Cooperation, Organization for, agreement on, 1080
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 226
U.S. Mission to the European Coal and Steel Community, established in Luxembourg, 441
Lynn, Albert L. 1079
Lyon, Cecil B., 865

Macpherson, Sir John, 691
Malaya, Federation of:
Communist aggression in, 724
Independence, U.K. assurance of, 347
Mann, Thomas C., 226
Mansfield, Sen. Mike, 14
Mao Tse-tung, 904
Maritime Consultative Organization, Intergovernmental, convention, 733
Marler, George C., 981
Marshall Islands, petition requesting cessation of nuclear tests in the Pacific, statement (Gerig), U.S. observations, letter (Macpherson), and text of petition, 689, 691, 692
Martin Artajo, Alberto, 248, 633, 666
Martino, Gaetano, 331, 835
Marton, Andrew, 247
Marton, Ilona, 247
Matsu and Quemoy Islands, defense of, statement (Dulles), 155, 156
Matthews, H. Freeman, 694
Mayer, René, 15, 241, 282, 288
Mayo, Charles W., 210
McIntosh, Dempster, 658
McLain, Marvin L., 947, 1017
McLeod, Scott, 355
Meany, George, 679
Mekong River, ICA survey of, 52
Melas, George V., 457
Memorials, war, agreement with France relating to grants of land located in France, 694
Menderes, Adnan, 456
Merchant, Livingston T., 865
Merrow, Rep. Chester E., 99, 117*n*, 138
Message of America, address (Eisenhower), 633
Meteorological Organization, World:
Convention of the, 141, 398
Establishment and functions, 481, 483
Meteorology:
Meteorological balloons. *See* Balloons
Rawinsonde observation stations, agreements with—Colombia, 782; France, 733
Mexico:
Heads of Government meeting (U.S., Canada, Mexico). *See* Heads of Government meeting
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Civil aviation convention, international, protocol amending, 1038
Cultural property, convention for protection in event of armed conflict, 952
IFC, articles of agreement, 73
Migratory labor, agreement with U.S. extending 1941 agreement, as amended, 142
Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, convention, final protocols, regulations of execution, and parcel post and money orders agreements, 398
Wheat agreement, international, 907
White slave traffic, agreement for repression of, 578
Middle East. *See* Near and Middle East
Migratory labor, agreement with Mexico extending 1951 agreement, as amended, 142

llitary assistance (*see also* Military missions, Mutual defense, *and* Mutual security):
Agreement with Spain providing for military equipment, address (John Lodge), 45, 47
Agreements regarding disposition of equipment, materials, and property, with—
Colombia, 694; Philippines, 622; Uruguay, 994; Viet-Nam, 694
ilitary bases:
Spain, agreement with U.S., address (John Lodge), 45, 46, 47, 48
U.S. position, statement (Lodge), 59
ilitary blueprints, President Eisenhower's proposals for exchange. *See under* Disarmament: Aerial inspection
ilitary cemeteries, agreements with—
France, relating to grants of land located in France, 694
Netherlands, extending 1947 agreement, 658
ilitary dependents' housing and tobacco, agreement with U.K., 1081
ilitary headquarters, international (NAT), protocol on status of, 73
ilitary information, exchange of. *See* Disarmament
ilitary missions, U.S., agreements with—
Honduras, 994; Iran, 533; Peru, 578
ilitary program, U.S. *See* Mutual defense, Mutual security, *and* National defense
ills, Sheldon T., 658
ixed Armistice Commission, Syrian-Israeli, functions, statement (Lodge), 182
ixed Board dealing with prisoners involved in German war crimes, appointment of U.S. member, 210
offat, Douglas Maxwell, 398
ohammed V, Sultan of Morocco, 454, 466, 467, 501, 667
olotov, Vyacheslav, 453
onaco:
Industrial property, convention (1934) for the protection of, 733
Opium, protocol (1953) regulating the production, trade and use of, 865
onetary Fund, International, establishment and functions, 481, 483
onnet, Jean, 126
oore, John Bassett, 665
orales-Carrión, Arturo, 820
orocco:
Extraterritorial rights in, U.S. policy on, 204
Independence of:
French-Moroccan declaration, 466
Spanish-Moroccan declaration, 667
U.S. and French policies, address (Dillon), 553, 554
U.S. policy, article (Howard), 453
World Health Organization, constitution, 1038
orton, Thruston B., 356
otion picture films, agreement with Federal Republic of Germany regarding tariff concession, text, 814
uccio, John J., 226
ueller, Helmut, 880
uenster Peace Medal, presentation, 880
urphy, Robert:
Addresses and statement:
A Crucial Contest With the Communist World, 556
For a Better World, 371
Murphy, Robert—Continued
Addresses and statement—Continued
Mutual Security, Maintaining the Strength of the Free World Through, 963
NATO, The Foundations of, 644
The New Soviet Diplomatic Offensive, 168
Soviet Reappraisal of Stalin, 719
Career ambassador, 694
Mutual defense assistance agreements (*see also* Military missions), with—
China, Republic of, disposition of equipment and materials, 994
Germany, Federal Republic of, 73, 74, 162
Japan, agreements for Japanese financial contributions, 356, 782
Pakistan, construction agreement, 1038
Philippines, military and economic assistance, amending and supplementing 1955 agreement, 821
Mutual defense treaties and agreements (*see also* Baghdad Pact, Collective security, Mutual security, National defense, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *and* Southeast Asia Treaty Organization):
Patent rights and technical information, exchange of, agreements with—
Belgium, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, and U.K., 104, 577; Germany, Federal Republic of, 104, 142, 577; Japan, 104, 577, 578; Turkey, 952, 953
Radar stations, agreements with Canada providing for establishment and operation of, 74
Mutual security and other assistance programs (*see also* Agricultural surpluses, Economic and technical aid, Military assistance, *and* Mutual defense):
Address, article, and statements: Dorsey, 793; Dulles, 199, 211, 214, 871, 1000; Eisenhower, 1004; Hoover, 550; Murphy, 963
Asia, address and statement: Dulles, 540; Robertson, 723
Defense support to—
Pakistan, 797; Spain, 45, 46, 47, 48, 678; Yugoslavia, 348, 679
Europe, statement (Elbrick), 674
Near East, South Asia and Africa, article and statement: Allen, 875; Howard, 510, 593
Outline of 1957 mutual security program, statement (Hollister) and charts, 605
Philippines, agreement with U.S. amending and supplementing 1955 agreement relating to military assistance, 821
President's messages and letter to Congress concerning:
Budget message, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152
Economic report, 256
Recommendations for 1957 program, 545, 1003
State of the Union message, 82
Relationship of national security to, statement (Dulles), 787

NAC. *See* North Atlantic Council
Narcotic drugs. *See* Drugs, narcotic
Nasser, Col. Gamal Abdel, 640, 642, 923
NAT. *See* North Atlantic Treaty
National Academy of Sciences, 1078
National Archives, access policy regarding State Department records, 344
National day of Poland, 803

National defense and security (*see also* Collective security, Mutual defense, *and* Mutual security):
Civil defense, development under NATO, article (Howard), 377
President's messages to Congress concerning, 82, 148
Relationship to mutual security program, statement (Dulles), 787
U.S. budget, national security considerations in the formulation of, statement (Dulles), 160
National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis, 469
National origins method of admitting aliens to U.S., proposed legislative changes, 275
Nationalism, address and statement concerning: Allen, 717; Sukarno, 929, 935, 936
NATO. *See* North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Natural resources: continental shelf and marine waters. *See* Territorial waters
Natural wealth and resources, permanent sovereignty over, U.S. position, 70, 71
Naval mission, agreement with Peru extending 1940 agreement, 578
Navigation, friendship, and commerce treaties:
Importance to American business abroad, address (Thibodeaux), 23
Treaties with—
Germany, Federal Republic of, 907; Netherlands, 621, 622; Nicaragua, 174, 181
Neal, Jack D., 954
Near and Middle East (*see also individual countries*):
Arab-Israeli dispute. *See* Arab-Israeli dispute
Arms shipments to. *See* Arms supply
Baghdad Pact. *See* Baghdad Pact
Communist threat of subversion, 203
Economic situation, addresses: Dulles, 122; Seager, 506
Israeli military action against Syria:
Article and statement: Dulles, 121; Howard, 463
U.N. action, statements (Lodge) and Security Council resolution, 182, 183
U.S. position, statement (Lodge), 103
Relationship to Atlantic Community, address (Dulles), 831
Relaxing tensions in, efforts toward, address and statements: Dulles, 12, 368, 922, 924; Wilcox, 368
Tripartite meeting (U.S., U.K., France) on situation in, 233, 286
U.S. aid, article and statements: Dorsey, 792, 794; Dulles, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14; White, 367
U.S. mutual security program:
President's recommendations to Congress, 547, 548
Statements and address: Allen, 875, 876; Dulles, 788, 1000; Hollister, 609, 611
U.S. policy:
Address, article, and statements: Dulles, 412, 639, 641, 643, 710, 714, 749; Hagerty, 668; Heath, 202; Howard, 452, 510, 593
Exchange of correspondence (Dulles, Members of House of Representatives), 285, 286
U.S.–U.K. policy:
Address (Aldrich), 799
Joint statement (Eisenhower, Eden), 233
Nehru, Jawaharlal, 565
Nepal:
Economic development, statement (Allen), 878, 879
U.S. aid, 348, 599
Netherlands:
Imports from dollar area, removal of restrictions on, 1048
Tariff concessions to U.S., GATT, renegotiation on behalf of Benelux countries, 350, 351
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Air transport, agreement with U.S., negotiations, 378, 650
Aircraft, imported, agreement with U.S. relating to certificates of airworthiness, 1038
American war graves, agreement with U.S. extending 1947 agreement, 658
Atomic energy, civil uses, agreement with U. S. for cooperation, 106
Atomic information, agreement between parties to NAT for cooperation, 106
Civil aviation convention, international, protocol amending, 1038
Friendship, commerce and navigation, treaty with U.S., 621, 622
GATT, amending protocols, 622, 953, 1081
Ice Patrol, North Atlantic, agreement concerning financial support of, 398
Patent rights and technical information for defense purposes, agreement with U.S. for exchange of, 104, 577
Wheat agreement, international, 907
West New Guinea, dispute with Indonesia concerning, address (Sukarno), 930
Netherlands Antilles, renegotiation with U.S. of GATT tariff concessions, 26
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (Korea), withdrawal of teams from South Korea, statement and exchange of notes, 967, 970
Neutrality:
Spanish policy during World War II, 45
Views on, address and statements: Dulles, 999, 1064; Eisenhower, 1004
New Guinea, convention to facilitate importation of commercial samples and advertising materials, extension to, 440
New Zealand:
Atomic energy, civil uses, agreement with U.S., 1071, 1081
GATT, amending protocols, 38, 622, 953
Tariff concessions, GATT, renegotiation with U.S., 26, 27
Wheat agreement, international, 907
Newman, John Henry Cardinal, 371
Nicaragua:
Tariff concessions, GATT, renegotiation with U.S., 26, 27
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Friendship, commerce and navigation, treaty with U.S., 174, 181
Friendship agreements with Costa Rica, 339
IFC, articles of agreement, 73
Political rights to women, inter-American convention on granting of, 865

Nicaragua—Continued
Treaties, agreements, etc.—Continued
Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, convention, final protocols, regulations of execution, and parcel post and money orders agreements, 398
Wheat agreement, international, 907
Nixon, Richard M., addresses and statements:
Brazilian–U.S. friendship, 335
Brazilian Vice President, visit to U.S., 803
Freedom, A Peaceful Crusade for, 1043
Indonesian President, visit to U.S., 927
Irish Prime Minister, visit to U.S., 560
Italian President, visit to U.S., 417
State Department honor awards ceremony, 6th annual, 812
NSC. *See* Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
Nolan, Charles P., 689
Non-self-governing territories. *See* Self-determination *and* Trust territories
Norstad, Gen. Lauris, 757, 758
North Africa (*see also individual countries*), U.S. and French policies in, address (Dillon), 553
North Atlantic Council:
Functions, article (Howard), 376
Meeting of Foreign Ministers at Paris, announcement, address and statements (Dulles), letter (Eisenhower), and text of communique, 791, 831, 835, 836
Resolution, retirement and appointment of Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, 757
North Atlantic Ice Patrol, agreement regarding financial support, current actions, 105, 106, 181, 317, 398, 533
North Atlantic Treaty:
Atomic information, agreement between parties for cooperation, current actions, 73, 106, 226, 622, 688
International military headquarters, protocol on status of, 73
National representatives and international staff, agreement on status, 994
Status of forces agreement, 73
U.S.–British views concerning, joint statement (Eisenhower, Eden), 232
North Atlantic Treaty Oganization:
Addresses and statements: Dulles, 706, 747, 832, 1066, 1069; Eden, 240; Gronchi, 420; Gruenther, 332; Murphy, 644
Agreements and protocol. *See* North Atlantic Treaty
Appointment of Senator George as personal representative and special ambassador of President to NATO, 836, 879, 881, 882
Cyprus, question of NATO administration of, 713
Fellowship awarded, 649
Forces stationed in Germany (NATO), question of German financial contributions to, statement (Dulles), 280
Importance of, joint communique (Adenauer, Dulles), 1047
Nonmilitary aspects, development of, addresses and statement: Eisenhower, 917; Dulles, 413, 925, 926
Progress of, and Soviet efforts to destroy, statement (Elbrick), 674, 675, 676
Seminar on international problems for representatives of NATO, announcement, 125
North Atlantic Treaty Organization—Continued
Soviet support of the principles of NATO, U.S. views on address by Winston Churchill, 837, 884, 886
Spain, question of membership, 748
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, retirement and appointment of, statement, NAC announcement and resolution, and letters (Eisenhower), 756
U.S. mutual security program, address (Dulles) and President's messages to Congress, 151, 547, 1001
North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries, U.S. visa applications cut off for escapees residing in, 1024, 1063
"Northern tier" pact. *See* Baghdad Pact
Norway:
International Bank loan, 888
Tariff concessions by U.S., GATT, announcement and memorandum to Secretary of the Treasury, 125
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Civil aviation convention, international, protocol amending, 1038
GATT, protocol on terms of accession of Japan, 106
GATT, 6th protocol of supplementary concessions, 1081
Ice Patrol, North Atlantic, agreement regarding financial support, 181
Patent rights and technical information for defense purposes, agreement with U.S. for exchange of, 104, 577
Plant protection convention, international, 907
Wheat agreement, international, 907
Nuclear energy. *See* Atomic energy
Nufer, Albert F., 839, 865
Nutting, Sir Anthony, 456, 924
Nyasaland. *See* Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Federation of

OAS. *See* Organization of American States
O'Boyle, Archbishop Patrick A., 372
Oceanographic Institute, Inter-American, proposed establishment of, 896
OEEC. *See* Organization for European Economic Cooperation
Oils and oilseeds, U.S. export prospects, 1020, 1022
"Open sky" proposals for aerial inspection. *See under* Disarmament
Opium, protocol (1953) regulating production, trade, and use of, 865
Organization for European Economic Cooperation:
European stability, OEEC contribution to, joint statement (Eisenhower, Eden), 232
Functions, 232, 833, 1074
Organization for Trade Cooperation. *See* Trade Cooperation, Organization for
Organization of American States:
Charter, ratification deposited by Argentina, 782
Costa Rican–Nicaraguan dispute, Council's role in mediation, 339
Development of, address (Dulles), 835
Inter-American Council of Jurists, 3d meeting, 224, 296
65th anniversary, 683
OTC. *See* Trade Cooperation, Organization for
Outer Mongolia, question of U.N. membership, 97, 113
Pact of mutual cooperation. *See* Baghdad Pact
Pact of Paris (1928), 740
Padmore, George Arthur, 637

Pakistan:
Economic development, article and statement: Allen, 878, 879; Dorsey, 796
International Bank loan, 795
Republic day, texts of letter and messages (Eisenhower, Dulles), 565
SEATO. *See* Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
Tariff concessions, GATT, renegotiation with U.S., 26, 27
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Agricultural commodities, agreement with U.S., 488, 578
Atomic energy, agreement with U.S., 594
Baghdad Pact. *See* Baghdad Pact
Civil aviation convention, international, protocol amending, 1038
Construction agreement with U.S., 1038
GATT, procès verbal and amending protocols, 38, 1080, 1081
IFC, articles of agreement, 73
Parcel post, agreement with U.S. concerning exchange of, and regulations for execution of the agreement, 181
Passport visas and visa fees, agreement with U.S. revising agreement relating to, 142
Trade Cooperation, Organization for, agreement on, 1080
U.S. aid, 53, 569, 598
U.S. mutual security program, 384, 612
Visit of U.S. atomic expert, 509
Palestine question. *See* Arab-Israeli dispute
Pan American Day and Pan American Week, 1956, proclamation, 544
Pan American Institute of Geography and History, U.S. delegate to 1st meeting of Directing Council, 994
Pan American Sanitary Bureau, 469
Panama:
Geneva Conventions (1949), 907
IFC, articles of agreement, 73
Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, convention, final protocols, regulations of execution, and parcel post and money orders agreements, 398
Visas, nonimmigrant, agreement with U.S., 1038
Wheat agreement, international, 907
Panama meeting of Presidents of American Republics, 880, 923, 925
Papagos, Alexander, 456
Papua, international convention to facilitate importation of commercial samples and advertising materials, extension to, 440
Paraguay:
Agricultural surpluses, agreement with U.S., 804, 907
IFC, articles of agreement, 73
Import privileges for nondiplomatic personnel, reciprocal, agreement with U.S., 1081
Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, convention, final protocols, regulations of execution, and parcel post and money orders agreements, 398
Parcel post agreements with—
Pakistan, concerning exchange of parcel post, and regulations for execution, 181
Spain, 658
Parsons, J. Graham, 994
Passports (*see also* Visas):
Passport regulations, revisions in, 129
Validation of passports for American citizens to travel to Hungary, 248
Pastore, Sen. John O., 97, 117*n*
Patent rights and technical information for defense purposes, agreements for exchange of, with—
Belgium, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, and U.K., 104, 577; Germany, Federal Republic of, 104, 142, 577; Japan, 104, 577, 578; Turkey, 952, 953
Patents, protection of American rights abroad, address (Thibodeaux), 24
Patterson, Jefferson, 658
Patterson, Morehead, 4, 210
Pauley, Edwin W., 596*n*
Peace:
Addresses and remarks: Dulles, 739, 999; Eisenhower, 3, 699
NATO efforts for, address and article: Gruenther, 332; Howard, 375
SEATO efforts for, 447, 450
U.S. and Soviet desires for, exchange of letters (Eisenhower, Bulganin) and draft Soviet treaty with U.S., 191, 193, 194, 195
U.S. and world efforts for, addresses and statements: Dulles, 84, 368, 542; Eden, 235, 239, 240, 241; Eisenhower, 80, 81, 82, 373; Hoover, 323; Robertson, 807, 808; Wilcox, 847
Peace Medal of the city of Muenster, Germany, presentation of, 880
Peace treaty, Japan, 106
Peaceful settlement of disputes. *See* Disputes *and* "Renunciation of force"
Pearson, Lester B., 835, 1066
Peaslee, Amos J., 186
Pedersen, Richard F., 990
Pepper, Sen. George Wharton, 664
Perkins, George W., 376
Personnel, Public Committee on, report released, 248
Persons, exchange of. *See* East-West contacts *and* Educational exchange
Peru:
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Agricultural surpluses, agreements with U.S., 847, 994
Atomic energy, civil uses, agreement with U.S. for cooperation, 226
Debts, German external, agreement on, 226
Educational exchange, agreement with U.S., 815, 865
GATT, 6th protocol of supplementary concessions, 1081
Geneva conventions (1949), 907
IFC, articles of agreement, 73
Naval mission, agreement with U.S. extending 1940 agreement, 578
Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, convention, final protocols, regulations of execution, and parcel post and money orders agreements, 398
Voluntary agency relief, agreement with U.S. amending 1954 agreement, 821
Wheat agreement, international, 907

ru—Continued
J.S. aid, 887
J.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 994
roleum imports, problem of, address (Hoover), 959
ilippines:
Asian Nuclear Center, site for, 544
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Civil aviation convention, international, protocol amending, 1038
Copyright convention, universal, 263
Military assistance, agreement with U.S., 622, 821
Wheat agreement, international, 907
J.S. aid, 568, 726, 772, 788
J.S. Ambassador, resignation (Ferguson), 733; confirmation (Nufer), 865
J.S. relations with, 750
illips, Christopher H., 225, 948, 1077
leger, Herman, 663
ay, Antoine, 454
ean, Christian, 241, 638
kerton, Lowell C., 694
nt protection convention, international, 311, 907, 1080
biscite in British Togoland, U.N. action, statements (Bell, Gerig) and General Assembly resolution, 37, 98, 100, 102
and:
National day, 803
Repatriation activities in U.S., text of U.S. note of protest, 802
U.S. visa applications for certain refugees, cutoff date announced, 940
omyelitis epidemic in Argentina, U.S. aid, 469, 527
itical rights to women, inter-American convention on granting of, 865
ntecorvo, Bruno, 1046
rt and harbor conference, inter-American, U.S. delegation, 688
rtugal:
oa, dispute with India concerning, statements (Dulles), 465
mports from dollar area, removal of restrictions on, 1048
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Civil aviation convention, international, protocol amending, 1038
Iberian defense pact with Spain, 45
International Court of Justice, statute of, declaration recognizing compulsory jurisdiction deposited, 317
Surplus agricultural commodities, agreement with U.S., 1038
Wheat agreement, international, 907
tal convention, universal, current actions, 73, 141, 398, 994
tal Union, Universal, establishment and functions, 481, 483
tal Union of the Americas and Spain, convention of the, agreements relative to parcel post, money orders, and provisions regarding airmail, current actions, 398
ultry, agreement with Federal Republic of Germany for sale, 28
wer Conference, World, meeting and U.S. delegation, 1078
President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities:
Appointment of board, announcement and letters (Eisenhower), 161
Establishment and functions, Executive order, 340
Presidents of American Republics, Panama meeting of, 880, 923, 925
Press, freedom of the:
Brazilian policy, 87, 88
Turkish press-control law, 1065
Prisoners in German war crimes cases, appointment of U.S. members of Mixed Board, 210
Prisoners of war, Geneva convention relative to treatment of, 907
Private bills for relief of aliens, proposed legislative changes, 276
Problems of Leninism, statement (Dulles), 642, 643
Prochnow, Herbert V., 184, 226, 529, 531
Proclamations by the President:
Pan American Day and Pan American Week, *1956*, 544
Tariff negotiations (1956) at Geneva, 1057
Trade agreement with Ecuador (1938), extension, 180
Tuna canned in brine, increased duty on imports, 654
Woodrow Wilson Centennial Year, 806
World trade week, *1956*, 686
Propaganda, Communist:
Combating, by means of Radio Free Europe, letter (Eisenhower), 636
Efforts to combat in U.N. and specialized agencies, statement (Wilcox), 485
Soviet treatment of President's letter to Premier Bulganin, 279
Propaganda balloons. *See* Balloons
Property, cultural, convention and protocol for protection in event of armed conflict, and regulations of execution, 440
Property, industrial, convention for the protection of, 440
Property in Austria, seized by Germans during World War II, claims for restitution, 49
Property rights and interests in Germany, charter of Arbitral Commission on, 106
Public Committee on Personnel, report released, 248
Publications:
Amerika, proposed distribution in U.S.S.R., texts of notes, 18
Congress, lists of current legislation of foreign policy, 252, 471, 570, 775, 810, 851, 893, 983, 1024, 1053
State Department:
Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945 (The War Years, March 18, 1940–June 22, 1940), released, 954
Far Eastern records, access and publication policies, 343
Foreign Relations of the United States, published:
1938, vol. V (The American Republics), 733
1939, vol. I (General), 441
Lists of recent releases, 74, 142, 318, 357, 442, 488, 534, 578, 734, 825, 866, 954, 1081
United Nations, lists of current documents, 71, 104, 181, 225, 310, 440, 693, 859, 902, 1037
Puerto Rico, teacher development workshop, article (Russell), 778
Pushkin, Georgi, 48

Quemoy and Matsu Islands, defense of, statement (Dulles), 155, 156

Radar stations in Canada, agreements with Canada providing for establishment and operation of, 74
Radiation, atomic, effects on human health. *See under* Atomic energy, radiation effects
Radio broadcasting to Soviet Union, statement (Dulles), 284
Radio in the American Sector (RIAS), Berlin, 10th anniversary, 242
Railway system in India, U.S. aid in developing, 205, 206
Randall, Clarence B., 171, 595
Randall, Robert H., 994
Rawinsonde observation stations, establishment and operation of, agreements with—
  Colombia, on island of San Andrés, 782
  France, on island of Guadeloupe, 733
Reciprocity Information, Committee for, 263, 351, 352
Reconstruction and Development, International Bank for. *See* International Bank
Refugee Fund, United Nations:
  Executive Committee, U.S. delegates to 2d and 3d sessions, 225, 948
  U.S. contributions, 590, 1077
Refugee Relief Act, 468, 775, 1063
Refugees and displaced persons:
  Arab refugee problem:
    Address, article, letter, and statements: Bergus, 503, 504; Dulles, 286, 287, 369; Howard, 458, 597; Wadsworth, 31, 32, 35
    General Assembly resolution, 33
    U.N. action, 98
  Copyright convention, protocol concerning application of convention to works of stateless persons and refugees, 263
  East Germany, refugees from, address (Hoover), 292
  Escapee program, U.S., 650, 1024
  ICEM. *See* Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration
  Right of asylum:
    U.N. action and statement (Blaustein), 99
    U.S. policy, 939
  U.S. program for relief:
    President's recommendations to Congress, 548
    Public Advisory Group, appointments, 679
    Statement (Phillips), 1077
    Viet-Nam, U.S. aid for refugee resettlement, 208
  U.S. visa applications, cutoff dates announced. *See under* Visas
Relief, voluntary agency, agreement with Peru amending 1954 agreement, 821
Relief and rehabilitation. *See* Refugees and displaced persons, Economic aid, *and individual countries*
Relief and Works Agency, U.N., aid to Palestine refugees, 31, 33
Relief supplies and packages, agreement with Libya providing for duty-free entry and tax exemption, 142
"Renunciation of force" principle, discussions at Geneva ambassadorial talks, 164, 165, 166, 167, 451, 1070
Repatriation activities of Poland in U.S., text of U.S. note of protest, 802
Representation allowances, budget request for fiscal year *1957*, 909
Research reactor agreement with Germany, discussions on, joint announcement, 92
Resolution of Ciudad Trujillo, 895, 897 (text)
Reyes, Narciso, 406
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Federation of:
  Commercial samples and advertising materials, international convention to facilitate importation of, 1038
  Deputy Prime Minister, visit to U.S., 552
  GATT, procès verbal and amending protocols, 622, 1081
  Tariff concessions to U.S., GATT, renegotiation of, 262
RIAS. *See* Radio in the American Sector
Rice:
  Distribution of surpluses for use in domestic and overseas programs, 53
  Rice-for-technicians, proposed agreement with Burma, 569
  U.S. export prospects, 1019, 1020, 1022
  U.S. shipments to Pakistan, 569
Richards, Arthur L., 356
Road traffic, convention on, with annexes and protocol, 317, 355
Robertson, Walter S., 279, 543, 723, 805, 972
Rockefeller, Nelson A., 248
Roddis, Louis, 509
Rodriguez Altamirano, Mario, 295
Rollman, Tony, 241
Root, Elihu, 739
Ruanda-Urundi:
  Political and economic developments (Gerig), 438
  Telecommunication convention, international, extension to, 782
Rubber, question of shipment to Communist China, statement (Dulles), 1067
Rubottom, Roy R., Jr., 954
Ruegger, Paul, 903
Ruiz Cortines, Adolfo, 590, 637
Rumania:
  Minister to U.S., credentials, 791
  Negotiations with U.S., proposed, 801
  Telecommunication convention, international (1952), 782
  U.S. Minster, confirmation, 226
Russell, Howard H., 778
Ruttenberg, Stanley H., 96
Ryerson, Knowles A., 732

Saar, elections in, statement (Dulles), 13
Safety at sea, regulations for preventing collisions at sea, 263, 1038
Safety of life at sea, convention on (1948), 622
St. Laurent, Louis S., 590, 636
St. Lawrence Seaway:
  Discussions between Canada and U.S., 981
  Lake Ontario, controlling levels of, 89, 92
  Status and progress of, report to President and President's report to Congress for fiscal year *1955*, 215
Saltzman, Charles E. 651, 953
San Andrés, agreement with Colombia for establishment and operation of rawinsonde observation station on, 782

n Marino, convention (1954) for protection of cultural property in event of armed conflict, with regulations of execution and protocol, 694
nders, William, 224
nitation:
Improvement of, as a means of developing tourism, 1032
Progress in French Togoland, statement (Gerig), 575
ntos-Jundiai Railway, Brazil, Export-Import Bank loan, 299
rper, Selim, 457, 511
tellite nations:
Eastern Europe, U.S. position concerning, address (Wilcox), 113
Soviet relations with, statements: Dulles, 751; Hoover, 245
tterthwaite, Livingston, 374, 528
udi Arabia:
Dispute with U.K. over Buraimi, 465
Royalties from Arabian-American Oil Company, 597
U.S. sale of tanks to, 326
iences, National Academy of, 1078
ientific Committee on Effects of Atomic Radiation, U.N., 1st meeting, article (Warren), 860
ager, Cedric H., 506, 754
amen of Soviet tanker *Tuapse*, departure of former crew members from U.S., 765
ars, Mason, 438*n*
EATO. *See* Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
curity, national. *See* National defense and security
curity Council, U.N.:
Arab-Israeli dispute, actions on, 462, 463, 464
Documents, lists of, 73, 225, 310, 693, 1037
Membership question, U.S. position and Soviet use of veto, addresses and statements: Dulles, 12; Lodge, 97, 354; Wilcox, 111, 112, 113, 114
Resolutions:
Israeli action against Syria, condemnation of, 183
Palestine question, 628, 1028
U.S. deputy representative, confirmation, 732
curity forces, U.S., in Japan, agreement with Japan providing for reduction of Japanese contribution for, 821
lf-determination:
Human Rights Covenants, U.S. position on article 1 of drafts, and statement (Lord), 70
U.N. Commission on Human Rights, actions by, report (Lord), 985
minar on international problems for representatives of NATO, announcement, 125
rvice academies, U.S., designation of foreign students to, Executive order, 538
rvices and supplies, U.S., in Japan, agreement with Japan relating to reduction of Japanese contributions for, 821
harett, Moshe, 461
haw, Byron T., 28
hips and shipping:
Collisions at sea, regulations for preventing, 263, 1038
Ice Patrol, North Atlantic, agreement regarding financial support, current actions, 105, 106, 181, 317, 398, 533
Inter-American port and harbor conference, U.S. delegation, 688
Ships and shipping—Continued
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, convention on (1948), 733
International loadline convention (1930), 733
Naval vessels, U.S., agreements with—
Cuba, for furnishing supplies and services, 226
France, for extension of loan of *Belleau Wood*, 356
Korea, for loan of vessels, 226
Nuclear-powered ship, President's request to Congress for funds for, 150
Safety of life at sea, conventiou on, 622
St. Lawrence Seaway. *See* St. Lawrence Seaway
Siefkin, Forest D., 171
Siracusa, Ernest V., 270
Slavery, multilateral agreement for repression of white slave traffic, 578
Slavery convention (1926), protocol amending and annex, 141, 263, 270, 533, 622, 658
Sobolev, Arkady A., 222, 765, 766
Social security benefits, Austrian, coverage of U.S. residents, 886
Sonnabend, Abraham M., 886
South Africa, Union of:
Civil aviation convention, international, protocol amending, 1038
GATT, procès verbal and amending protocols, 38, 622, 1081
U.N. General Assembly, withdrawal of delegation over racial question, 112
Visas, nonimmigrant, agreement with U.S. relating to reciprocal issuance, 782
Wheat agreement, international, 907
South America. *See* Latin America
South and Southeast Asia. *See* Asia.
South Carolina, legislation regarding Japanese textile imports, texts of notes, 712, 728
South Pacific Conference, 3d session, U.S. delegation, 732
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization:
Annual report of Council Representatives, 403
Council of Ministers, 2d meeting:
Announcement and U.S. delegation, 84, 408
Preparations for, text of communique, 207
Statements (Dulles), 408, 409, 449, 451, 539
Text of communique on accomplishments, 447
Development of, statements (Dulles), 413, 1067
Pakistani membership, evaluation of, statement (Dulles), 282
U.S.-British support of, joint statement (Eisenhower, Eden), 233
Soviet-bloc countries:
East-West trade. *See* East-West trade
Refugees from, U.S. policy on right of asylum, 939
Soviet Union (*see also* Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Communism, Propaganda, *and* Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic):
Amerika, proposed distribution in U.S.S.R., texts of notes, 18
Armaments and armed forces, proposed reduction of, statements (Dulles), 880, 881, 882, 883, 885, 920
Armed strength of, address and message: Eisenhower, 546; Gruenther, 332
Atomic Energy Agency, International, Soviet position on relationship to U.N., 115

Soviet Union—Continued
Baghdad Pact, Soviet opposition to, article (Howard), 511, 512
Berlin, development of para-military activities in Soviet sector, U.S. note of protest, 293
"Cold war," definition of, statement (Dulles), 749
Disarmament. *See* Disarmament
East Germany, Soviet domination of, address (Hoover), 290, 292
East–West contacts. *See* East–West contacts
East–West trade. *See* East–West trade
Economic aid to and penetration of other countries:
Addresses, article, and statements: Allen, 876, 877, 878, 879; Dulles, 8, 11, 363, 364, 366, 411, 475, 541, 714; Eisenhower, 546; Hoover, 550; Howard, 452; Wilcox, 484, 485
Soviet charges of U.S. efforts to hamper, and U.S. reply, statements (Jones, Kotschnig), 392, 394
U.S. views on countering Soviet efforts, 118, 159
Forced labor, use of, statement (Baker), 905
Germany, 4-power status:
Joint communique (Adenauer, Dulles), 1047
U.S. position, statement and letters (Conant, Pushkin), 48
Western position, statements (Dulles), 8, 12
Germany, Soviet position on reunification of, 192, 243, 244, 670, 672, 885
Industrial development and production goals, address and statements: Dulles, 159, 161; Gruenther, 332
Japanese-Soviet relations, 883, 922
Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S., invitation to visit Soviet Union, statement (Dulles), 1066
Meteorological and propaganda balloons. *See* Balloons
Middle East, assessment of Soviet statement on, 749
NATO, Soviet support of principles of, U.S. views on address by Winston Churchill, 837, 884, 886
"New look" policy, addresses and statements: Allen, 876; Armstrong, 307; Dulles, 363, 366, 409, 410, 411, 637, 641, 642, 643, 707, 789, 790, 871, 873, 884, 886, 1003, 1004, 1070; Allen Dulles, 758; Eisenhower, 701, 704; Elbrick, 674; Hoover, 1049; Murphy, 168, 170, 373, 556, 647; Nixon, 1043; Wilcox, 495, 844, 845
Radio broadcasts to, statement (Dulles), 284
Soviet-type dictatorships, statement (Dulles), 1064
Stalin, Josef. *See* Stalin
Tanker *Tuapse*, departure of former crew members from U.S., 765
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Plant protection convention, international, 1080
Telecommunication convention, international (1952), 356
U.N. Commission on the Status of Women, Soviet representative, 1033
U.N. membership, Soviet position, 97, 111, 112, 113
U.N. refugee program, Soviet efforts for forced repatriation, 99
U.N. technical assistance program, Soviet policy of inconvertibility, 397
U.S. claims against. *See under* Claims
U.S. relations with, exchange of correspondence (Eisenhower, Bulganin) and statements (Dulles), 191, 279, 280, 514, 751

Soviet Union—Continued
Visas, U.S.-Soviet exchange of notes regarding issuance to Archbishop Boris and Father Dion, 19
World domination, efforts toward, 231, 232, 375, 452, 834
Spaak, Fernand, 241
Spain:
Industrial progress, address (John Lodge), 379
NATO, question of Spanish membership, 748
Spanish-Moroccan declaration, text, 667
Trade with U.S., address (John Lodge), 126
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Agricultural surpluses, agreements with U.S., 317, 533, 622, 658
Civil aviation convention, international, protocol amending, 1038
Concordat with Vatican, 45, 46
Iberian defense pact with Portugal, 45
Industrial property, convention for the protection of, 440
Parcel post, agreement with U.S., 658
Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, convention, final protocols, regulations of execution, and parcel post and money orders agreements, 398
U.N. specialized agencies, membership in, 46
U.S. aid, 548
U.S. mutual security program, statements: Elbrick, 678; Hollister, 609
U.S. relations with, address (John Lodge), 43
Visit of Foreign Minister to U.S.:
Announcement, 248
Official party, 633
Statements (Dulles, Martin Artajo) and text to joint communique, 666, 667
Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED), General Assembly resolution and U.S. views on proposed establishment, 98, 436
Specialized agencies, U.N. (*see also name of agency*):
Coordination with U.N., statement (Merrow), 140
Importance of the U.N. specialized agencies to the U.N., statement (Wilcox), 480
Soviet attitude toward, and U.S. participation in, address (Wilcox), 497, 498
Spanish membership, 46
Teaching about the U.N. and specialized agencies, statement (Pedersen), 990
U.S. support of, address and message: Eisenhower, 548; Wilcox, 847
Spielman, Herbert, 343
Spiridonova, Mrs. Nina S., 1033
Staff Corps Review Panels, 7th, meeting and functions, 448
Stalin, Josef:
Soviet denunciation of, addresses and statements: Dulles, 637, 642, 707, 1064, 1069; Allen Dulles, 758; Murphy, 556, 557, 558, 648, 719
Soviet production goals, statements by Stalin, 332
Stassen, Harold E., 56, 486
State Department (*see also* Foreign Service):
Budget requirement for fiscal year 1957, excerpt from President's message to Congress and statement (Dulles), 154, 907
Confirmations, 226, 356, 488

tate Department—Continued
Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, functions and delegation of authority, public notice and statement (Dulles), 74, 213
Designations, 142, 270, 356, 398, 488, 954
Director of Administration, American Embassy, Vienna, delegation of authority, public notice, 142
Escapee program, U.S., functions transferred from ICA, announcement and Executive order, 650
Executive Director, American Embassy, Bonn, delegation of authority, public notice, 142
Far Eastern records, access and publication policies, 343
Foreign Service examination announced, 342
Franklin Medal, presentation, 953
Honor awards ceremony, 6th annual, remarks (Dulles, Nixon), 811, 812
ICA, integration within State Department, statement (Dulles), 211
Passport regulations, revisions in, 129
Public Committee on Personnel, report released, 248
Publications. *See under* Publications
Resignations, 356, 658
tate of the Union message, 79
tateless persons and refugees, protocol concerning application of universal copyright convention to works of, 263
tatus lists of international agreements, 822
tatus of forces agreement (NAT), 73
tephanopoulos, Stephanos, 455, 457
trategic materials, U.S. import certificate form, 378
trauss, Franz Josef, 797
trauss, Lewis L., 208, 470, 885
treetcars, U.S. shipment to Korea, 887
treibert, Theodore C., 249
tuart, R. Douglas, 1038
tubbins, Hugh A., 15, 16
tudent-exchange program. *See* Educational exchange
udan:
Independence of, U.S. recognition, 85, 465
U.N. membership, 354
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 694
U.S. Liaison Office in Khartoum, elevation to Embassy status, 356
World Health Organization, constitution, 1038
ugar:
International sugar agreement, 74
Liquid sugar, U.S. tariff increase on imports, 1056, 1057, 1062
U.S. sugar legislation, statements (Eisenhower, Holland), 172, 1016
World production and consumption, adjusting, statement (McLain), 1017
ugar Conference, U.N., U.S. delegation, 947
ukarno, visit to U.S.:
Announcement, 803
Addresses and statements: Dulles, 885; Eisenhower, 927; Nixon, 927; Sukarno, 927, 928, 934
Official party, 939
Letter to President on departure, 1005
UNFED. *See* Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development
Surplus agricultural commodities. *See* Agricultural surpluses
Sweden:
Commemoration of first U.S.-Swedish treaty, statements (Cabot, Undén), 800
Imports from dollar area, removal of restrictions, 1048
Tariff concessions by U.S., GATT, 289
Tariff concessions to U.S., GATT, renegotiation of, 350, 351
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Atomic energy, civil uses, agreements with U.S., 181
Civil aviation convention, international, protocol amending, 1038
GATT, amending protocols, 270, 733, 782, 1081
Ice Patrol, North Atlantic, agreement regarding financial support, 181
Wheat agreement, international, 907
U.S. visa applications cut off for escapees residing in, 1024, 1063
Switzerland:
Heavy water, purchase from U.S., 592
Imports from dollar area, removal of restrictions, 1048
Treaties, agreements, etc:
Civil aviation convention, international, protocol amending, 1038
Copyright convention, universal, 141, 263
Wheat agreement, international, 907
Syria:
Civil aviation convention, international, protocol amending, 1038
Export-Import Bank loan, 597*n*
Israeli military action against Syria. *See under* Near and Middle East
Universal postal convention, 994

Taiwan (*see also* China, Republic of):
Defense of, address and statements: Dulles, 1000, 1065; Robertson, 724, 725
Defense of Quemoy and Matsu Islands in event of attack on, statement (Dulles), 155, 156
Importance to U.S. national security, statement (Dulles), 787
"Renunciation of force" principle, application to Taiwan area, discussions at Geneva ambassadorial talks, 164, 165, 166, 167, 451, 542, 1070
Tani, Masayuki, 467
Tariff policy, U.S. (*see also* Customs *and* Trade agreements):
Acid-grade fluorspar, escape-clause relief held unnecessary, 569
Address (Williams), 978
Cuba, preferential treatment of certain Cuban products, 1057, 1059, 1062
GATT. *See* Tariffs and trade, general agreement on
Hat bodies, fur-felt, increased tariff on imports, 1056, 1057, 1062
Hatters' fur, continuation of duty on, 688
Sugar imports. *See under* Sugar
Tariff reductions, U.S. policy concerning:
Addresses: Coe, 430; Thibodeaux, 25
President's economic report to Congress, 253, 254
Tuna, canned in brine, increase in duty, proclamation, 654

Tariff policy, U.S.—Continued
Woolen and worsted fabrics, notice of hearing on tariff negotiations, 351
Tariffs, customs. *See* Customs
Tariffs and trade, general agreement on:
Addresses: Armstrong, 303; Prochnow, 531; Thibodeaux, 25; Weeks, 768, 769
Declaration on continued application of schedules, 1080
Germany, Federal Republic of, agreement with U.S. concerning tariff concessions on motion picture films, text, 814
Germany, Federal Republic of, removal of restrictions on imports from dollar area, 1048
Japan, protocol on terms of accession, 38, 106, 270, 356, 782
Organizational amendments, protocol of, 38, 441, 658, 1080
OTC. *See* Trade Cooperation, Organization for
Procès verbal of rectification concerning the protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX, protocol amending preamble and Parts II and III, and protocol of organizational amendments, 953, 1081
Protocols amending, 38, 441, 658, 1080
Rectification to French text, protocol of, 38, 356, 441, 782, 1081
Rectifications and modifications to annexes and texts of schedules, 4th protocol, 38, 356, 658, 1080
Rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules, 5th protocol, 622, 733, 907, 1081
Renegotiation of tariff concessions between U.S. and—
Austria, Ceylon, Cuba, the Netherlands, and Sweden, 350
India, Netherlands Antilles, New Zealand, Nicaragua, and Pakistan, 26
Supplementary concessions, 6th protocol, 941, 1081
Tariff negotiations at Geneva between contracting parties:
Advisers to U.S. delegation and purpose of negotiations, 96
Statement (Prochnow) concerning U.S. participation and U.S. delegation, 184
Results of negotiations:
Address (Kalijarvi), 1016
Advisers report to the President, 813
Announcement and text of proclamation, 1054, 1057
President's message to Congress, 1062
U.S. participation in:
Address (Thibodeaux), 849, 851
President's economic report to Congress, excerpt, 254
U.S. tariff concessions to—
Norway, 125; Sweden, 289
U.S. tariff negotiations with—
Finland, France, and the Dominican Republic, 687
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Federation of, 262
Technical aid to foreign countries. *See* Economic and technical aid
Technical assistance, U.N. *See under* United Nations
Technical assistance in the field of human rights, promotion of the status of women, 1035
Technical Committee on Travel Plant, 223
Technical cooperation activities in civil aviation, agreement with Colombia, 865
Technical Cooperation Administration (*see also* International Cooperation Administration), organizational structure, 212
Technical cooperation program, U.S. *See* Economic and technical aid
Technical information and patent rights for defense purposes, agreements for exchange of, with—
Belgium, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, and U.K., 104, 577; Germany, Federal Republic of, 104, 142, 577; Japan, 104, 577, 578; Turkey, 952, 953
Technical Property Committee for Defense, Interagency, 577
Technical Property Committees, functions, 105, 577
Telecommunications:
Color television, demonstrations for visitors to U.S., 428
Telecommunication convention, international (1952), current actions, 106, 355, 533, 658, 782, 994, 1080
Telecommunication Union, International, establishment and functions, 481, 483
Telegraph services, U.S.–U.K. discussions concerning, 981
Television, color, demonstrations for visitors to U.S., 428
Territorial waters and related matters:
Inter-American Council of Jurists, 3d meeting, texts of resolutions, and U.S. declaration and reservation, 296, 298, 299
Inter-American specialized conference on conservation of natural resources: continental shelf and marine waters, U.S. delegation, text of resolution, and U.S. statement for final act, 487, 894, 897
Textile exports, Japanese, question of protective restrictions by U.S.:
Statements (Dulles), 14, 638, 712, 921
Texts of notes, 728
Thailand:
Communist aggression in, 724
Mekong River, request for ICA survey, 52
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Atomic energy, civil uses of, agreement with U.S., 534, 590, 622
Collisions at sea, regulations for preventing, 1038
Tin concentrates, agreement with U.S. on sale and purchase of, 622
U.S. aid, 381, 788
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 226
Visit of U.S. atomic expert, 509
Thayer, Robert H., 226
Thermal-power development in Japan, Export-Import Bank loan, 888
Thibodeaux, Ben H., 22, 848
Three-power declaration of 1950, U.S. position on, statement (Dulles), 711
Tin concentrates, agreement with Thailand for sale and purchase of, 622
Tiselius, Arne, 801
Tobacco, U.S. export prospects, 1019, 1020, 1022
Tobacco and military dependents' housing, agreement with U.K., 1081
Togoland, British and French, future status of:
Statements: Bell, 100; Gerig, 36
U.N. resolutions, 38, 98, 102
Togoland, French, progress in the territory of, statement (Gerig), 573

ng, Hollington K., 1004
ukan, Tayslr A., 85
urism. *See* Travel, international
ade (*see also* Agricultural surpluses; East-West trade; Economic policy and relations, U.S.; Exports, U.S.; Imports; Tariff policy, U.S.; Tariffs and trade, general agreement on; Trade agreements; *and* Trade Cooperation, Organization for):
Brazil, trade with, address (Nixon), 337
International trade, stabilization of, address (Dulles), 744
Japan, U.S. trade mission to, 974
Japanese textile exports to U.S., question of protective restrictions by U.S.:
Statements (Dulles), 14, 638, 712, 921
Texts of notes, 728
Japanese trade problems, address (Eisenhower), 704
Promoting international flow of goods and capital, excerpts from President's economic report to Congress, 253, 257
Spain, expanding U.S. trade with, address (John Lodge), 126
Trade controls in Far East, U.S.–British views on, joint statement (Eisenhower, Eden), 234
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Address (Thibodeaux), 23
Commercial samples and advertising material, international convention to facilitate importation of, 440, 1038
Friendship, commerce and navigation, treaties with—Germany, Federal Republic of, 907; Netherlands, 621, 622; Nicaragua, 174, 181
U.K.–Communist China trade, statement (Dulles), 924
U.S. foreign trade policy, addresses and statements: Armstrong, 302, 306, 307; Coe, 429; Eisenhower, 705; Holland, 1006; Kalijarvi, 1014; McLain, 1017; Weeks, 767; Williams, 977
World trade development, addresses: Hoover, 1051; Thibodeaux, 848
rade agreements, with—
Ecuador, extension of 1938 agreement, proclamation, 180, 181
Iceland, agreement amending 1943 agreement, 578
rade Agreements Extension Acts, 96, 253, 353, 1056, 1057
rade Cooperation, Organization for:
Agreement on, signatures, 38, 441, 533, 1080
Functions, address and statements: Dulles, 472; Kalijarvi, 1014; Prochnow, 531; Weeks, 476
U.S. membership, question of:
Addresses and statements: Armstrong, 303; Dulles, 472; Thibodeaux, 851; Weeks, 476, 768
President's messages to Congress, excerpts, 81, 154, 254
Report to the President by nongovernmental advisers to the U.S. delegation negotiating tariff agreements in Geneva, excerpt, 814
rade fairs and missions, U.S. participation in, address (Williams), 978, 979
rade-marks, protection of American rights abroad, address (Thibodeaux), 24
ransport system in Burma, International Bank loan for improvement of, 889
Travel, international (*see also* Passports *and* Visas):
Hotel development in Latin America, problems of, 223
Hungary, U.S. restrictions on travel of American citizens in, 248
Private road vehicles, customs convention on temporary importation of, 73, 440, 658, 782, 864
Road traffic, convention on, with annexes and protocol, 317, 355
Touring, convention concerning customs facilities for, 73, 440, 658, 782, 864
Western Hemisphere, travel development in the, article (Kelly), 1029
Western Hemisphere, U.S. tourist expenditures in, address (Holland), 1009
Travel Congress, Inter-American, 6th, meeting and U.S. delegation, article (Kelly), 657, 1029
Treaties, agreements, etc., international (*for specific treaty, see country or subject*):
Agreements under the U.N. Charter, address (Wilcox), 844, 845
Agricultural surpluses agreements, address (Armstrong), 304
Atomic energy, bilateral agreements for cooperation in peaceful uses of, excerpt from report to President, 7
Bipartisan development of, address (Dulles), 999
Commemoration of first U.S.–Swedish treaty, statements (Cabot, Undén), 800
Current actions on, listed, 38, 73, 106, 141, 181, 226, 263, 317, 355, 398, 440, 487, 533, 578, 622, 658, 694, 733, 782, 821, 864, 907, 952, 994, 1038, 1080
Friendship, commerce and navigation, treaties of, importance to American business abroad, address (Thibodeaux), 23
Patent rights and technical information for defense purposes, provisions of agreements for exchange of, 104, 105
Requirements under Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, 132
Status lists, 822
Treaty rights in Morocco, U.S. policy, 204
Troops, U.S. *See* Armed forces
Tropical Tuna Commission, Inter-American, 910
Trust territories, U.N.:
French Cameroons, progress in, statement (Gerig), 730
Nuclear tests in trust territories of the Pacific:
Marshall Islands petition requesting cessation of, 689
U.S. views, statement (Gerig), 576
Ruanda-Urundi, political and economic development, statement (Gerig), 438
Togoland. *See* Togoland
Trusteeship Council, U.N.:
Documents, lists of, 104, 225, 440, 859, 902
Resolution on the future status of Togoland, 38
Tuapse, Soviet tanker, departure of former crew members from U.S., text of U.S. note, 765
Tuna, canned in brine, increase in duty on imports of, proclamation, 654
Tunisia:
FAO membership, 437
French policies in, address (Dillon), 553, 554
French-Tunisian protocol, texts of messages on signing of, 552

Tunisia—Continued
U.S. policy, address and article: Dillon, 553, 554; Howard, 455
World Health Organization, constitution, 1038
Turkey:
Cyprus. *See* Cyprus
Economic development program, address and statement: Allen, 876, 877; Seager, 507
Economic discussions with U.S., 171
Press-control law, statement (Dulles), 1065
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Agricultural surpluses, agreements with U.S., 534, 907
Atomic energy, agreement with U.S., 594
Atomic information, agreement between parties to NAT for cooperation, 622
Baghdad Pact. *See* Baghdad Pact
Bills of lading, international convention (1924) for unification of certain rules relating to, 694
Civil aviation convention, international, protocol amending, 1038
GATT, 6th protocol of supplementary concessions, 1081
Passport visas and visa fees, agreement with U.S. relating to, 441
Patent rights and technical information, agreement with U.S. for exchange for defense purposes, 952, 953
Postal convention, universal, 74
Road traffic, convention on, with annexes and protocol, 317
U.S. aid, 594, 595, 681
U.S. Ambassador, resignation (Avra Warren), 441; confirmation (Fletcher Warren), 488
U.S. mutual security program, statement (Hollister), 611
U.S. visa applications, cutoff date for escapees residing in, 1024, 1063
Visit of U.S. atomic expert, 509
Turkin, Nikolai, 765, 766

Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (*see also* Soviet Union), international telecommunication convention, 356
Undén, Östen, 801
Underdeveloped countries (*see also* Investment of private capital abroad):
Economic assistance to, multilateral approach, address (Wilcox), 115
Economic assistance to, Soviet program of. *See under* Soviet Union
Economic penetration by Communist countries, efforts to combat, addresses: Dulles, 1001; Nixon, 1044
South Asia, economic improvement of, statement (Allen), 878
U.N. technical assistance program. *See under* United Nations
U.S. aid, address and statements: Dulles, 119, 365; Murphy, 965
UNESCO. *See* Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, U.N.
Union of South Africa. *See* South Africa, Union of
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. *See* Soviet Union

United Kingdom:
Anglo-American discussions concerning common principles and world problems:
Agenda, proposed, statements (Dulles), 196, 201, 202
Arrival of Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, remarks (Dulles, Eden, Lloyd), 234, 235
Declaration of Washington, 231
Joint statement (Eisenhower, Eden), text, 232
Texts of addresses by Prime Minister to Congress and transcript of radio-TV address, 235, 237, 239
Atomic energy, U.K. assistance to Baghdad Pact countries for peaceful development of, 18
Atomic weapons, talks with U.S. regarding control of testing of, statement (Dulles), 198
Civil aviation talks with U.S., 374, 528
Cyprus. *See* Cyprus
Disarmament, 4-power (U.S., U.K., Canada, France) declaration of principles relating to, 838
Dispute with Saudi Arabia over Buraimi, 465
Foreign Office records, access policy, 344
Foreign policy, coordination with U.S. policy, address (Aldrich), 798
Heavy water, purchase from U.S., 592
Imports from the dollar area, removal of restrictions on, 1048
Imports of U.S. fruit, address (Thibodeaux), 850
International arbitration and adjudication, U.K. record of, 665
Korea, exchange of notes with Chinese Communists regarding withdrawal of foreign forces from and reunification of, 970
Malaya, Federation of:
Communist aggression in, 724
Independence, U.K. assurance of, 347
Middle East:
Tripartite (U.S., U.K., France) meeting on, 233, 286
U.K. policy in, 459, 460, 461, 462, 799
Telegraph services, discussions with U.S. concerning, 981
Togoland. *See* Togoland
Trade with Communist China, statements (Dulles), 924, 1067
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Atomic energy, agreements with U.S., 1071, 1081
Baghdad Pact (*see also* Baghdad Pact), agreement with Iraq under the, 17
External debts of the City of Berlin and public utility enterprises, agreement relating to, 93, 651, 865
GATT, procès verbal and amending protocols, 733, 1081
Ice Patrol, North Atlantic, financial support agreement, 317
IFC, articles of agreement, 73
OTC, agreement on, 533
Patent rights and technical information for defense purposes, agreement with U.S. for exchange of, 104, 577
Tobacco, sale of, and construction of military dependents' housing and community facilities for use of USAF in U.K., agreement with U.S., 1081
War criminals, penal administrative agreement, 658
U.S. mutual security aid, continuation of, 214
Visit of Prime Minister to U.S. *See* Anglo-American discussions, *supra*

ited Nations:
Addresses and statements:
Importance of the U.N. Specialized Agencies to the United Nations (Wilcox), 480
The Soviet Challenge and the United Nations (Wilcox), 495
Teaching About the U.N. and Specialized Agencies (Pedersen), 990
The United Nations in the Mainstream of History (Wilcox), 841
The United Nations: Some New Perspectives After 10 Years (Wilcox), 111
Atomic energy, actions concerning. *See* Atomic energy, radiation effects on human health; *and* Atomic Energy Agency
Atomic energy library, presentation by U.S., 656
Budget for 1956, analysis and U.S. views, statement (Merrow), 138
Charter. *See* United Nations Charter
Disarmament, efforts for. *See under* Disarmament *and also* United Nations Disarmament Commission
General Assembly. *See* General Assembly
League of Nations, replacement by U.N., 741
Membership question:
Japan and Sudan, U.S. views on, statements (Lodge), 354
U.S. position and Soviet use of veto, addresses and statements: Dulles, 12; Lodge, 97, 354; Wilcox, 111, 112, 113
Near and Middle East, U.N. role in settlement of disputes in. *See* Arab-Israeli dispute *and* Near and Middle East
Publications. *See under* Publications
SEATO Council, support of U.N. by member governments of, 447
Security Council. *See* Security Council
Specialized agencies. *See* Specialized agencies *and name of agency*
Technical assistance program:
Address and statements: Bell, 486; Hays, 99; Wilcox, 115, 116, 483
U.S. contributions, 120, 310, 794
U.S. support of, address, article, and statement: Howard, 593, 601; Kotschnig, 395; Wilcox, 846, 847
Trust territories. *See* Trust territories *and* Trusteeship Council
U.S. support of, 81
nited Nations, U.S. Committee for the, chairman, 732
nited Nations Administrative Tribunal, judicial review of judgments, General Assembly approval, 99
nited Nations Charter:
Development and enforcement of international law under the U.N., 741, 742
Evolution of, and collective security under, address (Wilcox), 843, 845
Review of, address (Wilcox) and U.N. action at 10th General Assembly, 98, 116
U.S. and Soviet obligations under, letters (Eisenhower, Bulganin) and draft Soviet treaty with U.S., 191, 194, 195
nited Nations Command (Korea), withdrawal of NNSC teams from South Korea, statement and exchange of notes, 967, 970
United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 12th session, report (Lord) and resolutions on annual reports and on studies of specific rights, 984, 989, 990
United Nations Commission on the Status of Women, 10th session, article (Hahn), 1033
United Nations Disarmament Commission:
50th meeting, statement (Lodge), 222
Indian proposal for enlargement of, U.S. position, statement (Lodge), 68
U.S. delegate to subcommittee meetings in London, 486
United Nations Economic and Social Council. *See* Economic and Social Council, U.N.
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe:
Coal Committee, meeting and U.S. delegation, 1079
U.S. representative to 11th session, confirmation, 592
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. *See* Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. *See* Food and Agriculture Organization
United Nations Fund for Economic Development, Special (SUNFED), General Assembly resolution and U.S. views on proposed establishment of, 98, 436
United Nations Refugee Fund:
Executive Committee, U.S. delegates to 2d and 3d sessions, 225, 948
U.S. contributions, 590, 1077
United Nations Relief and Works Agency, aid to Palestine refugees, 31, 33
United Nations Scientific Committee on Effects of Atomic Radiation, 1st meeting, article (Warren) and U.S. delegation, 533, 860
United Nations Sugar Conference, U.S. delegation, 947
United Nations Trusteeship Council. *See* Trusteeship Council, U.N.
United States citizens and nationals, protection of:
Communist China, detention and release of U.S. civilians. *See* Geneva ambassadorial talks
Jordan, U.S. representations against mob violence in Amman and the Jordan-occupied sector in Jerusalem, 85
United States Committee for the United Nations, chairman, 732
United States Escapee Program, 650, 1024
United States Information Agency, 251, 252
United States service academies, designation of foreign students to, Executive order, 528
Universal copyright convention, 141, 263, 865, 1036
Universal postal convention, 73, 141, 398, 994
Universal Postal Union (UPU), establishment and functions, 481, 483
Upton, Robert W., 210
Uranium resources of Chile, agreement with Chile for cooperative program of investigations of, 865
Uri, Pierre, 241
Uruguay:
Atomic energy, civil uses of, agreement with U.S. for cooperation, 141, 142
Collisions at sea, regulations for preventing, 622
Military assistance, agreement with U.S. for disposition of equipment and materials, 994
Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, convention, final protocols, regulations of execution, and parcel post and money orders agreements, 398

Uruguay—Continued
Technical cooperation, agreement with U.S., 694
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 658
U.S.S.R. *See* Soviet Union

Van Langenhove, Fernand, 64
Vatican City State, international wheat agreement, 907
Venezuela:
Geneva conventions (1949), 907
Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, convention, final protocols, regulations of execution, and parcel post and money orders agreements, 398
Safety of life at sea, convention on, 622
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 658
Ver Duin, Claude, 374
Vessels. *See* Ships and shipping
Veto power in Security Council. *See* Security Council: Membership question
Vicchi, Adolfo A., 7
Viet-Nam:
Economic progress, 447
Mekong River, request for ICA survey, 52
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Collisions at sea, regulations for preventing, 1038
Customs facilities for touring, convention concerning, 440
Economic cooperation, agreement with U.S. providing for direct forces support, 694
Equipment and materials, agreement with U.S. providing for disposition of, 694
Private road vehicles, customs convention concerning temporary importation of, 440
Telecommunication convention, international, and final and additional protocols, 533
U.N. membership, U.S. position on question of, 113
U.S. aid, 208, 725, 839
U.S. policy, address (Robertson), 972
Visas:
Archbishop Boris and Father Louis Dion, U.S.–Soviet notes concerning issuance of visas to, 19
Nonimmigrant visas, agreements relating to, with—
Dominican Republic, 270; Iceland, Iraq, 1081; Panama, 1038; South Africa, Union of, 782
Passport visas and visa fees, agreements relating to, with—
China, Republic of, 694; Pakistan, 142; Turkey, 441
U.S., issuance under Refugees Relief Act, 468, 775, 1063
U.S. visa applications, cutoff dates for refugees and displaced persons announced:
Chinese ethnic refugees, 810
Far East, refugees indigenous to, 568
Greece and Italy, refugees in, 16
NATO countries of continental Europe, Turkey, Sweden, and Iran, escapees residing in, 1024
Polish refugees, 940
Statement (Dulles), 1063
Voight, Lester P., 374
Volta Redonda, Brazil, industrial progress in, 336
Von Brentano, Heinrich, 210

Wadsworth, James J.:
Address, letter, and statements:
Atomic Energy Agency, International, 852, 898
Atomic radiation, effects on human health, 98
Economic aid, 117*n*
Palestine question and aid to Arab refugees, 31, 32, 35, 98, 1026, 1028
Designation as U.S. representative to International Atomic Energy Agency negotiations, 210
Wan Waithayakon, 590
Wang Ping-nan, 52, 164, 165, 451, 1070
War criminals, penal administrative agreement, 658
War memorials, agreement with France relating to grants of land located in France, 694
War victims, Geneva conventions (1949) relative to protection and treatment of, 907
Warren, Avra M., 441
Warren, Fletcher, 488
Warren, George L., 944
Warren, Shields, 98, 533, 860
Warsaw Pact, admittance of Eastern Germany, 334
Washington, Declaration of:
Addresses and article: Eden, 236, 237, 239, 240; Howard 604
Text, 231
Water resources, international development of, statement (Baker) and text of ECOSOC resolution, 949, 951
Waters, territorial. *See* Territorial waters
Waters, U.S.–Canadian boundary, joint study proposed, 940
Weather. *See* Meteorology
Weeks, Sinclair, 476, 766, 767
Welensky, Sir Roy, 552
Wells, Oris V., 436
West Africa. *See individual countries*
West New Guinea, dispute between Netherlands and Indonesia concerning, address (Sukarno), 930
Western Hemisphere, U.S. exports to, address (Thibodeaux), 850
Whaling convention, international, amendments to schedule, 865
Wheat, distribution of U.S. surpluses for use in overseas and domestic programs, 53, 1019, 1020, 1021, 1022, 1023
Wheat agreement, international, 907
White, Lincoln, 367, 505
White slave traffic, multilateral agreement for repression of, 578
White Sulphur Springs Meeting. *See* Heads of Government meeting (U.S., Canada, Mexico)
Whittenberger, James, 527
WHO. *See* World Health Organization
Wilcox, Francis O., 111, 480, 495, 841
Wilkins, J. Ernest, 949, 1036
Williams, Walter, 977
Wilson, Thomas B., 1079
Wilson, Woodrow:
Centennial year, proclamation, 806
Ideals of, address (Robertson), 805
Witman, William II, 142
WMO. *See* World Meteorological Organization

Women, economic opportunities for, article (Hahn), 1033
Women, inter-American convention on granting of political rights to, 865
Women, U.N. Commission on the Status of, 10th session, article (Hahn), 1033
Woolen fabrics, notice of hearing on tariff negotiations, 351
World Bank. *See* International Bank
World Health Assembly. *See under* World Health Organization
World Health Organization:
Constitution of the, 1038
Establishment and functions, 481, 482, 483
Executive Board, appointment of U.S. representatives, 210
World Health Assembly, 9th, meeting and U.S. delegation, 862
World Meteorological Organization:
Convention of the, 141, 398
Establishment and functions, 481, 483
World Power Conference, meeting and U.S. delegation, 1078
World trade week, 1956, proclamation, 686
Worsted fabrics, notice of hearing on tariff negotiations, 351
Wounded and sick, Geneva conventions (1949) on treatment in time of war, 907
Wriston, Henry M., 248, 651, 953
Wriston Committee. *See* Public Committee on Personnel

Yemen Development Corporation, concession to, 597
Yugoslavia:
Arms supply to Egypt, question of, statements (Dulles), 196, 197
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Agricultural surpluses, agreement with U.S. amending 1955 agreement, 317
Cultural property, convention and protocol for protection in event of armed conflict, and regulations of execution, 440
Customs, agreement with U.S. for reciprocal privileges for consular officers, 994
Economic assistance, agreement with U.S., 317
German external debts, agreement on, 733
Wheat agreement, international, 907
U.S. military and economic aid, 199, 348, 548, 609, 679

Zephirin, Mauclair, 163

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